ML14078A155

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Initial Exam 2013-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
ML14078A155
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 03/19/2014
From:
NRC/RGN-II
To:
References
50-424/13-301, 50-425/13-301
Download: ML14078A155 (38)
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, MOL, steady state operations.

(Base IC #14, snapped to IC #171 for HL18 NRC Exam)

Ecuiment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: Maintain 100% power. Spent fuel movement in progress in the spent fuel pool. Mike Chance is Fuel Handling Coordinator. Containment mini-purge is in service for a Containment entry on the next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

RMOO8 FHB Area High Radiation RM2532A/B FHB Effluent Radiogas RM2533A1B FHB Effluent Radiogas ES21A FHB HVAC Train A Auto Actuation Failure ES21 B FHB HVAC Train B Auto Actuation Failure CVO5 Letdown HX Tube Rupture PRO2A Pzr Pressure Trans Fails (Cont & Prot): PT-455 TU1 1 Main Turbine Hydraulic FluId Pump A Trip TU1OB Main Turbine EHC Pump B Auto Start Failure SGO1 B #2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Inlet CV16A Block Auto Start on CCP A Cvi 6B Block Auto Start on CCP B Overrides HS-5132A to OPEN (this will prevent closure of valve from QMCB)

HS-9378A to CLOSE (cause HV-9378A)B to close)

Event Malt. Event Event No. No. Type* Description Ti RM-008, I-UO Dropped Fuel Assembly during fuel shuffle for impending outage on 2532A/B, l-SS Unit 2.

2533A/B

@ 20% TS-SS TR 13.3.6 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation (Common System), Condition A TR 13.9.5 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System Condition A T2 CVO5 C-QATC CVCS Letdown Hx Tube Leak.

@ 50% C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.4.13 Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Condition A

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Maif. Event Event No. No. Type* Description T5 SGO3A1 l-SS SG PT-514 fails low.

0% TS-SS LCO 3.3.2, Condition A, FU le, Condition D, Eu 4d(1) Condition D ILCO 3.3.3, Condition A, FU 8 LCO 3.3.4, EU 13, Condition A T6 New malf C-OATC Pressurizer Spray Valve 1 PV-455C fails open (12)=TRUE CSS then 455 TS-SS LCO 3.4.1, Condition A prcv to 0.6 T7 ELO7A C-All Loss of 1AAO2 due to faulted bus TS-SS LCO 3.8.1, Condition A, B, & E LCO 3.8.9, Condition A LCO 3.7.5, Condition B (already in effect)

T8 Ovation C-UO #3 BFRV fails closed. SGWL may reach the Lo-Lo Reactor Trip DEW C-SS setpoint unless a pre-emptive reactor trip performed.

T8 EW1 5A C-UO A shaft shear of the only operating MEP will require the crew to 60 sec C-SS manually trip the reactor. SGWL will reach the Lo-Lo Reactor Trip delay setpoint unless a pre-emptive reactor trip is performed.

9 ESO1 C-OATC If the SGWL Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint is reached for event 8, the Pre- C-SS reactor will not automatically trip requiring the crew to perform a loaded manual reactor trip Pre- HS-40007 C-OATC The first reactor trip handswitch used by the OATC will fail to trip the loaded Neutral C-SS reactor, the second handswitch will perform a reactor trip T1O FWO6C @ M-All #3 SG Eaulted (ELB, IRC) followed by High Containment Pressure 20-30%

11 ES1O C-UO Train A Main Steam Line Auto Isolation Eailure Pre- ES1 1 C-SS Train B Main Steam Line Auto Isolation Eailure loaded 12 CSO1 B C-OATC Containment Spray Pump B fails to auto start Pre- Critical C-SS loaded (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

Reactor power is approximately 22%. Power must be raised to 25% in order to synchronize the Main Generator to the grid per 12004DF-1 (Power Operation, Mode 1).

Verifiable Actions:

OATC withdraw control rods and/or dilute to establish a positive SUR and raise power to 25%

as read on the Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 2:

At 25% reactor power, the main generator is synchronized to the grid per 12004DF-1, and 13830-1, Main Generator Operation.

Verifiable Actions:

UO synchronizes the main generator to the power grid.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 3:

Main generator excitation is lost causing the generator to trip when the UO raises turbine load per 13800-1. The turbine will fail to automatically trip on the generator trip.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually trip turbine.

CREW control reactor response per AOP 18011-C, Turbine Trip Below P9.

Technical Specifications:

None 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:

The reactor coolant pump seal injection filter becomes clogged/blocked reducing seal injection flow below the minimum acceptable value.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC operate charging flow and seal injection flow control valves to restore seal injection flow to required operating band.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 5:

Steam Generator # 1 Pressure Channel PT-514 fails low.

Verifiable Actions:

None Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS, Condition A, EU le, Condition D, LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS, EU 4d(1), Condition D, ILCO 3.3.3, PAMS, Condition A, EU 8, LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation EU 13, Condition A Event 6:

Pressurizer spray valve (1 PV-455C) fails partially (approximately 60%) open causing an uncontrolled drop in pressurizer pressure.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC perform IQA of AOP 18000-C and close PV-455C.

OATC takes manual control of pressurizer heaters to restore pressure normal operating band.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Elow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits the crew may respond quickly enough to prevent violating this LCO.

4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 7:

Fault on 1 E switchgear results in loss of power to 1 AAO2. This fault will prevent automatic and manual actuation of all Train A ECCS components. AOP 18031-C, Section A.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Emergency trips DG-1A, reduces TDAFW pump flow, reduces turbine load as necessary.

OATC Verifies reactor power stays below license limit by using Control Rods and RCS boron as necessary.

UO Aligns Containment HVAC to Train B.

Technical Srecifications:

LCO 3.8.1 AC Electrical Sources, Conditions A, B and E, 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating, Condition A & 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater, Condition B.

Event 8:

  1. 3 BFRV fails closed. SGWL may lower to the Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint. If the SGWL Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint is reached, the reactor will fail to automatically trip. Additionally, when the reactor is attempted to be tripped manually, the first reactor trip handswitch used will fail to cause a reactor trip.

Shaft shear of the only operating MFP causes a complete loss of feedwater flow to all steam generators. SGWL may lower to the Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint. If the SGWL Lo-Lo Reactor Trip setpoint is reached, the reactor will fail to automatically trip. Additionally, when the reactor is attempted to be tripped manually, the first reactor trip handswitch used will fail to cause a reactor trip.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Perform IQA of AOP 18016-C to restore and control feedwater flow and SGWL.

OATC Recognize the need for a manual reactor trip, if required OATC Perform IOA of EOP 19000-C UO Perform IOA of EOP 19000-C Technical Specifications:

None 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events 9,10,11,12:

A fault occurs on Steam Generator # 3 Feed Line, IRC. The fault is non-isolable resulting in the SG blowing down into containment and rising containment pressure. Rising containment pressure will result in automatic SI, SLI, and Containment Spray actuations; additionally, CVI &

CIA actuations will occur. The crew must also isolate #3 SG. Furthermore, Train A & B Auto SLI will fail to initiate and Containment Spray Pump B will fail to automatically start on Train B Containment Spray actuation.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Verifies proper actuation of SI, CVI and CIA functions.

UO Manually actuate SLI.

UO Isolate all influent sources to (MEW & AFW) and effluent loads from (Blowdown, Sampling, Main Steam, ARVs) #3 SG.

OATC manually start Containment Spray Pump B.

Technical Specifications:

None The scenario may be stopped after the crew transitions to E-1 or ES1 .1 as required with NRC Chief Examiner approval.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Isolates Main Steam Lines, ARVs, Blowdown and Sampling from SG #3 in E-0 and/or E 2 to limit Reactor power excursion, RCS uncontrolled cool down to limit positive reactivity addition and limit PTS concerns prior to receiving an Orange path on CSFST Integrity Status Tree. Automatic isolation of Main Steam Lines will NOT occur requiring an operator action to prevent a PTS conditionS
  • Close Main & Bypass SlVs from SG#3 (step 3 of 19020-C)
  • Close ARV from SG#3 (step 9 of 19020-C)
  • Close Blowdown & Sampling valves from SG#3 (step 10 of 19020-C)
2) Isolates Main and Auxiliary Feedwater to #3 SG to limit Containment Pressure rise prior to receiving an Orange path on CSFST Containment Status Tree.
  • Close Main & Bypass FIVs to SG#3 (step 5 of 19020-C)
  • Close Motor & Turbine DAFW pump throttle valves to SG#3 (step 6 of 19020-C)
3) Manually start Containment Spray Pump B (no later than step 5.c RNO of 19251-C.) With the failure of AAO2, no Train A components will start. Leaving only one train of containment coolers operating in slow speed to mitigate the rising containment pressure.

Containment Spray Pump B is required to ensure heat & iodine removal capability for Containment atmosphere in an adverse environment. Automatic isolation of Main Steam Lines will NOT occur requiring an operator action to prevent a Containment overpressure condition.

6

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vocitle Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at approximately 22% power, EOL, start-up in progress.

(Base IC #17, snapped to IC # 172 for HL18 NRC Exam)

Eciuiment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: Raise reactor power and synchronize the main generator to the grid per 12004DF-1 (Power Operation, Mode 1), Section 4.1; Surveillance 14901 was completed 21 days ago. Containment mini-purge is in service in preparation for a containment entry next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

TU1 8 Auto Turbine Trip Failure dfwO78a LV-5245_DOP BFRVC Primary ESO1 Reactor Fails to Auto Trip ES1 0 Train A MSL Auto Isolation Failure ES1 1 Train B MSL Auto Isolation Failure CSO1 B Containment Spray Pump B Fails to Auto Start Overrides:

HS-40007 Neutral (C panel Rx. Trip hand switch)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A R-OATC Raise reactor power to 25% in preparation for synchronizing Main R-SS Generator with the Grid per 12004DF-1 2 N/A N-UO Synchronize Main Generator with Grid per 12004DF-1 and 13830-1 N-SS T3 GEO3 Main Generator Exciter fails when UO raises load after synchronizing causing a Main Generator trip Pre- TU1 8 C-UO Turbine fails to auto trip on generator trip loaded C-SS T4 CV2O @ C-OATC Seal Injection Filter Blockage requires OATC to manually adjust 90% C-SS charging and injection flow

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Voctle Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Exam iners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, BOL, steady state operations.

(Base IC # 10, snapped to IC # 173 for HL18 NRC Exam)

EQuiment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: Maintain power operations per 12004DF-1 (Power Operation, Mode 1) section 4.3.

Containment Mini-Purge in service for containment entry next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

ESO1 Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip ES02 Failure of Manual Reactor Trip TU18 Auto Turbine Trip Failure SIO8NB RWST Sludge Mixing Valve 10957/1 0958 Failure CV19A CVI Train A Auto Actuation Failure CV19B CVI Train B Auto Actuation Failure Overrides H50456A B Train PORV CLOSE HV-81 04 Emergency Borate valve to CLOSE Event MaIf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description Ti NI1OB @ I-OATC PRNI-42 fails high causing automatic inward rod motion. Following 100% I-SS completion of bA, switches are repositioned at NI Cab to remove N-UO failed detector from service.

TS-SS LCO 3.3.1-i, Condition A (immediately); Function 2.a, Condition D; Function 2.b, Condition E; Function 3, Condition E; Function 6, Condition E; Function 16.b!cld, Condition S (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />); Function 16.e, Condition R (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).

T2 CV13 @ I-OATC CVCS VCT level transmitter LV-112 fails high 100% I-SS T3 RFTKO2 C-UO RWST sludge mixing line pipe break with valve auto closure failure (95%-88% C-SS 20 minute TS-SS LCO 3.5.4, Condition B & Condition D (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) ramp) TR 13.1.7, Condition D (Immediate)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malt. Event Event No. No. Type* Description T4 RM0002 C-UO Cnmt Area Lo Range RE-0002 fails to 100%, CVI fails to actuate.

C-ss Pre Cvi 9A TS-SS LCO 3.3.6, FU3.d, Condition A Load CV19B 5 MFP A hi R-OATC Power reduction due to MFPT A high vibrations vib=TRUE N-UO MFP A Hi R-SS Vibes=6.0 T6 ELO6A M-ALL Loss of 13.8kV bus 1 NAB resulting in loss of 2 RCPs, 2 Condensate Pumps, and 1 Circ Water Pump ATWT 7 RDO7 C-QATC ATWT Auto rod motion fails after 1 minute (1:10 mm C-SS (Manual rod insertion or establishment of Emergency Boration flow is delay) Critical a critical step).

8 C-UO Turbine Auto Trip failure requiring Manual Trip Pre- C-SS loaded NOTE These malfunctions are to force crew to LOHS and are part of the overall MAJOR event.

T9 AFO2A M TDAFW trips on overspeed T9 AFO3B M B MDAFW pump coupling shears 10 HS0456A C-OATC B Train PORV fails to open automatically or manually, requires use Pre C-SS of Reactor Vessel Head Vents during Feed and Bleed of LOHS.

load Critical 11 Delete C-UO TDAFW mechanical over speed trip is repaired allowing restart of the AFO2A C-SS pump to feed the SGs.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

PRNI-42 fails high causing automatic inward rod motion. Following completion of bA, switches are repositioned at NI Cab to remove failed detector from service.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Recognize failure of PRNI OATC Perform IOA of AOP 18002-C.

UO Perform subsequent operator actions for failed PRNI at NI Cabinet Technical Specifications:

3.3.1-1, Condition A (immediately); Function 2.a, Condition D; Function 2.b, Condition E; Function 3, Condition E; Function 6, Condition E; Function 16.b/c/d, Condition S (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />); Function 16.e, Condition R (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).

Event 2:

CVCS VCT level transmitter LV-1 12 fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually places VCT divert valve LV-1 1 2A in the VCT position to stop letdown diversion to the RHUT and loss of VCT inventory.

OATC Aligns VCT for manual makeup to maintain VCT level when makeup is necessary.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 3:

An RWST sludge mixing line pipe break will occur with auto closure failure of the sludge mixing line isolation valves LV-10957/LV-10958.

Verifiable Actions.

UO Manually closes either LV-1 0957 or LV-1 0958 to isolate the sludge mixing line break. The valve hand switches are located on the QPCP.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.5.4, ECCS, Condition B and Condition D (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action)

TL LCO 13.1.7, (Condition D Immediate Action) 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:

Containment High Range Radiation monitor RE-002 fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually closes CVI dampers and starts the Piping Penetration Area Filtration Units.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.6, FU3.d, Condition A Event 5:

MFPT A will develop high vibrations requiring a rapid power reduction to < 70% power to remove MFPT A from service.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Inserts control rods and adjusts RCS boron concentration to facilitate the down power.

UO Reduces Turbine load per direction of 18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 6, 7, 8:

A loss of 13.8 kV bus 1 NAB will result in the loss of 2 RCPs, 2 Condensate pumps, and 1 circulating water pump which places the plant in an ATWT condition due to the trip of 2 RCPs while at power.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Initiates a rapid control rod insertion to reduce reactor power. After about 1 minute, auto rod motion will fail requiring the QATC to manually insert control rods.

OATC Initiates an emergency boration of the RCS through LV-1 1OA and LV-1 lOB since HV 8104 Emergency Boration valve will not open.

UO Manually trips the turbine which will not automatically trip. This will preserve SG levels during the ATWT event.

Technical Specifications:

None 4

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 9,10 TDAFW will trip on over speed coincident with a coupling shear of B MDAFW pump. MDAFW pump A is tagged out and no AFW flow will be available, leading to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink condition. PORV 456 will fail to open in auto or manual requiring the UO to open the reactor vessel head vents for improved heat removal capability.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Stops all running RCPs.

OATC Manually actuates SI (if not actuated on the Turbine Trip failure)

OATC Manually arms COPS and opens PORV-455.

UO Manually opens all Reactor Vessel Head Vent Isolation and Throttle valves.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 11:

A report from the field will indicate the TDAFW mechanical overspeed trip linkage has been repaired and the TDAFW pump may be used to regain AFW flow.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Closes TDAFW pump discharge throttle valves.

UO Holds HV-5106 TDAFW Steam Admission valve closed to reset governor ramp circuit while closing HV-1 5129 the TDAFW Trip and Throttle Valve.

UO Opens HV-1 5129 and HV-51 06 to start the TDAFW pump.

UO Opens desired TDAFW throttle valves to re-establish AFW flow.

The scenario may be stopped after the TDAFW pump is started and AFW flow is established with NRC Chief Examiner approval.

CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Either of the following:
a. Manually insert control rods following automatic & manual reactor trip per step 1 RNO of 19211-C, or
b. Emergency borate the RCS per step 4 of 19211-C
2) Arms COPS and opens PORV-455 to establish bleed path.
3) Establishment of reactor vessel head vent path for reactor bleed on loss of heat sink per step 38 RNO of 19231-C.

5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Voctle Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 201 3-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, MOL, steady state operations.

(Base IC # 14, snapped to IC # 174 for HL18 NRC Exam)

Euiment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: None Preloaded Malfunctions:

ES11 Train B MSL Auto Isolation Failure 9001a op sig = TRUE 9001 A FAIL = TRUE 9001b op sig = TRUE 9001B FAIL = TRUE C CLR A LO FAIL = TRUE C CLR B LO FAIL = TRUE lAO9b Instrument Air Compressor # 2 auto start failure.

lAO9d Instrument Air Compressor # 4 auto start failure.

RHO4B Failure of RHR pump B to auto start Overrides HS3007B Train B SLI Handswitch Failure NORMAL HS13006A Train A SG#1 BSIV Fail to Close on SLI or Manually OPEN Event MaIf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description Ti ALBO5- N/A Spurious AMSAC TROUBLE annunciator actuates.

E04 T2 RC1OA I-OATC NR Tc Loop # 1 fails high.

@100% I-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.1-1, Function 6,7 Condition E, LCO 3.3.2, FU5b, Condition I T3 TUO7 C-UO Inadvertent Main Turbine Runback.

C-SS R-OATC Decreasing reactor power from the turbine runback R-SS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Maif. Event Event No. No. Type* Description T4 CVO7 C-OATC Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips.

C-SS TS-SS INFO LCOs TR 13.1.5 Condition A and LCO TR 13.1.3 Condition A 5 N-OATC Restore normal charging & letdown N-SS T6 RCO9C l-SS Wide range Tc on loop 3 fails low.

@0%

TS-SS LCO 3.3.3, PAMS, Condition A, FU 13, Condition D LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown, Condition A, FU 3, Condition D T7 AC 3 C-UO Air compressor # 3 trips with failure of AC # 2 and AC # 4 to TRIP C-SS automatically start.

= TRUE T8 E507 N/A Spurious AMSAC Actuation due to technician error while investigating spurious AMSAC TROUBLE annunciator. This will result in a reactor turbine trip.

T9 RCO3C M-All DBA LOCA on RCS Loop #3 10 ES11 C-UO Train B MSL Auto Isolation Failure.

C-SS Train B SLI Hand switch Fails to operate Pre HS3007B Train A Bypass Steam Line Isolation Valve fail to close on SLI or loaded HS13006A from QMCB 11 RHO4B C-OATC RHR pump Train B fails to automatically start on an SI signal.

Pre- C-SS loaded Critical 12 Cnmt C-OATC Both Containment Spray discharge valves fail to open automatically Pre- Spray C-SS on CS signal.

loaded Discharge Critical valves auto open failures 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 13 Cnmt C-UO All Containment Coolers fail to automatically start on LOW speed on Pre- Coolers C-SS an Si signal.

loaded fail to auto Critical start on LOW speed (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1:

A spurious AMSAC TROUBLE annunciator is received.

Verifiable Actions:

None- The crew will ask C & T and/or engineering to investigate the trouble alarm.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 2:

Loop # 1 NR Tcold fails high.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Perform 1OA of AOP 18001-C and places control rods in manual.

Defeats the failed channel using the Tave and Delta T defeat switches.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1-1, Function 6, Condition E LCO 3.3.1-1, Function 7, Condition E LCO 3.3.1-1, Function 5b, Condition I Event 3:

Inadvertent Main Turbine Runback occurs.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Perform 1OA of AOP 18012-C.

UO Perform 1OA of AOP 18012-C.

Technical Specifications:

None 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4,5:

The Normal Charging Pump will trip. CVCS Charging and Letdown will be returned to service.

(NOTE: The Chief Examiner may decide to go to the next event after a charging pump is started and prior to placing Letdown in service).

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually closes the Letdown Orifices and the Letdown Isolation valves to stop flashing in the Letdown system.

OATC / UO Trends the RCP operating parameters on the IPC computer.

OATC Adjusts HC-182 Seal Flow Controller to maximum seal flow and adjusts Charging Flow Controller FC-121 to minimum.

OATC Starts a charging pump. (CCP)

OATC Adjusts HC-182 to obtain 8 -13 gpm seal injection and adjusts Charging Flow Controller FC-121 to obtain desired charging flow.

NOTE: The next malfunction may be entered at this point with NRC Chief Examiner discretion.

The following steps may not be completed in its entirety prior to subsequent events and completion of scenario.

OATC Places Letdown Pressure Controller PIC-131 to 50 75% demand.

OATC Places Letdown Temperature Controller TIC-i 30 in manual and adjusts to the recorded control room rounds position.

OATC Opens letdown isolations and letdown orifices.

OATC Adjusts PIC-i31 and places in AUTO and places TIC-i 30 in AUTO.

OATC Adjusts FIC-i2i, HC-i82 to maintain PRZR level and seal injection.

Technical Specifications:

LCO TR 13.1.5 Charging Pumps Operating LCO TR 13.1.3 Boration Flow Paths Operating Event 6:

The WR Tcold for loop # 3 will fail low. This will require a Tech Spec entry by the SS but no operator actions are required.

Verifiable Actions:

None Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.3, PAMS, Condition A, FU 3, Condition D LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown, Condition A, EU 3, Condition D 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 7:

Air compressor # 3 trips with failure of Air compressors # 2 and # 4 to automatically start.

Verifiable actions:

UO Manually starts Instrument Air compressor # 2 or # 4.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 8:

Spurious AMSAC Actuation due to technician error while investigating spurious AMSAC TROUBLE annunciator. Reactor trips on Turbine Trip.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Performs lOAs of E-O.

UO Performs lOAs of E-O.

SS-Performs lOAs of E-O, transitions to ES-O.1 and directs crew in actions to stabilize the plant.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 9. 11, 12,13:

RCS DBA LOCA.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually starts RHR pump B which fails to automatically start.

OATC Manually opens Containment Spray discharge isolation valves which fail to automatically open.

UO Manually starts Containment Coolers in LOW speed which fail to automatically start in LOW speed.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 10:

Train B MSL Auto Isolation Failure.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Recognizes Train B SLI auto actuation failure.

UO Manually actuates SLI.

Technical Specifications:

None 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 The scenario may be stopped during the performance of 19010-C, E-1 Response to Reactor or Secondary Coolant Leakage CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Manually starts RHR pump B to provide ECCS injection flow to prevent an inadequate core cooling event. RHR pump B is required to be started by the end of the OATC Initial Operator Actions.
2) Manually opens CS Pump A and B discharge isolation valves which fail to automatically start on a CS actuation signal to provide adequate Containment cooling and depressurization.
3) Manually starts both trains of Containment Coolers in LOW speed to provide for adequate Containment cooling and depressurization.

6

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Voqtle Scenario No.: 6 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power, EOL, steady state operations.

(Base IC # 19, snapped to IC # 175 for HL18 NRC Exam)

Equipment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B)

Turnover: Shifting NSCW Train A pumps preparing for DTO of NSCW pump # 5 later today for scheduled maintenance. Containment Mini-Purge is in service in preparation for a containment entry next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

CV23 NCP Fails to Auto Trip on SI ES2OAJB CIA AIB Actuation Failure GEl 2B PCB 161810 Auto Trip Failure Overrides None Event MaIf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 NA N-UO Shift NSCW pumps from 3 & 5 to 1 & 3 N-SS T2 test.uvl C-OATC Uncontrolled rod motion UCAUTO C-SS ROD T3 COOl C-UO Loss of condenser vacuum

@ 20% C-SS (120 sec ramp) Lowering turbine load and rector power in responp to rising condenser pressure i) 1e /-af 4 a t1?

4 Note to Sim Instr:

actions are taken. Final severity should be 10-12% with load lowered

. 10 MWe and vacuum pumps running. Vacuum should be targeted to stabilize about 25.5 Hg.

T4 ACO2A, C-UO In-service ACCW pump trips with stand-by pump auto start failure ACO3B C-SS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Manually actuating CIA to prevent discharging contaminated containment atmosphere to the environment no later than completion of OATC INITIAL ACTIONS of EOP 1 9000-C.
2) Tripping RCPs per Foldout page of either 19000-C, E-0 or 19001-C, ES-ti within 10 minutes of RCS pressure lowering to < 1375 psig.

8

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Maif. Event Event No. No. Type* Description T5 RC16 @ C-OATC Reactor vessel head leak develops within the capacity of the charging 0.05% C-SS system. This severity level results in approximately 30-35 gpm leak (240 sec rate.

ramp) TS-SS LCO 3.4.13, Condition A T6 RD13K C-OATC RCCA M2 (SDA) drops C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.1.4, Condition B T7 R-OATC Power reduction to < 75% within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per AOP direction.

N-UO R-SS 8 RC16 @ M-ALL LOCA Reactor head leak severity worsens leading to SI actuation 5% Critical and exceeding RCP trip criteria.

(240 second ramp) 9 ES2OA/B C-OATC CIA A/B Fail to Auto Actuate, requires manual closure of CIA valves Pre- C-UO by both the QATC on front panels and UO on back panels.

loaded C-SS Critical 10 CV23 C-OATC NCP fails to auto trip on SI Pre- C-SS loaded 11 GE12B C-UO PCB 161810 Auto Trip Failure Pre- C-SS loaded (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

Shift NSCW pumps from 3 & 5 to 1 & 3 per SOP 131 50A-1, section 4.2.1 for scheduled maintenance of NSCW pump # 5 later today.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Reads NOTES for section 4.2.1 of SOP 1315041.

UO Performs steps of section 4.2.1.1 of SOP 131 50A-1.

UO Reports completion of procedure to SS.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 2:

A rod control system failure causes uncontrolled rod motion requiring entry into AOP 18003-C.

No annunciators are received for this malfunction. The OATC will need to take manual rod control in order to stop rod motion. Failure to properly take manual rod control will result in a continuous rod insertion ultimately lowering temperature below the minimum for criticality requiring a reactor trip.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Perform IOA of AOP 18003-C, Section B UO Restore Tavg to program by adjusting turbine load OATC Adjust RCS boron concentration to restore Tavg to program (if necessary)

OATC Maintain power distribution Technical Specifications (while not expected to meet the recuirements to implement the following Technical Specifications, the listed TS will ONLY be applicable at the RNO of specific procedural steps)

Step B3 RNO LCO 3.1.5, Condition A (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />); LCO 3.1.6, Condition A (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)

Step B5.a RNO LCO 3.2.3, Condition A (30 minutes)

Step B5.b RNO LCO 3.2.4, Condition A 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3:

Air in-leakage into the condenser causes vacuum to slowly lower prompting entry into ARP 1701 9-1 and/or AOP 18040-C. TURB CONDSR LO VAC (ALB19-B04) will be received at25Hg of condenser vacuum. The crew will be required to take action to restore vacuum including reducing turbine load and reactor power. Failure to properly mitigate the effects of rising condenser pressure will result in a Main Turbine trip and a >P9 reactor trip.

Verifiable Actions:

UO May refer to ARP 17019-1 if annunciator received, however, the crew may go directly to AOP 18040-C.

UO I OATC Initiate AOP 18040-C OATC Maintain Tave/Tref matched OATC / UO Reduce power using AOP 18013-C Technical Specifications:

None Event 4:

A complete loss of ACCW occurs when the operating pump trips and the stand-by pump fails to automatically start requiring entry into AOP 18022-C. The UO will be required to manually start the stand-by ACCW pump in order to restore ACCW flow. Failure to restore flow in a timely manner (within 10 minutes) will require a reactor trip and securing of all RCPs due to loss of thermal barrier cooling.

Verifiable Actions:

UO May refer to ARP 17004-1 UO Initiate AOP 18022-C UO Start standby ACCW pump Technical Specifications:

None 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5:

Reactor vessel head develops a leak within the capacity of the charging system requiring entry into AQP 18004-C. The OATC will be required to take action to maintain pressurizer level and calculate a leak rate. Failure to properly mitigate the effects of the loss of reactor coolant will result in higher than normal make up rates, increasing containment radiation, temperature, pressure, and moisture, and increased pressurizer heater operation to maintain normal RCS &

pressurizer pressure.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Identify loss of reactor coolant occurring and report to 55.

OATC Maintain PRZR level

a. maximize charging flow
b. isolate letdown
c. start an additional charging pump OATC Maintain VCT level OATC Verify PRZR PORVs & Safety Valves are closed UO Stop any load changes in progress OATC I UO Monitor CNMT pressure OATC I UO Initiate RCS Leakage Calculation OATC I UO Locate & isolate the leak OATC I UO Restore normal charging & letdown if possible Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.13, Condition A Event 6, 7:

E1,

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 RCCA M2 (SDA) drops requiring entry into AOP 18003-C. The crew will be required to implement actions of the AOP including reducing power and turbine load to less than 75% within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from time of rod drop. This will be the reactivity manipulation for this scenario. Failure to effectively mitigate adverse effects of the rod drop will result in uneven fuel burnout (power distribution), and potential for exceeding local power and heat flux limitations.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Recognize dropped rod and report to SS.

UO Stop turbine loading changes OATC Check DRPI available and only one rod dropped OATC Check rod misaligned> 110 steps OATC I UO Maintain Tavg at program by adjusting turbine load OATC Maintain Tavg at program by dilution/boration or manual rod control OATC Maintain power distribution OATC Check ALB1 0-F02 is clear OATC I UO Reduce Thermal Power to less than 75% within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from time of rod drop using 1 2004E-1, Power Operation (Mode 1)

OATO Mairtkn reduced power level until rod recovery is initiated Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.1 .4, Condition B (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)

Event 8:

The severity of the reactor vessel head leak worsens. The OATC recognizes that the leak exceeds the capacity of the charging system and that pressurizer level can no longer be maintained. The OATC will initiate a manual reactor trip and safety injection. Failure to perform the appropriate actions will result in depressurizing the RCS and subsequent automatic reactor trip and safety injection.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Recognize inability to maintain pressurizer level and report same to the SS.

OATC I UO Perform IOA of EOP 19000-C OATC I UO Perform initial operator actions of EOP 19000-C Technical Specifications:

None 6

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 9:

CIA A & B fail to actuate automatically on SI or manually requiring the OATC & UO to manually align CIA at the QMCB & QHVC. Failure to perform this action could result in a discharge of the contaminated containment atmosphere to the environment.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Recognize CIA did not automatically actually OATC Attempt to manually actuate CIA using panel handswitches no later than the end of the OATC INITIAL ACTIONS, of 19000-C.

OATC I UO Manually align CIA at the QMCB and QHVC no later than the end of the OATC INITIAL ACTIONS, of 19000-C.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 10:

NCP fails to auto trip on SI requiring the OATC to manually trip the NCP. Failure to perform this action could result in overheating and subsequent loss of CCPs due to insufficient minif lows for the operating centrifugal charging pumps.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Recognize NCP failed to trip on SI OATC Manually trip NCP no later than step 3.d, OATC INITIAL ACTIONS, of 19000-C.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 11:

PCB 161810 (Main Generator Output Breaker) will fail to automatically open on the trip of the Main Turbine.

Verifiable Actions:

The UO will have to depress the TURB SEQ TRIP OVERRIDE pushbutton (1PB-161810A) and then manually open the PCB breaker using HS-1 61810 to prevent motoring of the Main Turbine.

Technical Specifications:

None The scenario be stopped any time after the RCPs are stopped in E-0 or E-1 at the NRC Chief Exami er iscretion.

7

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Voatle Scenario No.: 7 Op-Test No.: 2013-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The plant is at approximately 50% power, BOL, power ascension in progress.

(Base IC # 11, snapped to IC # 176 for HL1 8 NRC Exam)

Euiment OOS: A RHR Pump for motor repair (TS 3.5.2, Condition A), A MDAFW Pump for bearing replacement (TS 3.7.5, Condition B).

Turnover: Currently at step 4.1.4.31 of 1361 5-1 placing MFPT B in service as directed by step 4.1 .46b of 12004DF-1 (Power Operation Mode 1). Place 2 MFP in service and continue power ascent to 100% per 1 2004DF-1. Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on next shift.

Preloaded Malfunctions:

CV22 Boric Acid Flow Deviation Failure EL19B EDG lB Fail to Auto Start AF05C TDAFW Auto Start Failure Overrides RD17H RCCA D4 (CBD) inserts to 110 steps on reactor trip RD17M RCCA Cli (SDC) inserts to 10 steps on reactor trip HS3009 1 HV-3009, #1 SG Steam Supply to TDAFW Pump OPEN H5276A-STOP on Trigger 4 (Boric Acid Pump # 006, Train A)

HS276A-Amber light ON on Trigger 4.

ALB3636-D01-ON on Trigger 4 (480V MCC 1ABD TROUBLE)

Event Malt. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 NA R-OATC Raise Power to 100%

R-SS 2 N-UO Place 2 MFP on-line N-SS T3 I-OATC Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel Fails Low PRO3A I-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.1, Eu 9, Condition M T4 BA C-OATC Boric Acid Transfer Pump A will trip during auto makeup with Boric Transfer C-SS Acid Flow Deviation failing to stop an inadvertent dilution.

Pump A trips INFO TR LCO 13.1.3 Boration Flow Paths Operating.

Pre load CV22 Boric Acid Flow Deviation failure does NOT stop inadvertent dilution.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event MaIf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description T5 NSO3 C-UO A Train NSCW leak.

C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.7.8, Condition A LCO 3.7.9, Condition A may be entered if basin level is pumped too low due to the leak LCO 3.8.1, Condition B T6 ELO2 C-All LOSP, reactor trip required due to both 1 E Emergency Buses have ELO3 no power.

7 ELi 9B CUO 1 B EDG fails to auto start on LOSP. Can be started manually Pre- C-SS load T8 SGO6A M-All SGTR on SG #1 (300 gpm) @ the top of the Steam Generator U

@ 30% Tubes Ramp 120 seconds 9 AFO5C C-UO TDAFW pump fails to start. Can be started manually Pre- C-SS load 10 RD1 7H C-OATC RCCA D4 (CBD) inserts to 110 steps on reactor trip Pre- RD1 7M C-SS RCCA Cli (SDC) inserts to 10 steps on reactor trip.

load Critical Emergency Boration required due to 2+ stuck rods.

11 HS3009 C-UO HV-3009 (#1 SG Steam Supply to TDAFW Pump) fails to shut from Pre- C-SS QMCB. UO has to use alternate method in E-3 to isolate SG # 1.

load Critical (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1,2:

Power is approximately 50%. Crew will take the shift with a plant power ascension in progress.

Beginning at step 4.1.4.31 of 1361 5-1, as directed by 4.1.46.b of 12004DF-1, the crew will be expected to continue power ascension including placing second MFP in service.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Withdraw control rods and/or dilute to establish a positive SUR and raise power.

nd 2

UO Place MFP online.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 3:

Pressurizer level transmitter LT-459 fails low causing a letdown isolation.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Recognize pressurizer level failure and letdown isolated OATC Perform IOA of AOP 18001-C, Section D OATC Take manual control of FV-1 21. Adjust FV-1 21 and HV-1 82 to control RCP seal injection and pressurizer level OATC Place pressurizer level channel selector switches to unaffected channel(s)

UO9- OATC Restore normal charging and letdown Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1, Function 9, Condition M Event 4:

Boric Acid Transfer Pump A trips during automatic makeup, a boric acid flow deviation failure requires the OATC to manually stop automatic makeup using HS-40001 B to prevent an uncontrolled dilution. Once this has been addressed, the OATC may restart the makeup using the other BA Transfer Pump and place HS-40001 B to START to restart the makeup.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually controls boric acid make-up flow.

Technical Specifications:

TR ILCO 13.1.3 for Boric Acid Flow Paths Operating.

3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5:

NSCW leak on Train A requires entry into AOP 18021-C.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Place affected train (Train A) NSCW pump handswitches in PULL-TO-LOCK.

UO Depress both Emergency Stop pushbuttons for the affected (Train A) DG.

UO Place the affected train (Train A) components in PULL-TO-LOCK (CCP, SIP, RHR Pump, CS Pump, CCW Pump, CREFS, ESF Chiller-stop position).

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.7.8, Condition A LCO 3.7.9, Condition A may be entered if basin level is pumped too ow due to leak LCO 3.8.1, Condition B Event 6. 7:

A loss of off-site power occurs coincident with an auto-start failure of 1 B EDG resulting in a loss power to both 1 AAO2 and 1 BAO3. 1 B EDG may be manually started by the UO at step 3 of 19000-C thereby preventing entry into EOP 19100-C (Loss of All AC).

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually starts 1 B EDG per step 3 RNO of 19000-C.

Technical Specifications:

None Event 8.9.10.11:

A SGTR will occur on SG #1. urrent with the reactor trip, two RCCAs fail to fully insert.

Additionally, the TDAFW pump fails to auto start and 1 HV-3009 will fail to close from the QMCB.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually actuates safety injection.

UO Places SGBD hand switches in hard closed to prevent water hammer to SGBD system.

UO Throttles AFW flow to maintain SG levels 10 65%.The UO may perform an early operator action and isolate AFW flow to SG #1 once SG #1 level is> 10% NR with SS permission.

UO Manually starts TDAFW pump no later than step 3 of 19001-C or step 4 of 19100-C depending on the manual start of 18 EDG.

4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 UO Isolates ruptured SG #1 by performing the following.

  • Trips TDAFW pump (HV3009, #1 SG Steam Supply to TDAFW Pump, fails to close from QMCB) as long as at least one MDAFW pump is running
  • Closes SG #1 MSIV and Bypass valves these valves may be shut earlier on cooldown step in 19001

UO Blocks Low Steamne Pressure SI and SLI when RCS pressure <2000 psig (P-il) and then places the steam dumps in Steam Pressure Mode and opens the 3 cool down steam dumps for a maximum rate Cooldown. If main steam lines are isolated, ARVs (SGs 2, 3, and/or 4) will need to be used for cooldown.

UO Closes the steam dumps (or ARVs) after selected CETC is reached and controls CETC below this temperature (usually this is 518°F or 506°F depending on ruptured SG pressure).

OATC Initiates emergency boration to account for two RCCAs not fully inserted per step 7 RNO of 19001-C.

NOTE to examiners and Simbooth: Post trip there will be no instrument air, IF the OATC establishes Emergency Boration via the blender, these valves will fail on the loss of air. The only maintainable boration flow path will be through LV-1 1 2E through the normal charging path or LV-1 1 2E to the BIT. Allow time for air to faiLso the OATC can djust his emergency boration flow path if required prior to the insertion of thSTR./%

,4 OATC Depressurizes RCS with a PRZR PORV ftow to refill the pressurizer since no air will be available with the LOSP to the non-i E buses and PRZR Sprays will NOT be available.

Technical SDecifications:

None The scenario may be stopped after completion of step # 41 to stop appropriate ECCS pumps or earlier with NRC Chief Examiner concurrence.

5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Isolates SG #1 to limit secondary contamination and potential release environment by performing the following actions no later than the 19030-C procedure steps. These are steps 6 through 11 of 1 9030-C.
  • Trips TDAFW (HV-3009, #1 SG Steam Supply to TDAFW pump, fails to close from QMCB), if at least one MDAFW pump is running
  • Closes SG #1 MSIV and Bypass valves
2) Initiates Emergency Boration for two stuck control rods per step 7 RNO of 19001-C.
3) Depressurizes PRZR to refill the PRZR using ECCS injection to limit break flow by using PRZR PORV to meet conditions of step 37 of 19030-C.
4) UO manually starts the 1 B EDG at step 3 of 19000-C to restore 1 E electrical power and AFW flow
  • If the UO fails to start lB EDG, then starting the TDAFW Pump to restore AFW flow becomes a criticakno later than step 4 of 19100-C.

6

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Maif. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 3 NI A N-OATC Places Excess Letdown in service.

N-SS T4 PRO2A I-OATC Controlling PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high.

@ 100%. I-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 Condition A, FU 6 Condition E, LCO 3.3.1 FU 8a Condition M, LCO 3.3.1 FU 8b Condition E, LCO 3.3.2 Condition A, FU id Condition D, LCO 3.3.2 FU 8b Condition L (One hour action),

LCO 3.4.1 .a Condition A T5 TU1 1 C-UO Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with failure of standby EHC pump to C-SS automatically start.

T6 SGO1 B R-OATC Steam Generator # 2, 30 gpm SGTL requiring a rapid down power.

@3% N-UO R-SS TS-SS LCO 3.4.13 Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Condition B 7 SGO1 B M-ALL DBA SGTR on SG #2 (-450 gpm)

@45%

Ramp 180 seconds T8 CVO6A C-OATC One CCP trips on SI, the other CCP fails to auto start.

Or C-SS CVO6B NOTE to simbooth operator. The CCP that is placed on the trigger Critical to trip will have to be done after the crew decides which CCP to start in response to the SGTR, the pump will need to trip on SI sequence.

9 Preload C-UO MDAFW discharge throttle valve to SG # 2 will not shut from QMCB.

Critical C-SS T10 Insert C-OATC HV-9378A & B to Containment fail shut on SI (this will prevent Trigger on C-SS opening of PRZR sprays or Auxiliary Spray to force using PORVs for SI depressurization to refill PRZR during 19030-C, E-3 performance).

actuation Critical (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:

Dropped fuel assembly results in FHB High Radiation with failure of FHB HVAC to auto actuate.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Manually actuates FHB Isolation using 13320-C using AHS-2532A or AHS-2533A.

UO Resets FHB Actuation using AHS-2532B or AHS-2533B.

UO Shuts down the desired Post Accident Filter Unit by placing either AHS-2540 or AHS-2541 to STOP.

Technical Specifications:

TR 13.3.6 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation (Common System), Condition A TR 13.9.5 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System Condition A Event 2:

CVCS Letdown Hx Tube leak rupture requiring isolation of CVCS letdown due to high radiation on iRE-i 950 as directed per AR P-i 7100-C.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Closes Letdown Orifices HV-8149A, B, C and Letdown Isolations LV-459 and LV-460 to isolate the letdown leak to the ACCW Hx.

OATC Isolates letdown by closing Letdown Containment Isolations HV-8152 and HV-8160.

OATC Adjust PV-0i 31, sets to max pressure. Adjust TV-01 30, sets to max. temperature.

CREW Direct closing of Letdown Heat Exchanger of manual valves as follows:

  • (AB-A08) 1-i 208-U 6-041
  • (AB-A17) i-i217-U4-126
  • (AB-108) i-i 21 7-U4-129.

Technical Srecifications:

LCO 3.4.13, Condition A (Note: Leakage is isolated after OATC closes the Letdown Orifices and Isolations) 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3:

Excess Letdown will be placed in service to the seal return header to control PRZR level.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Sets 1 HC-1 23 to closed. (0% demand).

OATC Opens Excess Letdown Isolation valves 1 -HV-81 53 / 1 -HV-81 54.

OATC Adjusts 1HC-123 to establish maximum allowable Excess Letdown flow (30 gpm).

OATC Adjusts 1FIC-121 and 1HC-1 82 to control charging and seal injection flows.

Event 4:

Controlling PRZR Pressure channel PT-455 fails high resulting in PORV 455A opening and both PRZR sprays fully open, RCS pressure will be lowering rapidly.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Perform lOAs of 18001-C by closing PRZR sprays, closing PORV 455A, and operating heaters as necessary to control PRZR pressure.

OATC Manually closes PORV Block Valve 1 HV-8000A to stop LOCA to PRT.

OATC Controls PRZR heaters and sprays to control PRZR pressure.

OATC Sets PRZR Master Controller to 25% demand.

OATC Selects channel 457 / 456 on PRZR Pressure control switch PS-455F.

OATC Places PRZR heaters and PORV 455A in AUTO and ensures proper operation.

OATC Places PRZR Pressure Master Controller in AUTO and verifies proper operation.

OATC Selects channel PT-457 as controlling channel on pressure recorder PS-455G.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation Condition A LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 6, Condition E LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 8a, Condition M LCO 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation EU 8b, Condition E LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Eeatures Actuation System (ESEAS) Condition A LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Eeatures Actuation System (ESEAS) EU ld, Condition D LCO 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESEAS) EU 8b Condition L (one hour)

LCO 3.4.1 .a RCS Pressure, Temperature, & Elow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5:

Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with failure of the standby pump to automatically start.

Verifiable Actions:

UO Starts EHC pump B prior to Main Turbine / Reactor trip on low EHC pressure of 1100 psig.

This will prevent an unnecessary Turbine / Reactor trip and transient on the plant.

Technical Siecifications:

None Event 6:

A 30 gpm SGTL will occur on SG # 2 requiring a rapid down power per 18013-C, this is to preclude the tube leak from propagating into a SGTR per the EPRI Guidelines.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Borates as necessary for rapid down power to maintain Tavg Tref matched.

UO Reduces Turbine load at <5% per minute to maintain Tavg Tref matched.

Technical Srecifications:

LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B 5

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 7, 8, 9. 10:

A DBA SGTR will occur on SG # 2 requiring a plant trip and safety injection.

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Manually trips the reactor using either QMCB hand switch, manually actuates safety injection, and adjusts seal injection to RCPs between 8 to 13 gpm after the SI.

OATC Manually starts CCP B which will not auto start on the Safety Injection signal.

j: COP B may already be running as a mitigation measure for the SGTL. If so, this action will not be performed other than verifying that the pump is still running & providing flow.

UO Places SGBD hand switches in hard closed to prevent water hammer to SGBD system.

UO Throttles AFW flow to maintain SG levels 10 65%.The UO may perform an early operator action and isolate AFW flow to SG # 2 once SG # 2 level is> 10% NR with SS permission.

UO Isolates ruptured SG # 2 by performing the following.

  • Closes 1 HV-301 9, SG # 2 steam supply to TDAFW pump
  • Closes SG # 2 MSIV and Bypass valves

UO Blocks Low Steam line Pressure SI and SLI when RCS pressure <2000 psig (P-il) and then places the steam dumps in Steam Pressure Mode and opens the 3 cool down steam dumps for a maximum rate Cooldown.

UO Closes the steam dumps after selected CETC is reached and controls CETC below this temperature (usually this is 518°F or 506°F depending on ruptured SG pressure).

OATC Arms COPS and depressurizes RCS a PORV to refill the pressurizer.

The scenario may be stopped after step # 41 with chief examiner approval.

6

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL TASKS:

1) Starts CCP which will NOT start on the SI actuation signal, with the other CCP tripping on the SI actuation signal, High Head Safety Injection will NOT be available unless the CCP is manually started no later than step 2.b RNO of AOP 18009-C, or step 3.a RNO, OATC INITIAL ACTIONS, of EOP 19000-C.
2) Isolates SG #2 to limit secondary contamination and potential release environment by performing the following actions no later than the 19030-C procedure steps. These are steps 6 through 11 of 1 9030-C.
  • Closes 1 HV-301 9, SG # 2 Steam Supply to TDAFW pump
  • Closes SG # 2 MSIV and Bypass valves.
  • MDAFW pump B discharge valve HV-5132 will NOT shut, the crew will have to either place MDADW pump B in PTL or dispatch personnel to manually close HV 5132 OR direct an operator to manually isolate HV-5132 using a local manual isolation valve.
3) Depressurizes PRZR to refill the PRZR with ECCS injection and to limit break flow using a single PRZR PORV to meet conditions of step 37 of 19030-C.

7

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