NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 8

Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 8

ML16071A176
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, Vogtle, Farley
Issue date:	03/03/2016
From:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16071A108	List: ML16071A110 ML16071A126 ML16071A132 ML16071A136 ML16071A137 ML16071A140 ML16071A144 ML16071A146 ML16071A147 ML16071A149 ML16071A150 ML16071A152 ML16071A153 ML16071A158 ML16071A160 ML16071A166 ML16071A170 ML16071A174 ML16071A176 ML16071A180 ML16071A181 ML16071A184 ML16071A185 ML16071A187 ML16071A188 ML16071A193 ML16071A195 ML16071A198 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 1 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 2 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 3 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 4 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 7 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 8 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 4 ... further results
References
NL-15-1898
Download: ML16071A176 (52)

Text

/Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2;Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2;Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2;License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 5 Marked-Up EAL Schemes Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 5 Farley Marked-Up EAL Schemes FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITIONS, THJRESHOLD VALUES, AND BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS I REGULATORY BACKGROUND

............................................................

I.1.1 OPERATING REACTORS ............................................................................

1 1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)............................I 1.3 NRCORDEREA-12-051.....................................................................

2 1.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF GENERIC INFORMATION.......................

12 1.5 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY

...........................................................

13 2 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS

............................

21 2.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

....................................................................

21 2.2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY

.............................................................

22 2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS

...............................

22 2.4 CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION........................

22 2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS................................................

23 2.6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING..............23 2.7 CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS .................................................

24 2.8 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS

...............................................

24 2.9 AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION

........25 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS .................

26 4 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS...............

51 5 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS..........

78 6 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS ...............................................

I8 7 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS.....110 S SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS....................................................

137 APPENDIX A -ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS........................................

A-I APPENDIX B -DEFINITIONS

.................................................................

B-I

OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND 1.1 OPERATING REACTORS Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Energy, contains the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations that apply to nuclear power facilities.

Several of these regulations govern various aspects of an emergency classification scheme. A-re4'iew-eoft Ihe relevant sections libtcd belzwv will aid thc reader in:..-raanding e ter., inalagy ...... avd in Sctin. 3.0 offor this document, arc:* 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(1)(i)

• 10 CFR § 50.47(b)(4)

• 10 CFR § 50.54(q)* 10 CFR § 50.72(a)* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.B, Assessment Actions* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.C, Activation of Emergency Organization Theab 1e hose regulations are supplemented by guidance documents.

44e-l)ocuments of particular relevance to NEI 99-01 areinclude:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1980. [Refer to Appendix 1, Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants]NUREG- 1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR § 50. 72 and § 50. 73 Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactorsl his list is not all-inclusive. is strongly recommended that scheme developers consult with licensing!

and regulatory compliance personnel to identify and understand all applicable requirements and guidance.

Questions ffay-also niay be directed to the NEI Emergency Preparedness staff.1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)Selected guidance in NEI 99-01 is applicable to licensees electing to use their 10 CFR 50 emergency plan to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32 for a stand-alone ISFSI. The emergency classification levels applicable to an ISFSI are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR § 50 and the guidance in NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1.

The initiating conditions germane to a 10 CFR § 72.32 emergency plan (as described in NUREG-1567) are aubumed-contained within the classification scheme for a 10 CFR §50.47 emergency plan.The generic ICs and EALs for an ISFSI are presented in Section 85, ISFSI ICs/EALs.

IC E-HU 1 covers natural and man-made events included within the scope of an ISFSI design. This IC is not applicable to installations or facilities that may process and/or repackage spent fuel. a Manitar.ad R oric... l, Scr .... Faciit ...an 1SFS! at. a pent fu:el precezi:ng facility).

.............

dditonally, appropriate aspects of IC HU!I and IC HAl should also be included to address a HOSTILE ACTION directed against an ISFSI.The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1 140, A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.

NUREG-1 140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to public health and safety. This evaluation shows that the maximum offsite dose to a member of the public due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem Effective Dose Equivalent.

Re.arding th. a.c+ ' inf... : m-tien,:_

the ..........

c" for an effhite reeponee te an Alnert claeeified uander a 10 CFP. § 72.32 emergency plan are generally ceneictent

-;ith thece for r..uire fcra 10. CFR § 72.32 ..m.rg.n.. plan ic diffcernt than that prescribed fcr a 10 1.3 NRC ORDER EA-12-051 The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 11, II, was the result of a tsunami that exceeded the plant's design basis and flooded the site's emergency electrical power supplies and distribution systems. This caused an extended loss of power that severely compromised the key safety functions of core cooling and containment integrity, mafd ultimately led-Jeading to core damage in three reactors.

W¥hile-Although the loss of power also impaired the spent fuel poo1 cooling function, sufficient water inventory was maintained in the pools to tf-e1d~e-prevent fuel damage from the loss of cooling.Following a review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the NRC concluded that several measures were necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50. 109(a)(4)(ii).

Amon g them t,'ore pro,,4de )ne such measure wvas that each spent fuel pool be prov idcd with reliable level instrumentation to significantly enhance the ability of key decision-makers to efkt~ci',cly allocate resources effect~'ely-following a beyond design basis event. To this end, the NRC issued Order EA- 12-051, Issuance of Order to Modi~fy Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, on March 12, 2012, to all U.S. nuclear plants with an operating license, construction permit, or combined construction and operating license.NRC Order EA- 12-051 states, in part, "All licensees

... shall have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following poo1 water level conditions by trained personnel:

(1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred." To this-erd-e AII licensees must therefobre provide:* A primary and back-up level instrument that will monitor water level from the normal 2 level to the top of the used fuel rack in the pool;* A display in an area accessible following a severe event; and* Independent electrical power to each instrument channel and pfe.vide-an alternate remote power connection capability.

NEI 12-02, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

", provides guidance for complying with NRC Order EA-12-05 1.NEI 99-01, Revision 6, includes three EALs that reflect the availability of the enhanced spent fuel pooi level instrumentation associated with NRC Order EA-12-05 1. These EALs are included within existing IC RA2, and new ICs RS2 and RG2. Associated EAL notes, bases and developer notes are also provided.It is recommended that these EALs be implemented when the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation is available for use.The regulatory process that licensees follow to make changes to their emergency plan, including non-scheme changes to EALs, is 10 CFR 50.54(q).

In acczrdance wi'th thi5 regu.l-t~cefi, Licensees are responsible for evaluating a proposed change and determining whether or not it results in a reduction in the effectiveness of the plan. a, result cfthe lie 1eesascd on this determination, the licensee will either make the change or submit it to the NRC for prior review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.3

............

A.1 Khi TigHINULm U !l5KU IN CIl 33 01 There are ceveral key terme that appear threughaut the NFl 99 01 methadelegy.

Th~.terme are intreduced in thie ecetien te zuppert underztandir.g efsabeequent material.

Ae an aid to the reader, the fcllcwing table ic provided az an overview tc il!uatrate the relationahip ef the termc te each other.Emergency Claccifienfien Level Unacual~ve*4+ + + +.+ - -+ -- 4-4i regeiiey -Eiefe.... -l... , Eefgencey

-Emergenle, (1) Whenc, m!ak'ing a. !emergecy cacnd:fg atien the Emergety, airet: utcnie all, norma,:,n having af Unusing onteE rprvceeent ofaIitatnUEndt)n Ti Appl....bil.ty, Naetyc ae the i~nf ormingdaicat infcrmatie,,n

.... .n th:e.....

Reregnitien Caegr F'=.., matri"ca E-- e ..... r-- f rred te ac Fi...... Pred.... Ba}r~rir Threah- ldt : t* h.h .* .r,.r....t.

...m e..... t....... an.... ....... ... .... cfc..".n !g'. .. ...2,.1 ^CE ..... ;r C.... NOUE a~nd U LE: EL (e CL.....) !tr.-::gabytr::hu t On c aat fne o tt ~abrd y h U Ncea RglaerCmma4c initat.. NoA r,. aeo o motrial

..r ogurig rcpnc °mniorn+ar pectd ulac futhe deradtio ofeafty yctme cecurs.2.1.2 life hreatening risk sit. c.........

or damage !t sit eupm t beas of HOSTILE re~adilay av'ailable to reoapond if the situ-ation beegmes more se~rious or to perform conirmtor rad... in:. m.n..r.. if.-. res"u.....

a.nd provi... onffei!te authoritiesc current 2.1.3 Site Arca Emergency n;'en."S -are ,in pr'ogriess or" nave' o.eeurroe~

wnlein invi,;OVc or1 liKe~ly majr" Ox load to the, likel!y fallur of. 2) that prvn ........ e aces......to

.. equipm.nt.needed for Purposc Te: 2.. purpose, ofthe, Site, Are~a Emergene~y d.e~elaratico is to asur:.e, that°m............................

staffd to asur tamoitoring t....... dispthe a.to 2.1.1 Ge~neral Emergency (CE)ore dgadation, or meltin ..ith pcte......

for los of .... nta...n....

integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical coentrole of'the, facility, can be.th ia'censee by a ffet! orgaen~ization~al e~aureoentsd to ini-tiateiadditionalft easuhritesa

..y actual or " pthentalrela---

t ro decoslttonwthoeteathrti 5

3.2 I' ITIATINC CONDITIO (IC)An, eenrt or ccn~dition t.hat aligne w,.ith the definition of one of the four emergency lncit-'::-'-..,..

cati.on l.... by virt"ue"...

of the potential or actual effects cr consequenec.

of which m"aete the definition of mn emergency cl!ccification le've. An' IC eno be Appcndix I ofNUP.EG 0651 does not contain eornple Emergency Action Le-elc (ALe)frah

........ ut.. ath..r.. !itiating Cnditionc i.e., pl'n ......oo a th... indic:ate..

whi...., if........d w u.. d. initiat...th.

emergency clac.....

io..... h...... it .... the .....instru-ment readings that would b the EALc.Considerations

--o f .r.the a ..ignm .n of peailclrliitigCniintoa!mrec classification le;vel are discussed in Section 3.2.3 Ac°T:orN LE"'u. (EALt A pr det....e cite epeci....

obser ..bl. threehold~

for an Initiating Condition that, when --" etor_.e.xceeded....

pace.... the pantu in..... a g ....n emrec cacit......l.el 2.4 Fissio'N PRoDUcT BARRIER TH:RES:IoLD-A pro determined, cite specific, oboervable threohold indicating the Ipso or potential locc of a fission product barrier.Diacu~sionz Ficcion product b~icr thresholdc reprecent threate to the defonce in depth decign concept that precludes the release of radioactivo ficcion products to the environment.

This concept relioc on multiple physica! b~ierc, any one of which, it maintained intact, precludee the release of significant amounto of radioactive ficcion preductc to the environment.

The prim~' ficcion product b~iers ~: E-4*ie4-eI*~d U Reactor Coolant Syctem (RCS)U-Cei~teiHffien~

Upon determination that one or more fission product barrier thresholds have been exceeded, the combination of barrier losc and/or potential bce thresholds ic compared to the fiosion product barrier IC,~AL criteria to determine the appropriate ECL.In come accident sequer.oec, the ICc and EALc precented in the Abnormal 6 r...............

.........h...rmr I~ adi .... raiatvty rleze th... t.re...u.t in ecrtan zilsit ,e= docc fro w~hatc'.'er cauce. includr.ng c;'entz that might not be fully 7 A mi ammm AA Ad An ............

emergency c........

cationT heme muet incorporatec a realicctien andem a.t.m......t..k an. app.....a.

balan.c.-

btcc:'en reaconably an'ticipated,..

...... or codtiequstn:.

coneunee.t paotentia accide~nt trajctris,5 paced riscr cavodc or?"Th The,,r.., ..........

a ng o *...nn .. emrec ....n.. frpoedt the US Nuep cltofECL* Assessments Cf the effect: and cons:cquenc:

eeoid4Itefs

5 of different types of event= and* Typical ,an emergency

... oprtn ......ur set......

and^ tr..ansitio I Typical Technical Specification and controls* R~adiologcacl Effiluent Technical Spcifications, ..R...),'f...........Calculati.n

• Review;' of selected Updated Final! Safet. Analysist=.+

Report (UF R

• ...., NU -EG -,, ndix. I, £.r......

Aa,.cx ........! Gu'iddhc/fc.

r),%clr Po.;v'v*I ndustr' Operating Experience

• Iinput from industry subject ma...er.e.pe...

an N~RC staff-member The. fo,,lowing ECL attributes

-. ere create.d by the I P.*Lioin 6 Prep.aration Team= to a:d inthe a*.t.ribute in r'.isin since they may be .... in b.:rifn and. taining:-s-..tting:s" (e-.+., helpin-.g=:" an Emergency Director understand why a particular condl~itio is cl.Jassfied aean Alert). It shauld be strenced that dev'elopers not attempt to redefin:e t-haes attrbute o... r appsly them in any fashion that.... woul chng th.. geei"udnc o ie in this doeument~

..i n"c~rpa*,a tkz ECL a*,t.-i~tz rite their seIhem: ta:t d ........, i" ,run b- :'r.1 elzzr *,h= tI: NRC .......aO*z.dt p hiityz a:

fc: a::; x.rp:. tr..." pr-- .................

.... zz-oidr ,t-: 8 The attributes of each ECL arc presented bclow.3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Lent ~NOUE)( AA precursor to a more significant

.........r condtin (C, .... .oeucc .............

sigr.htieaan though.t..........n.ti....t..n.t..l..al, .......n.3.l.2 ^ 'e" An no deined:. in sec..ion 2.1.2, ineludes but is not limitdtoan e....nt (B) An event or condition that significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of thc fuel clad or R.CS fissio produc bar.. (C) A significant loss of con..o of r*=adioacti.

m ........ r....ultin in an: inability to control radiation le-vels ",ithin thc plant, or a rclec~z of radioacti-ve matcrialo to thc thvionmete thtcul cuunndse ratrtan1 fanEAPA tor.ynA HOSTILE ACTION occun ring within thc OWN..ER CON.TROLLED AREA, Inde....n Spc+ nt Fue! Storage Installation+

..... ,.includina those direcetd at an 3.1.3 Sitc Area Emergcncy (B) A p ................

or condtio tat+ may lead to: the= 105 or poc..... lose multiple fission product b-.i.ers within a relativ'ely short period of time. Prec-,rar ents and conditions of this t)e include those that challcnge "f.he monitoring

-,nd./or control af multpe .....' system....(C) A release raiade aeil to. the .enironment tha could. reult.. i+ n do...e .grea than ,0%of an+ EPA ,AG- at or beon the.. it.boundar..., 9 (A) Locs:+' : of any' tw.o fiectien prodJut! barriers AND or potential .bce° of the third barric: ful, ela~ R.CS anM/or c.ontainment.

directly to co~re damage a.nd Ieee of containment integrity.

than- an EP'A at or beye.d*+ thc site boud.... +-+[(D)+A HOSCTlIE ACTION reultin in.1;. "hc -ieee lof e ct"af....

funct. 4..ione-- (rc.ti't, control, Emergency preparedncee ic a defence "n depth meacure that :ic independent of+ the EALc alc concidered ineights from cev'eralite s'cp+eific probabi!ietice cafety asceccmcnte (PSA. alec k..... ac probabi:letic rick aececement, PP).) Som .....r.. incighte.+

frm 1....... Acdn ec...n.....in..l.i.g

-... rloge ........all.AC poe ..... cignificant

..n..butor to.. core.. damage frequncey at many" Preecurized ater ....actore. ECL of Site Area Emergency.

Precu"'eor evente tea ae: of all AC poerw= :ere alco Reguat,, ....ide"'+ 1.155, ..........., .7y .........d..........i.

ehac criterion to demarcate betw'een a Site Area Emergency and a General Emergency.

The tiedmnini ritical to a prcperly+.+

antiipaor emergency*+.

declaration sincg ....ol-- lis-- tomxmz h .im .avial for.. Stat and, local officials to+ d.... lop ++. nd<implemet+:--+

ithe protective M..÷.-A.... 2 For ceverei core. daag e;'ent,iiw, uncertaintie exict in phenomena imp+.ortant accident,,O progeeon1e leadingI Becaceo thecell unertir.tie r r 10

3. PSAc indicated that Ieadin~ contributore to latent fotalitiec were ccouencec involving b.ypace, a largo Loec of Cveoolat-Aeetea....th...i.. spe.i.i. copring consainmeni raiiure. a ~satIon IiIOCKOUT iaorrnr ioncer ir perroc, ana a reactor coolant pump seat sailure. I ne generic LAL metnoooicgy neeas v to ac eutticiently rigorouc to acorese tfleee cc uencec in a timely rasnion.3..: I 01 "0.DNI':i'.r' AM) Lft.[IICL.U.

ANcr LE".[LS The- N.r:,t 9.. 0,1 methodology m.akec uce anf cymptom barri......d.an Fie t bsedIcan pedc o-irhedIsad EALe.arEathetsubset df symptdmbbae.

normal," reatr operatoeay wil imlhent pr..'ofch!edure to idetif the:.. prbab- eagain:).and Th~e harrier ba;ed lCc a~nd EALe consider the level of challenge to eac~h individual ba!r-rier po.ntil. lo.st... and ...t ad the total numbe o.. f barrier under challenge.

made hasarde such as a to~xic gas 3.i ~ DrstcN DWT1~RENCES difeenc btwc ......an ,WRSS) c .... by eecf in g Lk nijue mto& ' each t.....Nuleaer- Ste~am Supply Sycte ....S. ...h.e.a.......g............diferno

..ong PWR NSSSc: therefor-e, guidance is pro--vided to aid in the. d;evelome~nt of EALe..p....riote to different PWP. NSSS typ-ecu ........Whr nc ,cr,. developmn guidance ;al...o.addee unique.. con... iderations-for non reac~tor designs such as the (APWR) aund. the Evolutio....na

..o.er Rator .....,t I revel.p..

will... nee to conside the., relevant aspects of their plant's decigin and operating char'acteristics

-.when econverting the generic, guidSanc~e of this docu"ment into a the intent of generic oan EAL wit.. in the. ..ons..aints impoead by the .plant design rand operating characte~ristiecs.

To thic end, developaeers fa sche~me for an advanc..ecd non The guidana-ce in NEI 99 01 ic net applicablec to advaned light ",ater rea..ctor 11

• I~-aeeefea*~ee4%

~e1~-,4dvane~

ithN ~E! 07 01, Mc-:rcx+L ;g1. ILeter r:agyco.'-c~

Le"' prnn: 0t

,1ecr:cn 3.41.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF The scheme's geI,,ieinformation is organized by Recognition Category in the following order.R -Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent S.eetiein-6 C -Cold Shutdown!/

Refueling System Malfunction -Se~ieii7 E -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) -Seetieft-8 F -Fission Product Barrier -Seetie, n 9 H -Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety -Sect~on !S -System Malfunction -Sceft-nl 1 The fc.low;ing information and guidan'ce ic pro.;'ided fcr ac+h IC:* ECL the assigned emergency clecsifieati.on level for the !C.U Initiating Co-diti'n pro-videc a summary dsrito .... the. emergen........t..

or E2AL) app+--licable (ie,+ ar to be u,,cd to elaccy or conditiono)..-

ac.... ed i.c--t ...... tatio r.... ic no-t avai;loble at the plant), the z-I'chcp.r

...hould1 Forjrr Recognition F, the ficcion. product, barrier thr.shohlds are precented+

in degree of barrier challenge (i.e., potential+'" loss' ..r. lo.ws,.° This presen~tatin method H Basis Proyides background informati.on that explains the internt and application of t.he .... and" EA.... ^ °in some ceaes, the basis als0 includes rele;'ant source infc"m~ation

• Dev.eloepr.-o.o N .-a.tes.'- ....aio that sup, p ..... ..or the develepmerm of the cite cpe.........

and1EA,.13-Thic m~a; inlude.. -+ ela ,,ieatior k, referentec, exmpes inetmetion.....for calculations

++, etc Developer notec+ net+ be in. the+ sit'cemergene

• ECL Assi:gn:ment Attrib--tes Locat.ed within the D~eveloper Nt+e setinz specifi"esv. ,the atribute ...ed fcr ...inin the:_ IC to a^ givn .... c 12 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY symptom baza ICs EALs can bc azscsccz cnly during t.hc powcr zpcratic.nz, startup, safety cyc'scm acorpoc,.,ntz and thc use, of altcr.natc inotr-mcr=tationa.

The following table shows ,,hieh-Recognition Categories are-applicable in each plant mode. The ICs and EALs for a given Recognition Category are applicable in the indicated modes.MODE APPLICABILITY MATRIX Category Mode R C E F H S Power Operations X X X X X Startup X X X X X Hot Standby X X X X X Hot Shutdown X X X X X Cold Shutdown X X X X __Refueling X X X X Defueled X X X X ___13 T " " Startu Mede Swich"'k...

in Strtup/H.at, St`and ' r R..f..l Het, Shut`dcw;n (3): M.ede Switch in Shut`dz-wn, Average Rac-ter Cooalun Tempernturc

>200 O[ColdShutcwn(1):

ModeSwich i Shudcw, AvrageRea tr[arley. t nits I and 2 *lcchnical l able l, -I provides the followxing operating " N..+i

,+ mode detinitions:

Reactivity~

% Rated AergRS Mlode Title Condition Thermal AeaeRl~ower~a)

Tenlper~Iture (0 F" I Power Operation!

0.99 >5 NA 2 Startup 0: 099 5 NA 3 thlot Standby <0.99 NA 350 4 tlot Shutdown(l'i 0,99 NA 350 > 1,,, > 200 5 Cold Shutdowsn~b

< 0/.99 NA _. 200 6 Refuelingtc)

NA NA NA (a) Excluding decay heat.(bt All reactor xessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.(et One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully, tensioned In addition to these defined modes. "lDe fueled" is also applicable to the Farley [AL scheme. consistent wsith NEI 99-01. !Detueled is a No Mlode' condition where all of the fuel has been removed trom the reactor vessel (i.e.. full core offload during refueling or extended outagest.These modes are used throughout the F'arlev [Al .s with no modilications from NEI 99-(t 1 When a unit is defueled.

the Initiating Conditions designated as Mode Condition AL"'A.2 or "Dlbefeled" are applicable.

14

.1 D~1~D ~Pc~r Op~mtizr.z (1): RZQfl~ Pcwzr 5%, Kcft'0,99 StartuF (2): Rzaotzr Pc;;:r 5%, Kzff 0.99 Hot Standby (3): RCS 350 0 F, Kcff 0.99 Hot Shutdo~n (1): 200 0 F -~ RCS -350 0 F, Keft~:499 Cold Shutdown (5): RCS -200 0 F. Kcff 0.99 Refueling (6): On.. ~,rrz...r..

.~..2 het~d clesure bolte lese than fully tenojoned De~'clopero

~ill need to ir.cerpomte the mode criteria from unit epecific Technical Specificationo into their emergency clwxification scheme. In addition, the scheme must also include the fcllowing mode dco~gnation specific to NEt 99 01: L)etueled (None): All fuel removesl ttcm the reactor ~.'essel (i.e., hill core offload during refueling o~ e~:tendcd cutage).15 41 SITESPEIC~~iIFIC uCHEuE DEV-EL-nPMEunT"n OnrDANCE This section pra ides detailed guidance for developing a site specific emergency classification scheme. Conceptually, the approach diseu sed here mirrors the approach used to prepoec emergency operating procedures generic material prepared by reactor vendor owners groups is converted by each nue!ear power plant into site specific emergency operating procedures.

Likewise, the emergency classification scheme de'cloper will use the generic guidance in NEI 99 01 to prepare a site specific emergency classification scheme and the associated basis 4ee&~ffieffl, It is important that the NE! 99 01 emergency classificaticn scheme be implemented as an integrated package. Selected use of portions of this guidance is strongly discouraged as it will lead to an inconsistent or incomplete emergency classification scheme that will likaly not receive the necessary regulatory approval.1.1 CFNEI1AL 1~1PLE!~tENT~TlO1~

CIJIDA'~CEand- Emerge'ncy Action Level ...EA" .c .s), within the context of fsite specific characteristics plant design, operating features, ten.ninonlagy, etc. Meeting this closer alignment with the schemes of other nuclear pow;er plan't sites and better positicning to adopt future indust.ry wide scheme enhanc-ements.

As in .... Sc..: ^ 3, the. generic guidance includes ICs rand exm'.plc E It is the intent of this guidance both be included in site specific docum:'entsas-, each declaration.

The EAL(s) is the pre determined threshol.d that defines wvhen the IC is met.tf an IC or EAL include a~n explicit refesenee to a made dependent technical documentatian ta justify' why the IC and/r EAL were net inear-parated (i.e., sufficient olassificatian scheme are presented in Appendix A, Acrany.ms and Abbreviations.

Site Man' wards or te..'ns u-'sed in the NE! 99 01 emergency' elassifiatian scheme 16 m.-ay be incerporated depending upon site developer and ucer prefereneec.

U The !Cs within a R~ecogn~itin Catego.r' may be placed in r:evere order fcr..id, f...l...d by Si.. ^rea Emergency, Akol oad NOUE).£ The Initiating C..nditi....n....u.ber m..y b .h.. e... .U h is etro ...... Recognite

........ Cagr ....g.....n.may.be..

hang...............

-- P may be uaged in lieu- ofA"Acecited Ia woul.. hn ed to uRJ, A.ee* The ICc an=d EALs from R~ecognition Categories S an~d C may be incorporated into a mode applicability requirements are ma~intaned.

• The trmne EAL and threshold may be us:ced interchan=geably.

The material in the Developer Notes section is included to assist devcelpers with craf'tin correct IC and EAL statements.

This material is not required to be in the final emerson: s discu...ed above... de'eloepre ar-e encouraged to keep their site speific schemes as close to the generi guid.. nc a..... possible ...When r a.lin the scee d.....er ch-a-acteristics arc listed below.* Te ~c E ..,Oprain : ode pplicability criteria.

Notes mad infor...tion cpecific scheme must include some of ucer aid to facilitate timely and accuJrate UThe ICs, EALe, Operating Modde Applicabilit...

criteria Note and.. Bai information...

are technically.

complete accu..te (i.e-...,r the contain.....

the...; i...nfo..-ation neeesa:ry ts.U EAL statements "use objective criteria and debcer.'abe v'alues.* ICc, EALs, Operating Mode. Applicabilit.y -an Not ..........

n.. an formatting-y g 17 I The eche,,-e U The scheme facilil tates ........r-eln ..... dc;.-gr-"-1ng ci the emergency, Ij I\STItU~iENTATION IJt~ED roil EALS ,S Inetrumentation retereneel In IeAL etatemente efleula ~neIuOe that Ceeerited in the emergency plan ecetion which addreeeee 10 CFR 50.'17(b)(8) and (9) and/or Chapter 7 ot the ESAR. Inetruneentation uced for EALe need net be eafety related, addreeeed by a Technical Specification or ODC~I'~TS centrel requirement, nor powered from an emergency power ecurce; hewever, EAL d. ~%,p~r.~.~hould etrive to incorporate inetrumentation that ic reliable and routinely maintained in accordance with cite programs and proceduree.

Alarme referenced in EAL atemente ehould be theec that are the meet operatienally cignificant for the described event or condition.

Scheme developers should ensure that specified values used as [AL setpoints are within the calibmtcd range of the referenced instrumentation, and consider any automatic instrumentation functions that may impact accurate EAL assessment.

In addition, [AL selpoint values should not use terms such as "off scale 13w" er "off scale high" since that type of reading may net be readily differentiated from an instrument failure. Findings and vielatiens related te [AL instrumentation issues may be lecated cn the NRC website.1.1 rIlEsEN'!~.TIo-~

or ~CIIEME INFOIP~~ATiO~

TO L~iERS within ... .15 mi~nutes after the.. a'ailability of indicoaionr t plan o._.'- per-ators that._ asn claseiflcatisn procedure a-nd creating relatedal uer aids, devel.pe mu....t. det.rmin the

....

that, .. beet euppon"te the end users by facilitating accurate and timely emergenc claeei...........t.i.end-

....op"r ...u .-c.enir the follcrwing poite 5The first ucers of an emergency elaeeificato preedu.....t..p.....

inth respeneibility to per'fcrm:.

other critical toeL, and will, likely ha;ve minimal ae" .......in. makinrg a ecifi.as!"tier, a~secssernt.

be the firet persenne!

te n, tiec a change in plant ...........

They.can........the U Emergency rD: ..t... in the TSC a-d/er [OF will!! have mere oppor.tunt to.f.....on m-..-.rer wi:th whicoh li.eensed ops:'atrs.

arc neast comfor-table.

Develocpers will,.1 need to w...1ork -l... clocl with .. repesntati

.. .. .,e .. fr...te Opeatien and ..peatione "Tmining procedure and related ueer aide-). If ccessa:y, an alerat ...me..the.d fo pr..senting 18 emergency clacciticatien echeme information may be de~'eleped fcr uce by Emergency Directors and'er Offeite Reaponce Organizatian percennel.

A waUbaard ic en acceptable prccentatien method pravided that it eantaine all the infermatian nececcary to make a earreet emergency elacsifieaticn.

Thic infcrmation includec the ICc, Operating Made Applicability criteria, EALe and Note. Natec may be.~cpt zith cech applicable EAL er mo~ed ta a commar. area and rcfercnccd a refcrcr.ce ta a Nate ic acceptable ac Iceg ac the informatian ic adequately captured an the wallbaard and painted to by each appHcable EALa. Basic infcrinatien need net be incladed en a.vallbaerd but it chauld be readily available ta emc~gcncy claccificatien decisien makere.In come eacec. it may bc advantageauc ta develep twa walibearde ene for uce during pawer aperatione, ctartup and hat canditicec, and another fcr cald shutdazn and refueling car.ditionc.

Alternative precentation methade for the Recagnitian Categcry F ICe and ficcion product barrier threcholda are acceptable and include flaw chart, block diagrasne, and checklic: type tab!ec. Develepers muct cr.cure that the ite specific methcd ~ all p~cibIe threchold combinatiana and alaccifieaticn outoamoc chewn in the ~ or PWR EAL fiesian praduct barrier tables. The NRC etaffeanciders the precentatian method af the Recagnition Cotegory F informatian to be an impo~ant ucer aid and may requect a..hange to a particular prapoced method if, among ether reacans. the change ic r.eeeccary ta cremate eoncictene~

aerccc the inductr.'1.~ INTECRATION or lC&~EALs '.' ITII PLA~T Pnncrni itr~A..rigorouc integratian af IC and EAL referencec inta plant eperating pracedurec ic not recammended.

Thic appreach wauld greatly increase the adminictrative cantralc and..arklaad for maintaining pracedures.

On the ether hand, performance ehallengec ma:.'~ecur if recognition af meeting an IC or EAL ic boced eddy en the memar.' af a licenced~peratar ar en Emergency Dtr~t~r, ~peJally during periade af high etreec.Develapers shauld eancider placing apprapriate vicual cuec (e.g., a step, nate, cautian, etc.) in plant procedurec ale~ing the reader/uccr to ccneult the ite emergency iaccific~ien pmeedure.

X'icual cuec ceuld be placed in emergency operating pracedurec, abnarmal operating procedurec, alarm responce procedurec.

and nannal~perating pracedures that apply ta cold shutdown and refueling medas. As an eaample, a.,tep, note or caution cauld be placed at the begianing of an RCS leak abnarmal cperating precedure that reminds the reader that an emergency claccifteatian accesement chauld be.b....d......

isan.nt.gal...t.f..nemegenc

.....i.....n..hem....

Thy in.+---, t.... daeme.t _+, c sprtc" emergenc clac.......ifcatia

...........

making by r--din...............

ie th A. I ...... ... ... ..... ..t.... ... .... ...........

......................

.....T ..en 19 infrfming backgraun'rd anrd info.rmat.ian in a" readily format. !t classificatian., if neecessa:-.

The dagc"nient is also "-seful- for est.ab!ishing configuration':

a minirm.um, the fello-wing:

materila present:ed in: Sctzion 5. This materila may be, edited as neecded to align w:ith£ .,ch^* Initiating Cond!!itio along --ith the associated EALe or pr.du.

thresholds, Operting Magde Appleability,;

Nogtes and information.

and-' B,n respecti-vely.

This' materila may be as needed-^'

to9 align with~ site specific A B-,sis section shoul=d nagt contain in:formation that, could madify the meaning cr intent of the, asocciated IC or EAL. Suc:,h irnfogr"matian shauld be incorporated withirWn *,hc IC ,9 EAL statemen.t, or s EAL Noe",. Information:

in the Basis should only cla-ify and inform, decision making fagr an' emergency classificatio:.

Basis ir~formatir.z should! be avaia:°ble to9 be referencecd.

if r, ccsszary, by the Brecuse th-,e: info"rati'on i'nay baei documentf-c can paffct emergency EOla.s.ification dcisior. ,making (le g., th rgency Diree:q-:cta refer ta it durin an Evet) the No.eR- C 1.8 D1"ELOPER AND U5rn FEEDIIACK NEI Emergency, Prepa...dne...............ta.k.for.e.member...............to.the 20 52 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS

.-q.42. I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

..........

...fig-e.tl-r an\ emergency classification, the emergency director must consider all information having a bearing on the proper assessment of an initiating condition (IC).This includes the emergency action level (EAL),

associated operating mode applicability, notes and the informing basis information.

In the Recognition Category F matrices, EALs are referred to as Fission Product Barrier Thresholds; the thresholds serve the same function as an EAL.NRC regulations require the licensee to establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded:

and to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. The NRCs~'.. guidance on implementing this requirement in NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants.All emergency classification assessments sheoI4-xx iii be based upon valid indications, reports or conditions.

A valid indication, report, or condition, i -eue-+hut-has been verified thfeah-u~sing appropriate means..........t........

lca'. ing no doubt regarding the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy.

For example, validation could be through an instrument channel check, response on related or redundant indicators, or direct observation by plant personnel.

4-e~.°;alidnti af zhe'ul'd e ..... h..... ndicat t n xxiil be vatlid~ated in a manner that supports timely emergency declaration.

For ICs and EALs that have a stipulated time duration (e.g.,, IS m'nutez .... 30" minte,,-.:...

etc.), the emergency director shetild-x~

iii not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but sheutld-vill declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded,*or will likely exceed, the applicable time. If an ongoing radiological release is detected and the release start time is unknown, it shudwili be assumed that the release duration specified in the ICiEAL has been exceeded, absent data to the contrary.A planned work.activity..e suihrcumin in an expected event or condition w#hieh-that meets or exceeds an EAL does not warrant an emergency declaration provided that 1) the activity proceeds as planned and 2) the plant remains within the limits imposed by the operating license. Such activities include planned work to test, manipulate, repair, maintain or modify a system or component.

In theseo-such cases, the controls associated with the planning, preparation and execution of the work will ensure t#ht-compliance xx ith the operat in ' license iz

with all of the~v ....ratin'"g litence provided that the activity proceeds and concludes as expected.

Events or conditions of this type may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 § CFR 50.72.The asze~zment o~f cSome EALs is-are axsessed based on the results of analyses #-ha4-ere necessary to ascertain whether a specific EAL threshold has been exceeded-(e~g.,-d~es

..........., cheiz. ...p.... , RCS leak rate .......t.. n,: et.)...' The EAL and/or the associated basis discussion will identify the necessary analysis.

In these -e.ees.e4 tlhe 15-minute declaration period starts with the availability of the analysis results that show the 21 threshold to be exceeded (i.e., this is the time that the EAL information is first available).

The NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to initiate and complete EAL-related analyses within a reasonable period of time (e.g., maintain the .. ..

the EALs have been developed to address a full spectrum of possible events and conditions wh-ieb4-that may warrant emergency classification, a provision for classification based on operator/management experience and judgment is still necessary.

The NEI 99-01 scheme provides the emergency director with the ability to classify' events and conditions based upon judgment using EALs with the emergency classification level (ECL) definitions (refer to Category H). The emergency director will if the effects or consequences of the event or condition reasonably meet or exceed a particular ECL definition.

A similar provision is incorporated into the Fission Product Barrier Tables; judgment may be used to determine the status of a fission product barrier.CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY To make an emergency classification, the user will compare an event or condition (i.e., the relevant plant indications and reports) to an EAL(s) and determine if the EAL has been met or exceeded.

The c;'al",atizn c~f pAn EAL(s) evaluation must be consistent with the related operating mode applicability and notes. If an EAL has been met or exceeded,*lhim-the IC is eensidefedre-met and the associated ECL is declared in accordance with plant procedures.

When assessing an EAL that specifies a time duration for the off-normal condition, the"clock" for the EAL time duration runs concurrently with the emergency classification process "clock." For a full discussion of this timing requirement, refer to NSIRIDPR-ISG-01.CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS WhnIn the cv clt of multiple effergency emergencies conditions-are-prceent, the user will identify all met or exceeded EALs. The highest applicable ECL identified during this review is declared.

For example: If an Alert EAL and a Site Area Emergency EAL are met, ;whether at, one u-niter ...I. .,..awe .if ..r.n a Site Area Emergency should be declared.There is no "additive" effect from multiple EALs meeting the same ECL. For example: If two Alert EALs are met, at ..... uni ... at .... difren unit.. , an Alert sho,,ld-xx ill be declared.Related guidance eeneeffiifg-fbr classification of rapidly escalating events or conditions is provided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2007-02, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Emergency Notifications During Quickly Changing Events.CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURlING CLASSIFICATION oThe mode in effect at the time thot-an event or condition occurred, and prior to 22 any plant or operator response, ic the merde that determines whether IC is applicable.

If an event or condition occurs, and results in a mode change before the emergency is declared, the emergency classification level is still based on the mode that existed at the time that the event or condition was initiated (and not when it was declared).

Onc- a difeen m..d.. ic reached, ay n.. ew event or condition, net related to th... orgi, .... nt...r...nditi..n.

requirin~g emergency claccificati, n :chuld be e.aluated..

For that occu-r in Cold Shu:tdown-or PRefueling, ezea~ati-n isvia EALz t.hat are .pplicable in the Ccli Shu.tde-wn or R~efueling modec, even if.......h...... (o .... hihe d)iseteeCLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS Although EALs provide specific thresholds, the emergency director must remain alert to events or conditions that could lead to meeting or exceeding an EAL within a relatively short period of time (i.e., a change in the ECL is IMMINENT).

If, in the judgment of the emergency director, meeting an EAL is IMMINENT, the emergency classification eh*4be made as 4.though the EAL has been met. While applicable to all emergency classification levels, this approach is particularly important at the higher emergency classification levels since it provides additional time for implementation of protective measures.EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING SNC policy is that once anl emergency classification is made, it cannot be downgraded to a lower classification.

Tecrmination criteria contained in procedure A,./iP-tIP-I 1(1, Emergency ( ka~slyica, ion nod InitialAc/ions shall be completed for' an event to be terminated.

At termination, on an event specific basis, the site will enter either normal operating conditions or a recoscr'.

condition with a recovery organization established lbr turnover from the FRa. An ECL may be .... d~gadd when th even ....r.. condition that be eltei.mat.ed.

The fcllowing approach te doy~grading or terminating o~n ECL is recommended.

~~Acti~on When' Conditioen No Leonger Ale4 Do c..........r, terminate the emergency rn ne in 23 GcrFIe ral. ' e rgznI Tcrm i-nat cm.i.ergeny and entef.r is in RIS 2007 02..--7-2.7 CLASSIFICATION OF SnORT-LIVED EVENTS ,.A:.... die ae in Sectien^ 3 .2, entlivent-based ICs and EALs define a variety of specific occurrences that have potential or actual safety significance.

By their nature, some of these events may be short-lived and,4 t-sever' end before the emergency classification assessment can be completed=-, If. -n event.' eeurs t~hat mee.t r exeds-EA,thec azcei~ated ECL muzt be deClared regardle~c Cf ite: e~ntinued prceveee at the time cf deelaroatien.

E~ampleC lbr example. an earthquake, or of cu.ch events incl~ude a failure of the reactor protection system to automatically scram/trip the reactor followed by a successful manual scram/trin ra' .-%82.8 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS Many of the ICs andlof EALs eef1aiiaed-in this document employ time-based criteria-ti~an .......rit.ria..ill require th#4t-he-IC/EAL conditions be present for a defined period of time before an emergency declaration is warranted.

In cases where no time-based criteion s spcifid,.i b ..........

tha some transient conditions may cause an EAL to be met for a brief period of time (e.g..- a

.. *. ....

... The following guidance ill be applied to the classification of these conditions.

EAL momentarily met during expected plant response -In .re Whcn an EAL is briefly met during an expected (normal) plant response, an emergency declaration is not warranted provided that associated systems and components are operating as expected, and operator actions are performed in accordance with procedures.

EAL momentarily met but the condition is corrected prior to an emergency declaration

-If an operator takes prompt manual action to address a condition, and the action is successful in correcting the condition prior to the emergency declaration, then the applicable EAL is not considered met and the associated emergency declaration is not required.

Fer il,,otr.ti:

........., c the follo.,ing excample.

[his example presents an illustration:

An ATWS occurs and the auxiliary feedwater system fails to automatically start.Steam generator levels rapidly decrease and the plant enters an inadequate RCS heat removal condition (a potential loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers).

If an operator manually starts the auxiliary feedwater system in accordance with an EOP step and clears the inadequate RCS heat removal condition prior to an emergency declaration, then the classification shetld-will be based on the ATWS only.It is important to stf-ess-note that the 15-minute emergency classification assessment period is not a "grace period" dclax a classification .eGei order to eperforma,,ee-ef a corrective action that would obviate the need to 24 classify the event,-. Emergency classification assessments must be deliberate and timely, with no undue delays. The provision discussed above addresses only thee-rapidly evolving situations whfein which an operator is able to take a sueeessf**!corrective action prie-whclbrc r the emergency director eempleting-completes the review and ncccssar\

steps feesa.'-y-to make the emergency declaration.

This provision

...........

te-ensures

,,at-any public protective actions resulting from the emergency classification are truly warranted by the plant conditions.

5.92.9) AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION In some cases, an EAL may be met but the emergency classification was not made at the time of the event or condition.

This 5it-'-,aticn can occ~ur '.~'cn pPersonnel could discover that an event or condition existed whieh-that met an EAL, but no emergency was declared, and the event or condition no longer exists at the time of discovery.

4t:his-ht may be deeqe-the event or condition was not be~eg-recognized at the time, or there wxas an error thtws-faein the emergency classification process.In these cases, no emergency declaration is warranted; hee'.but, the guidance eeeaiee4-in NUREG-1022 is applicable.

Specifically, the event should be reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.72 within one hour of ............

y-ef the undeclared event or condition is discoxercd.

The licensee sheuldwill also notify appropriate State and local agencies in accordance with the agreed upon arrangements.

5 .1 RETI1ATIO) ,I EPERENV ECA'AT 25 63 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RG1 Release of RSI Release of RA1 Release of RUl Release of gaseous radioactivity gaseous radioactivity gaseous or liquid gaseous or liquid resulting in offsite resulting in offsite radioactivity resulting radioactivity greater dose greater than 1,000 dose greater than 100 in offsite dose greater than 2 times the mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem TEDE or 500 than 10 mrem TEDE

... ....ei....ie mrem thyroid CDE. mrem thyroid CDE. or 50 mnrem thyroid e4.I.:jei.t clee.e Op. Modes: All Op. Modes: All CDE. ....trdln d ........Op. Modes: All limits for 60 minutes or longer.______________Op.

Modes: All RG2 Spent fuel pool RS2 Spent fuel pool RA2 Significant RU2 UNPLANNED level cannot be level at lowering of water level loss of water level restored to at least bee4 above, or damage to, above irradiated fuel....... cifc , .....eefitien13()

kct irradiated fuel. Op. Modes: All...... p.....)130 fcci (ILcvcl 3). Op. Modes:" All (I evel 3) for 60 Op. Modes:" All minutes or longer.Op. Modes: All RA3 Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.Op. Modes:" All 26 RGI ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 she*uldwill be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Readings on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown below for 15 minutes or longer: I Is..t I I I I Q~jt~V~l .... [ i (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (sitec zpccficd p ..... ,he site boundarv.(3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond f:'i,,,-speeifie-deseoef..... ,lhe site boundary:* Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public.Radiological effluent EALs are also-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses 27 Re the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

I he monitor reading threshold are determined usini a dose assessment method that back calculates the (lose values specitied in the It. [he mecteologom, and source term (noble gases, particulates.

and halogens)used are the same as those used to> determine the monitor reading threshold values in I's RS I and RAI. this protocol will maintain intervals bctvceent the threshold values tbr thle three classificationms.

Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a relcaLse duration of one hour is assumed, and the threshold values arc based on a site boundar\ (or beyond) dose of I1000 n~lihour whole body or 5ot0t) mRliour thy roid. xxhichexer is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes..he .....u.nt..........a...i..lud.d t, .....d. a bo.ci. fcr claocit.,'ing events; that cannot....

be readily, ela iti!ed an the. of plant cenditiana alone..2Th., inolouain af beth lCc/EA!+.

mare fully addrcac. the. ......ru. *.ef pocc.ible co'ornto arnd arccidents.

Wh~e thic I may.n.t.b metab....

ehlene ... mul'ipl .iccin product ba~irrcr, it uravic elcc aton dierC y n may be ue.............

t-o lsfyenthtwulntrahth

..m. booed on pant ctas ..r. the fico pr.du. matrix alon:... Far,.many

-" f the DBAo of ficiain product be.arrsr challenged, but rather the amount of rodioactivity' releace d to the equi..alent. (TEDE), as, deie n1 cdin, lieu.o. ....u of ED and CEDE...'however,....e...a....have.de.ided.t...o.

protectivec action:, on child thyrid ,CrE.

powe:'r plant ICcEALs need to be eac~ctn~ot with the protective action methodologies employed The..,^ raading specifc monitor list andri .....ol vau" should. bedetenrnineda vith considerati.

of the. f4o..l.lowing:

.+..,a4aE_ , ._ C.D -.ID' 4

• Seectin oftheapprp~at intalld gaeouseffuentmoniors

• hecflertmoitrredig soudcorepndtoadoe f1,00memTEEor5,0 efti inf.orma .... inld, t r n* t limte te theRES/C an vaue ue in th t Dpenin up!'esn th maemrthdley unsdrts c the tEAL vuECL.hr myb velp doe site-' epe+.if+e d... recpte po. nt.. ic th ita. ...) "and/"r l-secatiuced bys the centor F'!te dictinguich onst n ihiedcc h elee itnc+)adc octescol en..u.. that 'I) EA value" being ic within th cab... re"p........

an dieplay, range af beyen th .p.r.....

er ........ ra.. ,. ng + e f th e intlldeflet

...h...cce. EAL Indav iable onsa +e"amp.., an _ EAL ci reading:.

mihtb ......t. at 0,.~ to95 o the higherctE~

Indicatione rem_ a red-'mcc tmdcrj..ticrn cy-te ........ net"' inlue inte eercEAc..any...........d..no..h..............i.it

.. Fe hs that. d- , th ....... bil....t.. not beth in ..laciore. ixcencee appreval v.111 be cci mayI re ,ec mc in+l e n, ei tmL ,. ...................

e ..*.i..%A 29 RG2 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least ite -sp~eei Level 3... dcs .... ,tIzn re ,cl 3 :) for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director &heu*ld-\x ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(I) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at t r~-sp...........

ec~cl 3) for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncovery of spent fuel. ['he spent F'uel level instrument is localted outside the Control Room but in close proximimy.

This condition will lead to fuel damage and a radiological release to the environment.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another General Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

In aceerdanec w',ith the discussion.

in Sction_ 1.1 N -,C Ore EA 12 051, it is recemmwended tha~t this IC an=d EAL "-ill be im~plemented

-.he~n thecnhaer=ced spont. fuel pecl evel

is defer'red.

This cite specific level is in aceordanee w'ith NR.C Order EA 1 2 051 an.d NEIt: 12 02, an.d applicabe greupt guidanc...

limitatiens c.seeiated w-ith the desian, Z~r oenratien Cf instr'umerta=tien used to dete...mine the.

i " ECL Assignment Attributes:

3.1.1 .C 30 RS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director ill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.(I) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: A 13 C (I ~Air I *(IWzzii nntrlz n hehl I'~lu~(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundwxizl(tc Tpczific d~c rzcptw......

p-).(3) Field survey results indicate EITHlER of the following at or beyond ....oe.-,epeei e-dese Ieeeptef-p....

the site bound'arv:

• Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mRihr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10%- percent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.Radiological effluent EALs are alse-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions 31 I~1aW05 alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

T[he monitor reading threshold values arc determined using a dose aLssessment method that hack calculates fi'om the dose xalues specilied in the IC. The meteorology, and source term (noble gases. pal iculates, and halogens~)

used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading thresltold xalues in ICs R Il and RAI. this protocol maintains intervals hetween the threshold values for the three classilications, Since doses arc generallN not monitored in real-time, a releakse duration of one hour is assumed.and the threshtold xalnes are based on a site boundary (or beyond} dose of I0 rotlLRhour whole body or 5010 ntR/hour thy'roid.

whichever is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at 10%-,- percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 500 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level weoid-beuses vi4a-IC RG 1...hil..thi....

may .-.at be met challenges to. multipl praduet barrier"s, it pr ...d...............di .r.it an ayb u..d.ta classify ...nt..th.t.....d.....r

...h.t..E... based plant , statu's- r the. fissian praduct matrix aleone. Far many' af the .. ,,. .- ....an paduc ba.i.r but, rather th ama.unt af radiaaeti'-'ity r-lase t.. the. i The EPA PA.Gs are expressed in af the suam of the effecti-ve dase egui-alent (EDE)equi-valent

('rCDE)o.

Far th p, rpase th... the dase quantity tatal effecti-ve dose equi-valent (TEDE) as defined i.n 10c CF §n 20 i... ue inleu. .of...m af EDE and CEDE..." pa--er lant !Cs/EALs edt eeassetwt the.......t......v e a..n.......ie eply by, the Statecs w:ithin ther P.. The ru t u)Teid CDE dae, .. use in .the IC- EAL shauld^.,.

b adjste .....so nceeeaa.'

ta, align witha State pratecti;ve action decisia making: criteria.* Seleetian of the a~ppropriate

mstalled gasca us effluent manientars.

• Manita ..ading will... be calculated.

using a set a~f asumed maetearalagi.cal data or 32 the ..... s _k.t , mi ... h uld beth same as that emp'lzyed

... 'al"ulat.

me~ni.tr fc~r ICs these -valu-es in a ma.-nnr tha.t ensures a Isgical ec.ealatisn in= the ECL.to the calcul:ated dzce point from cite to site.sou.rces to e?.'.su~re that* I) the I3A ^ being ......dcr... ic ""ithin the u...ble respence diela r_, ... f.. the- inctru nt. a.'d 2) there are: nz ....: ....... ,fcaure that may .redr th mOnitzr rczding inv...tali (e.g., ......z purg ......ure trgge.e at a particu.r

..nd..........

l ,el.zf the highest a~cu.'te mznito re...adin.

Thi.s ...... s-z noP:vithstan.dng, if the identfyg an alternate EAL threshold.

AltXhough the IC "-ef.r.nce.

TEDE fel surv results....

ar g....rally avalaleony s..h.le ...o. y dos.e,_ rwate....

this ..the.u field sur.'ey E.L, specifies a "closed w.indc<-

f.-:m a tme d. s -n ronjecing sys*tem arc nzt included.

in the genwric EALs.th cp fte ln ehia ...pecific " ..ation. EA license may Frequetr to;- i..ude......sin ral tm'ea dose! prze e.-ti.:on system reut;* appova wil ecosdee '.'es b as ss ECL Assienmont Attribtflec:

3.l.3.C 33 RS2 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level at sitke spcific Level .... des .....i n, Level 3).Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool level Qjet-(sit

...pecific Lev.el 3 va-ol",, ... 1x ec 3).Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. This condition eitai46-stems front major failures of plant functions needed protect the public and-4hjit hat warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

The spent fiuel pool level instrument is located outside the Control Room but in close proximitx.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another Site Area Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

Escalation of the emergency classification level weultd-betuses via IC RG1 or RG2.De'.dep.er-Netes:

In aeccrd~aanee witkh the disus ..... in- "-ctien NP.C Ord.er E A 12.n 51 , it s ........de taa t.2t~d~available fcr use. The "site speci ,iici Levl 3,ialue"is., usually lspvni fuelr~ iiial levieiill;,i wher... 12 02. applcable

........ p g,. ls a,....Deve..p. r sh....u.l., m.dif' the EAL scti: n t refle... t any site .p..ific ...n.train....

be~4 34 RA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2 or 3 or 4)Notes:* The emergency director se,,o4d-xt ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should-wsill be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer:.1 i N >~ -(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond specific~~

........ rzcvpt. pcintdthe site boundary.(3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond {s4.ipefl .........

r vpt, p .....the site boundary for one hour of exposure.(4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (sfte-speei:le-dese tlhe site boundary:* Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1-%- percent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of sefety -ef the satbty, as 35 ii indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).Radiological effluent EALs are al4ie-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

I he monitor reading threshold xalues arc determined usina a dose assessment method that hack calculates f'rom the dose xalues sp cified in the IC'. [lhe and source term (noble gases, particulates.

and halogens)used is the ,same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in It's RGiI and SI, [his protocol ntainta ins inmersals between the threshold vahlues lfor the three class ifieations.

Sinece doses arc ceneral l\ not mon iiiored in real-ti me, a release duration of one hour assuined and the threshold val tes arc based on a si le bOunldar\ (or heyorid) dose o1"It i0 mRhour u hole bodx or 50) mR~hour th'yroid.

w~hichever is more limitina.The TEDE dose is set at 1%- percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 50 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level weel4.-eiises 4'if-lC RSl1.pro-vides classificaticn diversity and may be used to classify ev¢ents that w.eu-ld not reach theECL bas,.ed sn plant status or the fi...i.n pde ..at.i.........For.m.n.....t......

The EPA PAGs; are expressed in tesc th.. ~um ..... cifec:io ,4c equ.. al. n (EDE) ~, equiv'alent, (CDE) Fer the purp.c cftbes°e IC,%ALs, the dcc ..uantity tea ...... cctive:" d^°equivr (TEDE).L as deie in ..0. CF ..... 20, is us ...d in lieu .f"....suno and .CED...Th EAPA uianeprvde frth seofaul hyci os onerin3ato6 thyr-o:d CDC at. th .. :st ....i.. : os rec.....t...

poi.." (c.n'sistent v.ith the calculation

-- Mhoni:-!to e fmntr readinswl ecleuhdsinga!

asetf msetefrological d!ata or.:.! !th...ose .. empoe .... calculat t... monto r,-eadins fo ;vI R! and RGs ;i. Aeptabl s--our:"es-sictec. s eme!drgency dose h

ReuetS;!'CM lyand vausue nthe sitet'sg emepa;"r=gency dose accm!eccei."ent metodlgy.

teo c,~.e, A values betw~d ee difeent I"c. Ded wite... il n.ed t; add.......

thi o..r.a.by..du..

in Th en t ~ccfordc recdngeptoi~be.F r ~poin, =: tEL distnters andior loaight us ed by99 the95 Ijenecto distingauich etween ontc offsit does ...h....e .el ..t .distane~ andor....toa dterine d~ ofcjcici ytemdss n Actiona Ri e

.' Th vari, atio in dos rcptorpcnts fmeans Fmthere mayb oen daiffcry~en e in th ditncued fro the release point.. evelop...

s ..h...ld..r...e....h ra.dition monto desigun dcument or.........inf....ation Iate. c r.:econiede httecniindsrbdb hsI may rees "-',e ELuina eSesute in md:i.olo:gicyate 37 apprc~'d will b~ ~crzkler~d cn a ~ax by zo~c b~L.ECL Azzi~nmcnt Attributzz:

3.l.2.C 38 RA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by alarms onl ANY of the following radiation monitors: 4Q (zito zpecific Ii~ting of mdiaticn mcnitcr~, and the a~s oziated readings, setpeint~

an~i'cr (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to I site specific Level '....... " lecil 2 ). [-gee Basis: RI 'Il-'lING~

PATR IWAY: [his includes the reactor refuel ca\ itx the f'uel transfe.r canal, and the spennt fuecl pool. canals and pools through which irradiated f'uel niav be mov ed. hut not including the reactor xcessel.This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly, c~ sig fig eant !m;;'crl.&g o~f ;'.tcr ieo ... '"thH: "h- sp......rd.

pool. (w ..... ...These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment.

As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level ofs~afety' of he-plantplant satietx.This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HUI.Escalation of the emergency woe, i4.beis based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.EAL #1 This EAL escalates from RU2. is-4hbt-t

[he loss of level; in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY; is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), as-weIJ-as-significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters.

Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL sheutd-xt, ill be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.

39 While an area radiation monitor could detect an increase in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether e*--net-the fuel is actually uncovered.

To the degree possible, readings sheld-ill be considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance vx, ith Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2_This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly.

A rise in readings on radiation monitors be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).

Containment Purge Ventilation Monitors are not available during all modes.EAL #3 Spent fuel pool water level at this value is within the lower end of the level range necessary to prevent significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation to personnel performing operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool. [he spoint fuel pool level instrument is located outside the (iontrol Roomi but in close proximnity.

This condition reflects a significant loss of spent fuel pool water inventory and thtis--i~-is a4se-a precursor to a loss of the ability to adequately cool the irradiated fuel assembles stored in the pool.Escalation of the emergency classification level ,weoitd-beuses RSl or Far EAL # l Depcnding upon t.he .";avaiabilit+y and range ef" inetrument+atien, thie EAL may include....ecifi.. reading indiAtiv+

..f fuel4, ....... .......c nide ..t.r and .adiatin level readings.Specif the mAd aplcbltyo atiua4nicta fiti ")valbci almdI. 0 EAL .,1 ff2 I-+... .A+:. .. *. k+.. Ak... Fer EALs # 1 and ff2......c......n.ure that I te EA, value, being censidered is w;ithin t.... lcrspne n display+ ef i.soment,+,+

and 2) there are ... autemati fcato that render. the meniter readin-- -.(e g. an,,ut ...... featu..e tig-cred+

at a partic'ular+

ir-.4dieatie le....-n ,4.40 It is that the by this IC may... reul in a.. raditio ..alue value; sho-uld b;: determ'.ined

-,ith a margin. su'-cient to ensu.re that an accurate monitor reoding is available.

For eromple, an EAL meonitor reading might be set at 90% to 95% of the highest.c.ura...m.

it...r.ad.....

Thi.. prvi......n notwithstnd'ng, if the ectimateg'ealculated mon'tar corro~boratin between monitar readings into t.he classification assessment.

Development of the EALs should also co~nsider the and limitratio~ns of made ofra par'ticu!lar monitor if it is not av'ailable in all mo~des.Inc acccrdance

,;ith the dis.cuss;ion in Seeticon L.I, NR-C Order EA 12 051!, it is recommended that 12 02. and applicable ow:ner's group guidance.Develeperse zshuld the EAL and'.or section tec reflect any' site determine the ILevel 2 value.ECL Assienment Attributes:

3.1.233 and 3.1.2.C 41 RA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.

(1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr on RomRaitinM n saAN'i ef#- Cen~reI-Reeii~

• Central Alarm Statizn (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any of the-fallew;inlg Ilahlc Ill1 plant rooms or areas: "lable IlI Moude Room Name Room Numher lIleIctrical Penetration Room 334,333,347

___________________________

2334, 2333. 2347 3 Ha~lh~ay Outside Filter Room 312332I A 2A '\1CC mas 2312.2332 Samrple Room aird IPrmnarx.

NtM 323 3 4_____________2323, 2324 Sampie Room and Primary ' NI] Iab> 323. 324 4 ~2323, 2324 RIIR Ilx Room 1281__________________________

2128 Basis: UNIlIlANNF+I):

A parameter change or an ecent that isrnot l ) the resurlt of an inttetnded ec olution or 2) art cxpcctcd plant responlse to a trmasielt, lhe cause of the paranteter change or event ma)be knlown or unknown.This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/ or areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown.

As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation ofth lve ..... y-e*4h- pl...plant, atctv. The emergency director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable.

[or l;AI. #1, the area requiring continuous occupancy is the control oroo and the central alarm station. Ihe central alartm station is in thle control room euxelopc, [he value ot 1 5mRnfhr is 42 dcri~cd fjino the (}I)(i 19 xahuc of 5 Remin i 31) dns w~ith adjustment fo~r expected tinies, For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access shi ,-~ill be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation increase occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures whieh-to address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).

• The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level w+:e*-11be-44euse\

Recognition Category R, C or F ICs.adj ustmen~t for= e.xpected ceccupncy times.car, tnuueu Ceceupa~ny tae mai'-ain n..... plant aperetan-e, a~r ta erform. .. .. ,onic ecaldw ...nd h e 4 The site .p..ifi .lis .... pat .... rom r .r.a .wit ...t.. reltd m... appl: ...... id ..... ie-d'shauld- speify+ th.a..3. ..zamsi~ ara-ea, th...t catain equi.. ment whih rcur maa'aclata 43 The lin should not include roorn~ or arcac for ~'hich entry ic required colely to perform actions of on ad~inictrati~e or record keeping nature (e.g.. r.ozTla! roundo or routine ir.opeetionz).

If the equipment in the li3ted room or ~ca wac already inoperable, or cut af zerlee, before the event occurred, then no cmcrgcr.ey ohould be declared zince the event vAil hove na adverse impact beyond that already ollo~ved by Technical Spccitieations at the time of the event.Rocmz and arano lieted in EAL flu do not need to bc included in EAL ff2, including the~e~fekReefi*~

44 RU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition; Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the O)D(Mit zp ..... .......u...n.. rclcae controling

.........) lihmits for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (! or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director sheuld-wx ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.(1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the zpczifi ez'--ucnt rd,~ .z......... ...... limits for 60 minutes or longer: l~iIu id F IIMucftS (Gaseous Flflucnts=encifc m.nit~r 1ist o.nd threhold -'nd'-e zo.rrenzo nz= tc 2 tires thz zcntrzll!!ie I]WNoWI~io (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.F](3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the OlNI, t ,, pc .... efflu ... znt ....... cntrllin .......) limits for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety..efthe-pl'atplant s~4~tv as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release).

It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, 45 monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment.

Further, t.here are e,\dministrative controls are established to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases.

The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment is-iiadiea'ive-e*idicates degradation in these features and/or controls.Radiological effluent EALs are aIso-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Releases sheuld-will not be prorated or averaged.

For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.EAL # 1 -This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous or liquid effluent pathways.EAL #2 -This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas).EAL #3 -This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level e*I-¢'.: be.-'4auscs IC RAI.Technical Spcifi."catic~nc or, plont. th-at ... ha-ve^ i-"..

G~eneric Letter 89 0 4 ,-.he.RETS'or OD!C"M"::

me:':-Ia :.thodo-g Prch-u:::b u'c, ed-: fPr e chn'ter-itrthh,-.fr hc C 46 proecented in the P.ETE ar ODCM. It is recagnizcd that a calculated EAL v'alue may be b'elow-....,.................

ma n...t be .........Tchnca a trli,. nc rea1e related....

r ..........

t.h.erefr it ic impFr~trnt

+that the a+cccated, EAL .and b.acis clearl!y identify an.. limitati+n on.. the ucec or availablity of_ th-- e moni.tore.+

....m..it .ma ...n.. +it advntaeou to ad...c gacaul..4

... andp liui rlacec wl--'th'oar., esceedingl2 tims re..lcac cotrel limit.+-- can .tralin dacurnen.

typiall For EAL #2 "/alues in this EAL shauld be 2 times the setpaint establishedJ by the ra Jatvt icag emtt wr farlaeta snti comp.ianc

.. th thecpei..

ied.+Dc-velep-ere sho~uld rcsearch radiatione moniter design dacu'ments or other infcr..-moatie source+ t ensure that I)J the EAL '+..u b.in. con sidered is++.- wihi th usab4",le.

and+I It is recognized that" the condition de ....ib.d by thi:s IC may result in a radi:-la-:c-'

effluent -ve!uc bey=.d the .p.....n :-r d'icptay, :rane'i ef theita .. d .affen .......t:r. ,n esti.mate4'-alcutat~ed manitar recading is g:'ater than.....:..

,.pe ,,cl ,.o0_ ^ef. the hi.he.t......t lndicat.ica's from" re-l tim d.... prajcti- system a-e net included in the- ge~neric '.

fem^ a perimeter mnito-ring system arc not included..in the generi.. EALs.controlledan m.aintained..

to. the .,~ l...l a plant" equipment, er witkhin the ..... of the plant'De-..'ezper

he'-'! kz~p in m:id: the reqii:."rmnt:

sI' 10 CFR 5.....~ aed ..... gu ..... pvls ..... IP ..........

..... .-pz,,, z imas:1.me

....... zccn+id:r.

the sd-itizn afstc*Nr effic-eant zsssitscs 47 appfevakw*WbE nz. In aiditi~n, rzadingz may bc infli ly r~guz~t tz iiwIud~ an EAL uaing a;icn~J ty envlrznm~ntai zr zthcr ,.~rirn~tzr mznitcrinz

~vztcm: zn a za~z cv z~z ~t~CL AzIanm~nt Attributz~:

3.I.LH 48

/Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2;Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2;Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2;License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 5 Marked-Up EAL Schemes Southern Nuclear Operating Company Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 5 Farley Marked-Up EAL Schemes FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITIONS, THJRESHOLD VALUES, AND BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS I REGULATORY BACKGROUND

............................................................

I.1.1 OPERATING REACTORS ............................................................................

1 1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)............................I 1.3 NRCORDEREA-12-051.....................................................................

2 1.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF GENERIC INFORMATION.......................

12 1.5 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY

...........................................................

13 2 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS

............................

21 2.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

....................................................................

21 2.2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY

.............................................................

22 2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS

...............................

22 2.4 CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION........................

22 2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS................................................

23 2.6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING..............23 2.7 CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS .................................................

24 2.8 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS

...............................................

24 2.9 AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION

........25 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS .................

26 4 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS...............

51 5 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS..........

78 6 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS ...............................................

I8 7 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS.....110 S SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS....................................................

137 APPENDIX A -ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS........................................

A-I APPENDIX B -DEFINITIONS

.................................................................

B-I

OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND 1.1 OPERATING REACTORS Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Energy, contains the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations that apply to nuclear power facilities.

Several of these regulations govern various aspects of an emergency classification scheme. A-re4'iew-eoft Ihe relevant sections libtcd belzwv will aid thc reader in:..-raanding e ter., inalagy ...... avd in Sctin. 3.0 offor this document, arc:* 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(1)(i)

• 10 CFR § 50.47(b)(4)

• 10 CFR § 50.54(q)* 10 CFR § 50.72(a)* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.B, Assessment Actions* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.C, Activation of Emergency Organization Theab 1e hose regulations are supplemented by guidance documents.

44e-l)ocuments of particular relevance to NEI 99-01 areinclude:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1980. [Refer to Appendix 1, Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants]NUREG- 1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR § 50. 72 and § 50. 73 Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactorsl his list is not all-inclusive. is strongly recommended that scheme developers consult with licensing!

and regulatory compliance personnel to identify and understand all applicable requirements and guidance.

Questions ffay-also niay be directed to the NEI Emergency Preparedness staff.1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)Selected guidance in NEI 99-01 is applicable to licensees electing to use their 10 CFR 50 emergency plan to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32 for a stand-alone ISFSI. The emergency classification levels applicable to an ISFSI are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR § 50 and the guidance in NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1.

The initiating conditions germane to a 10 CFR § 72.32 emergency plan (as described in NUREG-1567) are aubumed-contained within the classification scheme for a 10 CFR §50.47 emergency plan.The generic ICs and EALs for an ISFSI are presented in Section 85, ISFSI ICs/EALs.

IC E-HU 1 covers natural and man-made events included within the scope of an ISFSI design. This IC is not applicable to installations or facilities that may process and/or repackage spent fuel. a Manitar.ad R oric... l, Scr .... Faciit ...an 1SFS! at. a pent fu:el precezi:ng facility).

.............

dditonally, appropriate aspects of IC HU!I and IC HAl should also be included to address a HOSTILE ACTION directed against an ISFSI.The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1 140, A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.

NUREG-1 140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to public health and safety. This evaluation shows that the maximum offsite dose to a member of the public due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem Effective Dose Equivalent.

Re.arding th. a.c+ ' inf... : m-tien,:_

the ..........

c" for an effhite reeponee te an Alnert claeeified uander a 10 CFP. § 72.32 emergency plan are generally ceneictent

-;ith thece for r..uire fcra 10. CFR § 72.32 ..m.rg.n.. plan ic diffcernt than that prescribed fcr a 10 1.3 NRC ORDER EA-12-051 The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 11, II, was the result of a tsunami that exceeded the plant's design basis and flooded the site's emergency electrical power supplies and distribution systems. This caused an extended loss of power that severely compromised the key safety functions of core cooling and containment integrity, mafd ultimately led-Jeading to core damage in three reactors.

W¥hile-Although the loss of power also impaired the spent fuel poo1 cooling function, sufficient water inventory was maintained in the pools to tf-e1d~e-prevent fuel damage from the loss of cooling.Following a review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the NRC concluded that several measures were necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50. 109(a)(4)(ii).

Amon g them t,'ore pro,,4de )ne such measure wvas that each spent fuel pool be prov idcd with reliable level instrumentation to significantly enhance the ability of key decision-makers to efkt~ci',cly allocate resources effect~'ely-following a beyond design basis event. To this end, the NRC issued Order EA- 12-051, Issuance of Order to Modi~fy Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, on March 12, 2012, to all U.S. nuclear plants with an operating license, construction permit, or combined construction and operating license.NRC Order EA- 12-051 states, in part, "All licensees

... shall have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following poo1 water level conditions by trained personnel:

(1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred." To this-erd-e AII licensees must therefobre provide:* A primary and back-up level instrument that will monitor water level from the normal 2 level to the top of the used fuel rack in the pool;* A display in an area accessible following a severe event; and* Independent electrical power to each instrument channel and pfe.vide-an alternate remote power connection capability.

NEI 12-02, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, "To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

", provides guidance for complying with NRC Order EA-12-05 1.NEI 99-01, Revision 6, includes three EALs that reflect the availability of the enhanced spent fuel pooi level instrumentation associated with NRC Order EA-12-05 1. These EALs are included within existing IC RA2, and new ICs RS2 and RG2. Associated EAL notes, bases and developer notes are also provided.It is recommended that these EALs be implemented when the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation is available for use.The regulatory process that licensees follow to make changes to their emergency plan, including non-scheme changes to EALs, is 10 CFR 50.54(q).

In acczrdance wi'th thi5 regu.l-t~cefi, Licensees are responsible for evaluating a proposed change and determining whether or not it results in a reduction in the effectiveness of the plan. a, result cfthe lie 1eesascd on this determination, the licensee will either make the change or submit it to the NRC for prior review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.3

............

A.1 Khi TigHINULm U !l5KU IN CIl 33 01 There are ceveral key terme that appear threughaut the NFl 99 01 methadelegy.

Th~.terme are intreduced in thie ecetien te zuppert underztandir.g efsabeequent material.

Ae an aid to the reader, the fcllcwing table ic provided az an overview tc il!uatrate the relationahip ef the termc te each other.Emergency Claccifienfien Level Unacual~ve*4+ + + +.+ - -+ -- 4-4i regeiiey -Eiefe.... -l... , Eefgencey

-Emergenle, (1) Whenc, m!ak'ing a. !emergecy cacnd:fg atien the Emergety, airet: utcnie all, norma,:,n having af Unusing onteE rprvceeent ofaIitatnUEndt)n Ti Appl....bil.ty, Naetyc ae the i~nf ormingdaicat infcrmatie,,n

.... .n th:e.....

Reregnitien Caegr F'=.., matri"ca E-- e ..... r-- f rred te ac Fi...... Pred.... Ba}r~rir Threah- ldt : t* h.h .* .r,.r....t.

...m e..... t....... an.... ....... ... .... cfc..".n !g'. .. ...2,.1 ^CE ..... ;r C.... NOUE a~nd U LE: EL (e CL.....) !tr.-::gabytr::hu t On c aat fne o tt ~abrd y h U Ncea RglaerCmma4c initat.. NoA r,. aeo o motrial

..r ogurig rcpnc °mniorn+ar pectd ulac futhe deradtio ofeafty yctme cecurs.2.1.2 life hreatening risk sit. c.........

or damage !t sit eupm t beas of HOSTILE re~adilay av'ailable to reoapond if the situ-ation beegmes more se~rious or to perform conirmtor rad... in:. m.n..r.. if.-. res"u.....

a.nd provi... onffei!te authoritiesc current 2.1.3 Site Arca Emergency n;'en."S -are ,in pr'ogriess or" nave' o.eeurroe~

wnlein invi,;OVc or1 liKe~ly majr" Ox load to the, likel!y fallur of. 2) that prvn ........ e aces......to

.. equipm.nt.needed for Purposc Te: 2.. purpose, ofthe, Site, Are~a Emergene~y d.e~elaratico is to asur:.e, that°m............................

staffd to asur tamoitoring t....... dispthe a.to 2.1.1 Ge~neral Emergency (CE)ore dgadation, or meltin ..ith pcte......

for los of .... nta...n....

integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical coentrole of'the, facility, can be.th ia'censee by a ffet! orgaen~ization~al e~aureoentsd to ini-tiateiadditionalft easuhritesa

..y actual or " pthentalrela---

t ro decoslttonwthoeteathrti 5

3.2 I' ITIATINC CONDITIO (IC)An, eenrt or ccn~dition t.hat aligne w,.ith the definition of one of the four emergency lncit-'::-'-..,..

cati.on l.... by virt"ue"...

of the potential or actual effects cr consequenec.

of which m"aete the definition of mn emergency cl!ccification le've. An' IC eno be Appcndix I ofNUP.EG 0651 does not contain eornple Emergency Action Le-elc (ALe)frah

........ ut.. ath..r.. !itiating Cnditionc i.e., pl'n ......oo a th... indic:ate..

whi...., if........d w u.. d. initiat...th.

emergency clac.....

io..... h...... it .... the .....instru-ment readings that would b the EALc.Considerations

--o f .r.the a ..ignm .n of peailclrliitigCniintoa!mrec classification le;vel are discussed in Section 3.2.3 Ac°T:orN LE"'u. (EALt A pr det....e cite epeci....

obser ..bl. threehold~

for an Initiating Condition that, when --" etor_.e.xceeded....

pace.... the pantu in..... a g ....n emrec cacit......l.el 2.4 Fissio'N PRoDUcT BARRIER TH:RES:IoLD-A pro determined, cite specific, oboervable threohold indicating the Ipso or potential locc of a fission product barrier.Diacu~sionz Ficcion product b~icr thresholdc reprecent threate to the defonce in depth decign concept that precludes the release of radioactivo ficcion products to the environment.

This concept relioc on multiple physica! b~ierc, any one of which, it maintained intact, precludee the release of significant amounto of radioactive ficcion preductc to the environment.

The prim~' ficcion product b~iers ~: E-4*ie4-eI*~d U Reactor Coolant Syctem (RCS)U-Cei~teiHffien~

Upon determination that one or more fission product barrier thresholds have been exceeded, the combination of barrier losc and/or potential bce thresholds ic compared to the fiosion product barrier IC,~AL criteria to determine the appropriate ECL.In come accident sequer.oec, the ICc and EALc precented in the Abnormal 6 r...............

.........h...rmr I~ adi .... raiatvty rleze th... t.re...u.t in ecrtan zilsit ,e= docc fro w~hatc'.'er cauce. includr.ng c;'entz that might not be fully 7 A mi ammm AA Ad An ............

emergency c........

cationT heme muet incorporatec a realicctien andem a.t.m......t..k an. app.....a.

balan.c.-

btcc:'en reaconably an'ticipated,..

...... or codtiequstn:.

coneunee.t paotentia accide~nt trajctris,5 paced riscr cavodc or?"Th The,,r.., ..........

a ng o *...nn .. emrec ....n.. frpoedt the US Nuep cltofECL* Assessments Cf the effect: and cons:cquenc:

eeoid4Itefs

5 of different types of event= and* Typical ,an emergency

... oprtn ......ur set......

and^ tr..ansitio I Typical Technical Specification and controls* R~adiologcacl Effiluent Technical Spcifications, ..R...),'f...........Calculati.n

• Review;' of selected Updated Final! Safet. Analysist=.+

Report (UF R

• ...., NU -EG -,, ndix. I, £.r......

Aa,.cx ........! Gu'iddhc/fc.

r),%clr Po.;v'v*I ndustr' Operating Experience

• Iinput from industry subject ma...er.e.pe...

an N~RC staff-member The. fo,,lowing ECL attributes

-. ere create.d by the I P.*Lioin 6 Prep.aration Team= to a:d inthe a*.t.ribute in r'.isin since they may be .... in b.:rifn and. taining:-s-..tting:s" (e-.+., helpin-.g=:" an Emergency Director understand why a particular condl~itio is cl.Jassfied aean Alert). It shauld be strenced that dev'elopers not attempt to redefin:e t-haes attrbute o... r appsly them in any fashion that.... woul chng th.. geei"udnc o ie in this doeument~

..i n"c~rpa*,a tkz ECL a*,t.-i~tz rite their seIhem: ta:t d ........, i" ,run b- :'r.1 elzzr *,h= tI: NRC .......aO*z.dt p hiityz a:

fc: a::; x.rp:. tr..." pr-- .................

.... zz-oidr ,t-: 8 The attributes of each ECL arc presented bclow.3.1.1 Notification of Unusual Lent ~NOUE)( AA precursor to a more significant

.........r condtin (C, .... .oeucc .............

sigr.htieaan though.t..........n.ti....t..n.t..l..al, .......n.3.l.2 ^ 'e" An no deined:. in sec..ion 2.1.2, ineludes but is not limitdtoan e....nt (B) An event or condition that significantly reduces the margin to a loss or potential loss of thc fuel clad or R.CS fissio produc bar.. (C) A significant loss of con..o of r*=adioacti.

m ........ r....ultin in an: inability to control radiation le-vels ",ithin thc plant, or a rclec~z of radioacti-ve matcrialo to thc thvionmete thtcul cuunndse ratrtan1 fanEAPA tor.ynA HOSTILE ACTION occun ring within thc OWN..ER CON.TROLLED AREA, Inde....n Spc+ nt Fue! Storage Installation+

..... ,.includina those direcetd at an 3.1.3 Sitc Area Emergcncy (B) A p ................

or condtio tat+ may lead to: the= 105 or poc..... lose multiple fission product b-.i.ers within a relativ'ely short period of time. Prec-,rar ents and conditions of this t)e include those that challcnge "f.he monitoring

-,nd./or control af multpe .....' system....(C) A release raiade aeil to. the .enironment tha could. reult.. i+ n do...e .grea than ,0%of an+ EPA ,AG- at or beon the.. it.boundar..., 9 (A) Locs:+' : of any' tw.o fiectien prodJut! barriers AND or potential .bce° of the third barric: ful, ela~ R.CS anM/or c.ontainment.

directly to co~re damage a.nd Ieee of containment integrity.

than- an EP'A at or beye.d*+ thc site boud.... +-+[(D)+A HOSCTlIE ACTION reultin in.1;. "hc -ieee lof e ct"af....

funct. 4..ione-- (rc.ti't, control, Emergency preparedncee ic a defence "n depth meacure that :ic independent of+ the EALc alc concidered ineights from cev'eralite s'cp+eific probabi!ietice cafety asceccmcnte (PSA. alec k..... ac probabi:letic rick aececement, PP).) Som .....r.. incighte.+

frm 1....... Acdn ec...n.....in..l.i.g

-... rloge ........all.AC poe ..... cignificant

..n..butor to.. core.. damage frequncey at many" Preecurized ater ....actore. ECL of Site Area Emergency.

Precu"'eor evente tea ae: of all AC poerw= :ere alco Reguat,, ....ide"'+ 1.155, ..........., .7y .........d..........i.

ehac criterion to demarcate betw'een a Site Area Emergency and a General Emergency.

The tiedmnini ritical to a prcperly+.+

antiipaor emergency*+.

declaration sincg ....ol-- lis-- tomxmz h .im .avial for.. Stat and, local officials to+ d.... lop ++. nd<implemet+:--+

ithe protective M..÷.-A.... 2 For ceverei core. daag e;'ent,iiw, uncertaintie exict in phenomena imp+.ortant accident,,O progeeon1e leadingI Becaceo thecell unertir.tie r r 10

3. PSAc indicated that Ieadin~ contributore to latent fotalitiec were ccouencec involving b.ypace, a largo Loec of Cveoolat-Aeetea....th...i.. spe.i.i. copring consainmeni raiiure. a ~satIon IiIOCKOUT iaorrnr ioncer ir perroc, ana a reactor coolant pump seat sailure. I ne generic LAL metnoooicgy neeas v to ac eutticiently rigorouc to acorese tfleee cc uencec in a timely rasnion.3..: I 01 "0.DNI':i'.r' AM) Lft.[IICL.U.

ANcr LE".[LS The- N.r:,t 9.. 0,1 methodology m.akec uce anf cymptom barri......d.an Fie t bsedIcan pedc o-irhedIsad EALe.arEathetsubset df symptdmbbae.

normal," reatr operatoeay wil imlhent pr..'ofch!edure to idetif the:.. prbab- eagain:).and Th~e harrier ba;ed lCc a~nd EALe consider the level of challenge to eac~h individual ba!r-rier po.ntil. lo.st... and ...t ad the total numbe o.. f barrier under challenge.

made hasarde such as a to~xic gas 3.i ~ DrstcN DWT1~RENCES difeenc btwc ......an ,WRSS) c .... by eecf in g Lk nijue mto& ' each t.....Nuleaer- Ste~am Supply Sycte ....S. ...h.e.a.......g............diferno

..ong PWR NSSSc: therefor-e, guidance is pro--vided to aid in the. d;evelome~nt of EALe..p....riote to different PWP. NSSS typ-ecu ........Whr nc ,cr,. developmn guidance ;al...o.addee unique.. con... iderations-for non reac~tor designs such as the (APWR) aund. the Evolutio....na

..o.er Rator .....,t I revel.p..

will... nee to conside the., relevant aspects of their plant's decigin and operating char'acteristics

-.when econverting the generic, guidSanc~e of this docu"ment into a the intent of generic oan EAL wit.. in the. ..ons..aints impoead by the .plant design rand operating characte~ristiecs.

To thic end, developaeers fa sche~me for an advanc..ecd non The guidana-ce in NEI 99 01 ic net applicablec to advaned light ",ater rea..ctor 11

• I~-aeeefea*~ee4%

~e1~-,4dvane~

ithN ~E! 07 01, Mc-:rcx+L ;g1. ILeter r:agyco.'-c~

Le"' prnn: 0t

,1ecr:cn 3.41.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF The scheme's geI,,ieinformation is organized by Recognition Category in the following order.R -Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent S.eetiein-6 C -Cold Shutdown!/

Refueling System Malfunction -Se~ieii7 E -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) -Seetieft-8 F -Fission Product Barrier -Seetie, n 9 H -Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety -Sect~on !S -System Malfunction -Sceft-nl 1 The fc.low;ing information and guidan'ce ic pro.;'ided fcr ac+h IC:* ECL the assigned emergency clecsifieati.on level for the !C.U Initiating Co-diti'n pro-videc a summary dsrito .... the. emergen........t..

or E2AL) app+--licable (ie,+ ar to be u,,cd to elaccy or conditiono)..-

ac.... ed i.c--t ...... tatio r.... ic no-t avai;loble at the plant), the z-I'chcp.r

...hould1 Forjrr Recognition F, the ficcion. product, barrier thr.shohlds are precented+

in degree of barrier challenge (i.e., potential+'" loss' ..r. lo.ws,.° This presen~tatin method H Basis Proyides background informati.on that explains the internt and application of t.he .... and" EA.... ^ °in some ceaes, the basis als0 includes rele;'ant source infc"m~ation

• Dev.eloepr.-o.o N .-a.tes.'- ....aio that sup, p ..... ..or the develepmerm of the cite cpe.........

and1EA,.13-Thic m~a; inlude.. -+ ela ,,ieatior k, referentec, exmpes inetmetion.....for calculations

++, etc Developer notec+ net+ be in. the+ sit'cemergene

• ECL Assi:gn:ment Attrib--tes Locat.ed within the D~eveloper Nt+e setinz specifi"esv. ,the atribute ...ed fcr ...inin the:_ IC to a^ givn .... c 12 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY symptom baza ICs EALs can bc azscsccz cnly during t.hc powcr zpcratic.nz, startup, safety cyc'scm acorpoc,.,ntz and thc use, of altcr.natc inotr-mcr=tationa.

The following table shows ,,hieh-Recognition Categories are-applicable in each plant mode. The ICs and EALs for a given Recognition Category are applicable in the indicated modes.MODE APPLICABILITY MATRIX Category Mode R C E F H S Power Operations X X X X X Startup X X X X X Hot Standby X X X X X Hot Shutdown X X X X X Cold Shutdown X X X X __Refueling X X X X Defueled X X X X ___13 T " " Startu Mede Swich"'k...

in Strtup/H.at, St`and ' r R..f..l Het, Shut`dcw;n (3): M.ede Switch in Shut`dz-wn, Average Rac-ter Cooalun Tempernturc

>200 O[ColdShutcwn(1):

ModeSwich i Shudcw, AvrageRea tr[arley. t nits I and 2 *lcchnical l able l, -I provides the followxing operating " N..+i

,+ mode detinitions:

Reactivity~

% Rated AergRS Mlode Title Condition Thermal AeaeRl~ower~a)

Tenlper~Iture (0 F" I Power Operation!

0.99 >5 NA 2 Startup 0: 099 5 NA 3 thlot Standby <0.99 NA 350 4 tlot Shutdown(l'i 0,99 NA 350 > 1,,, > 200 5 Cold Shutdowsn~b

< 0/.99 NA _. 200 6 Refuelingtc)

NA NA NA (a) Excluding decay heat.(bt All reactor xessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.(et One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully, tensioned In addition to these defined modes. "lDe fueled" is also applicable to the Farley [AL scheme. consistent wsith NEI 99-01. !Detueled is a No Mlode' condition where all of the fuel has been removed trom the reactor vessel (i.e.. full core offload during refueling or extended outagest.These modes are used throughout the F'arlev [Al .s with no modilications from NEI 99-(t 1 When a unit is defueled.

the Initiating Conditions designated as Mode Condition AL"'A.2 or "Dlbefeled" are applicable.

14

.1 D~1~D ~Pc~r Op~mtizr.z (1): RZQfl~ Pcwzr 5%, Kcft'0,99 StartuF (2): Rzaotzr Pc;;:r 5%, Kzff 0.99 Hot Standby (3): RCS 350 0 F, Kcff 0.99 Hot Shutdo~n (1): 200 0 F -~ RCS -350 0 F, Keft~:499 Cold Shutdown (5): RCS -200 0 F. Kcff 0.99 Refueling (6): On.. ~,rrz...r..

.~..2 het~d clesure bolte lese than fully tenojoned De~'clopero

~ill need to ir.cerpomte the mode criteria from unit epecific Technical Specificationo into their emergency clwxification scheme. In addition, the scheme must also include the fcllowing mode dco~gnation specific to NEt 99 01: L)etueled (None): All fuel removesl ttcm the reactor ~.'essel (i.e., hill core offload during refueling o~ e~:tendcd cutage).15 41 SITESPEIC~~iIFIC uCHEuE DEV-EL-nPMEunT"n OnrDANCE This section pra ides detailed guidance for developing a site specific emergency classification scheme. Conceptually, the approach diseu sed here mirrors the approach used to prepoec emergency operating procedures generic material prepared by reactor vendor owners groups is converted by each nue!ear power plant into site specific emergency operating procedures.

Likewise, the emergency classification scheme de'cloper will use the generic guidance in NEI 99 01 to prepare a site specific emergency classification scheme and the associated basis 4ee&~ffieffl, It is important that the NE! 99 01 emergency classificaticn scheme be implemented as an integrated package. Selected use of portions of this guidance is strongly discouraged as it will lead to an inconsistent or incomplete emergency classification scheme that will likaly not receive the necessary regulatory approval.1.1 CFNEI1AL 1~1PLE!~tENT~TlO1~

CIJIDA'~CEand- Emerge'ncy Action Level ...EA" .c .s), within the context of fsite specific characteristics plant design, operating features, ten.ninonlagy, etc. Meeting this closer alignment with the schemes of other nuclear pow;er plan't sites and better positicning to adopt future indust.ry wide scheme enhanc-ements.

As in .... Sc..: ^ 3, the. generic guidance includes ICs rand exm'.plc E It is the intent of this guidance both be included in site specific docum:'entsas-, each declaration.

The EAL(s) is the pre determined threshol.d that defines wvhen the IC is met.tf an IC or EAL include a~n explicit refesenee to a made dependent technical documentatian ta justify' why the IC and/r EAL were net inear-parated (i.e., sufficient olassificatian scheme are presented in Appendix A, Acrany.ms and Abbreviations.

Site Man' wards or te..'ns u-'sed in the NE! 99 01 emergency' elassifiatian scheme 16 m.-ay be incerporated depending upon site developer and ucer prefereneec.

U The !Cs within a R~ecogn~itin Catego.r' may be placed in r:evere order fcr..id, f...l...d by Si.. ^rea Emergency, Akol oad NOUE).£ The Initiating C..nditi....n....u.ber m..y b .h.. e... .U h is etro ...... Recognite

........ Cagr ....g.....n.may.be..

hang...............

-- P may be uaged in lieu- ofA"Acecited Ia woul.. hn ed to uRJ, A.ee* The ICc an=d EALs from R~ecognition Categories S an~d C may be incorporated into a mode applicability requirements are ma~intaned.

• The trmne EAL and threshold may be us:ced interchan=geably.

The material in the Developer Notes section is included to assist devcelpers with craf'tin correct IC and EAL statements.

This material is not required to be in the final emerson: s discu...ed above... de'eloepre ar-e encouraged to keep their site speific schemes as close to the generi guid.. nc a..... possible ...When r a.lin the scee d.....er ch-a-acteristics arc listed below.* Te ~c E ..,Oprain : ode pplicability criteria.

Notes mad infor...tion cpecific scheme must include some of ucer aid to facilitate timely and accuJrate UThe ICs, EALe, Operating Modde Applicabilit...

criteria Note and.. Bai information...

are technically.

complete accu..te (i.e-...,r the contain.....

the...; i...nfo..-ation neeesa:ry ts.U EAL statements "use objective criteria and debcer.'abe v'alues.* ICc, EALs, Operating Mode. Applicabilit.y -an Not ..........

n.. an formatting-y g 17 I The eche,,-e U The scheme facilil tates ........r-eln ..... dc;.-gr-"-1ng ci the emergency, Ij I\STItU~iENTATION IJt~ED roil EALS ,S Inetrumentation retereneel In IeAL etatemente efleula ~neIuOe that Ceeerited in the emergency plan ecetion which addreeeee 10 CFR 50.'17(b)(8) and (9) and/or Chapter 7 ot the ESAR. Inetruneentation uced for EALe need net be eafety related, addreeeed by a Technical Specification or ODC~I'~TS centrel requirement, nor powered from an emergency power ecurce; hewever, EAL d. ~%,p~r.~.~hould etrive to incorporate inetrumentation that ic reliable and routinely maintained in accordance with cite programs and proceduree.

Alarme referenced in EAL atemente ehould be theec that are the meet operatienally cignificant for the described event or condition.

Scheme developers should ensure that specified values used as [AL setpoints are within the calibmtcd range of the referenced instrumentation, and consider any automatic instrumentation functions that may impact accurate EAL assessment.

In addition, [AL selpoint values should not use terms such as "off scale 13w" er "off scale high" since that type of reading may net be readily differentiated from an instrument failure. Findings and vielatiens related te [AL instrumentation issues may be lecated cn the NRC website.1.1 rIlEsEN'!~.TIo-~

or ~CIIEME INFOIP~~ATiO~

TO L~iERS within ... .15 mi~nutes after the.. a'ailability of indicoaionr t plan o._.'- per-ators that._ asn claseiflcatisn procedure a-nd creating relatedal uer aids, devel.pe mu....t. det.rmin the

....

that, .. beet euppon"te the end users by facilitating accurate and timely emergenc claeei...........t.i.end-

....op"r ...u .-c.enir the follcrwing poite 5The first ucers of an emergency elaeeificato preedu.....t..p.....

inth respeneibility to per'fcrm:.

other critical toeL, and will, likely ha;ve minimal ae" .......in. makinrg a ecifi.as!"tier, a~secssernt.

be the firet persenne!

te n, tiec a change in plant ...........

They.can........the U Emergency rD: ..t... in the TSC a-d/er [OF will!! have mere oppor.tunt to.f.....on m-..-.rer wi:th whicoh li.eensed ops:'atrs.

arc neast comfor-table.

Develocpers will,.1 need to w...1ork -l... clocl with .. repesntati

.. .. .,e .. fr...te Opeatien and ..peatione "Tmining procedure and related ueer aide-). If ccessa:y, an alerat ...me..the.d fo pr..senting 18 emergency clacciticatien echeme information may be de~'eleped fcr uce by Emergency Directors and'er Offeite Reaponce Organizatian percennel.

A waUbaard ic en acceptable prccentatien method pravided that it eantaine all the infermatian nececcary to make a earreet emergency elacsifieaticn.

Thic infcrmation includec the ICc, Operating Made Applicability criteria, EALe and Note. Natec may be.~cpt zith cech applicable EAL er mo~ed ta a commar. area and rcfercnccd a refcrcr.ce ta a Nate ic acceptable ac Iceg ac the informatian ic adequately captured an the wallbaard and painted to by each appHcable EALa. Basic infcrinatien need net be incladed en a.vallbaerd but it chauld be readily available ta emc~gcncy claccificatien decisien makere.In come eacec. it may bc advantageauc ta develep twa walibearde ene for uce during pawer aperatione, ctartup and hat canditicec, and another fcr cald shutdazn and refueling car.ditionc.

Alternative precentation methade for the Recagnitian Categcry F ICe and ficcion product barrier threcholda are acceptable and include flaw chart, block diagrasne, and checklic: type tab!ec. Develepers muct cr.cure that the ite specific methcd ~ all p~cibIe threchold combinatiana and alaccifieaticn outoamoc chewn in the ~ or PWR EAL fiesian praduct barrier tables. The NRC etaffeanciders the precentatian method af the Recagnition Cotegory F informatian to be an impo~ant ucer aid and may requect a..hange to a particular prapoced method if, among ether reacans. the change ic r.eeeccary ta cremate eoncictene~

aerccc the inductr.'1.~ INTECRATION or lC&~EALs '.' ITII PLA~T Pnncrni itr~A..rigorouc integratian af IC and EAL referencec inta plant eperating pracedurec ic not recammended.

Thic appreach wauld greatly increase the adminictrative cantralc and..arklaad for maintaining pracedures.

On the ether hand, performance ehallengec ma:.'~ecur if recognition af meeting an IC or EAL ic boced eddy en the memar.' af a licenced~peratar ar en Emergency Dtr~t~r, ~peJally during periade af high etreec.Develapers shauld eancider placing apprapriate vicual cuec (e.g., a step, nate, cautian, etc.) in plant procedurec ale~ing the reader/uccr to ccneult the ite emergency iaccific~ien pmeedure.

X'icual cuec ceuld be placed in emergency operating pracedurec, abnarmal operating procedurec, alarm responce procedurec.

and nannal~perating pracedures that apply ta cold shutdown and refueling medas. As an eaample, a.,tep, note or caution cauld be placed at the begianing of an RCS leak abnarmal cperating precedure that reminds the reader that an emergency claccifteatian accesement chauld be.b....d......

isan.nt.gal...t.f..nemegenc

.....i.....n..hem....

Thy in.+---, t.... daeme.t _+, c sprtc" emergenc clac.......ifcatia

...........

making by r--din...............

ie th A. I ...... ... ... ..... ..t.... ... .... ...........

......................

.....T ..en 19 infrfming backgraun'rd anrd info.rmat.ian in a" readily format. !t classificatian., if neecessa:-.

The dagc"nient is also "-seful- for est.ab!ishing configuration':

a minirm.um, the fello-wing:

materila present:ed in: Sctzion 5. This materila may be, edited as neecded to align w:ith£ .,ch^* Initiating Cond!!itio along --ith the associated EALe or pr.du.

thresholds, Operting Magde Appleability,;

Nogtes and information.

and-' B,n respecti-vely.

This' materila may be as needed-^'

to9 align with~ site specific A B-,sis section shoul=d nagt contain in:formation that, could madify the meaning cr intent of the, asocciated IC or EAL. Suc:,h irnfogr"matian shauld be incorporated withirWn *,hc IC ,9 EAL statemen.t, or s EAL Noe",. Information:

in the Basis should only cla-ify and inform, decision making fagr an' emergency classificatio:.

Basis ir~formatir.z should! be avaia:°ble to9 be referencecd.

if r, ccsszary, by the Brecuse th-,e: info"rati'on i'nay baei documentf-c can paffct emergency EOla.s.ification dcisior. ,making (le g., th rgency Diree:q-:cta refer ta it durin an Evet) the No.eR- C 1.8 D1"ELOPER AND U5rn FEEDIIACK NEI Emergency, Prepa...dne...............ta.k.for.e.member...............to.the 20 52 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS

.-q.42. I GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

..........

...fig-e.tl-r an\ emergency classification, the emergency director must consider all information having a bearing on the proper assessment of an initiating condition (IC).This includes the emergency action level (EAL),

associated operating mode applicability, notes and the informing basis information.

In the Recognition Category F matrices, EALs are referred to as Fission Product Barrier Thresholds; the thresholds serve the same function as an EAL.NRC regulations require the licensee to establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded:

and to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. The NRCs~'.. guidance on implementing this requirement in NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants.All emergency classification assessments sheoI4-xx iii be based upon valid indications, reports or conditions.

A valid indication, report, or condition, i -eue-+hut-has been verified thfeah-u~sing appropriate means..........t........

lca'. ing no doubt regarding the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy.

For example, validation could be through an instrument channel check, response on related or redundant indicators, or direct observation by plant personnel.

4-e~.°;alidnti af zhe'ul'd e ..... h..... ndicat t n xxiil be vatlid~ated in a manner that supports timely emergency declaration.

For ICs and EALs that have a stipulated time duration (e.g.,, IS m'nutez .... 30" minte,,-.:...

etc.), the emergency director shetild-x~

iii not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but sheutld-vill declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded,*or will likely exceed, the applicable time. If an ongoing radiological release is detected and the release start time is unknown, it shudwili be assumed that the release duration specified in the ICiEAL has been exceeded, absent data to the contrary.A planned work.activity..e suihrcumin in an expected event or condition w#hieh-that meets or exceeds an EAL does not warrant an emergency declaration provided that 1) the activity proceeds as planned and 2) the plant remains within the limits imposed by the operating license. Such activities include planned work to test, manipulate, repair, maintain or modify a system or component.

In theseo-such cases, the controls associated with the planning, preparation and execution of the work will ensure t#ht-compliance xx ith the operat in ' license iz

with all of the~v ....ratin'"g litence provided that the activity proceeds and concludes as expected.

Events or conditions of this type may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 § CFR 50.72.The asze~zment o~f cSome EALs is-are axsessed based on the results of analyses #-ha4-ere necessary to ascertain whether a specific EAL threshold has been exceeded-(e~g.,-d~es

..........., cheiz. ...p.... , RCS leak rate .......t.. n,: et.)...' The EAL and/or the associated basis discussion will identify the necessary analysis.

In these -e.ees.e4 tlhe 15-minute declaration period starts with the availability of the analysis results that show the 21 threshold to be exceeded (i.e., this is the time that the EAL information is first available).

The NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to initiate and complete EAL-related analyses within a reasonable period of time (e.g., maintain the .. ..

the EALs have been developed to address a full spectrum of possible events and conditions wh-ieb4-that may warrant emergency classification, a provision for classification based on operator/management experience and judgment is still necessary.

The NEI 99-01 scheme provides the emergency director with the ability to classify' events and conditions based upon judgment using EALs with the emergency classification level (ECL) definitions (refer to Category H). The emergency director will if the effects or consequences of the event or condition reasonably meet or exceed a particular ECL definition.

A similar provision is incorporated into the Fission Product Barrier Tables; judgment may be used to determine the status of a fission product barrier.CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY To make an emergency classification, the user will compare an event or condition (i.e., the relevant plant indications and reports) to an EAL(s) and determine if the EAL has been met or exceeded.

The c;'al",atizn c~f pAn EAL(s) evaluation must be consistent with the related operating mode applicability and notes. If an EAL has been met or exceeded,*lhim-the IC is eensidefedre-met and the associated ECL is declared in accordance with plant procedures.

When assessing an EAL that specifies a time duration for the off-normal condition, the"clock" for the EAL time duration runs concurrently with the emergency classification process "clock." For a full discussion of this timing requirement, refer to NSIRIDPR-ISG-01.CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS WhnIn the cv clt of multiple effergency emergencies conditions-are-prceent, the user will identify all met or exceeded EALs. The highest applicable ECL identified during this review is declared.

For example: If an Alert EAL and a Site Area Emergency EAL are met, ;whether at, one u-niter ...I. .,..awe .if ..r.n a Site Area Emergency should be declared.There is no "additive" effect from multiple EALs meeting the same ECL. For example: If two Alert EALs are met, at ..... uni ... at .... difren unit.. , an Alert sho,,ld-xx ill be declared.Related guidance eeneeffiifg-fbr classification of rapidly escalating events or conditions is provided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2007-02, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Emergency Notifications During Quickly Changing Events.CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURlING CLASSIFICATION oThe mode in effect at the time thot-an event or condition occurred, and prior to 22 any plant or operator response, ic the merde that determines whether IC is applicable.

If an event or condition occurs, and results in a mode change before the emergency is declared, the emergency classification level is still based on the mode that existed at the time that the event or condition was initiated (and not when it was declared).

Onc- a difeen m..d.. ic reached, ay n.. ew event or condition, net related to th... orgi, .... nt...r...nditi..n.

requirin~g emergency claccificati, n :chuld be e.aluated..

For that occu-r in Cold Shu:tdown-or PRefueling, ezea~ati-n isvia EALz t.hat are .pplicable in the Ccli Shu.tde-wn or R~efueling modec, even if.......h...... (o .... hihe d)iseteeCLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS Although EALs provide specific thresholds, the emergency director must remain alert to events or conditions that could lead to meeting or exceeding an EAL within a relatively short period of time (i.e., a change in the ECL is IMMINENT).

If, in the judgment of the emergency director, meeting an EAL is IMMINENT, the emergency classification eh*4be made as 4.though the EAL has been met. While applicable to all emergency classification levels, this approach is particularly important at the higher emergency classification levels since it provides additional time for implementation of protective measures.EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING SNC policy is that once anl emergency classification is made, it cannot be downgraded to a lower classification.

Tecrmination criteria contained in procedure A,./iP-tIP-I 1(1, Emergency ( ka~slyica, ion nod InitialAc/ions shall be completed for' an event to be terminated.

At termination, on an event specific basis, the site will enter either normal operating conditions or a recoscr'.

condition with a recovery organization established lbr turnover from the FRa. An ECL may be .... d~gadd when th even ....r.. condition that be eltei.mat.ed.

The fcllowing approach te doy~grading or terminating o~n ECL is recommended.

~~Acti~on When' Conditioen No Leonger Ale4 Do c..........r, terminate the emergency rn ne in 23 GcrFIe ral. ' e rgznI Tcrm i-nat cm.i.ergeny and entef.r is in RIS 2007 02..--7-2.7 CLASSIFICATION OF SnORT-LIVED EVENTS ,.A:.... die ae in Sectien^ 3 .2, entlivent-based ICs and EALs define a variety of specific occurrences that have potential or actual safety significance.

By their nature, some of these events may be short-lived and,4 t-sever' end before the emergency classification assessment can be completed=-, If. -n event.' eeurs t~hat mee.t r exeds-EA,thec azcei~ated ECL muzt be deClared regardle~c Cf ite: e~ntinued prceveee at the time cf deelaroatien.

E~ampleC lbr example. an earthquake, or of cu.ch events incl~ude a failure of the reactor protection system to automatically scram/trip the reactor followed by a successful manual scram/trin ra' .-%82.8 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS Many of the ICs andlof EALs eef1aiiaed-in this document employ time-based criteria-ti~an .......rit.ria..ill require th#4t-he-IC/EAL conditions be present for a defined period of time before an emergency declaration is warranted.

In cases where no time-based criteion s spcifid,.i b ..........

tha some transient conditions may cause an EAL to be met for a brief period of time (e.g..- a

.. *. ....

... The following guidance ill be applied to the classification of these conditions.

EAL momentarily met during expected plant response -In .re Whcn an EAL is briefly met during an expected (normal) plant response, an emergency declaration is not warranted provided that associated systems and components are operating as expected, and operator actions are performed in accordance with procedures.

EAL momentarily met but the condition is corrected prior to an emergency declaration

-If an operator takes prompt manual action to address a condition, and the action is successful in correcting the condition prior to the emergency declaration, then the applicable EAL is not considered met and the associated emergency declaration is not required.

Fer il,,otr.ti:

........., c the follo.,ing excample.

[his example presents an illustration:

An ATWS occurs and the auxiliary feedwater system fails to automatically start.Steam generator levels rapidly decrease and the plant enters an inadequate RCS heat removal condition (a potential loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers).

If an operator manually starts the auxiliary feedwater system in accordance with an EOP step and clears the inadequate RCS heat removal condition prior to an emergency declaration, then the classification shetld-will be based on the ATWS only.It is important to stf-ess-note that the 15-minute emergency classification assessment period is not a "grace period" dclax a classification .eGei order to eperforma,,ee-ef a corrective action that would obviate the need to 24 classify the event,-. Emergency classification assessments must be deliberate and timely, with no undue delays. The provision discussed above addresses only thee-rapidly evolving situations whfein which an operator is able to take a sueeessf**!corrective action prie-whclbrc r the emergency director eempleting-completes the review and ncccssar\

steps feesa.'-y-to make the emergency declaration.

This provision

...........

te-ensures

,,at-any public protective actions resulting from the emergency classification are truly warranted by the plant conditions.

5.92.9) AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION In some cases, an EAL may be met but the emergency classification was not made at the time of the event or condition.

This 5it-'-,aticn can occ~ur '.~'cn pPersonnel could discover that an event or condition existed whieh-that met an EAL, but no emergency was declared, and the event or condition no longer exists at the time of discovery.

4t:his-ht may be deeqe-the event or condition was not be~eg-recognized at the time, or there wxas an error thtws-faein the emergency classification process.In these cases, no emergency declaration is warranted; hee'.but, the guidance eeeaiee4-in NUREG-1022 is applicable.

Specifically, the event should be reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.72 within one hour of ............

y-ef the undeclared event or condition is discoxercd.

The licensee sheuldwill also notify appropriate State and local agencies in accordance with the agreed upon arrangements.

5 .1 RETI1ATIO) ,I EPERENV ECA'AT 25 63 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RG1 Release of RSI Release of RA1 Release of RUl Release of gaseous radioactivity gaseous radioactivity gaseous or liquid gaseous or liquid resulting in offsite resulting in offsite radioactivity resulting radioactivity greater dose greater than 1,000 dose greater than 100 in offsite dose greater than 2 times the mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem TEDE or 500 than 10 mrem TEDE

... ....ei....ie mrem thyroid CDE. mrem thyroid CDE. or 50 mnrem thyroid e4.I.:jei.t clee.e Op. Modes: All Op. Modes: All CDE. ....trdln d ........Op. Modes: All limits for 60 minutes or longer.______________Op.

Modes: All RG2 Spent fuel pool RS2 Spent fuel pool RA2 Significant RU2 UNPLANNED level cannot be level at lowering of water level loss of water level restored to at least bee4 above, or damage to, above irradiated fuel....... cifc , .....eefitien13()

kct irradiated fuel. Op. Modes: All...... p.....)130 fcci (ILcvcl 3). Op. Modes:" All (I evel 3) for 60 Op. Modes:" All minutes or longer.Op. Modes: All RA3 Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.Op. Modes:" All 26 RGI ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 she*uldwill be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Readings on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown below for 15 minutes or longer: I Is..t I I I I Q~jt~V~l .... [ i (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (sitec zpccficd p ..... ,he site boundarv.(3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond f:'i,,,-speeifie-deseoef..... ,lhe site boundary:* Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public.Radiological effluent EALs are also-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses 27 Re the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

I he monitor reading threshold are determined usini a dose assessment method that back calculates the (lose values specitied in the It. [he mecteologom, and source term (noble gases, particulates.

and halogens)used are the same as those used to> determine the monitor reading threshold values in I's RS I and RAI. this protocol will maintain intervals bctvceent the threshold values tbr thle three classificationms.

Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a relcaLse duration of one hour is assumed, and the threshold values arc based on a site boundar\ (or beyond) dose of I1000 n~lihour whole body or 5ot0t) mRliour thy roid. xxhichexer is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes..he .....u.nt..........a...i..lud.d t, .....d. a bo.ci. fcr claocit.,'ing events; that cannot....

be readily, ela iti!ed an the. of plant cenditiana alone..2Th., inolouain af beth lCc/EA!+.

mare fully addrcac. the. ......ru. *.ef pocc.ible co'ornto arnd arccidents.

Wh~e thic I may.n.t.b metab....

ehlene ... mul'ipl .iccin product ba~irrcr, it uravic elcc aton dierC y n may be ue.............

t-o lsfyenthtwulntrahth

..m. booed on pant ctas ..r. the fico pr.du. matrix alon:... Far,.many

-" f the DBAo of ficiain product be.arrsr challenged, but rather the amount of rodioactivity' releace d to the equi..alent. (TEDE), as, deie n1 cdin, lieu.o. ....u of ED and CEDE...'however,....e...a....have.de.ided.t...o.

protectivec action:, on child thyrid ,CrE.

powe:'r plant ICcEALs need to be eac~ctn~ot with the protective action methodologies employed The..,^ raading specifc monitor list andri .....ol vau" should. bedetenrnineda vith considerati.

of the. f4o..l.lowing:

.+..,a4aE_ , ._ C.D -.ID' 4

• Seectin oftheapprp~at intalld gaeouseffuentmoniors

• hecflertmoitrredig soudcorepndtoadoe f1,00memTEEor5,0 efti inf.orma .... inld, t r n* t limte te theRES/C an vaue ue in th t Dpenin up!'esn th maemrthdley unsdrts c the tEAL vuECL.hr myb velp doe site-' epe+.if+e d... recpte po. nt.. ic th ita. ...) "and/"r l-secatiuced bys the centor F'!te dictinguich onst n ihiedcc h elee itnc+)adc octescol en..u.. that 'I) EA value" being ic within th cab... re"p........

an dieplay, range af beyen th .p.r.....

er ........ ra.. ,. ng + e f th e intlldeflet

...h...cce. EAL Indav iable onsa +e"amp.., an _ EAL ci reading:.

mihtb ......t. at 0,.~ to95 o the higherctE~

Indicatione rem_ a red-'mcc tmdcrj..ticrn cy-te ........ net"' inlue inte eercEAc..any...........d..no..h..............i.it

.. Fe hs that. d- , th ....... bil....t.. not beth in ..laciore. ixcencee appreval v.111 be cci mayI re ,ec mc in+l e n, ei tmL ,. ...................

e ..*.i..%A 29 RG2 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least ite -sp~eei Level 3... dcs .... ,tIzn re ,cl 3 :) for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: Note: The emergency director &heu*ld-\x ill declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(I) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at t r~-sp...........

ec~cl 3) for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncovery of spent fuel. ['he spent F'uel level instrument is localted outside the Control Room but in close proximimy.

This condition will lead to fuel damage and a radiological release to the environment.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another General Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

In aceerdanec w',ith the discussion.

in Sction_ 1.1 N -,C Ore EA 12 051, it is recemmwended tha~t this IC an=d EAL "-ill be im~plemented

-.he~n thecnhaer=ced spont. fuel pecl evel

is defer'red.

This cite specific level is in aceordanee w'ith NR.C Order EA 1 2 051 an.d NEIt: 12 02, an.d applicabe greupt guidanc...

limitatiens c.seeiated w-ith the desian, Z~r oenratien Cf instr'umerta=tien used to dete...mine the.

i " ECL Assignment Attributes:

3.1.1 .C 30 RS1 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director ill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.(I) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: A 13 C (I ~Air I *(IWzzii nntrlz n hehl I'~lu~(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundwxizl(tc Tpczific d~c rzcptw......

p-).(3) Field survey results indicate EITHlER of the following at or beyond ....oe.-,epeei e-dese Ieeeptef-p....

the site bound'arv:

• Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mRihr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10%- percent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.Radiological effluent EALs are alse-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions 31 I~1aW05 alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

T[he monitor reading threshold values arc determined using a dose aLssessment method that hack calculates fi'om the dose xalues specilied in the IC. The meteorology, and source term (noble gases. pal iculates, and halogens~)

used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading thresltold xalues in ICs R Il and RAI. this protocol maintains intervals hetween the threshold values for the three classilications, Since doses arc generallN not monitored in real-time, a releakse duration of one hour is assumed.and the threshtold xalnes are based on a site boundary (or beyond} dose of I0 rotlLRhour whole body or 5010 ntR/hour thy'roid.

whichever is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at 10%-,- percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 500 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level weoid-beuses vi4a-IC RG 1...hil..thi....

may .-.at be met challenges to. multipl praduet barrier"s, it pr ...d...............di .r.it an ayb u..d.ta classify ...nt..th.t.....d.....r

...h.t..E... based plant , statu's- r the. fissian praduct matrix aleone. Far many' af the .. ,,. .- ....an paduc ba.i.r but, rather th ama.unt af radiaaeti'-'ity r-lase t.. the. i The EPA PA.Gs are expressed in af the suam of the effecti-ve dase egui-alent (EDE)equi-valent

('rCDE)o.

Far th p, rpase th... the dase quantity tatal effecti-ve dose equi-valent (TEDE) as defined i.n 10c CF §n 20 i... ue inleu. .of...m af EDE and CEDE..." pa--er lant !Cs/EALs edt eeassetwt the.......t......v e a..n.......ie eply by, the Statecs w:ithin ther P.. The ru t u)Teid CDE dae, .. use in .the IC- EAL shauld^.,.

b adjste .....so nceeeaa.'

ta, align witha State pratecti;ve action decisia making: criteria.* Seleetian of the a~ppropriate

mstalled gasca us effluent manientars.

• Manita ..ading will... be calculated.

using a set a~f asumed maetearalagi.cal data or 32 the ..... s _k.t , mi ... h uld beth same as that emp'lzyed

... 'al"ulat.

me~ni.tr fc~r ICs these -valu-es in a ma.-nnr tha.t ensures a Isgical ec.ealatisn in= the ECL.to the calcul:ated dzce point from cite to site.sou.rces to e?.'.su~re that* I) the I3A ^ being ......dcr... ic ""ithin the u...ble respence diela r_, ... f.. the- inctru nt. a.'d 2) there are: nz ....: ....... ,fcaure that may .redr th mOnitzr rczding inv...tali (e.g., ......z purg ......ure trgge.e at a particu.r

..nd..........

l ,el.zf the highest a~cu.'te mznito re...adin.

Thi.s ...... s-z noP:vithstan.dng, if the identfyg an alternate EAL threshold.

AltXhough the IC "-ef.r.nce.

TEDE fel surv results....

ar g....rally avalaleony s..h.le ...o. y dos.e,_ rwate....

this ..the.u field sur.'ey E.L, specifies a "closed w.indc<-

f.-:m a tme d. s -n ronjecing sys*tem arc nzt included.

in the genwric EALs.th cp fte ln ehia ...pecific " ..ation. EA license may Frequetr to;- i..ude......sin ral tm'ea dose! prze e.-ti.:on system reut;* appova wil ecosdee '.'es b as ss ECL Assienmont Attribtflec:

3.l.3.C 33 RS2 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level at sitke spcific Level .... des .....i n, Level 3).Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool level Qjet-(sit

...pecific Lev.el 3 va-ol",, ... 1x ec 3).Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. This condition eitai46-stems front major failures of plant functions needed protect the public and-4hjit hat warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

The spent fiuel pool level instrument is located outside the Control Room but in close proximitx.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another Site Area Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

Escalation of the emergency classification level weultd-betuses via IC RG1 or RG2.De'.dep.er-Netes:

In aeccrd~aanee witkh the disus ..... in- "-ctien NP.C Ord.er E A 12.n 51 , it s ........de taa t.2t~d~available fcr use. The "site speci ,iici Levl 3,ialue"is., usually lspvni fuelr~ iiial levieiill;,i wher... 12 02. applcable

........ p g,. ls a,....Deve..p. r sh....u.l., m.dif' the EAL scti: n t refle... t any site .p..ific ...n.train....

be~4 34 RA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (I or 2 or 3 or 4)Notes:* The emergency director se,,o4d-xt ill declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 should-wsill be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer:.1 i N >~ -(2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond specific~~

........ rzcvpt. pcintdthe site boundary.(3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond {s4.ipefl .........

r vpt, p .....the site boundary for one hour of exposure.(4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond (sfte-speei:le-dese tlhe site boundary:* Closed window dose rates greater than 10 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 1-%- percent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of sefety -ef the satbty, as 35 ii indicated by a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).Radiological effluent EALs are al4ie-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

I he monitor reading threshold xalues arc determined usina a dose assessment method that hack calculates f'rom the dose xalues sp cified in the IC'. [lhe and source term (noble gases, particulates.

and halogens)used is the ,same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in It's RGiI and SI, [his protocol ntainta ins inmersals between the threshold vahlues lfor the three class ifieations.

Sinece doses arc ceneral l\ not mon iiiored in real-ti me, a release duration of one hour assuined and the threshold val tes arc based on a si le bOunldar\ (or heyorid) dose o1"It i0 mRhour u hole bodx or 50) mR~hour th'yroid.

w~hichever is more limitina.The TEDE dose is set at 1%- percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 50 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level weel4.-eiises 4'if-lC RSl1.pro-vides classificaticn diversity and may be used to classify ev¢ents that w.eu-ld not reach theECL bas,.ed sn plant status or the fi...i.n pde ..at.i.........For.m.n.....t......

The EPA PAGs; are expressed in tesc th.. ~um ..... cifec:io ,4c equ.. al. n (EDE) ~, equiv'alent, (CDE) Fer the purp.c cftbes°e IC,%ALs, the dcc ..uantity tea ...... cctive:" d^°equivr (TEDE).L as deie in ..0. CF ..... 20, is us ...d in lieu .f"....suno and .CED...Th EAPA uianeprvde frth seofaul hyci os onerin3ato6 thyr-o:d CDC at. th .. :st ....i.. : os rec.....t...

poi.." (c.n'sistent v.ith the calculation

-- Mhoni:-!to e fmntr readinswl ecleuhdsinga!

asetf msetefrological d!ata or.:.! !th...ose .. empoe .... calculat t... monto r,-eadins fo ;vI R! and RGs ;i. Aeptabl s--our:"es-sictec. s eme!drgency dose h

ReuetS;!'CM lyand vausue nthe sitet'sg emepa;"r=gency dose accm!eccei."ent metodlgy.

teo c,~.e, A values betw~d ee difeent I"c. Ded wite... il n.ed t; add.......

thi o..r.a.by..du..

in Th en t ~ccfordc recdngeptoi~be.F r ~poin, =: tEL distnters andior loaight us ed by99 the95 Ijenecto distingauich etween ontc offsit does ...h....e .el ..t .distane~ andor....toa dterine d~ ofcjcici ytemdss n Actiona Ri e

.' Th vari, atio in dos rcptorpcnts fmeans Fmthere mayb oen daiffcry~en e in th ditncued fro the release point.. evelop...

s ..h...ld..r...e....h ra.dition monto desigun dcument or.........inf....ation Iate. c r.:econiede httecniindsrbdb hsI may rees "-',e ELuina eSesute in md:i.olo:gicyate 37 apprc~'d will b~ ~crzkler~d cn a ~ax by zo~c b~L.ECL Azzi~nmcnt Attributzz:

3.l.2.C 38 RA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(1) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by alarms onl ANY of the following radiation monitors: 4Q (zito zpecific Ii~ting of mdiaticn mcnitcr~, and the a~s oziated readings, setpeint~

an~i'cr (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to I site specific Level '....... " lecil 2 ). [-gee Basis: RI 'Il-'lING~

PATR IWAY: [his includes the reactor refuel ca\ itx the f'uel transfe.r canal, and the spennt fuecl pool. canals and pools through which irradiated f'uel niav be mov ed. hut not including the reactor xcessel.This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly, c~ sig fig eant !m;;'crl.&g o~f ;'.tcr ieo ... '"thH: "h- sp......rd.

pool. (w ..... ...These events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment.

As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level ofs~afety' of he-plantplant satietx.This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HUI.Escalation of the emergency woe, i4.beis based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.EAL #1 This EAL escalates from RU2. is-4hbt-t

[he loss of level; in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY; is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), as-weIJ-as-significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters.

Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL sheutd-xt, ill be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.

39 While an area radiation monitor could detect an increase in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether e*--net-the fuel is actually uncovered.

To the degree possible, readings sheld-ill be considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance vx, ith Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2_This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly.

A rise in readings on radiation monitors be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).

Containment Purge Ventilation Monitors are not available during all modes.EAL #3 Spent fuel pool water level at this value is within the lower end of the level range necessary to prevent significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation to personnel performing operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool. [he spoint fuel pool level instrument is located outside the (iontrol Roomi but in close proximnity.

This condition reflects a significant loss of spent fuel pool water inventory and thtis--i~-is a4se-a precursor to a loss of the ability to adequately cool the irradiated fuel assembles stored in the pool.Escalation of the emergency classification level ,weoitd-beuses RSl or Far EAL # l Depcnding upon t.he .";avaiabilit+y and range ef" inetrument+atien, thie EAL may include....ecifi.. reading indiAtiv+

..f fuel4, ....... .......c nide ..t.r and .adiatin level readings.Specif the mAd aplcbltyo atiua4nicta fiti ")valbci almdI. 0 EAL .,1 ff2 I-+... .A+:. .. *. k+.. Ak... Fer EALs # 1 and ff2......c......n.ure that I te EA, value, being censidered is w;ithin t.... lcrspne n display+ ef i.soment,+,+

and 2) there are ... autemati fcato that render. the meniter readin-- -.(e g. an,,ut ...... featu..e tig-cred+

at a partic'ular+

ir-.4dieatie le....-n ,4.40 It is that the by this IC may... reul in a.. raditio ..alue value; sho-uld b;: determ'.ined

-,ith a margin. su'-cient to ensu.re that an accurate monitor reoding is available.

For eromple, an EAL meonitor reading might be set at 90% to 95% of the highest.c.ura...m.

it...r.ad.....

Thi.. prvi......n notwithstnd'ng, if the ectimateg'ealculated mon'tar corro~boratin between monitar readings into t.he classification assessment.

Development of the EALs should also co~nsider the and limitratio~ns of made ofra par'ticu!lar monitor if it is not av'ailable in all mo~des.Inc acccrdance

,;ith the dis.cuss;ion in Seeticon L.I, NR-C Order EA 12 051!, it is recommended that 12 02. and applicable ow:ner's group guidance.Develeperse zshuld the EAL and'.or section tec reflect any' site determine the ILevel 2 value.ECL Assienment Attributes:

3.1.233 and 3.1.2.C 41 RA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)Note: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.

(1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr on RomRaitinM n saAN'i ef#- Cen~reI-Reeii~

• Central Alarm Statizn (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any of the-fallew;inlg Ilahlc Ill1 plant rooms or areas: "lable IlI Moude Room Name Room Numher lIleIctrical Penetration Room 334,333,347

___________________________

2334, 2333. 2347 3 Ha~lh~ay Outside Filter Room 312332I A 2A '\1CC mas 2312.2332 Samrple Room aird IPrmnarx.

NtM 323 3 4_____________2323, 2324 Sampie Room and Primary ' NI] Iab> 323. 324 4 ~2323, 2324 RIIR Ilx Room 1281__________________________

2128 Basis: UNIlIlANNF+I):

A parameter change or an ecent that isrnot l ) the resurlt of an inttetnded ec olution or 2) art cxpcctcd plant responlse to a trmasielt, lhe cause of the paranteter change or event ma)be knlown or unknown.This IC addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/ or areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown.

As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation ofth lve ..... y-e*4h- pl...plant, atctv. The emergency director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if another IC may be applicable.

[or l;AI. #1, the area requiring continuous occupancy is the control oroo and the central alarm station. Ihe central alartm station is in thle control room euxelopc, [he value ot 1 5mRnfhr is 42 dcri~cd fjino the (}I)(i 19 xahuc of 5 Remin i 31) dns w~ith adjustment fo~r expected tinies, For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access shi ,-~ill be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation increase occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures whieh-to address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).

• The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level w+:e*-11be-44euse\

Recognition Category R, C or F ICs.adj ustmen~t for= e.xpected ceccupncy times.car, tnuueu Ceceupa~ny tae mai'-ain n..... plant aperetan-e, a~r ta erform. .. .. ,onic ecaldw ...nd h e 4 The site .p..ifi .lis .... pat .... rom r .r.a .wit ...t.. reltd m... appl: ...... id ..... ie-d'shauld- speify+ th.a..3. ..zamsi~ ara-ea, th...t catain equi.. ment whih rcur maa'aclata 43 The lin should not include roorn~ or arcac for ~'hich entry ic required colely to perform actions of on ad~inictrati~e or record keeping nature (e.g.. r.ozTla! roundo or routine ir.opeetionz).

If the equipment in the li3ted room or ~ca wac already inoperable, or cut af zerlee, before the event occurred, then no cmcrgcr.ey ohould be declared zince the event vAil hove na adverse impact beyond that already ollo~ved by Technical Spccitieations at the time of the event.Rocmz and arano lieted in EAL flu do not need to bc included in EAL ff2, including the~e~fekReefi*~

44 RU1 ECL: Notification of Unusual Event Initiating Condition; Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity greater than 2 times the O)D(Mit zp ..... .......u...n.. rclcae controling

.........) lihmits for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (! or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director sheuld-wx ill declare the Unusual Event promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 60 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.(1) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the zpczifi ez'--ucnt rd,~ .z......... ...... limits for 60 minutes or longer: l~iIu id F IIMucftS (Gaseous Flflucnts=encifc m.nit~r 1ist o.nd threhold -'nd'-e zo.rrenzo nz= tc 2 tires thz zcntrzll!!ie I]WNoWI~io (2) Reading on ANY effluent radiation monitor greater than 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current radioactivity discharge permit for 60 minutes or longer.F](3) Sample analysis for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate greater than 2 times the OlNI, t ,, pc .... efflu ... znt ....... cntrllin .......) limits for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a potential decrease in the level of safety..efthe-pl'atplant s~4~tv as indicated by a low-level radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time (e.g., an uncontrolled release).

It includes any gaseous or liquid radiological release, 45 monitored or un-monitored, including those for which a radioactivity discharge permit is normally prepared.Nuclear power plants incorporate design features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment.

Further, t.here are e,\dministrative controls are established to prevent unintentional releases, and to control and monitor intentional releases.

The occurrence of an extended, uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment is-iiadiea'ive-e*idicates degradation in these features and/or controls.Radiological effluent EALs are aIso-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Releases sheuld-will not be prorated or averaged.

For example, a release exceeding 4 times release limits for 30 minutes does not meet the EAL.EAL # 1 -This EAL addresses normally occurring continuous radioactivity releases from monitored gaseous or liquid effluent pathways.EAL #2 -This EAL addresses radioactivity releases that cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed 2 times the limit established by a radioactivity discharge permit. This EAL will typically be associated with planned batch releases from non-continuous release pathways (e.g., radwaste, waste gas).EAL #3 -This EAL addresses uncontrolled gaseous or liquid releases that are detected by sample analyses or environmental surveys, particularly on unmonitored pathways (e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, etc.).Escalation of the emergency classification level e*I-¢'.: be.-'4auscs IC RAI.Technical Spcifi."catic~nc or, plont. th-at ... ha-ve^ i-"..

G~eneric Letter 89 0 4 ,-.he.RETS'or OD!C"M"::

me:':-Ia :.thodo-g Prch-u:::b u'c, ed-: fPr e chn'ter-itrthh,-.fr hc C 46 proecented in the P.ETE ar ODCM. It is recagnizcd that a calculated EAL v'alue may be b'elow-....,.................

ma n...t be .........Tchnca a trli,. nc rea1e related....

r ..........

t.h.erefr it ic impFr~trnt

+that the a+cccated, EAL .and b.acis clearl!y identify an.. limitati+n on.. the ucec or availablity of_ th-- e moni.tore.+

....m..it .ma ...n.. +it advntaeou to ad...c gacaul..4

... andp liui rlacec wl--'th'oar., esceedingl2 tims re..lcac cotrel limit.+-- can .tralin dacurnen.

typiall For EAL #2 "/alues in this EAL shauld be 2 times the setpaint establishedJ by the ra Jatvt icag emtt wr farlaeta snti comp.ianc

.. th thecpei..

ied.+Dc-velep-ere sho~uld rcsearch radiatione moniter design dacu'ments or other infcr..-moatie source+ t ensure that I)J the EAL '+..u b.in. con sidered is++.- wihi th usab4",le.

and+I It is recognized that" the condition de ....ib.d by thi:s IC may result in a radi:-la-:c-'

effluent -ve!uc bey=.d the .p.....n :-r d'icptay, :rane'i ef theita .. d .affen .......t:r. ,n esti.mate4'-alcutat~ed manitar recading is g:'ater than.....:..

,.pe ,,cl ,.o0_ ^ef. the hi.he.t......t lndicat.ica's from" re-l tim d.... prajcti- system a-e net included in the- ge~neric '.

fem^ a perimeter mnito-ring system arc not included..in the generi.. EALs.controlledan m.aintained..

to. the .,~ l...l a plant" equipment, er witkhin the ..... of the plant'De-..'ezper

he'-'! kz~p in m:id: the reqii:."rmnt:

sI' 10 CFR 5.....~ aed ..... gu ..... pvls ..... IP ..........

..... .-pz,,, z imas:1.me

....... zccn+id:r.

the sd-itizn afstc*Nr effic-eant zsssitscs 47 appfevakw*WbE nz. In aiditi~n, rzadingz may bc infli ly r~guz~t tz iiwIud~ an EAL uaing a;icn~J ty envlrznm~ntai zr zthcr ,.~rirn~tzr mznitcrinz

~vztcm: zn a za~z cv z~z ~t~CL AzIanm~nt Attributz~:

3.I.LH 48