ML22136A118
| ML22136A118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/2022 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML22136A118 (138) | |
Text
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Vogtle Units 3&4 Date of Examination:
March 2022 Examination Level:
Operating Test Number:
Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations R, M Determine if watch stander can relieve the watch.
G2.1.5 RO 2.9 Conduct of Operations R, N Given that 2 rods did not fully insert during a reactor trip; determine the volume to be added to the RCS and time needed to complete the boration in accordance with applicable procedures.
G2.1.20 RO 4.6 Equipment Control R, D Review completed surveillance ECS-OTS-17-001 for meeting acceptance criteria.
G2.2.12 RO 3.7 Radiation Control R, D, P Determine best route to limit personnel exposure and not to exceed exposure limits.
G 2.3.12 RO 3.2 Emergency Plan NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from EDQN 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank 1)
(P)revious 2 exams 1, randomly selected)
ES-301, Page 22 of 33 ML22136A118
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Vogtle Units 3&4 Date of Examination:
March 2022 Examination Level:
Operating Test Number:
Administrative Topic (see Note)
Type Code*
Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations R, M Determine if watch stander can relieve the watch and determine actions required for call-out during time off.
G2.1.5 SRO 3.9 Conduct of Operations R, N Determine requirements for Reactivity Management SRO.
G2.1.37 SRO 4.6 Equipment Control R, D, M Review completed surveillance PMS-OTS-017-001.
Determine TS requirements.
G 2.2.12 SRO 4.1 Radiation Control R, M Determine ODCM actions for failed VFS Rad Detector and Flow Detector.
G 2.3.11 SRO 4.3 Emergency Plan R, N Initial PAR Development.
G2.4.44 SRO 4.4 NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria:
(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from EDQN 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank 1)
(P)revious 2 exams 1, randomly selected)
ES-301, Page 22 of 33
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Vogtle Units 3&4 Date of Examination:
March 2022 Exam Level: RO
SRO-I
SRO-U
Operating Test No.: NRC 2022 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code*
Safety Function a.
Perform AOP-104 (Rod Control Malfunction) Attachment 5
==
Description:==
Rx Startup in progress, SD 4 Group 1 and 2 rods are at 267 steps. The operator uses AOP-104 Attachment 5 (ROD POSITION WITHDRAWAL ABOVE ARO POISTION) to restore SD 4 Group 1 and 2 rods to 264 steps.
SF1 A-311 AA2.02 RO/SRO 2.8 L, N, S 1
b.
Perform AOP-112 (Reactor Coolant Leak
==
Description:==
The operator is directed to perform AOP-112 (Reactor Coolant Leak) due to an uncontrolled reduction in RCS inventory. RCS leak rate is less than 100 gpm. CVS M/U Pump A will not start, operator will have to start CVS M/U Pump B and align makeup to makeup to the RCS.
SF2 RCS A4.01 RO/SRO 3.9 D, EN, S 2
c.
Perform AOP-103 (Steam Generator Tube Leak) to reduce RCS pressure
==
Description:==
The unit has been shutdown due to a steam generator tube leak. The operator is directed to perform AOP-103 starting with Step 34.
While attempting to lower pressure to less than 1920 psig, RCP spray valve fails to open so Auxiliary spray must be used to lower pressure.
SF3 A-304 AA1.01 RO/SRO 2.8 A, EN, L, M, S 3
(SRO-U) d.
Perform FR-H.4 (Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities)
==
Description:==
The unit has tripped following a manual Reactor trip. The operator has been directed to perform FR-H.4. The operator will be unable to open the steamline drain valves in Step 2 and will be forced to depressurize the affected SG using its associated PORV.
SF4P SGS A4.07 RO/SRO 3.7 A, D, EN, S 4P (SRO-U) e.
Perform AOP-207 (Loss of Turbine Load)
==
Description:==
The Unit is in Mode 1 at 50% Reactor Power and the Main Generator output breaker spuriously trips and the turbine failed to trip.
The operator is directed to perform AOP-207. The operator must trip the turbine manually at the PDSP. Once the turbine is tripped, after a slight delay, a Main Steam Safety Valve will lift which will require the operator to trip the Reactor using guidance from previous CA Step 5.
SF4S A-332 AA1.07 RO/SRO 3.8 A, D, P, S 4S (SRO-U)
f.
Perform AOP-702 (Loss of Component Cooling Water)
==
Description:==
The Unit is at 75% Reactor Power with CCS surge tank level lowering. The operator must recognize the tank level lowering and perform AOP-702 to address the lowering surge tank level. Procedure steps are unsuccessful requiring the operator to perform previous CA Step 1 to trip the reactor, secure RCPs, and lock off Both CCS Pumps.
SF8 A-317 AA1.01 RO/SRO 3.4 A, M, S 8
g.
Respond to a loss of reactive load control in accordance with AOP-301 (Main Generator Malfunction)
==
Description:==
The unit is at 75% Reactor Power. The operator has been directed to perform AOP-301 beginning with Step 10 due to reactive load changing without operator action. When RNO step 10 is unsuccessful using SP control, manual voltage control, and reducing MWe, the operator will trip the turbine.
SF6 ECS K6.08 RO/SRO 3.1 A, D, S 6
h.
Pump the Containment Sump to Waste Holdup Tanks
==
Description:==
The Unit is operating in MODE 5. The candidate is directed to perform 3-WLS-SOP-001 (Liquid Radwaste System) (Containment Sump Operations) Section 4.3, Manual Transfer of Containment Sump, to lower containment sump level to the bottom of the indicating range.
Pre-JPM brief required.
SF9 WLS A4.01 RO/SRO 2.6 D, S, P 9
(RO ONLY)
In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U i.
Perform AOP-602 (DAS Operations at Local Cabinets)
==
Description:==
The MCR has been evacuated to the RSR. Control from the RSR could NOT be established. The operator is directed to perform AOP-602 and must trip the Reactor, actuate CMTs, actuate PRHR, and actuate Containment Isolation from the local DAS processor cabinets.
SF7 A-307 AA1.01 RO/SRO 3.4 E, N, R 7
(SRO-U) j.
Perform local actions of FR-P.2 (Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock)
==
Description:==
The operator is directed to perform local actions of FR-P.2 Step 20.b to energize Accumulator Discharge MOVs to allow isolating accumulators.
SF3 FR-P.1 EA1.14 RO/SRO 3.2 E, N 3
k.
Perform local actions of AOP-702 (Loss of CCS)
==
Description:==
The operator is directed to perform the local actions of AOP-702 Step 10 d. RNO to locally isolate RNS HX B.
SF8 A-317 AA1.07 RO/SRO 2.9 E, N, R 8
(SRO-U)
All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for R /SRO-I/SRO-U
(A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)
(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6/4-6 /2-3
4
1
(control room system)
1
1
2 (randomly selected)
1 ES-301, Page 23 of 33
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Vogtle 3 & 4 Date of Exam: March 2022 Operating Test No.: N/A A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios 1
2 3
4 (SPARE)
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P R
I U
I1, I4 RO SRO-I SRO-U X
RX 4
5 1
3 1
1 0
NOR 6
1 1
1 1
I/C 1 2 4 5 7 8 9 10 1 3 7 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 19 4
4 2
MAJ 6
8 6
3 2
2 1
TS 3 4 4 5 4
0 2
2 I2, I3 RO SRO-I X
SRO-U RX 4
1 5 1
4 1
1 0
NOR 6
1 1
1 1
I/C 1 2 4 5 7 8 9 10 1 3 4 7 9 10 11 4 7 8 9 10 20 4
4 2
MAJ 6
8 6
3 2
2 1
TS 3 4 2 4 4
0 2
2 R2,R4 R6,R7 RO X
SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 1
1 0
NOR 0
1 1
1 I/C 1 4 5 10 4 9 10 11 8
4 4
2 MAJ 6
8 2
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2 R5 RO X
SRO-I SRO-U RX 4
5 2
1 1
0 NOR 6
1 1
1 1
I/C 2 7 8 9 1 3 7 2 3 5 11 11 4
4 2
MAJ 6
8 6
3 2
2 1
TS 0
0 2
2
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Instructions:
1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional I/C malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4.
For new reactor facility licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Vogtle 3 & 4 Date of Exam: March 2022 Operating Test No.: N/A A
P P
L I
C A
N T
E V
E N
T T
Y P
E Scenarios 1
2 3
4 (SPARE)
T O
T A
L M
I N
I M
U M(*)
CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P S
R O
A T
C B
O P
S R
O A
T C
B O
P R
I U
U1 RO SRO-I SRO-U X
RX 1 5 2
1 1
0 NOR 6
1 1
1 1
I/C 1 3 4 7 9 10 11 7
4 4
2 MAJ 8
1 2
2 1
TS 2 4 2
0 2
2 U2 RO SRO-I SRO-U X
RX 1
1 5 3
1 1
0 NOR 6
1 1
1 1
I/C 4 9 10 11 1 3 4 7 9 10 11 11 4
4 2
MAJ 8
8 2
2 2
1 TS 2 4 2
0 2
2 R1 RO X
SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
1 1
1 0
NOR 0
1 1
1 I/C 4 9 10 11 2 3 5 11 8
4 4
2 MAJ 8
6 1
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2 R3 RO X
SRO-I SRO-U RX 1
5 2
1 1
0 NOR 6
1 1
1 1
I/C 4 9 10 11 1 3 7 7
4 4
2 MAJ 8
8 2
2 2
1 TS 0
0 2
2
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Instructions:
1.
Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.
Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional I/C malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3.
Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4.
For new reactor facility licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.
ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Instructions:
Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Forms ES 303 1 and ES 303 3 describe the competency rating factors.)
(Note: Based on the scenarios chosen and the crew makeup, ATC and BOP (UO) positions will be filled by RO or SRO-I/U candidates. Form completed for control room positions, NOT individual candidates.)
Facility: Vogtle Units 3&4 Date of Examination: March 2022 Operating Test No.: n/a APPLICANTS RO SRO-I X
SRO-U RO (OATC) X SRO-I SRO-U RO (UO)
X SRO-I SRO-U RO SRO-I SRO-U X
Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 1
2 3
4 Interpret/Diagnose Events and Conditions 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 2,4, 6-9 1,4 8-11 1,4, 6-10 1-3, 6-8 1, 4, 5,6, 10 1,3, 5-8 2, 3, 5,6, 11 1,2, 4,5 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 Comply with and Use Procedures (1) 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 2,4, 6-9 1,4 8-11 1,4, 6-10 1-3, 6-8 1, 4, 5,6, 10 1,3, 5-8 2, 3, 5,6, 11 1,2, 4,5 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 Operate Control Boards (2) 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 2,4, 6-9 1,4 8-11 1,4, 6-10 1-3, 6-8 1, 4, 5,6, 10 1,3, 5-8 2, 3, 5,6, 11 1,2, 4,5 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 Communicate and Interact 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 2,4, 6-9 1,4 8-11 1,4, 6-10 1-3, 6-8 1, 4, 5,6, 10 1,3, 5-8 2, 3, 5,6, 11 1,2, 4,5 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3) 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1-10 1-11 1-11 1-8 Comply with and Use TS (3) 3, 4 2, 4 4, 5 2, 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3,5 2, 4 4, 5 2,3 Notes:
(1)
Includes TS compliance for an RO.
(2)
Optional for an SRO-U.
(3)
Only applicable to SROs.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 1 of 26 JPM Comments Generic Comments:
(
) items are things we should resolve/discuss before prep week.
For ADMIN JPMS: During PREP week, suggest preparing a classroom with laptops loaded with plant reference disks so we can administer the JPMs to the validators in the same place/setting that well be administering during exam week. Since one of the JPMs is time critical, suggest having a digital wall clock for the applicants to use.
Summary of Admin JPM usage:
RO COO-1 (A.1.a): Modified from 2016 NRC exam version RO COO-2 (A.1.b): NEW RO EC (A.2): Bank, 2017 NRC exam RO RC (A.3): Bank, 2018 NRC exam SRO Admin JPMs:
SRO COO-1 (A.1.a): Modified from 2016 NRC exam version SRO COO-2 (A.1.b): NEW SRO EC (A.2): Bank, 2018 NRC exam SRO RC (A.3): Modified from 2020 NRC exam version SRO EP (A.4): NEW Summary of Sim/In-plant usage (heavy use of AOP/EOP tasks):
JPM A: New JPM B: Bank, never on NRC exam JPM C: Modified from 2016 NRC exam version JPM D: Bank, 2017 NRC exam JPM E: Bank, 2020 NRC exam JPM F: Modified from 2016 version JPM G: Bank, 2017 NRC exam JPM H (RO-only): Bank, 2018 NRC exam (normal ops task)
JPM i: New, RCA JPM J: New, RCA JPM K: New, RCA
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 2 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments RO CONDUCT OF OPS (RO-COO-1, A.1.a): Determine if Watch Stander Can Relieve Watch NMP-AD-016-003, Scheduling & Calculating Work Hours, Section 4.1.2 & 4.1.3 NMP-AD-016-002, Scoping of Work Hour Limits NMP-AD-016-003, Scheduling and Calculating Work Hours Key: JPM Step 1 includes the picture of RO#1s work schedule, but JPM Step 2 and 3 dont include pictures of RO#2 and #3 schedules. Suggest deleting the picture of RO#1s schedule in JPM Step 1 because the handout provided to the applicants has all three schedules.
Note: The JPM is MODIFIED (M) from the 2016 NRC Exam JPM.
2016 version:
o RO#1: NO, because 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> worked in 7-day period o
RO#2: YES o
RO#3: NO, because <10 hr break OR >16 hrs in 24 hr period 2022 version:
o RO#1: NO, because 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> worked in 7-day period; work schedule includes Fire Brigade duties o
RO#2: NO because < 34-hour break in 9-day period; work schedule includes one-hour call at home.
o RO#3: YES
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 3 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments RO CONDUCT OF OPS (RO-COO-2, A.1.b): Determine Boration Rate/Volume: 2 rods 3-EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response 3-AOP-102, Emergency Boration I/C Focus: To ensure a boration is required at JPM Performance Step 1, suggest clarifying to the applicants (in the initial conditions) which two black rods did not fully insert, including their current positions. Otherwise, an applicant could potentially argue that a boration was not required if the two rods were gray.
I/C Focus: The first initiating cue statement may be missing the word emergency, i.e., you have been directed to determine if an emergency boration is / is NOT required. The same comment may apply to the 2nd initiating cue statement, i.e., IF an emergency boration is required, then include the makeup volume and how long the boration will take.
Cues: Initiating cues #4 (document your calculation, etc.) is not necessary because Initiating cue #2 already asks for this information.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 4 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments RO EQUIPMENT CONTROL (RO-EC, A.2): Ancillary DG Surveillance Review 3-ECS-OTS-17-001, ADG Quarterly Test, Attachment 1, Quarterly Operational Test Data Sheet, and Attachment 2, Ancillary Diesel Generator 1 Parameter Log JPM is DIRECT from the bank - - last used in 2017 NRC exam.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 5 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments RO RADIATION CONTROL (RO-RC, A.3): Determine ALARA Route NMP-HP-206, Issuance, Use, and Control of Radiation Work Permits The JPM is MODIFIED from 2018 NRC exam version. Dose rate, allowable dose limit, and dose alarm setpoints values are different, and the end-path choice is different.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 6 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments SRO CONDUCT OF OPS (SRO-COO-1, A.1.a): Replace Watchstander & Followup Reqts NMP-AD-016-003, Scheduling & Calculating Work Hours, Section 4.1.2 & 4.1.3 NMP-AD-016-002, Scoping of Work Hour Limits NMP-AD-016-003, Scheduling and Calculating Work Hours Key: JPM Step 1 includes the picture of RO#1s work schedule, but JPM Step 2 and 3 dont include pictures of RO#2 and #3 schedules. Suggest deleting the picture of RO#1s schedule in JPM Step 1 because the handout provided to the applicants has all three schedules.
- JPM is MODIFIED from the 2016 NRC exam version.
2016 version:
o RO#1: NO, because 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> worked in 7-day period o
RO#2: YES o
RO#3: NO, because <10 hr break OR >16 hrs in 24 hr period o
No SRO aspect for past NUREG-1021 revision.
2022 version:
o RO#1: NO, because 73 hours8.449074e-4 days <br />0.0203 hours <br />1.207011e-4 weeks <br />2.77765e-5 months <br /> worked in 7-day period; work schedule also includes Fire Brigade duties o
RO#2: NO because < 34-hour break in 9-day period; work schedule also includes one-hour call at home.
o RO#3: YES o
Added SRO aspect to evaluate admin requirements for the 3/25 incidental phone call to RO#2
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 7 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments SRO CONDUCT OF OPS (SRO-COO-2, A.1.b): Determine SRO Rx Management Reqts NMP-OS-001, Reactivity Management 3-GOP-306, Plant Startup Mode 2 to 25% Power 3-GOP-302, Reactor Startup Mode 3 to Mode 2 Perf Std: There are two correct answers to JPM Performance Step 3 about whose approval is required. An applicant who only chooses SS as the correct answer to the last part of the JPM can successfully argue that SS is the correct answer.
o 3-GOP-302, Section 2.0, Step 19 says that the Shift Supervisor (SS) agrees that the RM SRO is no longer required o NMP-OS-001, Section 4.5, Step 1 says that the Shift Manager (SM) agrees that that the RM SRO is no longer required.
o The SM could delegate the decision of suspending the RM SRO requirement.
o The procedures conflict, or one or the other contains a typo. (after the exam administration is complete, this item may require a CR)
Perf Std: There are two correct answers to JPM Performance Step 3 about when the RM SRO position can be suspended. An applicant who only says the reactor is stable in Mode 1 (but does not say that two feed pumps are required to be operating) can successfully argue that stable in Mode 1 is also the only correct answer.
o 3-GOP-302, Section 2.0, Step 19 says that the Reactor is stable in Mode 1.
o NMP-OS-001, Section 4.5, Step 1 says that the Reactor is stable in Mode 1, with at least two (2) MFPs operation are in service.
o The procedures conflict, or one or the other contains a typo. (after the exam administration is complete, this item may require a CR)
I/C Focus: The last bullet in Initiating Cue #2 has a grammar error (whos vs whose)
I/C Focus: Initiating Cue #1 (You are the Shift Supervisor) should be moved to the Initial Conditions section.
Cues: The Answer Sheet Handout provided to the applicants cues the applicants that either the SM or SS permission is required; the Answer Sheet Handout eliminates other plausible choices such as Ops Manager, Plant Manager, etc.
Perf Std: To ensure the performance standards have only one correct answer, to ensure plausibility of potentially incorrect choices, and to clarify the Initiating Cues, suggest re-wording the Initiating Cue Statement to become:
- 2. Identify the EARLIEST time WHEN the RM SRO function is no longer required, in accordance with the administrative procedure.
- 3. Identify the lowest level of authority whose approval is required to suspend the RM SRO function. (This doesnt resolve Comment #1 above)
JPM is NEW.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 8 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments SRO EQUIPMENT CONTROL (SRO-EC, A.2): Perform PAMS Instrument Channel Check 3-PMS-OTS-017-001, PAM Instrumentation Channel Check, Attachment 1, PAM Instrumentation Data Sheet TS 3.3.17, PAM Instrumentation JPM is DIRECT from bank, used previously P on 2018 exam; however, in the 10-8-21 outline submittal packager review process, we discussed using the following NEW JPM here in the equipment control category. Was there a scenario overlap issue with the IRWST JPM?
SRO CONDUCT OF OPS (SRO-COO-2, A.1.b): Evaluate Low IRWST Level 3-GEN-OTS-17-003, 24-Hour Tech Spec Surveillance, Data Sheet 1, Page 5 of 10 TS LCO 3.5.7, IRWST-Shutdown Mode 5, Condition D PXS-SOP-001, Passive Core Cooling System, Attachment 3, IRWST Operations Critical Step: In the standard for JPM Performance Step 5, need to include the reason why Function 8 (Containment Pressure - Extended Range) is inoperable. There seems to be a critical step missing inside the JPM for identifying that WR Ctmt Press being UNSAT.
Form ES-301-1: The 2018 NRC exam version only required TS 3.3.17 Function 3, whereas this version requires Functions 3 & 8 to be declared inoperable; it seems that this JPM may qualify as a (M) modified on the Form ES-301-1.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 9 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments SRO RADIATION CONTROL (SRO-RC, A.3): ODCM Actions for VFS Rad Monitor ODCM LCO 6.3.2, Gaseous Monitoring Instrumentation, Attachment 6, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation, Section 1, Radioactive Monitors providing Alarm but no Automatic Termination of Release JPM is MODIFIED from 2020 NRC Exam version.
2020 version:
o ODCM, Attachment 6, Section 2, Alarm and automatic release termination o
RCA Ventilation RM RE001 Fuel Handling Area Monitor, failed low o
RCA Ventilation Fuel Handling Flow Transmitter FT-013A, failed high o
Release CAN continue, Comp actions 46 & 47 2022 version:
o ODCM, Attachment 6, Section 1, Alarm but no release termination o
Plant Vent RM RE104B, Accident Hi Range Noble Gas Monitor, failed high o
Plant Vent RM RE102, Iodine Monitor, failed low o
Release may NOT continue, Comp actions 47 & 51
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 10 of 26 ADMIN JPM Comments SRO EMERGENCY PLAN (SRO-EP): PAR Determination NMP-EP-144, Protective Actions NMP-EP-144-F01 (PAR Worksheet)
Cues: The MES screenshot has the same wind direction values for the 10- and 60-meter heights; an applicant could select the elevated release point and still get the correct answer.
Suggest changing the 60-meter value to ensure applicants are being tested on their ability to use the NOTE for MES information for the PAR Worksheet.
I/C Focus: The MES screenshot provided in the applicants handout should be mentioned in the Initial Conditions.
Perf Std: In JPM Performance Step 8, and in the overall task standard, suggest modifying the standard to NOT include the time; the standard should only include the applicants name/signature and the date.
o Writing the time should not be critical in case an applicant uses the wrong time due to an exam administration technicality. The time critical aspect (15 minutes) still applies to the JPM; however, the applicants should not be penalized for writing the wrong minute due to the artificiality of the exam administration environment.
o On the other hand, an applicant should fail the JPM if he/she doesnt write their own name in the signature block with the correct date. Moreover, IF an applicant writes Emergency Director on the approval line, the examiner should ask a follow up question because the applicant may think he/she isnt allowed to sign the form even though the initial conditions stated that he/she is the ED. In this case the applicant could also fail the JPM.
Perf Std: Page 5 of 15 contains an evaluator note that says errors may be self-corrected provided the action would not have resulted in significant actual or potential consequences.
Once the applicants raise their hand, the time for self-correcting is over because this is operationally valid once the PAR Form has been transmitted. Suggest deleting the evaluator note.
This is a NEW JPM.
2018 version:
o LOCA outside Cnmt: FG1 General Emergency o
Fast Breaker assessment answer was no.
o Evacuate Zone A 2 mile, B5 2022 version:
o SGTR with open SG safety: FG1 General Emergency o
Fast Breaker assessment answer is no.
o Evacuate A, B5 2 mile, & SRS 5 mile
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 11 of 26 Simulator JPMs JPM A: Restore SD4 Group 1 & 2 Rods to 264 Steps per AOP-104 (SF1: Reactivity Control)
AOP-104, Rod Control Malfunction, Attachment 5, Rod Position Withdrawal Above ARO Position Critical Step: JPM Performance Step 6 should be critical; to select Normal Rod Sequence, otherwise SD4 bank will remain selected.
I/C Focus: Initial Conditions #2 and #3 should probably be past tense grammatically. For example, The crew was performing,. and SD4 G1 and G2 rods were withdrawn.
I/C Focus: The Initial Conditions should say that the crew entered AOP-104.
NEW JPM.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 12 of 26 Simulator JPMs JPM B: Perform AOP-112 RCS Leak (SF2: Inventory Control) (ALT PATH) 3-AOP-112, Reactor Coolant Leak The op test already has 5 alternate path JPMs; suggest converting this JPM to not be alternate path by allowing the applicants to perform subsequent AOP-112 steps to isolate LD and/or reduce the makeup capacity after PZR level turns upward.
o IF we retain this JPM as alternate path, THEN the simulator load should be modified to ensure at JPM Step 6, that the B M/U pump trips IF the applicants use it first.
Form ES-301-2 should not identify L (Low Power/Shutdown) because the Unit is in Mode 1.
I/C Focus and/or Cues: Initial Conditions should include information that pressurizer level is lowering; the 2nd item in the Initiating Cues (uncontrolled reduction in RCS inventory) is not necessary if the Initial Conditions contain the information.
I/C Focus: Initiating Cue #3 (no one in containment) can be moved to the Initial Conditions.
I/C Focus: The applicants initiating cue should only be to perform AOP-112.
Ensure no AOP-112 actions performed in the scenarios.
DIRECT from bank - - not been on any NRC exams.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 13 of 26 Simulator JPMs JPM C: Depressurize RCS w/ SGTL per AOP-103 (SF3: Pressure Control) (ALT PATH)
AOP-103, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Step 34 Form ES-301-2 should identify this JPM as MODIFIED instead of new because it is like the 2016 NRC exam JPM version, which required using ADS to depressurize the RCS.
Perf Std: The overall task standard should identify what actions must be performed.
Critical Step: For JPM Performance Step 18, or for Performance Step 26, the standard should be that the applicants must begin the auxiliary method of depressurization before the PZR safeties open.
We should consolidate some of the AOP-103, Step 35b RNO steps into less pages; the JPM has 34 pages and may be cumbersome to navigate. Perhaps shrink the screenshots down to allow multiple Step 35b RNO items on a page.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 14 of 26 Simulator JPMs JPM D: Perform FR-H.4 (SF4P: Heat Removal Primary) (ALT PATH)
FR-H.4, Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities Form ES-301-2 should identify this JPM as D DIRECT from bank because it was used on the 2017 NRC Exam.
I/C Focus: The Initial Conditions should say why FR-H.4 entry was required, i.e., pressure in SG #1 is at 1200 psig and slowly rising.
Note: The reason why this JPM is acceptable for safety function 4P (Primary) is because the AP1000 K/A Catalog, Steam Generator System (SGS) K/A A4.07 (ability to manually operate and monitor SG PORV control in the control room) directly hits the alternate path action being taken by the applicants. The FR-H.2 family of K/As dont have a K/A associated with the SG PORVs. The written exam outline skyscraper only identifies FR-H.2 as safety function 4. The Background Document (3-EOP-FR-H.4B) says the basis for Step 2 of FR-H.4 is to restore the SG for RCS Temperature Control.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 15 of 26 Simulator JPMs JPM E: Perform AOP-207, Turbine Load Loss (SF4S: Secondary Heat Removal) (ALT PATH)
AOP-207, Loss of Turbine Load Perf Std: JPM Step 24 (alternate path step to trip reactor) doesnt specify how long the applicant has to trip the reactor before failing the JPM. Suggest running the JPM without manually tripping the reactor after SGS-V030A opens and see what bad things happen.
DIRECT from bank, used in 2020 NRC Exam.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 16 of 26 Simulator JPMs JPM F: Perform AOP-702, for a CCS Leak (SF8: Plant Service Systems) (ALT PATH)
AOP-702, Loss of Component Cooling Water Form ES-301-2 should identify this JPM as M (Modified) because it was modified from the JPM used on the 2016 NRC Exam.
Ensure no overlap with RO Q#6.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 17 of 26 Simulator JPMs JPM G: Respond to a Loss of Reactive Load (SF6: Electrical) (ALT PATH)
AOP-301, Main Generator Malfunction, Step 10 DIRECT from bank; used on 2017 NRC exam
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 18 of 26 Simulator JPMs JPM H: Pump Cnmt Sump to WHTs (SF9: Rad Release)
WLS-SOP-001, Liquid Radwaste System, Attachment 6, Containment Sump Operations, Section 4.3, Manual Pump Down of Containment Sump Form ES-301-2 should include a P (Previous 2 exams) because this JPM was used on the 2018 NRC Exam.
DIRECT from Bank; used on 2018 NRC Exam
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 19 of 26 IN-PLANT JPMS JPM i: Trip Rx + CMTs + PRHR + CIS per AOP-602 (SF7: Instrumentation)
AOP-602, DAS Operations at Local Cabinets The JPM K/A should be A-307, DAS Operation at Local Cabinets, AA1.01 (see below) since the A-307 K/A is more representative of the task being performed by the applicants and is listed as SF7 in the written exam outline skyscraper in T1G1.
[Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to diverse actuation system operation at local cabinets: AA 1.01 Passive core cooling system.]
Perf Std: The standard for JPM Step 1 should include where the applicant must identify the keys are located.
JPM Step 12 should not indicate START ALTERNATE PATH because this JPM is not designated as an alternate path JPM.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 20 of 26 IN-PLANT JPMS JPM J: Close Accumulator Discharge MOV breakers per FR-P.2 (SF3: Pressure Control)
FR-P.2, Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock, Step 20.b JPM is NEW, RCA
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 21 of 26 IN-PLANT JPMS JPM K: Isolate RNS HX B per AOP-702 (SF8: Plant Service System)
AOP-702, Loss of CCS, Step 10.RNO.d and 10.RNO.e JPM NEW, RCA.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 22 of 26 Scenario Comments The *underlined asterisked scenario events are the events I credited as not being used on the previous 2 NRC exams.
Yellow highlighted arrow (
) items are things we should resolve/discuss before prep week.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 23 of 26 NRC Scenario 1: ATWS & Loss of Heat Sink (100% power)
- Event 1 - Feedwater Heater 4A leak (UO)
- Event 2 - Spent Fuel Pump A Disch FT fails low (OATC)
Event 3 - MCR Iodine RM B fails low (TS SRO only)
- Event 4 - TCS Pump A trip; standby f-t-s (UO)
[CT: Start B TCS Pump before manual/auto turbine trip (3 minutes)]
Event 5 - SG PORV fails 30% open (R-OATC + UO + TS SRO)
Form ES-D-1 should assign reactivity credit (R) to OATC instead of I/C credit to OATC Ensure PORV 30% value creates ample OATC opportunity for rods/boration/controlling Tavg
- Event 6 - MAJOR EVENT: Spurious FW Isolation Signal & ATWS Event 7 - Malfunction after EOP entry - Reactor fails to trip (OATC)
Suggest delaying the rods to drop; not happen after just one RTS switch turned, but after pre-determined time delay, or outside actions from CR completed. This helps to shorten the CT time in Event 9 and ensure new EOP actions, i.e., different event.
Event 8 - Malfunction after EOP entry - Turbine Stop & Control Valves f-t-c (OATC)
Event 9 - Malfunction after EOP entry - PRHR fails to auto-actuate (OATC)
[CT: Start one SUFW Pump before FR-H.1 bleed & feed criteria (65 minutes)]
Event 10 - Malfunction after EOP entry - CCS Pump trip; standby f-t-s (UO)
Manual control of auto-function: Event 1 Tech Specs: Event 3 & Event 5 Instrument/component malfunctions after EOP entry = four CTs: TWO EOPs entered = one (E0)
EOP contingencies = FR-H.1 (one)
- Scenario significantly modified from 2018 and 2020 exams, IAW ES-301 pg 15, Appendix D pg D-7, and OL Feedback Item 301.20; Events 1 & 6.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 24 of 26 NRC Scenario #2: SGTR (50% power)
- Event 1 - Turb Bypass Valve Fails Open (R-OATC + UO)
Form ES-D-1 should assign reactivity credit (R) to OATC instead of I/C credit to OATC.
Ensure BYP Vlv failure % creates ample OATC opportunity for rods/boration/controlling Tavg Event 2 - Containment Temperature Element fails high (SRO TS only)
- Event 3 - CVS Demin Bed A clog (OATC)
Event 4 - 35 gpm SGTL (OATC + SRO TS)
ES-301, Attachment 2 requires that the scenario must have acceptable grading criteria for crediting a leak rate calculation as a verifiable action. Suggest making the criteria to be that operator determines leak rate to be less than 50 gpm (actual value is 35 gpm).
Form ES-D-1 has typo: leak rate calculation will be performed by OATC, not UO Event 5 - Rapid Power Reduction (R-UO)
Suggest having rods in manual at turnover due to problem with auto; this would allow R credit to OATC.
Event 6 - Secure CDS Pump (N-UO)
- Event 7 - Hotwell Recirc FCV Controller fails in AUTO (UO)
The title of this event on ES-D-1 and inside scenario ES-D-2 is misleading, i.e., no seizure. The name of the event should be related to Hotwell Recirc FCV Controller Failure in AUTO.
Suggest verifying that without operator action this could be credited as a critical task.
Event 8 - MAJOR EVENT: SGTR Event 9 - Malfunction after EOP entry - PRHR fails to auto-actuate (OATC)
[CT: Actuate PRHR (DAS) before ??]
Suggest incorporating a failure of the 66.8% CVS M/U Auto-Isolation, and changing the CT criteria to say Actuate PRHR before 97% #1 SG NR level. Add to scenario how long it takes to get to 97% SG NR level.
Scenario still has FR-H.1 entry CT criteria listed everywhere even though FR-H.1 entry wont exist.
Event 10 - Malfunction after EOP entry - BDS Auto-Isolation fails (OATC)
[CT: Isolate before E-3, Step 7]
Event 11 - Malfunction after EOP entry - RNS auto-isolation failure (OATC + UO)
Manual control of auto-function: Event 7 Tech Specs = two Instrument/component malfunctions after EOP entry = three CTs: TWO EOPs entered = two (E-0 and E-3)
EOP contingencies = zero
- Scenario significantly modified from 2018 and 2020 exams, IAW ES-301 pg 15, Appendix D pg D-7, and OL Feedback Item 301.20; Events 1, 3 & 7.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 25 of 26 NRC Scenario #3: SG MSIV Closes + Faulted SG IC (75%)
Event 1 - Adjust AFD Setpoints (R-OATC)
Event 2 - CDS Pump Degraded & Stby Pump f-t-s (UO)
Why dont we just trip the CDS Pump? Why is degradation needed? We may not see a failure of the standby pump to auto-start if the running CDS Pump is only degraded.
This event may contain a CT if the applicants never manually start the standby pump.
Event 3 - Feed Reg Valve slowly fails open (UO)
[CT: Control SG level to prevent auto OR manual reactor trip]
Event 5 - PCCWST Outlet AOV fails open (UO + SRO TS)
- Event 6 - MAJOR EVENT #1: SG #1 MSIV Closure & Safeguards Actuation Event 7 - Malfunction after EOP entry - PRHR fails to auto-actuate (OATC)
[CT: Actuate PRHR before RCS pressure reaches 2485 psig]
Event 9 - Malfunction after EOP entry - SG 2 MSIV fail to auto-close (OATC)
Event 10 - MAJOR EVENT #2: Faulted SG 1 Inside Containment Manual control of auto-function: Event 3 and 4 Tech Specs: two Instrument/component malfunctions after EOP entry = three CTs: TWO EOPs entered = two (E0, E1)
EOP contingencies = zero
- Scenario significantly modified from 2018 and 2020 exams, IAW ES-301 pg 15, Appendix D pg D-7, and OL Feedback Item 301.20; Events 4, 6 and 8.
Vogtle March 2022 Draft Op Test Comments SECURE EXAM MATERIAL Page 26 of 26 NOTE: I re-ordered Events and Changed Event Numbers for these Comments NRC Scenario #4: LOCA outside Cnmt (17%)
- Event 1 - Raise power to close steam dumps (R-OATC + N-UO)
Suggest combining Event 1 and Event 2 into ONE event because these two events will represent ONE normal evolution for the UO and ONE reactivity credit for the OATC on Form ES-D-1 and in the scenario ES-D-2 pages. Suggest adding new Event 8 at the end of the scenario to compensate for combining these Events 1 & 2.
- Event 1 - Transfer Steam Dumps to Tavg control See comment above.
[CT: Manually Control the spray FCV before auto/manual reactor trip setpoint 1955 psig]
Suggest moving this event AFTER the SG Safety Valve event (reason provided below in Event 4 comment)
DNB Tech Spec is weak (may not occur) because RCS pressure may not lower to DNB Tech Spec setpoint when an applicant closes spray valve quickly.
Event 2 - SG1 Safety CIV lifts and stays open (C-UO + SRO TS)
Suggest swapping Events 3 and 4, i.e., in other words, have the SG Safety event occur first, to ensure the turbine load ramp will be in progress - otherwise a crew may stop the load ramp after the spray valve failure and well have to wait until they get permission to continue.
Suggest only assigning Component (C) failure credit to the UO on the ES-D-1 because the SG Safety Valve is a BOP piece of equipment and the BOP will perform the action to stop turbine and implement AOP.
- Event 4 - SWS Fan Trip (UO)
Event 6 - Malfunction after EOP entry - Div D Remote Node Controller failure (OATC)
Event 7 - Malfunction after EOP entry - RCP 2B CCS fail to close (OATC)
[CT: Manually close return AOV before 100% CCS level (overflow to drains); 55 minutes after Event 7]
Event 8 - Malfunction after EOP entry - VCS A Fan Trip (OATC)
Since Event 1 & 2 are combined, suggest adding this event, which was identified as optional.
Manual control of auto-function: E3 Tech Specs: two Instrument/component malfunctions after EOP entry = three CTs: TWO EOPs entered = two (E0 & E1)
EOP contingencies = one (ECA-1.1)
- Scenario significantly modified from 2018 and 2020 exams, IAW ES-301 pg 15, Appendix D pg D-7, and OL Feedback Item 301.20; Events 1, 3, 4 & 5
ES-401N AP-1000 Examination Outline Form ES-401N-2 Facility: VOGTLE UNITS 3 & 4 Date of Exam: MARCH 2022 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 A
2 A
3 A
4 G*
Total A2 G*
Total
- 1.
Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1
3 3
4 N/A 4
2 N/A 2
18 4
2 6
2 2
2 1
2 1
1 9
2 2
4 Tier Totals 5
5 5
6 3
3 27 6
4 10
- 2.
Plant Systems 1
3 2
3 2
2 2
3 3
3 3
2 28 3
2 5
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
10 2
1 3
Tier Totals 4
3 4
3 3
3 4
4 4
4 2
38 5
3 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1
2 3
4 10 1
2 3
4 7
2 3
2 3
2 2
1 2
Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline section (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)
- 2.
The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.
The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3.
Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401N for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4.
Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5.
Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
- 7.
The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401N for the applicable K/As.
- 8.
On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 above does not apply.) Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401N-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
G* Generic K/As
ES-401N 2
Form ES-401N-2 ES-401N AP-1000 Examination Outline Form ES-401N-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 A
1 A
2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR E-0, Reactor Trip or Safeguards Actuation / 1, 2, 3, 4 R
EK 2.06 Unavailability of either the startup feedwater pumps or passive residual heat removal system 3.6 ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response / 1, 2, 3, 4
ES-1.3, ADS Stage 1-3 Actuation Response / 3 S
EA 2.04 Fuel pool cask loading pit level 2.6 ES-1.4, ADS Stage 4 Actuation Response / 3 R
EK 3.01 Proper operation of ADS Stage 4 3.7 A-313, Uncontrolled Cooldown / 4 R
AK 2.03 Effect of changing feedwater temperature on reactor power (nuclear instrumentation system, calorimetric, and T) 3.7 A-336, Malfunction of Protection and Safety Monitoring System / 7 R
AA 1.14 Reactor trip system 4.0 E-1, Loss-of-Coolant Accident / 2, 3 R
EA 1.16 Containment recirculation cooling system 2.7 A-342, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction / 1, 2, 3, 4 S
EA 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation 4.7 A-337, Passive RHR Heat Exchanger Leak / 4 A-343, Loss of Normal Residual Heat Removal / 4 S
AA 2.03 Component cooling water system to normal residual heat removal system heat exchanger flow 2.7 A-317, Loss of Component Cooling Water
/ 8 R
AK 3.02 Stopping all reactor coolant pumps and variable frequency drives 3.4 ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown / 4 R
EK 1.03 Chemical and volume control system 2.8 FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / 1 R
EA 1.05 Passive residual heat removal system actuation, reset, and/or flow control 3.6 E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 R
EG 2.4.14 Knowledge of general guidelines for emergency and abnormal operating procedures usage 3.8 E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation /
4 R
EK 1.04 Main steam system 3.4 A-301, Rapid Power Reduction / 1 R
AK 3.02 Energizing pressurizer backup heaters 2.6 A-307, DAS Operations at Local Cabinets
/ 7 R
AK 3.02 Operation of diverse actuation system manual enable switch 3.3 FR-C.1, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 R
EA 2.02 Reactor coolant system subcooling 3.7 A-323, Loss of 6.9-kV, 4,160-V, or 480-V Bus Power / 6 R
AK 2.05 Loss of power to non-Class IE DC and UPS system 2.7 ES-1.1, Passive Safety System Termination / 3 R
EA 2.01 Reactor coolant system pressure, temperature, and pressurizer level 3.2 A-345, Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4 S
AG 2.2.23 Ability to track TS limiting conditions for operation 4.6 A-329, Loss of Instrument Air / 8 R
AG 2.1.19 Ability to use available indications to evaluate system or component status 3.9 ECA-1.1, Loss-of-Coolant Accident Outside Containment / 3 R
EA 1.02 Diverse actuation system 3.6 FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink /
4 S
EA 2.01 Passive residual heat removal system flow 3.7 SDP-1, Response to Loss of RCS Inventory During Shutdown / 2 S
EA 2.04 Normal residual heat removal system flow and/or pump amps 3.3 SDP-2 Response to Loss of RNS During Shutdown / 4 R
EK 1.04 Diverse actuation system (OE related) 3.6 K/A Category Totals:
3 3
4 4
2 4
2 2
Group Point Total:
18/
6
ES-401N 3
Form ES-401N-2 ES-401N AP-1000 Examination Outline Form ES-401N-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 A
1 A
2 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR A-311, Rod Control System Malfunction / 1 R
AK 1.01 Chemical and volume control system 2.8 A-308, Loss of Control Room AC / 8 S
AA 2.02 Nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system flow 2.8 A-320, Loss of Circulating Water / 8 A-302, Emergency Boration / 1 A-327, Startup Feedwater System Malfunction / 4 A-328, Malfunction of Feedwater Heaters and Extraction Steam / 4 FR-I.1 Response to High Pressurizer Level / 2 A-314, Fuel-Handling Incident / 8 A-304, Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 A-333, Main Turbine Malfunction / 4 FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure /
5 SDP-4, Response to Rising Nuclear Flux During Shutdown / 1 SDP-5, Response to RCS Cold Overpressure During Shutdown / 3 SDP-6 Response to Unexpected RCS Temperature Changes During Shutdown / 4 A-306, Evacuation of Control Room / 8 A-318, Condensate System Malfunctions / 4 R
AK 2.02 Deaerator storage tank level outside of normal operating band 2.7 FR-C-2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling / 4 FR-C.3, Response to Saturated Core Cooling / 4 R
EK 3.02 Stopping the reactor coolant pumps 3.2 FR-H.2, Response to Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 S
EG 2.4.17 Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures terms and definitions 4.3 FR-Z.2, Response to Containment Flooding / 5 FR-Z.3, Response to High Containment Radiation /
9 FR-Z.4, Response to Low Containment Pressure /
5 R
EA 1.01 Passive containment cooling system 2.8 A-332, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip / 4 R
AA 2.02 Steam generator level and/or pressure 2.8 ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization / 4 A-321, Loss of Data Display and Processing System / 7 R
AG 2.1.19 Ability to use available indications to evaluate system or component status 3.9 FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition / 3 R
EK 1.07 Reactor coolant system (head vents, pressurizer normal spray, and/or heaters) 2.9 A-340, Reactor Coolant Leak / 2 FR-1.2, Response to Low Pressurized Level / 2 FR-1.3, Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel / 2 S
EA 2.03 Chemical and volume control system makeup flow 2.7 A-326, Feedwater System Malfunctions / 4 R
AK 2.03 Main feed line break 2.6
ES-401N 4
Form ES-401N-2 A-331, Loss of Plant DC Power or Batteries / 6 R
AA 1.01 250-V DC switchboards Class 1E 3.2 A-348, Degraded Grid / 6 S
AG2.4.16 Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines, such as operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, or severe accident management guidelines 4.4 K/A Category Totals:
2 2
1 2
1 1
Group Point Total:
9/4 2 2
ES-401N 5
Form ES-401N-2 ES-401N AP-1000 Examination Outline Form ES-401N-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
System Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 A
2 A
3 A
4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Reactor Coolant / 2, 4 R
S SF2 K 1.04 Containment system SF4 A 2.23 Failure of PZR heaters 3.4 3.6 Steam Generator / 4 R R K 2.08 Main feedwater control valve control power K 3.03 Main steam system 2.5 3.5 Normal Residual Heat Removal /
4 R
K 3.04 Spent fuel pool cooling system 2.8 Passive Residual Heat Removal
/4 R
K 4.05 Passive residual heat removal system flow control 3.6 Passive Core Cooling / 2 R
K 5.03 Failure of reactor coolant pump to trip 4.3 Component Cooling Water / 8 R
K 6.17 Normal residual heat removal system heat exchanger tube leak 3.1 Pressurizer Pressure Control / 3 R
A 1.14 Makeup flow 3.0 Automatic Depressurization / 3 R
R A 2.01 Diverse actuation system G2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits 4.0 4.0 Reactor Trip System / 7 R
A 3.13 Steam generator narrow-range water levelhigh-2 reactor trip 4.1 Engineered Safeguards Actuation
/ 2 R
A 4.03 Steamline isolation actuation 4.1 Diverse Actuation / 7 R
R G2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures A 4.11 In-containment refueling water storage tank injection line valve actuation 3.3 4.0 Passive Containment Cooling / 5 R
S A 4.02 Makeup to passive containment cooling water storage tank from passive containment cooling ancillary water storage tank G2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO Responsibilities in emergency plan implementing procedures 3.0 4.5 Main Steam / 4 R
A 3.05 Steamline isolation actuation 3.5 Main and Startup Feedwater / 4 R
A 2.13 Steam flow 3.0 AC Electrical Distribution / 6 R
A 1.02 Ancillary diesel generator electrical operating parameters 3.0 Class 1E and Non 1E DC and UPS / 6 R
S K 6.11 Non-Class 1E inverter failure (OE related)
A 2.06 Class 1E Inverter failure (OE related) 2.5 3.8 Onsite Standby Power System / 6 R
R K 5.03 Number of diesel starts from the available volume of starting air A 3.01 Standby diesel generator starting and loading 3.2 3.2 Service Water / 4 R
K 4.06 Service water system tower makeup 2.7 Compressed Air / 8 R
R K 3.20 Service water system (OE related)
A 2.14 Containment isolation 2.5 3.5 Containment System / 5 R
R K 1.12 Class 1E DC and UPS system A 1.04 Containment water level 2.9 3.9
ES-401N 6
Form ES-401N-2 Reactor Coolant Pump / 4 R
S K 1.06 Steam generator system G2.2.17 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator 2.7 3.8 Chemical and Volume Control / 1, 2
R S
SF1 K 2.04 Containment isolation valves SF2 A 2.15 Mixed bed demineralizer 3.7 2.6 K/A Category Point Totals:
3 2
3 2
2 2
3 3
3 3
3 2
2 Group Point Total:
28/
5
ES-401N 7
Form ES-401N-2 ES-401N AP-1000 Examination Outline Form ES-401N-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
System Name / Safety Function K
1 K
2 K
3 K
4 K
5 K
6 A
1 A
2 A
3 A
4 G*
K/A Topic(s)
IR Digital Rod Control / 1 R
K 1.10 Reactor trip system 4.0 Pressurizer Level Control / 2 R
K 2.03 Pressurizer level channels 3.0 Rod Position Indication / 1 S
A 2.11 Failed digital rod position indication coil 3.2 In-Core Instrument System / 7 R
K 3.04 Protection and safety monitoring system 3.6 Containment Air Filtration / 8 R
K 4.05 Containment pressure control during normal operation 2.8 Containment Hydrogen Control /
5 S
G2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, and tables 4.2 Main Control Room HVAC / 8 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling / 8 R
K 5.01 P between containment and fuel handling buildings 2.8 Condensate / 4 R
K 6.06 Condenser air removal system 2.5 Condenser Air Removal / 4 Main Turbine and Main Turbine Control / 4 Fuel Handling / 8 R
A 2.16 Dropped or damaged fuel assembly 3.7 Gaseous Radwaste / 9 R
A 1.02 Carbon bed and/or vault temperatures 2.5 Radiation Monitoring / 7 S
A 2.02 Reactor coolant system leakage into containment 3.8 Circulating Water / 8 Fire Protection / 8 Steam Dump Control System / 4 R
A 3.02 Load rejection control in Tavg mode 3.1 Nuclear Instrumentation System /
7 R
A 4.03 Block power range high neutron flux low setpoint reactor trip 3.7 Liquid Radwaste System / 9 K/A Category Point Totals:
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 Group Point Total:
10/3 2 1
ES-401N Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)
Form ES-401N-3 Facility: VOGTLE AP1000 UNITS 3 & 4 Date of Exam: MARCH 2022 Category K/A #
Topic RO SRO-only IR IR
- 1. Conduct of Operations 2.1.15 Admin Reqts for temp mgmt direction 2.7 2.1.29 How to conduct system lineups, vlvs, bkrs, switches 4.1 2.1.
2.1.
2.1.20 Interpret/execute procedure steps 4.6 2.1.41 Knowledge of refueling process 3.7 Subtotal 2
2
- 2. Equipment Control 2.2.2 Manipulate console controls between SD & power levels 4.6 2.2.13 Tagging & clearance procedures 4.1 2.2.44 Interpret CR indications to verify status/operation 4.2 2.2.
2.2.23 Track TS LCOs 4.6 2.2.36 Effect of maint activities (power sources) on LCOs 4.2 Subtotal 3
2
- 3. Radiation Control 2.3.5 Use radiation monitoring systems 2.9 2.3.11 Control rad releases 3.8 2.3.
2.3.
2.3.
2.3.6 Approve liquid or gas release permits 3.8 Subtotal 2
1
- 4. Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.19 EOP & AOP layout, symbols, icons 3.4 2.4.22 Bases for prioritizing safety functions..abnormal/emerg 3.6 2.4.42 Emergency response facilities 2.6 2.4.
2.4.3 Identify post accident instrumentation 3.9 2.4.37 Lines of authority during EPs 4.1 Subtotal 3
2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 10 7
7
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier /
Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 2/1 DASG2.4.25 DAS is in the RCA and only action directed in Fire Procedure is to secure power - a discriminatory question could not be developed (Randomly selected PCSG2.4.25 as a replacement)
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
B/M/N
- 7.
U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only SAMPLE QUESTIONS recd 8-2-21 DRAFT WRITTEN recd 11-8-21 PRELIMINARY review of RO Exam: 16/75 = 21.3% unsat items Cred Dist: 3, 4, 6, 34, 40, 48, 57, 62, 63, 65, 72 Q=K/A: 5, 33, 51, 56 LOD=1: 74 PRELIMINARY review of SRO Exam: 5 7/25 = 28% 20% unsat items Cred Dist: 97, 98 Q=K/A: 87, 89, 90
Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts:
- 1.
Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2.
Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question a 1(easy) to 5 (difficult); questions with a difficulty between 2 and 4 are acceptable.
- 3.
Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
Stem Focus: The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
Cues: The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc.).
T/F: The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
Cred. Dist: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.
Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
- 4.
Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:
Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).
Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
- / Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
Backward: The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5.
Check questions for conformance with the approved K/A and those K/As that are designated SRO-only. (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable)
- 6.
Enter questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.
- 7.
Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 8.
At a minimum, explain any "U" Status ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
ES-401 2
Form ES-401-9
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only
1 H
2 x
x M
N E
S T1G1 E-0, EK 2.06 (operational implications/cause-effect relationships of unavailability of SUFW or PRHR Hx as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice C is not plausible because of the interplay between the 1st and 2nd parts. If a manual FW isolation is NOT required, then startup feedwater would be available and used for decay heat removal.
- 2.
Q=K/A: The proposed question tests the applicants knowledge that safeguards actuation should have caused an auto-MFW isolation, and that an auto-SFW isolation occurred due to high SG level coincident with reactor trip (P-4).
[E-0, Step 11 (Check MFW Isolation)]
[Step 12 (Check SUFW Isolation)]
The K/A requires testing the applicants knowledge of the operational implication or cause-effect relationship of SUFW not being available, and the ensuing required action(s). (Since PRHR Hx unavailability is already heavily tested on the operating test.)
ES-0.1 is the simple reactor trip procedure, which is an E-0 type procedure. Suggest testing the operational implications of not needing much SFW flow in ES-0.1.
For example, in ES-0.1, Step 3 and 4, where the SFW flow is causing an excessive RCS cooldown, test the required action to maintain SFW flow greater than 210 gpm.
Alternatively, suggest revising the question to test the impact of not having SFW and PRHR in E-0; will there be any impact at Step 23 [Implement CSFTs]? Ensure no overlap with S1E8, S2E9, and S3E7.
12-1-21: Recommendation incorporated for ES-0.1 question.
- 3.
Suggest changing Choice A to 1000:00 (since SG NR level is only 14% at 1000:00 vs 17% and rising at 1005:00)
- 4.
The reason for why the UO further reduced SG#2 flow at 1007 is missing; it would be better to delete the 1006 phrase to arrest the cooldown to make the 1006:00 event consistent with the 1007:00 event.
12-9-21: Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 2
F 2
x M
E S
T1G1 ES-1.4, ADS Stage 4 Actuation Response, EK3.01 reasons for proper operation of ADS Stage 4 as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Stem Focus: The time in the stem question only pertains to the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The 1st fill-in-the-blank statement may not be clear because it has the phrase time limit to actuate the valves, instead of saying time limit to place the DAS-HS208 to the ACTUATE position to fire the valves.
Suggest the following to remedy Comments 1 & 2 above and add the basis document to the stem question.
Given:
A LOCA has occurred At time 1000:00 The crew is performing ES-1.4 (ADS Stage 4 Actuation Response), Step 4.b RNO (see below) to actuate DAS ADS Stage 4:
The DAS Control Panel is enabled from the PDSP.
At time 1001:00 DAS-HS207 was placed in the ARM position and is currently in the ARM position.
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with 3-EOP-ES-1.4-B, Background Information for ES-1.4?
With DAS-HS207 in the ARM position, the DAS-HS208 switch (ACTUATE) ________ disabled.
[is vs. is NOT]
There ______ minimum required time to place DAS-HS208 to the ACTUATE position to fire the associated valves.
[is a vs is NO]
12-2-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT with minor adjustments to 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 3
H 2
x x
B N
U S
T1G1 A-313 Uncontrolled Cooldown, AK2.03, operational implications or cause-effect relationship of changing FW temp on reactor power, as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices A/B (power will be less than 100% if FRV opens) is not plausible because with the FRV continuously opening the cooler water will add positive reactivity and raise reactor power.
- 2.
Cred Dist: Choice C is not plausible because of the interplay between the 1st and 2nd parts, i.e., Choice C is saying that power is > 100% at 10:01 but M Bank rods remain in AUTO ten minutes later, even after AOP-201 was entered.
- 3.
Stem Focus: The phrase in accordance with AOP-201 in the stem question is confusing because it only pertains to the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement.
To remedy, suggest replacing the 1st part of the question to test whether the AO Bank [will vs will NOT] move outward (verify on simulator) in response to the FRV failure. Ensure no overlap with AOP-201 scenario events S1E4 (SGPORV), S2E1 (Stm Dump Vlv), and S3E3 (FRV).
The 2nd part of the question could perhaps test the AOP-201 limits on Tavg-Tref deviation that requires a manual reactor trip (10F).
12-1-21 Recommendation incorporated
- 4.
Partial: To remedy the subset issue on the 2nd part of the question (Choice C could be argued as correct), suggest changing the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to say the earliest time the crew is required to trip the Reactor is when the Tavg-Tref deviation is NOT trending to within ___
- 5.
Cred Dist: Suggest changing the word withdraw to move.
12-9-21: Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 4
H 2
x M
U S
T1G1 A-336 Malfunction of Protection & Safety Monitoring System, AA1.14, operate/monitor the reactor trip system as it applies to a malfunction of the protection & safety monitoring system.
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices C/D (AOP-402 entry condition not met) is not plausible because the 3rd stem bullet says a PMSA-fault exists - PMS stands for Protection and Safety Monitoring System, which is also the title of AOP-402.
AOP-403 is required to be entered; therefore, the plausibility was that an applicant could think that AOP-402 wasnt required if AOP-403 was required; however, its always plausible to be in two AOPs at the same time.
12-1-21:
- 2.
Cred Dist: Towards Comment #1 above, suggest adding a 3rd 1000 bullet that says The crew entered AOP-402 and change the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement to be:
AOP-403 is / is NOT required to be entered.
12-9-21: To ensure, 1st fill-in-the-blank question is bullet-proof, changed to AOP-403 entry conditions are/ are NOT met. Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 5
H 3
x N
U S
T1G1 E-1, Loss of Rx or Secondary Coolant, EA1.16 operate and/or monitor containment recirc cooling system is it applies to procedure.
- 1.
Q=K/A: The K/A requires testing operation/monitoring the VCS (Containment recirculation cooling system), as required in E-1; however, the proposed test item tests the IRWST recirculation system, as it applies to E-1.
Suggest testing the VCS indirectly by testing the applicants knowledge of E-1, Step 42 associated with chilled water, since chilled water is used to cool the VCS.
12-1-21: Recommendation incorporated
- 2.
Stem Focus: Suggest adding the time 1000:00 to the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 3.
Cue: Suggest changing the word are in the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to were.
12-9-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
6
?
L 2
x x
x x
N U
S T1G1 A-317, Loss of CCW, AK3.02, reasons for stopping all RCPs/VFDs as it applies to procedure.
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices C/D (crew not required to trip reactor with surge tank at 5% and lowering) is not plausible because the unit is at 100% power, and cooling is going away -
the RCPs will lose cooling soon and trip, which, in turn, will cause an auto-reactor trip if not manually performed.
Suggest changing the initial power level to 8% power, or some power where the RCP trip doesnt cause an auto-Rx trip and change the surge tank level to be 10% and dropping. The 10%
level still requires tripping the reactor because of the wording in Step 1
- 2.
Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice B (opening VFD supply breakers is not performed to preclude pump damage) because the reason the VFD supply breakers are opened is to preclude motor damage.
- 3.
Stem Focus: The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement has a typo; the word to is missing after the blank, i.e., ___(2)____ to prevent.
- 4.
Overlap: This test item overlaps with JPM H, Respond to lowering CCS tank level.
- 5.
Cue: The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement seems to cue the applicants to the first part of the question because tripping the RCPs would cause an auto-reactor trip, which means that a manual trip is required first.
- 6.
LOK: The two parts of the question seem to be memory level; Form ES-401-5 distracter analysis indicated higher cog.
12-1-21: 1st part of question changed to preclude JPM H overlap.
- 7.
Cue: Suggest deleting the phrase in place of CCS in the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement; suggest saying FPS is / is NOT required to be used to cool the spent fuel pool. Change distracter analysis supporting Is Not to describe AOP-11 PCS Spray as basis for plausibility.
- 8.
Cred Dist: Suggest changing the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to say The VFD Supply Bkrs (ECS-xxxx) are / are NOT required to be opened. This would still hit the K/A but eliminates the phrase about damage 12-9-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
7 H
2 x
x N
E/U S
E S
T1G1 ES-0.2, Natural Circ Cooldown, EK1.03, relationship between natural circ cooldown and CVCS
- 1.
Q=K/A: The 1st part of the question tests that the CVS return piping goes the #1 S/G; it doesnt test anything from ES-0.2. On the other hand, the 2nd part of the question tests that the Rx head vents are used for PZR level control in ES-0.2, but this has nothing to do with CVS, which the K/A requires.
- 2.
Minutia: The 1st part of the question may not be operationally valid if theres no instrument that the crew can see which loops
[boron] first rises. The 1st part of the question is really asking CVS returns to Loop __(1)____. Is there a way for the control room to see the loops [boron] concentrations? If so, then suggest including the instrument unid # in the fill-in-the-blank statement to ensure the question is operationally based.
To remedy both comments, suggest keeping the 1st part of the question (if operationally valid - see Comment 2 above) and changing the 2nd part to test the applicants knowledge of Step 5.d, makeup flow is required to be set at 100 gpm, which is a direct hit on the procedure and CVS.
12-1-21: Re-worked both parts; question is SAT.
1-28-22: Validation suggested changing 1st part to allowed to be set to a value above 100 gpm. Instead, recommend:
At 1020:00, when aligning for CVS boration, the highest allowed auto CVS-RMCS Makeup Flow setpoint is ________.
[ 100 gpm vs 135 gpm.]
2-10-22: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
8 F
2 x
x N
E S
T1G1 FR-S.1, ATWS, EA1.05, operate/monitor PRHR actuation as it applies to procedure.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only
- 1.
Partial: To preclude potential post-exam comments, suggest modifying the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement to include the bases document, and mirror its reason for Step 4:
In accordance with 3-EOP-FR-S.1, Background Information for FR-S.1, the reason PRHR status is checked at Step 4 is to
[mitigate the impact of increasing RCS inventory vs. ensure a positive reactivity insertion is not occurring]
- 2. Stem Focus: Suggest clarifying the last part of the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
If Safeguards Actuation is ON, the crew __(2)___ required to transition out of FR-S.1 prior to completing FR-S.1.
12-2-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
9 F
2 x
B M
E/U S
T1G1 E-3, SGTR, G2.4.14 general guidelines for emergency and abnormal operating procedures usage
- 1.
Q=K/A: The proposed test item does not test anything from E-3; the fill-in-the-blank statements are testing NMP requirements that could apply to any procedure.
Suggest testing the reason why heaters are operated to maintain PZR liquid temperature saturated at this point in the procedure, or overall mitigative strategy used in E-3 at some point in the EOP.
- 2.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 1st part of Choices A/B (dont have to tell SS about CPS issue) is questionable.
If this question is used, suggest changing the question such that CPS indicates PZR heater MCC load center breaker is open, but the OATC determines it is indeed closed. Then change the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement to ask whether the SS is required to be notified about the CPS issue.
12-1-21: Question re-worked to test E-3 requirement for PZR level and Comment #2 incorporated; question is SAT
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 10 F
2 M
S T1G1 E-2, Faulted S/G, EK1.04, relationship between faulted S/G isolation and the main steam system.
11 H
F 2
M N
E S
T1G1 A-301, Rapid Power Reduction, AK3.02, reasons for energizing PZR backup heaters as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Overlap: In S2E5 AOP-101 applicants will turn on PZR htrs, and in S4E3 the DNB Tech Spec occurs.
Suggest reworking the question to test the basis, instead of testing the AOP-101 required action and DNB TS, since the basis wont be tested in the scenarios. For example, something like this 4-part question:
In accordance with 3-AOP-101-B, Background information for 3-AOP-101, Rapid Power Reduction, the reason why PZR backup heaters are required to be placed in MANUAL/ON is _________
to ensure the RCS minimum temperature for criticality is not reached [basis for Step 4]
to ensure automatic rod control can prevent arming of steam dumps [basis for Step 2]
because the RCS spray valves response is faster than cycling PZR heaters [basis for Step 6]
because the boron addition rate is limited to 50 gpm
[basis for Step 8]
12-1-21: Suggestion incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 12 H
2 x
x B
E/U S
T1G1 A-307, DAS Ops at Local Cabinets, AK3.02, reasons for operation of DAS manual enable switch, as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 1st part of Choices C/D (place an enable switch to OFF) is questionable because the stem says the crew is performing DAS operations - placing the enable switch to OFF is not logical.
- 2.
Cues: The last part of the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement (to successfully trip the Reactor) and the last part of the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement (to locally trip the reactor) are not necessary to elicit the correct response.
To remedy both comments, suggest re-wording the 1st and 2nd fill-in-the-blank statements as:
At 1000:00, in accordance with AOP-602, the crew must place local switch __________ to the ON position.
[DAS-HSXXX (DAS Control Transfer Switch) vs DAS-HS400 (DAS Manual Enable Switch)]
At 1010:00, the reactor ______ tripped.
[is vs is NOT]
12-1-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
12-17-21: Validation changes (minutia switch recall) incorporated, but now plausibility issue with first part. Title of AOP-602 is DAS Ops at Local Cabinets and 1st part of Choices A/B say local cabinets are not required to be enabled, which doesnt make sense.
1-28-22: 1st part of A/B still not plausible. Recommend going with Suggestion in Comment #2 above; switch selection not minutia, e.g.,
see Q#36 tests DAS switches. Is there another plausible procedure that previously had the DAS processor cabs already enabled? 1st fill-in-blank statement could be re-worked to test whether enable already occurred prior to 10:00:00?
2-10-22: Plausibility is that AOP-601 was previously entered before AOP-602. Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 13 F
2 x
x x
N E
SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T1G1 FR-C.1 (Inadequate Core Cooling) EA2.02 (evaluate RCS subcooling as it applies to procedure)
- 1.
Cue: SRO question #84 provides a cue to this question; Q#84 contains FR-C.2 Step 10, which points to 870F. Suggest revising Q#84 to eliminate Step 10 wording.
- 2.
Stem Focus and/or Cue: Since the fill-in-the-blank statement may not align with Choice D (no CSF required), and because all choices pertain to Core Cooling, suggest making into a stem question such as:
Which F-0 Core Cooling entry condition is met, if any?
- 3.
Partial: The 2nd bullet at 1000 uses the word indicate; could be better to use the word are.
- 4.
Suggest modifying the NOTE in the distracter analysis to specify that neither FR-C.1 nor C.2 checks for subcooling.
13 F
2 x
N E
S T1G1 FR-C.1 (Inadequate Core Cooling) EA2.02 (evaluate RCS subcooling as it applies to procedure)
- 1.
All sample question comments incorporated.
- 2.
Stem Focus: Suggest adding the phrase entry condition is met to the last part of Choice D, i.e., NO Core Cooling Safety Function entry condition is met.
12-1-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
14 H
3 x
M E
S T1G1 A-323 Loss of AC Bus Power, AK2.05 operational implications or cause-effect relationship of loss of power to non-Class IE DC and UPS system as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Stem Focus: The order of the fill-in-the-blank statements seems backwards; suggest moving the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to the first spot.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The titles of AOP-302 and Attachment 1 are both missing.
12-2-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 15 F
2 x
B E
S T1G1 ES-1.1, Safeguards Termination, EA2.01, evaluate RCS pressure, temp, and pzr level as it applies to passive safety system termination.
- 1.
Stem Focus: The stem of the question may be disjointed from the fill-in-the-blank statement. Suggest re-wording the stem bullet as:
The crew is at ES-1.1 (Safeguards Termination), Step 8, Isolate Accumulators.
12-1-21: Comment not incorporated; seems like stem bullet should be for Step 8.
- 1.
Cue: The stem bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response. (Step 6) 12-9-21: Used Step 8; question is SAT.
16 H
2 x
M E
S T1G1 A-329, Loss of Instrument Air, G2.1.19, use available indications to evaluate system or component status.
- 1.
Stem Focus: Suggest re-wording the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to include the phrase is required to be, for example:
At 1005:00, in accordance with AOP-703, CAS-V017 is required to be ________.
- 2.
It could be easily modified to test Step 3 RNO items when the unit is in Mode 6 and IA pressure is not greater than 84.5 psig.
12-3-21: Comment #1 incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 17 F
2 B
E S
T1G1 ECA-1.1, LOCA Outside Cnmt, EA1.02, operate/monitor DAS is it applies to procedure
- 1.
The proposed test item is testing the design of the DAS Critical Containment Isolation Actuation logic, instead of testing the applicants ability to operate DAS per ECA-1.1.
Suggest re-working one part of the question to test the applicants ability to actuate the correct components/switches that are required to initiate a DAS Critical Containment Isolation Actuation at Step 6.
12-1-21: suggestion not incorporated; Step 4.b and Step 6 seem to the only places to hit DAS in this procedure.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The stem should tell the applicants that V045/V059 failed to auto-close via the PMS T signal, and that the operator is actuating a DAS Cnmt Isolation.
IF we tested which switch(es) must be turned to actuate the DAS Containment Isolation at Step 6, would there be overlap with Q#12, or overlap with another written exam question?
If not, then that could help with the original Comment #1 above.
12-9-21: Added new bullet; CVS-V059 doesnt close, Ensure then means PMS isolation and CIM local would be required. Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 18 H
2 x
?
E SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T1G1 SDP-2 (Loss of RNS during SD) EK1.04 (relationship between procedure and DAS)
- 1.
Stem Focus: In SDP-2, the RNO for Step 49 (Check Containment Isol) says IF any CIV fails to close, then Actuate CIS and DAS CIS. Therefore, the 3rd and 4th stem bullets may not be necessary. Since the 2nd stem bullet tells the applicants that a manual CIS was performed, it means the RNO for Step 49 was entered and a DAS CIS is also required. Therefore, the CAS-V014/WLS-V055, -V057 bullets may not be necessary.
Suggest deleting the 3rd and 4th stem bullets, and modify the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to be:
IF a manual DAS Containment Isolation was performed, CASV014, IA Supply CIV AOV, _______ auto-close.
[will vs will not]
- 2.
Source: The original version of the question was E-0 (vs. SDP-2), but both fill-in-the-blank statements and all four choices are the same. ES-401 (page 9 of 52) says that a significantly modified question has at least one condition in the stem changed, AND at least one distracter. Also changing the conditions in the stem such that one of the three distracters in the original version becomes the correct answer is also significantly modified. The proposed test item doesnt meet either condition; therefore, it should be reflected as BANK.
- 3.
The reason for SDP-2 entry wasnt specified in stem so during my review I assumed that RCS was closed and reason for entry was loss of power for my review. I found that to arrive at Step 49 (Check Containment Isol), I had to answer Step 45 (Feed &
Bleed required?) as YES. Is Feed & Bleed (Step 45) the only path to arrive at Step 49? Suggest clarifying in the distracter analysis how Step 49 was reached.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 18 H
2 B
M E
S T1G1 SDP-2 (Loss of RNS during SD) EK1.04 (relationship between procedure and DAS)
- 1.
Sample question Comment #1 partially addressed; the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement suggestion was not incorporated. What was identified during validation?
There are several questions on the exam where is (vs is NOT) is the right answer; therefore, suggest revising the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement as in the sample question Comment #1 above, to test that CASV-14 will NOT auto-close.
- 2.
Comment #2 addressed by changing Source to BANK.
Comment #3 addressed by including how feed and bleed was reached in Step 49.
12-3-21: Comment #1 partially incorporated to preclude exam overlap. Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 19 F
2 x
x N
E S
T1G2 A-311, Rod Control System Malfunction, AK1.01 relationship between rod control system malfunctions and CVS.
- 1.
Partial: An applicant could successfully argue there is no correct answer because neither AOP-104, nor its basis document, includes the 100-gpm limit; therefore, Choice B is not absolutely correct.
Also, the procedure uses the following sentence, which doesnt specify critical or not critical; we should try to mirror the procedure words as close as possible:
During power operations, boration flow is limited to 50 gpm when boration is used to reposition the control rods.
- 2.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of Choices A/D (both flow rates the same - critical vs not critical) is questionable because an applicant can successfully eliminate these two Choices solely based on psychometrics, i.e., the flow rates surely must be different with rods out vs rods in.
Suggest revising the question to test the 50-gpm limit (vs 100 gpm), but use the wording thats in the comment above, and also test the reason why the flowrate is limited to 50-gpm, per the basis document, which is to ensure the reactivity addition capability of control rod withdrawal is not exceeded vs. some other plausible choice.
- 3.
Stem Focus: The stem is missing the reason why AOP-104, was entered.
12-6-21: Comments incorporated; however,
- 4.
Partial: To ensure the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement is bullet-proof, suggest adding IAW CVS-SOP-001, Attachment 3, including the SECTION of Attachment 3, (Section 4.3? RCS Boration?) to the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement. What section is being used?
12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 20 H
2 x
x B
E S
T1G2 A-318, Condensate System Malfunctions, AK2.02, operational implications or cause-effect relationships of Deaerator storage tank level outside of normal operating band as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Overlap: S3E2 is a CDS pump trip at 75% power, which will overlap the 1st and 2nd part required actions the applicants will see/perform in the scenario.
Suggest making the stem event into abnormal deaerator level instead of a CDS pump trip. For example, you can test the 56.5-inch reactor trip criteria in Step 2.
- 2.
Cred Dist and/or Partial: To ensure the plausibility of the 1st part of Choices A/B (deaerator level stable with condensate header pressure lowering), and to ensure that the premise of the 1st part of the question is no operator action, suggest lowering the initial reactor power level to 65%, and add the phrase with no operator action to the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 3.
Typo: Distracter analysis should be T1G2 (instead of T1G1).
12-6-21: Comment #1 unresolved.
12-9-21: Question replaced with another Bank question; however,
- 4.
Partial: The 2nd part of the question isnt specific as to what time; therefore, Choice D is also correct.
12-10-21: 2nd part modified to specify at the time chosen for the first part; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 21 F
2 x
x x
N E
S T1G2 FR-C.3, Saturated Core Cooling, EK3.02, reasons for stopping RCPs at it applies to procedure
- 1.
Cue: the last phrase in the 2nd bullet (as resources and time permit) is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 2.
Partial: To ensure no post-exam appeals, suggest re-wording the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to cite the basis document.
- 3.
Stem Focus: Suggest changing the word the to this at the beginning of the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 4.
Typo: Distracter analysis should be T1G2 (instead of T1G1)
- 5.
LOK: Seems like both parts of the question are memory level knowledge.
12-1-21: Comment #1 not incorporated.
- 1.
Cues: There are no dot-3 FRPs that are Red/Orange. RO knowledge is Red/Orange path FRP numbers, which can be used to eliminate dot-3 FRPs. [ES-401, Attachment 2, page 23 of 52]
- 2.
Ensure no overlap with Q#33 12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT. as resources time removed.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 22 H
2 x
x N
E S
T1G2 FR-Z.4, Response to Low Cnmt Pressure, EA1.01, operate and/or monitor passive containment cooling system as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Partial: The word spurious could mean several things that could affect the 2nd part of the question. Suggest deleting the word spurious and tell the applicants what invalid instrument/component malfunction caused PCS to initiate.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The stem is missing the initial power level, if not shutdown.
For example, modify the 1st stem bullet to say that PCS actuated based on high containment temperature instrument failures.
This change could enhance the plausibility of the 2nd part of Choices B/D (DAS only).
12-3-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
1-28-22: Validation change to move IAW FR-Z.4 to only 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement acceptable; question still SAT.
23 H
2 x
x M
E S
T1G2 A-332, Turbine Trip w/o Reactor Trip, AA2.02, evaluate S/G level and/or pressure as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Stem Focus: The name of C-20 is missing; if an applicant asks us to provide the name of C-20 during the administration of the written exam, well likely have to provide it. I think the name is Turbine Runback. Why cant we just say that a MFW Pump trip occurred instead of saying that C-20-Turbine Runback actuates?
- 2.
Partial: Are there any operator actions performed between 1005 and 1030? If not, then suggest including the phrase, with no operator actions in the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement. If there are operator actions being performed, what will they be?
12-1-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 24 F
N E
S T1G2 A-321, Malfunction of Data Display and Processing System, AG2.1.19, use available indications to evaluate system or component status.
- 1.
Q=K/A: The proposed test item doesnt test AOP-401 knowledge; it tests the NMP-AP-005-GL04 knowledge below:
- 2.
Partial: The RNO column seems to imply Choice A (PDSP system level control) is also a correct answer. When addressing AOP-401, Step 7 for the magenta PRHR Hx Outlet FCVs, an applicant could correctly assume the answer to the 5th bullet (Device controlling module failures - NONE indicated) is NO.
Therefore, the RNO Column requires actuating PRHR Hx at the PDSP (Choice A)
- 3.
Stem Focus: Suggest mirroring NMP-AP-005-GL04, Section 4.6 words for the fill-in-the-blank statement. For example:
When verifying the position of any valve that indicates magenta in PLC, the crew is required to __________
- 4.
Stem Focus: Suggest using one of the AOP-401 entry conditions as the sole issue, instead of having a LOCA in progress.
12-3-21: Comments #3 and #4 incorporated; the reason why Choice A is incorrect is because the LOCA was eliminated (manual operation not required). K/A is being hit because AOP-401, Step 7 knowledge of how is being tested. However, suggest changing Choices A and B to become: A) ensure the valves in correct position on PLS and B) verify the Output Value (OV) on Ovation. Also modify D to be shorter, i.e., eliminate the words correlates to.
12-9-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT. Removed Ovation from stem and added workstation; changed D to be verifying the (lower case) actual position and remove the word associated.
12-10-21: The phrase in PLS in the stem question, makes Choice B not plausible. Suggest making the fill-in-the-blank statement:
In accordance with AOP-401 and NMP-AP-005-GL04, the crew is required to ensure the valves are in the correct position by ____.
12-17-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 25 F
2 x
N E
S T1G2 FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, EK1.07, relationship between PTS and RCS (head vents, PZR normal spray, and/or heaters)
- 1.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of Choices A/D (use normal and aux sprays in P.1) is questionable because the RCPs are not running and CVS is not available.
Suggest the following:
In Step 5, an ADS 1st stage MOV is required to be throttled open to maintain RCS subcooling greater than _________ and PZR NR level less than _________.
[10F [50] vs 20F [60))
[10% vs 55%]
- 2.
Typo: The word accordance is misspelled in the stem question.
12-1-21: Comment #1 not incorporated; new question provided.
- 3.
Job-Link: The correct choice (D) could appear to be procedure selection; suggest changing Choice D to be:
Actuate ADS Stages 1 - 3, to test same concept This is essentially the same thing youve proposed, but without the GO TO procedure piece (i.e., testing RO knowledge of overall mitigative strategy for PTS depress attempt failure) 12-9-21: Changed went back to original version,but changed Choice D to actuate Div A 2nd stage ADS. Question is SAT.
26 H
2 B
E S
T1G2 A-326, FW System Malfunctions, AK2.03, operational implications or cause-effect relationships of main feed line break as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Suggest changing the initial reactor power to 80% to enhance the plausibility of the 2nd part of Choices B/D (reactor trip not required).
12-2-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 27 H
3 B
S T1G2 A-331, Loss of Plant DC Power or Batteries, AA1.01, operate/monitor 250VDC switchboards Class 1E as it applies to procedure 28
?
F 2
N S
T2G1 SF2 RCS, K1.04, physical or control/protection logic relationship between the RCS and containment system
- 1.
LOK: The distracter analysis indicated this question was higher cog, but it appears to be a memory item.
29 F
2 x
M E/U S
T2G1 SGS K2.08 bus or division power supplies to MFCV control power
- 1.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of Choices C/D is questionable because these Choices are ECS (Main AC Power System) 480VAC boards.
Suggest replacing Choices C/D with an AC UPS Distribution Panel like IDSA-EA-1.
12-1-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
30 H
3 B
M S
T2G1 SGS K3.03 effect that a loss or malfunction of the SGS will have on main steam system
- 1.
Typo: The distracter analysis says the question is modified, but the bank slot is checked.
31 H
2 x
N E
S T2G1 Normal RHR (RNS), K3.04 effect that a loss or malfunction or RNS will have on spent fuel pool cooling
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice A (both RNS Pumps running) is not plausible because RNS Pump B was not previously running AND because theres nothing in the stem to be misconstrued as Shutdown Cooling being in service at 41% power.
12-1-21: No change to question; consider this:
At 1005:00, WOOTF completes both statements?
There _________ RNS Cooling to the SFP.
[will be vs will NOT be]
RNS Pump A _______ running.
[will be vs will NOT be]
12-9-21: Comment not incorporated; question is SAT. Plausibility for Choice A was that CCS and SW auto-start on LOOP.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 32 F
2 B
S T2G1 PRHR, K4.05 PRHR design features and/or interlocks that provide for PRHR flow control
- 1.
This question has been on the last two NRC exams; suggest modifying the question.
- 2.
Consider moving the noun name of V108B to the first bullet instead of the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 3.
Ensure no overlap with Q#73 and #80 Comment #2 incorporated; question is SAT.
33 F
2 N
U S
T2G1 Passive Core Cooling (PXS) K5.03 operational implications or cause-effect relationships of failure of RCP to trip as it applies to PXS
- 1.
Q=K/A: The K/A statement requires testing the PXS relationship with failure of an RCP to trip. For example, on a CMT actuation, the RCPs are automatically tripped after a 5 second time delay. The test item should be testing the issue when the RCPs dont trip as it applies to the CMT PXS component. Tech Spec SR 3.3.15.2 requires that the RCPs breakers trip open in response to a CMT actuation signal. I think the purpose of the RCP trip during a CMT actuation is to allow the CMT to drain when the cold legs boil.
12-2-21: Comment not addressed because it will overlap with Q#21.
Suggest revising Q#21 and transferring the 2nd portion of Q#21 to this question.
12-9-21: The question met the K/A because it relates to an RCP failing to trip; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 34 H
2 x
x x
M U
S T2G1 CCS K6.17 effect of normal RHR Hx tube leak on CCS
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 2nd part of Choices B/D (RNS HX in the turbine building) is not plausible because the RNS HX handles contaminated liquid, and if it developed a tube leak, the turbine building is not contained/filtered like the auxiliary building is.
- 2.
Partial: The 1st fill-in-the-blank statement wording is confusing (leak will be verified by) because it is not in accordance with any of the procedures. Therefore, the 1st part of the question could be argued as no correct answer.
- The guidance in AOP-702 says a local RNS HX Outlet activity sample is required - AOP-702 does not require a CCS rad rad monitor alarm as a method to verify the leak.
- ARP 3-CCS-ARP-001-55 Pump Suct Hdr Rad (CCS-RY 1_High1) requires contacting RP to survey Room 21380 and contacting Chemistry to sample CCS to verify the leak.
- 3.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 1st part of Choices A/B (verify RNS HX tube leak by the dilution of the RCS) is questionable because the stem says that pressurizer level is lowering and because this method of verifying the leak would take too long.
- 4.
Stem Focus: The 1st stem bullet should be a bit more specific with respect to the procedure name/section being implemented to cool the RCS by RNS, also consider adding which train of RNS is in service.
12-1-21: Comment #2 & #3 addressed by revising the 1st part of the question to test the relative pressures (surge tank rising/lowering) when RCS pressure is 250 psig.
- 5.
Based on Comment #1 (above) not resolved, suggest revising the 2nd part of the question to test which Room the RNS HX is located in.
12-9-21: Got rid of PZR level bullet; comment incorporated, question is SAT.
35 H
3 N
S T2G1 PZR Press Control System A1.14 predict/monitor changes in makeup flow
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 36 H
2 x
x M
B E/U S
T2G1 ADS A2.01 predict impacts of DAS malfunction / operation son ADS and use procedures to correct, control, mitigate
- 1.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 1st part of Choices A/C (use DAS first) is questionable because DAS is the backup method for actuations.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The 1st bullet should be clearer, i.e., instead of saying ADS Stages 1 - 3 auto-actuated, tell the applicants what the indication is that would mean ADS Stages 1 - 3 auto-actuated. Im concerned that someone may be confused because later in the stem we tell them that ADS really didnt auto-actuate.
12-1-21: Comment #2 incorporated; question is SAT. (Original plausibility was that if 1st Stage Actuation was ON, with MOVs closed, then DAS is required FIRST; distracter analysis updated.)
12-17-21: Interplay between two parts gives away answer to 1st part.
1-28-22: Comment #1 still applies; you always try PMS before DAS.
Suggest replacing 1st part with something in ES-1.3, e.g.,
At 1000:00, ADS & IRWST Injection Block switches _______
required to be placed in the UNBLOCK position. [are vs are NOT]
1-28-22: The noun name for RCS-V001A is missing in the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement.
2-10-22: Replaced with Bank Question; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 37
?
H 3
x x
N E
S T2G1 ADS G2.2.22 LCOs and Safety Limits
- 1.
Stem Focus: The phrase Division Specific in the parenthesis is not necessary.
- 2.
Partial: The 1st fill-in-the-blank should be worded to ask for the setpoint; where is the setpoint designated? I couldnt find it in TS SR 3.3.20.2. The fill-in-the-blank statement should be specific ( 81.3% or 81.3%?) and mirror the TS setpoint.
- 3.
Stem Focus: phrase When applicable is not necessary in the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement; should be replaced with In accordance with.
- 4.
LOK: The distracter analysis indicated higher level knowledge, but both parts of the question seem to be memory level.
- 5.
In the distracter analysis, we should describe the basis for why asking the LCO Function 1 Table knowledge is not beyond RO knowledge, i.e., is there a way that the applicants know how many CMT level channels exist so that they can logically rule out 4 as the correct answer to Choices B/D?
12-1-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
38 H
3 M
S T2G1 RTS A3.13, monitor auto-operation of SG NR High-2 reactor trip 39 H
3 x
x B
E S
T2G1 ESFAS A4.03 manually operate and monitor steam line isolation actuation in the control room
- 1.
Stem Focus: The 1st bullet is missing the number/name of the controlling procedure.
- 2.
Partial: The time 1005:00 stem bullet is vague because it uses the phrase all appropriate blocks ; instead, the bullet should say All blocks required to be inserted per procedure number/name have been inserted.
- 3.
Stem Focus: Consider adding the following at the bottom of the stem:
P-11: Divisional PZR NR Pressure 12-1-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 40 F
2 x
N U
SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T2G1 (DAS) G2.4.25 (knowledge of fire protection procedures)
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice A (local DAS Ops only required if RSR uninhabitable) is not plausible because the MCR is the preferred location to perform DAS Ops.
Choice B (local DAS Ops only required if MCR evacuated) is not plausible because the RSR is still available and preferred over local DAS Ops during a fire.
Choice D (local DAS Ops is not required by Fire Response procedure) is not plausible because there may a time when local DAS Ops is required due to inaccessibility of controls/equipment, etc.
Suggest testing the required action(s) in accordance with 1, Fire Area 1200 AF 01, when a fire threatens DAS (e.g., fire in Rooms 12452, 12553, or 12554). The actions involve opening doors and turning off breakers. Perhaps in order to hit the Tier 2 aspect, you could test the Rooms in which the DAS exist and the fire action per Attachment 21.
40 F
2 x
N U
S T2G1 (DAS) G2.4.25 (knowledge of fire protection procedures) 12-9-21: K/A rejected because DAS inside RCA and no Fire Procedure question could be written at a discriminatory level because only action is to deenergize DAS cabinet.
Randomly re-selected PCS Passive Containment Cooling G.2.4.25.
Easier to write a question is because AOP-902 covers PCS and additional actions to just deenergize.
T2G1 PCS G2.4.25 (knowledge of fire protection procedures)
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 2nd part of Choices B/D (breakers can remain on to cabinets with fire) is not plausible because a fire exists in the energized cabinet; therefore, it needs to be de-energized.
What about providing the applicants with the entire copy of AOP-902 (assuming it doesnt contain answers to other questions) and ask them to identify the correct attachment for the fire area in a four-part question format?
- 2.
Partial: An applicant could argue no correct answer to the 1st part of the question if health physics isnt needed. The 1st part of the question can be worded more straightforward as:
The DAS processor cabinet room is in the ______ side of the auxiliary building.
[RCA vs non-rad]
12-1-21: Comment #2 incorporated; the 2nd part of the question was subsequently modified to test whether RP is required to be dispatched if the fire is in the RCA. However,
- 3.
Cred Dist: The 2nd part of Choices B/D (RP not required to be dispatched because they arent fire brigade qual) is not plausible because the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement says the fire is in the RCA and fire brigade qualified RP staff exist.
12-10-21: Suggest including the phrase is required to be after the blank in both fill-in-the-blank statements. Also suggest making the word open into opened at the end of both fill-in-the-blank statement.
12-17-21: 1st part of Choices C/D not plausible because a fire is in containment and the FPS supply valve to cnmt must be open to fight the fire.
1-28-22: K/A not being tested (knowledge of fire protection procedures); the plant design is being tested even though the information is in the AOP-902, Attachment 18 bases. Suggestion in Comment #1 can work for this question.
2-10-22: Question replaced with New question; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 41 H
3 N
S T2G1 DAS A4.11 manually operate and monitor IRWST injection line valve actuation in the control room 42 F
2 x
x N
E SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T2G1 (PCS Passive Cnmt Cooling Sys) A4.02 (manually operate/monitor makeup to PCCWST from PCC ancillary water storage tank in the control room)
- 1.
Partial: In order to make the 1st part of the question bullet-proof with respect to post-exam appeals, suggest revising the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement to cite the procedure/surveillance that requires PCCWST level to be maintained greater than 96.3%.
Step 1 of Attachment 5 says:
IF PCCWST NR Lvl less than 96.3%, THEN locally perform Is PCS-SOP-001, Attachment 5, Step 1 the only place that says PCCSWT is required to be filled? Is there a better reference to use for testing whether the current WR PCCWST level is within normal band? What procedure contains the required level for the PCCWST? The stem question referral to PCS-SOP-001, may be weak from the standpoint of appeals, since it doesnt exactly say PCCWST is required to be filled.
Suggest revising 1st fill-in-the-blank statement to cite the procedure/surveillance that requires level band.
- 2. Cred Dist: Suggest providing the current PCCAWST level in the stem to add plausibility to D2.
42 F
2 N
S T2G1 (PCS Passive Cnmt Cooling Sys) A4.02 (manually operate/monitor makeup to PCCWST from PCC ancillary water storage tank in the control room)
- 1.
All sample question comments addressed; question is SAT.
43 H
3 B
S T2G1 MSS A3.05 monitor auto-operation of the steam line isolation actuation.
44 H
2 x
N E
T2G1 FWS Main & SUFW A2.13, predict the impacts of a steam flow malfunction on the FWS Main & SUFW system and use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate.
- 1.
Overlap with S1E4.
- 2.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 1st part of Choices A/B (SG level expected to shrink) is questionable because the SG pressure will lower.
- 3.
Partial and/or #/units: The 1st part of the question should include the level indicator number/name that the expected level swell will initially be expected.
To remedy Comments #2 & 3 suggest modifying the 1st part of the question to be:
At 1000:00, SG water level indication on XYZ, Name, is expected to __________.
[rise vs remain the same]
- 4.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 2nd part of Choices B/D (actuate main steam line isolation) is questionable because a MSL isolation will result in taking the unit off-line; the SG Relief Isolation is always preferred.
Suggest re-working the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to be:
LCO 3.7.10, SG Isolation Valves, _________ met.
[is vs is NOT]
12-3-21: Suggest replacing S1E4 or this question; see Comment #1 above.
12-9-21: Question replaced with a new question NOT related to PORV opening. However,
- 5.
Partial: Depending on the size of the weld failure, Choice C can also be argued as correct.
- 6.
Partial: The 1015 phrase has just is not necessary. Suggest deleting has just and say that has completed all of Step 5.
12-10-21: Cred Dist and/or LOD=1: The 1st part of choices C/D is not plausible based on leak size; The 2nd part of Choices B/D is not plausible because the whole Step 5 been completed to control temperature.
See next continuation line below
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 44 H
3 x
M E
S 44 continued below T2G1 FWS Main & SUFW A2.13, predict the impacts of a steam flow malfunction on the FWS Main & SUFW system and use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate.
- 1.
Stem Focus: The stem doesnt include a Time 1002:00 event.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The stem should include where the steam is leaking from, i.e., what component. We also need to be sure that one of the AOP-206 symptoms/entry conditions would have been seen for this steam leak component.
- 3.
Stem Focus: The stem should specify that MSS-V502A was manually closed per Attachment 6 (High Pressure FW Heaters 6
& 7) of AOP-206 (Malfunction of FWH and Extraction Steam).
1-28-22: Suggest adding two items to stem: 1) steam leak location is extraction line going into 6A FWH, and 2) 6A FWH level is 12 and lowering. Also, same Comments #1 and #3 above.
2-10-22: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
45 F
2 x
x B
U SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T2G1 (ECS AC Elect Distr Sys) A1.02 (predict and/or monitor changes in ancillary DG electrical operating parameters associated with operation of AC electrical distribution systems)
- 1.
Q=K/A: The proposed test item tests applicants knowledge of where the ancillary DG output breaker connection is located on a Division C mimic diagram. The proposed question does not test the applicants ability to monitor (or predict) a change in the ancillary DG parameters.
- 2. Cred Dist: Choice B (DG output connection is on DC side of inverter) is not plausible because the DG output is AC.
Suggest testing the applicants ability to monitor one of the ancillary DG parameters during AC electrical system operation.
Is there an ARP for ancillary DG trouble? Is there an SOP for AC operations when the ancillary DG is tied?
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 45 F
2 x
x N
E/U S
T2G1 (ECS AC Elect Distr Sys) A1.02 (predict and/or monitor changes in ancillary DG electrical operating parameters associated with operation of AC electrical distribution systems)
- 1.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 2nd part of Choices A/C (Ancillary generator output is 120VAC) is questionable because the generator is a diesel-powered generator and the procedure being used is only to start the machine (not tie it to system variable transformer.
Suggest testing one of the engine water temperature values
[i.e., > 70F OR < 223F] in Section 4.3. Alternatively, test the applicants knowledge of what a downstream voltage meter is expected to read once the ancillary DG is tied on.
- 2.
Partial: To ensure the 1st part of the question is bullet-proof, include the attachment and section of ECS-SOP-004 being performed in the 1st bullet:
ECS-SOP-004 (Ancillary Diesels), Attachment 1 (Ancillary DG Operation, Section 4.3 (Ancillary DG1 Startup), is being performed.
12-1-21: Comment #2 incorporated; plausibility of 120VAC is acceptable.
- 3.
Partial: Suggest modifying the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to mirror Step 6.d, i.e., the words output and approximately in the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement arent listed in Attachment 1, Step 6.d.
Suggest re-wording as:
Once running, Attachment, Step 6.d requires monitoring the Ancillary DG voltage to be ______.
12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 46 H
2 x
x x
B E
S T2G1 IDS Class IE and Non-Class IE DC and UPS Systems, K6.11, effect of non-class 1E Inverter failure on the Class 1E and Non-Class 1E DC and UPS systems.
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice A (nothing can be done to power up EDS1-EA-1) is not plausible because UPS systems are always designed with a way to power-up inverter loads after an inverter failure or during inverter maintenance.
- 2.
- /units: The noun names of EDS1-DU-1 (inverter 2nd bullet) and EDS1-EA-1 (stem question) are missing.
- 3.
Stem Focus: Choice B can be steam lined as:
The power lineup to EDS1-EA-1 will NOT change, no power will be lost.
12-3-21: The stem phrase the effect on power to is confusing, and also suggest re-wording the choices as follows:
At 1030:00 which one of the following predicts the status of power to EDS1-EA-1 (Annex Building UPS Distribution Panel)?
A.
EDS1-EA-1 will be deenergized regardless of manual manipulations or automatic switch repositioning B.
EDS1-EA-1 will remain energized with no change in its power supply lineup C.
EDS1-EA-1 will be deenergized unless the maintenance bypass switch is manually repositioned D.
EDS1-EA-1 will remain energized by automatic repositioning of the static transfer switch 12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 47 F
2 x
M E
S T2G1 Onsite Standby Power System (ZOS), K5.03, operational implications or cause-effect relationships of # of DG starts from the available volume of starting air
- 1.
Partial: The 1st fill-in-the-blank statement should mirror the ZOS-SOP-001, Attachment 10, DG Starting Air System Startup, language as closely as possible to preclude post-exam challenges. For example:
In accordance with ZOS-SOP-001, the DG starting air system receiver is sized to provide at least _______ consecutive DG starts without recharging.
- 2. The distracter analysis should include where the correct answer to the 2nd part of the question is found, i.e., suggest citing the ZOS-SOP-001, Attachment 10 item in the distracter analysis.
12-1-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
48 H
3 M
U S
T2G1 ZOS (Onsite Standby Power) A3.01, monitor auto-operation of the onsite standby power system, including standby DG starting and loading
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices A/B (RAT is powered) is not plausible because the stem says a loss-of-offsite-power occurred/exists.
- 2.
Partial: At the time 1001:00 bullet, the word spurious could be vague and create post-exam appeals.
Suggest adding something that says it was a breaker issue and that no bus fault exists.
12-1-21: Comments incorporated; 1st part revised to ask whether Standby EDB is / is not running. Question is SAT.
49 F
2 x
M E
S T2G1 SWS K4.06, design features and/or interlocks which provide for SWS tower makeup.
- 1.
Stem Focus: The 1st fill-in-the-blank statement could be clearer grammatically; for example:
The alternate makeup source to the SWS Cooling tower basin is the ______.
12-1-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 50 H
2 B
S T2G1 CAS (Compressed Air) K3.20, effect that a loss or malfunction of the compressed air system will have on SWS
- 1.
Ensure the SWS designator for the cooling tower basin normal makeup LCV does not give any cues for Q#49 (alternate source).
1-28-22: Validation comment to change basin level from 80% to 88%
to preclude potential challenge that a makeup was in progress, leading to no correct answer. Question is still SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 51 H
F 2
x M
U S
T2G1 CAS A2.14, predict the impacts of containment isolation on the CAS and use procedures to correct, control, mitigate
- 1.
Q=K/A: The spurious closure of CAS-V014 has nothing to do with the lowering IA supply header pressure. The proposed test item tests auto-start setpoint and reactor trip setpoint for an air leak.
The K/A statement requires testing the applicants ability to predict the impact of a valid containment isolation on the air system, including using procedures. How does the CAS-V014 closure affect the IA system?
12-1-21: Question revised to test wither repositioning containment components was/ was not the basis for the reactor trip, and whether safeguards actuation is / is NOT required prior to the E-0 transition.
However,
- 2.
Partial: For the 1st part of the revised question, an applicant can successfully argue that both choices are correct because the stem is vague with respect to instrument air pressure. Step 2 and 3 both require reactor trip; Step 2 is based on repositioning containment components and Step 3 is based on 84.5 psig.
Is there another pressure indicator downstream of CAS-V014? If so, how will the CAS-V014 closure affect the downstream pressure indication? (remain the same vs lower).
12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
12-17-21: I identified new plausibility issue with remain the same because the isolation valve closed; regardless of where FT is located containment air flow will always go down. In 1st part suggest asking whether FT is downstream or upstream of CAS-V014. Stem Question says IAW AOP-703, which only applies to 2nd part of question.
1-28-22: Same comment as 12-17-22; suggest testing whether FT is downstream or upstream of CAS-V014.
2-10-22: 2nd part replaced to test E-0 Step 4, which meets K/A; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 52 H
3 x
B E
S T2G1 Containment System, K1.12 physical or control/protection logic relationship between containment system and Class 1E DC and UPS system
- 1.
Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement may be referring to CAS-V014 auto-closure as when instrument air was isolated to containment. If so, then it may be clearer to re-word the fill-in-the-blank statement to say the earliest time that CAS-V014 auto-closed.
- 2.
Typo: The distracter analysis K/A statement has this system labeled as CAS, even though CAS is compressed air system.
12-6-21: Comment #1 not necessary because CAS-V014 is the only way to have instrument air isolated to cnmt; question is SAT.
53 F
H 3
x B
E S
T2G1 CNS (Containment System) A1.04, predict and/or monitor changes in containment water level associated with operation of the containment system
- 1.
Stem Focus: Suggest the following changes to remove words and enhance plausibility:
1st bullet: delete inside containment; not necessary 3rd bullet: change to 50 psig; delete and rising.
5th bullet: delete and rising 6th bullet: delete and rising If a trend is desired, change and rising to stable.
12-2-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
54 F
2 x
N E
S T2G1 RCP K1.06 physical connections between RCP system and steam generator system
- 1.
Stem Focus: The stem question is missing a parenthesis (s) after the word indicate. Also, the capitalized word ONCE may not be as clear as when. For example:
The RCPs will receive a DAS signal to auto-trip when ______
indicate(s) below ______.
12-3-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 55 F
2 M
S T2G1 CVS K2.04, bus or division power supply to containment isolation valves.
- 1.
In the original version of this question (that tested the V090 power supply), was the answer different than IDSA-DK-1?
56 H
2 x
x B
U S
T2G2 DRCS K1.10 physical or control/protection logic relationship between the DRCS and Reactor Trip system
- 1.
Q=K/A: The proposed test item solely tests the RTS system; nothing about the DRCS is being tested.
- 2.
Stem Focus: Suggest the following revisions to the fill-in-the-blank statement to be clearer and minimize words:
In order for a Reactor Trip Breaker to automatically open, its Undervoltage Coil must be _____, OR its shunt trip coil must be
- 3.
LOK: The distracter analysis indicated higher order question, but it appears to be memory level.
- 4.
Typo: Distracter analysis indicates this is T2G1 even though its T2G2.
12-2-21: Comment #1 not addressed; we need to somehow test a physical or logic relationship between RTS and DRCS.
12-9-21: 2nd opinion was that two choices not plausible and K/A match not met.
12-14-21: Cred Dist and/or LOD=1: The 2nd part of A/C (movable gripper energized) is not plausible because if the gripper is energized, the reactor trip wouldnt let them fall in. Are there any rod-stops generated by the RTS?
12-17-21: Replaced with high cog bank question. Why did turbine ramp auto-stop at 1000:00? Dont we need to tell them why it stopped at 1000:00.
1-28-22: C-3 (answer) is reason; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 57 H
2 N
U E
S T2G2 PZR Level Control System, bus or division power supplies to PZR level channels.
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice A (pzr level indication lost immediately after LOOP) and Choice B (pzr level indication lost 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after LOOP) are not plausible because pzr level indication is needed for EOPs, etc. and plant would not be designed such that no pzr level indication was available within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after a transient.
Suggest testing the specific power supply to the pzr level channels; suggest including the unid numbers/names for the level indicators and the power supplies.
12-3-21: The original question may have been graded too harshly; the original version of Choice B (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) may have been plausible.
- 2.
Suggest re-wording the fill-in-the-blank statement to include the word become and add the phrase from 1000:00. For example:
The EARLIEST time when PZR Level (RCS-LT195B) will become unavailable in the MCR is _______ hours from 1000:00.
12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
58 H
2 B
S T2G2 Incore Instrumentation System (IIS) K3.04, effect that loss or malfunction of IIS will have on protection and safety monitoring 1-28-22: Validation comment to clarify 1st fill-in-the-blank statement phrase available for post accident monitoring means, to avoid potential challenges. Question still SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 59 F
2 x
N E
S T2G2 VFS (Containment Air Filtration) K4.05 containment air filtration system design features and/or interlocks that provide for containment pressure control during normal operation
- 1.
Stem Focus: The 1st part of the question seems to be indirectly asking whether VFS-MS01A does/ does NOT have an auto-start or auto-cycle feature. Suggest re-wording the fill-in-the-blank statement as:
Ctmt AHU A (VFS-MS-01A) ________ automatically start and stop to maintain containment pressure.
[will vs will NOT]
This change will also help with the will not tally for the exam.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement doesnt need to include the phrase If containment pressure starts to degrade; the word degrade is subjective. Suggest re-wording as:
CTMT Vacuum Relief CIV MOV (VFS-V800A/B) will auto-open if containment pressure drops below ______.
- 3.
In the distracter analysis, suggest citing VFS-SOP-001,, Regulate Containment Air Pressure, Section 4.3, Pressurize Containment.
12-2-21: Comment#1 incorporated; Comment #2 is not relevant because degrade is standard language for applicants. Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 60 H
2 B
N E/U S
T2G2 SFS (Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System) K5.01 operational implications or cause-effect relationship of P between cnmt and fuel handling buildings
- 1.
Q=K/A: The proposed test item is not testing anything about the spent fuel pool cooling system related to P between containment and FH building. The Building filtration signal referred to in the 3rd bullet is a high activity/radiation signal, and the VFS-MA-02A shift from containment purge to the FH building is about aligning a filtered exhaust path. Not sure what the K/A statement is asking about.
12-3-21: Original question replaced with another new question.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The phrase At 1000, after a short time delay may confuse the applicants. Suggest changing the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to be:
VFS _______ auto-align to the FHA.
- 3.
Typo: The word ventilation in the 2nd bullet is misspelled.
- 4.
Cues: The phrase to maintain a negative atmospheric pressure in the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
12-9-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
61 H
2 B
S T2G2 CDS K6.06 effect of condenser air removal system malfunction/component malfunction on the condensate system
- 1.
Last 2 exams.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 62 F
H 2
x M
U S
T2G2 Fuel Handling System A2.16 predict impacts of dropped/damaged fuel assembly, use procedures to correct, control, mitigate
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices C/D (dont enter AOP until 2.5 R/hr) is not plausible because youd enter the AOP when radioactivity monitors first began to rise (well before 1020:00) or even at 1000:00 when the heavy item was first dropped on the fuel. Just using conservatism alone, the applicants can eliminate Choices C/D.
Suggest writing a question where a fuel handling incident occurred in the FH Building causing fuel damage and test the applicants knowledge of 1) which radiation detection instrument would begin to rise (VAS-RY001 (FHA Exh Rad) OR how the FH System equipment responds to the fuel handling even or fuel damage, including the required subsequent actions per the ARP or AOP.
12-2-21: Rewrote 1st part of original question to test the AOP Steps for when the fuel transfer tube gate valve is required to be closed, which solved Comment#1 above. However,
- 2.
Suggest including a stem bullet to tell the applicants the location of the Fuel Transfer Cart, to enhance plausibility to the first parts of A/B.
12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 63 F
2 x
x B
M U
S T2G2 Waste Gas System A1.02, predict/monitor changes in carbon bed and/or vault temperatures associated with operation of the Gaseous Radwaste System
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 2nd part of Choices A/B (auto-letdown causes Hi Carbon Bed Vault Temp) is not plausible because a hi bed temperature never normally occurs during an auto-letdown.
Perhaps there may be a room temperature (not carbon bed room) that rises some during an auto-letdown, but not the carbon bed room.
- 2.
Q=K/A: The 1st part of the question has nothing to do with the K/A. Normally on 2-part questions, one of the parts must be a direct hit on the K/A, and the other part must be related to the K/A. The 1st part of this question is testing whether the WGS Gas Cooler is cooled by VWS, which has nothing to do with the K/A statement.
Suggest writing a question related to normal operation of the Gaseous RW System and how carbon bed temperatures are expected to respond.
12-2-21: Re-worked the 1st part of the original question to test whether cause of High1 alarm is / is NOT a fire. However,
- 1.
Partial: To ensure the 1st part is bullet-proof to appeals, suggest using the phrase cause of the alarm, since its listed that way in the ARP:
The cause of the alarm _______ a carbon bed fire.
[is vs. is NOT]
12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
64 H
3 M
S T2G2 Steam Dump Control System A3.02 monitor auto operation of steam dump control including load reject in Tavg mode
- 1.
LOK: The distracter analysis indicated this was memory level (fundamental) question; however, it is higher cog.
Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 65 H
2 x
x N
U S
T2G2 NIS A4.03 manually operate/monitor block power range high neutron flux low setpoint reactor trip in the control room
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 2nd part of Choices A/C (low PR setpoint is 108.5%) is not plausible because 108.5% is a value above 100% power, which means its not low.
Suggest using a low value as the distracter, like a low power rod stop value.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The initial power level is missing in the question, and the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement is confusing because it doesnt say as the crew raises power from x to y, which is implied in the statement.
12-2-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 66 F
2 x
x B
E/U S
T3 G2.1.15 administrative requirements for temporary management direction, such as standing orders, night orders, or operations memos.
- 1.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 2nd part of Choices A/C (standing orders auto-terminate) is questionable because these orders are called standing.
- 2.
Job-Link: The 1st part of the question (review periodicity) could be argued as SRO knowledge since Section 4.4, Monthly Review of Standing Orders, says that the Shift Manager shall appoint an individual to review all standing orders each month.
Suggest the following:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with NMP-OS-007-003 (Plant Operating Orders)?
IF there is a conflict between a standing order and published plant procedure, the ________ will prevail in all cases without exception.
[standing order vs procedure]
Night Orders are valid for ONLY _____ days.
[three vs six]
12-2-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
67 F
2 x
B M
E S
T3 G2.1.29 how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, or switches
- 1.
Partial: Suggest deleting the first word Given: and the 1st stem bullet; the 1st bullet may have unintended consequences that could potentially result in post-exam challenges.
12-2-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 68 H
3 x
B M
E/U S
T3 G2.2.2 manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels.
- 1.
Q=K/A: Is there a generic plantwide aspect being tested in the proposed test item; the proposed test item is testing steam dumps, but is there a plantwide generic aspect also being tested? ES-401 Section D.2.a (page 7 of 52) says to ensure T3 questions maintain their focus on plantwide generic K/As and dont become an extension of Tier 2.
For example, in the operating fleet, this K/A could be tested by asking a question about the conduct of ops allowances/requirements for two-handed operations, or perhaps startup switch manipulation requirements, etc.
- 2. LOK: The distracter analysis indicated this was memory level (fundamental) question; however, it is higher cog.
12-2-21: The 2nd part of the question re-worked to test whether two-handed operations is allowed for the Stage 1 cooldown handswitches. However,
- 3.
Partial and/or Stem Focus: To be more precise and shorter, suggest the following for the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement:
Placing the Stage 1 Cooldown hand switches to ENABLE
________ listed in NMP-OS-007-001 (Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations), Attachment 2, Two Handed Operations Examples.
[is vs is NOT]
12-9-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
69 F
2 x
x x
M N
E S
T3 G2.2.13 tagging and clearance procedures
- 1.
Partial: None of the examples listed in NMP-AD-003, Section 4.1.4 (Status Tags and Non-Tagged Steps) include a status tag on an MOV. Is it possible to adjust the proposed test item for the status tag to be on a drain valve instead?
- 2.
Partial: An applicant could argue there is no correct answer to the question because NMP-AD-003, Section 4.1.3 (Danger Tags) dont contain the action described in the correct answer C.
- 3.
Cred Dist: Choice B (hang the danger tag and take off status tag) is not plausible because this choice implies that the operator is making his/her own personal decision in the field, without anyone elses permission.
- 4.
Stem Focus: The stem of the question is unclear about the timeline of events; did the operator encounter the MOV with a status tag as he/she was trying to hang the clearance? OR, was the operator going to the MOV with two tags to hang?
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with NMP-AD-003 (Equipment Clearance and Tagging)?
A Danger Tag __________ be applied to a component bearing a Status Tag.
[SHALL NOT vs can]
A drain valve which is NOT a boundary point, but is required to be open for a clearance _______
[can be a no-tag step vs. SHALL have a status tag]
12-2-21: A new question was used to replace the original modified question; however,
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice A (hang closed danger tag on open status tag) is not plausible because the stem says the danger/status tag positions conflict.
- 2.
Cred Dist: Choices C/D are not plausible for the same reason.
An applicant will always choose Choice B because this will eliminate the conflict between open vs closed required position.
12-9-21: Another new question used; however,
- 3.
The 2nd part of Choices B/D is not plausible because of the name of the Operating Permit Tag.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 12-10-21: 1st part of suggestion above incorporated and new part used to test Operating permit Tag; question is SAT.
70 F
2 B
S T3 G2.2.44 interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 71 F
H 2
x B
M E
S T3 G2.3.5 use rad monitoring systems, such as fixed rad monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring equipment
- 1.
Job-Link: The proposed test item is something that all employees are required to know; the exam should test at the licensed level of knowledge. This is a tough K/A to hit from a plantwide generic perspective. Here are some ideas:
Area rad monitors (ARMs) could be tested as a plantwide generic aspect; for example, are all ARMs GM detectors or are some ion chambers? Is there some generic guidance at the plant associated with ARM alarms in general?
Is there emergency-use only dosimetry staged for Ops personnel in the event of a fire?
What rad monitor(s) is/are checked each shift in 3-GEN-OTS-17-002, 12 Hour Tech Spec Surveillance?
12-2-21: Comment not incorporated.
12-9-21: 2nd opinion was that auto-reset of accumulated dose was not plausible and questionable license level knowledge.
12-14-21: Cred Dist: The N16 piece of the question isnt plausible because steam flow/RCS temp is so low the N16 doesnt make sense. Suggest putting the turbine online at a low power where the applicants are being tested on whether the N16s are allowed to be used. Instead of telling the applicants the size of the tube leak, can the applicants be tested on using the N16s to quantify the leak size.
12-17-21: Validation result was 2 out of 4 chose N16. Still suggest putting turbine online at low power and test whether N16s are/ are not allowed to be used.
1-28-22: Wheres the Vogtle guidance on when N16 indication is / is NOT valid? I couldnt find it; is it an annunciator procedure? Lesson plan? OP? AOP?. 12-14-21 comment still exists; the plausibility of the N16 piece is the concern. Same suggestion in 12-14-22 response.
2-10-22: 12-14-21 comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 72
?
F 2
x x
M U
S T3 G2.3.11 ability to control radiation release
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices C/D (release valve is full open when rad monitor is failed high) is not plausible because the design of monitored release paths is to ensure that a rad monitor causes the release to stop. On the other hand, if the question was changed to ask whether V051 closed after the rad monitor failed DOWNSCALE would be better.
- 2.
Overlap: The same concept (failed high instrument causes isolation) is tested in Q#98.
- 3.
Stem Focus: The 1st and 2nd parts of the question are disjointed; the 1st part of the question seems to only be needed because of the two-part question format since the 2nd part of the question is the only part related to the K/A.
- 4.
LOK: The distracter analysis said this was lower cog (fundamental) knowledge question, but the 1st part may be higher cog.
Suggest this:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with B-GEN-PLMC-120 (Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Permit Generation Data Control)?
The _________ Department has the lead responsibility for preparing radioactive gas release permits.
[Chemistry vs Radiation Protection]
The _______ Department is responsible for determining flow rate if the device is inoperable.
[Operations vs Chemistry]
12-2-21: The first part of the suggested question above was incorporated; the 2nd part was revised to test whether Outlet PCV auto-closes on High Discharge Pressure alarm. Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
73 H
F 2
x x
N E
S T3 emergency and abnormal operating procedures layout, symbols, and icons
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice D is not plausible because of the interplay between the 1st and 2nd parts. In other words, the wording of the fill-in-the-blank statement implies that one-valve-open flow is expected to be the greater of the two numbers, 1351 gpm.
- 2.
Cue: The 2nd part of Choices A/C (adverse containment conditions exist) cues the applicants to the correct answer for the 1st part of the question.
- 3.
Ensure no overlap with Q#32 and #80 Suggest this:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with NMP-AP-005-GL4 (Transient Response Procedure Users Guide)?
IF containment radiation is greater than _______ rad/hr, then use adverse numbers in procedures, until the _______.
[1.0 x 105 vs 1.0 x 106]
[Dose rate is less than 1.0 x 105 rad/hr vs integrated radiation dose is less than 1.0 x 106 rad]
12-2-21: Question replaced with another new question; however,
- 4.
Overlap: Continuous action step symbols will be heavily tested in the scenarios/JPMs.
- 5.
LOD=1: The bulleted list allowance for step performance will provide no discriminatory value on the exam.
Suggest using the question suggestion, or a version of it, to test an adverse condition that wont be encountered during the op test.
12-10-21: What procedure is being implemented in the stem? The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement leads to answer to the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement.
12-17-21: Distracter analysis doesnt way why the 1st part of C/D is plausible. The 1st part of C/D is not plausible because Step 21 says to reset.
1-28-22: The 1st part of the question will overlap the scenarios: CMT X means actuation is active. The 2nd part of the question is not related to the K/A. The suggestion in Comment #3 above hits the generic T3 topic because its testing the EOP bracketed icons.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 2-10-22: Question replaced with New question; question is SAT.
74 F
1 3
B N
U S
T3 G2.4.17 bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations
- 1.
LOD=1: The proposed test item will provide no discriminatory value on the exam.
12-6-21: Question replaced with a new question; however,
- 2.
Job-Link The way the question is presented could be argued as SRO knowledge, i.e., procedure selection based on assessment of plant conditions.
To remedy suggest:
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with F-0-B (Background Information for 3-EOP-F-0 Critical Safety Function Status Trees)?
[Consider each statement separately.]
IF during the performance of ORANGE Path FR-P.1 Step 5, a RED Path FR-P.1 rises, then _________.
[the FR-P.1 must be re-performed beginning at Step 1 vs.
performance of FR-P.1 can be continued from Step 5]
IF during the performance of a RED Path FR-P.1, a RED Path FR-H.1 rises, then ___________.
[the FR-P.1 must be completed first vs. FR-P.1 must be suspended]
12-10-21: New question comments incorporated, in essence; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 75 F
2 x
x x
B E
S T3 G2.4.33 knowledge of emergency response facilities
- 1.
Partial: The phrase such as in the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement can potentially lead to post-exam appeals. Its better to ask about a specific position, that is an aux operator or work-control center RO, instead of being too general with the phrase such as.
- 2.
Cue: The word onsite in the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 3.
Job-Link: An applicant could successfully argue that the 2nd part of the question is SRO-only knowledge associated with classifying emergencies and decisions for activating emergency response facilities.
Suggest writing the question to test the applicants knowledge of the location of the OSC and where auxiliary operators are required to report when a Site Area Emergency has been declared.
12-2-21: Question replaced with a new question; however,
- 4.
The same concern for Comment #3 above exists with the 2nd part of the question because an applicant could successfully argue that staffing time requirements is SRO knowledge.
The revised distracter analysis says that NPOs need to know the time limit for reporting to the location; however, the 2nd part of the question doesnt ask about NPOs.
12-10-21: Question replaced with Bank questions; however,
- 5.
Partial: Suggest modifying the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to specify IAW NMP-EP-142-F02, Emergency Notifications for Electronic Notification.
12-17-21: Cue: The Operations Supervisor in the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement is not necessary. Also, 12-10-21 Comment #5 above not incorporated.
1-28-22: ENS is for NRC; Question is SAT. Suggest adding NMP-EP-142, Section 4.4, ENS Notifications (NRC Notifications) to distracter analysis.
76 H
2 x
x x
N U
SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T1G1 ES-1.3 (ADS Stage 1-3 Actuation Response) EA2.04 (evaluate fuel pool cask loading pit level as it applies to procedure.
- 1.
SRO-only: The distracter analysis says the question targets 10CFR55.43.b (2), which is Tech Specs; however, the 1st part of the question is RO knowledge that CLP operability (gate OPEN) is required when decay heat is > 5 MWt and 7 MWt, i.e.,
above-the-line Tech Spec knowledge. The CLP level surveillance requirement is likely RO knowledge based on day-to-day surveillance logs that ROs are typically responsible for.
Tech Spec Bases is not being tested. IF the intent of the question was to target SRO 55.43 b (5), Procedure Selection, the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement doesnt require applicants to select the procedure, or an attachment, etc. For the remainder of the exam, if a SRO test item is targeting 55.43 (b) 5, then its cleaner to create a question where the applicants have to select a procedure, transition, attachment, etc. Otherwise, we may be in a gray area as to which 55.43 (b) item is being met.
- 2.
Cred Dist: Choice A (Gate IS required to be open even though CLP inventory required for DVI injection) is not plausible because of the interplay between the first and second parts of the question. If the Pit Loading Gate is required to be open, and CLP inventory used for DVI Line Injection, then spent fuel bundles would be in jeopardy.
- 3.
Cred. Dist.: Choice D (Gate NOT required to be open even though CLP required for SFP cooling) is not plausible because of the interplay between the first and second parts of the question. If the gate is not required to be open, then why would the inventory be required for SFP cooling?
- 4.
Stem Focus: Using the phrase will be used for in the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement could be replaced with is required to be used for. This is a generic comment related to entire exam; when possible, try to word questions as is required to be (instead of things like the crew will).
Suggest revising the question to delete the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement and make the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement into Is / Is NOT required choice for using CLP inventory for DVI Line Injection. The 2nd new part of the question could be related to the ES-1.3 basis document, as long as it isnt systems knowledge.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 76 H
3 N
S T1G1 ES-1.3 (ADS Stage 1-3 Actuation Response) EA2.04 (evaluate fuel pool cask loading pit level as it applies to procedure.
- 1.
Sample question comments incorporated.
1-28-22: Validation comment to remove 1st bullet about irradiated assemblies; Question is still SAT. Need to include Initial Power Level in the stem of the question.
77 H
3 x
x N
E S
T1G1 A-342 RCP Malfunctions G2.1.7 evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION
- 1.
Overlap: S4E7
- 2.
Partial: An applicant could successfully argue that Choice A (safeguards stopped the leak) is also correct because the RCS leak to outside containment was indeed stopped.
The root cause of this issue is the vagueness of the phrase stop the leak at the end of the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement.
Suggest replacing 1st fill-in-the-blank statement with:
At 1020:00 the RCS leak rate has/ has NOT stopped.
- 3.
Stem Focus: Suggest adding another 1000:00 bullet to say The crew entered AOP-114 (RCP Malfunctions) due to elevated RCP stator temperature indication. This helps the applicants know the procedural path taken, and also helps make the link to the K/A statement more obvious for future audits.
- 4.
Stem Focus: The 2nd bullet (1000:00) should include the words heat exchanger, or whatever the heat exchanger is called, at the end of the 2nd bullet.
- 5.
Stem Focus: The 3rd bullet (1020:00) should use the phrase due to lowering pressurizer level instead of due to the leak in progress, because it seems more clearer to the applicants.
- 6.
Partial: To ensure no subset issues, suggest re-wording the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to be:
The highest required emergency classification is a(n) _______.
- 7.
The distracter analysis, for Choice C, says the safeguards actuation will isolate CCS from RCS, which doesnt make sense; I think it should say and isolate the RCS leak from leaving containment.
12-3-21: No overlap with S4E7 because in this question Safeguards CCS Isolation works in this question and because in S4 the applicants wont observe containment sump level beginning to rise (from relief valve). Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 78 H
3 x
x N
E/U S
E S
T1G1 A-343 Loss of Normal RHR AA2.03 evaluate CCWS to Normal RHR Hx flow as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 2nd part of Choices B/D (concurrent implementation of AOP-702 not required) is questionable because the 2nd fill-in-the-blank has the phrase if NEITHER CCS pump is running, which means an additional issue at hand requiring AOP-702.
Suggest deleting the phrase if NEITHER CCS Pump is running in the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement and change the correct answer to Choice D.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The phrase and providing CCS cooling is not necessary in the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 3.
Stem Focus: In the 1st part of Choices A/B, suggest replacing the word is with remains.
For example, to address Comments #1 and #2, suggest:
At 1001:00, component cooling water flow _____ aligned to RNS Train A Hx. [remains vs is NOT]
12-6-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
12-17-21: 1st fill-in-the-blank statement changed due to validation; not sure why. It was testing whether CCS remained aligned to A Hx per procedure.
1-28-22: The 12-6-21 version tested whether CCS remained aligned to A Hx per procedure. The 12-17-21 version replaced the alignment with the required CCS flow. The 12-17-21 revision injured the plausibility of the 2nd part of Choices A/C (AOP-702 is required) because the 1st part about flow band implies nothing is wrong with CCS. The original version kept the plausibility intact, and the original version hit the K/A flow aspect already.
2-10-22: Replaced 2nd part to test whether concurrent AOP implementation is/ is not required. Question is SAT.
79 H
x x
N E
S T1G1 A-345 Loss of SW, G2.2.23 ability to track TS limiting LCOs
- 1.
Partial: IF NMP-OS-027 is the only guidance for admin LCOs, THEN an applicant can successfully argue that Choice D is also correct because no procedural requirement exists for initiating a tracking admin LCO.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The initial conditions are missing information that RNS Train A is in service and that the RCS will be opened after reaching Mode 5.
- 3.
Partial: Suggest adding words to the distracter analysis for the 2nd part of Choices A/C to say that with the B Pump SW MOV closed and power removed, that only one FUNCTIONAL SW Train exists, and the TRM basis says that if both pumps arent functional then the condition (open RCS) should not be entered.
- 4.
Stem Focus: Suggest modifying the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to cite the TRM basis (not just TRM).
12-3-21: Comment #1 not addressed because NMP-OS-027 definitions section is a broad general description that one method of tracking is an admin LCO.
- 5.
Suggest modifying the 2nd bullet in the Given Conditions to say:
GOP-205 (Plant Cooldown Mode 3 to Mode 5) is in progress to support opening the RCS pressure boundary.
- 6.
Suggest adding a bullet at 1030:00 that says:
The plant is in Mode 5 and the RCS pressure boundary remains closed.
- 7.
Suggest modifying the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement to be:
In accordance with NMP-OS-027 (Recording LCOs) an ADMIN LCO ________ allowed to be prepared at 1030:00.
[is allowed vs is NOT allowed]
- 8.
Suggest modifying the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to be:
In accordance with the bases for TRM 3.7.4 (SWS-RCS Open),
the RCS _________ be opened at 1030:00.
[can vs should NOT]
12-10-21: 2nd fillin-the-blank statement changed to test whether NMP-OS-027 is/ is not required to be performed; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 80 H
3 x
M E
S T1G1 FR-H.1, EA2.01 evaluate PRHR flow as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Overlap: We already evaluate the applicants assessment of the 700 gpm PRHR Hx flow value in S1E8, S2E9, and S3E7
- 2.
Cue: The PRHR flow value in the 1000:00 stem bullets is the only value presented with the word indicates.
Suggest changing the PRHR flow value to 890 gpm; would that still allow FR-H.1 entry based on answering no to the question PRHR in service?
- 3.
Ensure no overlap with Q#32 and #73 12-6-21: No change incorporated; need to discuss.
12-10-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 81 H
3 x
x M
E/U S
T1G1 SDP-1 Response to Loss of RCS Inventory during Shutdown EA2.04 evaluate normal RHR flow and/or pump amps as it applies to procedure EMERGENCY PLAN CLASSIFICATION
- 1.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 1st part of Choices C/D (pump runout) is questionable because the stem doesnt include a flow value for the applicants to assess.
To remedy, suggest re-working the 1st part of the question to test the required RNO action at 1015:00, when the crew is performing Step 5, Check RNS Pumps NOT Cavitating
[stop one RNS train vs stop both RNS trains].
- 2.
Partial: To ensure no subset issues, suggest re-wording the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to be:
At 1030:00 the highest required emergency classification is a(n)
- 3.
Typo: In the Proposed-References-to-be-Provided field in the distracter analysis, it says None.
12-2-21: Same Comment #1 above.
12-10-21: Question revised to ask for next required procedure action (stop one RNS pump vs initiate RNS Isolation); question is SAT.
1-28-22: Validation comment to change HL level to 20% instead of 10% to preclude SAE being a challengable answer. Question is still SAT.
82 F
2 x
N E
S T1G2 A-308 Loss of CR Air Conditioning AA2.02 evaluate Nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system flow as it applies to procedure
- 1.
Cue: The last portion of the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement is not necessary to elicit the correct response. Suggest re-wording the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement as:
When VES air banks are exhausted, the crew is required to perform __________.
12-2-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 83 F
2 x
N U
S E
S T1G2 FR-H.2 Response to SG Overpressure G2.4.17 knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures terms and definitions
- 1.
SRO-only: Both parts of the proposed test item are RO knowledge, i.e., the first part is the overall mitigative strategy for a SG whose pressure is greater than the highest safety valve relief setpoint, and the second part is the overall mitigative strategy of not feeding the affected SG because feeding will create more pressure inside the SG.
Suggest keeping the 1st part of the question and add a new 2nd part that tests the applicants knowledge of whether FR-H.2 does / does NOT include a transition to another ORANGE path procedure.
12-3-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
1-28-22: Validator comment was that Choice C was also correct for 2nd part of question because F-0 directed an Orange Path; proposed adding SG level item in stem and testing if FR-H.3 entry was required at SG1 level at 97%/stable. Since 97% is almost full, suggest changing to 90% and stable.
2-10-22: Changed to 90%; question is SAT.
84 H
2 x
x N
E SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T1G2 FR-I.3 (Response to Voids in Vessel) EA2.03 (evaluate CVCS makeup flow as it applies to procedure)
ES-401-9 NOTE: FR-I.3 has been incorporated into FR-C.2 and -
C.3; FR-I.3 no longer exists as a stand-alone procedure. However, its content was moved to FR-C.2 and -C.3.
- 1.
Cue: This question cues the RO applicants to the answer at Q#13 because the stem contains the exact wording of FR-C.2, Step 10, which points to the 870F threshold. Suggest revising the stem to eliminate the exact wording of Step 10.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement can be worded as is / is NOT required to transition to ES-1.3 at 1005:00. This is a generic comment related to entire exam; when possible, try to word questions as is required to be (instead of things like the crew will).
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 84 H
3 N
S E
S T1G2 FR-I.3 (Response to Voids in Vessel) EA2.03 (evaluate CVCS makeup flow as it applies to procedure)
ES-401-9 NOTE: FR-I.3 has been incorporated into FR-C.2 and -
C.3; FR-I.3 no longer exists as a stand-alone procedure. However, its content was moved to FR-C.2 and -C.3.
- 1.
Sample question comments incorporated; question is SAT.
12-17-21: Validation comment incorporated to provide CET trend is lowering, which injures the plausibility/ provides cueing to go to ES-1.3. Suggest providing the trend as stable.
1-28-22: Same comment as 12-17-21; everything in the stem is lowering therefore, the plausibility of going to ADS Stage 1 - 3 is not good. If we make it stable, as in SAT version previously approved, then the applicant has to know the numbers in the procedure.
2-10-22: Plausiblity is that C.1 would require ES-1.3; question is asking about C.2. Question is SAT.
85 H
2 x
x N
E SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T1G2 A-348 (Degraded Grid) EG2.4.16 (emergency & abnormal procedures implementation hierarchy & coordination with other support procedures or guidelines, such as Ops, AOPs, or SAMGs)
- 1.
Cues and/or Stem Focus: The NOTE that contains numbers and titles of GOP-101 and AOP-101 is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The 1st and 2nd fill-in-the-blank statements use the phrases will use and will direct. This is a generic comment related to entire exam; when possible, try to word questions as is required to be (instead of things like the crew will).
85 H
3 x
x x
N M
E S
E T1G2 A-348 Degraded Grid, G2.4.16 knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines, such as Ops, AOPs, or SAMGs
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice D (Loss of Business Loop) is not plausible because there is nothing in the stem that could be misconstrued such that D-ADM-OPS-001 was required to be performed.
- 2.
Partial: An applicant could successfully argue that Choices A/B are also correct because Step 2 of AOP-304 comes before Step
- 3.
To remedy Comment #1 and #2, suggest converting to a 2-part question to test whether 1) E-0 is / is NOT required, and 2) whether D-ADM-OPS-001 is / is NOT required. Add a stem bullet saying that all power to the training buildings was lost at the same time fluctuations occurred in the Main Generator output.
- 3.
Stem Focus: Instead of saying power has risen above 100%,
suggest providing the applicants with the exact value of 100.3%.
12-3-21: Comment #2 addressed by converting to a 2 x 2 question; however,
- 4.
Cred Dist and/or SRO-only: The plausibility of the 2nd part of Choices C/D is questionable because the degraded grid condition still exists, and the AOP-304 entry conditions are RO knowledge.
Recommend testing whether D-ADM-OPS-001 is / is NOT required to be implemented. The Business Loop is an approved Step in AOP-304, and D-ADM-OPS-001 is the RNO for Step 14.
12-10-21: Changed 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to be If a reactor trip was required, then AOP-304 ______ be performed concurrently with E-0. Question is SAT.
12-17-21: Validation comment to change LOOP to all MA rods drop, but the reason for why these particular rods fell is missing. IF OPDMS were function and these rods fell, would a reactor trip be required?
1-28-22: Validation comment was that 12-10 and 12-17 versions required no substantive actions in AOP-302, even though entry was required. Replaced with modified bank question; however,
- 5.
Stem Focus: suggest making Time 1003 bullets to be in different order: 1. Power at 100.3% (no stable mention), 2.
AOP-304 entered, 3. operator depressed GO at 20 MW/min.
More on next page
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only
- 6.
Stem Focus: Suggest making 1005 event to say that reactor power is 100.4% stable and crew cannot maintain <100%.
- 7.
Stem Focus: Suggest making 2nd fill-in-the-blank clearer to say The crew is / is NOT required to exit AOP-304 and transition to AOP-207.
2-10-22: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
86
?
H 2
x x
x N
E S
T2G1 RCS A2.23 predict the impacts of failure of PZR heaters on RCS and use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate
- 1.
Partial: An applicant could argue that the target RCS pressure was 0 psig and say there was no correct answer to the 2nd part of the question. Step 3 of ES-0.1 says to Determine RCS and SG Target Values.
Suggest adding a 1000:00 bullet that says the crew determined the RCS pressure and temperature target values to be 2335 psig and 547°F, respectively.
- 2.
Cue: The wording of the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement (ALL heaters) leads the applicants away from Choices C/D when RCS pressure is 2280 psig and rising.
Suggest changing the RCS pressure to be 2280 psig and stable, and re-word the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement as:
At 1010:00, Control Heaters ___________.
[are required to be OFF vs are allowed to remain ON]
- 3.
Stem Focus: In the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement, suggest adding the words target pressure, i.e., will direct the crew to maintain RCS target pressure using ______.
- 4.
LOK: If the above comments are incorporated, need to re-assess LOK.
12-2-21: Comment #2 (2280 psig and stable) not incorporated.
12-10-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
1-28-22: Validator comment was PZR control heater dont have off, instead have Off/Disabled. Question is still SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 87 F
2 x
N U
S T2G1 Passive Core Cooling (PXS) G2.4.40 knowledge of SRO responsibilities in the E-plan procedures
- 1.
Q=K/A: The PXS topic isnt being tested. Two ideas for how to hit the K/A:
What are the EOP exit points to the SAMGs and do the exit points involve any of the PXS component failures? SRO knowledge to know these EOP exit points to SAMGs.
Do any of the Hot or Cold E-plan charts contain criteria associated with PXS component degradation decision thresholds?
12-10-21: Question replaced; however,
- 2.
The title of UFSAR Table 7.4-1 in the fill-in-the-blank statement is wrong; should be Systems Required for Safe Shutdown (no caps).
12-17-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 88 H
3 x
x N
E S
T2G1 IDS Class 1E and Non-Class 1E DC and UPS Systems AA2.06 predict the impacts of Class 1E inverter failure and use procedures to correct, control, mitigate
- 1.
Partial: An applicant can successfully argue Choice A is also correct because the phrase detailed procedural guidance in the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement is subjective. In other words, an applicant could contend that AOP-303, Step 3 is detailed procedural guidance for where to go (SOP) to energize affected busses.
Suggest re-working the 2nd part of the question to test which 3-IDS-SOP-002 Attachment is required to be performed. (or is / is NOT) required.
- 2. Cred Dist: The plausibility of the 1st part of Choices B/C is questionable because the inverter has lost its DC supply power.
Suggest re-working the 1st part of the question to test whether LCO 3.8.5 (Distribution Systems-Operating) is / is NOT met.
12-6-21: Comment #1 not incorporated because 2nd fill-in-the-blank still have the phrase detailed procedure guidance in...
- 3.
Suggest adding another 1000:00 bullet that says the crew entered AOP-303.
- 4.
Suggest modifying the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to ask whether Attachment 2 is / is not required.
- 5.
Suggest replacing the last part of the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement (energize affected busses) to be specific to say energize 1DSD-EA-1.
12-10-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 89 H
3 M
U S
T2G1 RCP G2.2.17 process for managing maintenance activities during power ops, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator
- 1.
Q=K/A: The RCP topic isnt being tested; the proposed test item solely tests TS provisions for missed surveillances.
- 2.
Cue: The only Choice that includes the word decision is also the correct answer; the stem includes the phrase it has been decided.
12-2-21: Comment #1 not addressed. To remedy, suggest providing Tech Spec 3.3.15 (two pages) as an exam reference and modify the question to test:
- 1) what is the latest time that the missed surveillance can be delayed until, assuming a risk evaluation is performed, and
- 2) the Tech Spec 3.3.15 required action [A.1 vs B.1] when the surveillance performance is discovered to be unsat.
12-10-21: Change 2nd half of B/D to say B.1 and B.2; comments incorporated. Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 90 H
1.5 x
N E
SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T2G1 CVS A2.15 (predict impacts of mixed bed demineralizer system/component malfunctions on CVCS and use procedures to correct, control, mitigate)
- 1.
LOD: The GFE topic associated with release of Boron at rising resin temperatures may not be appropriate on the site-specific exam. Suggest revising the 1st fill-in-the-blank to test whether a specific annunciator is / is NOT alarming, etc.
- 2.
Partial: Post-exam, an applicant could successfully argue that Step 29 of AOP-702 is detailed procedural guidance; therefore, Choice A is also correct. Suggest revising the 2nd fill-in-the-blank to test which Attachment of 3-CVS-SOP-001 is required to be used to restore CVS letdown (as long as the title of the distracter attachment is plausible).
- 3.
Suggest including in distracter analysis what failure is causing the stem event to occur. Adding the premise of the event to the distracter analysis helps on using AOP-702 to review.
- 4.
Typo on distracter analysis: Should be T2G1 (instead of T2G2)
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 90 H
3 x
x N
U S
T2G1 CVS A2.15 (predict impacts of mixed bed demineralizer system/component malfunctions on CVCS and use procedures to correct, control, mitigate)
- 1.
Q=K/A: The mixed bed demineralizer operations K/A topic is not being hit. The CCS-V221 response occurs first, due to RCS flow entering CCS; the LD auto-isolation only occurs after CCS-V221 auto-isolates.
- 2.
Sample question Comment #2 not addressed.
- 3.
Stem Focus: The sequence of events in the 1000:00 stem bullet are presented in a reverse order. The first bullet should be that CCS Flow rises, (also add bullet that surge tank level rising), the next bullet should be that crew enters AOP-702.
Then, a new 1010:00 bullet should say that CVS-TE002 is 140 deg and rising (which occurs after the CCS-V221 auto-closure).
- 4.
Stem Focus: The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement will be confusing to the applicants because it doesnt reflect that full auto-letdown operation is necessary a long, long time after the stem events occurred, i.e., after the Hx has been fixed. However, Comment
- 1 above (Sample question Comment #2) is not addressed.
12-2-21: The premise of the question is that a LD HX leak occurs with reactor coolant entering the CCS. Comment #1 not addressed; lets discuss. Additionally, Comment #3 (add bullet that surge tank level is rising) not incorporated.
12-10-21: Added AOP-112 to stem, re-worded 2nd fill-in-the-blank to include steps, re-open, and the. Question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 91 F
H 2
x B
N U
S T2G2 RPIS A2.11 predict the impacts of failed digital rod position indication coil and use procedures to correct, control, mitigate
- 1.
SRO-only: The 2nd part of the question is RO knowledge of DRPI half-accuracy; Lesson Plan AP-LT-I-PP-DRCS, RO Objective 6: Predict DRCS response to Power/Logic Cabinet failures. Just because systems knowledge items may appear in the TS bases doesnt necessarily mean that the systems knowledge item is SRO knowledge.
Suggest testing the SRO applicants ability to use/apply TS 3.1.7 to address the DRPI Ctmt Cab loss of power event.
Note: The 2nd part of the question is necessary for the 1st part of this A2 K/A statement, i.e., the 2nd part of the question is the predict piece. The 1st part of the question is not predicting.
12-3-21: The 2nd part of the proposed change says LCO 3.1.7 Condition A _____ met. This seems to require the applicants to memorize Tech Specs, and could be backwards logic.
For the 2nd part of the question, suggest providing the applicants with the Tech Spec 3.1.7 and test whether Required Action A.1 OR A.2 vs Required Action B.1 AND B.2 is required.
12-10-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
1-28-22: Validator comment was that 1st fill-in-the-blank question too wordy and created note at bottom of stem. Question is still SAT.
Need to specify which pages of TS 3.1.7 will be provided to applicant in distracter analysis.
92 H
2 N
E S
E S
T2G2 VLS Containment H2 Control System, G2.1.25 interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, and tables
- 1.
The Generic K/A statement makes this a tough K/A to hit for the VLS topic. May need to randomly replace Generic K/A if theres nothing for the applicants to interpret given a reference.
- 2.
Direct Lookup for the SRO part: The two proposed references provided to the applicants (TRM Table 3.6.2-1 and 3-VLS-OTS Table 2) make the applicants determination that 3-out-of-4 igniters are required to be operable a direct lookup.
Table TR 3.6.2-1 indicates the minimum number of hydrogen igniters that are required in Comp 1.
Table 2 indicates the number of igniters in Comp 1.
12-2-21: Question revised such that applicants must know the 1700F surveillance requirement value from memory, with the two provided references.
- 3.
What is the basis for knowing the 1700F value from memory?
Is there a learning objective? The learning objective listed in the distracter analysis is about the basis for the regulatory requirement. For example, The hydrogen igniters limit the buildup of hydrogen to less than
______ assuming that 100% of the fuel clad is oxidized.
[4% vs 10%]
- 4.
The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement has a grammar error; the word then may be confusing.
12-10-21: SRO-only Learning objective added to distracter analysis.
Question is SAT.
1-28-22: Validator comment that 1st part of 12-17 version was minutia, i.e., knowing that igniters actuated from control room vs locally. However, revised version asks whether igniters can be actuated from control room; cannot is not plausible because in an accident the plant is designed to allow operators to actuate in the control room.
2-10-22: Question reworked to test whether an individual igniter can be actuated from the control room (versus only all igniters); question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 93 H
5 x
N E
S T2G2 Rad Monitoring System A2.02 predict the impacts of RCS leakage into containment on the RMS and use procedures to correct, control, mitigate
- 1.
Partial: An applicant could successfully argue that the containment sump level indicators ARE operable because they were trending correctly and the offscale high condition is accurate for the plant conditions.
- 2.
LOD=5: Without providing TS 3.4.9 as a reference, an applicant can successfully contend that the 2nd part of the question required them to memorize TS.
To remedy both comments, suggest setting up a timeline in the stem, at 1000:00 the containment sump level was XX% and rising, and reactor power is 19%.
Then at 1010:00, tell the applicants that both containment sump level channels (unid #s provided in stem) failed downscale and provide TS 3.4.9 as an exam reference to the applicants.
Then re-word the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement to test whether LCO 3.0.3 is / is NOT required.
12-3-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
94 F
2 x
B E/U S
T3 G2.1.20 ability to interpret and execute procedure steps
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice A (delay entry to E-1 until E-0 Attachment 1 finished) is not plausible because a LOCA exists that requires attention and delaying E-1 entry is non-conservative.
- 2.
Cred Dist: The plausibility of Choice C (undo Attachment 1 actions) is questionable because placing IWRST cooling is never required to be manually un-done in the EOPs.
12-2-21: The ROs perform Attachment 1; therefore, in addition to the Comments above, the correct answer to the question is RO knowledge.
12-14-21: The yellow path bullet that we discussed is missing.
12-27-21: Received corrected version on the same day as draft op test; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 95 F
2 x
x x
B U
SAMPLE QUESTION recd 8-2-21 T3 G2.1.41 (knowledge of refueling process)
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choices C (last head bolt tensioned) and A (upper internals back in place) are not plausible because this means that Mode 6 (Refueling) doesnt have to be entered until all the fuel bundles have been loaded.
- 2.
Partial: An applicant could successfully argue there is no correct answer because of the way the fill-in-the-blank statement is worded; the phrase administratively re-entered may not be an official term. GOP-305, Step 7.b requires 3-GOP-301, Mode Change Checklists, Attachment 2, Mode 6 Checklist to be performed BEFORE the first bundle is loaded. Step 8.d requires entering Mode 6 when the first bundle is placed in the reactor.
The phrase administratively re-entered may be slang and could make the question have no correct answer.
- 3.
SRO-only: The proposed test item may be too close to RO knowledge of Mode definitions.
Suggest testing something more specific from GOP-305, for example, Time/Day: The core was offloaded.
Time/Day: Preparations for core onload are in progress per GOP-305, Refueling Mode 6. No fuel has been loaded.
WOOTF completes both statements in accordance with 3-GOP-305?
When the core offload was initially completed on Time/Day, the Plant Mode NAP Manual Plant Mode Selection _______ allowed to remain in Mode 6.
[was vs. was NOT]
The Plant Mode NAP Manual Mode Selection is required to be in Mode 6 ________ the first fuel assembly is placed in the vessel.
[before vs when]
95 F
2 x
x N
E S
E S
T3 G2.1.41 (knowledge of refueling process)
- 1.
Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice A is also correct because neither GOP-305 nor GOP-301 specify who performs GOP-301, Attachment 3. The SS could perform GOP-305 and direct the FHS to perform GOP-301, Attachment
- 3. Just like the SS, the FHS has an SRO license and is required to ensure the procedures are adhered to by all refueling crew members.
- 2.
Cue: The first part of the 1st fill-in-the-blank statement (Prior to authorizing) is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 3.
Q=K/A: The K/A tie is weak because the proposed question only tests reviews that prepare the plant for the refueling process; the K/A statement requires knowledge of the refueling process - not just the reviews to enter the Refueling mode.
Suggest the following:
Given:
A core reload is in progress.
WOOTF completes the following statement in accordance with B-RFL-FHP-031, Fuel Handling Control Procedure?
No more than ___ fuel assembly(ies) SHALL be out of the storage racks, fuel cleaning canisters, new fuel elevator, fuel transfer system upender, or fuel assembly leak test canister at any given time in the Fuel Building.
[one vs two]
No more than ___ fuel assembly(ies) SHALL be out of the Reactor Vessel at any given time in the Containment.
[one vs two].
12-6-21: Question replaced with a new question; however,
- 4.
Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices C/D (FHS doesnt have to have a license) is not plausible because the applicants can eliminate these choices solely based on conservatism. Suggest testing whether the SRO can / cannot be assigned to the FHS position with an inactive SRO license.
12-10-21: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
12-17-21: Validation comment reworded 1st fill-in-the-blank from inactive to active. Suggest this reword instead, less cueing:
To be assigned as FHS, the SROs license ________ required to be active. [is vs is NOT]
1-28-22: Comment incorporated; question is SAT.
96 H
2 x
B E
T3 G2.2.23 Ability to track TS LCOs
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only S
- 1.
Cue: The 2nd 1100:00 bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 2.
Cue: The phrase CONDITION B will be entered again.. is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
Suggest deleting the 3rd stem bullet and re-wording the fill-in-the-blank statement as:
The subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from 12-2-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 97 H
F 2
x x
x B
M U
T3 G2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities such as degraded power sources, on the status of LCOs
- 1.
Cred Dist: Choice A (flow test is required) is not plausible because the stem contains no system identifier or other information that could be misconstrued as implying a flow surveillance procedure is required.
- 2.
Cred Dist: Choice D (admin tracking until electrically cycled) is not plausible because administrative tracking is vague and undefined in the Choice.
- 3.
Partial: An applicant could successfully argue that Choice D is also correct because of the subset issue associated with electrically cycling the valve, i.e., there is no known issue with the valve, it could be otherwise considered operable absent the need for the electrical cycling.
- 4.
Stem Focus: The question format should include a timeline like the other exam questions, so that its clear that the fill-in-the-blank statement is asking about the current conditions.
12-6-21: Comments #1, #2, and #3 not addressed. Need to discuss.
12-10-21: Choice B still has electrically cycled. Stem is missing the MOV number/name to coincide with PCS-OTS-17-001.
12-17-21: By providing the name/number of the MOV, then the 1st two stem bullets are no longer required, i.e., the applicants should know that the MOV is normally open and receives a confirmatory signal to initiate opening on Hi Cnmt pressure. Suggest deleting the 1st two bullets.
1-28-22: The plausibility of Choice B is questionable because administratively tracking until electrically cycled means inoperable.
Suggest the following (see next line)
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 97 1-28-22 comment continued Given:
At time 1000:00 PCS-V002 is tagged out in the CLOSED position o
PCS-V002C power supply breaker is opened o
The handwheel & breaker are included in tagout o
No maintenance work is being performed on PCS-V002C At time 15:00:00, Maintenance completed and tagout cleared PCS-V002C power supply breaker is Closed PCS-V002C position is restored to its required position An engineering evaluation has NOT been performed WOOTF completes both statements?
PCS-V002C is normally required to be in the _______ position.
[open vs closed]
At 1500:00, in accordance with NMP-OS-007-001 and NMP-AD-003, PCS-V002C is _______.
[Operable vs NOT Operable]
2-10-22: Question Modified to test whether manually operating MOV causes it to be inoperable, and location of the MOV (inside/outside containment). Question is Sat.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 98 H
B M
U S
U S
T3 G2.3.5 Ability to control radiation releases
- 1.
Cred Dist: The 1st part of Choices C/D (release continues when rad monitor is failed high) is not plausible because the design of monitored release paths is to ensure that a rad monitor causes the release to stop. On the other hand, if the question was changed to ask whether the liquid release continued after the rad monitor failed DOWNSCALE would be better.
- 2.
Overlap: The same concept (failed high instrument causes isolation) is tested in Q#72.
- 3.
Stem Focus: Suggest including the Section of Attachment 10 (Section 4.8, Discharge of WMT A) in the 1st and 4th bullets.
12-2-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
12-14-21: Facility changed question back to upscale. Cues: The indication ONLY fails low, and because were asking about something in the 2nd part that obviously must be required, the question is LOD=1. Suggest going back to rad monitor losing power supply.
12-17-21: Comment not incorporated; suggest going back to rad monitor losing power supply.
1-28-22: Comment not incorporated; suggest going back to 12-2 version.
2-10-22: Comment #1 incorporated (downscale); question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 99 H
3 N
E S
T3 G2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation
- 1.
Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that Choice C (PCCWST Standpipe Flow) is also correct because Tech Spec Table 3.3.17-1 Function 17 (PCS Heat Removal) includes the standpipe flow.
Suggest changing Choice C to:
Plant Vent-Noble Gas (Accident Mid-Range & High Range)
- 2.
Partial: To ensure the question is clear to the applicants and bullet-proof from partially correct answers, suggest the following re-wording:
Given:
The Unit is in MODE 1 WOOTF Functions is listed in Tech Spec Table 3.3.17-1 (Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation) AND is also used when evaluating emergency action level classifications?
- 3.
Stem Focus: To mirror the name of the Table 3.3.17-1 Function, suggest revising Choice B to say:
B. Ctmt Area Radiation (High Range) 12-6-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.
Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. Other
- 6.
Source B/M/N
- 7.
Status U/E/S
- 8.
Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job-Link Minutia
- /
units Back-ward Q=
K/A SRO Only 100 F
2 x
x B
E S
T3 G2.4.37 Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the E-Plan procedures
- 1.
Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that there is no correct answer to the question because Choice C (activation of the ERO) is a decision made by the Emergency Director; NMP-EP-142, Section 3.1 says that the Control Room Emergency Director activates the ERO at their discretion or when procedurally required.
NMP-EP-142-F07 (SNC ERO Recall System Activation) doesnt include straightforward language that says the ED can delegate the ERO Activation Package.
Suggest finding another bank question that tests the titles of the OSC, EOF, TSC, and JIC, including who works for who, etc.
- 2.
Stem Focus: The stem of the question is missing who the ED is; is it the CR ED or the TSC ED?
- 3.
Stem Focus: The four Choices can be shortened to:
A.
Protective Action Recommendation approval B.
Emergency exposure authorization C.
Emergency Response Organization activation D.
Potassium Iodide authorization.
- 4.
Typo: The distracter analysis says this question is T2G2 even though its T3 12-6-21: Comments incorporated; however,
- 5.
Choice C should mirror the NMP-EP-142 term, i.e., ERO Recall System Activation (instead of ERO activation - ERO callout) because Choice C doesnt mirror the Form 07 title/term and/or because callout could be subjective/slang/cue.
- 6.
Suggest adding stem bullet that says EOF is not activated, (required for non-delegable PAR criteria) OR a bullet saying that the Control Room Emergency Director is the Shift Manager.
- 7.
The fill-in-the-blank statement should be worded as is allowed to delegate instead of can.
12-10-21: Comments incorporated; question is SAT.