IR 05000391/2013610
| ML14049A158 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/2014 |
| From: | Haag R NRC/RGN-II/DCP/CPB3 |
| To: | Skaggs M Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Michelle Adams | |
| References | |
| IR-13-610 | |
| Download: ML14049A158 (46) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ary 14, 2014
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 CONSTRUCTION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000391/2013610
Dear Mr. Skaggs:
On December 31, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection of construction activities at your Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 22, 2014 with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your Unit 2 construction permit as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, the conditions of your construction permit, and fulfillment of Unit 2 regulatory framework commitments. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings were identified during this inspection.
In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert Haag, Chief Construction Projects Branch 3 Division of Construction Projects Docket No. 50-391 Construction Permit No: CPPR-92
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000391/2013610 w/Attachment
REGION II==
Docket No.: 50-391 Construction Permit No.: CPPR-92 Report No.: 05000391/2013610 Applicant: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Location: Spring City, TN 37381 Dates: November 17 - December 31, 2013 Inspectors: T. Nazario, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction Projects Branch (CPB) 3, Division of Construction Projects (DCP)
Region II (RII)
E. Patterson, Resident Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII S. Temple, Resident Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII C. Julian, Senior Construction Inspector, Construction Inspection Branch (CIB) 1, Division of Construction Inspection (DCI), RII, Sections OA.1.5, OA.1.6, OA.1.7 and OA.1.9 G. Crespo, Senior Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII, Sections OA.1.5, OA.1.6, OA.1.7 and OA.1.9 A. Matos, Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII, Section OA.1.6 T. Steadham, Senior Construction Inspector, CIB3, DCI, RII, Sections OA.1.4 J. Lizardi, Construction Inspector, CIB2, DCI, RII, Sections OA.1.2 and OA.1.3 J. Baptist, Senior Construction Project Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII, Sections P.1.1 and P.1.2 C. Even, Senior Construction Project Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII, Section OA.1.8 Approved by: Robert C. Haag, Chief Construction Projects Branch 3 Division of Construction Projects Enclosure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2
This integrated inspection included aspects of engineering and construction activities performed by TVA associated with the Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant Unit 2 construction project. This report covered a seven-week period of inspections in the areas of quality assurance (QA),
identification and resolution of construction problems, construction activities, pre-operational testing, and follow-up of other activities. The inspection program for Unit 2 construction activities is described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2517, Watts Bar Unit 2 Construction Inspection Program. Information regarding the WBN Unit 2 Construction Project and NRC inspections can be found at http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/wb/watts-bar.html.
Inspection Results
- The inspectors concluded that issues pertaining to a Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) involving electrical calculations have been appropriately addressed for WBN Unit 2. A corresponding inspection item was identified as Item 7 in Appendix HH of Supplement 22 to NUREG-0847. These items are closed.
- Other areas inspected were adequate with no findings identified. These areas included QA; piping; mechanical systems and components; electrical systems and components; fire protection; pre-operational testing activities; various NRC inspection procedures; and refurbishment activities.
Table of Contents I. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM .................................................................................... 5 Q.1 Quality Assurance Oversight Activities ......................................................................... 5 Q.1.1 Identification and Resolution of Construction Problems (Inspection Procedure 35007) ................................................................................................................... 5 II. MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS ................................................................. 6 C.1 Construction Activities .................................................................................................... 6 C.1.1 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Construction Activity Interface Controls ..................................... 6 C.1.2 Mechanical Components - Work Observation and Construction Refurbishment Process (Inspection Procedures 50073 and 37002) ............................................. 6 C.1.3 Piping - Piping Cleanliness and Flushing Work Observations (Inspection Procedure 49063) .................................................................................................. 7 C.1.4 Pipe Support (Snubber) Work Observations (Inspection Procedure 50090) ......... 8 C.1.5 Reactor Vessel and Internals Work Observation (Inspection Procedure 50053) .. 9 C.1.6 Electrical Components and Systems - Work Observation (Inspection Procedure 51053) ................................................................................................................. 10 F.1 Fire Protection .............................................................................................................. 101 F.1.1 Fire Protection (Inspection Procedure 64051) ..................................................... 11 P.1 Pre-Operational Activities ............................................................................................. 12 P.1.1 Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification (Inspection Procedure 71302) ................................................................................................................. 12 P.1.2 (Closed) Preoperational Test Procedure Review (Inspection Procedures 70300 and 70311) .......................................................................................................... 14 IV. OTHER ACTIVITES ........................................................................................................... 15 OA.1.1 (Discussed) Electrical Cable Issues Corrective Action Program - Sub-Issue:
Supports in Vertical Trays and Construction Deficiency Report 391/89-04:
Support of Class 1E Cables Installed in Long Vertical Cable Tray Runs (Temporary Instruction 2512/016 and Inspection Procedure 35007) .................. 15 OA.1.2 (Discussed) Inspection of Equipment Seismic Qualification Corrective Action Program (Temporary Instruction (TI) 2512/021, Inspection Procedure (Inspection Procedure) 51055) .......................................................................... 16 OA.1.3 (Discussed) Violation 391/86-21-02: Instrument Valves, Foxboro Transmitters, and Instrument Panels Not Seismically Qualified (Inspection Procedure 51055) 17 OA.1.4 (Discussed) Generic Letter 89-10: Safety Related Motor Operated Valve (MOV)
Testing and Surveillance (Inspection Procedures 50073 and 51053, Temporary Instruction 2515/109) ........................................................................................... 18 OA.1.5 (Discussed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program (Temporary Instruction 2512/037) ........................................................ 22 OA.1.6 (Discussed) Construction Deficiency Report 391/85-37: Incorrect Use of AMP PIDG Terminals (IP 35007) ................................................................................. 23 OA.1.7 (Discussed) Electrical Cable Issues Corrective Action Program - Sub-issue:
Cable Bend Radius Deficiencies (Temporary Instruction 2512/016, Inspection Procedures 51063 and 51065) ............................................................................ 24 OA.1.8 (Discussed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant QA Records Corrective Action Program Plan (Temporary Instruction 2512/028, Inspection Procedure 51055) . 26
OA.1.9 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report 391/86-13, Inadequate Calculations to Document Electrical System Design Basis and Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) Appendix HH Item 7, Verify Commitment Completion and Review Electrical Design Calculations (Inspection Procedure 92701) ............................. 26 V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS .............................................................................................. 27 X1 Exit Meeting Summary ................................................................................................... 27
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
During the inspection period covered by this report, TVA performed construction completion and pre-operational testing activities on safety-related systems and continued engineering design activities of the Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant, Unit 2.
I. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM Q.1 Quality Assurance Oversight Activities Q.1.1 Identification and Resolution of Construction Problems (Inspection Procedure 35007)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors continued to review problem evaluation reports (PERs), as part of the applicants corrective action program, to verify that issues being identified under the corrective action program were being properly identified, addressed, and resolved by the applicant.
The inspectors reviewed the disposition and actions associated with the following PERs:
- PER 786866, Flush plans for Unit 2 CCS may not meet regulatory requirements
- PER 792916, Incorrect response spectra applied in residual heat removal system stress calculation
- PER 801874, Dents on U2 Lower Internals Storage Stand, and previously in PER 210732, Significant Near-Miss: Ice Condenser Hoist Wire Rope Failed
- PER 810906, SYS WBN081 Pumps, Structural Interface Boundary (ABSCE) has been violated (also referenced in Section C.1.1 of this report)
The inspectors reviewed PER 810906, which documents a non-permitted breach in the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Envelope (ABSCE) boundary, to verify that the breach was evaluated, documented, and entered into the breach tracking program in accordance with TI-65, Breaching the Containment Annulus, ABSCE, or MCRHZ Pressure Boundaries, Revision (Rev.) 21. The review of PER 801874 and PER 210732 is discussed in more detail in Section C.1.5, Reactor Vessel and Internals Work Observation.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The issues in the PERs reviewed were adequately identified, addressed, and resolved.
II. MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS C.1 Construction Activities C.1.1 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Construction Activity Interface Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors independently assessed applicant controls, associated with Unit 2 construction work activities, to prevent adverse impact on Unit 1 operational safety. The inspectors attended routine Unit 1/Unit 2 interface meetings to assess the exchange and sharing of information between the two site organizations. Periodic construction and planning meetings were observed, at least once per week, to assess the adequacy of the applicants efforts to identify those construction activities that could potentially impact the operating unit. This included the review of select work activities, which the applicant had screened as not affecting Unit 1, to verify the adequacy of that screening effort.
Additionally, the inspectors independently assessed select construction activities to verify that potential impacts on the operating unit had been identified and adequately characterized with appropriate management strategies planned for implementation.
Furthermore, the inspectors performed independent walkdowns of select construction work locations to verify that controls to protect the operating unit provided an adequate level of protection and had been properly implemented.
Specific work activities observed included work associated with:
- WO 115189593, PMTI-62151 A train ERCW pre flow balance
- WO 115240661 and 115240643 which are associated with PER 810906, SYS WBN081 Pumps, Structural Interface Boundary (ABSCE) has been violated (also discussed in Section Q.1.1 of this report)
Specific work activities that the applicant had screened out as not affecting Unit 1 included, but were not limited to, electrical work activities and refurbishment activities as noted in this inspection report.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
Overall, adequate management oversight and controls were in place for observed construction activities that could potentially impact the operating unit, and an adequate level of protection had been implemented.
C.1.2 Mechanical Components - Work Observation and Construction Refurbishment Process (Inspection Procedures 50073 and 37002)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the foreign object retrieval of hardened non-metallic debris as part of the foreign object search and retrieval (FOSAR) activities on steam generator (SG) 3. The inspections were completed to verify the precautions were taken to maintain the integrity of SG 3, and to determine whether work instructions were adequate and being followed.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The observed foreign object removal process associated with the refurbishment of SG 3 was completed in accordance with the approved procedures, and the records reviewed were in compliance the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel code 1971 edition through 1973 summer addenda.
C.1.3 Piping - Piping Cleanliness and Flushing Work Observations (Inspection Procedure 49063)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed cleanliness procedure SMP-7.0, Control of Cleanness, Layup and Flushing, Rev. 3, and engineering specification N3M-938, Cleaning and Cleanness for fluid Systems and Components, Rev. 2, to determine if the procedures met the requirements of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N45.2.1, Cleaning of Fluid Systems and Associated Components During Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants, 1973.
The inspectors reviewed four temporary modifications packages to support the flushing of the piping for the component cooling system, interviewed four seismic structural engineers, and observed the final as-installed walkdowns of the temporary piping, supports and temporary filters. The reviews and walkdowns were completed to independently assess that the piping was installed in accordance with the engineered system specifications; that the interactions and clearances met the requirements of WB-DC-20.32, Integrated Interaction Program Screening and Acceptance Criteria, Rev. 5; that the installation met the requirements for seismic category 1(L) position 2 as described in Regulatory Guide 1.29; and that the applicant implemented controls to prevent adverse impact on Unit 1 operational safety.
Also, the inspectors reviewed the component cooling system clean plans and work orders to verify that the scope of work and acceptance criteria met the requirements of SMP-7.0 and ANSI N45.2.1. The inspectors observed a sample of the flushing activities for the component cooling 2A safety-related coolers and 2B main header flush. In addition, the inspectors reviewed two test director qualifications to verify the test directors were qualified in accordance with SMP-5.0, Indoctrination, Training and Qualification of Preoperational Startup Engineers, Rev. 5.
During the inspection period the inspectors entered the containment sump to observe preparations for cleanliness activities. The inspectors verified the existence of a divider plate between the residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray suction lines.
The inspectors also interviewed personnel regarding the cleanliness preparations.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The applicants procedures and implementation of the cleanliness plan for the component cooling system piping was implemented in accordance with ASNI N45.2.1-1973 and approved procedures for those activities observed during the inspection period.
C.1.4 Pipe Support (Snubber) Work Observations (Inspection Procedure 50090)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed dynamic pipe support (snubber) installations for the following samples and reviewed the as-built records to verify that the work activities relative to dynamic pipe support systems were completed in accordance with NRC requirements and the applicants approved procedures.
Snubbers inspected:
- WBN-2-SNUB-063-0169; size PSA 1, safety injection system
- WBN-2-SNUB-063-0213; size PSA 3, safety injection system The inspectors observed snubber installations to verify:
- the supports were free of damage and corrosion;
- pre-installation checks were completed;
- correct materials were used;
- extension rods and connecting joints were not deformed;
- the snubbers were installed with the correct pin to pin and cold set points in accordance with the design specifications; and
- measuring and test equipment (M&TE) was properly controlled and calibrated.
Design and installation records were reviewed to verify that the design inputs to include field changes and vendor specifications were properly translated to the field installation procedures and that the pipe support installations were completed in accordance with the approved drawings and design specifications.
The inspectors conducted interviews with three field engineers and two craft workers engaged in the installation of snubbers to verify:
- pre-installation checks were performed for damage, rust, or other conditions that may interfere with their proper operation;
- pre-installation checks were made to ensure that bolts, nuts, and other fastener items were available and of the correct type, size, and material with the required identification markings;
- any pre-installation field repairs or adjustments to the units were performed in accordance with specifications to ensure that proper seal materials and performance requirements were met; and
- personnel engaged in the installation of safety-related pipe supports and restraints were adequately trained to perform the tasks and processes contained in procedures, specifications, and work orders.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 50090 Section 02.03a - five samples
- IP 50090 Section 02.03c - seven samples Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The installations of the dynamic supports (snubbers) were completed in accordance with the approved drawings and procedures.
C.1.5 Reactor Vessel and Internals Work Observation (Inspection Procedure 50053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted inspections of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and reactor vessel internals storage, preservation, housekeeping, and protection activities to determine whether requirements, work procedures, and inspection (quality control)procedures were being met. These activities are controlled by procedure 25402-000-GPP-0000-N2102, Housekeeping, Rev. 8. The inspectors observed coverings for the stored reactor vessel and vessel internals to verify that protective devices were installed around top of open vessel and the vessel side openings to prevent entry of foreign objects or debris and protected from construction damage. The core barrel and internals were inspected to verify storage locations were adequate and controls were in place to provide protection from construction damage. The storage supports for the core barrel and internals were inspected to verify storage locations were adequate. The inspectors observed the documentation and initial assessment of minor visible construction damage on the stand utilized to support the stored reactor vessel lower internals and verified that the damage was appropriately characterized, documented, and evaluated by engineering. This damage was captured in PER 801874, Dents on U2 Lower Internals Storage Stand, and previously in PER 210732, Significant Near-Miss: Ice Condenser Hoist Wire Rope Failed.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 50053 Section 02.01.c - one sample
- IP 50053 Section 02.02.a - one sample
- IP 50053 Section 02.03.b - one sample
- IP 50053 Section 02.03.c - one sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
Adequate controls were in place to protect the reactor vessel and internals.
C.1.6 Electrical Components and Systems - Work Observation (Inspection Procedure 51053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed in-process work associated with modifications to the configuration of 2-XS-30-83A-A double throw transfer switch located in containment pertaining to motor 2-MTR-30-83-A, to evaluate if the components used were of the right size, were installed at the proper location by qualified craft personnel using suitable tools, adequate documentation of installation activities were completed in a timely manner, and required inspections were performed by QC personnel. The inspectors reviewed work packages to determine whether the latest approved revision procedures and specifications were available and used by the craftsmen. The inspectors measured cable bend radius of the low voltage cables used as compression lug wire assemblies to verify adequate bend radius inside the panel was maintained within limits. The inspectors reviewed Drawing Revision Authorization (DRA) 54172-076 to evaluate if the final configuration of the equipment was in accordance with the DRA.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that adequate measures were in place to ensure that electrical work was performed in accordance with applicable procedures and drawings.
F.1 Fire Protection F.1.1 Fire Protection (Inspection Procedure 64051)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a walkdown of construction areas to determine whether construction activities and areas met procedure requirements for fire protection. The inspectors took a limited set of field-verifiable attributes from preventive maintenance guidance into the field and evaluated 12 fire suppression devices. The inspectors reviewed labeling, accessibility, cartridge weight, extinguisher agent, and physical condition of fire extinguishers to verify no evidence of deterioration was present, the extinguisher agent was free of contamination, and cartridge weight met the preventive maintenance specifications. The inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance instructions to determine whether records of these 12 fire suppression devices met procedure inspection requirements.
The inspectors observed three construction activities using ignition sources to determine whether fire prevention procedure requirements were met. This included the handling and use of flammable materials and the use of combustible materials relative to locations of flammable ignition sources. Specifically, the inspectors observed fire watch activities related to:
- grinding under WO 114546527, Pipe support hanger 2-62-A-271 (12/04/13);
- welding under WO 115181833, Install Steam Generator #2 bumper stops and threads per DRA 55880-002 (12/12/13); and
- WO 11488809, Install Supports Reactor Cavity wall The following fire suppression devices were observed, and associated records were reviewed:
Temporary Hose stations:
- U2 Annulus El. 750 Az. 180
- U2 Annulus El. 730 Az. 180 Portable Fire Extinguishers:
- U2-FW-10 U2 Safety Trailer
- U2-FW-21 Access Stairwell El. 713
- U2-FW-50 U2 Safety Trailer
- U2-FW-69 U2 Safety Trailer
- U2-FW-140 U2 Safety Trailer
- U2-FW-28 El. 708 Az. 335
- U2-FW-137 El. 708 Az. 70
- U2-FW-154 El. 708 Az. 70
- U2-FW-29A El. 708 Az. 300
- U2-FW-32A El. 708 Az. 300 The following samples were inspected:
- IP 64051 Section 02.07 - 12 samples
- IP 64051 Section 02.08 - 3 samples Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The applicant generally implemented adequate fire protection measures and controls to support Unit 2 construction activities and minimize impact on Unit 1 operational activities.
P.1 Pre-Operational Activities P.1.1 Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification (Inspection Procedure 71302)
a. Inspection Scope
2.01 (Weekly Inspection Activities): The inspectors verified that the applicants management control system was effectively discharging its responsibilities over the preoperational testing program by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with applicant personnel, and review of facility records.
Preoperational testing activities were limited during the inspection period and included the following systems or portions thereof:
- System 074, RHR system As systems became available for preoperational testing, inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to make an independent assessment of equipment conditions, plant conditions, security, and adherence to regulatory requirements.
Inspectors also verified the following, as available and on a sampling basis during the tours:
- general plant/equipment conditions;
- plant areas for fire hazards; examined fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, and emergency equipment for operability; verified that ignition sources and flammable material were being controlled in accordance with licensee's procedures (further discussed in Section F.1.1);
- activities in progress (e.g., maintenance, preoperational testing, etc.) were being conducted in accordance with licensee's procedures; and
- construction work force authorized to perform activities on systems or equipment.
In addition, the inspectors witnessed the performance of component test procedure GTE-11, Motor Operated Valve/Damper Test, Rev. 5, for the 2-FVC-074-0033-A, system 074 residual heat removal system, Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System (MOVATS) test. The inspections were completed to verify that the testing was conducted in accordance with approved procedures and to verify the adequacy of test program records and preliminary evaluation of test results. The inspectors verified the following activities associated with this test observation:
- all test personnel were on station and had the latest revision of the procedure;
- plant systems in service to support the test;
- test equipment was installed and within calibration;
- test was performed in accordance with the approved procedure;
- testing events and discrepancies were properly documented;
- test was executed and coordinated properly;
- data was properly collected; and
- test personnel were using approved drawings and vendor manuals.
In addition, the inspectors observed the test to verify that the overall test acceptance was met. The inspectors conducted a review with the responsible test engineers to assure that the preliminary test evaluations were consistent with the inspectors observations. During the test, inspectors observed important data gathering activities to ensure the data was properly gathered and recorded. A post-test cursory review of the test data was performed to verify legibility, traceability, and permanence of the data sheet entries.
The inspectors conducted interviews for three motor operated valve (MOV) engineers involved in motorized valve testing to verify they had received appropriate training for performing the test.
02.02 (Monthly Inspection Activities): During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the turnover package for the Unit 2 portion of the Essential Raw Cooling Water system (System 67) as part of Startup Manual Procedure (SMP) 4.0, System Completion and Turnover, Rev.9, to verify jurisdiction controls were appropriate and applicant procedures were followed. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the turnover package to ensure required preventative maintenance was incorporated into a schedule for accomplishment.
The inspectors reviewed maintenance plans on safety-related equipment, to determine if the maintenance was scheduled in accordance with developed procedures and that these procedures were adequate for the maintenance being performed. The maintenance had not been performed but the methodology was discussed with the Refurbishment and Preventative Maintenance Manager to determine how systems with completed preoperational testing would be protected.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The applicants implementation of the preoperational test program and RHR system MOV testing was implemented in accordance with procedures for those activities observed during the inspection period.
P.1.2 (Closed) Preoperational Test Procedure Review (Inspection Procedures 70300 and 70311)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The purpose of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2513, Light Water Reactor Inspection Program - Preoperational Testing and Operational Preparedness Phase, is to verify through direct observation, personnel interviews, and review of facility records that:
- Systems and components important to the safety of the plant are fully tested to demonstrate that they satisfy their design requirements.
- Management controls and procedures, including quality assurance programs, necessary for operation of the facility have been documented and implemented.
IMC 2513 defines the minimum inspection program for a finding of readiness for license issuance (IP 94300, Status of Plant Readiness for an Operating Licensee). IMC 2513 requires the procedural review of the mandatory tests defined in IMC 2513 and five of the primal tests defined in IMC 2513. The following inspection was performed in relation to satisfying the required procedural review.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed pre-operational test procedure 2-PTI-067-02-A, ERCW System Flow Balance - Train A, to verify that the procedure contained the following administrative good practice attributes:
- the title described the purpose of the procedure
- the cover page had appropriate information and approval signatures
- each page had appropriate identification information
- the last page was clearly identifiable by markings
- a clear statement of procedure purpose/objectives
- planning information such as prerequisites, precautions, required tools, reference documents, and coordination requirements
- signoff requirements including concurrent and independent verification steps established where appropriate
- equipment alignment instructions are clear and concise
- equipment identifiers are accurate (10 percent sample)
- actions to be taken within the steps are specifically identified (20 percent sample)
- instrumentation units consistent for data collection (10 percent sample)
- graphs, charts, tables, data sheets, and work sheets are clearly usable
- calculation sheets were technically accurate
- clear coordination instructions for test activities involving multiple test personnel
- clear instructions for system restoration
- guidance for follow-up actions and points of contact
- overall, clear concise steps for testing with action critical (acceptance criteria) steps identified (20 percent sample)
- clear quantitative acceptance criteria with acceptability and contingencies
- overall sequence of the procedure consistent with the obtaining the intended result The inspectors also reviewed the procedure to verify that precautions or explanations were placed immediately ahead of the steps to which they applied. The inspectors performed a detailed review with the responsible test engineer to verify that the acceptance criteria met design requirements.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the applicants test procedure was written in a manner consistent with NRC requirements and the guidance of applicant procedure SMP-8.0, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Administration of Preoperational Test Instructions, Rev. 9.
IV. OTHER ACTIVITES OA.1.1 (Discussed) Electrical Cable Issues Corrective Action Program - Sub-Issue:
Supports in Vertical Trays and Construction Deficiency Report 391/89-04: Support of Class 1E Cables Installed in Long Vertical Cable Tray Runs (Temporary Instruction 2512/016 and Inspection Procedure 35007)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The concern that long vertical cable tray runs may not be adequately supported was initially reported to the NRC on May 26, 1989, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as CAQR WBP 880575. Additional background information is provided in NRC integrated inspection report (IIR) 05000391/2010605 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML110410680) and IIR 05000391/2013605 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13220A640).
Inspection Activities: The inspectors conducted interviews, document review and in-process work observation associated with WO 114309440 in order to evaluate the adequacy of the field implementation of the corrective actions associated with construction deficiency report (CDR) 391/89-04. The inspectors conducted walkdowns to determine if work performed on the horizontal portion of trays 0-4TRY-292-1928 and 0-4TRY-292-1927 located in the annulus was completed in accordance with established procedures and applicable drawings and whether it was sufficient to provide adequate support to the cables in the vertical section of the trays.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
Activities observed during the inspection were accomplished in accordance with procedures. Additional inspections will be required to obtain an adequate sample size of implementation activities associated with the corrective actions for CDR 391/89-04.
OA.1.2 (Discussed) Inspection of Equipment Seismic Qualification Corrective Action Program (Temporary Instruction (TI) 2512/021, Inspection Procedure (Inspection Procedure) 51055)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The Equipment Seismic Qualification Corrective Action Program (ESQ CAP) was developed by TVA to provide reasonable assurance that category I and I(L)equipment were adequately qualified for design basis seismic events, and were in compliance with the regulatory and licensing requirements. The ESQ CAP was developed to address a number of issues associated with documentation retrievability, interface control among engineering disciplines, interface control between engineering and other organizations, discrepancies between design documents and installed conditions, and discrepancies between the inspection documentation and the installed conditions.
Inspection Activities: The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of several actions taken to address the ESQ CAP, and to review some of the programmatic aspects involving the ESQ CAP as characterized by the applicant. The inspectors interviewed applicant staff, and reviewed the applicants open item closure report, including referenced documents and actions associated with commitment tracking number 111032078, to determine if programmatic issues associated with the ESQ CAP were properly developed as required by Calculation WCG-1-1419, WBN Seismic/Civil Validation Program Methodology Summary Report, Section B3 and Attachment C4. The inspectors held multiple interviews with the applicant staff responsible for the ESQ CAP implementation and development, including engineering, quality control, and quality assurance personnel. The purpose for these interviews was, in part, to determine whether the completed actions were performed in accordance with the Unit 2 ESQ CAP implementation plan description.
During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed several calculations, procedures, walk-down packages, and design input and output documents. These documents were reviewed to verify whether they were adequate, complete, and whether changes to these documents were properly controlled in accordance with commitments described in the ESQ CAP and TVAs Nuclear Quality Assurance Program. The inspectors reviewed several design input documents to verify that this information was appropriately used in the seismic evaluations performed by engineering personnel.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors reviewed several actions completed as part of the ESQ CAP implementation and development. The inspectors concluded these actions were performed in accordance with procedures and that they were documented and completed as required by their commitments and NRC requirements. Additional inspection is required for the ESQ CAP, with an emphasis on verifying adequate seismic design and field implementation of the ESQ CAP.
OA.1.3 (Discussed) Violation 391/86-21-02: Instrument Valves, Foxboro Transmitters, and Instrument Panels Not Seismically Qualified (Inspection Procedure 51055)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: Violation (VIO) 391/86-21-02 was issued as part of NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-390/86-21 and 50-391/86-21 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082280243). The notice of violation concerned TVAs failure to ensure that vendor information, specifically seismic qualification reports and calculations, was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, instructions, and the field installation as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. IIR 05000391/2013608 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13316A776) documented previous inspection results and background details of VIO 391/86-21-02.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors interviewed applicant staff and reviewed the applicants open item closure report, including referenced documents and actions associated with PERs 143758, 143701, and 143538 and commitment tracking number 114113692 to determine if the corrective actions associated with the seismic qualification deficiencies were properly resolved and documented.
The inspectors reviewed several work plan packages, calculations, drawings and material qualification documents. These documents were reviewed to determine the adequacy of field installation, seismic qualification, and material traceability. The inspectors reviewed design calculations associated with instrument racks installed in series to verify adequate seismic qualification. The inspectors observed as-built condition of mounting plates and support brackets for two Rosemount transmitters associated with PERs 143758 and 143701. These installations were compared against design and installation drawings to determine if these matched the as-built condition.
The following newly installed Rosemount transmitters were walked-down:
- 2-FT-68-6-A-D
- 2-FT-70-6-D-F Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
Corrective actions were conducted in accordance with PER corrective action plans, and the as-built condition matched final drawings and records. Additional document review needs to be performed to ensure that changes to procedures, instructions, and drawings do not affect original commitments for this violation. Supplementary field observations are required to verify whether implemented corrective actions adequately corrected discrepancies on existing installations and controlled future rework and installations.
OA.1.4 (Discussed) Generic Letter 89-10: Safety Related Motor Operated Valve (MOV)
Testing and Surveillance (Inspection Procedures 50073 and 51053, Temporary Instruction 2515/109)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed static MOV diagnostic tests for the following Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 MOVs:
- 2-FCV-74-008, reactor coolant system to residual heat removal inlet bypass isolation valve; and
- 2-FCV-74-035, residual heat removal crosstie isolation valve.
For these MOVs the inspectors:
- (1) reviewed the limit and torque switches to determine if the components were properly set and,
- (2) reviewed the test activities to determine if they were properly controlled and handled. To make those determinations, the inspectors used work instructions, applicable design specifications, calculations, system descriptions, work packages, and approved procedures. The inspectors reviewed training records for personnel associated with MOV testing to determine if the personnel supervising and conducting the tests were qualified in accordance with the applicants procedures.
During the observance of these tests, the inspectors determined if:
- measuring and test equipment used during the test was properly identified, traceable, and within the current calibration interval;
- measuring and test equipment was suitable for the application, was used within the calibrated range, and was recorded in the applicable work orders;
- testing results were recorded during the activity; and
- test discrepancies were properly identified for resolution.
The inspectors reviewed MOV thrust and torque capability engineering calculations for the two MOVs listed above to determine if the:
- actuator selections were in compliance with applicable site specifications and design requirements;
- design inputs for design basis operating conditions (such as temperature, flow, and pressure - including differential pressure) were consistent with the applicable system description and the Final Safety Analysis Report;
- calculations complied with design standard DS-M18.2.22, TVA Mechanical Design Standard for MOV Design Basis and Joint Owners Group (JOG) Review Methodologies Rev. 5; and
- calculations complied with design standard DS-M18.2.21, Mechanical Design Standard for Motor Operated Valve Thrust and Torque Calculations, Rev. 20.
The inspectors reviewed the applicants plans to determine the design basis capability of all Unit 2 GL 89-10 MOVs to determine if their plans met the requirements of GL 89-10, design standard DS-M18.2.22, and the method previously used for Unit 1. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the applicants plans to establish the design basis through dynamic testing, Electric Power Research Institute Performance Prediction Methodology, and grouping. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of 13 MOVs that the applicant planned to use the grouping method to determine the design basis capability. The inspectors obtained nameplate data on the valves and actuators to determine if the:
- data was consistent with the applicable MOV valve and actuator capability engineering calculations; and
- valve type, size, and manufacturer were consistent with the applicants grouping methodology.
The inspectors observed applicant activities in response to GL 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance." The inspectors performed a combination of Phase 1 and Phase 2 inspections as documented in TI 2515/109. The inspectors performed these reviews to determine if the applicant had established and was implementing a program that will ensure the proper performance of MOVs in safety-related systems. Because WBN Unit 2 has not operated yet, the applicant has not fully established a GL 89-10 program; therefore, the requirements of GL 89-10 have not been fully implemented.
The inspectors previously reviewed applicant actions to address GL 89-10 as described in Section OA.1.11 of NRC Inspection Report 05000391/2011608 (ADAMS Accession NO. ML11311A082). Therefore, this inspection was a limited scope inspection of the requirements of this TI. In accordance with requirements of TI 2515/109, Rev. 4, the inspectors evaluated and answered the following questions for Parts 1 and 2:
Part 1, Program Review:
04.01 Review licensee commitments in response to the generic letter.
The inspectors reviewed commitments made for Unit 1 and compared the actions being taken for Unit 2 to those commitments. The applicants plans for Unit 2 were consistent with the Unit 1 commitments.
04.02 Evaluate whether the licensee has established a program to provide assurance that the MOVs within the scope of Generic Letter 89-10 are capable of operating under design-basis differential pressure and flow conditions. For each aspect of the generic letter listed below, the inspector should make a determination of whether the licensee's actions are adequate.
b. Development of plans and procedures for the performance of design-basis reviews of the MOVs in the generic letter program.
The applicant used established procedures to perform design-basis reviews that were common to all TVA nuclear units including WBN Unit 2. The inspectors determined that the procedures complied with the requirements of GL 89-10 and that the applicants plans to establish the design basis for all GL 89-10 MOVs met the requirements of GL 89-10.
d. Development of plans and procedures for demonstrating the capability of the MOVs in the generic letter program.
The applicant used established procedures, which were common to all TVA nuclear units including WBN Unit 2, to demonstrate the capability of the GL 89-10 MOVs. The inspectors determined that the procedures complied with the requirements of GL 89-10 and that the applicants plans to demonstrate the capability for all GL 89-10 MOVs met the requirements of GL 89-10.
04.03 Review the following aspects of the licensees GL 89-10 program:
l. Control of open MOV maintenance items.
The applicant used their established corrective action program and work control program to control and resolve open MOV maintenance items.
Part 2, Verification of Program Implementation:
For a sample of MOVs from the population of MOVs in the generic letter program:
04.05 Verify that the licensee has performed design-basis reviews of the sampled MOVs consistent with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1), as appropriate.
The inspectors sampled two GL 89-10 MOVs, 2-FCV-74-008 and 2-FCV-74-035, to review as part of this inspection. The inspectors determined that the applicants design basis review was adequate for the sampled valves. The inspectors determined that more inspections are required to meet the sample requirements contained in Section 05.02.k of the TI.
04.06 Verify that the licensee has adequately sized the sampled MOVs in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1), as appropriate. Verify that switch settings are consistent with the expected design conditions for operation of the valve.
The inspectors verified that the applicant properly sized the sampled MOVs and that the limit and torque switch settings were appropriate. The inspectors verified the adequacy of the engineering design and that it was completed in accordance with applicable site specifications and design criteria. The inspectors reviewed the applicable thrust/torque and actuator capability engineering calculations for the sampled MOVs to ensure that the applicant had appropriately sized the actuators. The inspectors observed static MOV testing on the sampled valves and determined that the licensee appropriately set the limit switches. For MOVs that were limit seated in the closed direction, the inspectors visually verified that the torque switches were not wired into the control circuit.
04.07 Verify that the licensee has demonstrated the design-basis capability of the sampled MOVs and the adequacy of the licensee's program applied to the sampled MOVs in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1), as appropriate.
Although the static testing serves a role in the final design basis capability demonstration, this capability will be demonstrated upon successful differential pressure testing on the sampled valves.
04.08 Verify that the licensee has established a method for periodic verification of adequate capability of the sampled MOVs in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1), as appropriate.
The applicant maintained established procedures, which were common to all TVA nuclear units including WBN Unit 2, to perform this periodic verification. The inspectors determined that these procedures where adequate.
04.09 Verify that the licensee has analyzed MOV failures which have occurred and has an effective corrective action plan to prevent reoccurrence and the licensee trends failures of MOVs in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1), as appropriate.
Neither of the sampled MOVs has experienced a failure. The applicant maintained established procedures, which were common to all TVA nuclear units including WBN Unit 2, to analyze MOV failures. The inspectors determined that these procedures were adequate.
04.10 Verify that the licensee is meeting the program schedule in accordance with the generic letter or its commitments (where accepted under Part 1), as appropriate.
This item is not applicable for WBN Unit 2 because the unit is under construction.
04.11 Verify quality assurance program implementation in the design control and testing of the sampled MOVs.
Based on the activities inspected, the inspectors determined that the applicant was properly implementing their quality assurance program with regards to Unit 2 GL 89-10 MOVs.
The following samples were inspected:
- TI 2515/109, Section 04.04 - two samples
- IP 51053, Section 02.02.g - two samples
- IP 50073, Section 02.02.c(4) - two samples Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
Based on the activities reviewed, MOV testing was conducted by qualified individuals using qualified procedures, design calculations were performed in accordance with applicable specifications, and the applicant was adequately implementing GL 89-10 requirements. Additional inspection activities are required to complete this TI. These activities include additional MOV samples for Part 2 and all Part 3 requirements of this TI. Part 3 inspections will be performed after the applicant completes all GL 89-10 related actions. Based on this limited review and the remaining actions by the applicant, no additional conclusion is warranted for this inspection.
OA.1.5 (Discussed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program (Temporary Instruction 2512/037)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: In 1989, the WBN Performance Plan identified a Special Program (SP) to establish a controlled master fuse list. The SP provided corrective actions to address three primary issues:
- (1) Class 1E safety-related fuses had not been adequately identified and controlled,
- (2) Bussmann KAZ actuators had been improperly used to provide circuit protection, and
- (3) requirements for redundant overcurrent protection of electrical penetration assemblies had not been adequately addressed by design.
The previous inspection of this SP on Unit 2 was documented in inspection report 05000391/2013604 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13179A079), Section OA.1.23. That report documented acceptable results for a sample of 15 fuses in three plant systems.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the engineering complete closure package regarding the Master Fuse List Special program. The inspectors selected a sample of fuses that had been installed and verified by the applicant from three safety related systems that have been turned over to startup, including system 67, essential raw cooling water (ERCW), system 70, component cooling water system (CCS), and system 84, flood mode boration system. The inspectors reviewed work orders associated with the system inspected. The inspectors interviewed applicant staff members responsible for the design and selection of the fuses list on the Master Equipment List (MEL) where the Master Fuse List is stored. The inspectors performed a direct visual inspection on a sample of fuses to verify that they agreed with the fuses listed in the MEL. The inspectors conducted walk downs of Motor Control Centers (MCCs) to verify fuses installed in the individual compartments matched those listed in the design documents.
Documents reviewed and the list of fuses verified for this inspection is listed in the
.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the fuses in the systems reviewed were adequately sized, installed, and properly documented for the samples selected for inspection. Based on the small number of systems reviewed, inspectors will continue inspecting fuses in more safety related systems as they are turned over to startup.
OA.1.6 (Discussed) Construction Deficiency Report 391/85-37: Incorrect Use of AMP PIDG Terminals (IP 35007)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: This CDR involved the discovery that AMP Products Corporation Pre-Insulated Diamond Grip (PIDG) terminals had been used on solid conductor component leads despite the fact that the vendor did not recommend using these terminals for solid copper wire applications. This use was identified on Class 1E discrete electrical components in Foxboro control loops and test points, relay racks, and local panels. This deficiency was reported to the NRC in 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) and is further described in inspection reports 50-390, 391/91-26 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML072880173) and 50-390, 391/94-55 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072980605). The applicant determined that the cause of this deficiency was the failure to incorporate the requirements of TVA General Construction Specification, G-38 Installation, Modification and Maintenance of Insulated Cables Rated Up to 15,000 Volts, into site procedures for the installation and acceptance of lugs used in solid conductor component leads. CDR 391/85-37 has been inspected previously as documented in IR 05000391/2012602 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12087A324). This deficiency was also documented for Unit 1 as CDR 390/85-38 which was closed in IR 50-390, 391/94-55 (ADAMS Accession No.
Inspection Activities: Responsible personnel were interviewed, and the applicants Open Item/Commitment Completion Form (Engineering Complete) tracking number PER 172698 R1, was reviewed. PER 172698 R1, as well as the previous revision, was reviewed to evaluate whether the proposed corrective actions were adequate. The inspectors observed formal TVA training for electricians on crimping, splicing, and terminations to determine if the changes made to site procedures as a result of this CDR were being incorporated into indoctrination of craftsmen. The inspectors reviewed the Engineering Document Construction Releases (EDCRs) referenced in PER 172698 and the associated implementing work orders. The inspectors conducted field observations in the control, auxiliary and reactor buildings to verify work completed to address the concerns identified in the CDR. A sample of 10 panels was selected to visually verify that AMP PIDG lugs were no longer being used in the termination of components with solid conductors. The selected population included panels in which solid conductors were not found present by the applicant and junction boxes in which solid conductors were found being used with terminals approved for the application. The samples also included junction boxes in which the applicant identified solid conductors with PIDG terminals and replaced them with terminals approved for use with solid conductors. The panels selected included the following: WBN-2-PNL-278-L11A, WBN-2-PNL-278-L11B, 2-JB-293-0523-A, 2-JB-293-0525-B, 2-JB-293-0527-A, 2-JB-293-0529-B, 2-JB-293-0712-B, 2-JB-293-0714-A, 2-JB-293-0744-B, and 2-JB-293-0747-A.
Documents and records reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
The inspectors interviewed responsible personnel and obtained multiple documents containing additional information relevant to the reasoning for, and scope of actions taken to address the CDR which were not referenced on the applicable PP-19-2 Open Item/Commitment Completion Form (Engineering Complete). The PP-19-2 Engineering Complete partial closure package was being revised by the applicant to ensure that the actions taken to address the CDR are inclusive of all the areas possibly affected.
c. Conclusions
Based on the review of revision 1 of the applicable Open Item/Commitment Completion Form (Engineering Complete), as well as previous NRC inspection reports, the inspectors determined that the applicants proposed corrective actions are adequate to address the concerns identified in CDR 391/85-37. Further inspection will be required before closing this item to evaluate the next revision of PP-19-2 Open Item/Commitment Completion Form (Engineering Complete), PER 172698 R1, which was being revised by the applicant to ensure that the actions taken to address the CDR are inclusive of all the areas possibly affected.
OA.1.7 (Discussed) Electrical Cable Issues Corrective Action Program - Sub-issue: Cable Bend Radius Deficiencies (Temporary Instruction 2512/016, Inspection Procedures 51063 and 51065)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: Based on various employee concerns and non-conformance reports, TVA determined that the minimum bend radius recommended by Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA) had been violated at WBN.
Excessive bending has the potential of damaging cables and adversely affects their performance. Damage can be caused by
- (a) elongation stress to the insulation system, which may reduce the qualified life of the cable,
- (b) interfacial disruption of medium voltage cables stress control layers of insulation and insulation shield, which may have likelihood of corona degradation, and
- (c) conductor creeping, which will likely put radial stress on the insulation system. Items
- (a) and
- (c) apply to low voltage cables, while all three items apply to medium voltage cables.
To resolve this issue at Unit 1, TVA established bend radius parameters (upper and lower bounds) for Class IE cables, and revised General Construction Specification G-38 Installation, Modification and Maintenance of Insulated Cables Rated Up to 15,000 Volts, to include the bend radius requirements for cable installation. Cables were categorized based on 10 CFR 50.49 (Equipment Qualification) requirements, classifications, and voltage levels. They were then inspected, replaced, retrained, or their qualified life was reduced based on bending or kinking relative to upper and lower bend radii.
TVA will implement the Unit 1 approach on Unit 2 to resolve this issue.
The previous inspection of this CAP on Unit 2 was documented in IIR 05000391/2012602 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12087A324), Section OA.1.5.
Inspection Activities: Inspectors reviewed the work order records of locations where TVA had inspected cable splices and terminations for suspected instances of excessive bending of the cables. Inspectors visually examined the current installed conditions.
The inspectors reviewed CDR 85-30, calculations, work orders, work procedures for high voltage nuclear motor connections (Raychem NMCK8), specifications, drawings, correspondence, and field change requests (FCRs) to determine the adequacy of cable bend radius installations and motor terminations. The inspectors walked down the installation of safety related medium voltage feeders 2PP625A (both ends) feeding Containment Spray Pump 2A-A, 2PP600A feeding Safety Injection Pump 2A-A, 2PP637B feeding Containment Spray Pump 2B-B, and 2PP612B feeding Safety Injection Pump 2B-B, all part of DRA 55121-015 to verify adequacy of bend radius for cables installed. The inspectors interviewed engineering staff responsible for the design and engineering input for the motor connections and cable routing to discuss bend radius limits inside motor connection boxes, type of terminations used, and potential for water infiltration into the conduits for feeders under review, and exposed cable protection and separation. The inspectors reviewed operating mode calculations to assess required separation of exposed safety related cables to cooling system pipes and any dynamic stresses imposed on the cables by motion of the cooling piping. The inspectors reviewed conduit seals for safety related feeders with potential for water infiltration caused by pipe rupture or sprinkler system activation to verify integrity of the installation.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 51063 Section 02.02.e - 4 samples Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that medium voltage cables reviewed were adequately installed and properly documented for the samples selected for inspection. A population of low voltage, Class 1E cables require further review during future inspections. This item will remain open pending inspection of a sample of the low voltage cable installations.
OA.1.8 (Discussed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant QA Records Corrective Action Program Plan (Temporary Instruction 2512/028, Inspection Procedure 51055)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of QA records of electrical equipment. The inspectors reviewed the applicants sample assessment of the records to verify that the records specified the correct component type and location, that the functional specifications were met, that the required QA/QC inspections were performed, and that they were complete and legible. To verify that records were retrievable, the inspectors observed document control personnel locate independent samples of records from within the vault.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspection results are too limited to support a conclusion on the QA Records CAP at this time.
OA.1.9 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report 391/86-13, Inadequate Calculations to Document Electrical System Design Basis and Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) Appendix HH Item 7, Verify Commitment Completion and Review Electrical Design Calculations (Inspection Procedure 92701)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: This issue originated from CDR 50-391/86-13, Lack of Adequate Calculations to Document Electrical System Design Basis, which stated that the applicant had not established adequate electrical engineering calculations to support the adequate design of their nuclear plants. The inspectors followed up on TVA resolution of CDR 50-391/86-13. TVA initiated PER 144072 on February 3, 1989, to track this item. NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation addressed this item as Action Item 7 in Appendix HH of the Watts Bar 2 Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 22.
TVA originally established a list of a minimum set of electrical calculations necessary to fully document the design basis of a TVA nuclear plant in a document designated Procedure Method PM-86-02, Electrical Calculations, Rev. 1, dated 7/17/87. That list has been subsequently revised and incorporated into a Nuclear Power Group Standard Department Procedure, NEDP-2, Design Calculation Process Control, Rev. 17, as Appendix E.
The NRC last reviewed the status of this item in November 2011 as documented in IIR 05000391/2011612 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11348A081). At that time, TVA initiated PER 458200 to track corrective action on this item. That PER was initiated due to NRC-identified omissions of calculation topics in the computer based Calculation Cross-reference Information System, which has been replaced by the Calculation Tracking System.
Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the applicants PP-19-2, Engineering Complete Closure package report, including referenced documents and actions associated with PER 458200. The inspectors interviewed responsible personnel in conjunction with the reviews to better understand the PP-19-2 document. The inspectors compared the original TVA list of electrical calculations documented in PM-86-02 to the revised one in NEDP-2, Rev. 17, to identify any substantive differences between the two documents. The inspectors reviewed a sample of the issued calculations for Unit 2 and common to both Units to verify that calculation content addressed the specified technical topic.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that TVA has prepared and issued the required electrical engineering calculations for Unit 2, and sufficient inspections have been performed to close these two items.
V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS X1
Exit Meeting Summary
An exit meeting was conducted on January 22, 2014, to present inspection results Mr.
Skaggs and other members of his staff. The inspectors identified that no proprietary information had been received during the inspection and none would be used in the inspection report. The applicant acknowledged the observations and provided no dissenting comments.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Applicant personnel
- A. Aboulfaida, Bechtel - Electrical
- A. Bangalore, Bechtel - Electrical Engineer
- D. Beckley, Bechtel - Electrical Engineer
- J. W. Clark, TVA - QA Specialist, Unit 2
- T. Das, Bechtel - Civil Engineering
- M. McGrath, TVA - Licensing
- B. Pittman, TVA - Plant Support Engineer
- C. Stewart, Bechtel - Construction
- O. J. Zeringue, TVA - General Manager Engineering and Construction
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 35007 Quality Assurance Program Implementation During Construction and Pre-
Construction Activities
IP 37002 Construction Refurbishment Process - Watts Bar Unit 2
IP 49063 Piping - Work Observation
IP 50053 Reactor Vessel and Internals - Work Observation
IP 50073 Mechanical Components - Work Observation
IP 50090 Pipe Support and Restraint Systems
IP 51053 Electrical Components and Systems - Work Observation
IP 51055 Electrical Components and Systems - Record Review
IP 51063 Electrical Cable - Work Observation
IP 51065 Electrical Cable - Records Review
IP 52053 Instrument Components and Systems - Work Observation
IP 64051 Procedures - Fire Prevention/Protection
IP 70300 Preoperational Test Procedure Review
IP 70311 Preoperational Testing Procedure Verification
IP 71302 Preoperational Test Program Implementation Verification
IP 92701 Follow-up
TI 2512/016 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Cable Issues Corrective Action
Program Plan
TI 2512/021 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Equipment Seismic Corrective
Action Program Plan
TI 2512/028 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant QA Records Corrective Action
Program Plan
TI 2512/037 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program
TI 2515/109 Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-
Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
Item 7 SSER Verify Commitment Completion and Verify Appendix HH Electrical Design Calculations (Section OA.1.9)
391/86-13 CDR Inadequate Calculations to Document Electrical System Design Basis (Section OA.1.9)
Discussed
2512/016 TI Cable Issues Corrective Action Program -
Sub-Issue: Supports in Vertical Trays (Section OA.1.1)
391/89-04 CDR Support of Class 1E Cables Installed in Long Vertical Cable Tray Runs (Section OA.1.1)
2512/021 TI Inspection of Equipment Seismic Qualification Corrective Action Program (Section OA.1.2)
391/86-21-02 VIO Instrument Valves, Foxboro Transmitters, and Instrument Panels Not Seismically Qualified (Section OA.1.3)
89-10 GL Safety Related Motor Operated Valve (MOV)
Testing and Surveillance (Section OA.1.4)
2515/109, Rev. 4 TI Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter 89-
10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance (Section OA.1.4)
2512/037 TI Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program (Section OA.1.5)
391/85-37 CDR Incorrect Use of AMP PIDG Terminals (Section OA.1.6)
2512/016 TI Electrical Cable Issues CAP - Sub-issue:
Cable Bend Radius Deficiencies (Section OA.1.7)
2512/028 TI Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant QA Records Corrective Action Program Plan (Section OA.1.8)