ML102170465
| ML102170465 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/2010 |
| From: | Haag R NRC/RGN-II/DCP/CPB3 |
| To: | Bhatnagar A Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2013-0030, FOIA/PA-2013-0139 IR-10-603 | |
| Download: ML102170465 (82) | |
See also: IR 05000391/2010603
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
August 5, 2010
Mr. Ashok S. Bhatnagar
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Generation Development and Construction
Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
1101 Market Street
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT: WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 CONSTRUCTION - NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000391/2010603 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Bhatnagar:
On June 30, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection of
construction activities at your Watts Bar Unit 2 reactor facility. The enclosed integrated
inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 13, 2010, with
Mr. Masoud Bajestani and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your Unit 2 construction permit as they
relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, with the conditions
of your construction permit, and with fulfillment of Unit 2 regulatory framework commitments.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation
(Notice) and the circumstances surrounding this violation are described in detail in the enclosed
report. The violation involved failure to implement adequate measures to review the suitability
of application of materials, parts, and equipment essential to the safety related functions of
molded case circuit breakers and provide for the verification of checking the adequacy of
design, such as, calculational methods, performing a suitable test program, including
qualifications testing of a prototype unit, under the most adverse conditions. Although
determined to be a Severity Level IV violation, it is being cited because the criteria, specified in
Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for a non-cited violation was not satisfied.
Please note that you are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your
response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure
compliance with regulatory requirements.
Additionally, this report documents seven NRC-identified findings which were determined to
involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because these findings were Severity Level
IV violations and were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating them as
non-cited violations consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you
contest the non-cited violations in the enclosed report, you should provide a response within 30
TVA 2
days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTENTION: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of
Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and
the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the Watts Bar Unit 2 Nuclear Plant. In accordance with
10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your
response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Robert C. Haag, Chief
Construction Projects Branch 3
Division of Construction Projects
Docket No. 50-391
Construction Permit No: CPPR-92
Enclosure: 1. Notice of Violation
2. Inspection Report 05000391/2010603 w/attachment
cc w/encl: (See next page)
ML102170465 G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE
OFFICE RII: DCP RII:DCP RII:DCP RII:DCP RII:DCP RII:DCP RII:DCP
SIGNATURE *WCB *TXN ANI *KEM JBB WRL Via Email
NAME WBearden TNazario AIssa KMiller JBaptist WLewis GKhouri
DATE 8/4/2010 8/4/2010 8/4/2010 8/4/2010 8/4/2010 8/4/2010 7/30/2010
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OFFICE RII:DCP RII:DCP RII:DCP RII:DCI RII:DCI RII:DCI RII:DCI
SIGNATURE Via Email *PH Via Email Via Email CRO Via Email *JXL
NAME GCrespo PHeher CJFong CJones COgle JFuller JLizardi
DATE 8/3/2010 8/3/2010 8/2/2010 7/30/2010 8/5/2010 7/30/2010 8/4/2010
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OFFICE RII:DCI RII:DCI RII:DCI RII:DCI RII:DCI RII:DCI RII:DCI
SIGNATURE Via Email Via Email *CBA Via Email Via Email Via Email Via Email
NAME EMichel TSteadham CAbbott TFanelli LCastelli AArtayet CStandberry
DATE 7/30/2010 7/30/2010 8/4/2010 8/4/2010 8/3/2010 7/30/2010 8/4/2010
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OFFICE RII:DCI RII:DCI RII:EICS
SIGNATURE Via Email Via Email Via Email
NAME EHeher JKent CEvans
DATE 7/30/2010 8/4/2010 8/5/2010
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
TVA 3
cc w/encl:
Mr. Gordon P. Arent Mr. M.J. Hellstern
Manager General Manager
New Generation Licensing NGDC Governance & Oversight
Nuclear Generation Development Tennessee Valley Authority
and Construction 3A Blue Ridge Place
WBN Nuclear Plant 1101 Market Street
P.O. Box 2000 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801
Spring City, Tennessee 37381
Mr. R.M Krich
Mr. Masoud Bajestani Vice President
Vice President Nuclear Licensing
WBN Unit Two Tennessee Valley Authority
WBN Nuclear Plant 3R Lookout Place
Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street
P.O. Box 2000 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801
Spring City, Tennessee 37381
Mr. E.J. Vigluicci
Mr. Michael K. Brandon, Manager Assistant General Counsel
Licensing and Industry Affairs Tennessee Valley Authority
WBN Nuclear Plant 6A West Tower
Tennessee Valley Authority 400 West Summit Hill Drive
P.O. Box 2000 Knoxville, Tennessee 37402
Spring City, Tennessee 37381
Lawrence E. Nanney, Director
Mr. Preston D. Swafford Tennessee Department of Environmental
Chief Nuclear Officer Health and Conservation
and Executive Vice President Division of Radiological Health
Tennessee Valley Authority 3rd Floor, L&C Annex
3R Lookout Place 401 Church Street
1101 Market Place Nashville, TN 37243-1532
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801
Mr. D. E. Grissette
County Executive Site Vice President
375 Church Street WBN Nuclear Plant
Suite 215 Tennessee Valley Authority
Dayton, Tennessee 37321 P.O. Box 2000
Spring City, Tennessee 37381
W.R. Crouch, Manager
WBN Unit 2 Licensing County Mayor
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 156
Tennessee Valley Authority Decatur, Tennessee 37322
P.O. Box 2000
Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Senior Resident Inspector
WBN Nuclear Plant
Mr. Gregory A. Boerschig U.S. NRC
Plant Manager, WBN Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road
Tennessee Valley Authority Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000
P.O. Box 2000
Spring City, Tennessee 37381
TVA 4
cc email distribution w/encl:
Greg Scott
Tennessee Valley Authority
Electronic Mail Distribution
Letter to Ashok S. Bhatnagar from Robert C. Haag dated August 5, 2010.
SUBJECT: WBN NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 CONSTRUCTION - NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT 05000391/2010603
Distribution w/encl:
L. Raghavan, NRR
S. Campbell, NRR
P. Milano, NRR
C. Evans, RII
L. Slack, RII EICS
E. Guthrie, RII DRP
OE Mail (email address if applicable)
PUBLIC
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Tennessee Valley Authority Docket No. 50-391
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Construction Permit No. CPPR-92
Spring City, TN
During an NRC inspection conducted on April 26-30, 2010, a violation of NRC requirements was
identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below:
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states that measures shall be
established for the review for suitability of application of materials, parts, and equipment that are
essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs).
The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design,
such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational
methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Where a test program is used to
verify the adequacy of a specific design feature in lieu of other verifying or checking processes,
it shall include suitable qualifications testing of a prototype unit under the most adverse design
conditions.
Contrary to the above, measures used to review the suitability of application of materials, parts,
and equipment essential to the safety-related functions of molded case circuit breakers and
measures to provide for the verification of checking the adequacy of design, such as,
calculational methods, performing a suitable test program, including qualifications testing of a
prototype unit under the most adverse design conditions, were not adequate in that:
1. On October 5, 2009, the applicant installed molded case circuit breakers into the
120VAC vital instrument power boards; however, the test program used to seismically
qualify a prototype circuit breaker failed to use a suitable mounting method that reflected
the most adverse mounting condition.
2. On September 3, 2009, the applicant failed to perform an adequate review for suitability
of application parts and material used to modify dimensional critical characteristics in
molded case circuit breakers; further, the applicant failed to verify the adequacy of
design for the modification and the effects on essential safety related functions of the
circuit breakers.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II)
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Tennessee Valley Authority is hereby required to
submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the
subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation
(Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should
include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing
the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results
achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the date when full compliance will
be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the
correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be
Enclosure 1
NOV 2
issued as to why the construction permit should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why
such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown,
consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made
available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your
response that delete such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10
CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
days.
Dated this 5th day of August, 2010
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No.: 50-391
Construction Permit No.: CPPR-92
Report No.: 05000391/2010603
Applicant: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2
Location: 1260 Nuclear Plant Rd
Spring City TN 37381
Dates: April 1 - June 30, 2010
Inspectors: W. Bearden, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction Projects
Branch 3 (CPB3), Division of Construction Projects (DCP)
Region II (RII)
T. Nazario, Resident Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII
K. Miller, Resident Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII
W. Lewis, Resident Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII
J. Fuller, Senior Construction Inspector, Construction Inspection
Branch 3 (CIB3), Division of Construction Inspection (DCI), RII;
Sections C.1.8, C.1.9, C.1.10, C.1.11, C.1.12, C.1.13, C.1.14,
C.1.15, C.1.16, C.1.17, C.1.18, C.1.19, C.1.20
G. Crespo, Senior Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII;
Sections C.1.2, C.1.6, E.1.1, T.1.1, OA .1.4, OA.1.5, OA.1.6,
OA.1.7
A. Issa, Construction Inspector, CPB3, DCP, RII, Section Q.1.3
E. Michel, Senior Construction Inspector, CIB3, DCI, RII, Sections
C.1.9, C.1.11, C.1.12, C.1.13, C.1.14
T. Steadham, Construction Inspector, CIB3, DCI , RII, Section
C.1.5
J. Lizardi, Construction Inspector, CIB2, DCI, RII, Sections C.1.4,
C.1.7, C.1.8
C. Abbott, Construction Inspector, CIB2, DCI, RII, Section C.1.3
C. Jones, Senior Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII, Sections
E.1.2, OA.1.5, OA.1.8, OA.1.12
T. Fanelli, Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII, Sections C.1.2,
E.1.1
Enclosure 2
2
L. Castelli, Senior Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII Section
C.1.1
A. Artayet, Senior Construction Inspector, CIB3, DCI, RII, Sections
C.1.15, C.1.16
C. Smith-Standberry, Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII,
Section OA.1.13
G. Khouri, Senior Construction Inspector, CPB2, DCP, RII, Section
E.1.2
E. Heher, Construction Inspector, CIB2, DCI, RII, Section E.1.2
P. Heher, Construction Inspector, CPB2, DCP, RII, Section Q.1.3
J. Kent, Construction Inspector, CIB1, DCI, RII, Sections OA.1.1,
OA.1.9, OA.1.10, OA.1.11
C. Fong, Construction Inspector, CPB2, DCP, RII, Section C.1.3
Approved by: Robert C. Haag, Chief
Construction Projects Branch 3
Division of Construction Projects
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2
This integrated inspection included aspects of engineering and construction activities performed
by TVA associated with the Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Plant Unit 2 construction project. This
report covered a three-month period of inspections in the areas of quality assurance (QA);
identification and resolution of construction problems; construction activities; training and
qualification of plant personnel; fire protection; and follow-up of other activities. The inspection
program for Unit 2 construction activities is described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)
2517. Information regarding the WBN Unit 2 Construction Project and NRC inspections can be
found at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/plant-specific-items/watts-bar.html.
The inspection identified one NRC-identified Severity Level (SL) IV violation (VIO), seven non-
cited violations (NCV), and one Unresolved Item (URI).
Inspection Results
Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, was identified by the inspectors for the
failure to have procedures for identification, documentation and segregation of materials
identified as nonconforming to Purchase Order (PO) requirements by the kick and count
inspection. (Section Q.1.3)
- A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, Document Control, was identified by
the inspectors for the failure to establish adequate measures to control the issuance of
documents stored in the CONEX storage area. (Section Q.1.3)
- A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR Part 21 was identified by the inspectors for the failure to invoke
10 CFR Part 21 requirements on a supplier of safety-related services of basic components.
(Section Q.1.3)
- A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and
Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for failure to identify improper weld size by the
welder, field engineer, and quality control (QC) in accordance with applicable instructions,
procedures, and drawings. (Section C. 1.3)
- A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified
by the inspectors for inadequate measures to assure that conditions adverse to quality,
specifically non-conforming safety-related concrete, was promptly identified and corrected.
(Section C.1.4)
crossover piping. The inspectors concluded that in order to properly evaluate and disposition
this issue, additional inspection would be required to determine (1) whether areas of
concern (potential pitting) were properly identified and documented at the time by QC and
Field Engineer (FE) in accordance with applicable instructions and procedures; and (2)
whether the engineering disposition appropriately addressed the area of concern. (Section
C.1.8)
2
- A SL IV, NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping,
was identified by the inspectors in that the applicant failed to control the storage and
preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection instructions
to prevent damage from nearby construction activities. Specifically, the inspectors identified
multiple locations of weld and paint spatter, arc strikes, and mechanical damage on safety-
related welds, piping, and components. (Section C.1.9)
- A SL IV VIO of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified by the
inspectors in that the applicant failed to implement adequate design control measures in the
qualification analysis, testing, and calculational methods used to qualify and analyze safety-
related components. This is regarding the seismic qualification of circuit breakers in safety-
related 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Boards. Two examples of design control violation
are listed in the report details section. The violation did not meet the criteria for a non-cited
violation in Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because the applicants corrective
action did not adequately address the findings identified and would not ensure that
compliance was restored in a reasonable timeframe or prevent recurrence. (Section E.1.1)
- A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the
inspectors for a failure to correctly translate the design basis, as described in a System
Description Document, into affected drawings and specifications. Specifically, a design
basis requirement to provide diverse level measurement systems for the Safety Injection
System Accumulators was not correctly translated into affected specifications and drawings
issued for construction. (Section E.1.2)
- The inspectors concluded that concerns pertaining to the cable CAP sub-issue on adhesive
backed cable mount supports have been appropriately addressed for Watts Bar Unit 2 and
this item is closed. (Section OA.1.3)
- Other areas inspected were adequate with no findings of significance identified. These
areas included: response to response Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Items; electrical
systems and components; nuclear welding; structural welding; nondestructive examination
and inservice inspection activities; craft training; and fire protection.
Table of Contents
I. QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) PROGRAM ............................................................................ 1
Q.1 QA Oversight Activities ................................................................................................. 1
Q.1.1 Identification and Resolution of Construction Problems (Inspection Procedure (IP) ....
35007) .................................................................................................................................... 1
Q.1.2 Safety Conscience Work Environment (IP 35007)..................................................... 1
Q.1.3 Procurement, Receiving, and Storage Inspection (IP 35060 and IP 35065) .............. 2
II. MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS .................................................................. 6
C.1 Construction Activities .................................................................................................. 6
C.1.1 Instrument Components and Systems - Work Observation (IP 52053) ..................... 6
C.1.2 Instrumentation installation activities- Work Observation (IP 52053) ....................... 7
C.1.3 Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (IP 50090, 46071, and TI 2512/023) ................ 7
C.1.4 Structural Concrete (IP 46053)................................................................................ 10
C.1.5 Safety-Related and RCS Pressure Boundary Piping Records Review (IPs 49055 ......
and 49065, TI 2512/024) ....................................................................................................... 11
C.1.6 Cable Signal Tracing - Work Observation (TI 2512/016, IP 52053) ........................... 13
C.1.7 RPV Internals and Protection of Installed Plan Equipment during Construction ..........
Activities (IP 50053) .............................................................................................................. 14
C.1.8 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Piping (IP 49053) .................................................. 14
C.1.9 Protection of Installed Plant Equipment During Construction Activities - Reactor .......
Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (IP 49053) ...................................................................... 16
C.1.10. URI 78-05-02, Reactor Vessel - Nozzle Weld Surface Cracking ............................. 18
C.1.11 Inservice Inspection - Review of Program (IP 73051) ............................................. 19
C.1.12 Inservice Inspection - Review of Procedures (IP 73052) ........................................ 20
C.1.13 Preservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (IP 73053) ......... 20
C.1.14 Preservice Inspection - Data Review and Evaluation (IP 73055) ............................. 21
C.1.15 Nuclear Welding General Inspection Procedure (IP 55050) .................................... 23
C.1.16 Structural Welding General Inspection Procedure (IP 55100) ................................. 26
C.1.17 Visual Examination of Safety Related Welds (IP 57050) ......................................... 29
C.1.18 Liquid Penetrant Examination of Safety Related Welds (IP 57060) ......................... 30
C.1.19 Magnetic Particle Examination of Safety Related Welds (IP57070) ......................... 31
C.1.20 Ultrasonic Examination of Safety-Related Welds (IP 57080, 73053) ....................... 32
E.1 ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES ......................................................................................... 32
E.1.1 Procurement, Receiving, and Storage (IP35065) .................................................... 32
E.1.2 Engineering Design Activities and Design Control (IPs 35100 and 37055) .............. 35
T.1 TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION OF PLANT PERSONNEL ....................................... 37
T.1.1 Craft Training (IPs 51051 and 64051) ..................................................................... 37
T.1.2 Engineering Organization Training (IP 35960) ........................................................ 38
III. OPERATIONAL READINESS ACTIVITIES ........................................................................ 38
F.1 Fire Protection (IP 64051) ............................................................................................ 38
2
IV. OTHER ACTIVITIES ...................................................................................................... 39
OA.1.1(Discussed) QA Records Corrective Action Program (TI 2512/28, IPs 50075, 51065, ....
51055, 52055) ....................................................................................................................... 39
OA.1.2 Corrective Action Plans and Special Programs Reviews (TI 2512/017, 025) ...... 40
OA.1.3 (Closed) Electrical Issues CAP Sub-issue: Adhesive Backed Cable Support Mount .....
(ABCSM) (TI 2512/020, IP 51063) ........................................................................................ 41
OA.1.4 (Discussed) Cable Issues CAP Sub-Issue: Computerized Cable Routing System ........
(CCRS) Software and Database Verification and Validation (TI 2512/016) ........................... 41
OA.1.5 (Discussed) Station Blackout (SBO) Rule Procedures and Actions (TI 2515/120) ..... 42
OA.1.6 (Discussed) Non-cited Violation NCV-391/2008-010-01 corrective action for failure......
to document a cable raceway separation non-conforming condition...................................... 42
OA.1.7 (Closed) NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power ........
Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant ..................................
Transients. ............................................................................................................................ 43
OA.1.8 (Discussed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special ................
Program (TI 2512/037) .......................................................................................................... 43
OA.1.9 (Discussed) NRC Bulletins 74-15, Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three .................
Position Maintained Switch Model No. 10250T; 75-03, Incorrect Lower Disc ..........................
Spring and Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 and 8302 ASCO Solenoid .............................
Valves; and 75-06, Defective Westinghouse Type OT-2 Control Switches ........................ 45
OA.1.10 (Discussed) NRC Bulletin 76-02, Relay Coil Failures - General Electric Type HFA, ...
HGA, HKA, and HMA Relays ................................................................................................ 46
OA.1.11 (Discussed) Violation 391/86-02-01; Failure to Follow Procedures that Resulted in ....
Improperly Installed Solenoid Valves .................................................................................... 47
OA.1.12 (Discussed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiation Monitoring System .......
Special Program (TI 2512/041) ............................................................................................. 47
OA.1.13 (Discussed) Applicant Actions on Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Items .................. 48
V. MANAGEMENT MEETINGS ............................................................................................. 51
X.1 EXIT MEETING SUMMARY .......................................................................................... 51
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
During the current inspection period, TVA performed pre-service inspection (PSI) activities and
construction completion activities on safety-related systems, and continued engineering design
activities.
I. Quality Assurance (QA) Program
Q.1 QA Oversight Activities
Q.1.1 Identification and Resolution of Construction Problems (Inspection Procedure (IP)
35007)
a. Inspection Scope
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed problem evaluation reports
(PERs) as part of TVAs corrective action program to verify that issues being identified
under the corrective action program were being properly identified, addressed, and
resolved by TVA. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed three recent Bechtel QA
surveillance reports regarding ongoing nondestructive examination work activities.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
Generally, the PERs reviewed were properly identified, addressed, and resolved;
however, as noted in Section C.1.4, Structural Concrete, a violation of regulatory
requirements was identified for failure to promptly identify and correct a condition
adverse to quality.
Q.1.2 Safety Conscience Work Environment (IP 35007)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors continued routine meetings with the Unit 2 Employee Concerns Program
(ECP) representative to evaluate the effectiveness of the applicants program for
resolving employee concerns. The inspectors reviewed existing program requirements
and all recent safety-related concerns identified by the applicants and contractors ECP
programs. The inspectors also verified that significant problems were documented
under the corrective action program and were being properly identified, addressed, and
resolved by TVA. This included a review of anonymous PERs and trending for the
months of April and May.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2
c. Conclusions
The inspectors did not identify any issues or concerns regarding the ability of the
applicant to provide a safety-conscience work environment.
Q.1.3 Procurement, Receiving, and Storage Inspection (IP 35060 and IP 35065)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a procurement, receiving, and storage inspection in
accordance with IP 35065, Procurement, Receiving, and Storage, and Section 02.04 of
IP 35060, Applicant management of QA activities. In addition, IP 38703, Commercial
Grade Dedication, was used for guidance in reviewing commercial grade dedication
activities. The inspection covered all aspects of procurement and procurement
interfaces. This included a review of the design bases; material requests; procurement
data sheets; technical evaluations and commercial dedication plans; purchase orders;
10 CFR Part 21 provisions; receiving inspection records; storage; corrective action
program; interfaces between design, procurement engineering, procurement and QA;
personnel training and qualification; and internal and external oversight. The objectives
of the inspection were to verify that these activities were performed in accordance with
the applicable QA programs and NRC requirements.
Specifically, the inspectors:
1) Reviewed audit reports of procurement activities at the site.
2) Independently reviewed material requests, technical specifications in procurement
data sheets, and procurement documents to determine whether they invoked the
applicable Quality Assurance (QA) requirements and the applicable codes and
standards; and whether the specified design parameters were in accordance with
those listed in the design specifications. This included ASME Code Section III
requirements and environmental and seismic qualifications.
3) Reviewed purchasing documents for basic components to determine whether they
imposed the requirements of 10 CFR 21 and whether the suppliers were on the
approved suppliers list.
4) Reviewed two samples of commercial grade dedication, to determine the adequacy
of the dedication plan including the identification of critical characteristics, and to
ascertain that the completed dedication activities complied with the dedication plan.
5) Reviewed for adequacy, the requirements specified in the procurement documents
for documentation and acceptance of purchased items and sampled certificate of
conformances (COCs).
6) Reviewed procurement documents to determine whether source verification was
specified for complex engineered items when required and whether the appropriate
receiving inspection organization was aware of the source verification results.
7) Examined the CONEX trailer to determine the adequacy of implementation for the
protection, handling and control of purchasing documents.
8) Examined the system established for conducting receiving inspection including
facilities and records of acceptance such as COCs to determine whether receiving
inspection records were available and whether identified discrepancies were
reviewed by QA and/or engineering, as appropriate, to assure proper disposition.
9) Examined material receiving inspection records to determine compliance with
acceptance requirements and to ascertain whether receiving inspections were
based on acceptable documentation, direct examination, or record of source
verification.
3
10) Examined storage facilities for safety-related items to ensure adequate protection
and compliance with the applicable storage level. The inspectors checked for
proper segregation and identification of nonconforming items. The warehouses
examined included warehouse number 6 where the kick and count inspection takes
place, warehouse number 8 where Quality Control (QC) inspection takes place, and
warehouse number 7 where items are stored for issue to the field. Warehouse
number 7 also included storage of items originally intended for warehouses 6 and 8.
11) Reviewed purchaser notification points, hold points, and access rights when
required to be included in procurement documents.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors identified three violations of regulatory requirements as discussed below:
Violation 1:
Introduction: A Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix
B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components, was identified by the
inspectors for the failure to have procedures for identification, documentation and
segregation of materials identified as nonconforming to Purchase Order (PO)
requirements by the kick and count inspection. Specifically, effective measures did not
exist to segregate or properly identify hydraulic snubbers procured under PO 63534 as
nonconforming to the PO identification requirements.
Description: On June 8, 2010, the inspectors conducted a walk-down of warehouse
facilities at the WBN2 site. In warehouse number 7, the inspectors observed crates
containing hydraulic snubbers that had not been subjected to QC receipt inspection,
stored next to receipt inspected materials available for issue. Further review indicated
that some of these snubbers did not conform to the PO requirements in that they did not
have all the required identification. The finding was determined to be more than minor
because it represented an improper and uncontrolled work practice that can impact
quality or safety, involving nonconforming safety-related hydraulic snubbers, being
stored without proper identification in close proximity to other materials available for use.
This condition was documented in PER 234358. The cause of this finding was directly
related to the resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, as
defined in IMC 0310, because TVA failed to provide a complete, accurate and up-to-date
procedure, 25402-000-GPP-0000-N6104, Material Receiving, Revision (Rev.) 4, to
address the handling of materials identified as nonconforming to PO requirements at the
kick and count stage of the receiving inspection (H.2(c)).
Enforcement: 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, Nonconforming Materials,
Parts, or Components, states in part that measures shall be established to control
materials, parts, or components which do not conform to requirements in order to
prevent their inadvertent use or installation. These measures shall include, as
appropriate, procedures for identification, documentation, segregation, disposition, and
notification to affected organizations.
Contrary to the above, on June 8, 2010, the inspectors observed crates containing
hydraulic snubbers being stored next to receipt inspected materials available for issue
even though some of the snubbers did not conform to the PO requirements, in that they
did not have all the required identification. In addition, the affected snubbers were not
properly identified as nonconforming. Although procedures SPP-4.3, Rev. 0006, section
3.5 and 25402-000-GPP-0000-N6104, Rev. 4, section 6.5.12, require the immediate
4
segregation or identification of nonconforming material, these requirements apply to the
QC portion of the receiving inspection and not the kick and count portion. This finding
was determined to be a SL IV violation using Supplement II of the Enforcement Policy.
Because this was a SL IV violation and because it was entered into the corrective action
program as PER 234358, it is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the
NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 5000391/2010603-01, Marking and Segregation of
Nonconforming Materials from Accepted Materials Available for Use.
Violation 2:
Introduction: A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, Document Control,
was identified by the inspectors for the failure to establish adequate measures to control
the issuance of documents. Specifically, the applicant failed to establish proper storage
and control of documents stored in the CONEX storage area that were used during
performance of safety-related work activities.
Description: On June 8, 2010, the inspectors walked down the CONEX storage area
and interviewed warehouse personnel on its use. The storage area was environmentally
controlled, used fire rated cabinets, and was locked during off shift hours. Files in the
storage area were sometimes removed from storage or copied during performance of
safety-related work activities. A sign-out folder was to be used whenever a file was
removed from the area. The area included a refrigerator that was being used by
personnel to retrieve drinks and food. On June 9, 2010, the inspectors attempted to
retrieve a completed receiving package for PO 31774, I&C Instrument Isolation Valves
ASME Section III, Class 2, Safety-Related. The package had been removed from the
file cabinets without using a sign-out folder. The finding was determined to be more than
minor because it represented an improper and uncontrolled work practice that could
impact quality or safety, involving the use of improperly stored and uncontrolled
documents in safety-related activities. This condition was documented in PER 234281.
The cause of this finding was directly related to the resources component of the Human
Performance cross-cutting area, as defined in IMC 0310, because TVA failed to provide
a complete, accurate and up-to-date procedure, 25402-ADM-001, Document Control,
Rev. 9, that describes what to do with copies of documents once originals have been
transmitted to Document Control and how to control satellite document control facilities
(H.2(c)).
Enforcement: 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VI, Document Control, requires
that Measures shall be established to control the issuance of documents, such as
instructions, procedures, and drawings, including changes thereto, which prescribe all
activities affecting quality. These measures shall assure that documents, including
changes, are reviewed for adequacy and approved for release by authorized personnel
and are distributed to and used at the location where the prescribed activity is
performed.
Contrary to the above, some files in the CONEX trailer have been used or copied to
perform safety-related work activities effectively making it a satellite document control
station, and the files in this trailer were not properly protected nor controlled. The area
included a refrigerator containing food and drinks and the receiving records for PO
31774 were missing from the files in the CONEX trailer with no logout folder in place. In
addition, there were no signs in the trailer, on the filing cabinets or on the folders
themselves identifying these records as for information only (FIO). This finding was
determined to be a SL IV violation using Supplement II of the Enforcement Policy.
5
Because this was a SL IV violation and because it was entered into the corrective action
program as PER 234281, it is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the
NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 5000391/2010603-02, Inadequate Storage and Improper
Control of Documents Used in Safety Related Activities.
Violation 3:
Introduction: A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR Part 21 was identified by the inspectors for the
failure to invoke the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 on a supplier for services of safety-
related components. Specifically, lever arms for limit switches were purchased under
PO 87607. The lever arms were sent to TVA Central Laboratories to perform
commercial grade dedication activities without invoking the provisions of 10 CFR Part
21.
Description: The inspectors reviewed the completed package for PO 87607 and
concluded that it did not invoke the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 on TVA Central
Laboratories. The inspectors also reviewed intergroup agreement (IGA) -11, Central
Laboratories, Rev. 001. This agreement, which is between TVA Nuclear Power Group
(NPG) and TVA Central Laboratories, establishes the responsibilities and requirements
in providing requested services. The inspectors noted that this agreement did not invoke
the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21. The finding was determined to be more than minor
because it represented an improper and uncontrolled work practice that can impact
quality or safety, involving the issuance of procurement documents that did not invoke
the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21. This condition was documented in PER 235485.
There was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation.
Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 21.31 states that each individual, corporation, partnership,
dedicating entity, or other entity subject to the regulations in this part shall ensure that
each procurement document for a facility, or a basic component issued by him, her or it
on or after January 6, 1978, specifies, when applicable, that the provisions of 10 CFR
Part 21 apply.
Contrary to the above, PO 87607 did not specify that the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21
applied to TVA Central Laboratories nor did IGA-11, between TVA (NPG) and TVA
Central Laboratories. This finding was determined to be a SL IV violation using
Supplement II of the Enforcement Policy. Because this was a SL IV violation and
because it was entered into the corrective action program as PER 235485, it is being
treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV
5000391/2010603-03, Failure to Invoke 10 CFR Part 21 in Safety Related Procurement
Documents.
In addition, the inspectors made the following observations as a result of their
inspections:
- The dedication performed by TVA Central Laboratories for NAMCO limit switch
lever arms purchased under PO 87607 was accepted even though it did not fully
meet the dedication plan for verification of manufacturer and part number. This
condition was documented in PER 234290.
- Level B Condition Examples on page 14 of CAP procedure 25402-MGT-0003,
Rev. 7 cover repetitive supplier nonconformances detected during receiving but
since trending only covers conditions documented in PERs, other
6
nonconformances detected during the kick and count portion of the receiving
inspection will not support this trending effort.
c. Conclusions
Problems were identified in the areas of equipment storage, document control and
invoking the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 as documented above. Other inspected
procurement, receiving and storage activities were performed in accordance with the
applicable QA programs and NRC requirements.
II. Management Oversight and Controls
C.1 Construction Activities
C.1.1 Instrument Components and Systems - Work Observation (IP 52053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed safety-related instrumentation components and systems by
direct observation of work performance and work in progress to verify related activities
were performed in accordance with NRC requirements and applicant procedures. Four
samples were inspected and selected from those associated with the reactor trip system
and the engineered safety features actuation system. Specifically, the inspectors
reviewed receiving documents, component identification, controls for potential
nonconforming components, storage conditions, qualifications of warehouse personnel,
and physical condition of the components. The inspectors interviewed responsible
personnel associated with receiving inspection and conducted walk-downs of
warehouses 7, 8, and the Spring City facility to observe the storage facilities for
purchased instrument components. The following items were inspected:
- 2-FT-68-6A (Receipt and Storage)
- 2-PT-68-340D (Receipt and Storage)
- 2-FT-68-48A (Receipt and Storage)
- Westinghouse Power Range Detector (Storage)
- 2LT-063-180, 181, 182, 183 (Receipt)
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 52053 Section 02.02.a - four samples
- IP 52053 Section 02.02.b - four samples
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed in-process work orders for containment sump level
transmitters. The inspectors verified the transmitters were bench calibrated with proper
control of measuring and test equipment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
Adequate receipt and storage controls were established for the inspected samples.
7
C.1.2 Instrumentation Installation Activities- Work Observation (IP 52053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors interviewed responsible personnel, reviewed documentation, and
evaluated Unit 2 instrument installation activities.
The inspectors interviewed responsible construction oversight personnel to determine
the status of installation activities being performed at Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed
installation procedures MAI-4.4A, Instrument Line Installation and MAI-4.4B,
Instrument and Instrument Panel Installation to determine the verification, testing and
documentation requirements for instrument and instrument line installation. The
inspectors performed walk downs to evaluate the installation activities in the north and
south fan rooms to determine the progress and quality of installation activities.
The following items were inspected:
- 2-LT-003-0094-F - Steam Generator 2 Narrow Range Level
- 2-LT-003-0156-A - Steam Generator 2 Narrow Range Level
- 2-RTV-003-0285A - Root Valve for 2-LT-3-42/174
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspection results are too limited to support a conclusion at this time.
C.1.3 Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (IP 50090, 46071, and TI 2512/023)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed procedures and instructions pertaining to pipe support and
restraint systems to determine if they had been evaluated and approved by appropriate
applicant personnel. The inspectors also conducted interviews with personnel engaged
in pipe support installation and performed work observations to confirm adequate
performance of pre-installation checks, field adjustments, equipment control, and
calibrations. The inspectors assessed whether that personnel had received the
appropriate training, had the latest revisions of applicable drawings, and significant
modifications to supports had been approved by appropriate personnel.
The inspectors conducted walk-downs of the following installed safety-related pipe
supports to verify their compliance with NRC requirements and applicant commitments:
- H-406-14-23-72 (Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS))
- H-406-14-23-71 (CVCS)
- 2-47A462-11-172 (Ice Condenser System)
- 2-47A462-11-173 (Ice Condenser System)
- 2-47A462-11-174 (Ice Condenser System)
- 2-47A450-26-304 (Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System)
Specifically, the inspectors performed a visual inspection to verify the absence of
deformation and corrosion. Independent measurements were also performed to
determine whether the installed configuration of pipe supports was consistent with final
as-built drawings.
8
The inspectors also observed applicable controls of specific processes and activities
including torquing of bolts, minimum spacing between bolts, slippage of nut during
installation, and number of washers used on bolts for the following supports:
SUPPORT ID # (2 bolts per support)
110714210-570
110714210-385
110714210-386
110714210-373
110714210-358
110714210-413
110714210-380
110714210-158
110714210-304
110714210-115
110714210-351
110714210-329
995417923-153
995417923-055
995417923-170
SUPPORT ID# (4 bolts per support)
110714194-084
110714194-126
110714194-128
110714194-129
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 50090 Section 02.02.a - one sample
- IP 50090 Section 02.03.a - one sample
- IP 50090 Section 02.03.b - two samples
- IP 50090 Section 02.03.d.2 - six samples
- IP 50090 Section 02.03.d.2 - six samples
- IP 50090 Section 02.03.f - six samples
- IP 46071 Section 02.02.b - 46 samples
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors identified the following NCV:
Introduction: A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions,
Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for failure to identify
improper weld size by the welder, field engineer, and quality control (QC) in accordance
with applicable instructions, procedures, and drawings.
Description: On February 25, 2010, the inspectors performed a walk-down of newly-
installed pipe supports to determine whether their as-installed configurations matched
those specified by the applicable drawing revision authorizations (DRAs). The
inspectors identified an example where the weld throat did not meet the minimum size
requirements, specified by DRA 52897-005, for a weld joining an embed plate to pipe
support 2-47A450-26-304 for the safety-related ERCW system.
9
Specifically, the inspectors identified that Weld #1 joining embed plate 48N913-8B to
pipe support 2-47A450-26-304 was (1) not welded in accordance with the drawings; (2)
was verified and signed off by the field engineer (FE) despite the incorrect weld size; and
(3) was accepted by QC despite the fact that the weld size did not meet the acceptance
criteria specified in DRA 52897-005.
On February 26, 2010 the applicant initiated PER 219205 to document the conditions
identified by the inspectors. The applicant concluded that although the weld had been
final accepted by QC, it did not meet the size requirements specified by DRA 52897-005,
and would have to be repaired or reworked. An initial extent of condition evaluation was
performed and included re-inspection of 67 safety-related welds, 18 of which were found
not to meet the acceptance criteria. The applicants review of this issue and follow-up
extent of condition review, which identified the additional 18 undersize weld, extended
into the inspection period covered by this report and is the reason this violation is
documented in this inspection report.
This finding was determined to be more than minor because it represented an
inadequate work activity and inadequate quality oversight function that, if left
uncorrected, could adversely affect the quality of the construction and records of a
safety-related system, the ERCW system. The cause of this finding was directly related
to the work practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area, as
defined in IMC 0310, because TVA failed to appropriately communicate human error
prevention techniques, such as self checking, and proper documentation of activities
(H.4 (a)).
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and
Drawings requires in part that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in
accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Section 6.1.3 of Bechtel procedure 25402-000-GPP-0000-N3504, Pipe and Instrument
Tubing Supports requires that all materials, work, and services shall fully comply with
the design drawings, specifications, applicable codes and standards. Additionally,
Section 6.3.1 requires that the quality control engineer (QCE) inspect and verify all
inspection attributes for Safety-Related (SR) and Quality Related (QR) activities. These
inspection attributes include orientation, configuration, and dimensions as defined in
attachment B of the procedure. Finally, Section 6.3.7 requires that the FE verify that
hangers and supports are installed in accordance with design output documents,
including drawings.
Contrary to the above, activities affecting quality were not accomplished in accordance
with applicable instructions, procedures, and drawings. Specifically, Weld #1 joining
embed plate 48N913-8B to pipe support 2-47A450-26-304 was (1) not welded in
accordance with the drawings; (2) was verified and signed off by FE despite the incorrect
weld size; and (3) was accepted by QC despite the fact that the weld size did not meet
the acceptance criteria specified in DRA 52897-005.
This finding was determined to be a SL IV violation using Supplement II of the
Enforcement Policy. Because this was a SL IV violation and because it was entered into
the corrective action program as PER 219205, this violation is being treated as a NCV
consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 5000391/2010603-04,
Undersized Pipe Support Welds.
10
c. Conclusions
The inspected activities associated with the installation of pipe supports for those
discussed above were not performed in accordance with applicant procedures and NRC
regulations; however, other activities observed were performed in accordance applicable
procedures.
C.1.4 Structural Concrete (IP 46053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed concrete placement activities associated with work order (WO)
09-954333-011. The inspectors interviewed personnel involved with these activities and
assessed the following conditions prior to and during the placement process:
- The pre-placement inspection performed by QC was completed before any
concrete was placed.
- The placement area was cleaned and joint preparation was as specified in the
construction specification.
- Records were produced, reviewed, and indicated mix, location, time placed,
water additions, and temperature of the concrete mix and ambient conditions.
- Concrete temperature, slump, air content, and unit weight were determined at the
proper location and frequency.
- Sampling and testing techniques conformed to the procedures specified in the
applicable American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards.
- Test specimens, for concrete strength determination, were sampled at the
required location and frequency and were molded and cured in accordance with
specified requirements.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 46053 Section 02.03.e - one sample
- IP 46053 Section 02.03.f - one sample
- IP 46053 Section 02.03.h - two samples
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors identified the following NCV:
Introduction: A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective
Action, was identified by the inspectors for inadequate measures to assure that
conditions adverse to quality, specifically non-conforming safety-related concrete,
were promptly identified and corrected.
Description: On May 17, 2010, the inspectors observed concrete placement activities
associated with work order (WO) 09-954333-011. On May 21, 2010, PER 230811,
Concrete Mixing and Placement Violations, was issued to document issues with
concrete mixing and placement discrepancies identified during the placement of
concrete into the floor for support No. 2-70-888 in accordance with WO 09-954333-
011. Prior to placement, QC rejected the safety-related concrete batch; however, the
concrete was placed with known concerns.
11
On June 30, 2010 the inspectors reviewed PER 230811 and discovered that the
PER and associated actions had been closed and archived. The action to address
the nonconforming condition did not fully address the discrepancies identified during
placement as stated in PER 230811. On July 1, 2010, the applicant initiated PER
237820 to document the inappropriate closure of PER 230811.
This finding was determined to be more than minor because it represented an
improper or uncontrolled work practice that can impact quality or safety, involving
safety-related SSCs, in that the failure to appropriately disposition the nonconforming
condition (concrete rejected by QC) led to the inadvertent use of concrete of
indeterminate quality in a safety-related application. The cause of this finding was
directly related to the work practices component of the Human Performance cross-
cutting area, as defined in IMC 0310, because the applicant failed to ensure
supervisory and management of oversight of work, including contractors, such that
nuclear safety is supported (H.4(c)).
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires in
part that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality,
such as deficiencies, deviations, defective materials, and nonconformances are
promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, measures specified in the Corrective Action Program
procedure 25402-MGT-003 including oversight by responsible organizations, were
inadequate to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies,
deviations, defective materials, and nonconformances were corrected. Specifically,
PER 230811 was closed inappropriately without an adequate engineering disposition
for non-conforming (as rejected by QC) safety-related concrete and the responsible
organization did not verify completion of the PER corrective actions.
This finding was determined to be a SL IV violation using Supplement II of the
Enforcement Policy. Because this was a SL IV violation and because it was entered
into the corrective action program as PER 237820, this violation is being treated as a
non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement
Policy: NCV 5000391/2010603-05, Inadequate corrective actions for non-conforming
safety-related concrete.
c. Conclusions
The inspected activities associated with the disposition of non-conforming safety-related
concrete were not performed in accordance with applicant procedures and NRC
regulations as noted above.
C.1.5 Safety-Related and RCS Pressure Boundary Piping Records Review (IPs 49055
and 49065, TI 2512/024)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the applicants actions related to the Heat Code Traceability
Corrective Action Program (CAP) implementation plan (plan) for Unit 2 following the
guidance in Temporary Instruction (TI) 2512/024. This CAP was designed to resolve
issues related to traceability problems identified in the mid-1980s with pressure retaining
loose piping, fittings, and flange bolting (materials) used in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) applications. The overall objective of the CAP was to
12
provide a re-verification of ASME Section III Code compliance of the installed hardware.
The plan for the CAP was designed to address the following identified issues and to
provide for recurrence control:
The inspectors compared the Unit 2 plan to the Unit 1 plan to evaluate the similarity of
approach for both units and to determine whether any differences were appropriate.
Overall, the inspectors reviewed records related to ASME Section III, Class 1, 2, and 3
pressure retaining materials to determine if the applicant was effectively implementing
the Unit 2 plan. The inspectors reviewed applicant efforts to resolve unverified non-
destructive evaluation (NDE) for Class 1, 2, and 3 pressure retaining materials as well as
recurrence control efforts. More specifically, the inspectors:
- Reviewed records to determine if the required performance tests, nondestructive
tests, and other specification requirements were met and if the required
inspections were performed. The inspectors reviewed the applicants efforts to
ensure adequate traceability and Code compliance of Class 1, 2, and 3 pressure
retaining materials to determine if those efforts were being performed in
accordance with the plan;
- Reviewed the applicant/contractor system for reporting and dispositioning
nonconforming materials associated with the reactor coolant pressure boundary
piping and other safety-related piping and two nonconforming reports to
determine:
- whether the records adequately documented the status of the
nonconformances;
- whether the sample of records was legible and complete; and,
- whether the records were being properly identified and stored.
Class 3 weld, and one Class 2 valve to evaluate the base metal traceability to the
material certifications and the adequacy of the material certifications compared to
the relevant Code requirements. This review included 27 loose material pieces
consisting of 17 separate heat numbers installed in four systems. The nine
reactor coolant pressure boundary welds reviewed included five 3/4 diameter,
two 2 diameter, and two 3 diameter parts. These reactor coolant pressure
boundary parts were located in the reactor coolant, chemical and volume control,
and safety injection systems. The specific list of welds that were inspected is
included in the Attachment to this report;
- Performed field walk-downs of welds 2-068A-T035-27 and 2-068A-T015-27,
which were annotated in the N-5 database as being removed, to evaluate the
accuracy of the database; and,
- Reviewed Bechtel and TVA procurement and material control procedures to
determine if the procedures contained appropriate recurrence control elements;
The inspectors interviewed ASME N-5 personnel about TVAs implementation of the
plan. The inspectors also reviewed Boundary Information Transmittals (BIT),
engineering evaluations, work orders, material certification packages (weld map,
13
certified mill test reports, certificates of compliance, weld fit-up data sheets, and
examination record data sheets), historical condition reports, and the Unit 1 plan to
evaluate the applicants plan for Unit 2. Other documents reviewed are also included in
the attachment.
These inspection activities reviewed a portion of the applicants plan. Therefore, this
CAP remains open.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
During implementation of the Unit 2 plan, the applicant identified numerous traceability
concerns with installed materials and addressed each issue by writing a BIT. The
inspectors reviewed two BITs and determined the BITs appropriately characterized the
nonconformance and the BITs were in conformance with all applicable procedures.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed all deviations between the plans for both units and
determined that they were acceptable because the scope of the Unit 2 plan exceeded
the scope of the Unit 1 plan. For example, the plan for Unit 1 consisted of a statistical
sampling of all Class 2 & 3 materials to obtain a 95% confidence level that all materials
complied with the Code; however, the applicant reviewed all Class 2 & 3 materials for
Unit 2 and did not rely on a statistical sampling technique to ensure Code compliance.
c. Conclusions
The applicants closure plan for the Heat Code Traceability CAP was similar to the plan
used to close the Unit 1 CAP with no unacceptable deviations identified. The applicant
was effectively implementing the Unit 2 plan for those activities reviewed during this
inspection.
C.1.6 Cable Signal Tracing - Work Observation (TI 2512/016, IP 52053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed calculation EDQ00299920090014, Engineering Document
Construction Release (EDCR) 54264, and WO 111010149 associated with the signal
tracing of B-train, safety-related cable 2V1916B. Additionally, the inspectors interviewed
responsible engineering staff and observed field cable signal tracing activities.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors determined that the pre-job
briefings were adequate, covering staff qualifications, equipment calibration and
operating conditions, other staff assistance requirements for providing ladders and
access to spaces inside the Auxiliary Building, operations coordination, and appropriate
tools. The inspectors verified that the staff performing the tracing were following proper
peer-to-peer verification procedures. The inspectors observed the signal tracing;
however, the applicant noted the results did not appear reasonable to accurately identify
routing. It was identified that the routing picked up by the tracing was different from the
routing shown on the drawings and Integrated Cable and Raceway Design System
(ICRDS) data sheets. At the end of the inspection period, the applicant was still
investigating the tracing anomaly.
14
c. Conclusions
Further inspection is needed to verify ICRDS is updated with the results from the signal
tracing.
C.1.7 RPV Internals and Protection of Installed Plan Equipment during Construction
Activities (IP 50053)
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of the reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) condition assessment activities. The assessment activities
included walk-downs and non-destructive examinations (NDEs). This inspection was to
determine whether requirements, work procedures, and inspection (quality control)
procedures were being met. The inspectors also observed ongoing visual examination
activities performed by PCI Energy Services (PCI) inside the RPV. Housekeeping and
protection controls of the RPV were observed to determine whether procedural
requirements were being met. These activities are controlled by procedure 25402-000-
GPP-0000-N2102, Housekeeping. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the
attachment.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 50053 Section 02.01.c - one sample
- IP 50053 Section 02.02.a - one sample
- IP 50053 Section 02.03.b - one sample
- IP 50053 Section 02.03.c - one sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
Adequate controls were in place to protect the RPV during the inspection period.
C.1.8 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Piping (IP 49053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed work activities associated with the reactor coolant system
including loops 1 through 4 hot legs and cold legs. The inspectors entered and visually
examined the piping to verify the material condition. The inspectors also verified the
following:
- Inspection (QC) and/or work performance verification, including specified
frequency of inspections
- Utilization of qualified inspection personnel
- Control of nonconforming items
15
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 49053 Section 02.03 - one sample
- IP 49055 Section 02.02 - one sample
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors identified the following unresolved item:
Introduction: The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) related to the material
condition inside of the loop-3 RCS crossover piping.
Description: On June 30, 2010, the inspectors reviewed PER 224434 associated with
the material condition of the loop-3 RCS crossover piping. The inspectors had
previously entered the loop-3 crossover piping on March 20 and 21 to inspect the
material condition of the interior of the piping as documented in inspection report
05000391/2010602. During that time and after work had been completed and signed off
by QC. The inspectors noted that some potential areas of pitting had not been
documented by the applicant as specified in WO 110739214. Specifically, Step 5.5.3.C
of WO 110739214, stated the following:
After cleaning, the surface of the RCS piping and welds shall be visually
examined to determine if surface pitting has occurred. The pipe interior shall be
inspected for any area showing a reduction in wall thickness as PER NDRF
211911. Any suspect areas shall be forwarded to engineering for inspection and
further evaluation.
In addition, Appendix B of the Corrective Action Program procedure 25402-MGT-003
requires that nonconforming items be dispositioned by engineering and a technical
justification be included for Accept-As-Is or Repair.
As result of the NRCs questions, on April 7, 2010 the applicant initiated PER 224434 to
address the issues identified by the NRC related to the material condition of the
crossover piping and document the location of these potential areas of concern;
however, on June 30 after further review of the PER, the inspectors noted that corrective
action 224434-002 included an engineering disposition unrelated to the issue and
instead addressed a 3 drain line.
The inspectors concluded that in order to properly evaluate the applicants disposition of
this issue, additional inspection would be required to determine (1) whether areas of
concern (potential pitting) were properly identified and documented at the time by QC
and FE in accordance with applicable instructions and procedures; and (2) whether the
engineering disposition appropriately addressed the area of concern. This issue was
identified as URI 05000391/2010603-06, Material Condition Inside Loop-3 RCS
Crossover Piping.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that additional inspection would be required to resolve
questions associated with material condition of RCS piping.
16
C.1.9 Protection of Installed Plant Equipment During Construction Activities - Reactor
Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (IP 49053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a walk-down of a sample of installed safety-related welds,
piping, and components to determine whether the applicant and their contractors had
established adequate controls for the storage and preservation of safety-related, ASME
materials and equipment. Specifically, the inspectors performed walk-downs of portions
of the following systems:
- Reactor coolant system (pressurizer surge line, pressurizer spray line, pressurizer
relief and safety valve lines)
- Residual heat removal system
- Safety injection system
The inspectors observed housekeeping activities to determine whether quality
assurance program requirements were adequately implemented by the applicant and
their contractors. The inspectors compared observations made to the following quality
assurance program requirements:
- Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, of 10 CFR Part 50
- The TVA quality assurance program, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Nuclear Quality
Assurance Program (NQAP), Rev. 23
- Watts Bar Unit 2 Construction Completion Project, Bechtel Project Nuclear Quality
Assurance Manual (PNQAM), Rev. 6
- American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N45.2.3-1973, Housekeeping during
the Construction Phase of Nuclear Plants, (referenced in both NQAP and PNQAM)
- ANSI N45.2.2-1972, Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and handling of
Items for Nuclear Plants. (Referenced in both NQAP and PNQAM)
- ANSI N45.2.8-1975, "Supplementary Quality Assurance Requirements for the
Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Mechanical Equipment and Systems for the
Construction of Nuclear Power Plants.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors identified the following NCV:
Introduction: The inspectors identified a SL IV, NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, in that, the applicant failed to control
the storage and preservation of safety-related material (welds, piping, and components)
to prevent damage from nearby construction activities. Specifically, the inspectors
identified multiple locations of weld and paint spatter, arc strikes, and mechanical
damage on safety-related welds, piping, and components.
Description: On June 23, 2010, while performing a walk-down of the pressurizer safe-
end to elbow weld (RCF-D144-11), the inspectors identified multiple examples of weld
and paint spatter, arc strikes, and mechanical damage (e.g., dents, dings, gouges, etc.)
on adjacent ASME Class 1, safety-related welds, piping, and components. On June 24,
2010, the inspectors performed another walk-down of piping systems in the reactor
building and identified additional examples of weld and paint spatter, arc strikes, and
mechanical damage on ASME Class 1, safety-related welds, piping, and components.
17
The inspectors identified approximately 70 locations of damage associated with welds,
piping, and components within the following systems: (1) reactor coolant system, (2)
safety injection system, and (3) residual heat removal system. The specific issues
identified by the inspectors were documented by the applicant in PER 236720.
The inspectors noted that affected welds, piping, and components were fabricated from
stainless steel alloys, and were all ASME Class 1, pressure boundary items. The
inspectors determined that these issues were reasonably within the applicants ability to
foresee and correct, and should have been prevented.
TVAs Nuclear Quality Assurance Program and the Bechtel PNQAM both require the
implementation of ANSI N45.2.8-1975, "Supplementary Quality Assurance
Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Mechanical Equipment and
Systems for the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants. Section 4.6, Care of Items, of
ANSI N45.2.8-1975, states in part:
Items on which inspection and testing activities are being performed shall be
protected from personnel traffic, weather, and adjacent construction activities
such as sandblasting, acid cleaning, welding, jack hammering, chipping,
burning and stress relieving that would adversely affect the quality of the item
or test results. Such protection shall be provided through good cleanliness
and housekeeping practices, temporary packaging, erection of barriers,
protective covers, and walkways as required in accordance with Subsection
2.6.
ANSI N45.2.8-1975, Section 2.6 references ANSI N45.2.3-1973, Housekeeping during
the Construction Phase of Nuclear Plants, which both TVA and Bechtel commit to in
their quality assurance programs. This ANSI standard specifically addresses the
protection of materials and equipment from physical damage during the construction
phase. Bechtel implements the requirements of ANSI N45.2.3-1973 through adherence
to Procedure 5402-000-GPP-0000-N2102, Housekeeping. Section 6.11,
Housekeeping During Construction Activities, of this procedure, states in part:
Barriers, screens, shields, restricted access, or other protection shall be
provided as necessary for isolation of areas where dust, inclement weather,
or other conditions exist that may affect the quality of work being performed.
This protection should be maintained throughout the work cycle.
Based on the applicants preliminary evaluation of the conditions identified, the
inspectors determined that the applicant failed to provide adequate protection of safety-
related welds, piping, and components from adjacent construction activities in
accordance with work and inspection instructions.
The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it represented
an inadequate quality oversight function that, if left uncorrected, could adversely affect
the quality of the construction of safety-related, pressure boundary welds, piping, and
components. Specifically, these conditions could render the quality of the installed items
unacceptable or indeterminate. Additionally, the repairs or rework required to correct the
identified conditions may require additional examinations to verify conformance with the
construction code of record. Furthermore, the applicant had previously completed pre-
service inspections on some of the affected welds, and depending on the repair required
to correct the condition, the pre-service examination results may be invalidated.
18
This issue was entered into the corrective action program as PER 236720. This PER
stated that some of these issues were likely the result of recent construction activities
and others were likely historical issues, in that they were caused by construction and/or
installation activities that occurred prior to 2008. There was no cross-cutting aspect
associated with this violation.
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping,
requires, in part, that, measures shall be established to control the handling, storage,
shipping, cleaning and preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work
and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deterioration.
TVAs Nuclear Quality Assurance Program and the Bechtel PNQAM both require the
implementation of ANSI N45.2.8-1975 and ANSI N45.2.3-1973. Section 4.6, Care of
Items, of ANSI N45.2.8, states in part that, Items on which inspection and testing
activities are being performed shall be protected from adjacent construction
activitiesthat would adversely affect the quality of the item or test results.
Section 6.11, Housekeeping During Construction Activities, of Procedure 5402-000-
GPP-0000-N2102, Housekeeping, Rev. 8, states in part: Barriers, screens, shields,
restricted access, or other protection shall be provided as necessary for isolation of
areas where dust, inclement weather, or other conditions exist that may affect the quality
of work being performed.
Contrary to the above, prior to June 24, 2010, the applicant failed to control the storage
and preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection
instructions to prevent damage from adjacent construction activities as evidenced by
multiple locations of weld and paint spatter, arc strikes, and mechanical damage on
safety-related welds, piping, and components.
This finding was determined to be a SL IV violation using Supplement II of the
Enforcement Policy. Because this was a SL IV violation and because it was entered into
the corrective action program as PER 236720, it is being treated as a NCV consistent
with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 5000391/2010603-07, Failure to
Protect Safety-Related Welds, Piping, and Components During Construction Activities.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors identified a violation for the applicants failure to control the storage and
preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection
instructions to prevent damage from nearby construction activities.
C.1.10. Unresolved Item 78-05-02, Reactor Vessel - Nozzle Weld Surface Cracking
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted interviews and reviewed documentation related to URI 78-05-
02, Reactor Vessel - Nozzle Weld Surface Cracking, to determine whether the cracking
had been adequately repaired. The inspectors reviewed welding records and NDE
reports related to repairs completed to loop four, reactor vessel cold leg nozzle weld 2-
068C-W004-01, to evaluate compliance with the requirements of ASME Section III,
1971 edition through the summer 1973 addenda. Following all repairs, the final
radiographic exam (RT) was performed on May 9, 1978, and was accepted by both the
19
Level II reviewer and Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI). However, a subsequent May
19, 1988, review rejected the May 9, 1978, RT due to excessive geometric unsharpness
and use of the wrong penetrameter. This issue was generic in nature, in that, during an
NRC conducted review of RT film for both Unit 1 and Unit 2, 683 Class 1 and Class 2
welds were identified with geometrical unsharpness issues. See NRC inspection report
50-390, 391/91-23 for additional information on the RT review. A subsequent
evaluation, and development of a special procedure per the 1971 edition of the ASME
Section III, Appendix IX, paragraph IX-3110, was performed by the applicant to resolve
the geometrical unsharpness issue for Watts Bar Unit 1. See NRC inspection report 50-
390, 391/91-32 for additional details and disposition.
As these issues relate to Watts Bar Unit 2, the applicant intends to submit a special
procedure to the NRC as a proposed alternative per the requirements of 10 CFR
50.55a, Codes and Standards, and to the ANI for review and acceptance. Further
inspection of URI 78-05-02 will continue, once those reviews or acceptable alternatives,
have been completed.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that URI 78-05-02, Reactor Vessel - Nozzle Weld Surface
Cracking will remain open.
C.1.11 Inservice Inspection - Review of Program (IP 73051)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of NDE coverage calculations to determine whether
the applicant adequately calculated the percentage of code-required examination
volume coverage obtained. The inspectors also performed a walk-down of the following
welds in order to evaluate the validity of relief requests intended to be submitted for less
than 90% NDE coverage within the preservice inspection (PSI) program. The inspectors
also reviewed the following NDE report coverage diagrams:
- RCF-G1-4, 31 Class 1 pipe to reactor coolant pump bowl weld
- SIF-D198-06, 6 Class 1 elbow to check valve weld
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 73051 Section 02.09 - 4 samples
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
20
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the observed NDE activities met the requirements
established by the applicants PSI program and the ASME Code.
C.1.12 Inservice Inspection - Review of Procedures (IP 73052)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed N-UT-78, PDI Generic Procedure for the Manual Ultrasonic
Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds PDI-UT-6, Rev. 0005 to determine the
adequacy of both the scope and technical content in meeting the requirements of the 10
CFR 50.55a Codes and Standards, and Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, 2001 edition through 2003 addenda. The inspectors also observed the
procedure in use during the examination of W09-10, reactor pressure vessel head
circumferential weld.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 73052 Section 02.03 - 1 sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the ultrasonic examination procedure reviewed met
applicable ASME code and 10 CFR 50.55a requirements.
C.1.13 Preservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (IP 73053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a selected sample of PSI related activities to determine
whether the onsite preservice inspection of ASME Class 1, 2 and 3 pressure retaining
components was performed in accordance with the applicants PSI program, Preservice
Inspection Program Plan, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2, Rev 3. Specifically, the
inspectors observed the ultrasonic (UT) PSI examination of reactor pressure vessel
head Circumferential Weld W09-10.
The inspectors observed portions of the examination and reviewed associated NDE
reports to determine whether the examinations were performed in accordance with
approved procedures and consistent with the ASME Code of Record for the PSI
program (ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 2001 edition including 2003
addenda,Section XI, Division 1, Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant
Components). Examination records were reviewed to determine whether they were
prepared, evaluated, and maintained in accordance with the applicants QA program
requirements (TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Rev. 23) and the requirements specified in ASME
21
Qualification and certification records for examiners, inspection equipment, and
consumables along with the applicable NDE procedures for the pre-service examination
activities were reviewed to determine whether they met the requirements established by
the applicants PSI program and the ASME Code.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 73053 Section 02.03 - 1 sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the observed NDE activities and qualification records for
examination personnel met the requirements established by the applicants PSI program
and the ASME Code.
C.1.14 Preservice Inspection - Data Review and Evaluation (IP 73055)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of recently completed PSI examination records (NDE
records) for safety-related systems. The inspectors reviewed these records to determine
whether they met the requirements the ASME Code, the associated NDE procedure,
and the applicants quality assurance program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the
records to determine whether they contained or referenced the following information:
- Examination results and data sheets
- Examination equipment data
- Calibration data sheets (as applicable)
- Extent of examination
- Records on disposition of findings (if applicable)
- Identification of NDE material such as penetrant, penetrant cleaner, couplant,
films, tapes, etc.
The inspectors also reviewed these records to determine whether:
- Collected examination data and any recordable indications were properly
recorded to permit accurate evaluation and documentation.
- Evaluation of examination data was performed by a Level II or Level III
examiner.
- Evaluation of examination data was consistent with the procedure.
- Evaluation of indications (if applicable) complied with the criteria of the NDE
procedure and ASME Section XI.
- Incomplete examinations and results were repeated to permit full evaluation (if
applicable).
22
The inspectors reviewed the following PSI examinations:
Report # NDE Weld # / System Description ASME
Method Component Class
R-P0240 Liquid RCF-D144-11 Reactor Safe End to 1
Penetrant Coolant Elbow Weld
R-P0970 Liquid SIS-163 Safety Elbow to Pipe 2
Penetrant Injection Weld
R-P0972 Liquid SIF-D123-07 Safety Valve to 2
Penetrant Injection Reducer
R-P0992 Visual RCP3FLG Reactor Flange 1
Coolant
R-P0993 Magnetic FWF-D002-03 Feed Water Valve to Pipe 2
Particle Weld
R-P0994 Magnetic FWS-015 Feed Water Pipe to 2
Particle Reducer
R-P0996 Magnetic MSS-052 Main Steam Cap to Pipe 2
Particle Weld
For PSI examinations that identified unsatisfactory examination results, the inspectors
reviewed the applicants actions to determine whether indications were dispositioned in
accordance with approved procedures, and the ASME Code. Specifically, for PSI report
R-P0240 (weld number RCF-D144-11), the inspectors reviewed the associated
corrective action documents (PER 166624) that the applicant used to correct an
unsatisfactory linear indication. The inspectors reviewed WO 10-951028-000 and
supplemental examination reports (PT-019 and UT-019) to determine whether the
indication was adequately corrected. The inspectors also performed an independent
visual inspection of the repair area to determine whether the weld conformed to contour
and surface finish requirements. For the other PSI reports that documented
unacceptable indications, the inspectors were unable to review the corrective actions
because the conditions had not been corrected at the time of the inspection. The
inspectors reviewed the PERs that were generated for the unacceptable indications.
The inspectors reviewed records related to the PSI ultrasonic examination of the reactor
pressure vessel head circumferential weld, W09-10, to determine whether the
examination was performed in accordance with N-UT-78, Rev. 5. The inspectors also
reviewed these records to determine whether the records provided documentary
evidence that the examination met the prescribed acceptance criteria and other technical
and quality requirements. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed records to determine
whether:
- The method, extent and technique complied with the requirements of the PSI
program and ASME Section XI.
- Exam data were within the ASME Section XI and NDE procedure acceptance
criteria.
- Recording, evaluation and disposition of findings were in compliance with Section
XI and the NDE procedure.
- The method used was sufficient to determine the full extent of an indication or its
acceptance.
23
The inspectors performed the following samples:
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the PSI data reviewed met applicable ASME Code
Sections, the applicant quality assurance program, and PSI Program requirements. The
inspectors also determined that the PSI data was complete and was either within the
prescribed acceptance criteria or documented in a corrective action document to restore
compliance with acceptance criteria.
C.1.15 Nuclear Welding General Inspection Procedure (IP 55050)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an inspection of applicant activities associated with the
fabrication and repair of safety-related piping welds at Watts Bar Unit 2. The inspectors
reviewed the contractors welding program controls for welding fabrication and weld
repair of safety-related piping welds.
The inspectors compared safety-related welding activities and records reviewed to the
following technical and quality requirements:
- Bechtel Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 3 (Section 9, Control of Special
Processes)
- The applicants quality assurance manual TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Rev. 23 (Section
9.3, Control of Special Processes)
- Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B,
Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing
Plants
- The Watts Bar Unit 2 piping code of record (American Society of Mechanical
Engineers [ASME] Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1971 Edition with addenda
through summer 1973,Section III, Division 1, Rules for Construction of Nuclear
Facility Components).
The inspectors reviewed portions of the contractors Special Processes Manual (SPM),
Rev. 1, to determine whether the contractor had established an adequate program to
implement the above quality and technical requirements. The SPM included program
documents such as: welding procedure specifications (WPSs) with supporting
procedure qualification records (PQRs); welding filler metal control procedures; welder
performance qualification procedures; general welding standards; general purging
specification; various NDE procedures; postweld heat treatment (PWHT) procedures;
and weld documentation procedures.
24
Base Material and Weld Filler Material Compatibility for Welding
The inspectors reviewed WFMC-1, Bechtel Welding Specification - Welding Filler
Material Control, Rev. 1, to verify that the contractor had established procedures and
instructions for the purchasing, receiving, storing, identifying, disbursing, and handling of
welding filler metals. The inspectors reviewed the contractors procedures to determine
whether they had established procedural controls for the following: (1) environmental
(moisture) control; (2) holding and baking temperatures and out-of-oven exposure times
for covered electrodes; (3) filler metal identification and control; and (4) filler metal
disbursement. The inspectors compared WFMC-1 to the applicable quality requirements
of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B; and technical requirements of the ASME Section III
piping code of record.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of welding material purchasing and receiving records
to verify conformance with the applicable quality and technical requirements. The
inspectors reviewed the certified material test reports (CMTRs) for 17 heat/lot numbers
of welding filler metals to determine whether they met the requirements of the ASME
code (ASME Section II - Part C) and the applicable technical requirements prescribed by
the contractors specifications. The inspectors also reviewed these records to determine
whether the traceability of heat/lot numbers for weld filler metals and base materials
were properly recorded on production weld records.
The inspectors observed the issuance of weld filler material from the weld rod issue
room and observed the identification, storage, and handling of welding filler materials.
The inspectors observed these activities to determine whether they were performed in
accordance with WFMC-1.
Welding Procedures
The inspectors reviewed the contractors welding program to determine whether they
had established adequate procedures for the preparation, qualification, distribution, and
revision of WPSs. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the contractors general welding
requirements for pressure retaining components GWS-1, Bechtel General Welding
Standard, Rev. 2, along with the following four welding procedures:
- P1-AT-Lh (CVN+10)
- P1-AT-Lh
- P8-AT-Ag
- P8, P1-AT-Ag
The inspectors reviewed the above welding procedures to determine whether they met
the requirements of ASME Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualification. The
inspectors reviewed these procedures to determine whether they adequately defined the
essential, supplementary essential (for impact toughness), and nonessential variables
for each welding process, as prescribed by ASME Section IX.
For the above welding procedures, the inspectors also reviewed the supporting PQRs
for conformance to ASME Section IX requirements to verify that the procedures were
properly qualified. The inspectors verified that the PQRs were certified by the contractor
and properly listed the essential variables. For each PQR, the inspectors: (1) verified
that the ranges of the essential variables were consistent with those permitted by the
WPS and were within the limits of ASME Section IX; and (2) reviewed the mechanical
25
testing results to verify that they were completed and properly documented in the PQR,
and that the test results met or exceeded the minimum technical requirements.
During the review of the above WPSs, the inspectors verified that any changes or
revisions to the essential or nonessential variables were properly identified, documented,
and supported by requalification (if necessary).
Welder Performance Qualifications
The inspectors reviewed the contractors welding program to determine whether: (1) the
contractor had established adequate procedures for the qualification of welders and
welding operators; and (2) the contractor had established an adequate system to control
the qualification status of welding personnel. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the
contractors procedure, WQ-1, Welding Performance Qualification Specification [ASME
Section IX], Rev. 2, for conformance to welder qualification requirements prescribed by
ASME Section III and Section IX. The inspectors reviewed six welder performance
qualification records, and compared these records to procedure WQ-1 and ASME
Section IX.
Production Welding
The inspectors reviewed three work packages containing completed weld records for
compliance with the contractors welding program requirements, the applicants ASME
Section III code of record, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Specifically, the inspectors
reviewed Field Weld Checklists (WR-5) and associated fabrication and installation
drawings, material traceability documents, ASME code data reports, and NDE reports on
the following welds:
- Weld Number 2-068A-D145-02 C1R0; safety-related ASME Section III, Class 1
- Weld Number 2-061B-T023-1, C0R0; safety-related ASME Section III, Class 3
- Weld Number 2-061B-T023-2, C0R0; safety-related ASME Section III, Class 3
The inspectors reviewed the weld records for the above welds to determine whether: (1)
the welding activity was properly documented on the weld traveler; (2) the weld traveler
appropriately referenced the correct welding procedure; (3) the welding technique and
sequence requirements were specified; (4) the weld traveler established quality control
and authorized nuclear inspector hold points; and (5) the base materials and welding
filler materials were properly identified and traceable to the required test reports and
certifications.
Preheat and Postweld Heat Treatment
The inspectors reviewed the contractors welding program to determine whether the
contractor had established adequate procedures for weld joint preheating and PWHT.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the contractors procedure; PHT-1, Bechtel
General Welding Standard, Rev. 2; for the process of localized PWHT. The inspectors
verified that PHT-1 contained requirements for the monitoring and recording of the time
and temperature of the weld joint. The inspectors reviewed this procedure to determine
whether it implemented the applicable ASME Section III requirements for PWHT.
26
The inspectors performed the following samples:
- IP 55050 Section 02.01 - seventeen heat/lot numbers for welding filler metals
- IP 55050 Section 02.03 - six welder performance qualification records
- IP 55050 Section 02.04 - three field welding document packages
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The welding program documents reviewed met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B; the contractors quality assurance manual; the applicants quality assurance
manual; and the applicants ASME Section III code of record.
C.1.16 Structural Welding General Inspection Procedure (IP 55100)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an inspection of applicant activities associated with the
fabrication and repair of safety-related structural steel welds at Watts Bar Unit 2. The
inspectors reviewed the contractors welding program controls for welding fabrication
and weld repair of safety-related structural steel.
The inspectors observed in-process welding, inspected completed structural steel welds,
and reviewed completed weld records. The inspectors compared safety-related welding
activities and records reviewed to the following technical and quality requirements:
- Bechtel Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 3 (Section 9, Control of Special
Processes)
- The applicants quality assurance manual, TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Rev. 23 (Section
9.3, Control of Special Processes)
- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power
Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants
- Watts Bar Unit 2 structural steel welding code of record (American Welding
Society [AWS] D1.1, Structural Welding Code, 1972 edition with Rev. 1-73 and 1-
73.)
Base Material and Filler Material Compatibility for Welding
The inspectors reviewed WFMC-1, Bechtel Welding Specification - Welding Filler
Material Control, Rev. 1, to verify that the contractor had established procedures and
instructions for the purchasing, receiving, storing, identifying, disbursing, and handling of
welding filler metals. The inspectors reviewed the contractors procedures to determine
whether the contractor had established procedural controls for the following: (1)
environmental (moisture) control; (2) holding and baking temperatures and out-of-oven
exposure times for covered electrodes; (3) filler metal identification and control; and (4)
filler metal disbursement. The inspectors compared WFMC-1 to the applicable quality
27
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B; and technical requirements of the AWS
D1.1.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of welding material purchasing and receiving records
to verify conformance with the applicable quality and technical requirements. The
inspectors reviewed the CMTRs for two heat/lot numbers of welding filler metals to
determine whether they met applicable quality and technical requirements. The
inspectors also reviewed these records to determine whether the traceability of heat/lot
numbers for weld filler metals and base materials were properly recorded on production
weld records.
The inspectors observed the issuance of weld filler material from the weld rod issue
room and observed the identification, storage, and handling of welding filler materials.
The inspectors observed these activities to determine whether they were performed in
accordance with WFMC-1. The inspectors also observed the control and handling of
welding material during the welding of safety-related conduit supports to determine
whether they met the requirements of procedure WFMC-1.
Welding Procedures
The inspectors reviewed the contractors welding program to determine whether the
contractor had established adequate procedures for the preparation, qualification,
distribution, and revision of WPSs. The inspectors reviewed the contractors general
welding standard, GWS-Structural, Rev. 1, and a prequalified structural steel welding
procedure for conformance with the AWS D1.1 code of record. Specifically, the
inspectors reviewed the prequalified welding procedure P1-A-Lh (Structural) for
conformance with AWS D1.1.
Welder Performance Qualification
The inspectors reviewed the contractors welding program to determine whether: (1) the
contractor had established adequate procedures for the qualification of welders and
welding operators; and (2) the contractor had established an adequate system to control
the qualification status of welding personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the contractors procedure WQ-2, Bechtel Welding
Performance Qualification Specification [D1.1], Rev. 0, for the qualification of welders,
and compared the procedure to the Watts Bar Unit 2 AWS D1.1 code of record. The
inspectors reviewed three welder performance qualification records to determine
whether welding personnel were qualified in accordance with procedure WQ-2, ASME
Section IX, and AWS D1.1.
Production Welding
The inspectors observed a sample of in-process welding activities associated with
safety-related conduit supports to determine whether: (1) welding procedures, detailed
drawings and instructions, and weld data sheets were readily available to the welder; (2)
the WPS used was appropriate for the weld joint; (3) the welding technique and
sequence requirements were specified; (4) base materials and welding filler materials
were properly inspected, tested, and identified, and were traceable to test reports and
certifications; (5) weld joint geometry was specified and the weld joint surfaces were
properly prepared, cleaned, and inspected; (6) weld fit-up was as specified on the design
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drawing; (7) welding was performed in accordance with approved welding procedures;
and (8) welders were properly qualified.
The inspectors also reviewed portions of WO 09-954179-023, Fabricate Typical
Supports in the Fabrication Shop to be Installed in WOs under EDCR 54633. During
the review of this WO, the inspectors reviewed a sample of completed weld records to
determine whether the welds met applicable quality and technical requirements.
The inspectors reviewed weld records for the following safety-related conduit support
- 995417923-001
- 995417923-002
- 995417923-003
- 995417923-031
- 995417923-036
- 995417923-040
- 995417923-066
- 995417923-155 FW-2
- 995417923-156 FW-3
- 995417923-157 FW-4
- 995417923-160 FW 7
The inspectors reviewed the weld records for the above welds to determine whether: (1)
the welding activity was properly documented on the weld traveler; (2) the weld traveler
appropriately referenced the correct welding procedure; (3) the welding technique and
sequence requirements were specified; (4) the weld traveler established quality control
hold points; and (5) the base materials and welding filler materials were properly
identified and traceable to the required test reports and certifications.
Examination and Inspection of Welds
The inspectors independently inspected a sample of safety-related conduit support
welds fabricated on-site by the contractor to determine whether these welds met the
acceptance criteria specified in the AWS-D1.1 code of record. During the inspection of a
sample of fillet welds, the inspectors also compared the following attributes to the AWS
D1.1 code or record: weld surface finish; shape and size of fillet welds; and the absence
of surface defects including cracks, lack of fusion, porosity, and slag.
Specifically, the inspectors observed the following safety-related conduit support welds:
- 995417923-124
- 995417923-125
- 995417923-126
- 995417923-155
- 995417923-157
- 995417923-160
- 995417923-163
- 995417923-164
- 995417923-165
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- 995417923-166
- 995417923-167
The inspectors performed the following samples:
- IP 55100 Section 02.01 - two samples of lot numbers for welding filler metals
- IP 55100 Section 02.02 - one sample for a prequalified welding procedure
- IP 55100 Section 02.03 - three samples of welder performance qualification
records
weld records)
- IP 55100 Section 02.06 - eleven samples
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The welding program documents reviewed met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B; the contractors quality assurance manual; the applicants quality assurance
manual; and the applicants AWS D1.1 code of record. Welding activities observed were
performed in accordance with approved welding procedures. With the exception of
undersized welds identified in Section C.1.3, the completed welds observed by the
inspectors met the acceptance criteria of the contractors inspection procedures and the
AWS D1.1 code of record.
C.1.17 Visual Examination of Safety Related Welds (IP 57050)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the contractors NDE procedure; VT-ASME III Piping, Bechtel
Nondestructive Examination Standard, Visual Examination, Rev. 1. The inspectors
compared this procedure to the ASME Section III code of record and ASME Section V,
Nondestructive Examination, 1971 edition with addenda through summer 1973.
The inspectors also reviewed the contractors visual examination procedure for safety-
related structural steel VT-AWS D1.1, Bechtel Nondestructive Examination Standard,
Visual Examination, Rev. 1. The inspectors compared this procedure to the AWS code
of record.
The inspectors also reviewed the above procedures to determine whether they were
issued and qualified in accordance with the contractors quality assurance program, and
were reviewed and approved by the authorized nuclear inspector (if required).
The inspectors reviewed the contractors written practice NEPQ, Bechtel Construction
Operations Inc. Nondestructive Examination Standard, NDE Personnel Qualification and
Certification, Rev. 1. The inspectors compared the written practice to the NDE
personnel qualification requirements specified in the ASME Section III code of record.
The inspectors also reviewed the personnel qualification records (visual examination) for
one Level III inspector, for conformance with the requirements of the contractors written
practice.
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The inspectors performed the following samples:
- IP 57050 Section 02.01 - one sample
- IP 57050 Section 02.03 - one sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The visual examination procedures and NDE personnel qualification records reviewed
by the inspectors met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and the
applicants ASME Section III and AWS codes of record.
C.1.18 Liquid Penetrant Examination of Safety Related Welds (IP 57060)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the contractors NDE procedure PT (SR)-ASME III Piping,
Bechtel Nondestructive Examination Standard, Liquid Penetrant Examination, Rev. 5.
The inspectors compared this procedure to the ASME Section III code of record and
ASME Section V, Nondestructive Examination, 1971 edition with addenda through
summer 1973.
The inspectors also reviewed the above procedure to determine whether it was issued
and qualified in accordance with the contractors quality assurance program and
approved by the authorized nuclear inspector.
The inspectors also reviewed the personnel qualification records (liquid penetrant
examination) of one Level III inspector for conformance with the requirements of the
contractors written practice.
The inspectors reviewed the following liquid penetrant examination reports to determine
whether they met the requirements of the applicants procedure PT (SR)-ASME III
Piping: PT-022, ASME Section III Class 1, pressurizer spray line, pipe to fitting.
The inspectors performed the following samples:
- IP 57060 Section 02.01 - one sample
- IP 57060 Section 02.03 - two samples (one personnel and one examination
record)
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The liquid penetrant examination procedure and NDE personnel qualification records
reviewed by the inspectors met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and
the applicants ASME Section III code of record.
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C.1.19 Magnetic Particle Examination of Safety Related Welds (IP57070)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the contractors NDE procedure MT-ASME, Bechtel
Nondestructive Examination Standard, Magnetic Particle Examination, Rev. 5. The
inspectors compared this procedure to the ASME Section III code of record and ASME
Section V, Nondestructive Examination, 1971 edition with addenda through summer
1973.
The inspectors reviewed the above procedure to determine whether it was issued and
qualified in accordance with the contractors quality assurance program and was
approved by the authorized nuclear inspector.
The inspectors also reviewed the personnel qualification records (magnetic particle
examination) of one Level III inspector for conformance with the requirements of the
contractors written practice.
The inspectors reviewed the following magnetic particle examination reports to
determine whether they met the requirements of the applicants procedure MT-ASME:
- MT-058, ASME Section II Class 3, Ice condenser drain piping, pipe to elbow
- MT-064, ASME Section II Class 3, Ice condenser drain piping, pipe to elbow
In addition to the document review, the inspectors observed magnetic particle (MT)
examination for the completed pipe welds listed below, including review of the
qualification records of examination personnel and review of the applicable measuring
and test equipment calibration records. These welds were on safety-related piping and
part of the ongoing ice condenser drain piping modification activities performed under
WOs 08-956218-025 and 08-956218-038. These welds were ASME Section III Class III
piping welds associated with EDCR 52813, Redesign and Reinstall Ice Condenser Drain
Piping. MT examinations were observed to determine whether they were performed in
accordance with the applicable ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III.
Specific MT examinations observed included the following:
Weld ID Component
2-061B-T018-09 12-inch diameter pipe weld
2-061B-T028-04 12-inch diameter pipe weld
The inspectors performed the following samples:
- IP 57070 Section 02.01 - one sample
- IP 57070 Sections 02.02 - one sample
- IP 57070 Section 02.03 - three samples (one personnel and two examination
records)
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
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c. Conclusions
The magnetic particle examination procedure and NDE personnel qualification records
reviewed by the inspectors and the magnetic particle examinations observed by the
inspectors met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and the applicants
ASME Section III code of record.
C.1.20 Ultrasonic Examination (UT) of Safety-Related Welds (IP 57080, 73053)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed phased array UT examination for completed dissimilar metal
welds on nine safety-related control rod drive mechanism (CRDM). A circumferential
and axial scan was performed with both the shear and refracted longitudinal waves. UT
examinations were observed to determine whether they were performed in accordance
with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, 1971 Edition with Addenda
through summer 1973 to verify compliance.
The inspectors reviewed applicant NDE procedure N-UT-87, Generic Procedure for the
Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal Welds, Rev. 0. For the
examination, the inspectors reviewed the completed NDE reports, the qualification
records of the examination personnel, and observed calibration checks of the UT
equipment. The observed examinations and completed examination reports were
compared with the contractors procedures for UT examination of ASME Code welds.
Specific UT examination was observed for dissimilar metal welds on CRDMs 54, 60, 64,
65, 66, 67, 71, 72, and 73.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed records of completed observation reports for QA
oversight activities of contractor NDE activities. A list of QA observation reports is
included in the attachment.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 57080 Section 02.02 - one sample
- IP 73053 Section 02.03 - one sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the observed/reviewed UT examinations met applicable
Code requirements and other regulatory requirements.
E.1 Engineering Activities
E.1.1 Procurement, Receiving, and Storage (IP35065)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the applicants actions to resolve Bulletin 88-10 for non-
conforming molded case circuit breakers (breakers). The inspectors reviewed the
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applicants program for commercial grade molded case breakers dedicated under the
QA plan. The inspectors compared observations to references in the Final Safety
Analysis Report, Chapter 3.10 Seismic Design of Category I Instrumentation and
Electrical Equipment, paragraph 3.10.1 Seismic Qualification Criteria based on IEEE
344-1971 or IEEE 344-1975 and IEEE 323-1974 requiring the capability of Class 1E
power equipment to withstand seismic disturbances to be established by seismic
analysis and/or testing of each system component.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors identified the following VIO:
Introduction: On April 30, 2010, the inspectors identified a violation with two examples of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for failure to implement design
control measures that provided for design reviews, calculational methods, and
qualification testing of a prototype unit under the most adverse design conditions and to
review for suitability of application of materials, parts, and equipment.
Description: The applicant installed breakers into the 4 divisions of 120VAC Vital
Instrument Power Boards. The electrical loads in the power boards are safety related
and necessary to shut down and maintain the plant in a safe condition. The following
describes the violation with two examples resulting from the inspectors observations
and review of the records and time line involved in the installation of the breakers.
Example 1: The inspectors found that significant differences existed between the
original qualification mounting and the actual mounting method of the breakers in the
power boards. During the 1992 qualifications testing, (report S522-RP-02) the breakers
were individually mounted to a plate with screws and no front cover. The actual
breakers are mounted in the power boards by clamping 12 breakers with a 36 front
cover against two horizontal angle iron supports in the rear and without additional
screws. The actual mounting method used introduces different shock and random
frequency impacts during a postulated seismic event to the breakers that were not
simulated nor analyzed in the tested mounting method. Additionally, the actual mounting
method exposes the bus bar to additional seismic loading not simulated in the
qualification testing. The front cover plate is held in place with one screw in each corner
and introduces an uncertain clamping pressure across the 12 breakers. The inspectors
determined that the tested breaker mounting did not envelope the mounted condition of
the breakers in the power boards.
Example 2: The inspectors reviewed WO 08-816370-000 used to replace old and add
new breakers into the WBN-2-BD-235-0003 120VAC vital instrument power board. The
inspectors determined the applicant received breakers in which two attributes had been
changed. The depth (Z dimension), a critical characteristic, was reduced and the
auxiliary contact was moved from the outside to the inside of the breakers. The 1992
qualification report indicated a Z dimension of 3.75 and the manufacturers catalog now
indicates 2.609 for the critical characteristic. The applicant recognized that the breaker
with the smaller Z dimension would not mount into the power board. The inspectors
determined that the applicant modified the breaker by attaching a Micarta plate to the
rear of the breaker using 4 nuts and bolts to fit them in the power boards as described in
example 1 without updating the qualification package. The inspectors determined the
applicant did not analyze if any detrimental effects may have been introduced by the
modification, demonstrate an adequate review for suitability of application, or the impact
on other components.
34
The inspectors reviewed calculation WCG-ACQ-1004, Rev. 1, used by the applicant to
demonstrate qualification by analysis. The inspectors verified the calculations purpose
was to qualify the breakers and the calculation concluded the breakers were qualified.
The calculation only determined the power board weight change and the shift in natural
frequency of the power board and its effect on the power board floor anchor bolts.
However, the calculation did not address the breaker performance during a seismic
event. The inspectors determined that the conclusion that the breakers were qualified
was not validated by the calculation.
The inspectors reviewed problem evaluation report (PER) 227786 dated May 10, 2010
for the qualification findings identified by the inspectors. The inspectors determined that
the PER was inadequate. The PER characterized the seismic evaluation calculation
WCG-ACQ-1004, Rev. 1 as having evaluated and addressed the seismic qualification of
the breakers. The inspectors determined the calculation did not address the qualification
of the breakers but rather the qualification of the floor anchor bolts of the power boards.
The PER further stated that the breaker installation was in compliance with the 1992
qualification report S522-RP-02. The inspectors determined that the 1992 seismic
qualification of the breakers did not envelope the breaker mounting method used for the
breakers in the power boards. The 1992 seismic qualification report did not envelope
the breaker mounting method used either before or after the attribute changes imposed
by the manufacturer occurred. The PER stated that the breakers are acceptable and the
integrity of the breakers in the power boards is maintained. No further action was
required by the applicant in the corrective actions of the PER. The inspectors
determined the PER did not address the effects that changes in attributes may impose
on safety, verify the conclusions made in the above calculation, address the qualification
of the breakers, or the different mounting method in the 1992 qualification report. The
inspectors determined the PER failed to adequately address the findings identified and
would not ensure that compliance was restored in a reasonable timeframe or prevent
recurrence in accordance with the enforcement policy. Therefore, the criterion for a non-
cited violation was not met and a Notice of Violation is warranted, requiring a formal
response from the applicant.
Example 1 is more than minor because the finding represents a deviation that, if left
uncorrected, could adversely affect the environmental or seismic qualification of a
component. Example 2 is more than minor because the violation represents an
inadequate process, procedure, or quality oversight function that, if left uncorrected,
could adversely affect the quality of the fabrication, construction, testing, analysis, or
records of a safety-related component. The cause of this finding was directly related to
the decision-making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because
the applicant failed to appropriately review safety significant decisions to verify the
validity of the underlying assumptions and identify possible unintended consequences.
H.1 (b) An unresolved item, URI-05000390/2009002-03, was identified on Unit 1 related
to the adequacy of the same seismic qualification report for breakers associated with
station 120VAC Vital Instrumentation Boards.
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states that
measures shall be established for the review for suitability of application of materials,
parts, and equipment that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures,
systems, and components (SSCs). The design control measures shall provide for
verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design
reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the
performance of a suitable testing program. Where a test program is used to verify the
35
adequacy of a specific design feature in lieu of other verifying or checking processes, it
shall include suitable qualifications testing of a prototype unit under the most adverse
design conditions.
Contrary to the above, measures used to review for the suitability of application of
materials, parts, and equipment essential to the safety related functions of molded case
circuit breakers and measures to provide for the verification of checking the adequacy of
design, such as, calculational methods, performing a suitable test program, including
qualifications testing of a prototype unit under the most adverse conditions were not
adequate in that:
1. On October 5, 2009, the applicant installed molded case breakers into the 120VAC
vital instrument power boards, however, the test program used to qualify a prototype
breaker failed to use a suitable mounting method that reflected the most adverse
mounting condition.
2. On September 3, 2009, the applicant failed to perform an adequate review for
suitability of application parts and material used to modify dimensional critical
characteristic in molded case breakers, and further, the applicant failed to verify the
adequacy of design for the modification and the effects on essential safety related
functions of the breakers.
This is identified as violation (VIO) 005000391/2010603-08, Failure to Adequately
Evaluate and Qualify Molded Case Circuit Breakers.
c. Conclusions
The applicant failed to verify the validity of the underlying assumptions and identify
possible unintended consequences resulting from inadequate qualification testing and a
modification to a critical characteristic of the molded case circuit breakers used for safety
related 120VAC power applications.
E.1.2 Engineering Design Activities and Design Control (IPs 35100 and 37055)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the implementation of design controls and the content of
drawings, specifications, and instructions that had been verified, approved, and issued
for construction. The reviews consisted of document reviews and interviews with
responsible engineering personnel.
The inspectors reviews were conducted to verify the design documents were correctly
incorporated into applicable design inputs, including a site-specific commitment to
maintain fidelity to the associated Unit 1 designs. Inspectors evaluated whether designs
were technically adequate, and that they had been reviewed, verified, approved, and
controlled in accordance with NRC requirements and applicants procedures.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors identified the following NCV associated with EDCR 52424, Rev. B,
Replace Level Transmitters for the Safety Injection System Cold Leg Accumulators:
Introduction: A SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was
identified by the inspectors for a failure to correctly translate the design basis, as
36
described in a System Description Document, into affected drawings and specifications.
Specifically, a design basis requirement to provide diverse level measurement systems
for the Safety Injection System Accumulators was not correctly translated into affected
specifications and drawings issued for construction.
Description: The inspectors identified that Section 3.3.1 of System Description
Document WBN2-63-4001, Rev.1, Safety Injection System, stated Each CLA [i.e. Cold
Leg Accumulator] is provided with two diverse level measurement systems. Both
systems are used to determine the operational readiness of the accumulators during
steady state operations.
TVA Nuclear Standard Department procedure NEDP-1, Rev. 5, Design Basis and
Design Input Control, Appendix D, identified System Description Documents as a
primary source for defining design inputs.
The drawings and specifications released for construction under EDCR 52424 did not
provide diverse level measurement systems for the Cold Leg Accumulators. Instead, the
design documents provided duplicate level measurement systems. This configuration
also differed from the Unit 1 design which contained diverse level measurement
systems. The inspectors identified that the level measurement systems were required to
implement Technical Specification Surveillance 3.5.1.2, and were classified as Quality-
Related and non-Safety Related.
EDCR 52424 identified that differences existed between Unit 1 and Unit 2 on Attachment
E, EDCR Unit Difference Form. Specifically, the EDCR stated that each accumulator on
Unit 1 was provided a Rosemount Model 1152 DP level transmitter and an FCI Thermal
Dispersion level element; whereas each accumulator on Unit 2 was provided two
Rosemount Model 1153 DD3RB transmitters. Although the EDCR documentation
provided a justification for using a different model Rosemount transmitter on Unit 2 than
installed on Unit 1, it did not provide a basis for specifying a different form and function
of level sensor in comparison to the thermal dispersion devices provided for Unit 1. The
inspectors noted this omission did not comply with a requirement in procedure 25402-
3DPG04G-00081, Engineering Document Construction Release, Section 7.2.4, which
states that every unit difference must contain an evaluation which addresses differences
in form, fit, or function.
The inspectors also noted the EDCR contained a draft Revision to WBN-63-4001,
System Description for Safety Injection System; however, neither the description of the
revision contained in the document nor the marked changes in Section 3.3.1 identified
any intent to change the requirement for diverse level measurement systems.
The violation was determined to be more than minor because the failure to correctly
translate the design requirement from the System Description Document and the failure
to properly evaluate the difference created with the Unit 1 design represented an
improper work practice which could impact the proper functioning of the Safety Injection
System Accumulator level measurement system.
A cross-cutting aspect was identified for this violation which was related to Human
Performance - Work Practices (H.4 (b)). This aspect is applicable in that the applicant
did not effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and
personnel following procedures.
The applicant issued PER 226246 to address this condition and other concerns with
discrepancies in EDCR Technical Evaluations.
Enforcement: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that
measures are to be established to correctly translate the design basis into affected
37
drawings and specifications. TVA Nuclear Standard Department procedure NEDP-1,
Design Basis and Design Input Control, identifies System Description Documents as a
primary source for defining design inputs.
Contrary to the above, on May 21, 2010, the inspectors identified that the applicant failed
to correctly translate a requirement for a diverse level measurement system into design
drawings and specifications issued for construction under EDCR 52424, as specified in
System Description Document WBN2-63-4001, Safety Injection System.
This finding was determined to be a SL IV violation using Supplement II of the
Enforcement Policy. Because this was a SL IV violation, and because it was entered
into the corrective action program under PER 226246, this violation is being treated as a
NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV
5000391/2010603-09, Failure to Correctly Translate the Design Basis into Affected
Specifications and Drawings Issued for Construction.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that, in most cases, design drawings, specifications, and
instructions were developed in accordance with NRC and applicant requirements.
Design documents were provided specific approvals for differences that were created
between the Unit 2 design and the Unit 1 design. However, one violation was identified
where a requirement to provide diverse level measurement systems for Safety Injection
System Cold Leg Accumulators was not correctly translated into design documents.
T.1 Training and Qualification of Plant Personnel
T.1.1 Craft Training (IPs 51051 and 64051)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a classroom training session for electrical craft personnel.
Specifically, the inspectors observed containment CONEX penetration and Kapton
insulated conductor familiarization in accordance with vendor technical document
WBN-VTD-C515-0060, Installation Manual for CONEX Electrical Conductor Seal
Assemblies. The training session included discussions on installation and repair of
Kapton insulated conductors.
The inspectors also observed classroom fire watch training. The inspectors reviewed
the associated procedures and lesson plans, and held discussions with the instructors.
The training highlighted selected portions of TVA procedure SPP-10.11, Control of
Ignition Sources (Hot Work).
Samples inspected are as follows:
- IP 51051 Section 02.03 - one sample
- IP 64051 Section 02.04 - one sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
38
c. Conclusions
TVAs program for training of newly hired personnel relating to repair or installation of
CONEX Penetration Seals and Kapton Insulated Conductors and training for hot work
fire watches was adequate for the current level of construction activities being
performed.
T.1.2 Engineering Organization Training (IP 35960)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a classroom training session for engineering personnel.
Specifically, the inspectors observed Introduction to ASME Code for Design Engineers.
The training session was intended to be an introduction on use of the ASME Class III
Code by engineering design personnel. Additional future training on ASME Code
requirements would be required.
Samples inspected are as follows:
- IP 35960 Section 02.01 - one sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
The inspection results are too limited to support a conclusion at this time.
III. Operational Readiness Activities
F.1 Fire Protection (IP 64051)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a walk-down of TVAs established fire protection/prevention
controls for Unit 2 and inspected hot work activities inside the Unit 2 reactor building.
Inspectors observed fire watches and verified that fire suppression devices were
available at or near the location of the hot work activities. The inspectors interviewed fire
watch personnel to verify knowledge of responsibilities as fire watches. The inspectors
also verified that hot work permits were posted at the location of any hot work and that
appropriate signoffs had been completed in the associated work control documents.
The inspectors also verified that the assigned fire watches had current training and
appropriate qualifications. The inspectors observed fire prevention aspects associated
with welding activities. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 64051 Section 02.07 - one sample
- IP 64051 Section 02.08 - one sample
39
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusions
TVA implemented adequate fire protection measures and controls to support Unit 2
construction activities and minimize impact on Unit 1 operation activities.
IV. Other Activities
OA.1.1 (Discussed) Quality Assurance Corrective Action Program (TI 2512/28, IPs 50075,
51065, 51055, 52055)
a. Inspection Scope
Background: The QA Records Corrective Action Program (CAP) was developed in the
mid-1980s after TVA determined that required QA records were:
- Not retrievable in a timely manner or were missing
- Not maintained in proper storage
- Incomplete, technically, or administratively deficient
The applicant has taken various actions to correct previously identified records
deficiencies. These actions included:
- Ensuring adequate storage and retrievability
- Resolving quality and technical problems
- Ensuring programs were established to prevent recurrence of previous record
problems
TVA selected a sample size of 124 records for each of the ANSI/ASME N45.2.9, 1974,
Appendix record types for Unit 2 and utilized an accepted statistical sampling
methodology (95/95). NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) dated June 9, 1992, and
September 8, 2009, approved the sampling methodology used by the applicant.
The inspectors reviewed the applicants implementation of the QA Records CAP.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the results of sample assessments performed by
the applicant in several areas to verify resolution of previously identified problems with
retrievability, storage, and completeness and to resolve quality and technical problems.
Additionally, the inspectors performed an independent sample selection of 47 records
which were shown on the applicants Engineering Construction Monitoring and
Documentation (ECM&D) database as active records for the following QA record types:
Mechanical Records (23 records)
- Valves (7 records)
- Mechanical Equipment (5 records)
- Piping (5 records)
- Ductwork (6 records)
40
Electrical/Instrument Records (24 records)
- Cables (6 records)
- Electrical Equipment (8 records)
- Instrument Subassemblies (4 records)
- Electrical Instruments (6 records)
Specific QA records and applicant sample assessment reports reviewed are listed in the
attachment.
The following samples were inspected:
- IP 50075 Section 02.02 - one sample
- IP 51055 Section 02.01 - one sample
- IP 51055 Section 02.04 - one sample
- IP 51055 Section 02.06 - one sample
- IP 51065 Section 02.01 - one sample
- IP 51065 Section 02.05 - one sample
- IP 51065 Section 02.07 - one sample
- IP 52055 Section 02.01 - one sample
- IP 52055 Section 02.04 - one sample
- IP 52055 Section 02.06 - one sample
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified. The applicant was able to produce each of
the above requested QA records from the Unit 2 records vault. The inspectors reviewed
the original records and determined that the records were legible and complete.
The inspectors verified that TVA had adequately reviewed an appropriate size sample of
each record type for mechanical and electrical/instrument records. Record-related
discrepancies were properly identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program as
appropriate. The applicant had not yet completed all planned QA record sample
assessments at the end of the inspection period. Future QA record sample
assessments are planned for various civil, welding and system cleanliness record types.
c. Conclusions
The actions performed to resolve the issues associated with the QA Records CAP for
Unit 2 mechanical and electrical/instrument records were found to be adequately
planned and implemented. Additional NRC review of future applicant QA record
assessments will be needed prior to closure of this CAP.
OA.1.2 Corrective Action Plans and Special Programs Reviews (TI 2512/017, 025)
The inspectors held discussions with both TVA and Bechtel engineering and licensing
personnel regarding the actions planned to resolve the issues associated with the Cable
Tray and Cable Tray Supports CAP, TI 2512/017, and HVAC Duct and Supports, CAP TI
2512/025. The initial meeting associated with these CAPs was held during previous
inspection periods; however, the inspectors reviewed applicable documentation to plan
future inspections in these areas.
41
The actions discussed covered the following areas as applicable:
- Walk-downs
- Engineering
- Construction
- Testing
The purpose of these discussions was for the inspectors to gain an understanding of the
actions required to close the subject CAPs, in order to help them develop inspection
plans and preliminary inspection schedules. Actual inspection activities associated with
CAPs and SPs performed during this reporting period are discussed elsewhere in this
report and contain the appropriate observations and findings.
OA.1.3 (Closed) Electrical Issues CAP Sub-issue: Adhesive Backed Cable Support Mount
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the applicants actions to resolve the Electrical CAP Sub-Issue,
Adhesive Backed Cable Support Mount, to confirm that the applicants program complies
with all commitments and NRC requirements. The inspectors reviewed calculations,
specification (G-38), EDCR, drawings, documentation of walk downs, and inspected a
number of control panels in the Unit 2 Control Room.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors determined that all adhesive
backed cable support mounts have been removed and replaced with cable ties and Ty-
rap clamps to maintain separation inside panels and control cabinets to provide the
physical restraint required by the specifications. The inspectors verified that redundant
divisional train safety-related cables inside selected Main Control Room cabinets were
placed in braided sleeves as called out in the specifications.
c. Conclusions
This inspection concluded that concerns pertaining to the electrical CAP sub-issue, on
adhesive backed cable mount supports, have been appropriately addressed for Watts
Bar Unit 2.
OA.1.4 (Discussed) Cable Issues CAP Sub-Issue: Computerized Cable Routing System
Software and Database Verification and Validation (TI 2512/016)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the applicants actions to resolve the Cable CAP Sub-Issue,
Computerized Cable Routing System (CCRS) software and database verification and
validation and to evaluate related activities to confirm that the applicants program
complies with all commitments and NRC requirements. The inspectors reviewed
documentation and scheduling to inspect signal tracing field activities associated with
this sub-issue. The inspectors interviewed responsible design personnel and reviewed
the Environmental Qualification Cable Walkthroughs that establishes the schedule for
signal tracing field activities. Anomaly tables and action listings were reviewed to
establish reasonable assurance that data transfer from CCRS to ICRDS has been
verified.
42
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified. The applicant replaced CCRS with ICRDS
and transferred the data, which included Unit 1 and 2 cables, to the new system. The
inspectors determined that the applicant verified and validated the transfer of data into
ICRDS in accordance with TVA QA procedures. Part of the Unit 2 verification
methodology will be to signal trace all Environmental Qualification (EQ) and Appendix R
cables that are shown as installed in ICRDS, but do not have pull cards available
(missing QA records). The purpose of the signal trace is to verify the routing and lengths
of cables for comparison with information in ICRDS. Observations of signal tracing
activities are discussed in Section C.1.6.
Conclusions
The inspectors determined that further inspection will be required to verify acceptable
completion of the CAP Sub-Issue, ICRDS software and database verification and
validation.
OA.1.5 (Discussed) Station Blackout (SBO) Rule Procedures and Actions (TI 2515/120)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed design activities associated with implementation of the SBO
requirements for Unit 2. The inspectors examined planned and in-process actions to
confirm Unit 2 actions paralleled the actions implemented on Unit 1 and to determine
whether the Unit 2 actions were technically valid, and were implemented in accordance
with NRC and applicant requirements.
The inspectors interviewed the responsible engineering representatives to determine the
applicants status toward completion of the SBO rule requirements. The inspectors
reviewed design calculations EPMMA041592 Rev. 10, SBO Coping Evaluation, to
determine the applicants required SBO time period and actions necessary to cope with
an the event. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed EDQ00023620070003 Rev. 5, 125V
DC Vital Battery System Analysis, to determine the adequacy of the applicants 125V
DC batteries and chargers.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors interviews and reviews of
design calculations determined that the applicant has not completed the as-built design
calculations, procedures, and action requirements. The applicants intent is to parallel
Unit 1 SBO requirements.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that further inspection will be required to verify acceptable
completion of SBO procedures and processes.
OA.1.6 (Discussed) Non-cited Violation NCV-391/2008-010-01 Corrective Action for
Failure to Document a Cable Raceway Separation Non-conforming Condition.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed documentation, performed an independent walk down, and
interviewed responsible personnel related to the Unit 2 corrective action plan associated
with NCV-391/2008-010-01 for failure to document non-conforming cable raceways.
The inspectors reviewed PER 158979 to determine the corrective action plan taken by
the applicant. The inspectors reviewed walk down procedure WDP-GEN-1 package
43
number LSWDP-430 to determine the extent of condition found by the applicant. The
inspectors performed an independent walk down of a portion of the facility to verify the
adequacy of the applicant findings. The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel
responsible for implementing the extent of condition walk down to determine the
synthesis of the corrective action plan and extent of condition.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The inspectors independent walk down and interviews with applicant personnel
determined that corrective actions were adequate with the exception of non safety
raceways associated with safety race ways and conduits and their traceability between
divisions, which could not be verified.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that further inspection will be required to verify acceptable
closure of the NCV. The inspection of the associated raceways could not be completed
during this inspection.
OA.1.7 (Closed) NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power
Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the TVAs actions in response to GL 07-01 including Response
Letter dated September 7, 2007 - Attachment 22 identifying the extent of the scope
covering 24 pump feeder cables. The inspectors reviewed ICRDS cable reports on
safety-related control cables running underground to address similar concerns of
disabling accident mitigating systems. The inspectors reviewed wiring diagram drawings
and conduit & grounding detail drawings associated with the underground control cables.
b. Observations and Findings
This generic issue identified that cables, qualified for 40 years through the equipment
qualification program, were failing at several nuclear stations prior to the end of their
qualified life. In an effort to address this issue, the NRC published Generic Letter 2007-
01. At Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, twenty of the 24 feeders that fall under this category are
either Unit 1 or are common to both units and are already in service. The remaining four
feeders are the Unit 2 Condenser Circulation Water (CCW) pump non safety-related
cables that the applicant has scheduled for testing prior to fuel load. Based on the
results of this inspection, this GL is closed for Unit 2.
c. Conclusions
Based on the results of this inspection, Generic Letter 2007-01 is closed for Unit 2. The
only four remaining feeder cables left as part of the response to the generic letter are the
Unit 2 CCW pump feeders, which are non safety-related and are scheduled to be tested.
OA.1.8 (Discussed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special
Program (TI 2512/037)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed design activities associated with implementation of the Master
Fuse List (MFL) Special Program for Unit 2. The inspectors evaluated planned and in-
process activities to confirm Unit 2 actions paralleled the actions implemented on Unit 1;
44
and to determine whether the Unit 2 actions were technically valid and were
implemented in accordance with NRC and applicant requirements. The inspectors
interviewed responsible design personnel and reviewed documents related to the Unit 2
implementation plan. The information was compared to actions taken on Unit 1 as
described in the Watts Bar SER (NUREG 0847), the Watts Bar Nuclear Performance
Plan, and the Watts Bar Unit 1 CAPs/SPs Closure Book.
b. Observations and Findings
The Unit 2 implementation plans were found to be generally consistent with the scope of
the Unit 1 MFL Special Program.
The inspectors made the following observations about the key elements of the Unit 2
Special Program:
1) Establishment and maintenance of a field-verified Master Fuse List
Consistent with the Unit 1 Special Program, the inspectors found that
requirements for Unit 2 fuses were formally defined in Design Criteria WB-DC-30-
05, WB-DC-30-27, and WB-DC-30-28. The design criteria were applicable to
both units and were controlled according to TVA Nuclear procedure NEDP-1,
Design Basis and Design Input Control.
A review of EDCRs 52324, 54796, and 54798 determined that design
engineering had developed coordinated fuse applications and had specified fuse
types, fuse sizes, and fuse ratings. The requirements were formally input into a
master list of fuses (i.e. Fuse Tabulations) in the Master Equipment List (MEL).
The inspectors review of EDCR 52324 verified that, consistent with Unit 1,
vendor-supplied fuses were controlled in the MEL for those instances where the
fuses were credited for protection of safety-related items. A review of TVA
procedure SPP-9.6, Master Equipment List, verified the control of the MEL
information system was guided by a written procedure, and was applicable to
both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
A review of TVA Operations procedure OPDP-7, Fuse Control, verified that
controls had been established to maintain correct fuse configurations after
equipment turnover from construction. The controls were applicable to both Unit
1 and Unit 2.
The inspectors noted that the Unit 1 program called for field walk-downs by the
applicant to verify correct installations of Special Program fuses; however,
interviews with responsible applicant personnel indicated that the construction
project had not yet progressed to the point where the fuses have been installed.
Thus, the applicant had not yet implemented plans to field-verify the correct
installation of fuses on Unit 2. Further, interviews with responsible applicant
personnel indicated the fuse tabulations in the MEL will not be appended to the
permanent equipment information system (MAXIMO) until after the as-installed
fuse configurations are verified.
2) Correction of deficiencies with misapplication of Bussmann KAZ actuators
The inspectors review of electrical calculations WBNEEBEDQ00299920080019
and WBNEEBMSTI0070005 verified that the applicant has identified applications
using KAZ actuators and, consistent with Unit 1, has specified replacement fuses
that were electrically coordinated with the associated distribution systems.
Requirements for the replacement fuses were formally input to the Fuse
Tabulations of the MEL as documented in EDCR 54798.
45
The inspectors interviews with responsible applicant personnel indicated that the
construction project had not progressed to the point where replacement fuses for
KAZ actuators could be physically installed on Unit 2. Accordingly, the applicant
was not ready to field-verify the correct installations of replacement fuses as
done under the Unit 1 Special Program.
3) Correction of deficiencies with redundant protection for electrical penetration
assemblies.
The inspectors review of calculation WBNEEBEDQ00299920080019 verified the
calculation specified redundant protection for electrical penetration assemblies to
prevent damage from fault currents or overload conditions. The calculation
documented that the analyzed configurations were based upon reviews of as-
designed drawings and ultimately were to be compared to as-constructed or
configuration controlled drawings. The inspectors determined that the analyzed
capabilities of the penetration assemblies were documented and demonstrated to
be able to withstand the analyzed fault currents. Also, the calculation
demonstrated the coordination of electrical protection devices associated with the
penetration assemblies. The inspectors determined that the requirements for the
electrical penetration assembly fuses were formally input to the Fuse Tabulations
of the MEL as documented in EDCR 54798.
Because the construction project had not progressed to the point where the new
fuse configurations have been installed, inspectors did not perform a verification
of correct installation.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the activities committed for the MFL Special Program are
still in process and will require further inspection to verify acceptable completion. In this
inspection, the inspectors obtained sufficient samples to verify that a master list of fuses
was being configured in the MEL; however, the permanent fuse list had not been
updated. Inspectors verified that provisions have been made to replace KAZ actuators,
and that design requirements have been developed to provide redundant protection of
electrical penetration assemblies. However, the applicant had not yet installed the
Special Program fuses on Unit 2, and had not conducted field verifications of the as-
installed configurations. Further inspection will be required to verify effective
implementation and completion of the Special Program.
OA.1.9 (Discussed) NRC Bulletins 74-15, Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three
Position Maintained Switch Model No. 10250T; 75-03, Incorrect Lower Disc
Spring and Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 and 8302 ASCO Solenoid
Valves; and 75-06, Defective Westinghouse Type OT-2 Control Switches
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the responses from the applicant regarding all three NRC
Bulletins. The inspectors reviewed historical NRC inspection reports, response letters,
and tracking records. The inspectors interviewed TVA engineers responsible for
compliance with the individual bulletins to understand what activities had been
performed. The documents reviewed in response to each of the NRC Bulletins were:
1)Bulletin 74-15; the inspectors reviewed NRC inspection reports 50-390/75-5 and 50-
391/75-5, response letter T90 080128 001, and tracking record NCO080008070.
2)Bulletin 75-03; the inspectors reviewed NRC inspection reports 50-390/75-6 and 50-
391/75-6, response letter T90 080128 001, and tracking record NCO080008030.
46
3)Bulletin 75-06; the inspectors reviewed NRC inspection reports 50-390/85-25 and
50-391/85-20, response letter T02 080320 001, and tracking record 10187136.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The inspectors made the following observations about each electrical component and
system:
1) Interviews conducted by the inspectors with TVA and Bechtel engineers, responsible
for compliance with this bulletin, revealed that TVA plans to replace existing Cutler-
Hammer model 10250T switch with the new Eaton 10250T switch and to
environmentally qualify existing Eaton 10250T switches.
2) Discussions with licensing and engineering personnel overseeing compliance to
Bulletin 75-03 revealed that the intent was to replace all associated valves instead of
modification.
3) The original applicant response letter for Bulletin 75-06 stated that the only action
would be to inspect these switches. Licensing and engineering personnel indicated
that the applicant will be refurbishing functional control switches and replacing
inadequate control switches.
In all three cases the applicant has not yet prepared design modification packages for
this work.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the activities committed to correct the misapplication of
the Cutler-Hammer three position switches, incorrect lower disc spring and clearance
dimension in Series 8300 and 8302 ASCO solenoid valves, and defective Westinghouse
Type OT-2 control switches are still in process and will require further inspection to verify
acceptable completion.
OA.1.10 (Discussed) NRC Bulletin 76-02, Relay Coil Failures - General Electric Type HFA,
HGA, HKA, and HMA Relays
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the response from the applicant regarding NRC Bulletin 76-02,
Relay Coil Failures - GE Type HFA, HGA, HKA, and HMA Relays. The inspectors
reviewed the applicants response letter T02 080320 001 and tracking record 10187197.
The inspectors interviewed the TVA and Bechtel engineers responsible for compliance
with this bulletin to understand what activities had been achieved.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified. The responsible engineer for this effort
informed the inspectors that 14 of these relays were safety-related and that the entire
population would be replaced with the current version of the same relay.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the activities committed to correct relay coil failures for
GE type HFA, HGA, HKA, HMA relays are still in process and will require further
inspection to verify acceptable completion.
47
OA.1.11 (Discussed) Violation 391/86-02-01; Failure to Follow Procedures that Resulted in
Improperly Installed Solenoid Valves
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the response from the applicant regarding NRC Violation 86-
02-01, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Failure to Follow Procedures. The
inspectors reviewed the historical NRC reports 50-390/86-02 and 50-391/86-02, as well
as the applicants response letter to Violation 86-02-01, tracking record NCO860152003,
and PER 143711. The inspectors interviewed the TVA and Bechtel engineers
responsible for resolution of this violation to understand what activities had been
achieved.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Actions required to resolve this violation for Unit 2 have not been completed. An
updated response to the violation dated June 12, 1995 sent to the NRC (Applicant
tracking number T04950612145 - WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - REVISED
RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 50-390, 391/86-02-01, FAILURE TO FOLLOW
PROCEDURE AND REVISED FINAL REPORT FOR CDRs 50-390/85-52 AND 50-
391/86-14) outlined the proposed solution to modify the solenoid valve mounts to
become compliant through vendor-approved instructions or justification to use as-is.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the activities committed to correct this violation have not
been performed and will require further inspection to verify acceptable completion.
OA.1.12 (Discussed) Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiation Monitoring System
Special Program (TI 2512/041)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed design activities associated with implementation of the
Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) Special Program for Unit 2. The inspectors
examined planned and in-process actions to confirm Unit 2 actions paralleled the actions
implemented on Unit 1; and to determine whether the Unit 2 actions results were
technically valid, and were implemented in accordance with NRC and applicant
requirements. The inspectors interviewed responsible design personnel and reviewed
program documentation related to the Unit 2 implementation plan. The information was
compared to actions taken on Unit 1 as described in the Watts Bar SER (NUREG 0847),
the Watts Bar Nuclear Performance Plan, and the Watts Bar Unit 1 CAPs/SPs Closure
Book.
b. Observations and Findings
The Unit 2 activities were found to be generally consistent with the scope of the Unit 1
RMS Special Program.
The inspectors made the following determinations about the key elements of the Unit 2
Special Program:
1) Establishment and maintenance of formally defined design criteria
The inspectors review of RMS Design Criteria, WB-DC-40-24, determined the
document implemented the Special Program commitment to formally define RMS
design requirements and to incorporate the requirements of NRC Regulatory
Guide 1.97. The design criteria were applicable to both units. In addition,
48
inspectors found that design criteria documents were controlled according to TVA
Nuclear procedure NEDP-1, Design Basis and Design Input Control.
2) Correction of deficiencies with RMS sample lines
Design actions to correct deficiencies with radiation monitoring system sampling
lines were still in process. No samples were yet available for NRC inspection.
3) Correction of deficiencies with RMS hardware
The inspectors evaluated design measures for the Main Steam Line Radiation
Monitors as defined in EDCR 2-52342. Consistent with the Special Program
actions implemented for Unit 1, the Unit 2 EDCR and its supporting calculations
were found to define range and accuracy requirements in accordance with the
specifications for Type E variables contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97.
The EDCR documented that the Unit 2 design had no equipment differences or
operating differences with Unit 1. Inspectors noted a companion design change,
Design Change Notice (DCN) 51154, was incorporated into the EDCR that
changed the radiation monitors reset logic following loss of power to the
monitors. The design change was appropriately justified, was reviewed and
approved by designated authority, and was applied to both units.
Interviews with responsible management indicated the procurement of the Main
Steam Line Radiation Monitors was still in process, and the monitors have not yet
been received or installed.
No other designs for Special Program radiation monitors were issued at the time
of this inspection.
4) Correction of omissions in documenting calibrations of RMS devices
Actions to correct deficiencies with documenting primary calibrations of radiation
monitor were still in process. No samples were available for NRC inspection.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the activities committed for the RMS Special Program
were still in process and will require further inspection to verify acceptable completion.
The inspectors verified that formal design criteria had been established for the Unit 2
radiation monitoring system. The inspectors reviewed one of the Special Program
measures to correct hardware deficiencies. No significant issues were identified;
however, further inspection will be required to evaluate correct installation of design
features. Also, additional reviews of hardware designs will be required to determine
acceptable implementation of this element of the RMS Special Program. The Special
Program elements associated with deficient sample lines and primary calibrations were
still in process and not available for inspection. Further inspection will be required to
verify effective implementation of the Special Program.
OA.1.13 (Discussed) Applicant Actions on Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Items
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Unit 2 design activities associated with TMI Action Items and
for the following electrical components and systems: 1) Acoustic Monitoring Valve
position indication, 2) emergency power for pressurizer heaters, 3) power supplies for
pressurizer relief valves, block valves, level indicators, and 4) emergency power
associated with coolant pump seals. Unit 2 design activities associated with hydrogen
igniter backup power were also reviewed for consistency with Generic Safety Issue-189
49
(GI-189) requirements. The inspectors assessed whether TMI or GI-189 actions
including NRC requirements and SAR commitments were properly translated into
drawings, design change packages, procedures, and other electrical component design
documentation and whether the design was adequately controlled.
The inspectors observed and evaluated storage activities and conditions for electrical
components to determine whether components were stored in the proper storage level
designation, properly identified, and that storage environmental conditions and
requirements were controlled and monitored as specified by the applicable manufacturer
specification. The inspectors reviewed applicant and contractor monitoring activities to
determine if they were being performed in accordance with procedural requirements.
The inspectors reviewed documentation received with components relative to quality
requirements to assure manufacturer requirements were met.
The inspectors reviewed storage procedure, Bechtel Field Material Storage Control No.
25402-PRO-0007, to determine if it provided a means to assure that proper storage
environments were established for various types of electrical components and met
applicable storage classification levels regardless of location of stored component.
The inspectors reviewed design drawings and documents and interviewed responsible
design personnel related to this inspection scope. The design information was reviewed
for actions taken on Unit 2 required in NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan
Requirements. The Unit 2 planned or in-process activities were also compared to
actions taken on Unit 1 as a result of the TMI requirements to determine whether the
Unit 2 actions were technically valid and were implemented in accordance with NRC and
applicant requirements.
Additionally, the inspectors evaluated actions planned or in-process for the following TMI
Action Items: Noble Gas Monitors (TMI II.F.1.2.A), Iodine Particulate Sampling (TMI
II.F.1.2.A), Containment High Range Monitoring (TMI II.F.1.2.C), and In-Plant Radiation
Monitoring (TMI III.D.3.3).
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The inspectors made the following observations about each electrical component and
system:
1) Valve Position Indication of Acoustic Monitoring on PORVs (TMI Action Item
II.D.3)
The inspectors reviewed EDCR 52409, Replacement of Equipment required for
Unit 2 Acoustic Monitoring system. Since Unit 1 has already completed the
required TMI Actions, the Unit 2 design parallels Unit 1. Types of new
components that were installed in Unit 1 are planned to be installed in Unit 2 per
EDCR 52409. The inspectors determined that the design change package was in
accordance with Procedure SPP-9.3, Plant Modification & Engineering Change
Control, and design changes were technically valid.
The design had not progressed to the point of installation of the Acoustic
Monitors on Unit 2. Therefore, the inspectors were unable to verify the correct
installation of Acoustic Monitor level indication components on Unit 2.
Procurement documentation for Acoustic Monitors and electrical components
(PO#: 00049277) was reviewed for adherence to manufacturers storage
specifications and applicant requirements. Five samples of electrical
components were inspected for proper storage in the warehouse. The electrical
components were stored in the proper storage level designation and were
50
properly identified by the correct labels, part numbers, and serial numbers on the
receipt inspection label. Storage conditions and requirements were controlled
and monitored as specified by the applicable specification and manufacturer, and
in-place storage requirements were satisfied.
2) Emergency Power for Pressurizer (PZR) Heaters (TMI Action Item: II.E.3.1) /
Power Supplies for PZR Relief Valves, Block Valves, & Level Indicators (TMI
Action Item: II.G.1) / Power from Emergency Diesel Generator on Reactor
Coolant Pump seals (TMI Action Item: II.K.3.25)
According to the drawings, the design for Unit 2 PZR heater emergency power,
power supplies for PZR relief and block valves, level indicators, and power from
emergency diesel generator for reactor coolant pump seals is identical to the Unit
1 design. TMI actions, NRC requirements and SAR commitments were properly
translated into design drawings for adequate control and installation of electrical
components. Through interviews with responsible applicant personnel, the
inspectors determined that there was no other design documentation to review
because there were no planned design change activities taking place on the Unit
2, and the design had not progressed to the point of installation on Unit 2.
Therefore, the inspectors were unable to verify the correct installation of the PZR
heater components on Unit 2.
3) Back-up Power for Hydrogen Igniters (GI-189 and TI 2515/174)
The inspectors reviewed EDCR 52348, complete installation/refurbish of
Hydrogen Mitigation System in Unit 2. The inspectors determined that the design
change package was in accordance with Procedure SPP-9.3, design changes
were technically valid, and the Unit 2 design of hydrogen igniters parallels Unit 1.
New hydrogen igniters will be installed on Unit 2 per EDCR 52348.
Procurement documentation for Hydrogen Igniters and electrical components
(PO#: 00070570) was reviewed for adherence to manufacturers storage
specifications and applicant requirements. Two samples of electrical
components were inspected for proper storage in the warehouse. The electrical
components were stored in the proper storage level designation and were
properly identified by the correct labels, part numbers, and serial numbers on the
receipt inspection label. Storage conditions and requirements were controlled
and monitored as specified by the applicable specification and manufacturer, and
in-place storage requirements were satisfied.
The design of the backup power supply for hydrogen igniters per GI-189 and TI
2515/174 commitments could not be verified from design documentation
reviewed for Unit 2. The inspectors determined, from interviews with the
applicant, that Unit 1 has developed procedures to support the temporary
connection of a backup power supply to hydrogen igniters; however, the Unit 2
design activities have not progressed to incorporate any of the GI-189
requirements into the Unit 2 design, or to the point of installation of the hydrogen
igniters.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the activities committed to for the previously mentioned
TMI actions and GI-189 requirements are still in process or not available for review, and
will require further inspection to verify acceptable completion. Inspectors were able to
obtain sufficient samples of electrical components to verify that storage requirements
were met and manufacturer specifications were followed. Design packages and/or
51
drawings were also verified for adherence to SAR commitments and requirements. On
each system, the applicant had not yet installed the necessary components on Unit 2 in
accordance with TMI actions and GI-189, so further inspection will be required to verify
effective implementation and completion of the TMI Action Items and GI-189
commitments.
V. Management Meetings
X.1 Exit Meeting Summary
On July 13, 2010, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Masoud
Bajestani and other members of his staff. Although some proprietary information may
have been reviewed during the inspection, no proprietary information was included in
this inspection report..
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Applicant personnel
C. Ankeny, Quality Assurance Manager, PCI Energy Services
G. Arent, Licensing Manager, Unit 2
M. Bajestani, Vice President, Unit 2
M. Bali, Electrical Design Manager, Bechtel
R. Baron, Nuclear Assurance Project Manager, TVA, Unit 2
D. Beckley, Electrical Design Manager, Bechtel
T. Moran, MELB and MIC Special Program Owner
B. Briody, Maintenance and Modifications Manager, TVA, Unit 2
B. Crouch, Lead Mechanical Engineer, TVA, Unit 2
M. Das, Principal Engineer, Bechtel
L. Davenport, Contracts/Procurement Manager, TVA, Unit 2
M. Easter, Westinghouse Joint Test Team Manager
R. Esnes, Engineering Manager, Washington Group, Inc
T. Franchuk, Quality Manager, Bechtel
E. Freeman, Engineering Manager, TVA, Unit 2
W. Goodman, Procurement Manager, Bechtel
J. Hannah, Corrective Action Coordinator, Bechtel
D. Helms, Lead Engineer CAPs & SPs, TVA, Unit 2
S. Hilmes, Lead Electrical Engineer, TVA, Unit 2
M. Lackey, ECP Rep, TVA, Unit 2
I. Khan, Electrical Engineer, Bechtel Design
R. Kuhn, Quality Assurance Manager, Bechtel
D. Malone, Quality Assurance, TVA, Unit 2
J. Mitchell, Field Procurement Manager, Bechtel
J. Moseley, Westinghouse Site Director
D. Myers, Quality Assurance Manager, TVA, Unit 2
B. Newton, General Manager- Welding Technology and Programs, PCI Energy Services
J. Robertson, Engineering Manager, Bechtel
S. Sawa, Training Manager, Bechtel
J. Schlessel, Construction Manager, TVA, Unit 2
P. Theobold, Radcon Supervisor, TVA, Unit 2
D. Tinley, Quality Assurance, TVA, Unit 2
R. White, Radiography Level III
Attachment
2
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 35007 Quality Assurance Program Implementation During Construction
IP 35060 Licensee Management of QA Activities
IP 35065 Procurement, Receiving, and Storage
IP 35960 QA Program Evaluation of Engineering Organization
IP 37002 Construction Refurbishment Process - Watts Bar Unit 2
IP 37055 Onsite Design Activities
IP 46053 Structural Concrete - Work Observation
IP 48053 Structural Steel and Supports Work Observation
IP 49053 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping - Work Observation
IP 49055 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Record Review
IP 49061 Safety-Related Piping - QA Review
IP 49063 Safety-Related Piping - Work Observation
IP 50075 Safety-Related Components - Records Review
IP 50090 Pipe Support and Restrain Systems
IP 51051 Electrical Components and Systems - Procedure Review
IP 50053 Reactor Vessel and Internals Work Observation
IP 51055 Electrical Components and Systems - Record Review
IP 51061 Electrical Cable - Procedure Review
IP 51063 Electric Cable - Work Observation
IP 51065 Electric Cable - Record Review
IP 52051 Instrument Components and Systems - Procedure Review
IP 52053 Instrument Components and Systems - Work Observation
IP 52055 Instrument Components and Systems - Record Review
IP 51053 Electrical Components and Systems Work Observation
IP 55050 Nuclear Welding General Inspection Procedure
IP 55100 Structural Welding General Inspection Procedure
IP 57050 Visual Testing Examination
IP 57060 Liquid Penetrant Testing Examination
IP 57070 Nondestructive Examination Procedure Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure
Review/Work Observation/Record Review
IP 57080 Nondestructive Examination Procedure Ultrasonic Examination Procedure
Review/Work Observation/Record Review
IP 57090 Nondestructive Examination - RT
IP 64051 Procedures - Fire Prevention/Protection
IP 73051 Inservice Inspection - Review of Program
IP 73052 Inservice Inspection - Review of Procedures
IP 73053 Preservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities
IP 73055 Preservice Inspection Data Review and Evaluation
IP 92701 Followup
TI 2512/015 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Employee Concerns Program
TI 2512/016 Plant Cable Issues Corrective Action Program
TI 2512/018 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Electrical Conduit and Supports Corrective
Action Program Plan
TI 2512/020 Plant Electrical Issues Corrective Action Program
TI 2512/024 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Heat Code Traceability Corrective Action
Program Plan
TI 2512/025 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant HVAC Duct and Supports Corrective
Action Program Plan
3
TI 2512/028 QA Records Corrective Action Program
TI 2512/037 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program
TI 2512/041 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiation Monitoring System Special
Program
TI 2515/174 Hydrogen Igniter Backup Power Verification
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
2010603-01 NCV Marking and Segregation of nonconforming
materials from accepted materials available for use
(Section Q.1.3)
2010603-02 NCV Inadequate storage and improper control of
documents used in safety related activities (Section Q.1.3)
2010603-03 NCV Failure to invoke 10 CFR Part 21 in safety related
procurement documents (Section Q.1.3)
2010603-04 NCV Undersized pipe support welds (Section C.1.3)
2010603-05 NCV Inadequate corrective actions for non-conforming
safety-related concrete (Section C.1.4)
2010603-06 URI Material Condition inside loop-3 RCS crossover
piping (Section C.1.8)
2010603-07 NCV Failure to Protect Safety-Related Welds, Piping,
and Components During Construction Activities (Section
C.1.9)
2010603-08 VIO Failure to adequately evaluate and qualify molded
case circuit breakers (Section E.1.1)
2010603-09 NCV Failure to correctly translate the design basis into
affected specifications and drawings issued for
construction (Section E.1.2)
Discussed
2512/018 TI QA Records CAP (Section OA.1.1)
2512/016 TI Cable Issues CAP Sub-Issue: Computerized Cable
Routing System (CCRS) Software and Database
Verification and Validation (Section OA.1.4)
2515/120 TI Station Blackout (SBO) Rule Procedures and
Actions (Section OA.1.5)
4
2008-010-01 NCV Corrective action for failure to document a cable
raceway separation non-conforming condition (Section
OA.1.6)
2512/037 TI Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse
List Special Program (Section OA.1.8)
74-15 BL Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three Position
Maintained Switch Model No. 10250T (Section OA.1.9)
75-03 BL Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and Clearance
Dimension in Series 8300 and 8302 ASCO Solenoid
Valves (Section OA.1.9)
75-06 BL Defective Westinghouse Type OT-2 Control
Switches (Section OA.1.9)
76-02 BL Relay Coil Failures - General Electric Type HFA,
HGA, HKA, and HMA Relays (Section OA.1.10)
86-02-01 VIO Failure to Follow Procedures that Resulted in
Improperly Installed Solenoid Valves (Section OA.1.11)
2512/041 TI Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiation
Monitoring System Special Program (Section OA.1.12)
Closed
2512/020 (Partial) TI Electrical Issues Corrective Action Program - Sub-
issue Adhesive Backed Cable Mount Supports CAP
Electrical Sub-issue (Section OA.1.3)
2007-01 GL Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures
that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant
Transients (Section OA.1.7)
5
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
I. Quality Assurance Program
Q.1.1 Identification and Resolution of Construction Problems
Procedures/Programs
25402-MGT-0003, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 5
Bechtel Oversight/Self-Assessment Documents
QA Surveillance Report 25402-WBN-SR-10-0932, NDE - Liquid Penetrant (PT) by Ivey Cooper
QA Surveillance Report 25402-WBN-SR-10-0958, NDE - Magnetic Particle (MT) by Ivey
Cooper
QA Surveillance Report 25402-WBN-SR-10-0960, Eye exam records of project QC personnel
Q.1.3 Procurement, Receiving, and Storage Inspection
Procedures/Programs
25402-000-GPP-0000-N6104, Materials Receiving, Rev. 4
25402-MGT-0003, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 7
CLS.QPP.03.001, TVA Central Laboratories Services, Corrective Action, Rev. 1
CLS.QPP.03.002, TVA Central Laboratories Services, 10 CFR Part 21 Reporting Requirements,
Rev. 1
IGA-2, Intergroup Agreement TVA Nuclear and Fossil Power Group, Rev. 4
IGA-11, Intergroup Agreement with Central Laboratories Services, Rev. 0001
SPP-4.3, Material Storage and Handling, Rev. 0006
Watts Bar Unit 2 Construction Completion Project, Project Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual,
Rev. 5
Audits
25402-WBN-AR-09-0004, Bechtels Internal Audit of Procurement, Supplier Quality, and
Subcontractors, Rev. 0
Procurement Documents
25402-000-FMR-JV01-00071, Field Material Requisition (FMR) for Diaphragm, Actuator, QA
1for Valve WBN-2-PCV-003-0183, Rev. 0
MEL Package No. 10EMC3072, Component Update Request for EDCR 53276, dated
04/06/2010
PEG PKG No. FMR-JV01-00011 M0, Technical Evaluation for Diaphragm, Aux Feedwater
Turbine Pressure Reducing Valve WBN-2-PCV-003-0183, Rev. 0
PEG PKG No. CPT802W, Procurement Data Sheet (PDS) for Diaphragm, Actuator, QA 1for
Valve WBN-2-PCV-003-0183, Rev. 0
PO 28498, Welding Consumables, Tape, Insulation, QA 2, Rev. 0
PO 22993-1, Pipe and Fittings, ASME III, for Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 1
PO 32815 -1, Valve, Solenoid (Nuclear), Rev. 1
6
PO 33205, Breakdown Orifices for Aux Feedwater, Orifice Assembly, ASME Section III, Class 3,
QA 1, Rev. 0
PO 37189, Relay, QA 1, Order Date: 10/29/2010
PO 42199-2, Main Steam Safety Valves, Refurb., ASME Section III, Rev. 2
PO 54795, Fuses, Holder, QA 2, Order Date: 12/08/2009
PO 59120, Valves, Fittings, Bolt Studs, QA 2, Rev. 0
PO 63534, Snubber, Hydraulic, QA 1, for Steam Generators, Rev. 0
PO 80513, Diaphragm, QA 1, Order Date: 02/24/2010
PO 87607, Limit Switch, ARMS, for Actuator, QA 2, Rev. 0
PO 87844, Electrical, Push Buttons, Etc., QA 1, Rev. 0
PO 92806, Valve, Fittings, ASME, QA 1, Rev. 0
Problem Evaluation Reports
PER 224697, New MRs Generated for Issued EDCRs, Reported Date: 04/12/2010
PER 225712, Increased Activity in Project Trend Code M.1 - Procurement of Material, Reported
Date: 04/19/2010
II. Management Oversight and Controls
C.1.3 Pipe Support and Restraint Systems (IP 50090, 46071, and TI 2512/023 )
TVA Work Order 08-957282-001
Drawing Rev. Authorization 52897-005
C.1.4 Structural Concrete (IP 46053)
TVA Procedure MAI-5.10 Concrete Placement, Surface Preparation, Placing, Finishing, Curing,
and Testing, Rev. 5
TVA Procedure MAI-5.4 Concrete Removal, Repair, Grouting, and Dry Packing, Rev. 11
TVA Walk-down Procedure WDP-GEN-1 General Walk-down Requirements, Rev. 13
Service Request 180764, Concrete Mixing and Placement Violations
C.1.5 Safety-Related and RCS Pressure Boundary Piping Records Review (IPs 49055
and 49065, TI 2515/024)
Procedures/Programs
Bechtel Procedure 25402-3DP-G06G-00001, Material Requisitions, Rev. 6
Bechtel Procedure 25402-000-GPP-0000-N6204, Field Material Control and Traceability, Rev. 7
Bechtel Procedure 25402-3DP-G06G-00010, Specifying and Evaluating Supplier Quality
Management System or Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Rev. 2
Bechtel Procedure 25402-PRO-0002, Purchase Order Formation, Rev. 3
Bechtel Procedure 25402-3DP-G06G-00012, Supplier Deviation Disposition Requests, Rev. 3
Bechtel Procedure 25402-3DP-G04G-00082, Interface with the TVA Boundary Information
Transmittal Process, Rev. 3
TVA procedure SPP-4.1, Procurement of Material, Labor, and Services, Rev. 23
TVA Procedure NEDP-8, Technical Evaluation for Procurement of Materials and Services, Rev.
14
TVA Procedure NGDC-PP-6, Completion of TVA Partial ASME Section III N-5 Data Reports,
Rev. 5
7
Purchase Orders
Contract 74C38-83015, Principal Piping Systems, 11/19/1975
Corrective Action Documents
PER 228857, ASME Code Class Not Properly Recorded in WO 08-952876-000, 05/11/2010
PER 228824, Missing FME Cover, 05/11/2010
PER 228845, Procedure Enhancement Regarding Requirements for CMTRs, 05/11/2010
Miscellaneous
Watts Bar Unit 2 ASME N-5 Database
Watts Bar Unit 2 Heat Code Traceability Closure Implementation Plan
25402-011-YDA-PB02-00002-001, Evaluation of Flange Supplied to 1995 Code Edition,
08/05/2009
25402-011-YDA-JXF0-00002-001, Evaluation of Fittings Supplied to 1995 Code Edition,
08/13/2009
WO 08-952876-000, Remove Non-Code Pipe and Replace with Code Pipe, 01/07/2009
BIT 371 for TVA Partial N-5 No. TVA-2-62-1-P9, Rev. 2
BIT 841 for TVA Partial N-5 No. TVA-2-03-2-P6, Rev. 0
Weld No. 2-068A-T037-05 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-068A-T037-06 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-068A-T037-07 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-068A-T037-08 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-068A-T037-16 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-062B-T342-10 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-062B-D136-11 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-062B-D136-11B ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-063A-T013-02 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-063B-T082-06 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-068G-T013-02 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-062B-T328-01 ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-062A-T019-04A ASME Material Certification Package
Weld No. 2-062A-T036-03 ASME Material Certification Package
Valve 2-3-845 ASME Material Certification Package
C.1.7 RPV Internals and Protection of Installed Plant Equipment during Construction
Activities (IP 50053)
Service Request 180764, Concrete Mixing and Placement Violations
Service Request 182224, Liquid Penetrant Exam in Reactor Vessel
C.1.8, C.1.9, C.1.10, C.1.11, C.1.12, C.1.13, C.1.14, C.1.15, C.1.16, C.1.17, C.1.18, C.1.19,
C.1.20 Collective section documentation)
Procedures
TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Program, Rev. 23
25402-000-GPP-0000-N3701, Unit 2 Construction Completion Project Procedure (CCPP),
Welding Program, Rev. 3
25402-000-GPP-0000-N3705, Welding and NDE Documentation and Records Management,
Rev. 2
25402-000-GMX-GCE-00001, Watts Bar Unit 2 Construction Completion Project, Special
8
Processes Manual, Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0036, Bechtel Welding Standard, Documentation of Welds, WD-1, Rev.
6
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0012, Bechtel General Purging Standard, GPS-1, Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0013, Bechtel General Welding Standard, GWS-1, Rev. 2
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0021, Bechtel General Welding Standard, GWS-Structural, Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S00038, WFMC-1, Bechtel Welding Specification - Welding Filler
Material Control, Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0078, WQ-1, Bechtel Welding Performance Qualification Specification
[ASME Section IX], Rev. 2
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0079, WQ-2, Bechtel Welding Performance Qualification Specification
[D1.1], Rev. 0
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0030, PHT-1, Bechtel General Welding Standard, Rev. 2
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0165, NEPQ, Bechtel Construction Operations Inc. Nondestructive
Examination Standard, NDE Personnel Qualification and Certification, Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0131, VT-ASME III Piping, Bechtel Nondestructive Examination
Standard, Visual Examination, Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0133, VT-AWS D1.1, Bechtel Nondestructive Examination Standard,
Visual Examination, Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0125, PT (SR)-ASME, Bechtel Nondestructive Examination Standard,
Liquid Penetrant Examination, Rev. 5
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0124, MT-ASME, Bechtel Nondestructive Examination Standard,
Magnetic Particle Examination, Rev. 5
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0049, Bechtel Technical Specification for Welding Filler Metal, WM-
E7018(CVN), Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0066, Bechtel Technical Specification for Welding Filler Metal, WM-
ER70S-2(CVN), Rev. 1
25402-000-4MP-T040-S0068, Bechtel Technical Specification for Welding Filler Metal, WM-
ER70S-6 (CVN), Rev. 1
TVA-NQA-PLN89-A, Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Quality Assurance Program, Rev. 23
25402-PRO-0007, Field Material Storage Control, Rev. 2
Bechtel Project Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, Rev. 6
N-UT-78, PDI Generic Procedure for the Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure
Vessel Welds PDI-UT-6, Rev 0005
N-PT-9, Liquid Penetrant Examination of ASME and ANSI Code Components and Welds, Rev
0033
EPRI-DMW-PA-1, Procedure for Manual Phased Array Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar
Metal Welds, Rev. 1
NPG Nondestructive Examination Procedure N-UT-87, Generic Procedure for the Phased Array
Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal Welds, Rev. 0
Work Orders (WOs)
WO 10-951203-000, Cut-Out and Remake Weld 2-068A-D145-02 C0R0
WO 09-954333-001, Modification of Pipe Supports on the Component Cooling System in the
Reactor Building under EDCR 52526
WO 09-954179-023, Fabricate Typical Supports in the Fabrication Shop to be Installed in Work
Orders under EDCR 54633
WO 08-956218-021, Install New Drain Piping and Fittings for Lower Ice Condenser Bay #1 and
Reinstall Flapper Valve 2-CKV-61-913 System 061 under EDCR 52813
9
WO 10-951028-000, Rework weld by removing linear indication and have inspected and
accepted.
Bechtel Welding Procedure Specification
P1-AT-Lh (CVN+10)
P1-AT-Lh
P8-AT-Ag
P8-P1-AT-Ag
P1-A-Lh (Structural)
NDE Reports
MT-058, ASME Class III
MT-064, ASME Class III
PT-022, ASME Class 1
R-P0240, Penetrant - ASME Class 1
R-P0970, Penetrant - ASME Class 2
R-P0992, Visual - ASME Class 1
R-P0993, Magnetic Particle - ASME Class 2
R-P0994, Magnetic Particle - ASME Class 2
R-P0996, Magnetic Particle - ASME Class 2
TVA Radiographic Examination Report for acceptance of weld 2-068C-W004-01, 10/28/08
TVA-WPNP NDE Evaluation Data Sheet Radiographic No. 2-1228, 5/19/88
PERs and Service Requests
PER 212696
PER 219039
PER 222093
PER 222236
PER 214589
PER 166624
PER 236720
PER 236733
Service Request 166386
Service Request 167044
Other
NRC Inspection Report 50-390/91-32
NRC Inspection Report 50-390, 391/91-23
NRC Inspection Report 50-390/78-05 and 50-391/78-04
Preservice Inspection Program Plan Watts Bar Nuclear Plan Unit 2, WBN-2 PSI Rev. 3
NGDC PP-15, Watts Bar Unit 2 ASME Section XI, Rev 0
Watts Bar Unit 2 Red Lined FSAR Sections 5.2.8, 5.4.4.4, and 6.6
PDI RPV Manual Detection PDI-UT-06 Table 1 and Table 2, Rev 15
Performance Demonstration Qualification Summary No. 621, PDI-UT-06, Rev G, Addenda 0
NDE UT Examination Report R-P1028, Welds CRDW-60, CRDW-64, CRDW-65, CRDW-72,
CRDW-73
10
NDE UT Examination Report R-P1029, Welds CRDW-54, CRDW-60, CRDW-62, CRDW-64,
CRDW-65, CRDW-66, CRDW-67, CRDW-72, CRDW-73
III. Operational Readiness Activities
F.1 Fire Protection
Procedures and Standards
SPP-10.9, Control of Fire Protection Impairments, Rev. 3
SPP-10.11, Control of Ignition Sources (Hot Work), Rev. 3
IV. Other Activities
Procedures
TVA Construction Engineering Procedure CEP-1.40-3, Universal System Program, Rev. 2
TVA QA Record Sample Assessment Reports
Records Assessment, Mechanical Valves, April 2010
Records Assessment, Mechanical Equipment, April 2010
Records Assessment, Mechanical Ductwork, April 2010
Records Assessment, Mechanical Piping, April 2010
Records Assessment, Electrical Cables, April 2010
Records Assessment, Electrical Equipment, April 2010
Records Assessment, Electrical Instrument Subassemblies, April 2010
Records Assessment, Electrical Instruments, April 2010
Corrective Action Documents
PER 233454, ASME/Hanger inspection records cannot be retrieved in timely manner
Other
Engineering Construction Monitoring and Documentation (ECM&D) database
Mechanical Records
Valve, 0-067-DA-V-RTV-825B, Test 70A
Valve, 2-001-NV-V-RTV-290A, Test 70A
Valve, 2-030-RB-V-TV-555, Test 70A
Valve, 2-062-AB-V-FCV-128, Test 73B
Valve, 2-062-AB-V-ISV-537, Test 70A
Valve, 2-063-AB-V-FCV-175, Test 70A
Valve, 2-067-AB-V-TCV-132, Test 70A
Mechanical Equipment, 0-03B-AB-SL-0786A, Test 35A
Mechanical Equipment, 0-041-AB-SL-2014A, Test 01A
11
Mechanical Equipment, 0-082-DIEG-0C1, Test 34A
Mechanical Equipment, 2-I&C-RB-SL-0005, Test 01A
Mechanical Equipment, 2-081-PMP-81-7, Test 33A
Duct, 0-030-DA-D-029, Test 12A
Duct, 2-030-AB-D-141C, Test 11A
Duct, 2-030-RB-BKD-572, Test 13A
Duct, 2-030-RB-BT-TVA4, Test 91A
Duct, 2-030-RB-CT-005, Test 15A
Pipe Segment, 0-018-DA-L-840-2-018, Test 23A
Pipe Segment, 0-067-FB-F-0041, Test 02A
Pipe Segment, 0-067-YD-P-845-5-12, Test 79A
Pipe Segment, 0-067-47W845-5-6-18, Test 50A
Pipe Segment, 2-003-NV-P-803-1-14, Test 23A
Pipe Segment, 2-003-PT-F-0009, Test 28A
Pipe Segment, 2-03B-AB-P-803-3-50, Test 18A
Electrical Records
Cable, 2-2A-62-3624, Test 77A
Cable, 2-2NM-92-100-D, Test 55A
Cable, 2-2NM-92-243-E, Test 77A
Cable, 2-2NM-92-416-F, Test 64A
Cable, 2-3V-1-7611-A,Test 77A
Cable, 2-3V-74-1938-A,Test 77B
Electrical Component, 2-BKR-212-B2/3B-B, Test 67A
Electrical Component, 2-JB-290-2875-D, Test 25B
Electrical Component, 2-JB-293-692-A, Test 61A
Electrical Component, 2-MCCC-213-A1/17E-A, Test 70A
Electrical Component, 2-MTR-61-AHU/07, Test 25A
Electrical Component, 2-PENT-293-14-A, Tests 04A and 64A
Electrical Component, 2-PENT-293-31-G, Test 25A
Instrument Subassembly, 0032JN-042, Test 59A
Instrument Subassembly, 0032LA-A, Test 52A
Instrument Subassembly, 2001AO-001, Test 04A
Instrument Subassembly, 2032BC-042, Test 41A
Electrical Instrument, 2-FCV-62-90-A, Test 47A
Electrical Instrument, 2-FCV-63-118-A, Test 75A
Electrical Instrument, 2-FCV-67-146-A, Test 61A
Electrical Instrument, 2-HS-1-18A-B, Test 61D
Electrical Instrument, 2-HS-3-164A-A, Test 61B
Electrical Instrument, 2-TM-68-65B-E, Test 25A
12
OA.1.6 Non-cited Violation NCV-391/2008-010-01 corrective action for failure to
document a cable raceway separation non-conforming condition.
Walk Down Package
LSWDP-430 Cable Trays for Electrical External Separation Baseline Calculation Program:
Corrective Action for PER 158979
Others
ICRDS QA Report, Cable ID 2PM3870D, 2PM3877E, 2PM3882F, and 2PM3887G; Conduits
2PLC29D, 2PLC62E, 2PLC31E, 2-2PLC-299-23F, and 2-2PLC-299-39G.
OA.1.7 NRC Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable
Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients.
Others
T90 070911 002, TVA - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Initial Responses to Bulletins and
Generic Letters dated September 7, 2007.
OA.1.8 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Master Fuse List Special Program
Design Change Documents
EDCR 52324, Rev. A, Refurbish Solid State Rod Control System Cabinets
EDCR 54796, Rev. A, Install Fuses for Radiation Monitoring System, etc.
EDCR 54798, Rev. A, Install Fuses for 120 VAC Vital AC, etc.
Procedures
SPP 4.1 - Rev. 21
NEDP-1, Rev. 5, (TVA Procedure) Design Basis and Design Input Control
OPDP-7, Rev. 3, (TVA Procedure) Fuse Control
SPP-9.3, Rev. 22, (TVA Procedure) Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control
SPP-9.6, Rev. 9, (TVA Procedure) Master Equipment List (MEL)
25402-3DP-G04G-0081, Rev. 007, (Bechtel Procedure) Engineering Document Construction
Release
WB-DC-30-5, Rev. 022, (Design Criteria) Power, Control, and Signal Cables For Use in
Category I Structures -- (Unit 1 / Unit 2)
WB-DC-30-27, Rev. 030, (Design Criteria) AC and DC Control Power Systems - (Unit 1 / Unit 2)
WB-DC-30-28, Rev. 20, (Design Criteria) Low and Medium Voltage Power Systems
Others
WBNEEBMSTI070005, Rev. 53, (Calculation) 125V DC Protection and Coordination Calculation
EDQ00299920080019, Rev. 001, (Calculation) Electrical Penetration Protection Study Voltage
Level V3 - Unit 2
CATD 20103-WBN-02, (Concern) Discrepancies Have Been Identified for Electrical Design
Criteria
CATD 23702-WBN-04, (Concern) No Calculations could be found to demonstrate that fuses
provided adequate full range short circuit protection
CATD 23702-WBN-05, (Concern) Circuit breakers with trip settings higher than permitted by
criteria
NCO850160001, (Commitment) Provide redundant tripping devices to protect containment
13
OA.1.9 NRC Bulletins 74-15, Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three Position
Maintained Switch Model No. 10250T; 75-03, Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and
Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 and 8302 ASCO Solenoid Valves; and 75-06,
Defective Westinghouse Type OT-2 Control Switches
Others
10187136, B 1975-06, Defective Westinghouse Type OT-2 Control Switches Inspect
Westinghouse Type OT-2 control switches, 6 October 2009
T02 080320 001, Dated 20 March 2008
T90 080128 001, Dated 29 January 2008
NCO080008030 (Commitment), B 75-03, Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and Clearance
Dimension in Series 8300 8302 ASCO Solenoid Valves-Modify Valves Not Modified At
Factory, initiated 27 March 2008
NCO080008070 (Commitment), Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three Position Maintained
Switch Model No. 10250T, initiated 31 March 2008
OA.1.10 NRC Bulletin 76-02, Relay Coil Failures - General Electric Type HFA, HGA, HKA,
and HMA Relays
Others
T02 080320 001, Dated 20 March 2008
10187197, B 1976-02, Relay Coil Failures - GE Type HFA, HGA, HKA, HMA Relays; Repair
or replace relays before preoperational tests., 6 October 2009
OA.1.11 Violation 391/86-02-01, Failure to Follow Procedures that Resulted in Improperly
Installed Solenoid Valves
Others
NCO860152003 (Commitment), Modify Existing ASCO 8315 Series Valves or Ensure
Justification for Use As-Is is provided
OA.1.12 Inspection of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Radiation Monitoring System Special
Program (TI 2512/041)
Design Change Documents
EDCR 2-52342, Rev. A, Install Radiation Monitoring Loops in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building
Procurement Documents
25402-011-MRA-HARA-00001, Rev. 4, (Purchase Requisition) Radiation Monitoring System
(System 90)
Procedures
WB-DC-40-24, Rev. 021, (Design Criteria) Radiation Monitoring (Unit 1/ Unit 2)
Others
WBNAPS3047, Rev. 4, (Calculation) Calibration Factors for the Main Steam Line Radiation
Monitors
WO 08-813772-000 - Field Change
WBNAPS3048, Rev. 19, (Calculation) Instrument Range and Accuracy for Measurement of
Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type E Variables
14
OA.1.13 Applicant Actions on Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Items
Design Change Documents
EDCR 52409, Rev. A, Replacement of Equipment required for Unit 2 Acoustic Monitoring
system
EDCR 52348, Rev. A, Complete installation/refurbish of Hydrogen Mitigation System in Unit 2
EDCR-2 # 55127, Rev. A, - Resolves physical internal cable separation and electrical isolation
breakages identified by Calc EDQ0029992009002 Rev. 0. - dated: 4/20/10
Drawings
2-45W724-3 Rev. 0, Unit 2 6900 Shutdown Board 2A-A Single Line, 12/15/08
2-45W724-4 Rev. 0, Unit 2 6900 Shutdown Board 2B-B Single Line, 12/15/08
2-45W760-68-3 Rev. 1, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Schematic Diagrams, 12/15/08
2-45W760-68-4 Rev. 1, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Schematic Diagrams, 12/15/08
1-45W724-3 Rev. 23, Units 1& 2 6900 Shutdown Board 2A-A Single Line, 9/22/90
1-45W724-4 Rev. 20, Units 1& 2 6900 Shutdown Board 2B-B Single Line, 9/22/90
1-45W760-68-3 Rev. 12, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Schematic Diagrams, 9/22/90
1-45W760-68-4 Rev. 8, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Schematic Diagrams, 9/17/90
2-45W751-8 Rev. 1, Unit 2 480V Reactor MOV Bds 2B1-B Single Line SH-2, 12/15/08
2-45W751-3 Rev. 1, Unit 2 480V Reactor MOVE Bds 2A1-A Single Line SH-3, 12/15/08
2-45W760-68-5 Rev. 0, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Schematic Diagrams, 12/15/08
2-45W600-68-1 Rev. 1, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Schematic Diagrams, 12/11/08
1-45W600-68-1 Rev. 12, Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Schematic Diagrams, 9/22/90
1-45W760-68-5 Rev. 18, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Schematic Diagrams, 9/21/90
1-45W751-3 Rev. 42, Units 1& 2 480V Reactor MOVE Bds 1A1-A & 2A1-A Single Line SH-3,
9/22/90
1-45W751-8 Rev. 26, Units 1& 2 480V Reactor MOV Bds 1B1-B & 2B1-B Single Line SH-2,
9/22/90
1-45W703-1 Rev. 47, Units 1&2 125V Vital Battery Board I Single Line Sh-1, 9/22/90
1-45W703-2 Rev. 36, Units 1&2 125V Vital Battery Board II Single Line Sh-2, 9/22/90
1-45W703-3 Rev. 40, Units 1&2 125V Vital Battery Board III Single Line Sh-3, 9/22/90
1-45W703-4 Rev. 32, Units 1&2 125V Vital Battery Board IV Single Line Sh-4, 9/22/90
2-45W760-68-4 Rev.1, Unit 2 RCS Schematic Diagram, 12/15/08
2-45W760-68-3 Rev.1, Unit 2 RCS Schematic Diagram, 12/15/08
1-45N709-4 Rev.2, Units 1&2 Chargers Inverters and Misc Equip Connections Diagram, SH-4,
6/14/76
1-45W756-2 Rev.69, Units 1&2 480V Cont and Aux Bldg VT BD 1A1-A & 2A1-A Single Line,
SH-2, 9/22/90
1-45W756-6 Rev.74, Units 1&2 480V Cont and Aux Bldg VT BD 1B1-B & 2B1-B Single Line,
SH-2, 9/22/90
2-45W756-2 Rev.0, Unit 2 480V Cont and Aux Bldg VT BD 2A1-A & 2B1-B Single Line, SH-2,
12/15/08
1-45W749-4A Rev.40, Units 2 480V 2B2-B Single Line, 1/29/93
1-45W749-1A, Rev.37, Units 2 480V 2A1-A Single Line, 2/1/93
1-45W749-3A, Rev.38, Units 2 480V 2B1-B Single Line, 1/29/93
2-45W749-4, Rev.2, Units 2 480V 2B2-B Single Line, 12/15/08
2-45W749-1, Rev.1, Units 2 480V 2A1-A Single Line, 12/15/08
2-45W749-3, Rev.1, Units 2 480V 2B1-B Single Line, 12/15/08
2-45W2640, Rev. 1, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram Control Boards Critical Wiring Braid Installation,
08/14/09
15
2-45W2640-1, Rev. 0, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram Control Boards Critical Wiring Braid Installation,
07/14/09
Procurement Documents
25402-011-MRA-HAYS-00001, Acoustic Monitoring Material Requisition
PO# 00070570, Hydrogen Igniter Purchase Order
PO# 00049277, Acoustic Monitoring Purchase Order
25402-011-MRA-EWE2-00012, Hydrogen Igniters Material Requisition
QAR-2375, Qualification Summary Report, Tayco Engineering Inc, Hydrogen Igniter Assembly
Procedures
25402-PRO-0007 Rev.1, Bechtel Field Material Storage Control, 10/9/08
MAI-4.4B Instrument and Instrument panel Installation
Walk Down Package
LSWDP-404 Rev. 0, 2-PNL-99-L116 Internal Separation Walk-down
LSWDP-409 Rev. 0, 0-PNL-278-M26 Internal Separation Walk-down
LSWDP-422 Rev. 0, 2-PNL-278-M9 Internal Separation Walk-down
Others
N3-68-4001, Rev. 0028, TVA, Reactor Coolant System, 8/27/09
WBN2-68-4001, Rev. 0000, TVA, Reactor Coolant System, 7/23/08
PER Service Request # 170923, Drawing Deviation, NRC Identified 1-45W760-68-5, 2-
45W760-68-5, 4/29/10
Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 158979, Cable separation issues not identified during walk
down.
WO 08-951069-001 - CRDR EDCR2 52366 (U1RG Approved) PHASE III, PANEL 2-M-9, WILL
PROCURE, MOUNT, & WIRE ONLY T, June 15, 2010.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
10 CFR Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
AWS American Welding Society
BIT Boundary Information Transmittals
CAP Corrective Action Program
CAQ condition adverse to quality
CCRS Computerized Cable Routing System
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CMTR certified material test report
CRDM control rod drive mechanism
DCN design change notice
ECM&D Engineering construction monitoring & documentation
ECP Employee Concerns Program
EDCR engineering document construction release
FE Field Engineer
FPIP fire protection impairment permit
HDR Historical Document Review
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter (NRC)
ICRDS Integrated Cables Raceway Design System
IP Inspection Procedure (NRC)
IR inspection report
MT magnetic particle
NA Nuclear Assurance
NCV non-cited violation
NDE non-destructive examination
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC)
NUREG (NRC) technical report designation
PCI PCI Energy Services
PER Problem Evaluation Report
PO purchase order
PSI Pre-Service Inspection
PT Liquid Penetrant Testing (examination)
QA quality assurance
QC quality control
RCP reactor coolant pump
RMS radiation monitoring system
RT radiograph test (examination)
SCWE safety conscience work environment
SL Severity Level
SP Special Program
SSC structures, systems, and components
SWBP sidewall bearing pressure
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TI Temporary Instruction (NRC)
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
UHI upper head injection
URI unresolved item
UT Ultrasonic test
VIO Violation
WBNPP Watts Bar Nuclear Performance Plan
WO work order