NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 4

Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 4

ML16071A160
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, Vogtle, Farley
Issue date:	03/03/2016
From:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16071A108	List: ML16071A110 ML16071A126 ML16071A132 ML16071A136 ML16071A137 ML16071A140 ML16071A144 ML16071A146 ML16071A147 ML16071A149 ML16071A150 ML16071A152 ML16071A153 ML16071A158 ML16071A160 ML16071A166 ML16071A170 ML16071A174 ML16071A176 ML16071A180 ML16071A181 ML16071A184 ML16071A185 ML16071A187 ML16071A188 ML16071A193 ML16071A195 ML16071A198 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 1 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 2 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 3 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 2: EAL Deviations and Differences Maxtrix (Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle) Part 4 of 4 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 3: Hatch EAL Calculations - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 3 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 4: EAL Verification and Validation Documents - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 6 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 2 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 3 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 4 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 5 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 6 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 7 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 8 of 8 NL-15-1898, Enclosure 5: Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes - License Amendment Request for Changes to EAL Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant. Part 1 of 4 ... further results
References
NL-15-1898
Download: ML16071A160 (47)

Text

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 5 Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITIONS, THRESHOLD VALUES, AND BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND.............................................................

1 1.1 OPERATING REACTORS ............................................................................

1I 1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)...........................

1 1.3 NRC ORDER EA-12-051.....................................................................

2 1.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION

...................................

12 1.5 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY

...........................................................

13 2 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS......................

21,3123, 2.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

..............................................................

2 l2 I4-2.2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY........................................................2223 2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS.........................

22 2.4 CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION

................. 2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF IMMIINENT CONDITIONS

......................................... 2.6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UJPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING

..... 2.7 CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS...........................................

242 2.8 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS.........................................

242 2.9 AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION....

25232 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS ...........

263637 4 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS .......5113533 5 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS ....78787 6 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS.........................................

8181.83 7 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS .......................................................................

110110111 8 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS ..........................................

139,38-140 APPENDIX A -ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

........................................

A-1 A*rEIliUI u r EmI ti -- Ul:rlFII I IUflO,,...,,.,....,,,.,,,,..,....,...,,

OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND 1.1 OPERATING REACTORS Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Energy, contains the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations that apply to nuclear power facilities.

Several of these regulations govern various aspects of an emergency classification scheme. A-review -f-theTh relevant sections !Ibted belaw': will aid the reader in un............

th ..... te..........gy preyidead in Scti;on 3.0 offor this document are:,* 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(1)(i)

• 10 CFR § 50.47(b)(4)

• 10 CFR § 50.54(q)* 10 CFR § 50.72(a)* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.B, Assessment Actions* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.C, Activation of Emergency Organizationlhsce regulations are supplemented by va-ioieas-regulatory guidance documents.

44e-l)ocuments of particular relevance to NEI 99-01 eaei-miclude:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1980. [Refer to Appendix 1, Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants]NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR § 50. 72 and § 50. 73 Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors 4-he-abve~elhis list is not all-inclusive.

wnd41t is strongly recommended that scheme developers consult with licensingLand regulatory compliance personnel to identify and understand all applicable requirements and guidance.

Questions say-also may be directed to the NEI Emergency Preparedness staff.1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)Selected guidance in NEI 99-01 is applicable to licensees electing to use their 10 CFR 50 emergency plan to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32 for a stand-alone ISFSI. The emergency classification levels applicable to an ISFSI are consistent with the requirements of 1 0 CFR § 50 and the guidance in NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-I1.

The initiating conditions germane to a 10 CFR § 72.32 emergency plan (as described in NUREG-1 567) are e'ibs',med-contained within the classification scheme for a 10 CFR §50.47 emergency plan.The generic ICs and EALs for an ISFSI are presented in Section 85, ISFSI ICsiEALs.

IC E-HU I covers the-speetrw:i-0f credible natural and man-made events included within the scope of an ISFSI design. This IC is not applicable to installations or facilities that *nay process and/or repackage spent fuel te.g., a Menier: .......

Sterage....

Facility' cr an ISFS at ...... f..e, pc........

I-addieltrAdditionlaIlx, appropriate aspects of IC HUI and IC I-AlI shu4vill also be included to address a HOSTILE ACTION directed against an ISFSI.The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-l 1140, A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.

NUREG-1 140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to public health and safety. This evaluation shows that the maximum offsite dose to a member of the public due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed I rem Effective Dose Equivalent.

.........un.. r.........

s 2....2 .. em rgnc plan arc... gcncral ..............

ith......

for The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 11, 2-O42011 , was the result of a tsunami that exceeded the plant's design basis and flooded the site's emergency electrical power supplies and distribution systems. This caused an extended loss of power that severely compromised the key safety functions of core cooling and containment integrity, mtad ultimately led-Icadino to core damage in three reactors. -While-A ithouch the loss of power also impaired the spent fuel pool cooling function, sufficient water inventory was maintained in the pools to preelede-picx cnt fuel damage from the loss of cooling.Following a review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the NRC concluded that sevefa measures were necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii).

Amoang them to pfe4de)nc such meas~ure that each spent fuel pool be providcd with reliable level instrumentation to significantly enhance the ability of key decision-makers to ecl'cctix cily allocate resources effeetively-following a beyond design basis event. To this end, the NRC issued Order LA- 12-051!, Issuance of Order to Modif Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, on March 12, 2012, to all US nuclear plants with an operating license, construction permit, or combined construction and operating license.NRC Order EA-12-051 states, in part, "All licensees

... shall have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel:

(1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred." Toethi5 end, aAll licensees must t herc Iorc provide:* A primary and back-up level instrument that will monitor water level from the normal 2 level to the top of the used fuel rack in the pool..* A display in an area accessible following a severe event;-maid.

• Independent electrical power to each instrument channel and p*e4ean alternate remote power connection capability.

NEI 12-02, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, 'To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

", provides guidance for complying with NRC Order EA-12-051I.

NEI 99-01, Revision 6, includes three EALs that reflect the availability of the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation associated with NRC Order EA-12-05 1. These EALs are included within existing IC RA2, and new ICs RS2 and RG2. Associated EAL notes, bases and developer notes are also provided.It is recommended that these EALs be implemented when the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation is available for use.The regulatory process that licensees follow to make changes to their emergency plan, including non-scheme changes to EALs, is 10 CFR 50.54(q).

In accerdance

with thi'&reguileae!4, !,icensees are responsible for evaluating a proposed change and determining whether or not it results in a reduction in the plan>'s effectiveness-ef the-pl=n.

AS-arfe':'u1!

..... healeeI *efsa~cd on this determination, the licensee will either make the change or submit it to the NRC for prior review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.3 2I K£L' TighRMiNlOGYi l SED~ INl NESSl Thcrc arc cral kcy tcm~ that appcar thrcughcut thc NEI 99 01 rncthcdclcgy.

Thczz tcrrn~ arc intrcduccd in thb zcctizn tz ~uppcrt ur.dzrztanding zf~ubc.zqucnt matcrial.

As an aid tz the reader, the follewing taHe is previded a~ an aver.iew t3 illuctrate th. relatianehip af the terme tz each ether.Emergency CIez~ificaticn Level GE+ + + +-4~e~g -k~g -4~g~efidi*4eti

~ei~di~ieft

~end~ieft Ce6di4ieft

+ + + +-Effiefgefley Aet4eft-be~ekd)

Ae~efi-be~4+~)

.-O~e~ng-Mede App~ieebili4y

.-Nete~ .44ete~ oNctee (1) When making an emergcr.cy cla~ificatien, the Ernergcney Directer muet ecn~ider all infermatian having a bearing an the preper a~zezrnent af an Initiating Conditien.

This includc~ the Ec~crgcney Actien Level (EAL) plus thc ae~ociatcd Operating Mzdc Applicability.

N3tce and thc informing Bazi~ infcrmaticn.

Ir. thc Recegnitien Catcgery F matriee~.

EAL~ arc refcrrcd te ae Fic~ien Preduct Barricr Thre~hcIde:

the threeh3lde eer;c the earnc funetien a~ an EAL.2.1

'.-LAS£.iFicATI.oh LEVEL .(ECLU ,(NPCl f::r zti :r.mrrn eve:.nt econditon:

aeemrdi.ne.

ts (; n. ,te'ntial cr act",al ettecte Cr ecnceguer.cee.

ana t~e) rc~uIt1ng cre.~tc ana attett rezpcr.ze actizr.~.

I cc emer~cnc', elazificatian leveL, in azccndin~z erder of ecvcritv.

arc: I U ft.CtitieCtIOr.

ci Uflu~uai tveni I~7~UUL)5-Aleit* Site Area Emergency (SAE)* General Emergency (GE)2.1.1 r'otl~i~catcn at Unusual Ev'ent (NU-LUE)".....sfe'afte lnta indiat a..... eecri thr" .... fa~cility preteeticn been' ..... of =n i ' ofn~e zwt.'nzo I!c:+ Uc:~ vn ...........

e .........zie~pefi ~nic~~, h Netitieatier-ef i E .-ve iit, l NOUE ed 1[.......l Ever-d ...... ue ,{ inter....

e ... thre .,. .... t.hl....is

.......

P:rpoEo: T~he pu.rpece of thic c!a ificatien ic tc aco--e .. hat. fir.. t e... ep in.. futur; ,,- ...pr..vide c .". yctematic 0 f unucual ecent .inf--crm..

at...on and deccionc:

making.E-vntz ar-e in pregreco or ha-ve occu'rrd -which invole!' an act.ual or potential cubotantial Pu."oe:; T~e pur"poce of thic claccification ic to accure that e.-mergency persc.nne area;vailable to reopond if the cit'.ation bvccmec more ceriouc er to perform co.n.irmator"y reSadiatio monito'ring.-

if req...uired an r:i.4 offoit ....horitie; ..u....nt 2.1.3 Site Area Emergency!.ad to the likel failur .. f or 2.. thtpeet fetv o the protection of the public. Anyrleccaro

............

to .............

in .........l..* .hich exc EPA PAG ecopocure levels beyond the ci+te boundary..

cituatio0n bte......

more serious, to providec

"":ith off.it ....h.iti.:,:

and. to pro~ioe u~xtarcc to tne puictie rnrougn government aurnorniec.

2.1.1 General Emergency (GE)Event are in progreec or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for Ieee of eontai~ent inte~ity or HOSTILE ACTION that reculte in an actual be: of phycical control of the facility.

Releacec can be reaconablv expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure leveL offeite for more than the immediate cite area.Purpose: The purpoce of the Generel Emergency declaration ic to initiate predetermined protective aetionc for the public, to provide continuouc acoccement of information from the licensee and offeite organizational mcoeurementc, to initiate additional meocurec no indicated by actual or potential releacec, to provide concultation with offeite authoritice, and to p;~vide update: for the public through government authentic:.

5 2.2 INMTIATr"C CO,".DITION' .ftC', A....n...r..

..................

th th de .....n... t....n.....f ce ofhe four emergency..f.....h.m.....th.....f....i.n of an cemergencey elaeoifieation level .... An IC e v earthquake) or the otatuc of ne.: or more tficrion produet boarriero (e~g., bes of the R.CS Appendix I of NUREG 06551 doec not contain Em*ergeney Action Level'that a radiological

.............

r....n. tha ...uld lead to.4 a radiological ernergene',, hoc" oeercd). NUR.EG 0655 cs -.th;:at the Initiating Con~ditione form the bacic for 2.3 El~tEItcu.c';

ACTIO' IATVLL (EAL)A pre detemiined, cite opecifie, ob~er.ahle threohcld for an Initiating Condition that, when met or exceeded.

placce the plant in a given emergency claccifleation level.Di~cu~doni EAL otaternents may utilize a variety of criteria including inotniment readingo and otatuc indiectiono:

oboer'~'able event; reoulto of caleulationo and anal>...., entry into particular procedurec:

and the occurrence of natural phenomena.

2. FI'e;t~lto\

Pl~ltO-iB uc"T B.Juunllll TiinE~llfil Dice-u:sion:

Fission product baraier thresholds r.eprecent threatos to the defen.ce in..n.ir:..m.nt.

Thic cocnept, reliec on multiple phycical barre-; any.... one"of whic, it products to the environment. primar .fission produact barriers are: 5-IFue! C~ttd* eco Coolanm nt 'ce RS Upon determination that, one or more tfiosion product barrier thresohodo have been the ficirit-.

rod,-ct harr~ier IC,'AL criteria:

to .dete,'i-.-.ie the acaronriate ECL.tn come accident sequences, ttoe ft/c and EALs precented in the Abnormal 6 Radiatbn Le~L/ Radiclzgical Et'f1u~nt (A) Rezzgniticn Catzgory will b~ ~xc:zd~d a~thc zamc time, 3r ~hortIy Qfi~r, thc Ic~ ~f znz or mzr~z fi~izn product barriers.

This redundancy i~ intentional

~ th~ fcrmcr ICs ~ddrezs radicaeti~'ity reIeazz~ ~t ~ult in eefl~n cffzit~ d~zcz ftom whatz~'~r c~uz~, including cver.t th~ night nct be fully enecmpn~sed by flszien pr~duzt barriers (e.g., spent fuel pool accident, design czntair.nicnt leakage following a LOCA, etc.).7 3 E IONII OF THEI iEIN 0l1i EMERGENCY C L T IF CAT..Oi VII EM A~n efl.e.ctie cmc.rgncy cla..cifleation ocecmc must incorporate a realiotic and n1eat-..n ano. sarety riSro in ir.e.

or ze'-a" tn:reat t:'ra an or*ha ma .....ur. during an. ea.uai.n..

^- NEI 99 01 eme.rgency clacoification schem-e Regu...at..ry C"omi.o:ion (NRC) otaff:i accordance with the requirement:

of 10 CFR g prov'ided in NUR.EG 1022. Certain evcnto repertable under the pro-viciono ef 10 CFR §.......d ... talg ..a...........i.g Conditi.n. (IC) with,, the appropriate it w;as n.... ar t" deeri..t....ib te each......

.............

.- Thec go-l .f.............

....nsw flwIng ......u.rce .p ¢roie ......io a n............ nth dev' elopments of[C*T~piea! abnormal oan emergency..p.rat.ng procedure

.o....p...n....

and traoiio ..riteri.£ Typical Technical Specification limits and controls I Environmental Protection Agency (EiPA) Protectfive Action Guidelinco (PAGo)* IJE 0rt. 651..,,.r rn A ppendi.x,.

I, Emer~ge;==*

,:.fctl Lo;'c! Co:idclihesfe., Niwckcer Pox.v....U Industry Operating Experience

• Input from indentry subject mattecr expert and NR.C satafmembcro; The. , following ECL...........

w..ere c..aed...

th Re.........n...

Prpaato Team.....

toai in* "i-go (.g...

Emergency Director underotand whya., particula ic in thic documentA.... .........................

..........

........ ......- ..... ... ... ..... ... .. ..... .........

.1h ..... ot rittz irFLhc=,:

.fe L=.y b.. .. .i ..... .......t t t .........................

of EAL chat~gc is unacceFptbl 8

The attributes cf each ECL Notifleatien zf Unu~uaI E~ar~ nre~ented below. A Netificatien cC Unucual Went, as defincd in ~ec~iCn 2.1.1, ineludee but L nzt limited te an ecnt Cr ezndition that in;'ehee: (A)A preeor~Cr tC a mere zigr.ifieant e~'ent Cr eCnditiCn.(B) A mincr loc~ cC contrel ef radiCaeti~c matcriaI~

or the ab:lity tC ccnttzl radiatien leveL within the plar.t.(C)A cen~egUn~.

~ .,.. .Ignificant cr.cugh tC warrant nct:ficctien to Lea!, State and Federal authCritics.

3. 1.2 Alen An Alert, as defined in cectiCn 2.1.2, includec but is net limited to an event or-~~ndition that invohee: (A)A less er petential

!CcC of either the fuel clad or Reacter Coelant Syctem (RCS)fiscion product barrier.(B) An event Cr eCflditien that significantly reduece the margin to a Ices ~r petential Ices Cf the Cue! clad Cr RCS fleeiCn preduct barrier.(C) A cignificant IC~C Cf cCntrel Cf radicactive metcr~ale rezu!ting in an inability te eontrCl radi~iCn leveL within the plant. Cr a releace Cf radicactive materiaL te the envlrCnment that could recult in deece greater than 1% Cf an EPA PAG at or be~nd be~d~(D)A HOSTILE ACTION eccurring within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.including tbCec directed ~t an lndcper.dcnt Spent Fuel Sterage InctcilatiCr. (ISFEt).3.1.3 Site Area Emergency A Site ~Area Emergency, as defined in eectiCn 2.1.3, includee but ic not limited to an event or condition that involvee: (A) A Icee CT petential Ieee cC any twe fiezior. product barriere fu~I clad. RCS and/er ee~ein1~eR~, (B) A preeurecr event zr cenditicn that may lead to the ieee Cr petential less of multiple fieeien preduct barriere within a relatively shert period of time. Precureor e'.ents and cenditiene of thie type include thoce that challenge the meniterir.g and/or contrel ot multiple eafety sycteme.(C) A release ef radienetive materials te the envirenment that eculd result in dCeee greater than 10% ef~ EPA PAG at ar beyend the cite beundary.9 KU, IL- AU *O, ,, c.,u.... withi.n the p!lant PRO IECI ED A.REA.tor. cdtan thatPGa in ar e c:,ndtesebods.(A)Lrea ac!nyP tw o tfein r !dut barr...r...A

....... ar ..t..... lac of the.. thid. ar..(E) A precu .... :a r dinsight fro t, snmitialstedma leeifi t-ap*-;

laze of.a...thr........

diretribyo to care damage agdlae afrequny tzimany Pnerity.zd ae *. that an blackes t oaFri ....o the it. .... da...... .. .. ..., ( -D)A .HOSTILaE" .a,,, ACIO rculting i la.ze af ....y eaft (r..tiit , ntro.a care .. cainRP ...t..r ar RSihet r.s emoel r dmgent-to a se:...,nt fl.....Emerg'ncy prprdnensio ic rtea! defnc in dpther mteiasury hti indrgencydent afaa th nc impleednit cfrom an paroeticula actidonts.~

cc; ~ te eeamn fa 2e Feciv emsergen crlasage a-cation Chemcatmnta bertist frmn rhenoiena risk. :'aned coezmnitionuls.

T"ai t hyt eanthiin dcontairnent ansignment~b aofe cer!taing Iseqande 10

3. PSAs indicated that leading ecntributo~rs to latent fatnities vwere sequences inv-okving c.nain. n fa... .ilur.. a Station Blackout lasting longer "t'an the site specific coping to be sufficient!:.'

rigorous ad...s ths .....en....i. a. timely fashi.on.*:e.'nt based ICc rand EALs. Each is discussed below:.Symptom based ICs and EALs arc parameters or conditions that arc measurable normal,-,'

reactor .............

at..or ..ill implement prcedures to identif the probable ..u... an,...take corrective action.EAL: that refer specifically tcte level ' o... ' ha-"-"ge toth prin barie: ag.in. th.. e, The. barrier based. Is oad EAs con..id.r the , lev'el of challenge to each individual"-

barrier potentially lost and lost an.-d the total number of barricr under ehallenge.

or .. actual sfety sigi, ..... Thee includ.e th.e failur ..f. an au..omati, reactor.........i to ..hut.do.n.th...reacto., natu...l phnom.'ena (e.g., an," earthqakte), or7 man.made suc:'h as a toxeas! -- rclsaas.3.3 I~SSS IIESICN DIFrEttENCE~

amon. P,,WR NSSs; th.e.rfo, gu.. dance. is provided to cai in the dev'elopmen~t of EAL: S Advan:eed PBoiling Water Reactor (ABPr),te*

Adv ^and .. re.. sur... d W.aA ter÷ Rea.t.r (i T R)sIY' anda the Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPDD \operating charac.teristics w-hen coner;:ting t.he g..n.eri..

guid..ce *.of thi document into.a site specific classification scheme. The goal is to mzaintain as much fideltyb as possible to pas;sive reactor ma~y need to add, modify or delete some info..rma.-tion econtained in this scheme appro;val procss=.designs. An Emer'ge-cy Cl"ssiflea:io Scheme for this type of plan:t sho:uld be developed--'

11

.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF The scheme's is organized by Recognition Category in the following order.R -Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent -geeti~-6 C -Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction

-4eetien 7 E -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) -Seemien-F -Fission Product Barrier -Seetief 9 H -Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety -Seetie, n,19 S -System Malfunction -Setez e! -!* EC!, the a~cigned emergency lcci,.fi.catien' Ie!-,: for the IC.U Ini.tiat+ing Cecnd'tion'

......e a- ...m..... d, ce...iptie

... th, emergency

....nt o r EAL) ar applic....

blet (i.e., ar " t. b......d t.o evente or ....iti:r; ...* Em-e:rgncy:%

Ac;i-n L .... I/ Pro;videc repo.rt and ;indication° ,that ..... concidere t meect the intent of the IC. Developers cho~uld address c2e x..m EAL. If the generic approach to develo~pment of a eom EAL canno.t b ue (...g. , a..attempt to epecify' an alerat ..........

for idetifying entr.. ir.to +theIC For R~ecognition Catege.r' F, the ficcion product barrer thrccholdc r p.........

in : dere ..f. barrier challenge (i.e., poten:tial locs or loc). Thic pr....t.t..

meth..odk-sho-'vc the sy'nergicm

..mong the ....... accurate................

the IC an..d EALc. In scme c"cec, the bacis nace incl'udec relevant sc'urce informa~otio~n an~d EALo. The may in~clude elarificationa, referren ., c.mpk.., inm.ct~eionc for claccisficatian scherne bacizs docu-ment.

DU-..c kpcr. may elect to include'..

info~rmation t .... J m w LUL .~.s~uEnment i.urmnurec Locaica wunin inc ueveioper r~orec cecuon.*1 *. al

• I...................

u.....e.....

aocig.".."g i."c :te to a given- LIJL..12

.5 Ic AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY the applieability, of ICc -a-nd EALs -;i'll v'a-y with plant mode. For example. seine or hot ctandby!chutdewvn modec af pe.ration

when all praduet; barrier are in plece, and pla~nt inetrumentation an.d safety cycteme are fully operati.anal. .n..h.....d shutdown

and refu-eling

....... different cymptom baed an AL .i.l :oent The following table shows whehRecognition Categories eve-applicable in each plant mode. The ICs and EALs for a given Recognition Category axe applicable in the indicated modes.MODE APPLICABILITY MATRIX Category Mode R C E F HI S Power Operations X X X X X Startup X X X X X Hot Standby X X X X X Hot Shutdown X X X X X Cold Shutdown X X X X Refueling X X X X Defueled X X X X Permanently, 13 Voatlc t nits I and 2 I1 ethnical ~Specifications "ibl H o ides thc lbollovhig operating niodc definiiitions:

Reactih itD % Rated MIode 'litl Condition Thermal Ai erage R( S (Ke~rr) c rO, 'em perature ("F)I Povscr Operation 0.99 >5 NA 2 Stailup " 0.99 < 5 NA 3 tHot Standby 0.99 NA > 350 4 I lot Shuido\, 0.99 NA 350 > I,,: 200 5 ('old Shutdovanib')

<: 0.99) NA 200 6 Refuelingc:

1 NA NA NA~tt~S ,H (a) 1Excludinig decay heat.(b)(c)All rcactor \cssci head closure bolts fully tcnsioncd.

One or morc reactor csscl head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.

Ini addition to I hese identified nodles, "Al)etue led" is also applicahlc to I he Vogtle I AI, schernc. consistcnt vs hh NEI 199-01 guidance.

D efucled is a 'No Mode' condition ,a here a!l of thc f'uel has been remnoved foro thc reactor cssel (i~c.. hilll core ofhload during refuecling or extended outages).l hcsc modes arc uscd throughoutl thle 'Vow~tle I-Al s xith no niodifications from NI- 99-01\\, hcn a unit is dctuelcd, thc Initiating Conditions dcsignated as Mode Condition "A I ." or"lDct'elcd'" arc applicable.

T 'a WPzwzOpcrat'cn. (I.: McdcSichi u cr PcfuJc (-w.ith all '.'c'.cl, hcad bolts fully tcncizncdl)

D .... Shutcw"t.na

' ( .).... S ..it.h in Sh%,dKn>14rg ccc clntTrprtr 20 0

~,99 Startup (2): Reaetcr Power ~ 5%, K~,ff 0.99 Wt Standby (3): RCS 350 0 F, Keff 0.99 Het Shutdcwn (1): 200 0 F -RCS 350 0 F, Ke Celd Shutdcwn (5): RCS -200 0 F, Kcff- 0.99 Refueling (6): One er mere ~'esscI head closure bclt Ie~ than fully tenciened Dcvc1zpc~

ill need te ~nec~or~c tkz mede erilc~a from ~it ~p~eific Technical Specificatiene into their emergency cla~ificaticn echeme. In additien, the scheme muet aLe include the fellewine mcdc decienetien ecceifie te NEI 99 01

I IJetuelci I 1'~cne)

AU tuel remz~'ed tram tfle reactor ~c~ccl I~rf*4I care clilend during refucline er er.tendcd cutaceL 15 A SITE-DPECIFI SCHEME DEVDELOPMEN This section provides dctaiLxl guidane.z fcr de~ eloping a site specific emergency classification scheme. Conceptually, the approach discussed here mirrors the approach used Ic prepare emergency operating procedures generic material p~pared by reactor ~endor owners groups is ccn~erted by eash nuclear power plant into site specific emergency operating procedures.

Likewise, the emergency classification scheme dx.'elcper will use the generic guidance in NE!99 01 to prepare a site specific emergency classification scheme and the associated basis dee*imefi, It is impertant that the NEI 99 0! emergency classification scheme be implemented as an integrated package. Selected use of portions of this guidance is strongly discouraged as it will lead to an inconsistent or incomplete emergency classification scheme that will likely nct reeer.e the neec:;sarv reaulator; anaroval.1.t CI7J~ERAL lMPLEMENTATIO~.

(~UIDANCE The guidance..

in 01 not intendedl to b applied to plants ... "s is";...hov'::'ev, de-velopers should attempt toc keep theicr site speci',c scheme *'s close to thec goal till! result in a shorte an.. les cum....ber....ome N ... revi.. and approval pro....,.l..r.l.n.

nt.it t he......h..m...........

th...r nuclear powe*r, pant and better....di...u...d..in.S...tion 3 ,te, gneric g~uidance"in.ludes I and... exml .. ~....It is the intent of this guidance that beth be included in si:te ,pecific dceuaments as each...... a specific purpose. The ,,C i* th.e fi.d.....

event or condition requiring a!fan IC or EAL inelu-des explicit refernce to a mode depen'dent specification....li.it.tha.

..is not appli.ab..t...h.plnt, then that IC and.'er EAL need net be documentation to justf h h Ca o EAL-. wer.........inco....

ora.. ed (i....e., sufficent det..ail.

to allow- a third p ' to und.......d..the.deci.i........to inco .o..t the generic Usfl coym n abeiain ascitd+ihte E 9 1eerec 16 Defin~tieR=.

B¢law. wze exam"apecs af acccptable mcdi.ficaticns te the generic guidan:ce.

Thecec........ic. : ........ (e.g., ctt ...i :th a_ .... ' Emergen~cy at the'. lef~t.'p ef a uce.aid, fofa. e ...Site. Area Emergncay, Alert and NOUE).aprovided the wchang i changd thrug Uior all ,Af th a.... e C dnifee"a"(for Abna~e!ale may. be':~ chrgedte a R (fctr Radiati h ). Thcz meact. T ese rf-a achmceatedIc:

aroulstd be chagdt U ,.2 .~ ,ec aremmonspreent -tian method one'! .tabe.roi th.. t al w relg atyd .............

madEA pLismcabilty "r:equiremene aret maintind -.cr'bcv!-s* The I,. an EALe, Op ratn Em.ergency Dir~eeb rjuget n ccty relatedacmz3 .... t may-.,t.-be,,placed unde,,r, ReoniinCategor......

17

• The seceme fac!iitat.s -an do......ad inc of the emcreencv classification w ia ;o:a~es eioosinc:auon 01[

events3 or, conanicos.

4.3 INSTIlUMENTATION liNED ron EALN lr.strumcntation referenced in EAL statement should include that described in the emergency plan section which add.-esscs 10 CFR 50.17(bflS) and (9) and/or Chapter 7 ot the ESAR. Instrumentation used for EALo aced not be safety rclated, addressed by a Technical Specification or ODCMJRETS control reguiremont, no~ powered from an emergency power source; ho;;ever, EAL dc slopers should strive to incorporate instrumentation that is reliabic and routinely maintained in accordance with site programs and procedures.

Alanns refereneed in EAL statements should bo those that arc the most oporationally significant for the described event or condition.

Scheme developers should ensure that specifiod value 0 used as EAL setpoints are within the calibratad range of the referenced instrumentation, and consider any automatic inotrumentation functions that may impact acourata EAL assesoment.

In addition, EAL sctpoint values should not use tenno such as "off scale low" or "off scale high" since that type of reading may not bc readily differentiatcd from an instrument failure. Findings and violations related to EAL instrumentation issuss may be located on the NRC website.1.1 PRENE'~TA1ION OF ScItEt~tr INrOnM.~TION TO ISEItN maintain thc capability to assess, an'd declare- an.......

-,-emergenc promptly**-.

classification, pracdure and creating related user aids, the dve-'eoper must detenn-..ine the pres.ntatio mehod.s. best the en=d users by facilitating

..ccurate an timely'emergency classification.

To. this.! end, develop.Frs should considecr the following pont..;..* The first users of an emergency classification proed~ure-

.... op.....era.tors in,: th.,.responsibility tc perform othe .riica tasks, i. and will likely hav minima : assistance...

Opertions:

Facility (EO,).ma~king a~n emergency classification, a..rd w'ill probably" have ad*visor from Operations:

available to help them.18 eme~rgency cl-.,+oification scheme int.,'mat+ion may b....d.v-lp f.r...b..

mr.nc Directoro and'ar Gif.hite Response Organizati!on peroonel...alb..d...

acetal p, .........

meth. d provid...

d thatao it ccntaino all the inf-rationr L ance yt make ... corr.......m.....n..

c......itcto.....

inorat;.in.lud. I¢s. Opratin:g Modea Ap.plicab~lity.

critaria EALz a.-d !Notc. NIotee may bc a Notc jo a~cceptabio ac lang ao the inf'orm'ation iz .ad....... "c apturcd a n tha ...llbo..ar walloar -it Thoul bc~n~m readil ava^ilabi to: cmer--ney

..... ific.ati.n

.Altarnatho' presentation methkod.a for thc Recognition Cat.egory F iCea nda fission product.type+ tab.,o. Dv.... r mu..... ,e...... that the cite opecifi .. method +adr......al

,, ...a.,e fission praduct. barrier table:> The NRC i+tf conoid.ers the preoentation method of the cteor F..

t.. be. an im...rant u.... aid anda may reguect a chagetoa prtcuar roosd mthd f mon ohe recoothechng isneeoar ta Ermt cnlistency acrass. ind " t.... h h.. 15 l~Tr.cti~.Tiox or IC~!EAL~ wITH PLA~.T PnocrDunts A rgorusin+graia of IC<- and~ AL rcfercnc...... pla--nt"perating p "foedu+re&.

is -nat occaur if recognition of mcctin:g an IC or EAL is based s~alvl on the memory of a !ilaarz.d.........r.a Emre......ncy

......,... 'ia'" during period.s of high sotress.D-e.cloper+ .houl c-o`:;ider+ ....appoprat viua e.g., a.... n.-

operating procedures that apply' to cold. shutdo.....

an refueling mod.. A so an e xam.nple, a ste.note or.......

cautio+..,n:

could+++ be placed at the beginning of an. PCS leak abno.rm.al operating 1.6 B.tsit~ DOCUMENT A basis document is -a-n integral par-*t of an emergency classification scheme. The material........ +=...... this document supot prope clsifi.. ation" d.ci.. ion.m... in... by.pro..iding da.. i.:^ ,: ...... thz, EA. If p::fe tz hz-a.e IeCr: ..........

..........

N ..TE .th. EAL time .: ha ." e+:e~' ..r -;511 I1tJ= bz e~ceedezl 19

• ~nb Eacrch d !+itoing trainng stuain den makng ani+ h. .scae EaLtual fime: rgen'cy JciA!stictin, if nre.-cccr.

-The:do.um.nt.ic ale ....... ceablihin pcnfiguratio manaemen -for EP: r...ated.

....mcn and -.-:plai....g Aan

~cnc a miimm, the f...ll.owing:

.............di .....u ...sio. n of theerneryn

.alace ficatinaddclaainprcn.eletn h Bca-cthrehlo Oprfc.wat+ing Nateecan infor fation.decision making (e.g.. the Emergency Director Jaff expects that changes to the basic docurnen procicione of 10 CFR 50.51(g).+ far toI it dur..ing++-

an ...nt.. the~ NRCh 1.( L.

• L; ,.,,,U-LtLC LU1 urILipLlt L-xt TlU .ur A* Lt r k *lU POINTll.'tl -ll~lAtl produt a rrier.; thresholds ay be.. draw ... om a'+ ' planf ....an..... hi approachr.

1.8 DE~'ELOPEn AND USER FEEDBACK Qucetione or comments concerning the material in thie document may be directed to the NEI Emergency Preparedness etaff, NFl EAL tack force members or eubmitted to the Emeracacy Preaaredness Frecuently Asked Oucetione croceso.20 52 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONSI GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

............

g-, ..Ior an'. emergency classification, the emergency director must consider all information having a bearing on the proper assessment of an Initiating Condition (IC).This includes the emergency action level (EAL). pkls-the associated operating mode applicability, notes and the informing basis information.

In the recognition category F matrices, EALs are referred to as fission product barrier thresholds; the thresholds serve the same function as an EAL.NRC regulations require the licensee to establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. The NRC staff has provided guidance on implementing this requirement in NSIR/DPR-ISG-0 1, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants.All emergency classification assessments s-eIuld-w ill be based uipon valid indications, reports or conditions.

A valid indication, report, or condition, ne that-has been verified appropriate means. uhta ............

bIet in no doubt regarding the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy.

For example, validation could be thrc-gh an instrument channel check, response on related or redundant indicators, or direct observation by plant personnel.

h e4 !ndications be ..... p .... vahdldtcd in a manner that supports timely emergency declaration.

For ICs and EALs that have a stipulated time duration (e.g., 15 ......,.3.........,........

, the emergency director sh ld-.I not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but shudwill declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. If an ongoing radiological release is detected and the release start time is unknown, it shu4will be assumed that the release duration specified in the IC/EAL has been exceeded, absent data to the contrary.A planned work activity #ht-vet....

....... s tlsrlting in an expected event or condition whieho-tlhal meets or exceeds an EAL does not warrant an emergency declaration provided that 1) the activity proceeds as planned and 2) the plant remains within the limits imposed by the operating license. Such activities include planned work to test, manipulate, repair, maintain, or modify a system or component.

In t4iesesuelh cases, the controls associated with the planning, preparation and execution of the work will ensure *4hat-compliance wsith the opetating license is maintained, with all acpcctc of the pecrazting licence provided t-It-the activity proceeds and concludes as expected.

Events or conditions of this type may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 § CFR 50.72.The asceccment ,ef zSome EALs is-are assessed based on the results of analyses that-ai'necessary to ascertain whether a specific EAL threshold has been exceeded-fe~g., osee.........., chem:ietry ca..pling, RCS* l....r.............

et........

The EAL and/or the associated basis discussion will identify the necessary analysis.

Il+4hese-ceoss

[ he 15-minute declaration period starts with the availability of the analysis results that show the 21 threshold to be exceeded (i.e., this is the time that the EAL information is first available).

The NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to initiate and complete EAL-related analyses within a reasonable period of time (a.g., maintain thec necezsary3 e-xpertie the EALs have been developed to address a full spectrum of possible events and conditions whieha-that may warrant emergency classification, a provision for classification based on operator/management experience and judgment is still necessary.

The NEI 99-01 scheme provides the emergency director with the ability to classify' events and conditions based lipon judgment using EALs that-a-e-econsistent with the emergency classification level (ECL) definitions (refer to Category H). The emergency director will need to determine if the effects or consequences of the event or condition reasonably meet or exceed a particular ECL definition.

A similar provision is incorporated into the fission product barrier tables; judgment may be used to determine the status of a fission product barrier.#n22.2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY To make an emergency classification, the user will compare an event or condition (i.e., the relevant plant indications and reports) to an EAL(s) and determine if the EAL has been met or exceeded.

The evalation:e cCf a'n EAL(s) aluationt must be consistent with the related Operating Mode Applicability and Notes. If an EAL has been met or exceeded, t-he,-the IC is cnti.dere4-met and the associated ECL is declared in accordance with plant procedures.

When assessing an EAL that specifies a time duration for the off-normal condition, the"clock" for the EAL time duration runs concurrently with the emergency classification process "clock." For a full discussion of this timing requirement, refer to NSIRIDPR-ISG-01.CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS Whaen-nth lcx cuct of multiple emezrgency z rent snrergcncics or conditions-are-present, the user will identify all l;AI s met or exceeded-E~.

The highest applicable ECL identified during this review is declared.

For example: If an Alert EAL and a Site Area Emergency EAL are met, -w.hether at cne unit .or at two' diffewnt a Site Area Emergency should be declared.There is no "additive" effect from multiple EALs meeting the sanme ECL. For example: If two Alert EALs are met, whether at ene unit or at tw.o dificrent unit, an Alert sheoi4-x ill be declared.Related guidance coner~ning-,irr classification of rapidly escalating events or conditions is provided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2007-02, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Emergency Notifications During Quickly Changing Events.CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION-The mode in effect at the time that-an event or condition occurred, and prior to 22 any plant or operator response, i.c the mode that dietermines whether or-met-an IC is applicable.

If an event or condition occurs, and results in a mode change before the emergency is declared, the emergency classification level is still based on the mode that existed at the time that the event or condition was initiated (and not when it was declared).-

O nce " a d ffr en m.d. ir o h d any n;w....nt or c nditio,: n.. .r late t., a For eo:ontc that aczur in Cold Shu-tdown or Roefuetng, :ecalation Ic -via =ALc t.hat pro applicabl in Cold. Shudo, o+... -r Rofuoling ,m,.odoc, even if Hot Shutdo-wn (or a higher barrior E..ALe aro appli!cable only to ov-=ntc that initiate in the Hot. Shu-tdow.'n mode orCLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS Although EALs provide specific thresholds, the emergency director must remain alert to events or conditions that could lead to meeting or exceeding an EAL within a relatively short period of time (i.e., a change in the ECL is IMMINENT).

If, in the judgrnent of the emergency director, meeting an EAL is IMMINE.NT, the emergency classification should w~ill be made as if-though the EAL has been met. While applicable to all emergency classification levels, this approach is particularly important at the higher emergency classification levels since it provides additional time for implementation of protective measures.EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING SNCi policy is thati once a'n emergnc.\

classificationi is made, it cannot hc doxsngradcd to a lower class ificat ion. T erm ination criteria cont aitied in procedure N Ml- 110, l-mergencv, ( lassilication and Initial Actions sha~l be completed for an cxcnt to he terminated.

At ternti nat ion. ont an e cot Speci lie has is. the site enter either normal operating conditions or a recovery condition a rccoxcr> orgalli/atio established for turnoxer from the tRO. An- ECL. may. be do-w.ngraded w:hen th een ....r.. e -nditi.. that m'eeta the .highest ....C. " and EAL na langer eciete, and ather- c'ite .p..ifi downgr....;.

......ading be termintd Thefll, wn, a .1-./..ppr..ach to. daw.....adi or ter"minating an ECL ic r.c.mm.nded.

Al4Dawn:grade or te:'minate the emergncye, in accordSance vWsth procedures.

S..;' ite,-"...

Area .....Emergency Terminate the emergency an"d enter recov'ery in 23 lon trm p..... , eam.....

accordance wi'th plant M ...... abz .., g~iuidance concerning classification of rapidly escalating events or conditions is provided in RIS 2007-02.CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS A^ d i ...... in Szzi i ICs and EALs define a variety of specific occurrences that have potential or actual safety significance.

By their nature, some of these events may be short-lived and, ht.u, -'er cnd before the emergency classification assessment can be completed=-.

If an ....... zzr th...at mzzt ...r.. z .zzd an EL t hc dcclaratiz~n. for cxamnplc an earthquake, or 3f s',ch cvznt., inzludc a failure of the reactor protection system to automatically scram/trip the reactor followed by a successful manual scram/trin r..... 1...CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS Many of the ICs and/oee EALs this document employ time-based criteria, The~e critcria will that require t4hat-the IC/EAL conditions be present for a defined period of time before an emergency declaration is warranted.

In cases where no time-based critrionis seci.ed,.t..

rz, .......that some transient conditions may cause an EAL to be met for a brief period of time (e.g.. a fe',- tafre..., mi.nuLes).

The following guidance should be applied to the classification of these conditions.

EAL momentarily met during expected plant response -In in~tances

".-hzreX~hcn an EAL is briefly met during an expected (normal) plant response, an emergency declaration is not warranted provided that associated systems and components are operating as expected, and operator actions are performed in accordance with procedures.

EAL momentarily met but the condition is corrected prior to an emergency declaration

-If an operator takes prompt manual action to address a condition, and the action is successful in correcting the condition prior to the emergency declaration, then the applicable EAL is not considered met and the associated emergency declaration is not requiredv.

Fz ..

............

.hzu f..la..ng

....pl... i c, ampl.presents an illustration:

An ATWS occurs and the auxiliary feedwater system fails to automatically start.Steam generator levels rapidly decrease and the plant enters an inadequate RCS heat removal condition (a potential loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers).

If an operator manually starts the auxiliary feedwater system in accordance with an EOP step and clears the inadequate RCS heat removal condition prior to an emergency declaration, then the classification ill be based on the ATWS only.It is important to stress that the 15-minute emergency classification assessment period is not a "grace period" during which a classification may be delayed to allow the 24 performance of a corrective action that would obviate the need to classify the event;emergency classification assessments must be deliberate and timely, with no undue delays. The provision discussed above addresses only those rapidly evolving situations where an operator is able to take a successful corrective action prior to the emergency director completing the review and steps necessary to make the emergency declaration.

This provision is included to ensure that any public protective actions resulting from the emergency classification are truly warranted by the plant conditions.AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION In some cases, an EAL may be met but the emergency classification was not made at the time of the event or condition.

This sd"-tizn c-'n a, cur -.hcn pl'ersonnel could discover#hmt-an event or condition existed ,hieh-i t,-hat met an EAL, but no emergency was declared, and the event or condition no longer exists at the time of discovery.

4liine maix b the event or condition as not beiivg-recognized at the time, or therean error .....-fiade....in the emergency classification process.In these cases, no emergency declaration is warrante"di-hewevei, but the guidance-ontainiad-in NUREG-1022 is applicable.

Specifically, the event shotald-will be reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.72 within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared event or condition.

The licensee also notify appropriate state and local agencies in accordance with the agreed upon arrangements.

5.10 'RE...........

OF .........C. DLnA..........the rztracticnoz f an emecrgency declarati.cn rcpart, d ta, tc NR.C is dise'caaed in, N.1JREG 1 022.25 63 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RG1 Release of RS1 Release of RA1 Release of RU1 Release of gaseous radioactivity gaseous radioactivity gaseous or liquid gaseous or liquid resulting in offsite resulting in offsite radioactivity resulting radioactivity greater dose greater than 1,000 dose greater than 100 in offsite dose greater than 2 times the mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem TEDE or 500 than 10 mrem TEDE OI)XMfs4.te

.... iri mrem thyroid CDE. mrem thyroid CDE. or 50 mrem thyroid efflent-ireleae Op. Modes: All Op. Modes: All CDE. cznt....n do- c a ......Op. Modes: All limits for 60 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: All RG2 Spent fuel pool RS2 Spent fuel pool RA2 Significant RU2 UNPLANNED level cannot be leve at 019to leve lowering of water level loss of water level restored to at least t 4 s~cfi 3 above, or damage to, above irradiated fuel......e~c v ............

d ..... ,, Ievcl 3). irradiated fuel. Op. Modes: All Op. Modes All Op. Modes:" All..... t- ..... lexcl 3)for 60 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: All RA3 Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.____________________________Op.

Modes: All 26 RG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director sheitkwil1 declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (sitz spezifc dc~ rccptzr pc,:nt)thc et (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond {(~espte pcl.e-d4ese

• Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public.Radiological effluent EALs are also-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions 27 NZ~4Moe~ o~

alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

[he monitor reading threshold values are determined using a dose as~sessment method that back calculates horo the dose values s 1~ci l~ed inl thle IC. I he nmeteorolo)g and source term (noble gases. particulates, and halogens)used are the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold

,,altues in los RS 1 and RA1 IlIis protocol \ill maintain intervals btw.t\een the threshold valoes for the three classifications.

Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed, and the threshold values are based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of 11000 ml~hour ,a hole bod\ or 50)00 mR/hour thy roid. xxhichlever is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Th eiu.. nt .... z!"EAI " are included te pro;vide a bacis f-r cla"ifyin:

...en... tha .......pre-vides di;versity and may b~e usred ta elaasc.y events that ",vul:d net reach the cam EC baeden lan sttu erthefisie preduc mat.. a+e.e. 1- Far m':any ...th.............d in Updte Final. Safety Analy.....i..

Rpe.dut, the discimiato wil net1 b o thAum ef f,,s;i.n praduet ehallenge&

but* rathr the ....unt f radioactivi:,t-r.. l...ase to the equivcralnt (CDE).AFar.the.p..p

.....f.the.e.........

tedc quantity.......t..tal.

efeciv ..... .c Sequvln .......,.as.........in..10....

§ 0..is....d.i.lieu...................nd.CED...

mrmThemd,-e. , EP.P...dac pra......

fo.r th ...... ef adult thvr,,, ..... o enver..i; n , ete.,o:_S Monitor readings e atmacicherie dicrer ill be calculated ucing a cet af~sian facte~; the data or ficeters 28 iccumea metcarelegicai data Cr celected for use chauld be the came ac those employed toc th; monitor readings for ICc PA I and RS !. Acceptable so'urees of this include, but are not limited to, the P.ETS/ODC.M rand ;values u.sed in the site's emergence, dee az..:ment methodology.

• Th.e calc..lation of-^: m ..it .reading...il also require of an assumed r!eleas isotopic mix;RA I and PRS 1. Acceptable sources of'this3 info.rmatio.n include, but' are not limited to, the RETS!ODCM and v:alues used in the site's emergency docso acscssmernt methodology.

• -

up... n- the methodology used tO calculate the.. E.cA.L values, there may be otverlop ci^sme .alue ....t.e....n diffren .. s.. Devclopers w"ill need to address this ...erlap by adu. tenseurl.

si that !)te A '~ cu:dr-s a ; wicsaltihnin h th-sbe rCL.r:ad !pa.'rn;o the ~int.-spcifi, r2) ethor: r pont"i a't~~the dict'aneos anth at io r nsder b the lictt eadnget reyondt the conrtent rd~a ag of the emrec ln,.and roedur~aln monthor.eg uc tohdeermin~e, EALit doesund Prtctiv e Aet.-.newic Rcmmegnd:ati et oens.uhev reati at in aelrcted d osereetor pod-int me.......

there be some dFfeecsi h dca rmthe....rel........ase.=

p..n..t..the.alculat.d dg c Develcper ma chool rseac radiatcincld monitor des :ign docum tsc anr ..th ..r if ..m..............

ensret~hat I the EAL rvferuebeingDE .ccidcrvey i wi.athin the ueealyac-ablerpononl and dipay range!isnaviabl.

or; eramp, an EAcLme monitor raing mighte bre set natac 90% to5 gof the highst EUL Assignment Attributes: .ui. .IA..29 RG2 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 14It ]sie-,v--~ ~v .........

d , ..... ,, LceI c 3) for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: SNote: The emergency director sh*4will declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(I) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least ~4 ~ ~ t pct zc (I ~ev l 3) for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncovery of spent fuel. Ihe spent l)hcl pool le'vel instrument is located outside the control room hut in close proximitY.

This condition will lead to fuel damage and a radiological release to the environment.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another General Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

dfeSrr~ed.

Thk site =poetciic

!e-'z! L dete,-mincd in accordanee wit!h NpRC Order EA 12 051 a-nd NEI'e 12 02-, adnpl zb wzregcp udn 30 RSI ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director shu44xx ill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 shouldvxil!

be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the i bu ....,ific ............

tz-(3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond fsie-se

• Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10-%- per'cent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.Radiological effluent EALs are alse-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions 31~V2 1~ns~cat~e~

Snd~Rorermoe cpwq~~,~ ~

alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

[he monitor reading threshold s alues are dletermnined using a dose aLssessment method that back calculates from the dose ,,alucs speihctfd in the I(. t he meteorology and source term (noble gases., particulates, and halogens)used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold s.atues in ICs R( iI and RA\I. ]his protocol maintains intervals betsseen thc threshold values For the three cla~ssifications.

Since doses are generally not nmonitored in real-time, a duration of one hour is akssumed.and the threshold

',alues are based on a site boundar3 (or beyond) dose of' IItt mR/hour whole body or 500) mR/hour thyroid. whichea er is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at 1°0-%- percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 500 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level wou4d-be-v4ause's IC RGI.While IC may .... be m..t a nt.... challenges ta multiple fissia predu....

barriers, it pn'ravieselasfcti.

iest n a eue acasiyec~sta el a ec h adThe ammitte efetfic d quir L n~t (CDE.ara threhl '!,e" th.ai comeminted da,-: eqivlnt(DE.Fo tepupseo these~ IC/EA+ s, the des quantity + tatalm++ Tff2ctiv dasek eqialn ......T...EIDE)...

....... a eie in1 ER.2,isu in lieu.of ..+ ."ur --+afEDE'and CEDE The PA PG gudanc pra ide forthe se a adut thraiddosecan,-"ia -acars hoevrsmestte av dcde t bs potd .aJ~nnchldtyri CE3N2la VI thi ..f...... in.. de J b.. ........ .nat _lmite a .. h. zR T ! CM ad aue edi th* The ealeu'lat-ian af monitor re adinge w-ill alia requirea se af an .za--umed releace. ic tapic mix;;RA, .an RG,.

&~thiL .......t limitd th RETS/ODCM arnd v'aluec uced in the cite's emergncay dazeac aceczernen methadalagy.

• u:p...n. :mthbadalagyued

...a ,e akul'ate the .EA ,v.=:aluec.

there may be avcrlap of soevalues betw-een different ICe. Dev'elaperc "will need to ai.dreec thi, ova:erlap by' adjucti!ng laca-tiana' chaul:d reflect the content 0f the emergency plan, and the pracedura!

methaedolagy uced dace receptar painee meanca thera may be came diffbereenc' in the dicanene from the releace paint De-c~elpers chauld resear-ch radiatian monitor design dacumenteare, ether infnatiarm.a:a

.....i .....pl.... : .ay;~} range afteic8ct nd2 hr r aatamatie....

feature tha. ma ren.d:er th e.anta r.adin iicn vealid (e 1 ..g. an~ au..t.a:.

purg fc-.r triggered...

....: .... ,..-.. r niatio ....el).: t It ...... -ae- that-.. the ^:condit-an dec eribedy thic I-.may in .................

efluntau.byod .h .-peratingeor or.ange af ..h. intle effluent mcnia.....

In thace cacec.I,A E -..-- vaue hol be++. detemine wit a.. marg n. .u...en to en.u. e tha.t: an., a.. ceurate -......H,,.t- .... -t.... may-Fequ......iam ......g mayrcinn iencea ~. er.viranmcnrni ar amer~erimcter manitaring cyctem;aaurrava:

".l:; ae en:;l.erea

e .a. ::; ,-.1;EUL, ,cs.lgnmernt

,"tirl:autec:;.~.

t,'.,,.L" 33 RS2 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level at !I4 ! .... cpeeifie ........... :-+ii-4Lc*

l 3).Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 1 4 footia .....ti : e, e 3 .... ue)(cx,, 3.I Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fu~el pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. Ilhc Spcot F~uel pool Itxel instrument is located outside the comrol room but in close proximity.

This condition etaits-stcms from major failures of plant functions needed fer-mo protectiei-4f the public fi-lui warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another Site Area Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

Escalation of the emergency classification level w.;eudtiI

..b... .... ies IC RG1 or RG2 In a-ecerdan:ec

",.ith the di'ue'.sicn in Sectior. !.1, NPRC Order EA 12 05 I, it ic re o.mmen~ded that a.ai.bl far.1 u"..... The ..... :p...... Level 3 ..... ic ucua~lly th... cpn fu...l pad leve wh.. ere.s..fu:el rer:nain ceavered and a-etienc ta impl.Femrent make u-p water additian ch.-u.ld na longer b dfrred,.-a Thc cite epecifie lev'el ic determined in a....d...

with... NRC. " Order EX.I.A 12 05 and .NEIc 12 02 and .a pplicableoc c graup .uid.n.e.DcLpersl shauldue.'teELado aicscint elc n it pcfccntanc LUL Accianment Attrltutec:

J.LJd~34 RA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 sheo*dxx ii be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.(i) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (oit.... spmi dos ..........

pcint' hc (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond iie.........

r vpt. p ..... ic or, one hour of exposure.(4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond eose* Closed window dose rates greater than 1 0 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to l-%-perccnt of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plani safety efthe-plaw, as indicated by 35 a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).Radiological effluent EALs are e4se-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

The monitor reading thareshold values arc determined using a dose assesslment method that back calculates from the dose values specified in the IC. The meteorology and source term (noble gases. particulates.

and halogens)used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in IC's R Il and RS I. [his protocol maintains intervals bet~xcen the threshold values for the three classifications.

Since doses are gencrallx not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed.and the threshold values arc based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of It) mR/hour wvhole body or 50 mR/hour thxroid, whichever is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at 1%- percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 50 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level we,:'-udbe-viauses IC RS 1.af fission product barriers, challenged, but rathe~r the amount af radioactivity released ta the and- the commited effecti;ve dase equivalent CEDE), er as the thyraid e.u.aen rCDE)^. Far t.e..u....

of thsea ICEALs, the dcc quantity tatal effective d~oe The, EPDA AG gn-id..n-e .... vides f4or the use *.af adult* th..rai-d dae eanversioln factors;, adjusted as neceess3' ta align w'th State prtectiv;e aetian decisi...

m,.: criteria..

The..si.e specifie mani'tar list..and..h.........alue."..h......e.determine...ith 36

-- Monitor readirngs wl b'e calculated using a set of asumed meteorologieal data o~r site's emergency dose asessme:mnt methodology.

-- The caleulatien of monitor readings will! also require uce of ass"umed release isotopic mio;the selected mio shoul:'d be the s".me as that emplyecd to calcul:ate monitor readings for !Ce RS1 and vGI. Acepab,, e ....u.rces.. of th.......

nfr atn in.lu....but

.... ne lmiedt, ..Dependin:g up..n th methodology used to calculate the [A values, ther. may... be overlap at The "site spci~fic dse rcept.....r pain" is the dist..c...)

and/ar^. loc.ion us....d by the=licensee.

t.Ao+ dis.ngis between+ on.... site .ad otffse doses. The selected distance/s)

+an/er te determine dses ane"d Protective Action Recommendatio~ns.

The va~riatien in selected dese+ recept..r po ints ÷ me..ns thr may~ be+ samdierecsnthen di"stance from... th elae a scures, toL ensure that~ I)te [Avale bei.ng osieedi withamrgncint the unsable respons anduat monitor reading invali (.g..., ... maut prefeatue trgedat ta:+. a +...: pa ..cula indiation level).Ilthieougnieh ta the conditi....

n by .. this IC mageseltin a

Ionitr eading iso avalbe orca esam+-=p-ale,= )tr an[Lmitrc dngt minhtubed set at ..... to 95+' oveof the hihet ccmt reain. Thi:.os provision notisandrng.

if the -"+ 'EA usn..o..tor..readi.,.then

..developers

..may chose not..to include..the..monitor.as..an.indicatioe_

nd idni an.. alternate...

EA threhol.... A Srgaprmtrmntr':....

37 apprz;-a! -will bc ccni'rc a b, bas'z.38 RA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors: (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 04 gite zpecific Lze 2.. , -, .,l,, ve, 2). fq.... ... .... ...... ...,,p.c 2 .s]Basis: RI,;FtlIJNGi PAFtHWAY:

Ihis includes the reactor refuel cavity th-e fuel transtir canal, and the spent fuel pooi, canals and pools through wahich irradiated tucl may be mos ed, hbl not including th e iactor vessel..This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly, or a significant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool-(:ee-D'.'ekpeirThese events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment.

As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety of the plnt, lVhe spent hitel pool level itnstrutnent is located outside the control room but in close proximity.

This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU1.Escalation of the emergency we*4d-eis based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.EAL # 1 39 This EAL escalates from RU2.

loss of level, in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), es-we'l4-as-significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters.

Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL should-will be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.

While an area radiation monitor could detect an increase in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether or'--ie4-the fuel is actually uncovered.

To the degree possible, readings sheoi4d-wilI be considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance

~xiih Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2 This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly.

A rise in readings on radiation monitors 5heu4d-x\

ill be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).

EAL #3 Spent fuel pool water level at this value is within the lower end of the level range necessary to prevent significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation to personnel performing operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool. This condition reflects a significant loss of spent fuel pool water inventory and thums-k-is ehie-a precursor to a loss of the ability to adequately cool the irradiated fuel assembles stored in the pool.Escalation of the emergency classification level w;ou,4 4 .....".;... scs ICs RSI or Fcr. E A t "lrcadin:g:

indi.cai'~c cf fucl unca;'zry; czn;idzr ;rater and rndiaticn=

lz;vz readingc.Fcr 40 display, range of the instrument, rand 2) there m-c n.....t...ti f-catures that may-: r....ar_ th maniter rading in-valid (e.g., an auto .. ur.... fe-tue- tr...ggered, at a particular level!).It is recegnize.d tha the c.ondition desc~ribed by this IC may resul~t in a radiation -val.e monitor reading. "this provision nctwi"tbstanding, if the estimoatesi'aloul2'-ated mo.?nitor rain i.. ea .. ....h..n ,,appr ,iatey. 0 ofoer7 ra!the highes :cua ... nit"orf rheading, then:b!To.... further..

promote accurate:_

class--ifiato.

dev lrper Ehul con....id......if

.....m..De....l. p" ent. af... EA' .... uld ;al: so cosidy thes~n av-i!abilt

...y a .d liitios of a de....dee det or! othe co;;n~oredbu te":'* rait...ntr..eif h aeaplcbl L T ] ..J* .1 ueve~oper~

snouia moaisv inc iixL anpor ijosis secuan to reucci any sue specuic t *.onstra.nts or l'm.tat..ns.....c.a..

with ...... esign or peration at instrumentatian used to 1L-U- Assonm....t A ttributes:,*

.2.i an U i,4 2.I 41 RA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)SNote: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.

(1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:* Control Room* Central Alarm Station (Survey Only)I S (ctbcr ~itc zDccitlc areo~!r3cm~)

(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any eft4he-.........

g, abI le I plant rooms or areas:[ableI !11_______

Applicable Building Room Number Md ICB-226 ICB-A45.2CB-223, 2CR-A22 tCB-A77, ICR-B61.(CB-B76, ICR-B79 2CRB-A79 2CR-B0I Control Building 2C B-B04, 2C B-B18 lCB-226, IC-A45 ICRB1384.

2CR-B85 4 2CB-223, 2CRB-A22 ICB-A48, IC R-.\50 2CB-A 15.2CR-A 16_______A~W ~~1 l ~AEW Pump O)peration and standbx A-level detain vessel vals;e galleries I1AB-A24.

2AB-A77 3 IAR-AU8 2AB-AI01 3 Auxiliary Building IAR-C85. l.'B-C89 2AB-C38, 2AB-C44________

lAB-B I5 MIJZ lAB-BI19 MEZZ 2ARB-B117 NILZ!_____________2AR-B 119 ML! _ZZ_____Basis: 42 UN'P1 AN NtI ): A paramele r change or an es em that is ni) t 1) the resouI of an intended evolution or 2 ) an expected plant response to a transient, Ilk cause of the parameter change or event may be know\n or unkno~asn.

This 1C addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown.

As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety- of.he-plan+.

The emergency director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels anid determine if another IC may be applicable.

For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access sh**4-xill be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation increase occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).

• The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level w6*ouj44be-'4ause., Recognition Category R, C or F ICs.De2ATe N1 E.. Atn::.L )* '*: .. ..... ..rl.-m .... ... ....Th Aiu "l mRh dredfc hGIC1 au f5rm n3da it adutm,...

n tF ,! f 'or CxpCz ........z tirnc... .., ... .. -- a ap lca ,,, 43 pcr-f.cr,-cd.. (e.g., a,' actien to add2rccc anm ftT narm"xal .r emargency as emercne-y r....r. : ...... , mcasurce o.r cmcrgcncay o~perati'ne).

In addit:i:n, the lt zhcul:d epecif the plan rnde~e duing hic anty wuld e rquird fr eah r ,mr ac.T......t.h........i...u........r..

r.. for wh..... h , ntr........

.. r c ......y .to ...rf ..m ).t n Ccf nt! P-dinetrtv rrcr epn aue(m..nra eneo otn npcin)E(If the : ..ui.m.n in the;,, ...t.d roam or "t a aray nprblo oto ri 44 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 License Amendment Request for Changes to Emergency Action Level Schemes to Adopt NEI 99-01 Rev. 6 and to Modify Radiation Monitors at Farley Nuclear Plant Enclosure 5 Vogtle Marked-Up EAL Schemes VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITIONS, THRESHOLD VALUES, AND BASIS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND.............................................................

1 1.1 OPERATING REACTORS ............................................................................

1I 1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)...........................

1 1.3 NRC ORDER EA-12-051.....................................................................

2 1.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION

...................................

12 1.5 IC AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY

...........................................................

13 2 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS......................

21,3123, 2.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

..............................................................

2 l2 I4-2.2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY........................................................2223 2.3 CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS.........................

22 2.4 CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION

................. 2.5 CLASSIFICATION OF IMMIINENT CONDITIONS

......................................... 2.6 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UJPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING

..... 2.7 CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS...........................................

242 2.8 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS.........................................

242 2.9 AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION....

25232 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS ...........

263637 4 COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS .......5113533 5 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) ICS/EALS ....78787 6 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER ICS/EALS.........................................

8181.83 7 HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ICS/EALS .......................................................................

110110111 8 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ICS/EALS ..........................................

139,38-140 APPENDIX A -ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

........................................

A-1 A*rEIliUI u r EmI ti -- Ul:rlFII I IUflO,,...,,.,....,,,.,,,,..,....,...,,

OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS 1 REGULATORY BACKGROUND 1.1 OPERATING REACTORS Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Energy, contains the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations that apply to nuclear power facilities.

Several of these regulations govern various aspects of an emergency classification scheme. A-review -f-theTh relevant sections !Ibted belaw': will aid the reader in un............

th ..... te..........gy preyidead in Scti;on 3.0 offor this document are:,* 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(1)(i)

• 10 CFR § 50.47(b)(4)

• 10 CFR § 50.54(q)* 10 CFR § 50.72(a)* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.B, Assessment Actions* 10 CFR § 50, Appendix E, IV.C, Activation of Emergency Organizationlhsce regulations are supplemented by va-ioieas-regulatory guidance documents.

44e-l)ocuments of particular relevance to NEI 99-01 eaei-miclude:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1980. [Refer to Appendix 1, Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants]NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR § 50. 72 and § 50. 73 Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors 4-he-abve~elhis list is not all-inclusive.

wnd41t is strongly recommended that scheme developers consult with licensingLand regulatory compliance personnel to identify and understand all applicable requirements and guidance.

Questions say-also may be directed to the NEI Emergency Preparedness staff.1.2 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI)Selected guidance in NEI 99-01 is applicable to licensees electing to use their 10 CFR 50 emergency plan to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32 for a stand-alone ISFSI. The emergency classification levels applicable to an ISFSI are consistent with the requirements of 1 0 CFR § 50 and the guidance in NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-I1.

The initiating conditions germane to a 10 CFR § 72.32 emergency plan (as described in NUREG-1 567) are e'ibs',med-contained within the classification scheme for a 10 CFR §50.47 emergency plan.The generic ICs and EALs for an ISFSI are presented in Section 85, ISFSI ICsiEALs.

IC E-HU I covers the-speetrw:i-0f credible natural and man-made events included within the scope of an ISFSI design. This IC is not applicable to installations or facilities that *nay process and/or repackage spent fuel te.g., a Menier: .......

Sterage....

Facility' cr an ISFS at ...... f..e, pc........

I-addieltrAdditionlaIlx, appropriate aspects of IC HUI and IC I-AlI shu4vill also be included to address a HOSTILE ACTION directed against an ISFSI.The analysis of potential onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-l 1140, A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.

NUREG-1 140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to public health and safety. This evaluation shows that the maximum offsite dose to a member of the public due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed I rem Effective Dose Equivalent.

.........un.. r.........

s 2....2 .. em rgnc plan arc... gcncral ..............

ith......

for The Fukushima Daiichi accident of March 11, 2-O42011 , was the result of a tsunami that exceeded the plant's design basis and flooded the site's emergency electrical power supplies and distribution systems. This caused an extended loss of power that severely compromised the key safety functions of core cooling and containment integrity, mtad ultimately led-Icadino to core damage in three reactors. -While-A ithouch the loss of power also impaired the spent fuel pool cooling function, sufficient water inventory was maintained in the pools to preelede-picx cnt fuel damage from the loss of cooling.Following a review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the NRC concluded that sevefa measures were necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii).

Amoang them to pfe4de)nc such meas~ure that each spent fuel pool be providcd with reliable level instrumentation to significantly enhance the ability of key decision-makers to ecl'cctix cily allocate resources effeetively-following a beyond design basis event. To this end, the NRC issued Order LA- 12-051!, Issuance of Order to Modif Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, on March 12, 2012, to all US nuclear plants with an operating license, construction permit, or combined construction and operating license.NRC Order EA-12-051 states, in part, "All licensees

... shall have a reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water level conditions by trained personnel:

(1) level that is adequate to support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water addition should no longer be deferred." Toethi5 end, aAll licensees must t herc Iorc provide:* A primary and back-up level instrument that will monitor water level from the normal 2 level to the top of the used fuel rack in the pool..* A display in an area accessible following a severe event;-maid.

• Independent electrical power to each instrument channel and p*e4ean alternate remote power connection capability.

NEI 12-02, Industry Guidance for Compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051, 'To Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

", provides guidance for complying with NRC Order EA-12-051I.

NEI 99-01, Revision 6, includes three EALs that reflect the availability of the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation associated with NRC Order EA-12-05 1. These EALs are included within existing IC RA2, and new ICs RS2 and RG2. Associated EAL notes, bases and developer notes are also provided.It is recommended that these EALs be implemented when the enhanced spent fuel pool level instrumentation is available for use.The regulatory process that licensees follow to make changes to their emergency plan, including non-scheme changes to EALs, is 10 CFR 50.54(q).

In accerdance

with thi'&reguileae!4, !,icensees are responsible for evaluating a proposed change and determining whether or not it results in a reduction in the plan>'s effectiveness-ef the-pl=n.

AS-arfe':'u1!

..... healeeI *efsa~cd on this determination, the licensee will either make the change or submit it to the NRC for prior review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.3 2I K£L' TighRMiNlOGYi l SED~ INl NESSl Thcrc arc cral kcy tcm~ that appcar thrcughcut thc NEI 99 01 rncthcdclcgy.

Thczz tcrrn~ arc intrcduccd in thb zcctizn tz ~uppcrt ur.dzrztanding zf~ubc.zqucnt matcrial.

As an aid tz the reader, the follewing taHe is previded a~ an aver.iew t3 illuctrate th. relatianehip af the terme tz each ether.Emergency CIez~ificaticn Level GE+ + + +-4~e~g -k~g -4~g~efidi*4eti

~ei~di~ieft

~end~ieft Ce6di4ieft

+ + + +-Effiefgefley Aet4eft-be~ekd)

Ae~efi-be~4+~)

.-O~e~ng-Mede App~ieebili4y

.-Nete~ .44ete~ oNctee (1) When making an emergcr.cy cla~ificatien, the Ernergcney Directer muet ecn~ider all infermatian having a bearing an the preper a~zezrnent af an Initiating Conditien.

This includc~ the Ec~crgcney Actien Level (EAL) plus thc ae~ociatcd Operating Mzdc Applicability.

N3tce and thc informing Bazi~ infcrmaticn.

Ir. thc Recegnitien Catcgery F matriee~.

EAL~ arc refcrrcd te ae Fic~ien Preduct Barricr Thre~hcIde:

the threeh3lde eer;c the earnc funetien a~ an EAL.2.1

'.-LAS£.iFicATI.oh LEVEL .(ECLU ,(NPCl f::r zti :r.mrrn eve:.nt econditon:

aeemrdi.ne.

ts (; n. ,te'ntial cr act",al ettecte Cr ecnceguer.cee.

ana t~e) rc~uIt1ng cre.~tc ana attett rezpcr.ze actizr.~.

I cc emer~cnc', elazificatian leveL, in azccndin~z erder of ecvcritv.

arc: I U ft.CtitieCtIOr.

ci Uflu~uai tveni I~7~UUL)5-Aleit* Site Area Emergency (SAE)* General Emergency (GE)2.1.1 r'otl~i~catcn at Unusual Ev'ent (NU-LUE)".....sfe'afte lnta indiat a..... eecri thr" .... fa~cility preteeticn been' ..... of =n i ' ofn~e zwt.'nzo I!c:+ Uc:~ vn ...........

e .........zie~pefi ~nic~~, h Netitieatier-ef i E .-ve iit, l NOUE ed 1[.......l Ever-d ...... ue ,{ inter....

e ... thre .,. .... t.hl....is

.......

P:rpoEo: T~he pu.rpece of thic c!a ificatien ic tc aco--e .. hat. fir.. t e... ep in.. futur; ,,- ...pr..vide c .". yctematic 0 f unucual ecent .inf--crm..

at...on and deccionc:

making.E-vntz ar-e in pregreco or ha-ve occu'rrd -which invole!' an act.ual or potential cubotantial Pu."oe:; T~e pur"poce of thic claccification ic to accure that e.-mergency persc.nne area;vailable to reopond if the cit'.ation bvccmec more ceriouc er to perform co.n.irmator"y reSadiatio monito'ring.-

if req...uired an r:i.4 offoit ....horitie; ..u....nt 2.1.3 Site Area Emergency!.ad to the likel failur .. f or 2.. thtpeet fetv o the protection of the public. Anyrleccaro

............

to .............

in .........l..* .hich exc EPA PAG ecopocure levels beyond the ci+te boundary..

cituatio0n bte......

more serious, to providec

"":ith off.it ....h.iti.:,:

and. to pro~ioe u~xtarcc to tne puictie rnrougn government aurnorniec.

2.1.1 General Emergency (GE)Event are in progreec or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for Ieee of eontai~ent inte~ity or HOSTILE ACTION that reculte in an actual be: of phycical control of the facility.

Releacec can be reaconablv expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure leveL offeite for more than the immediate cite area.Purpose: The purpoce of the Generel Emergency declaration ic to initiate predetermined protective aetionc for the public, to provide continuouc acoccement of information from the licensee and offeite organizational mcoeurementc, to initiate additional meocurec no indicated by actual or potential releacec, to provide concultation with offeite authoritice, and to p;~vide update: for the public through government authentic:.

5 2.2 INMTIATr"C CO,".DITION' .ftC', A....n...r..

..................

th th de .....n... t....n.....f ce ofhe four emergency..f.....h.m.....th.....f....i.n of an cemergencey elaeoifieation level .... An IC e v earthquake) or the otatuc of ne.: or more tficrion produet boarriero (e~g., bes of the R.CS Appendix I of NUREG 06551 doec not contain Em*ergeney Action Level'that a radiological

.............

r....n. tha ...uld lead to.4 a radiological ernergene',, hoc" oeercd). NUR.EG 0655 cs -.th;:at the Initiating Con~ditione form the bacic for 2.3 El~tEItcu.c';

ACTIO' IATVLL (EAL)A pre detemiined, cite opecifie, ob~er.ahle threohcld for an Initiating Condition that, when met or exceeded.

placce the plant in a given emergency claccifleation level.Di~cu~doni EAL otaternents may utilize a variety of criteria including inotniment readingo and otatuc indiectiono:

oboer'~'able event; reoulto of caleulationo and anal>...., entry into particular procedurec:

and the occurrence of natural phenomena.

2. FI'e;t~lto\

Pl~ltO-iB uc"T B.Juunllll TiinE~llfil Dice-u:sion:

Fission product baraier thresholds r.eprecent threatos to the defen.ce in..n.ir:..m.nt.

Thic cocnept, reliec on multiple phycical barre-; any.... one"of whic, it products to the environment. primar .fission produact barriers are: 5-IFue! C~ttd* eco Coolanm nt 'ce RS Upon determination that, one or more tfiosion product barrier thresohodo have been the ficirit-.

rod,-ct harr~ier IC,'AL criteria:

to .dete,'i-.-.ie the acaronriate ECL.tn come accident sequences, ttoe ft/c and EALs precented in the Abnormal 6 Radiatbn Le~L/ Radiclzgical Et'f1u~nt (A) Rezzgniticn Catzgory will b~ ~xc:zd~d a~thc zamc time, 3r ~hortIy Qfi~r, thc Ic~ ~f znz or mzr~z fi~izn product barriers.

This redundancy i~ intentional

~ th~ fcrmcr ICs ~ddrezs radicaeti~'ity reIeazz~ ~t ~ult in eefl~n cffzit~ d~zcz ftom whatz~'~r c~uz~, including cver.t th~ night nct be fully enecmpn~sed by flszien pr~duzt barriers (e.g., spent fuel pool accident, design czntair.nicnt leakage following a LOCA, etc.).7 3 E IONII OF THEI iEIN 0l1i EMERGENCY C L T IF CAT..Oi VII EM A~n efl.e.ctie cmc.rgncy cla..cifleation ocecmc must incorporate a realiotic and n1eat-..n ano. sarety riSro in ir.e.

or ze'-a" tn:reat t:'ra an or*ha ma .....ur. during an. ea.uai.n..

^- NEI 99 01 eme.rgency clacoification schem-e Regu...at..ry C"omi.o:ion (NRC) otaff:i accordance with the requirement:

of 10 CFR g prov'ided in NUR.EG 1022. Certain evcnto repertable under the pro-viciono ef 10 CFR §.......d ... talg ..a...........i.g Conditi.n. (IC) with,, the appropriate it w;as n.... ar t" deeri..t....ib te each......

.............

.- Thec go-l .f.............

....nsw flwIng ......u.rce .p ¢roie ......io a n............ nth dev' elopments of[C*T~piea! abnormal oan emergency..p.rat.ng procedure

.o....p...n....

and traoiio ..riteri.£ Typical Technical Specification limits and controls I Environmental Protection Agency (EiPA) Protectfive Action Guidelinco (PAGo)* IJE 0rt. 651..,,.r rn A ppendi.x,.

I, Emer~ge;==*

,:.fctl Lo;'c! Co:idclihesfe., Niwckcer Pox.v....U Industry Operating Experience

• Input from indentry subject mattecr expert and NR.C satafmembcro; The. , following ECL...........

w..ere c..aed...

th Re.........n...

Prpaato Team.....

toai in* "i-go (.g...

Emergency Director underotand whya., particula ic in thic documentA.... .........................

..........

........ ......- ..... ... ... ..... ... .. ..... .........

.1h ..... ot rittz irFLhc=,:

.fe L=.y b.. .. .i ..... .......t t t .........................

of EAL chat~gc is unacceFptbl 8

The attributes cf each ECL Notifleatien zf Unu~uaI E~ar~ nre~ented below. A Netificatien cC Unucual Went, as defincd in ~ec~iCn 2.1.1, ineludee but L nzt limited te an ecnt Cr ezndition that in;'ehee: (A)A preeor~Cr tC a mere zigr.ifieant e~'ent Cr eCnditiCn.(B) A mincr loc~ cC contrel ef radiCaeti~c matcriaI~

or the ab:lity tC ccnttzl radiatien leveL within the plar.t.(C)A cen~egUn~.

~ .,.. .Ignificant cr.cugh tC warrant nct:ficctien to Lea!, State and Federal authCritics.

3. 1.2 Alen An Alert, as defined in cectiCn 2.1.2, includec but is net limited to an event or-~~ndition that invohee: (A)A less er petential

!CcC of either the fuel clad or Reacter Coelant Syctem (RCS)fiscion product barrier.(B) An event Cr eCflditien that significantly reduece the margin to a Ices ~r petential Ices Cf the Cue! clad Cr RCS fleeiCn preduct barrier.(C) A cignificant IC~C Cf cCntrel Cf radicactive metcr~ale rezu!ting in an inability te eontrCl radi~iCn leveL within the plant. Cr a releace Cf radicactive materiaL te the envlrCnment that could recult in deece greater than 1% Cf an EPA PAG at or be~nd be~d~(D)A HOSTILE ACTION eccurring within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.including tbCec directed ~t an lndcper.dcnt Spent Fuel Sterage InctcilatiCr. (ISFEt).3.1.3 Site Area Emergency A Site ~Area Emergency, as defined in eectiCn 2.1.3, includee but ic not limited to an event or condition that involvee: (A) A Icee CT petential Ieee cC any twe fiezior. product barriere fu~I clad. RCS and/er ee~ein1~eR~, (B) A preeurecr event zr cenditicn that may lead to the ieee Cr petential less of multiple fieeien preduct barriere within a relatively shert period of time. Precureor e'.ents and cenditiene of thie type include thoce that challenge the meniterir.g and/or contrel ot multiple eafety sycteme.(C) A release ef radienetive materials te the envirenment that eculd result in dCeee greater than 10% ef~ EPA PAG at ar beyend the cite beundary.9 KU, IL- AU *O, ,, c.,u.... withi.n the p!lant PRO IECI ED A.REA.tor. cdtan thatPGa in ar e c:,ndtesebods.(A)Lrea ac!nyP tw o tfein r !dut barr...r...A

....... ar ..t..... lac of the.. thid. ar..(E) A precu .... :a r dinsight fro t, snmitialstedma leeifi t-ap*-;

laze of.a...thr........

diretribyo to care damage agdlae afrequny tzimany Pnerity.zd ae *. that an blackes t oaFri ....o the it. .... da...... .. .. ..., ( -D)A .HOSTILaE" .a,,, ACIO rculting i la.ze af ....y eaft (r..tiit , ntro.a care .. cainRP ...t..r ar RSihet r.s emoel r dmgent-to a se:...,nt fl.....Emerg'ncy prprdnensio ic rtea! defnc in dpther mteiasury hti indrgencydent afaa th nc impleednit cfrom an paroeticula actidonts.~

cc; ~ te eeamn fa 2e Feciv emsergen crlasage a-cation Chemcatmnta bertist frmn rhenoiena risk. :'aned coezmnitionuls.

T"ai t hyt eanthiin dcontairnent ansignment~b aofe cer!taing Iseqande 10

3. PSAs indicated that leading ecntributo~rs to latent fatnities vwere sequences inv-okving c.nain. n fa... .ilur.. a Station Blackout lasting longer "t'an the site specific coping to be sufficient!:.'

rigorous ad...s ths .....en....i. a. timely fashi.on.*:e.'nt based ICc rand EALs. Each is discussed below:.Symptom based ICs and EALs arc parameters or conditions that arc measurable normal,-,'

reactor .............

at..or ..ill implement prcedures to identif the probable ..u... an,...take corrective action.EAL: that refer specifically tcte level ' o... ' ha-"-"ge toth prin barie: ag.in. th.. e, The. barrier based. Is oad EAs con..id.r the , lev'el of challenge to each individual"-

barrier potentially lost and lost an.-d the total number of barricr under ehallenge.

or .. actual sfety sigi, ..... Thee includ.e th.e failur ..f. an au..omati, reactor.........i to ..hut.do.n.th...reacto., natu...l phnom.'ena (e.g., an," earthqakte), or7 man.made suc:'h as a toxeas! -- rclsaas.3.3 I~SSS IIESICN DIFrEttENCE~

amon. P,,WR NSSs; th.e.rfo, gu.. dance. is provided to cai in the dev'elopmen~t of EAL: S Advan:eed PBoiling Water Reactor (ABPr),te*

Adv ^and .. re.. sur... d W.aA ter÷ Rea.t.r (i T R)sIY' anda the Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPDD \operating charac.teristics w-hen coner;:ting t.he g..n.eri..

guid..ce *.of thi document into.a site specific classification scheme. The goal is to mzaintain as much fideltyb as possible to pas;sive reactor ma~y need to add, modify or delete some info..rma.-tion econtained in this scheme appro;val procss=.designs. An Emer'ge-cy Cl"ssiflea:io Scheme for this type of plan:t sho:uld be developed--'

11

.4 ORGANIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF The scheme's is organized by Recognition Category in the following order.R -Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent -geeti~-6 C -Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction

-4eetien 7 E -Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) -Seemien-F -Fission Product Barrier -Seetief 9 H -Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety -Seetie, n,19 S -System Malfunction -Setez e! -!* EC!, the a~cigned emergency lcci,.fi.catien' Ie!-,: for the IC.U Ini.tiat+ing Cecnd'tion'

......e a- ...m..... d, ce...iptie

... th, emergency

....nt o r EAL) ar applic....

blet (i.e., ar " t. b......d t.o evente or ....iti:r; ...* Em-e:rgncy:%

Ac;i-n L .... I/ Pro;videc repo.rt and ;indication° ,that ..... concidere t meect the intent of the IC. Developers cho~uld address c2e x..m EAL. If the generic approach to develo~pment of a eom EAL canno.t b ue (...g. , a..attempt to epecify' an alerat ..........

for idetifying entr.. ir.to +theIC For R~ecognition Catege.r' F, the ficcion product barrer thrccholdc r p.........

in : dere ..f. barrier challenge (i.e., poten:tial locs or loc). Thic pr....t.t..

meth..odk-sho-'vc the sy'nergicm

..mong the ....... accurate................

the IC an..d EALc. In scme c"cec, the bacis nace incl'udec relevant sc'urce informa~otio~n an~d EALo. The may in~clude elarificationa, referren ., c.mpk.., inm.ct~eionc for claccisficatian scherne bacizs docu-ment.

DU-..c kpcr. may elect to include'..

info~rmation t .... J m w LUL .~.s~uEnment i.urmnurec Locaica wunin inc ueveioper r~orec cecuon.*1 *. al

• I...................

u.....e.....

aocig.".."g i."c :te to a given- LIJL..12

.5 Ic AND EAL MODE APPLICABILITY the applieability, of ICc -a-nd EALs -;i'll v'a-y with plant mode. For example. seine or hot ctandby!chutdewvn modec af pe.ration

when all praduet; barrier are in plece, and pla~nt inetrumentation an.d safety cycteme are fully operati.anal. .n..h.....d shutdown

and refu-eling

....... different cymptom baed an AL .i.l :oent The following table shows whehRecognition Categories eve-applicable in each plant mode. The ICs and EALs for a given Recognition Category axe applicable in the indicated modes.MODE APPLICABILITY MATRIX Category Mode R C E F HI S Power Operations X X X X X Startup X X X X X Hot Standby X X X X X Hot Shutdown X X X X X Cold Shutdown X X X X Refueling X X X X Defueled X X X X Permanently, 13 Voatlc t nits I and 2 I1 ethnical ~Specifications "ibl H o ides thc lbollovhig operating niodc definiiitions:

Reactih itD % Rated MIode 'litl Condition Thermal Ai erage R( S (Ke~rr) c rO, 'em perature ("F)I Povscr Operation 0.99 >5 NA 2 Stailup " 0.99 < 5 NA 3 tHot Standby 0.99 NA > 350 4 I lot Shuido\, 0.99 NA 350 > I,,: 200 5 ('old Shutdovanib')

<: 0.99) NA 200 6 Refuelingc:

1 NA NA NA~tt~S ,H (a) 1Excludinig decay heat.(b)(c)All rcactor \cssci head closure bolts fully tcnsioncd.

One or morc reactor csscl head closure bolts less than fully tensioned.

Ini addition to I hese identified nodles, "Al)etue led" is also applicahlc to I he Vogtle I AI, schernc. consistcnt vs hh NEI 199-01 guidance.

D efucled is a 'No Mode' condition ,a here a!l of thc f'uel has been remnoved foro thc reactor cssel (i~c.. hilll core ofhload during refuecling or extended outages).l hcsc modes arc uscd throughoutl thle 'Vow~tle I-Al s xith no niodifications from NI- 99-01\\, hcn a unit is dctuelcd, thc Initiating Conditions dcsignated as Mode Condition "A I ." or"lDct'elcd'" arc applicable.

T 'a WPzwzOpcrat'cn. (I.: McdcSichi u cr PcfuJc (-w.ith all '.'c'.cl, hcad bolts fully tcncizncdl)

D .... Shutcw"t.na

' ( .).... S ..it.h in Sh%,dKn>14rg ccc clntTrprtr 20 0

~,99 Startup (2): Reaetcr Power ~ 5%, K~,ff 0.99 Wt Standby (3): RCS 350 0 F, Keff 0.99 Het Shutdcwn (1): 200 0 F -RCS 350 0 F, Ke Celd Shutdcwn (5): RCS -200 0 F, Kcff- 0.99 Refueling (6): One er mere ~'esscI head closure bclt Ie~ than fully tenciened Dcvc1zpc~

ill need te ~nec~or~c tkz mede erilc~a from ~it ~p~eific Technical Specificatiene into their emergency cla~ificaticn echeme. In additien, the scheme muet aLe include the fellewine mcdc decienetien ecceifie te NEI 99 01

I IJetuelci I 1'~cne)

AU tuel remz~'ed tram tfle reactor ~c~ccl I~rf*4I care clilend during refucline er er.tendcd cutaceL 15 A SITE-DPECIFI SCHEME DEVDELOPMEN This section provides dctaiLxl guidane.z fcr de~ eloping a site specific emergency classification scheme. Conceptually, the approach discussed here mirrors the approach used Ic prepare emergency operating procedures generic material p~pared by reactor ~endor owners groups is ccn~erted by eash nuclear power plant into site specific emergency operating procedures.

Likewise, the emergency classification scheme dx.'elcper will use the generic guidance in NE!99 01 to prepare a site specific emergency classification scheme and the associated basis dee*imefi, It is impertant that the NEI 99 0! emergency classification scheme be implemented as an integrated package. Selected use of portions of this guidance is strongly discouraged as it will lead to an inconsistent or incomplete emergency classification scheme that will likely nct reeer.e the neec:;sarv reaulator; anaroval.1.t CI7J~ERAL lMPLEMENTATIO~.

(~UIDANCE The guidance..

in 01 not intendedl to b applied to plants ... "s is";...hov'::'ev, de-velopers should attempt toc keep theicr site speci',c scheme *'s close to thec goal till! result in a shorte an.. les cum....ber....ome N ... revi.. and approval pro....,.l..r.l.n.

nt.it t he......h..m...........

th...r nuclear powe*r, pant and better....di...u...d..in.S...tion 3 ,te, gneric g~uidance"in.ludes I and... exml .. ~....It is the intent of this guidance that beth be included in si:te ,pecific dceuaments as each...... a specific purpose. The ,,C i* th.e fi.d.....

event or condition requiring a!fan IC or EAL inelu-des explicit refernce to a mode depen'dent specification....li.it.tha.

..is not appli.ab..t...h.plnt, then that IC and.'er EAL need net be documentation to justf h h Ca o EAL-. wer.........inco....

ora.. ed (i....e., sufficent det..ail.

to allow- a third p ' to und.......d..the.deci.i........to inco .o..t the generic Usfl coym n abeiain ascitd+ihte E 9 1eerec 16 Defin~tieR=.

B¢law. wze exam"apecs af acccptable mcdi.ficaticns te the generic guidan:ce.

Thecec........ic. : ........ (e.g., ctt ...i :th a_ .... ' Emergen~cy at the'. lef~t.'p ef a uce.aid, fofa. e ...Site. Area Emergncay, Alert and NOUE).aprovided the wchang i changd thrug Uior all ,Af th a.... e C dnifee"a"(for Abna~e!ale may. be':~ chrgedte a R (fctr Radiati h ). Thcz meact. T ese rf-a achmceatedIc:

aroulstd be chagdt U ,.2 .~ ,ec aremmonspreent -tian method one'! .tabe.roi th.. t al w relg atyd .............

madEA pLismcabilty "r:equiremene aret maintind -.cr'bcv!-s* The I,. an EALe, Op ratn Em.ergency Dir~eeb rjuget n ccty relatedacmz3 .... t may-.,t.-be,,placed unde,,r, ReoniinCategor......

17

• The seceme fac!iitat.s -an do......ad inc of the emcreencv classification w ia ;o:a~es eioosinc:auon 01[

events3 or, conanicos.

4.3 INSTIlUMENTATION liNED ron EALN lr.strumcntation referenced in EAL statement should include that described in the emergency plan section which add.-esscs 10 CFR 50.17(bflS) and (9) and/or Chapter 7 ot the ESAR. Instrumentation used for EALo aced not be safety rclated, addressed by a Technical Specification or ODCMJRETS control reguiremont, no~ powered from an emergency power source; ho;;ever, EAL dc slopers should strive to incorporate instrumentation that is reliabic and routinely maintained in accordance with site programs and procedures.

Alanns refereneed in EAL statements should bo those that arc the most oporationally significant for the described event or condition.

Scheme developers should ensure that specifiod value 0 used as EAL setpoints are within the calibratad range of the referenced instrumentation, and consider any automatic inotrumentation functions that may impact acourata EAL assesoment.

In addition, EAL sctpoint values should not use tenno such as "off scale low" or "off scale high" since that type of reading may not bc readily differentiatcd from an instrument failure. Findings and violations related to EAL instrumentation issuss may be located on the NRC website.1.1 PRENE'~TA1ION OF ScItEt~tr INrOnM.~TION TO ISEItN maintain thc capability to assess, an'd declare- an.......

-,-emergenc promptly**-.

classification, pracdure and creating related user aids, the dve-'eoper must detenn-..ine the pres.ntatio mehod.s. best the en=d users by facilitating

..ccurate an timely'emergency classification.

To. this.! end, develop.Frs should considecr the following pont..;..* The first users of an emergency classification proed~ure-

.... op.....era.tors in,: th.,.responsibility tc perform othe .riica tasks, i. and will likely hav minima : assistance...

Opertions:

Facility (EO,).ma~king a~n emergency classification, a..rd w'ill probably" have ad*visor from Operations:

available to help them.18 eme~rgency cl-.,+oification scheme int.,'mat+ion may b....d.v-lp f.r...b..

mr.nc Directoro and'ar Gif.hite Response Organizati!on peroonel...alb..d...

acetal p, .........

meth. d provid...

d thatao it ccntaino all the inf-rationr L ance yt make ... corr.......m.....n..

c......itcto.....

inorat;.in.lud. I¢s. Opratin:g Modea Ap.plicab~lity.

critaria EALz a.-d !Notc. NIotee may bc a Notc jo a~cceptabio ac lang ao the inf'orm'ation iz .ad....... "c apturcd a n tha ...llbo..ar walloar -it Thoul bc~n~m readil ava^ilabi to: cmer--ney

..... ific.ati.n

.Altarnatho' presentation methkod.a for thc Recognition Cat.egory F iCea nda fission product.type+ tab.,o. Dv.... r mu..... ,e...... that the cite opecifi .. method +adr......al

,, ...a.,e fission praduct. barrier table:> The NRC i+tf conoid.ers the preoentation method of the cteor F..

t.. be. an im...rant u.... aid anda may reguect a chagetoa prtcuar roosd mthd f mon ohe recoothechng isneeoar ta Ermt cnlistency acrass. ind " t.... h h.. 15 l~Tr.cti~.Tiox or IC~!EAL~ wITH PLA~.T PnocrDunts A rgorusin+graia of IC<- and~ AL rcfercnc...... pla--nt"perating p "foedu+re&.

is -nat occaur if recognition of mcctin:g an IC or EAL is based s~alvl on the memory of a !ilaarz.d.........r.a Emre......ncy

......,... 'ia'" during period.s of high sotress.D-e.cloper+ .houl c-o`:;ider+ ....appoprat viua e.g., a.... n.-

operating procedures that apply' to cold. shutdo.....

an refueling mod.. A so an e xam.nple, a ste.note or.......

cautio+..,n:

could+++ be placed at the beginning of an. PCS leak abno.rm.al operating 1.6 B.tsit~ DOCUMENT A basis document is -a-n integral par-*t of an emergency classification scheme. The material........ +=...... this document supot prope clsifi.. ation" d.ci.. ion.m... in... by.pro..iding da.. i.:^ ,: ...... thz, EA. If p::fe tz hz-a.e IeCr: ..........

..........

N ..TE .th. EAL time .: ha ." e+:e~' ..r -;511 I1tJ= bz e~ceedezl 19

• ~nb Eacrch d !+itoing trainng stuain den makng ani+ h. .scae EaLtual fime: rgen'cy JciA!stictin, if nre.-cccr.

-The:do.um.nt.ic ale ....... ceablihin pcnfiguratio manaemen -for EP: r...ated.

....mcn and -.-:plai....g Aan

~cnc a miimm, the f...ll.owing:

.............di .....u ...sio. n of theerneryn

.alace ficatinaddclaainprcn.eletn h Bca-cthrehlo Oprfc.wat+ing Nateecan infor fation.decision making (e.g.. the Emergency Director Jaff expects that changes to the basic docurnen procicione of 10 CFR 50.51(g).+ far toI it dur..ing++-

an ...nt.. the~ NRCh 1.( L.

• L; ,.,,,U-LtLC LU1 urILipLlt L-xt TlU .ur A* Lt r k *lU POINTll.'tl -ll~lAtl produt a rrier.; thresholds ay be.. draw ... om a'+ ' planf ....an..... hi approachr.

1.8 DE~'ELOPEn AND USER FEEDBACK Qucetione or comments concerning the material in thie document may be directed to the NEI Emergency Preparedness etaff, NFl EAL tack force members or eubmitted to the Emeracacy Preaaredness Frecuently Asked Oucetione croceso.20 52 GUIDANCE ON MAKING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONSI GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

............

g-, ..Ior an'. emergency classification, the emergency director must consider all information having a bearing on the proper assessment of an Initiating Condition (IC).This includes the emergency action level (EAL). pkls-the associated operating mode applicability, notes and the informing basis information.

In the recognition category F matrices, EALs are referred to as fission product barrier thresholds; the thresholds serve the same function as an EAL.NRC regulations require the licensee to establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and to promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. The NRC staff has provided guidance on implementing this requirement in NSIR/DPR-ISG-0 1, Interim Staff Guidance, Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants.All emergency classification assessments s-eIuld-w ill be based uipon valid indications, reports or conditions.

A valid indication, report, or condition, ne that-has been verified appropriate means. uhta ............

bIet in no doubt regarding the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy.

For example, validation could be thrc-gh an instrument channel check, response on related or redundant indicators, or direct observation by plant personnel.

h e4 !ndications be ..... p .... vahdldtcd in a manner that supports timely emergency declaration.

For ICs and EALs that have a stipulated time duration (e.g., 15 ......,.3.........,........

, the emergency director sh ld-.I not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but shudwill declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. If an ongoing radiological release is detected and the release start time is unknown, it shu4will be assumed that the release duration specified in the IC/EAL has been exceeded, absent data to the contrary.A planned work activity #ht-vet....

....... s tlsrlting in an expected event or condition whieho-tlhal meets or exceeds an EAL does not warrant an emergency declaration provided that 1) the activity proceeds as planned and 2) the plant remains within the limits imposed by the operating license. Such activities include planned work to test, manipulate, repair, maintain, or modify a system or component.

In t4iesesuelh cases, the controls associated with the planning, preparation and execution of the work will ensure *4hat-compliance wsith the opetating license is maintained, with all acpcctc of the pecrazting licence provided t-It-the activity proceeds and concludes as expected.

Events or conditions of this type may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 § CFR 50.72.The asceccment ,ef zSome EALs is-are assessed based on the results of analyses that-ai'necessary to ascertain whether a specific EAL threshold has been exceeded-fe~g., osee.........., chem:ietry ca..pling, RCS* l....r.............

et........

The EAL and/or the associated basis discussion will identify the necessary analysis.

Il+4hese-ceoss

[ he 15-minute declaration period starts with the availability of the analysis results that show the 21 threshold to be exceeded (i.e., this is the time that the EAL information is first available).

The NRC expects licensees to establish the capability to initiate and complete EAL-related analyses within a reasonable period of time (a.g., maintain thec necezsary3 e-xpertie the EALs have been developed to address a full spectrum of possible events and conditions whieha-that may warrant emergency classification, a provision for classification based on operator/management experience and judgment is still necessary.

The NEI 99-01 scheme provides the emergency director with the ability to classify' events and conditions based lipon judgment using EALs that-a-e-econsistent with the emergency classification level (ECL) definitions (refer to Category H). The emergency director will need to determine if the effects or consequences of the event or condition reasonably meet or exceed a particular ECL definition.

A similar provision is incorporated into the fission product barrier tables; judgment may be used to determine the status of a fission product barrier.#n22.2 CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY To make an emergency classification, the user will compare an event or condition (i.e., the relevant plant indications and reports) to an EAL(s) and determine if the EAL has been met or exceeded.

The evalation:e cCf a'n EAL(s) aluationt must be consistent with the related Operating Mode Applicability and Notes. If an EAL has been met or exceeded, t-he,-the IC is cnti.dere4-met and the associated ECL is declared in accordance with plant procedures.

When assessing an EAL that specifies a time duration for the off-normal condition, the"clock" for the EAL time duration runs concurrently with the emergency classification process "clock." For a full discussion of this timing requirement, refer to NSIRIDPR-ISG-01.CLASSIFICATION OF MULTIPLE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS Whaen-nth lcx cuct of multiple emezrgency z rent snrergcncics or conditions-are-present, the user will identify all l;AI s met or exceeded-E~.

The highest applicable ECL identified during this review is declared.

For example: If an Alert EAL and a Site Area Emergency EAL are met, -w.hether at cne unit .or at two' diffewnt a Site Area Emergency should be declared.There is no "additive" effect from multiple EALs meeting the sanme ECL. For example: If two Alert EALs are met, whether at ene unit or at tw.o dificrent unit, an Alert sheoi4-x ill be declared.Related guidance coner~ning-,irr classification of rapidly escalating events or conditions is provided in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2007-02, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Emergency Notifications During Quickly Changing Events.CONSIDERATION OF MODE CHANGES DURING CLASSIFICATION-The mode in effect at the time that-an event or condition occurred, and prior to 22 any plant or operator response, i.c the mode that dietermines whether or-met-an IC is applicable.

If an event or condition occurs, and results in a mode change before the emergency is declared, the emergency classification level is still based on the mode that existed at the time that the event or condition was initiated (and not when it was declared).-

O nce " a d ffr en m.d. ir o h d any n;w....nt or c nditio,: n.. .r late t., a For eo:ontc that aczur in Cold Shu-tdown or Roefuetng, :ecalation Ic -via =ALc t.hat pro applicabl in Cold. Shudo, o+... -r Rofuoling ,m,.odoc, even if Hot Shutdo-wn (or a higher barrior E..ALe aro appli!cable only to ov-=ntc that initiate in the Hot. Shu-tdow.'n mode orCLASSIFICATION OF IMMINENT CONDITIONS Although EALs provide specific thresholds, the emergency director must remain alert to events or conditions that could lead to meeting or exceeding an EAL within a relatively short period of time (i.e., a change in the ECL is IMMINENT).

If, in the judgrnent of the emergency director, meeting an EAL is IMMINE.NT, the emergency classification should w~ill be made as if-though the EAL has been met. While applicable to all emergency classification levels, this approach is particularly important at the higher emergency classification levels since it provides additional time for implementation of protective measures.EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL UPGRADING AND DOWNGRADING SNCi policy is thati once a'n emergnc.\

classificationi is made, it cannot hc doxsngradcd to a lower class ificat ion. T erm ination criteria cont aitied in procedure N Ml- 110, l-mergencv, ( lassilication and Initial Actions sha~l be completed for an cxcnt to he terminated.

At ternti nat ion. ont an e cot Speci lie has is. the site enter either normal operating conditions or a recovery condition a rccoxcr> orgalli/atio established for turnoxer from the tRO. An- ECL. may. be do-w.ngraded w:hen th een ....r.. e -nditi.. that m'eeta the .highest ....C. " and EAL na langer eciete, and ather- c'ite .p..ifi downgr....;.

......ading be termintd Thefll, wn, a .1-./..ppr..ach to. daw.....adi or ter"minating an ECL ic r.c.mm.nded.

Al4Dawn:grade or te:'minate the emergncye, in accordSance vWsth procedures.

S..;' ite,-"...

Area .....Emergency Terminate the emergency an"d enter recov'ery in 23 lon trm p..... , eam.....

accordance wi'th plant M ...... abz .., g~iuidance concerning classification of rapidly escalating events or conditions is provided in RIS 2007-02.CLASSIFICATION OF SHORT-LIVED EVENTS A^ d i ...... in Szzi i ICs and EALs define a variety of specific occurrences that have potential or actual safety significance.

By their nature, some of these events may be short-lived and, ht.u, -'er cnd before the emergency classification assessment can be completed=-.

If an ....... zzr th...at mzzt ...r.. z .zzd an EL t hc dcclaratiz~n. for cxamnplc an earthquake, or 3f s',ch cvznt., inzludc a failure of the reactor protection system to automatically scram/trip the reactor followed by a successful manual scram/trin r..... 1...CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT CONDITIONS Many of the ICs and/oee EALs this document employ time-based criteria, The~e critcria will that require t4hat-the IC/EAL conditions be present for a defined period of time before an emergency declaration is warranted.

In cases where no time-based critrionis seci.ed,.t..

rz, .......that some transient conditions may cause an EAL to be met for a brief period of time (e.g.. a fe',- tafre..., mi.nuLes).

The following guidance should be applied to the classification of these conditions.

EAL momentarily met during expected plant response -In in~tances

".-hzreX~hcn an EAL is briefly met during an expected (normal) plant response, an emergency declaration is not warranted provided that associated systems and components are operating as expected, and operator actions are performed in accordance with procedures.

EAL momentarily met but the condition is corrected prior to an emergency declaration

-If an operator takes prompt manual action to address a condition, and the action is successful in correcting the condition prior to the emergency declaration, then the applicable EAL is not considered met and the associated emergency declaration is not requiredv.

Fz ..

............

.hzu f..la..ng

....pl... i c, ampl.presents an illustration:

An ATWS occurs and the auxiliary feedwater system fails to automatically start.Steam generator levels rapidly decrease and the plant enters an inadequate RCS heat removal condition (a potential loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers).

If an operator manually starts the auxiliary feedwater system in accordance with an EOP step and clears the inadequate RCS heat removal condition prior to an emergency declaration, then the classification ill be based on the ATWS only.It is important to stress that the 15-minute emergency classification assessment period is not a "grace period" during which a classification may be delayed to allow the 24 performance of a corrective action that would obviate the need to classify the event;emergency classification assessments must be deliberate and timely, with no undue delays. The provision discussed above addresses only those rapidly evolving situations where an operator is able to take a successful corrective action prior to the emergency director completing the review and steps necessary to make the emergency declaration.

This provision is included to ensure that any public protective actions resulting from the emergency classification are truly warranted by the plant conditions.AFTER-THE-FACT DISCOVERY OF AN EMERGENCY EVENT OR CONDITION In some cases, an EAL may be met but the emergency classification was not made at the time of the event or condition.

This sd"-tizn c-'n a, cur -.hcn pl'ersonnel could discover#hmt-an event or condition existed ,hieh-i t,-hat met an EAL, but no emergency was declared, and the event or condition no longer exists at the time of discovery.

4liine maix b the event or condition as not beiivg-recognized at the time, or therean error .....-fiade....in the emergency classification process.In these cases, no emergency declaration is warrante"di-hewevei, but the guidance-ontainiad-in NUREG-1022 is applicable.

Specifically, the event shotald-will be reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.72 within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared event or condition.

The licensee also notify appropriate state and local agencies in accordance with the agreed upon arrangements.

5.10 'RE...........

OF .........C. DLnA..........the rztracticnoz f an emecrgency declarati.cn rcpart, d ta, tc NR.C is dise'caaed in, N.1JREG 1 022.25 63 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ICS/EALS GENERAL SITE AREA EMRENY EMRENYALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RG1 Release of RS1 Release of RA1 Release of RU1 Release of gaseous radioactivity gaseous radioactivity gaseous or liquid gaseous or liquid resulting in offsite resulting in offsite radioactivity resulting radioactivity greater dose greater than 1,000 dose greater than 100 in offsite dose greater than 2 times the mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem TEDE or 500 than 10 mrem TEDE OI)XMfs4.te

.... iri mrem thyroid CDE. mrem thyroid CDE. or 50 mrem thyroid efflent-ireleae Op. Modes: All Op. Modes: All CDE. cznt....n do- c a ......Op. Modes: All limits for 60 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: All RG2 Spent fuel pool RS2 Spent fuel pool RA2 Significant RU2 UNPLANNED level cannot be leve at 019to leve lowering of water level loss of water level restored to at least t 4 s~cfi 3 above, or damage to, above irradiated fuel......e~c v ............

d ..... ,, Ievcl 3). irradiated fuel. Op. Modes: All Op. Modes All Op. Modes:" All..... t- ..... lexcl 3)for 60 minutes or longer.Op. Modes: All RA3 Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.____________________________Op.

Modes: All 26 RG1 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director sheitkwil1 declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (sitz spezifc dc~ rccptzr pc,:nt)thc et (3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond {(~espte pcl.e-d4ese

• Closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude will require implementation of protective actions for the public.Radiological effluent EALs are also-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions 27 NZ~4Moe~ o~

alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

[he monitor reading threshold values are determined using a dose as~sessment method that back calculates horo the dose values s 1~ci l~ed inl thle IC. I he nmeteorolo)g and source term (noble gases. particulates, and halogens)used are the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold

,,altues in los RS 1 and RA1 IlIis protocol \ill maintain intervals btw.t\een the threshold valoes for the three classifications.

Since doses are generally not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed, and the threshold values are based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of 11000 ml~hour ,a hole bod\ or 50)00 mR/hour thy roid. xxhichlever is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Th eiu.. nt .... z!"EAI " are included te pro;vide a bacis f-r cla"ifyin:

...en... tha .......pre-vides di;versity and may b~e usred ta elaasc.y events that ",vul:d net reach the cam EC baeden lan sttu erthefisie preduc mat.. a+e.e. 1- Far m':any ...th.............d in Updte Final. Safety Analy.....i..

Rpe.dut, the discimiato wil net1 b o thAum ef f,,s;i.n praduet ehallenge&

but* rathr the ....unt f radioactivi:,t-r.. l...ase to the equivcralnt (CDE).AFar.the.p..p

.....f.the.e.........

tedc quantity.......t..tal.

efeciv ..... .c Sequvln .......,.as.........in..10....

§ 0..is....d.i.lieu...................nd.CED...

mrmThemd,-e. , EP.P...dac pra......

fo.r th ...... ef adult thvr,,, ..... o enver..i; n , ete.,o:_S Monitor readings e atmacicherie dicrer ill be calculated ucing a cet af~sian facte~; the data or ficeters 28 iccumea metcarelegicai data Cr celected for use chauld be the came ac those employed toc th; monitor readings for ICc PA I and RS !. Acceptable so'urees of this include, but are not limited to, the P.ETS/ODC.M rand ;values u.sed in the site's emergence, dee az..:ment methodology.

• Th.e calc..lation of-^: m ..it .reading...il also require of an assumed r!eleas isotopic mix;RA I and PRS 1. Acceptable sources of'this3 info.rmatio.n include, but' are not limited to, the RETS!ODCM and v:alues used in the site's emergency docso acscssmernt methodology.

• -

up... n- the methodology used tO calculate the.. E.cA.L values, there may be otverlop ci^sme .alue ....t.e....n diffren .. s.. Devclopers w"ill need to address this ...erlap by adu. tenseurl.

si that !)te A '~ cu:dr-s a ; wicsaltihnin h th-sbe rCL.r:ad !pa.'rn;o the ~int.-spcifi, r2) ethor: r pont"i a't~~the dict'aneos anth at io r nsder b the lictt eadnget reyondt the conrtent rd~a ag of the emrec ln,.and roedur~aln monthor.eg uc tohdeermin~e, EALit doesund Prtctiv e Aet.-.newic Rcmmegnd:ati et oens.uhev reati at in aelrcted d osereetor pod-int me.......

there be some dFfeecsi h dca rmthe....rel........ase.=

p..n..t..the.alculat.d dg c Develcper ma chool rseac radiatcincld monitor des :ign docum tsc anr ..th ..r if ..m..............

ensret~hat I the EAL rvferuebeingDE .ccidcrvey i wi.athin the ueealyac-ablerpononl and dipay range!isnaviabl.

or; eramp, an EAcLme monitor raing mighte bre set natac 90% to5 gof the highst EUL Assignment Attributes: .ui. .IA..29 RG2 ECL: General Emergency Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least 14It ]sie-,v--~ ~v .........

d , ..... ,, LceI c 3) for 60 minutes or longer.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: SNote: The emergency director sh*4will declare the General Emergency promptly upon determining that 60 minutes has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.(I) Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored to at least ~4 ~ ~ t pct zc (I ~ev l 3) for 60 minutes or longer.Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fuel pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to a prolonged uncovery of spent fuel. Ihe spent l)hcl pool le'vel instrument is located outside the control room hut in close proximitY.

This condition will lead to fuel damage and a radiological release to the environment.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another General Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

dfeSrr~ed.

Thk site =poetciic

!e-'z! L dete,-mincd in accordanee wit!h NpRC Order EA 12 051 a-nd NEI'e 12 02-, adnpl zb wzregcp udn 30 RSI ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)Notes:* The emergency director shu44xx ill declare the Site Area Emergency promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 shouldvxil!

be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.

(1) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the i bu ....,ific ............

tz-(3) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond fsie-se

• Closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to 10-%- per'cent of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.Radiological effluent EALs are alse-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions 31~V2 1~ns~cat~e~

Snd~Rorermoe cpwq~~,~ ~

alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

[he monitor reading threshold s alues are dletermnined using a dose aLssessment method that back calculates from the dose ,,alucs speihctfd in the I(. t he meteorology and source term (noble gases., particulates, and halogens)used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold s.atues in ICs R( iI and RA\I. ]his protocol maintains intervals betsseen thc threshold values For the three cla~ssifications.

Since doses are generally not nmonitored in real-time, a duration of one hour is akssumed.and the threshold

',alues are based on a site boundar3 (or beyond) dose of' IItt mR/hour whole body or 500) mR/hour thyroid. whichea er is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at 1°0-%- percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 500 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level wou4d-be-v4ause's IC RGI.While IC may .... be m..t a nt.... challenges ta multiple fissia predu....

barriers, it pn'ravieselasfcti.

iest n a eue acasiyec~sta el a ec h adThe ammitte efetfic d quir L n~t (CDE.ara threhl '!,e" th.ai comeminted da,-: eqivlnt(DE.Fo tepupseo these~ IC/EA+ s, the des quantity + tatalm++ Tff2ctiv dasek eqialn ......T...EIDE)...

....... a eie in1 ER.2,isu in lieu.of ..+ ."ur --+afEDE'and CEDE The PA PG gudanc pra ide forthe se a adut thraiddosecan,-"ia -acars hoevrsmestte av dcde t bs potd .aJ~nnchldtyri CE3N2la VI thi ..f...... in.. de J b.. ........ .nat _lmite a .. h. zR T ! CM ad aue edi th* The ealeu'lat-ian af monitor re adinge w-ill alia requirea se af an .za--umed releace. ic tapic mix;;RA, .an RG,.

&~thiL .......t limitd th RETS/ODCM arnd v'aluec uced in the cite's emergncay dazeac aceczernen methadalagy.

• u:p...n. :mthbadalagyued

...a ,e akul'ate the .EA ,v.=:aluec.

there may be avcrlap of soevalues betw-een different ICe. Dev'elaperc "will need to ai.dreec thi, ova:erlap by' adjucti!ng laca-tiana' chaul:d reflect the content 0f the emergency plan, and the pracedura!

methaedolagy uced dace receptar painee meanca thera may be came diffbereenc' in the dicanene from the releace paint De-c~elpers chauld resear-ch radiatian monitor design dacumenteare, ether infnatiarm.a:a

.....i .....pl.... : .ay;~} range afteic8ct nd2 hr r aatamatie....

feature tha. ma ren.d:er th e.anta r.adin iicn vealid (e 1 ..g. an~ au..t.a:.

purg fc-.r triggered...

....: .... ,..-.. r niatio ....el).: t It ...... -ae- that-.. the ^:condit-an dec eribedy thic I-.may in .................

efluntau.byod .h .-peratingeor or.ange af ..h. intle effluent mcnia.....

In thace cacec.I,A E -..-- vaue hol be++. detemine wit a.. marg n. .u...en to en.u. e tha.t: an., a.. ceurate -......H,,.t- .... -t.... may-Fequ......iam ......g mayrcinn iencea ~. er.viranmcnrni ar amer~erimcter manitaring cyctem;aaurrava:

".l:; ae en:;l.erea

e .a. ::; ,-.1;EUL, ,cs.lgnmernt

,"tirl:autec:;.~.

t,'.,,.L" 33 RS2 ECL: Site Area Emergency Initiating Condition:

Spent fuel pool level at !I4 ! .... cpeeifie ........... :-+ii-4Lc*

l 3).Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 1 4 footia .....ti : e, e 3 .... ue)(cx,, 3.I Basis: This IC addresses a significant loss of spent fu~el pool inventory control and makeup capability leading to IMMINENT fuel damage. Ilhc Spcot F~uel pool Itxel instrument is located outside the comrol room but in close proximity.

This condition etaits-stcms from major failures of plant functions needed fer-mo protectiei-4f the public fi-lui warrant a Site Area Emergency declaration.

It is recognized that this IC would likely not be met until well after another Site Area Emergency IC was met; however, it is included to provide classification diversity.

Escalation of the emergency classification level w.;eudtiI

..b... .... ies IC RG1 or RG2 In a-ecerdan:ec

",.ith the di'ue'.sicn in Sectior. !.1, NPRC Order EA 12 05 I, it ic re o.mmen~ded that a.ai.bl far.1 u"..... The ..... :p...... Level 3 ..... ic ucua~lly th... cpn fu...l pad leve wh.. ere.s..fu:el rer:nain ceavered and a-etienc ta impl.Femrent make u-p water additian ch.-u.ld na longer b dfrred,.-a Thc cite epecifie lev'el ic determined in a....d...

with... NRC. " Order EX.I.A 12 05 and .NEIc 12 02 and .a pplicableoc c graup .uid.n.e.DcLpersl shauldue.'teELado aicscint elc n it pcfccntanc LUL Accianment Attrltutec:

J.LJd~34 RA1 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity resulting in offsite dose greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)Notes:* The emergency director declare the Alert promptly upon determining that the applicable time has been exceeded, or will likely be exceeded.* If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded 15 minutes.* If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.* The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAL #1 sheo*dxx ii be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available.(i) Reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the reading shown for 15 minutes or longer: (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond (oit.... spmi dos ..........

pcint' hc (3) Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses greater than 10 mrem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond iie.........

r vpt. p ..... ic or, one hour of exposure.(4) Field survey results indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond eose* Closed window dose rates greater than 1 0 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer.* Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 50 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Basis: This IC addresses a release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity that results in projected or actual offsite doses greater than or equal to l-%-perccnt of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs).It includes both monitored and un-monitored releases.

Releases of this magnitude represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plani safety efthe-plaw, as indicated by 35 a radiological release that significantly exceeds regulatory limits (e.g., a significant uncontrolled release).Radiological effluent EALs are e4se-included to provide a basis for classifying events and conditions that cannot be readily or appropriately classified on the basis of plant conditions alone. The inclusion of both plant condition and radiological effluent EALs more fully addresses the spectrum of possible accident events and conditions.

The monitor reading thareshold values arc determined using a dose assesslment method that back calculates from the dose values specified in the IC. The meteorology and source term (noble gases. particulates.

and halogens)used is the same as those used to determine the monitor reading threshold values in IC's R Il and RS I. [his protocol maintains intervals bet~xcen the threshold values for the three classifications.

Since doses are gencrallx not monitored in real-time, a release duration of one hour is assumed.and the threshold values arc based on a site boundary (or beyond) dose of It) mR/hour wvhole body or 50 mR/hour thxroid, whichever is more limiting.The TEDE dose is set at 1%- percent of the EPA PAG of 1,000 mrem while the 50 mrem thyroid CDE was established in consideration of the 1:5 ratio of the EPA PAG for TEDE and thyroid CDE.Classification based on effluent monitor readings assumes that a release path to the environment is established.

If the effluent flow past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped due to actions to isolate the release path, then the effluent monitor reading is no longer valid for classification purposes.Escalation of the emergency classification level we,:'-udbe-viauses IC RS 1.af fission product barriers, challenged, but rathe~r the amount af radioactivity released ta the and- the commited effecti;ve dase equivalent CEDE), er as the thyraid e.u.aen rCDE)^. Far t.e..u....

of thsea ICEALs, the dcc quantity tatal effective d~oe The, EPDA AG gn-id..n-e .... vides f4or the use *.af adult* th..rai-d dae eanversioln factors;, adjusted as neceess3' ta align w'th State prtectiv;e aetian decisi...

m,.: criteria..

The..si.e specifie mani'tar list..and..h.........alue."..h......e.determine...ith 36

-- Monitor readirngs wl b'e calculated using a set of asumed meteorologieal data o~r site's emergency dose asessme:mnt methodology.

-- The caleulatien of monitor readings will! also require uce of ass"umed release isotopic mio;the selected mio shoul:'d be the s".me as that emplyecd to calcul:ate monitor readings for !Ce RS1 and vGI. Acepab,, e ....u.rces.. of th.......

nfr atn in.lu....but

.... ne lmiedt, ..Dependin:g up..n th methodology used to calculate the [A values, ther. may... be overlap at The "site spci~fic dse rcept.....r pain" is the dist..c...)

and/ar^. loc.ion us....d by the=licensee.

t.Ao+ dis.ngis between+ on.... site .ad otffse doses. The selected distance/s)

+an/er te determine dses ane"d Protective Action Recommendatio~ns.

The va~riatien in selected dese+ recept..r po ints ÷ me..ns thr may~ be+ samdierecsnthen di"stance from... th elae a scures, toL ensure that~ I)te [Avale bei.ng osieedi withamrgncint the unsable respons anduat monitor reading invali (.g..., ... maut prefeatue trgedat ta:+. a +...: pa ..cula indiation level).Ilthieougnieh ta the conditi....

n by .. this IC mageseltin a

Ionitr eading iso avalbe orca esam+-=p-ale,= )tr an[Lmitrc dngt minhtubed set at ..... to 95+' oveof the hihet ccmt reain. Thi:.os provision notisandrng.

if the -"+ 'EA usn..o..tor..readi.,.then

..developers

..may chose not..to include..the..monitor.as..an.indicatioe_

nd idni an.. alternate...

EA threhol.... A Srgaprmtrmntr':....

37 apprz;-a! -will bc ccni'rc a b, bas'z.38 RA2 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Significant lowering of water level above, or damage to, irradiated fuel.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2 or 3)(I) Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY.(2) Damage to irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity from the fuel as indicated by ANY of the following radiation monitors: (3) Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 04 gite zpecific Lze 2.. , -, .,l,, ve, 2). fq.... ... .... ...... ...,,p.c 2 .s]Basis: RI,;FtlIJNGi PAFtHWAY:

Ihis includes the reactor refuel cavity th-e fuel transtir canal, and the spent fuel pooi, canals and pools through wahich irradiated tucl may be mos ed, hbl not including th e iactor vessel..This IC addresses events that have caused IMMINENT or actual damage to an irradiated fuel assembly, or a significant lowering of water level within the spent fuel pool-(:ee-D'.'ekpeirThese events present radiological safety challenges to plant personnel and are precursors to a release of radioactivity to the environment.

As such, they represent an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety of the plnt, lVhe spent hitel pool level itnstrutnent is located outside the control room but in close proximity.

This IC applies to irradiated fuel that is licensed for dry storage up to the point that the loaded storage cask is sealed. Once sealed, damage to a loaded cask causing loss of the CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is classified in accordance with IC E-HU1.Escalation of the emergency we*4d-eis based on either Recognition Category R or C ICs.EAL # 1 39 This EAL escalates from RU2.

loss of level, in the affected portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, is of sufficient magnitude to have resulted in uncovery of irradiated fuel. Indications of irradiated fuel uncovery may include direct or indirect visual observation (e.g., reports from personnel or camera images), es-we'l4-as-significant changes in water and radiation levels, or other plant parameters.

Computational aids may also be used (e.g., a boil-off curve). Classification of an event using this EAL should-will be based on the totality of available indications, reports and observations.

While an area radiation monitor could detect an increase in a dose rate due to a lowering of water level in some portion of the REFUELING PATHWAY, the reading may not be a reliable indication of whether or'--ie4-the fuel is actually uncovered.

To the degree possible, readings sheoi4d-wilI be considered in combination with other available indications of inventory loss.A drop in water level above irradiated fuel within the reactor vessel may be classified in accordance

~xiih Recognition Category C during the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.EAL #2 This EAL addresses a release of radioactive material caused by mechanical damage to irradiated fuel. Damaging events may include the dropping, bumping or binding of an assembly, or dropping a heavy load onto an assembly.

A rise in readings on radiation monitors 5heu4d-x\

ill be considered in conjunction with in-plant reports or observations of a potential fuel damaging event (e.g., a fuel handling accident).

EAL #3 Spent fuel pool water level at this value is within the lower end of the level range necessary to prevent significant dose consequences from direct gamma radiation to personnel performing operations in the vicinity of the spent fuel pool. This condition reflects a significant loss of spent fuel pool water inventory and thums-k-is ehie-a precursor to a loss of the ability to adequately cool the irradiated fuel assembles stored in the pool.Escalation of the emergency classification level w;ou,4 4 .....".;... scs ICs RSI or Fcr. E A t "lrcadin:g:

indi.cai'~c cf fucl unca;'zry; czn;idzr ;rater and rndiaticn=

lz;vz readingc.Fcr 40 display, range of the instrument, rand 2) there m-c n.....t...ti f-catures that may-: r....ar_ th maniter rading in-valid (e.g., an auto .. ur.... fe-tue- tr...ggered, at a particular level!).It is recegnize.d tha the c.ondition desc~ribed by this IC may resul~t in a radiation -val.e monitor reading. "this provision nctwi"tbstanding, if the estimoatesi'aloul2'-ated mo.?nitor rain i.. ea .. ....h..n ,,appr ,iatey. 0 ofoer7 ra!the highes :cua ... nit"orf rheading, then:b!To.... further..

promote accurate:_

class--ifiato.

dev lrper Ehul con....id......if

.....m..De....l. p" ent. af... EA' .... uld ;al: so cosidy thes~n av-i!abilt

...y a .d liitios of a de....dee det or! othe co;;n~oredbu te":'* rait...ntr..eif h aeaplcbl L T ] ..J* .1 ueve~oper~

snouia moaisv inc iixL anpor ijosis secuan to reucci any sue specuic t *.onstra.nts or l'm.tat..ns.....c.a..

with ...... esign or peration at instrumentatian used to 1L-U- Assonm....t A ttributes:,*

.2.i an U i,4 2.I 41 RA3 ECL: Alert Initiating Condition:

Radiation levels that impede access to equipment necessary for normal plant operations, cooldown or shutdown.Operating Mode Applicability:

All Emergency Action Levels: (1 or 2)SNote: If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted.

(1) Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in ANY of the following areas:* Control Room* Central Alarm Station (Survey Only)I S (ctbcr ~itc zDccitlc areo~!r3cm~)

(2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or impede access to any eft4he-.........

g, abI le I plant rooms or areas:[ableI !11_______

Applicable Building Room Number Md ICB-226 ICB-A45.2CB-223, 2CR-A22 tCB-A77, ICR-B61.(CB-B76, ICR-B79 2CRB-A79 2CR-B0I Control Building 2C B-B04, 2C B-B18 lCB-226, IC-A45 ICRB1384.

2CR-B85 4 2CB-223, 2CRB-A22 ICB-A48, IC R-.\50 2CB-A 15.2CR-A 16_______A~W ~~1 l ~AEW Pump O)peration and standbx A-level detain vessel vals;e galleries I1AB-A24.

2AB-A77 3 IAR-AU8 2AB-AI01 3 Auxiliary Building IAR-C85. l.'B-C89 2AB-C38, 2AB-C44________

lAB-B I5 MIJZ lAB-BI19 MEZZ 2ARB-B117 NILZ!_____________2AR-B 119 ML! _ZZ_____Basis: 42 UN'P1 AN NtI ): A paramele r change or an es em that is ni) t 1) the resouI of an intended evolution or 2 ) an expected plant response to a transient, Ilk cause of the parameter change or event may be know\n or unkno~asn.

This 1C addresses elevated radiation levels in certain plant rooms/areas sufficient to preclude or impede personnel from performing actions necessary to maintain normal plant operation, or to perform a normal plant cooldown and shutdown.

As such, it represents an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety- of.he-plan+.

The emergency director should consider the cause of the increased radiation levels anid determine if another IC may be applicable.

For EAL #2, an Alert declaration is warranted if entry into the affected room/area is, or may be, procedurally required during the plant operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels. The emergency classification is not contingent upon whether entry is actually necessary at the time of the increased radiation levels. Access sh**4-xill be considered as impeded if extraordinary measures are necessary to facilitate entry of personnel into the affected room/area (e.g., installing temporary shielding, requiring use of non-routine protective equipment, requesting an extension in dose limits beyond normal administrative limits).An emergency declaration is not warranted if any of the following conditions apply.* The plant is in an operating mode different than the mode specified for the affected room/area (i.e., entry is not required during the operating mode in effect at the time of the elevated radiation levels). For example, the plant is in Mode 1 when the radiation increase occurs, and the procedures used for normal operation, cooldown and shutdown do not require entry into the affected room until Mode 4.* The increased radiation levels are a result of a planned activity that includes compensatory measures which address the temporary inaccessibility of a room or area (e.g., radiography, spent filter or resin transfer, etc.).* The action for which room/area entry is required is of an administrative or record keeping nature (e.g., normal rounds or routine inspections).

• The access control measures are of a conservative or precautionary nature, and would not actually prevent or impede a required action.Escalation of the emergency classification level w6*ouj44be-'4ause., Recognition Category R, C or F ICs.De2ATe N1 E.. Atn::.L )* '*: .. ..... ..rl.-m .... ... ....Th Aiu "l mRh dredfc hGIC1 au f5rm n3da it adutm,...

n tF ,! f 'or CxpCz ........z tirnc... .., ... .. -- a ap lca ,,, 43 pcr-f.cr,-cd.. (e.g., a,' actien to add2rccc anm ftT narm"xal .r emargency as emercne-y r....r. : ...... , mcasurce o.r cmcrgcncay o~perati'ne).

In addit:i:n, the lt zhcul:d epecif the plan rnde~e duing hic anty wuld e rquird fr eah r ,mr ac.T......t.h........i...u........r..

r.. for wh..... h , ntr........

.. r c ......y .to ...rf ..m ).t n Ccf nt! P-dinetrtv rrcr epn aue(m..nra eneo otn npcin)E(If the : ..ui.m.n in the;,, ...t.d roam or "t a aray nprblo oto ri 44