IR 05000391/2015602
| ML15083A276 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/2015 |
| From: | Haag R NRC/RGN-II/DCP/CPB3 |
| To: | Skaggs M Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Michelle Adams | |
| References | |
| IR 2015602 | |
| Download: ML15083A276 (42) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION rch 24, 2015
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 CONSTRUCTION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000391/2015602
Dear Mr. Skaggs:
On February 14, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection of construction and testing activities at your Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on March 12, 2015, with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your Unit 2 construction permit as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, the conditions of your construction permit, and fulfillment of Unit 2 regulatory framework commitments. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings were identified during this inspection.
In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert Haag, Chief Construction Projects Branch 3 Division of Construction Projects Docket No. 50-391 Construction Permit No: CPPR-92
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000391/2015602 w/ Attachment
REGION II==
Docket No.: 50-391 Construction Permit No.: CPPR-92 Report No.: 05000391/2015602 Applicant: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Location: Spring City, TN 37381 Dates: January 1, 2015 - February 14, 2015 Inspectors: T. Nazario, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction Projects Branch (CPB) 3, Division of Construction Projects (DCP),
Region II (RII)
E. Patterson, Resident Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII M. Magyar, Resident Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII P. Cooper, Resident Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII J. Baptist, Senior Construction Project Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII, Sections P.1.1, P.1.2, P.1.3, P.1.5, and P.1.7 A. Wilson, Construction Project Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII, Sections P.1.4 and OA.1.1 J. Seat, Construction Project Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII, Section OA.1.7 G. Crespo, Senior Construction Inspector, Construction Inspection Branch (CIB) 1, Division of Construction Inspection (DCI), RII, Sections OA.1.3 and OA.1.5 A. Matos-Marin, Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII, Sections OA.1.5 and OA.1.6 P. Braxton, Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII, Section OA.1.4 J. Christensen, Construction Inspector, CIB3, DCI, Section OA.1.2 J. Eargle, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 (EB) 1, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII, Section OA.1.1 Approved by: Robert C. Haag, Chief Construction Projects Branch 3 Division of Construction Projects Enclosure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2
This integrated inspection included aspects of engineering and construction activities performed by TVA associated with the Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant Unit 2 construction project. This report covered a seven-week period of inspections in the areas of quality assurance (QA),
identification and resolution of construction problems, engineering and construction activities, preoperational testing, and follow-up of other activities. The inspection program for Unit 2 construction activities is described in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2517, Watts Bar Unit 2 Construction Inspection Program. Information regarding the WBN Unit 2 Construction Project and NRC inspections can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/wb/watts-bar.html.
Inspection Results
- The inspectors concluded that issues pertaining to several open items, including one unresolved item (URI), two inspection procedures (IPs), five temporary instructions (TIs),
one generic letter (GL), and one supplemental safety evaluation report (SSER) Appendix HH item have been appropriately addressed for WBN Unit 2. These items are closed.
- Other areas inspected were adequate with no findings identified. These areas included QA; piping; mechanical components; electrical systems and components; preoperational testing activities; and various NRC inspection procedures.
Table of Contents I. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM ............................................................................... 5 Q.1.1 Identification and Resolution of Construction Problems (Inspection Procedure 35007) ................................................................................................................... 5 Q.1.2 Safety Conscious Work Environment (Inspection Procedure 35007 and Temporary Instruction 2512/015) .......................................................................... 5 II. MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS ............................................................ 6 C.1 Construction Activities .................................................................................................... 6 C.1.1 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Construction Activity Interface Controls ..................................... 6 C.1.2 Mechanical Components - Work Observation and Construction Refurbishment (Inspection Procedures 50073 and 37002) ........................................................... 7 P.1 Preoperational Activities ................................................................................................. 9 P.1.1 Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification (Inspection Procedure 71302) ................................................................................................................... 9 P.1.2 (Closed) Preoperational Test Procedure Review (Inspection Procedures 70300 and 70308) .......................................................................................................... 10 P.1.3 Preoperational Test Procedure Review (Inspection Procedures 70300 and 70311) ................................................................................................................. 12 P.1.4 Preoperational Test Procedure Review (Inspection Procedures 70300 and 70333B) ............................................................................................................... 13 P.1.5 Preoperational Test Witnessing (Inspection Procedures 70302, 70312, and 70433) ................................................................................................................. 14 P.1.6 Preoperational Test Results Evaluation (Inspection Procedure 70400) .............. 15 P.1.7 Preoperational Test Results Evaluation (Inspection Procedure 70400) .............. 16 IV. OTHER ACTIVITES ........................................................................................................ 17 OA.1.1 (Closed) Quality Assurance Program - Records and Unresolved Item 05000391/2014607-02, Potential Inadequate Storage of QA Records (Inspection Procedure 35748B) ............................................................................................. 17 OA.1.2 (Closed) Instrument Sensing Lines Corrective Action Program (Temporary Instruction 2512/026 and Inspection Procedures 49061, 49063, 49065, 52051, 52053, and 52055) ................................................................................................................. 19 OA.1.3 (Closed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program (Temporary Instruction 2512/037) ....................................................................... 21 OA.1.4 (Closed) Generic Letter 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits (Temporary Instruction 2515/139) ........................................................................................... 22 OA.1.5 (Closed) Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power Verification (Temporary Instruction 2515/174) ............................................................................................................ 23 OA.1.6 (Closed) Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, Appendix HH, Open Item 33: Verify Completion of Design Change Notices of 125V DC Vital Battery System Analysis (Inspection Procedures 51053, 51063, and 92702) ............................................ 24 OA.1.7 (Closed)Bulletin 85-02, Undervoltage Trip Attachments of Westinghouse DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers (Temporary Instruction 2515/72) ..................................... 25 V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS .......................................................................................... 25 X1 Exit Meeting Summary ................................................................................................... 25
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
During the inspection period covered by this report, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)performed construction completion and preoperational testing activities on safety-related systems and continued engineering design activities of the WBN Plant, Unit 2 (U2).
I.
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM Q.1.1 Identification and Resolution of Construction Problems (Inspection Procedure 35007)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors continued to review problem evaluation reports (PERs), as part of the applicants corrective action program, to verify that issues being identified under the corrective action program were being properly identified, addressed, and resolved by the applicant.
The inspectors reviewed PER 958010 - System 81 Primary Water Pumps Shunt Trip Wiring Not Landed. The inspectors reviewed PER 958010 to verify that the following corrective actions were completed: immediate actions to tag out the pump breakers, the completion of the extent of condition review, and revising the test procedures. The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and adequacy of the Apparent Cause Analysis Report. Based on the apparent cause, the applicant strengthened the technical instruction process, 0-TI-12.08, Control of Unit Interfaces, Revision (Rev.) 0001, to ensure special requirements were met prior to releasing the boundary. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 impact evaluation to verify that the issue did not significantly affect Unit 1.
The inspectors also reviewed and followed up on the corrective actions of several PERs discussed throughout sections of this report.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The issues identified in the PERs reviewed were adequately identified, addressed, and resolved.
Q.1.2 Safety Conscious Work Environment (Inspection Procedure 35007 and Temporary Instruction 2512/015)
a. Inspection Scope
On January 23, 2015, the inspectors met with TVA employee concerns program coordinators to discuss the 2014 third and fourth quarterly analysis of concerns and any trends. The inspectors reviewed existing program requirements and recent concerns identified by the applicants and contractors employee concerns programs.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors did not identify any issues or concerns regarding the ability of the applicant to provide a safety conscience work environment.
II.
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS C.1 Construction Activities C.1.1 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Construction Activity Interface Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors independently assessed applicant controls, associated with Unit 2 construction work activities, to prevent adverse impact on Unit 1 operational safety. The inspectors attended routine Unit 1/Unit 2 interface meetings to assess the exchange and sharing of information between the two site organizations. Periodic construction and planning meetings were observed, at least once per week, to assess the adequacy of the applicants efforts to identify those construction activities that could potentially impact the operating unit. This included the review of select work activities, which the applicant had screened as not affecting Unit 1, to verify the adequacy of that screening effort.
Additionally, the inspectors independently assessed select construction activities to verify that potential impacts on the operating unit had been identified and adequately characterized with appropriate management strategies planned for implementation.
Furthermore, the inspectors performed independent walkdowns of select construction work locations to verify that controls to protect the operating unit provided an adequate level of protection and had been properly implemented.
Specific work activity observed included work associated with:
- Work Order (WO) 116499660, Drain and Refill Unit 2 GLYCOL System, Maintain Unit 1 Separation, and
- WO 113268970, System 003, Auxiliary Feed Water Pressure Test, Boundary Near Unit 1 equipment.
Specific work activities that the applicant had screened out as not affecting Unit 1 included, but were not limited to, work activities as noted in this inspection report.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified
c. Conclusions
Overall, management oversight and controls were in place for observed construction activities that could potentially impact the operating unit.
C.1.2 Mechanical Components - Work Observation and Construction Refurbishment (Inspection Procedures 50073 and 37002)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: After resumption of Watts Bar Unit 2 construction activities in 2007, safety injection pumps 2A and 2B were sent to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and vendor, Flowserve, to be refurbished as part of TVAs refurbishment program. In October 2010, during the receipt inspection of safety injection pump 2A, a PER was generated to document several hardware non-conformances, to include the lower thrust end bearing housing clearance fit-up with the pump casing and the visual damage to the inboard end auxiliary packing gland. TVA engineering determined that the non-conformances would not invalidate the pumps performance to meet its safety function and accepted the non-conforming parts as use-as-is. The safety injection pumps were installed and placed in a dry layup condition in the summer of 2011.
In January 2014, the 2A safety injection pump shaft was damaged during construction activities while drilling thermocouple mounting holes through the pump journal bearing housing. TVA determined the pump was delivered, from the vendor, with an incorrect pilot hole angle in the bearing upper housing used for drilling the bearing. TVA initiated corrective actions and replaced the 2A safety injection pump shaft and rotating element.
During the disassembly of the 2A safety injection pump, to address the damaged shaft, TVA discovered that the pump had several mechanical assembly errors that did not meet the pump vendor supplied drawings, and foreign material was found in the pump casing and internals. In addition, TVA found water in the bottom half of the 2A pump casing. TVA initiated several PERs to address the pump vendors negative quality performance trend and included corrective actions for the additional pump vendor assembly errors for the 2B safety injection pump and the two safety-related charging pumps. The vendor submitted an initial 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of Defect in April 2014, a final report to the NRC in June 2014, and a root cause analysis to TVA which stated that the vendor had a lack of quality control during the final refurbishment and reassembly of the pumps prior to shipment due to a lack of knowledge and experience in personnel. The 2A safety injection pump shaft and rotating element was replaced with a spare from TVAs inventory, and the 2B and charging safety-related pumps were repaired and reassembled to support open vessel testing during the summer of 2014.
During open vessel testing the safety injection pumps 2A and 2B operated at a flow rate greater than the rated 800 gallons per minute (gpm), also known as pump run-out, due to a system valve alignment error; this caused the pumps to operate outside of the pump curve specifications for a short period of time. The valve alignment was reconfigured and the test 2-PTI-063-01, Safety Injection System SIS Integrated Test, Rev. 0, was completed. The pump operating temperature and vibration specifications were monitored during the test and did not exceed alarm limits. TVA disassembled the 2A and 2B safety injection pumps after the open vessel test and discovered the pump shaft and thrust end-bearings were excessively worn. Both pump rotating assembly and shaft drive lube oil pumps were sent off site to the OEM vendor, Flowserve, for repair and a root cause analysis.
As part of the evaluation of the rotating element for the 2A safety injection pump with the drilled damaged shaft, the vendor noted several defects and water marks on the impellers that appeared to be from microbiological influence corrosion (MIC). During the original construction refurbishment time frame, the 2A safety injection pump was refurbished and returned to site in 2011. The refurbished pump contained the original impeller and diffuser material, but upgraded shaft material. The original impellers were made from ASTM A296, grade CA40, and the diffusers were made from CA6NM. The spacers were made of AISI type 400 series material. The CA40 and American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) type 400 series material had very little alloying elements and a maximum of 0.5 percent molybdenum. Interviews with TVAs metallurgist noted that contaminated water may cause MIC that attacks stainless steel material that has little to no molybdenum. TVA was unable to conclude the cause, where the water came from, or how long the 2A safety injection pump impeller had been sitting in water. TVA and the vendor verified that the 2B safety injection pump was not sitting in water during its layup condition. They also confirmed that the 2B safety injection pump shaft and impeller material were upgraded to CA6NM material (which was a material with a higher percentage of molybdenum) during the original refurbishment activities in 2011. Also, TVA flushed the safety injection system flow path with demineralized water to verify that no contaminates remained in the pump flow path.
Flowserve implemented the repair plan for both safety injection pumps which included new bearings, removing the shaft scarred areas, and building back up the shaft area with a hard chrome plate. In addition, the 2B safety injection pump repair plans included removing and re-applying material to wear surfaces from significant grooving on several impeller stages. Several other minor impeller groove wear and casting defects were accepted as-is and all critical dimensions were noted as within OEM tolerances. The 2A safety injection pump repair plan is in progress.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and observed the corrective action management reviews associated with the safety injection pump refurbishment. Also, the inspectors interviewed TVA staff and the pump vendor representative on site to verify that specially trained personnel were utilized and were available to meet the manufacturers instructions. The inspectors reviewed the vendors root cause evaluation, TVAs engineering consultant root cause evaluation, and the pump vendors as-found condition report and repair plans to verify that the causes and corrective actions were properly identified, documented, and were implemented into TVAs corrective action plans.
The inspectors observed the installation of the 2B safety injection pump and reviewed WO 116306257, Assembly of the 2B Safety Injection Pump, to verify the vendor and TVA assembly instructions were followed, to include pre-lubrication of the pump, cleanliness, alignment, tolerances, and that clearances were met. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the pump assembly documents to verify the hold points were observed and the inspection records were adequate, to include hold points for the refurbishment cleanliness inspections.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified. The refurbishment program is a unique process specific to the Watts Bar Unit 2 reactivation construction project. TVA is in the process of documenting the corrective actions and has provided additional quality oversight to the pump vendor refurbishment remaining scope of work. The safety-related charging pumps have been repaired and reinstalled and have performed adequately during initial component testing. The safety injection pump repair plans are in process in accordance with the approved corrective action plans.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that TVA had identified several safety-related pump manufacturing and field construction non-conformances and created several corrective action plans to ensure the pumps are assembled correctly and will perform their safety function. The remaining repair plans and corrective actions include assembly of the 2A safety injection pump, component testing, and updating site specific procedures and vendor manuals.
P.1 Preoperational Activities P.1.1 Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification (Inspection Procedure 71302)
a. Inspection Scope
(Weekly Inspection Activities): The inspectors verified that the applicants management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities over the preoperational testing program by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with the applicants personnel, and reviewing facility records.
Preoperational testing activities were limited during the inspection period and included the following systems or portions thereof:
- System 061 - Ice Condenser
- System 063 - Safety Injection System
- System 074 - Residual Heat Removal
- System 003B - Auxiliary Feedwater As systems became available for preoperational testing, inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, plant conditions, security, and adherence to regulatory requirements.
Inspectors also verified the following, as available and on a sampling basis, during the tours:
- general plant/equipment conditions;
- plant areas for fire hazards - examined fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, firefighting equipment, and emergency equipment for operability and also verified that ignition sources and flammable material were being controlled in accordance with applicants procedures;
- activities in progress (e.g., maintenance, preoperational testing, etc.) were being conducted in accordance with applicants procedures;
- watched for abuse of installed instrumentation, such as stepping or climbing on the instrumentation, that could affect the calibration or ability to function;
- listened for the public address system announcements to determine that blind spots do not exist; (i.e., cannot be heard clearly enough to be understood);
- construction work force is authorized to perform activities on systems or equipment; and
- looked for uncontrolled openings in previously cleaned or flushed systems or components.
In addition, the inspectors observed the component tests of motor-operated valve 2-FCV-074-40 and observed portions of the implementation of test procedure GTM-02, Pump Functional Test, Rev. 2, for the 2A auxiliary feedwater pump and the 2B safety injection pump.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusion The applicants implementation of the preoperational test program was in accordance with procedures for those activities observed during the inspection period.
P.1.2 (Closed) Preoperational Test Procedure Review (Inspection Procedures 70300 and 70308)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The purpose of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2513, Light Water Reactor Inspection Program - Preoperational Testing and Operational Preparedness Phase, issue date January 1, 1984, is to verify through direct observation, personnel interviews, and review of facility records that:
- Systems and components important to the safety of the plant are fully tested to demonstrate that they satisfy their design requirements.
- Management controls and procedures, including quality assurance programs, necessary for operation of the facility have been documented and implemented.
IMC 2513 defines the minimum inspection program for a finding of readiness for license issuance (IP 94302, Status of Watts Bar Unit 2 Readiness for an Operating License).
IMC 2513 requires the procedural review of the mandatory tests defined in IMC 2513 and five of the primal tests defined in IMC 2513. The following inspection was performed in relation to satisfying the required procedural review.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed preoperational test procedure (PTI) 2-PTI-068-01, Hot Functional Test (HFT) - Heatup and Cooldown, Rev.0, to verify that the test procedure adequately addressed NRC requirements and licensing commitments outlined in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), docketed correspondence, Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Technical Specifications, and Regulatory Guide 1.68.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-068-01 to verify that the procedure contained the following administrative good practice attributes:
- the title described the purpose of the procedure;
- the cover page had appropriate information and approval signatures;
- each page had appropriate identification information;
- the last page was clearly identifiable by markings;
- a clear statement of procedure purpose/objectives;
- planning information such as prerequisites, precautions, required tools, reference documents, and coordination requirements;
- signoff requirements including concurrent and independent verification steps established where appropriate;
- equipment alignment instructions are clear and concise;
- equipment identifiers are accurate;
- actions to be taken within the steps are specifically identified;
- instrumentation units consistent for data collection;
- graphs, charts, tables, data sheets, and work sheets are clearly usable;
- calculation sheets technically accurate;
- clear coordination instructions for test activities involving multiple test personnel;
- clear instructions for system restoration;
- guidance for follow-up actions and points of contact;
- overall, clear concise steps for testing with action critical (acceptance criteria)steps identified;
- clear quantitative acceptance criteria with acceptability and contingencies; and
- overall sequence of the procedure was consistent with obtaining the intended result.
The inspectors also reviewed the procedure to verify that precautions or explanations were placed immediately ahead of the steps to which they applied. The inspectors performed a detailed review with the responsible test engineer to verify that the acceptance criteria met design requirements.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-068-01 to verify the following:
- all related procedures (operating, administrative, etc.) were approved;
- variations made to conduct the cold functional testing have been reset or returned to normal as required to perform HFT;
- the integrated HFT procedure was the controlling document for testing to be performed;
- the procedure had provisions to document satisfactory completion of the various steps and sequence that must be accomplished;
- initial conditions were listed;
- water quality was stated;
- test criteria was clearly defined for each test;
- the heatup, systems to be operated, indicated modes of operation, and checks to be performed are listed;
- a specified inspection of piping hangers, piping leakage, and hanger settings while the systems are hot;
- the residual heat removal system will be tested to demonstrate the performance and capability for cooldown and for low temperature overpressure control while solid;
- the temperature/pressure plateaus at which testing will be performed are defined;
- provisions exist to correct operating procedures if errors are found;
- provisions exist for system inspections to ensure that electrical cables, paper boards, flammable material, etc., will not contact hot pipes;
- all applicable steam turbines are protected against inadvertent rotation during testing;
- necessary actions exist to control the plant in the event relief valves lift and do not reset;
- guidance exists regarding vibration of reactor internals outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.20;
- guidance exists regarding demonstration of component and system operability in various modes and throughout full design operating range, regarding expansion and restraint testing, "water hammer," and other areas as outlined in applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix A;
- guidance exists on testing of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) as outlined in applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.79; and
- there is evidence of incorporation of appropriate documents from applicable vendor manuals and applicable precaution, limitation, and setpoint documents.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the applicants test procedure was written in a manner consistent with the guidance of procedure SMP-8.0, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Administration of Preoperational Test Instructions, Rev. 11. This completes the hot functional test procedure review of preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-068-01. IP 70308 is closed.
P.1.3 Preoperational Test Procedure Review (Inspection Procedures 70300 and 70311)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The background for this preoperational test procedure review is the same as that in the background section of P.1.2.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-063-06, Safety Injection System Check Valve Test, Rev. 0, to verify that the procedure contained the following administrative good practice attributes:
- the title described the purpose of the procedure;
- the cover page had appropriate information and approval signatures;
- each page had appropriate identification information;
- the last page was clearly identifiable by markings;
- a clear statement of procedure purpose/objectives;
- planning information such as prerequisites, precautions, required tools, reference documents, and coordination requirements;
- signoff requirements including concurrent and independent verification steps established where appropriate;
- equipment alignment instructions are clear and concise;
- equipment identifiers are accurate;
- actions to be taken within the steps are specifically identified;
- instrumentation units consistent for data collection;
- graphs, charts, tables, data sheets, and work sheets are clearly usable;
- calculation sheets were technically accurate;
- clear coordination instructions for test activities involving multiple test personnel;
- clear instructions for system restoration;
- guidance for follow-up actions and points of contact;
- overall, clear concise steps for testing with action critical (acceptance criteria)steps identified;
- clear quantitative acceptance criteria with acceptability and contingencies; and
- the overall sequence of the procedure was consistent with obtaining the intended result.
The inspectors also reviewed the procedure to verify that precautions or explanations were placed immediately ahead of the steps to which they applied. The inspectors performed a detailed review with the responsible test engineer to verify that the acceptance criteria met design requirements. This concludes all the planned procedure reviews for System 63 (safety injection system) preoperational testing.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the applicants test procedure was written in a manner consistent with NRC requirements and the guidance of applicant procedure SMP-8.0, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Administration of Preoperational Test Instructions, Rev.
11.
P.1.4 Preoperational Test Procedure Review (Inspection Procedures 70300 and 70333B)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The background for this preoperational test procedure review is the same as that in the background section of P.1.2.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-062-02, Boric Acid Subsystem Logic Test, to verify that the procedure contained the following administrative good practice attributes:
- the title described the purpose of the procedure
- the cover page had appropriate information and approval signatures
- each page had appropriate identification information
- the last page was clearly identifiable by markings
- a clear statement of procedure purpose/objectives
- planning information such as prerequisites, precautions, required tools, reference documents, and coordination requirements
- signoff requirements including concurrent and independent verification steps established where appropriate
- equipment alignment instructions are clear and concise
- equipment identifiers are accurate
- actions to be taken within the steps are specifically identified
- instrumentation units consistent for data collection
- graphs, charts, tables, data sheets, and work sheets are clearly usable
- calculation sheets technically accurate
- clear coordination instructions for test activities involving multiple test personnel
- clear instructions for system restoration
- guidance for follow-up actions and points of contact
- overall, clear concise steps for testing with action critical (acceptance criteria)steps identified
- clear quantitative acceptance criteria with acceptability and contingencies
- overall sequence of the procedure consistent with obtaining the intended result.
The inspectors also reviewed the procedure to verify that precautions or explanations were placed immediately ahead of the steps to which they applied. The inspectors performed a detailed review with the responsible test engineer to verify that the acceptance criteria met design requirements.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the applicants test procedure was written in a manner consistent with the guidance of procedure SMP-8.0, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Administration of Preoperational Test Instructions, Rev. 11.
P.1.5 Preoperational Test Witnessing (Inspection Procedures 70302, 70312, and 70433)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed activities associated with the performance of preoperational test instruction 2-PTI-062-01, Charging and Letdown Logic Test, Rev. 1 to verify that the testing was conducted in accordance with approved procedures and to verify the adequacy of test program records and preliminary evaluation of test results. The following components logic tests were selected for inspection of this item:
- Section 6.12, 2-FCV-62-84
- Section 6.27, 2-FCV-62-77.
The inspectors assessed the following attributes associated with these test observations:
- all test personnel were on station and had the latest revision of the procedure;
- test prerequisites were performed;
- plant systems were in service to support the test;
- test equipment was installed and within calibration;
- testing was performed in accordance with the approved procedure;
- test interruptions and continuations were handled in accordance with approved procedures and documented in the chronological test log;
- testing events and discrepancies were properly documented in the test deficiency log;
- testing was executed and coordinated properly;
- data was properly collected;
- temporary equipment was installed and tracked appropriately;
- administrative test controls were properly followed; and
- test personnel were using approved drawings and vendor manuals.
The inspectors observed the tests to verify that the overall test acceptance was met.
The inspectors conducted a review with the responsible test engineer to assure that the preliminary test evaluations were consistent with the inspectors observations. During the tests, the inspectors observed important data gathering activities to ensure the data was properly gathered and recorded. A post-test cursory review of the test data was performed to verify legibility, traceability, and permanence of the data sheet entries.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the applicants test procedure was performed in a manner consistent with the guidance of procedure SMP-9, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2, Conduct of Test, Rev. 5.
P.1.6 Preoperational Test Results Evaluation (Inspection Procedure 70400)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the results for portions of the preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-030E-01, containment air return fans associated with the implementation of GTM-05, HVAC Air Balance, Rev. 2. The containment air return fan system moves air from upper containment, from several dead-ended spaces where there is potential for accumulation of hydrogen, to lower containment up through the ice condenser during a large break loss of coolant accident. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the applicants evaluation of the procedure performance and results was conducted in accordance with approved procedures. This review was performed to provide assurance that the test data was within the established acceptance criteria and the applicants methods for identifying and correcting deficiencies were adequate. The inspectors performed the following activities associated with this test results review:
- reviewed all documented test deficiencies to verify they had been properly resolved, reviewed, and accepted;
- reviewed the test summary and evaluation to verify that the system was evaluated to meet design requirements and acceptance criteria;
- reviewed the original as-run copy of the test to verify completion of data sheets, calculations and signatures/initials; and
- the approval of the test results was reviewed for completeness with respect to the acceptance of the test results.
The inspectors reviewed the test results to verify that the overall test acceptance was met. The inspectors conducted a review with the responsible test engineer to ensure that the test evaluation was performed in accordance with established procedures.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified. The applicant initiated PER 971781 to address several test deficiency notices for not meeting the required air flow rates for the containment air return system. The as-built air flows were consistent with Watts Bar Unit 1 air flows.
The air flows were reviewed and accepted as-is and the applicant committed to update the design documents to reflect the as-built airflows as part of the corrective actions associated with PER 971781.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the applicants test results were documented, reviewed, and approved in a manner consistent with the guidance of procedure SMP-10.0,Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Packaging and Processing Test Results, Rev. 2. This completes the test results evaluation of preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-030E-01 associated with GTM-05, HVAC Air Balance, Rev. 2.
P.1.7 Preoperational Test Results Evaluation (Inspection Procedure 70400)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the results for preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-063-02, Safety Injection System (SIS) Accumulators, Rev. 1, to verify that the applicants evaluation of the procedure performance and results was conducted in accordance with approved procedures. This review was performed to provide assurance that the test data was within the established acceptance criteria and the applicants methods for identifying and correcting deficiencies were adequate. The inspectors performed the following activities associated with this test results review:
- reviewed all changes made to the test procedure to verify they were properly annotated, did not affect the objective of the test, and were performed in accordance with administrative procedures;
- reviewed all documented test deficiencies to verify they had been properly resolved, reviewed, and accepted;
- reviewed the test summary and evaluation to verify that the system was evaluated to meet design requirements and acceptance criteria;
- reviewed the original as-run copy of the test to verify completion of data sheets, calculations, and signatures/initials;
- quality assurance (QA) inspection records were reviewed to verify they were completed as required by the test procedure; and
- the approval of the test results was reviewed for completeness to ensure that personnel charged with the responsibility for review and acceptance had documented their evaluation and corrected any identified discrepancies.
The inspectors reviewed the test results to verify that the overall test acceptance was met. The inspectors conducted a review with the responsible test engineer to assure that the test evaluation was performed in accordance with established procedures.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the applicants properly evaluated the test in accordance with the guidance of procedure SMP-10.0, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Packaging and Processing Test Results, Rev. 2. This completes the test results evaluation of preoperational test procedure 2-PTI-063-02.
IV.
OTHER ACTIVITES OA.1.1 (Closed) Quality Assurance Program - Records and Unresolved Item 05000391/2014607-02, Potential Inadequate Storage of QA Records (Inspection Procedure 35748B)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: For Watts Bar Unit 1, IP 35748B, Records, dated October 1, 1976, was used to verify that the applicant had developed a QA program relating to the control of records that is in conformance with regulatory requirements, commitments in the application, and industry guides and standards. Based on the record storage program being well-established under the Unit 1 organization, the inspectors performed Section II.2.b of the IP 35748B and verified that Unit 2 will be incorporated into the established record storage program at Watts Bar when dual-unit operation begins. This Unit 2 inspection was performed and documented in NRC IIR 05000391/2014607 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14274A076). IIR 05000391/2014607 documented an unresolved item (URI), URI 05000391/2014607-02, Potential Inadequate Storage of QA Records.
Inspection Activities: In response to the inspectors observations in IIR 05000391/2014607, the applicant issued PER 927528 to review the URI. The inspectors reviewed PER 927528 to verify that the applicant had made corrective actions to restore compliance.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
On January 18, 1990, the NRC approved TVAs Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan (NQAP) as acceptable to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The applicants NQAP states, in part that, TVA will provide two-hour minimum fire-rated protection for QA records and utilize one of the following alternatives as single storage facilities:
1. A fire-resistive vault or file room that meets the applicable requirements of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 45.2.9-1974 with the following exceptions:
a. records will be afforded the protection of a two-hour rated facility; b. records will be stored in fully enclosed cabinets; c. structure, doors, frames, and hardware shall be designed to fully comply with a minimum two-hour rating; d. pipes or penetrations will be allowed for fire protection, lighting, temperature, humidity control, or communications; e. work not directly associated with records storage or retrieval will be prohibited in the facility; and f. smoking and eating/drinking will be prohibited throughout the records facility.
2. One-hour fire-rated cabinets if the following conditions are met:
a. the records are re-creatable; OR b. are contained within a facility of fire-resistive construction with adequate smoke detection or fire-suppression systems; OR c. are within a facility with a fuel loading less than 25 pounds/square foot as defined by National Fire Protection Act (NFPA) 232-1980.
TVA utilized Trailer 71 and room EQB1D as facilities to process QA records. Trailer 71 and room EQB1D met the second part of the statement by following alternatives 2.c. and 2.b., respectively, of the NQAP as a single storage facility. However, TVA had not demonstrated that the configuration of Trailer 71 met the first part of the statement, that the single storage facility was equivalent to two-hour fire-rated protection. The inspectors determined that the applicants failure to comply with the NQAP was a performance deficiency.
Criterion V of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50 requires, in part, that Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Section 5.6 of the NQAP states that TVA will provide two-hour minimum fire-rated protection for QA records.
Contrary to the above, since identified on August 25, 2014, the applicant failed to provide two-hour minimum fire-rated protection for QA records in accordance with the requirements of the NQAP. The records were contained in a one-hour fire-rated cabinet and were within a facility with fuel loading less than 25 pounds/square foot. The inspectors review of ASTM E119-80 time temperature curves indicate that a one hour barrier within the typical trailer structure would not reach a temperature of 2000 degrees until approximately four hours; therefore, the inspectors determined that the applicants storage of QA records in a one-hour fire-rated cabinet in this trailer would not have resulted in damage if a fire would have occurred. For this reason, the inspectors determined this violation to be of minor significance in accordance with IMC 2517, Watts Bar Unit 2 Construction Inspection Program. The applicant issued PER 927528 to review the deficiency and make corrective actions to restore compliance. Corrective action was taken to electronically scan all QA records in Trailer 71 and store them on a designated QA server. The applicant modified the receipt process to store all incoming QA records in a two-hour fire rated, impact-resistant cabinet until scanning of the records is complete. This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. URI 05000391/2014607-02 is closed.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that corrective actions were taken to restore compliance for the issue identified in URI 05000391/2014607-02. URI 05000391/2014607-02 is closed.
In addition, the inspectors concluded no further inspection will be required to verify the adequacy of IP 35748B as long as the implementation of current procedures and the planned transition plan to two unit operation remains intact. Inspection Procedure 35748B is closed.
OA.1.2 (Closed) Instrument Sensing Lines Corrective Action Program (Temporary Instruction 2512/026 and Inspection Procedures 49061, 49063, 49065, 52051, 52053, and 52055)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The objective of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2512/026, Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Instrument Lines Corrective Action Program Plan, is to gather sufficient information to make a determination as to whether TVAs Instrument Sensing Lines Corrective Action Program (CAP) plan has been satisfactorily implemented to assure that the issues it addressed are being adequately resolved.
The Watts Bar Program Team was formed in 1987 and performed an integrated systematic evaluation of Watts Bar after the applicant withdrew the certification that Watts Bar Unit 1 was ready for licensing due to over 5000 employee concerns. This team recommended 18 CAP plans (including the Instrument Sensing Lines CAP) and submitted them to the NRC for review. The issues identified with the instrument sensing lines fell into two categories:
1. Functional issues related to minimum slope requirements: A number of sensing lines were found that did not conform to the minimum slope requirements on design output drawings.
a. Thermal effects: Instrument lines and supports were not designed considering the effects of thermal expansion. Operating modes associated with many of these lines indicated that portions of systems will be subjected to thermal expansion effects.
b. Pipe and tube bending devices: Implementing procedures used to qualify pipe and tube bending devices were not being executed and qualification records for the bending devices and specific bends were not being maintained for all work.
c. Compression fittings: Numerous discrepancies with compression fittings were discovered that did not satisfy manufacturers installation instructions. These discrepancies were not specific to one aspect of installation. Tubing cuts were not properly deburred, fittings were not properly tightened or installed, and ferrules were missing, reversed, or unidentifiable.
d. Installation discrepancies: Support documentation for some instrumentation lines was determined to be lost or incorrect. The scope of the structural issues included Seismic Category I and I(L) instrument lines and their associated supports.
TVA committed to implement the Unit 1 approach to instrument line systems for Unit 2.
To date, NRC inspectors have performed numerous inspections that have focused on these issues. Inspectors have previously reviewed much of the progress of the Watts Bar 2 corrective actions. Information on previous inspections of the CAP can be found in the following Watts Bar Unit 2 Inspection Reports:
- 05000391/2010603 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102170465)
- 05000391/2010604 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103060240)
- 05000391/2011602 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110800483)
- 05000391/2011604 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111810890)
- 05000391/2011607 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112730197)
These inspections covered the design and calculation aspects of the Instrument Sensing Lines CAP. The inspectors performed field observations of work on the sensing lines including slope and installation verifications. Inspections also covered the review of previous modifications, the review of engineering change notices and field change requests, and the inspection of previous testing performed on instrument sensing lines.
These previous inspections also reviewed nonconformance and deviation reports and audit reports relating to instrument sensing line work orders.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed applicant and contractor procedures for the qualification and use of pipe and tube bending machines. The inspectors also reviewed the process for determining the instrument systems affected by thermal expansion. This included a review of the drawings and calculations associated with thermal expansion, to verify that the process was implemented correctly and that proper engineering practices were used in the determination. Additional inspection of thermal effects on instrument line systems will be conducted as part of a future inspection of Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) 86-11.
The inspectors reviewed and walked down the accessible portions of six safety-related instrument lines on five different safety-related systems to determine if they were properly sloped and supported, the pipe was correctly sized, and if the actual field configuration matched the isometric drawings. The inspectors reviewed drawings for two supports to determine if the supports and tubing clips were installed according to the drawings and specifications. The inspectors also reviewed field change requests associated with the instrument lines to verify that changes were incorporated into the work orders.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of six receipt inspection reports for material on the selected work orders to determine if adequate measurements were in place to verify physical condition and delivery of correct materials along with proper documentation to ensure that procurement specifications have been met. The inspectors reviewed 30 examples of work orders to verify that the correct bender usage lists and bender inspection documents were maintained as required by TVA procedure. The inspectors also reviewed training records for seven craft personnel conducting work on instrument line work orders.
The inspectors witnessed one in-process field hydrostatic test to verify that the work performed on instrument systems met the design requirements. The NRC inspectors also witnessed the testing of numerous instrument sensing lines during the reactor coolant system cold hydrostatic test, which was conducted in September 2014 and is documented under IIR 05000391/2014608 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14322A182).
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that issues associated with the Instrument Sensing Lines CAP (TI 2512/026) were properly addressed and tracked in the applicants corrective action program and appropriate measures were taken to prevent recurrence. Based on a review of the applicants engineering complete closure package and results of this and previous inspections, the Instrument Sensing Lines CAP (TI 2512/026) is closed.
OA.1.3 (Closed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program (Temporary Instruction 2512/037)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: In 1989, the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Performance Plan identified a special program (SP) to establish a controlled master fuse list. The SP provided corrective actions to address three primary issues:
- (1) Class 1E safety-related fuses had not been adequately identified and controlled;
- (2) Bussmann KAZ actuators had been improperly used to provide circuit protection; and
- (3) requirements for redundant overcurrent protection of electrical penetration assemblies had not been adequately addressed by design.
The previous inspections of this SP on Unit 2 were documented in IIRs 05000391/2010603 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102170465), Section OA.1.8; 05000391/2010605 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110410680), Section OA.1.16; 05000391/2013604 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13179A079), Section OA.1.23; and 05000391/2013610 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14049A158), Section OA.1.5. These reports documented acceptable results for a sample of 39 fuse sets in six safety-related plant systems.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the engineering complete closure package regarding the Master Fuse List Special Program. The inspectors selected a sample of fuses that had been installed and verified by the applicant from four safety-related systems that had been turned over to startup, including systems 30A (auxiliary building ventilation), 62 (chemical and volume control system), 70 (component cooling system), and 30J (reactor building ventilation). The list of fuses inspected is provided in the Attachment. Included in the listing of fuses reviewed was fuse KAZ - WBN-2-BD-212-B002-B/9C (applied as an indicator device in parallel with actual power fuses). The inspectors interviewed applicant staff members responsible for the design and selection of the fuses listed on the master equipment list (MEL). The inspectors performed a direct visual inspection on a sample of fuses to verify that they agreed with the fuses listed in the MEL. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of motor control centers (MCCs) to verify fuses installed in the individual compartments matched those listed in the design documents.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusion The inspectors concluded that the fuses in the systems reviewed were adequately sized, installed, and properly documented for the samples selected for inspection. Based on the significant number of fuses and systems reviewed, inspectors determined that sufficient inspections have been performed. Therefore, Temporary Instruction 2512/037 is closed.
OA.1.4 (Closed) Generic Letter 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits (Temporary Instruction 2515/139)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: A TVA letter dated April 18, 1996, (ADAMS Accession No. ML082401216),
Subject: Response to Generic Letter (GL) 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, committed to completing the actions requested by the NRC in GL 96-01 for Unit 1 and prior to the initial fuel load for Unit 2. During an inspection of Watts Bar Unit 2 on August 25-29, 2014, IIR 391/2014608 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14322A182) the inspectors concluded that objective evidence was not provided to confirm that applicable Unit 2 surveillance instructions were reviewed in accordance with the GL 96-01 requirements during the development process. This inspection continued the inspection efforts of gathering sufficient information to determine if TVA performed adequate technical reviews in connection with their commitment and the requirements of GL 96-
01.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors continued the inspection efforts initiated in NRC IIR 391/2014608 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14322A182) regarding the commitments and requirements of GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions related to PER 931429 and the resolutions for any differences between WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2. Additionally the inspectors conducted interviews with responsible personnel developing the surveillance instructions to better understand the process and methodology used to address GL 96-01 for Unit 2.
Inspectors performed a review of applicable procedures, surveillance requirements and instructions, PERs, electrical schematics, and logic diagrams. Based on the objective evidence reviewed, the inspectors concluded that the applicant performed the needed reviews and verified the referenced electrical schematic and logic diagrams against the surveillance requirements in accordance with their commitment to GL 96-01.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observation and Findings No findings were identified c. Conclusion Based on a review of the applicants documents and the aforementioned inspection activities, the inspectors determined that the applicant had implemented actions that are sufficient to address the commitment and requirements of GL 96-01 for Watts Bar Unit 2.
Therefore, Generic Letter 96-01 and Temporary Instruction 2515/139 are closed.
OA.1.5 (Closed) Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power Verification (Temporary Instruction 2515/174)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The objective of TI 2515/174, Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power Verification, is to verify that licensees have adequately implemented commitments related to providing backup power to containment hydrogen igniters. The inspection activities under this TI were closed for Unit 1 and documented in NRC IIR 05000390/2008003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082210342). Previous inspections of this item for Unit 2 were documented in IIR 05000391/2011608 Section OA.1.7 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11311A082), IIR 05000391/2012609 Section OA.1.2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12356A073), and IIR 05000391/2014608 OA.1.7 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14322A182).
Inspection Activities: The inspectors conducted walkdowns and held discussions with responsible personnel to verify that the generator and associated components were pre-positioned in suitable locations according to the commitments. The inspectors reviewed training documents to verify that a suitable training program was established to train selected staff in the actions necessary to provide backup power to the igniters. In addition, the inspectors reviewed implementing documents to verify that procedures were in place to govern those actions. The inspectors reviewed emergency operating instructions related to power recovery following a station blackout to verify that starting of the air-return fans and assessment of the concentration of hydrogen are accomplished prior to energizing the hydrogen igniters. This would address the concern of hydrogen concentration at or above the ice beds following a loss of power as expressed in NUREG 1150, Part II, Section 5.3.2, Important Plant Characteristics.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusion The inspectors concluded that TVA had established adequate measures to implement the remaining commitments related to providing backup power to containment hydrogen igniters. Temporary Instruction 2515/174 is closed.
OA.1.6 (Closed) Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, Appendix HH, Open Item 33:
Verify Completion of Design Change Notices of 125V DC Vital Battery System Analysis (Inspection Procedures 51053, 51063, and 92702)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: While responding to a preliminary request for information regarding the Unit 2 FSAR, TVA stated in Attachment #9 of its letter dated July 31, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102290332), that certain design change notices (DCNs) were required or anticipated for completion of WBN Unit 2. These DCNs, later identified as DCN 53421 and DCN 54636, were assumed design configurations deemed equivalent to Unit 1. These assumptions used by TVA in their 125V DC Vital Battery System Analysis were the basis of an open item subsequently established by the NRC. The open item was documented as Item #33 in Appendix HH of Supplement 22 to the WB2 Safety Evaluation Report (SSER), NUREG-0847 (ADAMS Accession No.ML110390197). The NRC determined that verification of completion of these DCNs would need to be provided to the NRC staff before issuance of the operating license. SSER 24 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11277A148) established that the item will remain open until NRC staff has verified implementation of these DCNs by inspection. These DCNs later became EDCRs and subsequently experienced further changes based on field change requests.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors conducted interviews, document reviews, and walkdowns to verify adequate implementation of cable modifications associated with DCN 54636 in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and throttle valve control circuits. The inspectors interviewed responsible engineers and reviewed calculations to evaluate a decision to utilize cables sized smaller than those proposed in the original modification design. The inspectors reviewed calculations to verify that voltage drop will remain adequate based on the as-installed cable sizes. In addition, the inspectors reviewed closed work orders, Integrated Cable & Raceway Design Software (ICRDS)reports, and other records to verify that necessary actions were taken to abandon reciprocating charging pump 2C in order to implement DCN 53421.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and findings No findings were identified.
c. Conclusion The inspectors determined that TVA had addressed the assumptions used in its analysis of the 125V DC vital battery system which prompted the SSER 22 Open Item #33.
Furthermore, TVA had subsequently incorporated changes associated with DCNs 53421 and 54636 into the WB2 design. This item is closed.
OA.1.7 (Closed)Bulletin 85-02, Undervoltage Trip Attachments of Westinghouse DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers (Temporary Instruction 2515/72)
a. Inspection Scope
Section OA.1.23 of IIR 05000391/2011602 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110800483)documents the closure of NRC Bulletin (BL) 85-02. NRC inspectors utilized TI 2515/72 to ensure that the applicant had met the applicable requirements of BL 85-02. Although it was never specifically stated in Section OA.1.23 of IIR 05000391/2011602, the intent of TI 2515/72 was met at the time of the inspection, and no further inspections were to be performed.
No BL 85-02 or TI 2515/72 inspection activities were performed during this inspection period. This report entry is intended only to clarify both BL 85-02 and TI 2515/72 were considered closed in Section OA.1.23 of IIR 05000391/2011602.
b. Observations and findings No findings were identified.
c. Conclusion Based on inspection activities documented in Section OA.1.23 of IIR 05000391/2011602, BL 85-02 and Temporary Instruction 2515/72 are closed.
V.
MANAGEMENT MEETINGS X1
Exit Meeting Summary
An exit meeting was conducted on March 12, 2015, to present inspection results to you and other members of your staff. The inspectors identified that no proprietary information had been received during the inspection and none would be used in the inspection report. The applicant acknowledged the observations and provided no dissenting comments.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Applicant personnel
- A. Bangalore, Bechtel - Electrical Engineer
- D. Charlton, TVA - Regulatory Compliance
- D. Cox, Bechtel - Field Engineering
- G. Gomez, Bechtel - Field Engineering
- M. McGrath, TVA - Licensing
- J. McLemore, Bechtel - Field Engineering
- J. Noriega, Bechtel - Field Engineering
- G. Peterson, Bechtel - Electrical Engineer
- L.J. Peterson, TVA - Engineering
- O. J. Zeringue, TVA - General Manager Engineering and Construction
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 35007 Quality Assurance Program Implementation During Construction and
Pre-Construction Activities
IP 35748B QA Program - Records
IP 37002 Construction Refurbishment Program - Watts Bar Unit 2
IP 49061 Safety-Related Piping - QA Review
IP 49063 Piping - Work Observation
IP 49065 Safety-Related Piping - Records Review
IP 50073 Mechanical Components - Work Observation
IP 51053 Electrical Components and Systems - Work Observation
IP 51063 Electric Cable - Work Observation
IP 52051 Instrument Components and Systems - Procedure Review
IP 52053 Instrument Components and Systems - Work Observation
IP 52055 Instrument Components and Systems - Record Review
IP 70300 Preoperational Test Procedure Review
IP 70302 Preoperational Test Program Implementation
IP 70308 Preoperational Hot Functional Testing - PWR Procedure Review
IP 70311 Preoperational Testing Procedure Verification
IP 70312 Preoperational Test Witnessing
IP 70333B Chemistry Control System Test - Preoperational Test Procedure Review
IP 70400 Preoperational Test Results Evaluation
IP 70433 Chemical Control System Test - Preoperational Test Witnessing
IP 71302 Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification
IP 92702 Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations
TI 2512/015 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Employee Concerns Program
TI 2512/026 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Instruments Line Corrective Action
Program Plan
TI 2512/037 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Master Fuse List Special
Program
TI 2515/72 Inspection of Response to IE Bulletin 85-02
TI 2515/139 Inspection of Licensees Implementation of Generic Letter 96-01 Testing
of Safety Related Logic Circuits.
TI 2515/174 Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power Verification
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
35748B IP Quality Assurance Program - Records (Section OA.1.1)
70308 IP Preoperational Hot Functional Testing - PWR Procedure Review (Section P.1.2)
2512/026 TI Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Instrument Lines Corrective Action Program Plan (Section OA.1.2)
2512/037 TI Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program (Section OA.1.3)
2515/139 TI Inspection of Licensees Implementation of Generic Letter 96-01-Testing of Safety Related Logic Circuits (Section OA.1.4)
2515/174 TI Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power Verification (Section OA.1.5)
96-01 GL Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits (Section OA.1.4)
Item 33 SSER Verify Completion of Design Change Notices of 125V Appendix HH DC Vital Battery System Analysis (Section OA.1.6)
2515/72 TI Inspection of Response to IE Bulletin 85-04 (Section OA.1.7)
Discussed
None