ML21074A382
| ML21074A382 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/2019 |
| From: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | NRC/RGN-II |
| References | |
| Download: ML21074A382 (619) | |
Text
ML21074A382 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1
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Facility: Vogtle 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
Initial Conditions: The unit is at 100% reactor power, MOL, steady state operations. Boron concentration is 805 ppm.
Equipment OOS: ACCW pump #1 is tagged out due to an oil leak - RTS in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
Crew is performing a fuel shuffle at the Unit 1 SFP.
Thunderstorms are expected in the area.
Critical Tasks:
- 1. Manually start standby EHC Pump B
- 2. Manually trip the RCPs per the RCP Trip Criteria (RCS pressure < 1400 psig and at least one CCP or SI Pump running)
Reset to IC 360 Pre-loaded Malfunctions:
TU10B EHC Pump B Fails to Auto Start NS07F NSCW Pump #6 Fails to Auto Start ES20C CIA Fails to Auto Actuate (Both Trains)
GE12A PCB 161710 Fails to Auto Open GE12B PCB 161810 Fails to Auto Open Triggered Malfunctions:
(1) PR03A (0%) 1LT-459, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, Fails Low (3) NI10A (100%) N41, PR NI Lower Detector, Fails High (4) NS02D NSCW Pump #2 Trips (5) RD13D RCCA K14 Rod Drops (6) TU11 EHC Pump A Trips (7) RD13H RCCA D4 Rod Drops (9) PR01A (80% to 10% 1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety Valve, Fails Open over 5 min)
Southern Company l Scenario 2 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 Trigger 1 I-OATC 1LT-459, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, fails low causing entry into I-SS 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. As a result 10 min TS-SS of the failure, Letdown will automatically isolate.
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 9, CONDITION M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Function 8, CONDITION A, 30 days 2 N/A N-OATC Restore Normal Letdown to service per 13006-1, Chemical and N-SS Volume Control System.
15 min 3 Trigger 3 I-OATC Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will insert I-SS automatically, and the crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear 10 min TS-SS Instrumentation System Malfunction.
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 2a (Power Range Neutron Flux - High),
CONDITION D, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 3 (Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 16c (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8),
CONDITION S, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> o Function 16d (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9),
CONDITION S, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> o Function 16e (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 and input to P-7), CONDITION R, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Southern Company l Scenario 2 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 4 Trigger 4 C-UO NSCW Pump #2 trips with NSCW Pump #6 failing to automatically C-SS start (pre-loaded malfunction). Crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of 10 min Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
5 Trigger 5 R-OATC Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds R-SS using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which 30 min N-UO directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
TS-SS 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, CONDITION B, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt ratio (QPTR), CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (this is delayed and is dependent on how quickly power is lowered) 6 Trigger 6 C-UO EHC Pump A trips with the standby EHC Pump B failing to C-SS automatically start (pre-loaded malfunction).
5 min Critical Task:
Manually start standby EHC Pump B 7 Trigger 7 M-ALL Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to manually trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
8 N/A C-UO Main Generator output breakers, 1PCB 161710 and 1PCB 161810, C-SS fail to automatically trip open (pre-loaded malfunction).
9 Trigger 9 M-ALL 1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, will fail open (steam space LOCA) during the 19001-1 actions, which will require a transition back to 20 min 19000-1 and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Critical Task:
Manually trip the RCPs per the RCP Trip Criteria (RCS pressure
< 1400 psig and at least one CCP or SI Pump running) 10 N/A I-OATC Containment Isolation Phase A (CIA) fails to automatically actuate I-SS (pre-loaded malfunction).
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Southern Company l Scenario 2 3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, fails low causing entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. This failure will result in an automatic Letdown isolation.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
OATC - Determines that 1LT-459 is the failed instrument.
Reduces charging flow to approximately 10 gpm greater than total seal injection flow.
Selects the unaffected channel on the Pressurizer Level Control Select, 1LS-459D.
Selects the unaffected channel on the Pressurizer Level Recorder Select, 1LS-459E.
Restores Pressurizer Heaters to service.
Technical Specifications:
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 9, CONDITION M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Function 8, CONDITION A, 30 days Event 2:
Restore normal Letdown to service per 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Directs the restoration of normal Letdown per 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System.
OATC - Places 1PIC-131, Letdown Pressure, in MANUAL and adjusts output to between 50% and 75%.
Places 1TIC-130, Letdown Temperature, in MANUAL to match status board reading.
Adjusts 1HC-182, RCP Seal Flow, to 8 - 13 gpm to each RCP.
Adjusts 1FIC-121, Charging Flow, to between 80 and 90 gpm.
Opens Letdown isolations and then a 75 gpm orifice.
Adjusts 1PIC-131, Letdown Pressure, to between 360 and 380 psig and places in AUTO.
Adjusts 1TIC-130 to less than or equal to 115 F and places in AUTO.
Restores pressurizer level to within 1% and places 1FIC-121 in AUTO.
Technical Specifications:
None Southern Company l Scenario 2 4
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction, Section B, and verifies Immediate Operator Actions for a failed Power Range NI.
OATC - Performs Immediate Operator Actions of 18002-C by placing Control Rods in MANUAL.
Withdraws Control Rods to restore Tavg to the program band.
Returns Control Rods to AUTO when conditions are stable.
Technical Specifications:
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 2a (Power Range Neutron Flux - High), CONDITION D, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 3 (Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 16c (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8), CONDITION S, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> o Function 16d (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9), CONDITION S, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> o Function 16e (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 and input to P-7), CONDITION R, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Event 4:
NSCW Pump #2 trips with NSCW Pump #6 failing to automatically start (pre-loaded malfunction). Crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
UO - Determines that NSCW Pump #2 tripped.
Starts NSCW Pump #6.
Verifies system parameters are normal for the current system alignment.
Technical Specifications:
None Southern Company l Scenario 2 5
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5:
Control rod K-14 drops to the bottom of the core, which requires entry into 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction. Tech Spec LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, directs a reduction of thermal power to 75% RTP within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; however, 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, states that for the purpose of reducing power as soon as practical to minimize local fuel power distribution variances and the chances of fuel damage, the crew shall reduce power to 75% RTP within one hour using 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1).
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, for a dropped control rod.
Directs reactor power reduction using 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1).
OATC - Control RCS temperature and flux distribution using Control Rods and boration during Main Turbine power reduction.
UO - Reduces Main Turbine load.
Controls Tavg and Tref deviation by performing manual Main Turbine adjustments.
Technical Specifications:
3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, CONDITION B, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt ratio (QPTR), CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (this is delayed and is dependent on how quickly power is lowered)
Event 6:
Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with a failure of standby EHC Pump B to automatically start.
Prolonged operation with no EHC Pump running will lead to EHC header pressure degrading, which will cause a Main Turbine trip at EHC pressure of 1100 psig followed by a reactor trip when above 40%
power.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Directs the start of standby EHC Pump B. Consults ARP for follow-up actions, as required.
UO - Starts standby EHC Pump B and monitors for proper operation.
Technical Specifications:
None Southern Company l Scenario 2 6
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events 7, 8:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and verifies Immediate Operator Actions.
OATC - Manually trips reactor when second control rod drops.
Performs Immediate Operator Actions of 19000-1.
UO - Performs Immediate Operator Actions of 19000-1.
Manually opens the Main Generator output breakers, PCB 161710 and PCB 161810.
Technical Specifications:
None Events 9, 10:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, will fail open (steam space LOCA) during the 19001-1 actions, which will require a transition back to 19000-1 and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Transitions to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Transitions to 19011-1, SI Termination, or 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, depending on pace.
OATC - Trips RCPs.
Manually actuates CIA.
UO - Throttles AFW flow to control RCS cooldown.
Technical Specifications:
None The scenario may be stopped when a transition to 19011-1, SI Termination, or 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, is made or at the Chief Examiners discretion.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 7
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL TASKS:
- 1. Manually start standby EHC Pump B Failure to start the standby EHC Pump will result in further reduction of EHC pressure. At 1100 psig the Main Turbine will automatically trip and, when the reactor is above 40% power, a subsequent Turbine Trip - Reactor Trip will occur. Therefore, if the standby EHC Pump is not started to mitigate lowering EHC pressure before an automatic Turbine Trip - Reactor Trip occurs, then this constitutes task failure.
- 2. Manually trip the RCPs per the RCP Trip Criteria (RCS pressure < 1400 psig and at least one CCP or SI pump running)
Per the Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks, for the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200 F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents incorrect crew performance in which the crew has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to violation of the facility license condition. The analysis presented in the FSAR for a SBLOCA typically assumes that the RCPs trip because of a loss of offsite power that coincides with the reactor trip. However, during a SBLOCA, offsite power might remain available and RCPs might continue to run for some period of time.
Following the accident at TMI-2, the NRC expressed concern about RCP operation during a SBLOCA. In response, the WOG sponsored analyses to determine when the RCPs must be tripped if power remains available. It was determined that manually tripping the RCPs before RCS inventory is depleted to less than the critical inventory results in a peak cladding temperature about the same as the PCT in the FSAR analysis. Manually tripping the RCPs before depletion below the critical inventory conservatively ensures that PCT remains below 2200 F. As the crew transitions through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and into 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, the crew will be presented with three separate opportunities to procedurally secure RCPs if the trip criteria are met. Therefore, if the crew does not secure RCPs, and have met the criteria to do so, by Step 3 of 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, then this constitutes task failure.
Target Quantitative Attributes per Scenario (See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 2
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP requiring substantive actions (1 per 0 scenario set)
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 2 (Revision 11)
Southern Company l Scenario 2 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of 1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, failing low.
Alarms:
ALB11-A01 PRZR PROPORTIONAL HTR TROUBLE ALB11-B01 PRZR LO LEVEL HTR CNTL OFF LTDN SECURED ALB11-D01 PRZR LO LEVEL DEVIATION ALB11-C01 PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON (received later as pressurizer level rises)
Indications:
Charging flow rate rises.
Letdown automatically isolates.
All Pressurizer heaters turn off.
The annunciators listed above.
CREW 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section D, Failure of Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Crew update for entry into 18001-C, Section D, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation.
D1 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC D2 -
OATC D3 -
OATC D4 -
OATC D5 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC D6 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 6 for 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System, actions.
OATC D7 -
OATC D8 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC D9 -
The crew may ask for permission from the Shift Manager for placing controller associated with this failure back in AUTO.
OATC D10 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Depending on the level deviation, the crew may return charging to MANUAL if the integrated controller demand has not decayed sufficiently.
SS D11 -
If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
SS D12 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS D13 -
SS D14 -
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 9, CONDITION M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Function 8, CONDITION A, 30 days FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
SS D15 -
END OF EVENTS 1 AND 2 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Section 4.4.2, Returning Normal Charging and Letdown to Service 4.4.2.1 -
OATC 4.4.2.2 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 7 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.3 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: For Step h. above, the current 1TIC-130 output demand is recorded on the status board behind the Shift Supervisor.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 8 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.3 - (CONTINUED)
OATC 4.4.2.4 -
OATC 4.4.2.5 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 9 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.6 -
OATC 4.4.2.7 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 10 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.8 -
OATC 4.4.2.9 -
OATC 4.4.2.10 -
OATC 4.4.2.11 -
OATC 4.4.2.12 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 11 of 11 Events: 1 - 2 Event
Description:
1LT-459, Pressurizer Level, fails low causing normal Letdown to isolate, which requires entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction. The crew will take corrective actions and then restore normal Letdown to service.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.13 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Depending on the level deviation, the crew may return charging to MANUAL if the integrated controller demand has not decayed sufficiently.
OATC 4.4.2.14 - 4.4.2.16 This completes the applicable actions of 13006-1, Section 4.4.2, Returning Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 1 - 2 11
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
ACTIONS
NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more referenced in required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the inoperable. channel(s).
B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
OR B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
for Functions 1, 17, 18, or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR or 5, closing the reactor trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> permitted.
One channel or train inoperable.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One Power Range ---------------------NOTES------------------
Neutron Flux High 1. A channel may be channel inoperable. bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment.
- 2. Refer to LCO 3.2.4 for an inoperable power range channel.
D.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR D.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-2 Amendment No. 143 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 123 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE---------------------
A channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
E.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR E.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> F. THERMAL POWER F.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
> P-6 and < P-10, one POWER to < P-6.
Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel OR inoperable.
F.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> POWER to > P-10.
G. THERMAL POWER G.1 Suspend operations Immediately
> P-6 and < P-10, two involving positive reactivity Intermediate Range additions.
Neutron Flux channels inoperable. AND G.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> POWER to < P-6.
H. THERMAL POWER H.1 Restore channel(s) to Prior to increasing
< P-6, one or two OPERABLE status. THERMAL POWER Intermediate Range to > P-6 Neutron Flux channels inoperable.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-3 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. One Source Range I.1 Suspend operations Immediately Neutron Flux channel involving positive reactivity inoperable. additions.
J. Two Source Range J.1 Open RTBs. Immediately Neutron Flux channels inoperable.
K. One Source Range K.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Neutron Flux channel OPERABLE status.
OR K.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> L. Required Source Range ---------------------NOTE--------------------
Neutron Flux channel Enter Applicable Conditions and inoperable. Required Actions of LCO 3.3.8, "High Flux at Shutdown Alarm" (HFASA) for HFASA channels made inoperable by the Source Range instrumentation.
L.1 Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-4 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME M. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. For RCP bus undervoltage or underfrequency instrument functions; the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels.
- 2. For other instrument functions; a channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-7.
N. One Reactor Coolant ---------------------NOTE--------------------
Flow-Low (single loop) A channel may be bypassed for up channel inoperable. to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
N.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR N.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-8.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-5 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME O. One Low Fluid oil ---------------------NOTE--------------------
pressure Turbine Trip A channel may be bypassed for up channel inoperable. to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
O.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR O.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-9.
P. One or more Turbine P.1 Place channel(s) in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> stop valve Closure Turbine Trip channels OR inoperable.
P.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-9.
Q. One train inoperable. ---------------------NOTE--------------------
One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
Q.1 Restore train to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
OR Q.2 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-6 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME R. One or more channels R.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions.
OR R.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> S. One or more channels S.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions.
OR S.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> T. One RTB train -------------------NOTE--------------------
inoperable. One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE.
T.1 Restore train to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
OR T.2 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-7 Amendment No. 145 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 125 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME U. One trip mechanism U.1 Restore inoperable trip 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> inoperable for one RTB. mechanism to OPERABLE status.
OR U.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> V. An inoperable trip V.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately mechanism, RTB, or Automatic Trip Logic occurs on opposite trains concurrently.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-8 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 8. Pressurizer Pressure
- a. Low 1(f) 4 M SR 3.3.1.1 1950 psig 1960(g) psig SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
(n)(o)
- b. High 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 2395 psig 2385 psig (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
- 9. Pressurizer Water 1(f) 3 M SR 3.3.1.1 93.9% 92%
(n)(o)
Level - High SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.10
- 10. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low
- a. Single Loop 1(h) 3 per loop N SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
(n)(o)
- b. Two Loops 1(i) 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
(n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)
(f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
(g) Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Pressurizer Pressure-Low are 10 seconds for lead and 1 second for lag.
(h) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(i) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS
NOTE------------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Restore required Function 30 days Functions inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.4-1 Amendment No. 180 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 161 (Unit 2)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 8 Event: 3 Event
Description:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically. Crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the failure of Power Range N41.
Alarms:
ALB10-A03 POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX HI SETPOINT ALERT ALB10-C02 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION ALB10-D03 OVERPOWER ROD STOP ALB10-F02 POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX RATE ALERT ALB10-E06 RADIAL TILT (after a brief delay)
Indications:
Control rods stepping in.
Power Range N41 indicates high on the QMCB.
Trip Status Light Box (TSLB) will be lit for N41, to include high power of 109% and high power rate of 5% in 2 seconds.
The annunciators listed above.
OATC 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction, Section B, Power Range Drawer N41, N42, N43, N44 Malfunction Crew update for entry into 18002-C, Section B, Power Range Drawer N41, N42, N43, N44 Malfunction. This normally occurs following the board operators initial IOA response.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS B1 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 8 Event: 3 Event
Description:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically. Crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS B2 -
OATC B3 -
SS B4 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Shift Supervisor will contact C&T or Engineering by phone to initiate 88015-C.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 8 Event: 3 Event
Description:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically. Crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO B5 -
OATC B6 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The crew may return the Control Rods to the All Rods Out position while restoring Tavg.
SS / B7 -
OATC NOTE TO EXAMINER: Placing Control Rods in AUTO is preferred, but the crew may wait for troubleshooting to be performed. The crew may ask for permission from the Shift Manager.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 8 Event: 3 Event
Description:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically. Crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC B8 -
SS B9 -
If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
SS B10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 8 Event: 3 Event
Description:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically. Crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / B11 -
OATC END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
THE FOLLOWING STEPS FROM 18002-C ARE INCLUDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 8 Event: 3 Event
Description:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically. Crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction (CONTINUED)
B12 -
SS / B13 -
OATC Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 7 of 8 Event: 3 Event
Description:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically. Crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS B14 -
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 2a (Power Range Neutron Flux - High),
CONDITION D, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 3 (Power Range Neutron Flux High Positive Rate), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 16c (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8),
CONDITION S, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> o Function 16d (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9),
CONDITION S, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> o Function 16e (Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 and input to P-7), CONDITION R, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 8 of 8 Event: 3 Event
Description:
Power Range N41 Lower Detector fails high. Control rods will begin to insert automatically. Crew will enter 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS B15, B16, B17 -
This completes the applicable actions of 18002-C, Nuclear Instrumentation System Malfunction.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 3 8
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
ACTIONS
NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more referenced in required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the inoperable. channel(s).
B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
OR B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
for Functions 1, 17, 18, or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR or 5, closing the reactor trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> permitted.
One channel or train inoperable.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One Power Range ---------------------NOTES------------------
Neutron Flux High 1. A channel may be channel inoperable. bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing and setpoint adjustment.
- 2. Refer to LCO 3.2.4 for an inoperable power range channel.
D.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR D.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-2 Amendment No. 143 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 123 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE---------------------
A channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
E.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR E.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> F. THERMAL POWER F.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
> P-6 and < P-10, one POWER to < P-6.
Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel OR inoperable.
F.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> POWER to > P-10.
G. THERMAL POWER G.1 Suspend operations Immediately
> P-6 and < P-10, two involving positive reactivity Intermediate Range additions.
Neutron Flux channels inoperable. AND G.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> POWER to < P-6.
H. THERMAL POWER H.1 Restore channel(s) to Prior to increasing
< P-6, one or two OPERABLE status. THERMAL POWER Intermediate Range to > P-6 Neutron Flux channels inoperable.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-3 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. One Source Range I.1 Suspend operations Immediately Neutron Flux channel involving positive reactivity inoperable. additions.
J. Two Source Range J.1 Open RTBs. Immediately Neutron Flux channels inoperable.
K. One Source Range K.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Neutron Flux channel OPERABLE status.
OR K.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> L. Required Source Range ---------------------NOTE--------------------
Neutron Flux channel Enter Applicable Conditions and inoperable. Required Actions of LCO 3.3.8, "High Flux at Shutdown Alarm" (HFASA) for HFASA channels made inoperable by the Source Range instrumentation.
L.1 Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-4 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME M. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. For RCP bus undervoltage or underfrequency instrument functions; the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels.
- 2. For other instrument functions; a channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-7.
N. One Reactor Coolant ---------------------NOTE--------------------
Flow-Low (single loop) A channel may be bypassed for up channel inoperable. to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
N.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR N.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-8.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-5 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME O. One Low Fluid oil ---------------------NOTE--------------------
pressure Turbine Trip A channel may be bypassed for up channel inoperable. to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
O.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR O.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-9.
P. One or more Turbine P.1 Place channel(s) in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> stop valve Closure Turbine Trip channels OR inoperable.
P.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-9.
Q. One train inoperable. ---------------------NOTE--------------------
One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
Q.1 Restore train to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
OR Q.2 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-6 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME R. One or more channels R.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions.
OR R.2 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> S. One or more channels S.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. required state for existing unit conditions.
OR S.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> T. One RTB train -------------------NOTE--------------------
inoperable. One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE.
T.1 Restore train to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
OR T.2 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-7 Amendment No. 145 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 125 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME U. One trip mechanism U.1 Restore inoperable trip 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> inoperable for one RTB. mechanism to OPERABLE status.
OR U.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> V. An inoperable trip V.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately mechanism, RTB, or Automatic Trip Logic occurs on opposite trains concurrently.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-8 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 1 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 2. Power Range Neutron Flux
- a. High 1,2 4 D SR 3.3.1.1 111.3% RTP 109% RTP SR 3.3.1.2 SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
(n)(o)
- b. Low 1(b),2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 27.3% RTP 25% RTP (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.8 (n)(o)
- 3. Power Range 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o) 6.3% RTP 5% RTP (n)(o)
Neutron Flux High SR 3.3.1.11 with time with time Positive Rate SR 3.3.1.15 constant constant 2 sec 2 sec
- 4. Intermediate 1(b), 2(c) 2 F,G SR 3.3.1.1 41.9% RTP 25% RTP Range Neutron SR 3.3.1.8(n)(o)
(n)(o)
Flux SR 3.3.1.11 2 H SR 3.3.1.1 41.9% RTP 25% RTP 2(d) SR 3.3.1.8 (n)(o)
(n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.11 (continued)
(a) With Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
(b) Below the P-10 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(c) Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-14 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 5. Source Range 2(d) 2 I,J SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5 Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8(n)(o) cps cps (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.11 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o) cps (n)(o) cps SR 3.3.1.11 1 L SR 3.3.1.1 3(e), 4(e), 5(e) SR 3.3.1.11 (n)(o)
NA NA
- 6. Overtemperature T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 1 Refer to Note 1 SR 3.3.1.3 (Page 3.3.1-20) (Page 3.3.1-20)
SR 3.3.1.6 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
- 7. Overpower T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 2 Refer to Note 2 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (Page 3.3.1-21) (Page 3.3.1-21)
(n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)
(a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
(d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(e) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide input to the High Flux at Shutdown Alarm System (LCO 3.3.8) and indication.
(n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-15 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 5 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 14. Turbine Trip (n)(o)
- 15. Safety Injection (SI) 1,2 2 trains Q SR 3.3.1.13 NA NA Input from Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
- 16. Reactor Trip System Interlocks
- b. Low Power 1 1 per train S SR 3.3.1.5 NA NA Reactor Trips Block, P-7
- e. Power Range 1,2 4 R SR 3.3.1.11 (l,m) (l,m)
Neutron Flux, SR 3.3.1.12 P-10 and input to P-7
- f. Turbine 1 2 S SR 3.3.1.10 12.3% Impulse 10% Impulse Impulse SR 3.3.1.12 Pressure Pressure Pressure, Equivalent Equivalent P-13 turbine turbine (continued)
(d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(j) Above the P-9 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(l) For the P-10 input to P-7, the Allowable Value is 12.3% RTP and the Nominal Trip Setpoint is 10% RTP.
(m) For the Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10, the Allowable Value is 7.7% RTP and the Nominal Trip Setpoint is 10% RTP.
(n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-18 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event: 4 Event
Description:
NSCW Pump #2 trips with NSCW Pump #6 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of NSCW Pump #2 tripping with NSCW Pump #6 failing to automatically start.
Alarms:
ALB03-B01 NSCW TRAIN B LO HDR PRESS ALB03- Multiple NSCW low flow alarms ALB37-A01 4160 V SWGR 1BA03 TROUBLE Indications:
Lowering NSCW supply header pressure.
NSCW Pump #4 handswitch amber light is lit.
NSCW Pump #6 handswitch red light is NOT lit.
The annunciators listed above.
SS / UO 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Crew update for entry into 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
1-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 5 Event: 4 Event
Description:
NSCW Pump #2 trips with NSCW Pump #6 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 6-NOTE TO EXAMINER: This is a Verify step, so the UO should start NSCW Pump #6 without going to Step 6 RNO.
UO 7-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 5 Event: 4 Event
Description:
NSCW Pump #2 trips with NSCW Pump #6 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 9-UO 10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 5 Event: 4 Event
Description:
NSCW Pump #2 trips with NSCW Pump #6 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 11 -
SS 12 -
UO 22 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 5 Event: 4 Event
Description:
NSCW Pump #2 trips with NSCW Pump #6 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 23 -
If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
END OF EVENT 4 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 4 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the dropped rod.
Alarms:
ALB10-C02 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION ALB10-D06 ROD DEV ALB10-E05 ROD AT BOTTOM ALB12-A03 RC LOOP T /AUCT T HI-LO DEV ALB12-A04 RC LOOP TAVG/AUCT TAVG HI-LO DEV Indications:
Reactor power will initially lower.
Tavg will lower.
Pressurizer and RCS pressure will initially lower.
DRPI displays the rod bottom LED lit for control rod K-14.
The annunciators listed above.
SS / UO 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, Dropped Rods in Mode 1 Crew update for entry into 18003-C, Section A, Dropped Rods in Mode 1.
A1 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC A2 -
OATC A3 -
SS A4 -
3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, CONDITION B, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> NOTE TO EXAMINER: SDM calculation will be requested from C&T.
FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW A5 -
OATC / A6 -
UO NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 10 for 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, covering RCS boration during the power descent.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 13 for 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, for power reduction.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / A7 -
OATC 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt ratio (QPTR), CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (this is delayed and is dependent on how quickly power is lowered)
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Annunciators ALB10-D02 PWR RANGE UP DET HI FLX DEV and ALB10-E02 PWR RANGE LWR DET HI FLX are indicators of QPTR outside of limits. Crew may wait until a manual calculation is performed to verify the Tech Spec required limit.
Tech Spec LCO 3.2.4 will require a manual QPTR calculation.
The Shift Supervisor will contact C&T to have this performed.
FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS A8 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Maintenance has NOT determined the cause of the rod drop, so the lift coil will not be disconnected.
If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
SS A9 -
OATC A10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW A11 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 8 for 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), covering the power reduction.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 10 for 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, covering RCS boration during the power descent.
SS A12 -
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: If crew requests preconditioned power level, report that Unit 1 has been at 100% power for 8 months.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 7 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS A13 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: It is expected that the next event will be initiated before reaching Step A13.
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: If requested, report that a Recovery Plan is being developed.
END OF EVENT 5 - WHEN THE CREW HAS INITIATED THE POWER REDUCTION, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 8 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode1), for Power Reduction 4.2.5 -
SS 4.2.6 -
SS 4.2.7 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 9 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / UO 4.2.8 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 13 for 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, for Main Turbine load reduction.
This completes the applicable actions of 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1).
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 10 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.8, Frequent Boration While Controlling Reactor Power 1-OATC 2-OATC 3-OATC 4-OATC 5-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 11 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 6-OATC 7-OATC 8-OATC 9-OATC 10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 12 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 11 -
This completes the applicable actions of 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 13 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, Section 4.2.2, Main Turbine Unloading 4.2.2 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 14 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, Section 4.2.3, Main Turbine Load Adjustments 4.2.3 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 15 of 15 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Control rod K-14 in Control Bank B drops, and the crew responds using 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, which directs a power reduction to less than 75% in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4.2.3 - (CONTINUED)
This completes the applicable actions of 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 5 15
Rod Group Alignment Limits 3.1.4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits LCO 3.1.4 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE, with all individual indicated rod positions within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more rod(s) A.1.1 Verify SDM is the limit 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> untrippable. specified in the COLR.
OR A.1.2 Initiate boration to restore 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> SDM to within limit.
AND A.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> B. One rod not within B.1.1 Verify SDM is the limit 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> alignment limits. specified in the COLR.
OR (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.1.4-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
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QPTR 3.2.4 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR)
LCO 3.2.4 The QPTR shall be d 1.02.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 50% RTP.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. -----------NOTE------------- A.1 Limit THERMAL POWER 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Required Action A.6 to t 3% below RTP for must be completed each 1% of QPTR > 1.00.
whenever Required Action A.5 is AND implemented.
A.2.1 Perform SR 3.2.4.1. Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> QPTR not within limit. AND A.2.2 Limit THERMAL POWER -----------NOTE----------
to t 3% below RTP for For performances of each 1% QPTR > 1.00. Required Action A.2.2 the Completion Time is measured from the completion of SR 3.2.4.1.
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> AND A.3 Perform SR 3.2.1.1, SR Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after 3.2.1.2, and SR 3.2.2.1. achieving equilibrium conditions with THERMAL POWER limited by Required Actions A.1 and A.2.2 (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.2.4-1 Amendment No. 180 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 161 (Unit 2)
QPTR 3.2.4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) AND Once per 7 days thereafter AND A.4 Reevaluate safety Prior to increasing analyses and confirm THERMAL POWER results remain valid for above the limit of duration of operation Required Action under this condition. A.1 and A.2.2 AND A.5 -------------NOTE-------------
Perform Required Action A.5 only after Required Action A.4 is completed.
Calibrate excore detectors Prior to increasing to show QPTR = 1.00. THERMAL POWER above the limit of Required Action A.1 and A.2.2 AND (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.2.4-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 3 Event: 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with a failure of standby EHC Pump B to automatically start. The operating crew will be directed by ARP 17020-1 for ALB20-C06 to start standby EHC Pump B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of EHC Pump A Trip.
Alarms:
ALB33-B07 480 V SWGR 1NB02 TROUBLE ALB33-D05 HYD FLUID LO PRESS (at 1500 psig)
ALB20-B05 STBY HYD FLUID PMP RUNNING (received when EHC Pump B starts)
Indications:
EHC pressure lowering.
1HS-6539, EHC Pump A, handswitch amber light is lit.
The annunciators listed above.
CREW 17020-1, for ALB20-D05 HYD FLUID LO PRESS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 3 Event: 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with a failure of standby EHC Pump B to automatically start. The operating crew will be directed by ARP 17020-1 for ALB20-C06 to start standby EHC Pump B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Critical Task #1 - Manually start standby EHC Pump B before an automatic Turbine Trip - Reactor Trip occurs is satisfied by completion of this step.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The crew may start EHC Pump B prior to specific procedural guidance. The guidance to perform this early action is in NMP-OS-007-001, Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 3 Event: 6 Event
Description:
Main Turbine EHC Pump A trips with a failure of standby EHC Pump B to automatically start. The operating crew will be directed by ARP 17020-1 for ALB20-C06 to start standby EHC Pump B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
END OF EVENT 6 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Event 6 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the second dropped rod.
Alarm:
ALB10-F05 TWO OR MORE RODS AT BOTTOM Indications:
Reactor power will initially lower.
Tavg will lower.
Pressurizer and RCS pressure will initially lower.
DRPI displays the rod bottom LED lit for control rod D-4.
The annunciator listed above.
SS / 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section A, OATC Dropped Rod in Mode 1 Continuous Action Step A2 applies:
NOTE TO EXAMINER: When the second control rod drops, the crew is required to trip the reactor. However, there is no procedural time limit for tripping the reactor. Per Tech Spec LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, Condition D, if more than one rod is not within alignment limits, then a one hour Required Action applies.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after the Immediate Operator Actions.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1-UO 2-UO 3-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4-SS / UO 5-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response Crew update for entry into 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
1-CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 9 for 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree, actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 1 - (CONTINUED)
FOLDOUT PAGE SS 2-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 3-UO 4-OATC 5-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 7 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 6-EVENT 8: Main Generator output breakers, 1PCB 161710 and 1PCB 161810, failure to automatically trip during the Main Turbine trip is procedurally addressed in this step.
OATC 7-OATC 8-NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Pressurizer Safety failing open (Event 9) at this time with Chief Examiner concurrence.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 8 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 9-UO 10 -
SS Continuous Action Step 2 applies:
END OF EVENTS 7 AND 8 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 9 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree OATC 1-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 10 of 10 Events: 7 - 8 Event
Description:
Second control rod, D-4, drops, which requires the crew to trip the reactor, enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-OATC 3-OATC 4-This completes the applicable actions of 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 7 - 8 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 1 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of Pressurizer Safety Valve failing open (steam space LOCA).
Alarms:
ALB09-A04 PRZR PRESS SI RX TRIP ALB11-A02 PRZR LO PRESS SI ALERT ALB12-F01 PRZR SAFETY RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP Indications:
Pressurizer pressure lowering.
Automatic SI actuation.
The annunciators listed above.
SS / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after the Immediate Operator Actions.
1-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 2 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 2-UO 3-OATC 4-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 3 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 6-CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 4 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 6 - (CONTINUED)
FOLDOUT PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 5 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC OATC INITIAL ACTIONS 1-OATC 2-EVENT 10: Containment Isolation Phase A fails to automatically actuate is procedurally addressed in this step.
OATC 3-OATC 4-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 6 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 5-OATC 6-OATC 7-OATC 8-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 7 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 9-OATC 10 -
OATC 11 -
OATC 12 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 8 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 13 -
OATC 14 -
OATC 15 -
This completes the OATC Initial Actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 9 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS 1-UO 2-UO 3-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 10 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4-UO 5-UO 6-UO 7-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 11 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 8-UO 9-This completes the UO Initial Actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 12 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
UO 7-NOTE TO EXAMINER: After RCPs are stopped, RCS WR Tcolds may be rising until natural circulation is established.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 13 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 8-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 14 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 9-NOTE TO EXAMINER: This may have already been done using the Foldout Page guidance.
Critical Task #2 - Manually trip the RCPs per the RCP Trip Criteria (RCS pressure < 1400 psig and at least one CCP or SI Pump running) before Step 3 of 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is satisfied by completion of this step.
OATC 10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 15 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 11 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 16 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 12 -
OATC NOTE TO EXAMINER: The PRT is pressurizing and will rupture due to the Safety Valve leak. The crew may go to Step 12 RNO because they anticipate deteriorating containment conditions when the PRT ruptures. Remaining in 19000-1 will next require a transition to 19010-1 at Step 24.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 22 for 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, actions.
OATC 13 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 17 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 14 -
OATC 15 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Ensure is an action, so one CCP will be stopped.
OATC 16 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 30 for 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, actions.
UO 17 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 18 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 17 - (CONTINUED)
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 19 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 18 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 30 for 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, actions.
SS 19 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 27 for 19011-1, SI Termination, actions.
OATC 20 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 31 for 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree, actions.
SS 21 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 20 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 22 -
UO 23 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 21 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 24 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See the next page for 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 22 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Crew update for entry into 19010-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant or Secondary Coolant.
1-CONTINUOUS ACTION PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 22
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 23 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 1 - (CONTINUED)
FOLDOUT PAGE NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 33 for 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control, actions (the crew may request an extra operator to place Hydrogen Monitors in service).
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 24 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-UO 3-UO 4-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 25 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 5-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 26 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 6-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 26
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 27 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 7-OATC NOTE TO EXAMINER: RCS subcooling will be slowly rising. If it is not greater than 22 F at this point, Step 7 is a Continuous Action step for transitioning to 19011-1. The Step 7 RNO is to go to Step 8, which is included on the next page.
CREW 19011-1, SI Termination Crew update for entry into 19011-1, SI Termination.
END OF SCENARIO 2 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE FOLLOWING THE TRANSITION TO 19011-1, SI TERMINATION, WITH CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
THE FOLLOWING STEPS FROM 19010-1 ARE INCLUDED IF SUBCOOLING IS NOT YET GREATER THAN 22F.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 27
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 28 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 8-OATC 9-OATC 10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 28
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 29 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / 11 -
UO NOTE TO EXAMINER: This will loop back to Step 2 until ECCS flow can be reduced (subcooling greater than 22 F).
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 30 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 19012-1, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Crew update for entry into 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
END OF SCENARIO 2 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE FOLLOWING THE TRANSITION TO 19012-1, POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, WITH CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 30
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 31 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree OATC 1-Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 31
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 32 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-OATC 3-OATC 4-This completes the applicable actions of 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 32
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 33 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control Section 4.2 -
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 33
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 34 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control Section 4.2 - (CONTINUED)
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 34
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 2 Page 35 of 35 Events: 9 - 10 Event
Description:
1PSV-8010A, Pressurizer Safety, fails open (steam space LOCA) after the reactor trip, which will require a transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then to 19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control Section 4.2 - (CONTINUED)
This completes the applicable actions of 13130-1, Post -
Accident Hydrogen Control.
Southern Company l Scenario 2 - Events 9 - 10 35
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
Initial Conditions: The unit is at 100% reactor power, MOL, steady state operations. Boron concentration is 805 ppm.
Equipment OOS: ACCW pump #1 is tagged out due to an oil leak - RTS in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
Crew is performing a fuel shuffle at the Unit 1 SFP.
Thunderstorms are expected in the area.
Critical Tasks:
- 1. Manually actuate SI
ES08 SI Train A Fails to Auto Actuate ES16 SI Train B Fails to Auto Actuate Triggered Malfunctions:
(1) MS03D (100%) 1PV-3030, Loop #4 ARV Transmitter, Fails High (2) TU07 Inadvertent Main Turbine Runback (3) RC10C (100%) 1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold, Fails High (4) SG01B (3%) SG #2 Tube Rupture on Inlet (~10 gpm leak)
(4) SG01B (60%) SG #2 Tube Rupture on Inlet (~600 gpm)
(6) FW20B MFP B High Vibrations (6) FW01B MFP B Trip (with 1 minute delay)
(9) PR05 (100%) 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, Fails Open (9) 1HS-8000A 1HV-8000A, PORV-455 Block Valve, to OPEN (9) PR12A 1HV-8000A, 1PORV-455 Block Valve, Fails to Auto Close Pre-loaded Override:
1HS-3019 1HV-3019, Loop #2 Steam to TDAFW Pump, to OPEN Remote Function:
PR03RF 1HV-8000A, PORV-455 Block Valve (de-energizes valve)
Southern Company l Scenario 3 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 Trigger 1 C-UO 1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open due to a malfunctioning C-SS pressure transmitter. The crew will enter 18008-C, Secondary 5 min Coolant Leakage, and isolate the leak.
2 Trigger 2 C-UO Inadvertent Main Turbine runback. The crew enters 18012-1, C-SS Turbine Runback, to disable the runback and to stabilize the plant.
10 min 3 Trigger 3 I-OATC 1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, fails high causing I-SS entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, 10 min TS-SS Section B, Failure of RCS Loop Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation.
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 7 (Overpower T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 5b (Low RCS Tavg Coincident with Reactor Trip, P-4), CONDITION I, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 4 Trigger 4 C-OATC SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm. Crew enters 18009-C, C-SS Steam Generator Tube Leak.
10 min TS-SS 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, CONDITION B, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 3.4.17, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity, CONDITION B, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 5 N/A R-OATC SG #2 tube leak requires a rapid down power per 18009-C, Steam R-SS Generator Tube Leak, and 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction.
20 min N-UO Southern Company l Scenario 3 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 6 Trigger 6 M-ALL MFP B automatically trips one minute after a high vibration alarm is and received. This event will lead to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture of 25 min Adjust approximately 600 gpm occurs during the reactor trip. Crew will enter Trigger 4 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to 19030-1, severity Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Trigger 4 value must be raised to 60% (SGTR) when reactor trip occurs.
7 N/A C-OATC SI fails to automatically actuate (pre-loaded malfunction).
C-SS Critical Task:
Manually actuate Safety Injection 8 N/A C-UO TDAFW Pump steam supply from SG #2 will not isolate, which will C-SS require tripping the TDAFW Pump (pre-loaded malfunction).
Critical Task:
Isolate the ruptured SG #2 9 Trigger 9 M-ALL 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, fails open during the 19030-1 cooldown. 1HV-8000A, PORV Block Valve, fails to close. The crew 10 min will transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired.
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Southern Company l Scenario 3 3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open due to a malfunctioning pressure transmitter. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage. Directs Main Turbine load reduction, if required.
UO - Isolates the secondary leak by manually closing 1PV-3030 using the M/A controller.
Reduces Main Turbine load to reduce reactor power to less than 100% (this may not occur depending on how quickly the crew responds).
Technical Specifications:
None Event 2:
Inadvertent Main Turbine runback occurs. With Control Rods in automatic, they will insert as Tavg deviates from Tref. The crew will determine if the Main Turbine runback is required via OTT / OPT Trip Status Light Bistable indication. Steam Dumps may open depending on the timeliness of the Immediate Operator Actions. The crew enters 18012-1, Turbine Runback.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Directs entry into 18012-1, Turbine Runback, and provides oversight of reactivity manipulations.
UO - Navigates to the Digital Turbine Control Main Turbine/Control/Load Screen.
Selects Disable (orange) under OPDT/OTDT RUNBACK STATUS.
Verifies Main Turbine load is stable.
Technical Specifications:
None Southern Company l Scenario 3 4
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3:
1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section B, for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation, and perform the associated Immediate Operator Actions. As a result of this failure, 1FV-121, Charging Flow Control, will raise charging flow and pressurizer level.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18001-C, Section B, and verifies Immediate Operator Actions for failure of an RCS NR Tcold Instrument.
OATC - Places Rod Bank Selector Switch in MANUAL.
Takes manual control of charging by placing 1FIC-121, Charging Flow Controller, in MANUAL.
Defeats Tavg and Delta-T inputs by placing 1TS-412T and 1TS-411F to the affected channel.
Manually adjusts charging flow to restore pressurizer level to program.
Returns charging to automatic by placing 1FIC-121 in AUTO, when required.
Technical Specifications:
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 7 (Overpower T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 5b (Low RCS Tavg Coincident with Reactor Trip, P-4), CONDITION I, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Event 4:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines leak rate.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak.
OATC - Adjusts charging flow to stabilize pressurizer level.
Calculates the estimated RCS leak rate.
Technical Specifications:
3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, CONDITION B, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 3.4.17, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity, CONDITION B, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Southern Company l Scenario 3 5
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events 5:
SG #2 tube leak requires a rapid down power per 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction.
Verifiable actions:
SS - Directs a rapid power reduction per 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, upon determination that the SGTL is greater than 5 gpm.
OATC - Borates as necessary during the rapid down power to maintain RCS temperature.
UO - Reduces Main Turbine load at less than 5%/minute.
Technical Specifications:
None Events 6, 7, 8:
MFP B automatically trips following a high vibration alarm. SG #2 tube rupture of approximately 600 gpm occurs during reactor trip. This event will cause an automatic reactor trip; however, the crew may manually trip the reactor first. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SI fails to automatically actuate and the TDAFW steam supply from SG #2 will not isolate (pre-loaded malfunctions).
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and verifies Immediate Operator Actions.
Transitions to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
OATC - Performs Immediate Operator Actions of 19000-1.
Manually actuates SI.
UO - Performs Immediate Operator Actions of 19000-1.
Isolates all feedwater to SG #2.
Trips TDAFW Pump when steam supply from SG #2 will not close.
Technical Specifications:
None Southern Company l Scenario 3 6
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 9:
1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, fails open during the 19030-1 cooldown. 1HV-8000A, PORV Block Valve, fails to close. The crew will transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Transitions to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired.
OATC - Resets SI.
Resets CIA.
De-energizes the pressurizer heaters.
UO - Re-establishes instrument air to containment.
Re-energizes the stub buses.
Technical Specifications:
None The scenario may be stopped following Step 10 of 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired, or at the Chief Examiners discretion.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 7
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL TASKS:
- 1. Manually actuate Safety Injection Per the Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks, for the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to manually actuate SI results in the needless continuation of a situation in which there has been no systematic and thorough actuation of even one train of SI-actuated safeguards. Some safeguards components such as AFW and feedwater isolation components may be running because of other actuation signals. However, safeguards systems such as ECCS, Containment Isolation Phase A, CCW, and containment fan coolers will not be operating in their safeguards mode. Although the completely degraded status is not due to the crews action (was not initiated by operator error), continuation in the completely degraded status is a result of the crews failure to manually actuate SI. The acceptable results obtained in the FSAR analyses are predicated on the assumption that, at the very least, one train of safeguards actuates. If SI is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid.
Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of SI (under the postulated conditions and when it is possible to do so) constitutes a violation of the license condition. Per NMP-OS-014-003, VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program, manual safety injection is required within 10 minutes after a valid SI injection signal is generated and failure to actuate within this time frame constitutes a failure of this task.
- 2. Isolate the ruptured SG #2 Per the Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks, isolating the ruptured SG maintains a differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The differential pressure (250 psi) ensures that minimum RCS subcooling remains after RCS depressurization. Without steam isolation, the ruptured SG pressure decreases to less than 250 psi above the intact SG as the cool down occurs. When the crew cannot maintain the 250 psi differential, the ERGs require a transition to contingency ECA-3.1. This transition unnecessarily delays the sequence of actions leading to RCS depressurization and SI termination.
For feedwater, isolation must occur after the ruptured SG level exceeds minimum indication, delaying isolation until after the SG tubes are covered. The feedwater coverage of the tubes places a water barrier between the tubes and the steam in the upper portion of the SG. Failure to maintain the water barrier allows the SG steam to contact the tubes. When the tube temperature decreases during the subsequent RCS cool down, the tubes condense the hot steam, decreasing the SG pressure. The decreasing SG pressure decreases the differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs to less than 250 psi. This forces the crew to transition to contingency ECA-3.1, which delays RCS depressurization and SI termination.
Any delay in the feedwater isolation allows the ruptured SG level to increase as the feedwater adds additional inventory along with the primary-to-secondary leakage. Too long a delay prevents the crew from depressurizing the RCS and terminating SI before excessive inventory seriously compromises the SG as a fission-product barrier, which complicates mitigation. The delay in feedwater isolation cannot be measured in terms of SG water level. But the delay can be measured in terms of the crews inability to complete the RCS depressurization or SI termination before excessive SG inventory accumulates.
Thus, when the crew fails to isolate steam and feedwater when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions), it constitutes the following:
An incorrect action that necessitates the crew to take compensating actions that would complicate the event mitigation AND A significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 8
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 The Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks and the Vogtle FSAR Chapter 15 discussion of SG tube rupture isolation requirements both assume that manual isolation of the SG is performed with no additional malfunctions or complications. Per NMP-OS-014-003, VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program, manual isolation of the ruptured SG is required to occur within 20 minutes from the start of the SGTR. However, in this scenario the SG tube rupture is complicated by a failure of Safety Injection (SI) to automatically actuate and by a failure of the SG #2 steam supply to the TDAFW pump to close. Since each of these events require an RNO procedure action, the exam developers and the Operations Representative agreed to allow an additional 10 minutes to complete the isolation of SG #2. Isolation of the ruptured SG #2 requires: 1) closure of its MSIV and BSIV, 2) tripping of the TDAFW Pump, and 3) isolating AFW to SG #2. Based on the justification provided above, failure to isolate the ruptured SG within 30 minutes from the start of the SGTR constitutes failure of this task. For this exam scenario, the SGTR initiates at the reactor trip.
Target Quantitative Attributes per Scenario (See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 2
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP requiring substantive actions (1 1 per scenario set)
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 2 (Revision 11)
Southern Company l Scenario 3 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 8 Event: 1 Event
Description:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of 1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, failing open.
Alarms:
ALB15-F01 MN STM SFTY VLVS LEAKING Indications:
The operators may check temperature indications on the QPCP to verify that an ARV is leaking.
ZLB-4 status light for 1PV-3030 will indicate open.
Rising reactor power.
Rising Ts.
Lowering Main Turbine power.
The annunciator listed above.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 8 Event: 1 Event
Description:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage Crew update for entry into 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.
1-NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 6 for 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 8 Event: 1 Event
Description:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 2-UO 3-OATC / 4-UO Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 8 Event: 1 Event
Description:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 5-UO 6-UO 7-UO 8-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 8 Event: 1 Event
Description:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 9-If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
SS 10 -
END OF EVENT 1 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 6 of 8 Event: 1 Event
Description:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, Section 4.2.2, Main Turbine Unloading 4.2.2 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 7 of 8 Event: 1 Event
Description:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, Section 4.2.3, Main Turbine Load Adjustments 4.2.3 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 8 of 8 Event: 1 Event
Description:
1PV-3030, SG ARV Loop #4, fails open. The crew enters 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage, and manually closes the ARV using the M/A controller.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4.2.3 - (CONTINUED)
This completes the applicable actions of 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, for this event.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 1 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event: 2 Event
Description:
An inadvertent Main Turbine runback occurs. Control Rods will automatically insert as Tavg deviates from Tref. The crew will identify the runback and then enter 18012-1, Turbine Runback.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the inadvertent Turbine Runback.
Alarms:
ALB12-A05 TAVG/TREF DEVIATION ALB20-B01 TURBINE CONTROL MAJOR ALARM Indications:
Yellow DOWN arrow lit on Digital Turbine Control screen.
Lowering Main Generator MWe output.
Insertion of control rods while in automatic.
The annunciators listed above.
SS / UO 18012-1, Turbine Runback Crew update for entry into 18012-1, Turbine Runback. This normally occurs following the board operators initial IOA response.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 5 Event: 2 Event
Description:
An inadvertent Main Turbine runback occurs. Control Rods will automatically insert as Tavg deviates from Tref. The crew will identify the runback and then enter 18012-1, Turbine Runback.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 16 -
CREW 17 -
UO 18 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 5 Event: 2 Event
Description:
An inadvertent Main Turbine runback occurs. Control Rods will automatically insert as Tavg deviates from Tref. The crew will identify the runback and then enter 18012-1, Turbine Runback.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 19 -
UO 20 -
OATC 21 -
OATC 22 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 5 Event: 2 Event
Description:
An inadvertent Main Turbine runback occurs. Control Rods will automatically insert as Tavg deviates from Tref. The crew will identify the runback and then enter 18012-1, Turbine Runback.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 23 -
UO 24 -
UO 25 -
OATC 26 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 5 Event: 2 Event
Description:
An inadvertent Main Turbine runback occurs. Control Rods will automatically insert as Tavg deviates from Tref. The crew will identify the runback and then enter 18012-1, Turbine Runback.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 27 -
END OF EVENT 2 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 2 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event: 3 Event
Description:
1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section B, for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of 1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument failing high.
Alarms:
ALB10-C03 OVERPOWER T ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK ALERT ALB10-E03 OVERTEMP T ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK ALERT ALB11-D01 PRZR LO LEVEL DEVIATION ALB12-A03 RC LOOP T/AUCT T HI-LO DEV ALB12-A04 RC LOOP TAVG/AUCT TAVG HI-LO DEV ALB12-A05 TAVG/TREF DEVIATION ALB12-A06 OVERTEMP T ALERT ALB12-B04 AUCT TAVG HIGH ALB12-B06 OVERPOWER T ALERT Indications:
Tavg, as indicated on 1TI-432, fails high T, as indicated on 1TDI-431A, fails low.
OPT and OTT trip setpoints will lower to a value less than their respective 100% power nominal trip values.
The annunciators listed above.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 6 Event: 3 Event
Description:
1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section B, for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, OATC Section B, Failure of RCS Loop Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation Crew update for entry into 18001-C, Section B, Failure of RCS Loop Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation. This normally occurs following the board operators initial IOA response.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS B1 -
OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS B2 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Tavg on the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) will be incorrect, so diverse indications will be required.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Crew may adjust Main Turbine load to restore Tavg to program band.
OATC B3 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 6 Event: 3 Event
Description:
1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section B, for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC B4 -
OATC B5 -
OATC B6 -
The crew may ask for permission from the Shift Manager for placing the controller associated with this failure back in AUTO.
SS / B7 -
OATC NOTE TO EXAMINER: Crew may leave the Control Rods in MANUAL due to the previous Main Turbine runback.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 6 Event: 3 Event
Description:
1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section B, for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS B8 -
If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
SS B9 -
SS B10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 6 Event: 3 Event
Description:
1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section B, for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS B11 -
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 7 (Overpower T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
Instrumentation o CONDITION A, Immediately o Function 5b (Low RCS Tavg Coincident with Reactor Trip, P-4), CONDITION I, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
CREW B12 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 6 of 6 Event: 3 Event
Description:
1TE-431B, RCS Loop #3 NR Tcold Instrument, fails high. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section B, for Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS B13 -
END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Event 3 6
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
ACTIONS
NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more referenced in required q channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the inoperable. channel(s).
B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
OR B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
for Functions 1, 17, 18, or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR or 5, closing the reactor trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> permitted.
One channel or train inoperable.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE---------------------
A channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
E.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR E.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> F. THERMAL POWER F.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
> P-6 and < P-10, one POWER to < P-6.
Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel OR inoperable.
F.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> POWER to > P-10.
G. THERMAL POWER G.1 Suspend operations Immediately
> P-6 and < P-10, two involving positive reactivity Intermediate Range additions.
Neutron Flux channels inoperable. AND G.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> POWER to < P-6.
H. THERMAL POWER H.1 Restore channel(s) to Prior to increasing
< P-6, one or two OPERABLE status. THERMAL POWER Intermediate Range to > P-6 Neutron Flux channels inoperable.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-3 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 5. Source Range 2(d) 2 I,J SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5 Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8(n)(o) cps cps (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.11 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o) cps (n)(o) cps SR 3.3.1.11 1 L SR 3.3.1.1 3(e), 4(e), 5(e) SR 3.3.1.11 (n)(o)
NA NA
- 6. Overtemperature T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 1 Refer to Note 1 SR 3.3.1.3 (Page 3.3.1-20) (Page 3.3.1-20)
SR 3.3.1.6 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
- 7. Overpower T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 2 Refer to Note 2 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (Page 3.3.1-21) (Page 3.3.1-21)
(n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)
(a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
(d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(e) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide input to the High Flux at Shutdown Alarm System (LCO 3.3.8) and indication.
(n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-15 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2 1.
ACTIONS
NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more required q referenced in Table channels inoperable. 3.3.2-1 for the channel(s) or train(s).
B. One channel inoperable. B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
OR B.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> AND B.2.2 -------------NOTE-------------
LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4.
Be in MODE 4. 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-1 Amendment No. 179 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 160 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE-------------------
A channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
I.1 I..1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR I.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> J. One Main Feedwater J.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> Pumps trip channel OPERABLE status.
OR J.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> K. One RWST Level - Low --------------------NOTE-------------------
Low channel inoperable. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
K.1 Place channel in bypass. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR K.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> AND K.2.2 -------------NOTE-------------
LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4.
Be in MODE 4. 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-5 Amendment No. 179 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 160 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 7)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation
- a. Automatic 1,2(f) 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays
- b. Low RCS T 1,2((f) f) 4 I SR 3.3.2.1 561.5 °F 564 °F avg (i)(j)
SR 3.3.2.4 (i)(j)
SR 3.3.2.7 Coincident with Refer to Function 8a for all P-4 requirements.
Reactor Trip, P-4
- c. SG Water 1,2(f) 4 per SG I SR 3.3.2.1 82.5% 82.0%
(i)(j)
Level-High High SR 3.3.2.4 (i)(j)
(P-14) SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.8
- d. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.
- a. Automatic 1,2,3 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays
- b. SG Water 1,2,3 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 35.9% 37.8%
(i)(j)
Level-Low Low SR 3.3.2.4 (i)(j)
SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.8 (continued)
(f) Except when one MFIV or MFRV, and its associated bypass valve per feedwater line is closed and deactivated or isolated by a closed manual valve.
(i) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(j) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-13 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the SG #2 Tube Leak.
Alarms:
ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM Indications:
Lowering pressurizer level.
Small rise in SG #2 level followed by a return to program.
Various secondary radiation alarms (1RE-810, 1RE-724, and 1RE-12839 are most common for a SG tube leak).
The annunciators listed above.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak Crew update for entry into 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak.
1-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 3-OATC 4-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 5-OATC NOTE TO EXAMINER: See next page for 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, actions.
3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage, CONDITION B, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 3.4.17, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity, CONDITION B, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
SS 12 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: This completes the actions for 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, covered in this guide. The crew will continue in 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, (next page).
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 6 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction Crew update for entry into 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction.
CREW 1-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 7 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-OATC 3-The crew may use the reactivity briefing sheet or the Beacon printout to determine approximately 700 gallons of boric acid are required. This assumes about half of the reactivity will come from the control rods and half will come from the boron.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 13 for 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 8 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4-ATTACHMENT 1 NOTE TO EXAMINER: Event 6 (MFP TRIP / SGTR) may be inserted at any point following the initiation of the load reduction, but must occur no later than 85% reactor power to ensure the MFP trip will require a reactor trip (less than 70%
power will NOT require a reactor trip).
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Trigger 6 with Chief Examiner concurrence and then raise Trigger 4 value to 60%
(SGTR) when reactor trip occurs.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 9 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction (CONTINUED) 5-UO 6-OATC 7-NOTE TO EXAMINER: Some IPC points for Tavg are still affected by the failed Tcold instrument.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 10 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / 8-UO OATC 9-OATC 10 -
UO 11 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 11 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 12 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Crew will call C&T or directly call the System (Grid) Operator.
SS 13 -
UO 14 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 12 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 15 -
This completes the actions for 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, covered in this guide. The crew is not expected to perform any more meaningful actions for the remainder of this procedure as the Scenario continues.
END OF EVENTS 4 AND 5 - AFTER THE CREW HAS REDUCED POWER TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER (BUT NOT LOWER THAN 85%
POWER), EVENT 6 (MFP TRIP / SGTR) MAY BE INSERTED.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 13 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC NOTE TO EXAMINER: The crew may use Section 4.8, Frequent Borations While Controlling Reactor Power, or Section 4.2, Boration. Section 4.2 begins on Page 15 of this guide.
13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.8, Frequent Borations Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 14 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC Section 4.8 - (CONTINUED)
OATC Section 4.8 -
This completes the applicable actions of 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, for Frequent Borations.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 15 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.2, Boration OATC Section 4.2 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 16 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC Section 4.2 - (CONTINUED)
OATC Section 4.2 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 17 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC Section 4.2 - (CONTINUED)
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 18 of 18 Events: 4 - 5 Event
Description:
SG #2 tube leak of approximately 10 gpm develops. Crew enters 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, and determines that a rapid down power per 18013-1, Rapid Power Reduction, is required.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC Section 4.2 - (CONTINUED)
This completes the applicable actions of 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, for Boration.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 4 - 5 18
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:
- a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;
- b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
- c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and
- d. 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCS operational A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> LEAKAGE not within within limits.
limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.
B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.
B.2 -------------NOTE-------------
OR LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering Pressure boundary MODE 4.
LEAKAGE exists. ----------------------------------
OR Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.13-1 Amendment No. 179 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 160 (Unit 2)
SG Tube Integrity 3.4.17 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity LCO 3.4.17 SG tube integrity shall be maintained.
AND All SG tubes satisfying the tube plugging criteria shall be plugged in accordance with the Steam Generator Program.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS
NOTE---------------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG tube.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more SG tubes A.1 Verify tube integrity of the 7 days satisfying the tube affected tube(s) is maintained plugging criteria and not until the next refueling outage plugged in accordance or SG tube inspection.
with the Steam Generator Program. AND A.2 Plug the affected tube(s) in Prior to entering accordance with the Steam MODE 4 following the Generator Program. next refueling outage or SG tube inspection B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.
B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> OR SG tube integrity not maintained.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.17-1 Amendment No. 171 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 153 (Unit 2)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 1 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of MFP B high vibration.
ALB15-D05 MFPT B HI VIB Indications:
Elevated MFP B vibration indications on ATSI screen.
The annunciator listed above.
CREW ARP 17015-1 for ALB15-D05 MFPT B HI VIB Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 2 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW ARP 17015 (CONTINUED)
NOTE TO EXAMINER: MFP B will automatically trip one minute after the high vibration alarm is received.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 3 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of MFP B trip.
ALB16-D01 MFPT B TRIPPED Indications:
Lowering feedwater flow.
Lowering MFP B discharge pressure.
The annunciator listed above.
CREW 18016-1, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunctions, Section A, Loss of MFP NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Raise malfunction SG01B severity to 60% immediately when the reactor is tripped (~ 600 gpm SG #2 tube rupture).
Crew update for entry into 18016-1, Condensate and Feedwater Malfunctions, if time permits.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 4 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of SG #2 tube rupture.
Alarms:
ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM ALB09-A04 PRZR PRESS SI RX TRIP Indications:
Lowering pressurizer level.
Lowering pressurizer pressure.
A rise in SG #2 level.
Various secondary radiation alarms.
The annunciators listed above.
SS / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after the Immediate Operator Actions.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 5 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 2-UO 3-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 6 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4-EVENT 7: Safety Injection (SI) fails to automatically actuate is procedurally addressed in this step.
Critical Task #1 - Manually actuate Safety Injection (SI) within 10 minutes after a valid SI signal is generated is satisfied by completion of this step.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 7 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 6-CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 8 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 6 - (CONTINUED)
FOLDOUT PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 9 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC OATC INITIAL ACTIONS 1-OATC 2-OATC 3-OATC 4-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 10 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 5-OATC 6-OATC 7-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 11 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 8-OATC 9-OATC 10 -
OATC 11 -
OATC 12 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 12 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 13 -
OATC 14 -
OATC 15 -
This completes the OATC Initial Actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 13 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS 1-UO 2-UO 3-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 14 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4-UO 5-UO 6-UO 7-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 15 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 8-UO 9-This completes the UO Initial Actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 16 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
UO 7-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 17 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 8-OATC 9-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 18 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 19 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 11 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See next page for 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 20 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Crew update for entry into 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
1-CONTNUOUS ACTIONS PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 21 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 1 - (CONTINUED)
FOLDOUT PAGE NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 37 for 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree, actions.
OATC 2-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 22 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 3-UO 4-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 22
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 23 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 5-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 24 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 6-EVENT 8: 1HV-3019, TDAFW Steam Supply from SG #2, will NOT isolate is procedurally addressed in this step.
UO 7-UO 8-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 25 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 9-Critical Task #2 - Isolate the ruptured SG #2 by: 1) closing the SG #2 MSIV and BSIV; 2) tripping the TDAFW Pump; and 3) isolating AFW to SG #2 within 30 minutes from the start of the SGTR is satisfied by completion of this step.
UO 10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 26 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 11 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 26
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 27 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 12 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 27
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 28 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 12 - (CONTINUED)
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Trigger 9 (Pressurizer PORV fails open) when the crew initiates the cooldown with concurrence from the Chief Examiner. Trigger 9 must be inserted before Step 14 is reached.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 28
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 29 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 12 - (CONTINUED)
UO NOTE TO EXAMINER: If RCS pressure lowers to less than 1400 psig after the cooldown is initiated, the RCPs are NOT required to be stopped (Continuous Action Step 3.b RNO).
13 -
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 30 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 14 -
OATC NOTE TO EXAMINER: See next page for 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired, actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 30
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 31 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired Crew update for entry into 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired.
1-CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 31
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 32 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 1 - (CONTINUED)
FOLDOUT PAGE OATC 2-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 32
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 33 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 3-OATC The crew will normally make a page announcement to notify the plant population.
UO 4-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 33
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 34 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 5-OATC 6-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 34
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 35 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 7-UO 8-OATC 9-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 35
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 36 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 10 -
END OF SCENARIO 3 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE WITH CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 36
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 37 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree OATC 1-Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 37
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 3 Page 38 of 38 Events: 6 - 9 Event
Description:
MFP B trips, which leads to a reactor trip. SG #2 tube rupture occurs upon reactor trip. Crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, transition to 19030-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and then transition to 19131-1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:
Subcooled Recovery Desired, when a Pressurizer PORV fails open.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-OATC 3-OATC 4-This completes the applicable actions of 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree.
Southern Company l Scenario 3 - Events 6 - 9 38
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
Initial Conditions: The unit is at 75% reactor power, BOL, with power ascension in progress. Control rods are in MANUAL. Boron concentration is 861 ppm.
Equipment OOS: ACCW pump #1 is tagged out due to an oil leak - RTS in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
Crew is performing a fuel shuffle at the Unit 1 SFP.
Thunderstorms are expected in the area.
Continue power ascension to 100% per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1),
beginning at Section 4.1, Step 58.
Critical Tasks:
- 1. Manually close 1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve
- 2. Insert negative reactivity using Control Rods Reset to IC 362 Pre-loaded Malfunctions:
ES01 Reactor Auto Trip Failure ES02 Reactor Manual Trip Failure AF05A MDAFW Pump A Fails to Auto Start AF05B MDAFW Pump B Fails to Auto Start Triggered Malfunctions:
(2) CC03A (40% over 1 min.) CCW Train A Discharge Header Pipe Break (5) RM07 Dropped Fuel Assembly in SFP (6) PR07A (60%) 1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, Fails Open (7) GE01 Main Generator Trips (7) RD07 Control Rods Fail to Move on Auto Demand (7) CV07 Normal Charging Pump Trips Triggered Overrides:
(4) A-TIC130 (100%) A-TIC130_POT LETDOWN TEMPERATURE Fails Low Triggered Remote Functions:
(20) SF01RF SFP Cooling Train A OOS (21) SF02RF SFP Cooling Train B In-Service Southern Company l Scenario 4 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A R-OATC Raise reactor power by increasing Main Turbine load. Control RCS R-SS temperature with control rods or dilution.
20 min N-UO 2 Trigger 2 C-UO CCW Train A discharge header ruptures. Crew enters 18020-C, C-SS Loss of Component Cooling Water.
5 min TS-SS 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, CONDITION A, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3 N/A N-UO CCW Train B is placed in service per 13715B-1, Component N-SS Cooling Water System Train B.
5 min 4 Trigger 4 I-OATC 1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature, fails low, which I-SS results in high Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature. 1TV-10 min 129, Letdown to Demins, will automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing Demins).
ARP 17007-1 for ALB07-D03 LTDN HX OUT HI TEMP and ALB07-F04 LTDN HX HI TEMP DEMIN DIVERT provide crew guidance.
5 Trigger 5 C-UO Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP. Fuel Handling Building C-SS Isolation (FHBI) actuates. Crew will refer to the ARP for high 15 min T-SS radiation and enter 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.
TR 13.3.6, FHB Post-Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation, CONDITION A, apply TR 13.9.5 (when FHBI is reset per the SOP)
TR 13.9.5, FHB Post-Accident Ventilation System, CONDITION B, immediately (if both Trains of FHBI are reset) OR CONDITION A, 7 days (if one Train of FHBI is reset - Required Action is to place the remaining FHB Post-Accident Ventilation system in operation)
Southern Company l Scenario 4 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 6 Trigger 6 I-OATC 1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, fails open to 60% due I-SS to a 1PIC-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve Controller, 10 min TS-SS malfunction. The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction.
3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (if RCS pressure lowers to 2199 psig)
Critical Task:
Manually close 1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve 7 Trigger 7 M-ALL Main Generator trips due to a fault, and the reactor does not automatically trip. Reactor will not manually trip from the Control 20 min Room (pre-loaded malfunctions). Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT. Normal Charging Pump trips.
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Delete ES01 after 5 minutes have elapsed from the time the Control Room dispatches an operator to locally open the Reactor Trip Breakers.
Critical task:
Insert negative reactivity using Control Rods 8 N/A C-UO MDAFW Pumps fail to automatically start (pre-loaded malfunctions).
C-SS 9 N/A C-OATC Normal Charging Pump (NCP) trips when Main Generator trips.
C-SS
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Southern Company l Scenario 4 3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:
Raise reactor power by increasing Main Turbine load using 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1).
Maintain RCS temperature as necessary using control rod withdrawal or RCS dilution.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Directs UO and OATC to raise reactor power and provides reactivity management oversight.
OATC - Maintains RCS temperature in the programmed band by withdrawing control rods or diluting the RCS.
UO - Raises Main Turbine load using the Digital Turbine Control system.
Technical Specifications:
None Event 2:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which requires entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water, for CCW piping rupture.
UO - Determines that two CCW Pumps are operating on Train A and that a piping rupture has occurred.
Stops CCW Pumps on Train A and puts them in PTL.
Technical Specifications:
3.7.7, Component Cooling Water System, CONDITION A, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Event 3:
Place CCW Train B in service using 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Directs placing CCW Train B in service using 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
UO - Starts two CCW Pumps on Train B and verifies proper system operation.
Technical Specifications:
None Southern Company l Scenario 4 4
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature, fails low, which results in high Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature. 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, will automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing demins).
ARP 17007-1 for ALB07-D03 LTDN HX OUT HI TEMP and ALB07-F04 LTDN HX HI TEMP DEMIN DIVERT provide crew guidance to control 1TIC-130 in MANUAL.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Directs the actions of ARP 17007-1 to restore Letdown temperature.
OATC - Determines 1TIC-130 is malfunctioning.
Manually adjusts 1TIC-130 as necessary to control Letdown Heat Exchanger outlet temperature.
When Letdown temperature is controlled, returns 1TV-129 to the DEMIN position.
Technical Specifications:
None Event 5:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP. Fuel Handling Building Isolation (FHBI) actuates. Crew will refer to the ARP for high radiation and then enter 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, Section A, for a dropped Spent Fuel Assembly.
UO - Verifies proper FHB HVAC alignment using 13320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System.
Resets FHBI actuation signal.
Shuts down one FHB Post-Accident Ventilation Unit and verifies proper damper alignment.
Technical Specifications:
TR 13.3.6, FHB Post-Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation, CONDITION A, apply TR 13.9.5 (when FHBI is reset per the SOP)
TR 13.9.5, FHB Post-Accident Ventilation System, CONDITION B, immediately (if both Trains of FHBI are reset) OR CONDITION A, 7 days (if one Train of FHBI is reset -
Required Action is to place the remaining FHB Post-Accident Ventilation system in operation)
Southern Company l Scenario 4 5
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 6:
1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, fails open to 60% due to a 1PIC-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve Controller, malfunction.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction, and verifies Immediate Operator Actions for a pressurizer spray valve malfunction.
OATC - Determines Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve is malfunctioning.
Closes Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve.
Operates Pressurizer Heaters as required.
Technical Specifications:
3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (if RCS pressure lowers to 2199 psig)
Events 7, 8, 9:
Main Generator trips due to a fault, and the reactor fails to automatically trip. Reactor will not manually trip from the Control Room (pre-loaded malfunctions). Crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT. The MDAFW Pumps will fail to automatically start (pre-loaded malfunction) and the Normal Charging Pump (NCP) will trip.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transitions to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, and verifies Immediate Operator Actions.
OATC - Performs Immediate Operator Actions of 19000-1 and 19211-1.
Manually inserts control rods (automatic rod insertion will NOT work).
Starts CCP A or CCP B for emergency boration.
Initiates emergency boration by opening 1HV-8104, Emergency Borate Valve.
UO - Performs Immediate Operator Actions of 19000-1 and 19211-1.
Starts MDAFW Pumps.
Technical Specifications:
None The scenario may be stopped following the transition back to 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or at the Chief Examiners discretion.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 6
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL TASKS:
- 1. Manually close 1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve For a failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve, failure to take action to close the valve will result in an unintentional RPS and ESF actuation. Specifically, a reactor trip will occur at 1960 psig pressurizer pressure followed by a Safety Injection at 1870 psig pressurizer pressure.
Therefore, not closing 1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, before an automatic reactor trip occurs constitutes task failure.
- 2. Insert negative reactivity using Control Rods Per the FR-S.1 background document, the basic strategy of FR-S.1 is as follows:
Perform manual actions to reduce core power (such as manually driving control rods inward) and verify automatic actions such as turbine trip and AFW actuation Initiate emergency boration of the RCS Check for possible sources of positive reactivity and eliminate them Verify subcriticality This strategy is based on making the reactor subcritical and providing shutdown margin as rapidly as possible. Thus, the actions to reduce core power and provide shutdown margin are prioritized according to how quickly they can be performed from the control room. Aside from the normal method of reactor trip, de-energizing the rod drive MG sets is the fastest method to shut down the reactor and provide shutdown margin (provided that it is feasible, on a plant-specific basis, to de-energize the MG sets from the control room).
The second and third fastest methods are to insert control rods and to establish emergency boration flow to the RCS, respectively. It is true that local operator actions might result in reactor trip, which - if and when it occurs - would shut down the reactor faster than boration (and faster than rod insertion). However, it is anticipated that effecting the local actions will be time-consuming and that actions that can be implemented from the control room should be given precedence.
Thus, before dispatching operators to perform local actions to trip the reactor, the crew should perform or initiate performance of at least one of the three methods listed previously for shutting down the reactor and providing shutdown margin. Making the reactor subcritical is an essential part of the strategy of FR-S.1. To implement the MAC of verifying subcriticality, FR-S.1 directs the crew to check for power range indication of less than 5% and for negative SUR indication on the intermediate range. If either of these conditions is not met, the crew is directed to continue boration (and repeat a loop in the procedure) until both conditions are met. Additionally, a caution directs the crew to continue boration in order to obtain adequate shutdown margin.
The analyses upon which FR-S.1 is based do not foresee critical operation in the power range for an indefinite period of time. They assume that the operating crew will take action to shut down the reactor, once the RCS stabilizes at some quasi-equilibrium condition.
Furthermore, NMP-OS-014-003, VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program, identifies the manual insertion of Control Rods during an ATWT as a Time Critical Action. The required time is 1.1 minutes from the receipt of a First Out annunciator.
The Control Rods are required to be inserted until reactor power is less that 5% or until the Reactor Trip Breakers are opened locally. Therefore, failure to initiate manual Control Rod insertion within 1.1 minutes from the receipt of a First Out annunciator and to continue manual Control Rod insertion until reactor power is less than 5% or until the Reactor trip Breakers are opened locally constitutes task failure.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 7
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes per Scenario (See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP requiring substantive actions (1 1 per scenario set)
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 2 (Revision 11)
Southern Company l Scenario 4 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event: 1 Event
Description:
Continue raising reactor power from 75% per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), Section 4.1, Step 58.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1)
OATC Section 4.1 -
The crew may hold a briefing at this point prior to moving forward with the power ascension.
This completes the applicable actions of 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), for this event.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, covering RCS dilution during the power ascent begins on Page 2.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, covering the power ascent begins on Page 4.
END OF EVENT 1 - AFTER FIRST DILUTION AND TURBINE LOAD REDUCTION ARE INITIATED, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 1 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 4 Event: 1 Event
Description:
Continue raising reactor power from 75% per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), Section 4.1, Step 58.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.7, Frequent Dilutions While Controlling Reactor Power 4.7 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 1 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 4 Event: 1 Event
Description:
Continue raising reactor power from 75% per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), Section 4.1, Step 58.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.7 - (CONTINUED)
This completes the applicable actions of 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 1 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 4 Event: 1 Event
Description:
Continue raising reactor power from 75% per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), Section 4.1, Step 58.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation, Section 4.2.3, Main Turbine Load Adjustments 4.2.3 -
This completes the applicable actions of 13800-1, Main Turbine Operation.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 1 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 8 Events: 2 - 3 Event
Description:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which will require entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water. The crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A and place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of Component Cooling Water Train A rupture.
Alarms:
ALB61-C06 LVL A LEAK DETECTED ALB02-A06 CCW TRAIN A LO HDR PRESS ALB02-A05 CCW TRAIN A SURGE TANK LO-LO LVL ALB02-B05 CCW TRAIN A SURGE TK HI/LO LVL ALB02-C05 CCW TRAIN A SURGE TK MAKE UP LVL Indications:
CCW supply header pressure lowering as read on 1PI-1874.
CCW supply header flow rising as read on 1FI-1876.
CCW Surge Tank level lowering.
The annunciators listed above.
SS / UO 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water Crew update for entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water.
1-NOTE TO EXAMINER: The CCW Pumps will trip on Surge Tank Low-Low level. Depending on the pace of the crew, the pumps may not be running at this point. This will not change the sequence of actions to be taken in the AOP.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 2 - 3 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 8 Events: 2 - 3 Event
Description:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which will require entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water. The crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A and place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 2-NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 6 for 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B, actions for placing Train B in service.
UO 4-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 2 - 3 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 8 Events: 2 - 3 Event
Description:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which will require entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water. The crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A and place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 5-OATC 9-UO 10 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Crew may decide to close the Makeup Valve early to minimize flooding (see next Step).
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 2 - 3 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 8 Events: 2 - 3 Event
Description:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which will require entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water. The crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A and place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 11 -
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: If crew requests to isolate CCW Train A Surge Tank make-up locally, then Override handswitches HS1848 and HS1850 to CLOSE.
SS 12 -
3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, CONDITION A, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 2 - 3 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 5 of 8 Events: 2 - 3 Event
Description:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which will require entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water. The crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A and place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13 -
UO 14 -
SS 15 -
END OF EVENTS 2 AND 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 2 - 3 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 6 of 8 Events: 2 - 3 Event
Description:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which will require entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water. The crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A and place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B, Section 4.1.2, CCW Train B Startup from Standby 4.1.2.1 -
UO 4.1.2.2 -
UO 4.1.2.3 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 2 - 3 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 7 of 8 Events: 2 - 3 Event
Description:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which will require entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water. The crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A and place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4.1.2.4 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant can start any combination of CCW Pumps - #2 and #4, #2 and #6, or #4 and #6.
UO 4.1.2.5 -
UO 4.1.2.6 -
UO 4.1.2.7 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 2 - 3 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 8 of 8 Events: 2 - 3 Event
Description:
CCW Train A discharge header ruptures, which will require entry into 18020-C, Loss of Component Cooling Water. The crew will be required to shutdown CCW Train A and place CCW Train B in service per 13715B-1, Component Cooling Water System Train B.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4.1.2.8 -
UO 4.1.2.9 thru 4.1.2.10 -
This completes the applicable actions of 13715B-1, Section 4.1.2, CCW Train B Startup From Standby.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 2 - 3 8
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the 1TIC-130 controller failure.
Alarms:
ALB07-D03 LTDN HX OUT HI TEMP ALB07-F04 LTDN HX HI TEMP DEMIN DIVERT Indications:
Letdown temperature rising as read on 1TI-130.
1TV-129 diverts Letdown flow, bypassing the Mixed Bed Demineralizers (1TV-129 is in AUTO with the amber light lit).
Rising VCT temperature as read on 1TI-116.
The annunciators listed above.
OATC 17007-1 for ALB07-D03 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE TO EXAMINER: Step 3 is Verify, so the OATC can take 1TIC-130 to MANUAL to open 1TV-130.
SS SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS This completes the actions of 17007-1 for ALB07-D03.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 17007-1 for ALB07-F04 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS OATC This completes the actions of 17007-1 for ALB07-F04. The crew may return 1HS-129 to the DEMIN position at this time or wait until temperature is stable.
If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The actions on the next page are included if the crew enters 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water.
END OF EVENT 4 - WHEN LETDOWN FLOW AND TEMPERATURES RETURN TO NORMAL, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 5 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Crew update for entry into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water.
1-UO 2-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 6 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 3-OATC 4-UO 5-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 7 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 6-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 8 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 7-UO 8-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 9 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 9-OATC 10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 10 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 11 -
OATC This completes the actions of 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The actions on the next are included if the crew enters 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 11 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, OATC Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow NOTE TO EXAMINER: Shift Supervisor may choose to enter this procedure to isolate Letdown as directed from 17007-1 for ALB07-D03 LTDN HX OUT HI TEMP.
Crew update for entry into 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction.
A1 -
OATC A2 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 12 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC A3 -
CREW A4 -
CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE OATC A5 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 13 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC A6 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 14 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC A7 -
OATC A8 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 15 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC A9 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 16 for 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System, actions, if required.
OATC A10 -
OATC A11 -
OATC A12 -
OATC A13 -
This completes the actions of 18007-C, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 16 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System NOTE TO EXAMINER: This procedure would be entered from Step A9 of 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction.
4.4.2.1 -
OATC 4.4.2.2 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 17 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.3 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 18 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.3 - (CONTINUED)
OATC 4.4.2.4 -
OATC 4.4.2.5 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 19 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.6 -
OATC 4.4.2.7 -
OATC 4.4.2.8 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 20 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.9 -
OATC 4.4.2.10 -
OATC 4.4.2.11 -
OATC 4.4.2.12 -
OATC 4.4.2.13 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 21 of 21 Event: 4 Event
Description:
1TIC-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Controller, fails low, resulting in 1TV-130, Letdown Heat Exchanger Temperature Control Valve, closing. This leads to high Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperatures, which will cause 1TV-129, Letdown to Demins, to automatically divert to the VCT (bypassing the Demins).
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.14 -
OATC 4.4.2.15 -
OATC 4.4.2.16 -
This completes the actions of 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 4.4.2, Returning Normal Charging and Letdown to Service.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 4 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the dropped Spent Fuel Assembly in the Fuel Handling Building.
Alarms:
ALB05-B03 INTMD RADIATION ALARM ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM ALB39-D02 480 V SWGR ANB13 TROUBLE ALB54-A01 FHB POST ACCIDENT FLTR 1 TROUBLE ALB54-A02 FHB POST ACCIDENT FLTR 2 TROUBLE ALB54-A03 FHB SPLY F-1 LO FLOW/TEMP TRIP ALB54-B03 FHB EXH F-1 LO AIR FLOW Indications:
Radiation alarms for FHB.
Report from personnel of damaged fuel.
The annunciators listed above.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The crew may directly enter 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, based on the indications. See Page 5 for 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, actions.
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: After the crew correctly diagnoses the event, call the Shift Supervisor and report that a Spent Fuel Assembly was dropped in the SFP and all personnel have left the area.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 17005-1 for ALB05-C03 HIGH RADIATION ALARM 1-UO 2-UO 3-UO 4-This completes the actions of 17005-1 for ALB05-C03.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 17102-1 for CDCAB6 (ARE-2532A) 1-NOTE TO EXAMINER: The ARP actions are presented for ARE-2532A, which are the same as for ARE-2532B and ARE-2533A/B.
UO 2-SS 3-The crew will normally make a plant page announcement to alert personnel.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4.1 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 9 for 13320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System, actions.
SS 4.2 -
UO 4.3 -
SS 4.4 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See next page for 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 5 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event Crew update for entry into 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event.
A1 -
SS A2 -
SS A3 -
SS A4 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 6 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS A6 -
SS / UO A7 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 9 for 13320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System, actions.
SS A8 -
SS A9 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 7 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS A10 -
SS A11 -
UO A12 -
UO A13 -
SS A14 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 8 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS A15, A16, and A17 -
TR 13.3.6, FHB Post-Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation, CONDITION A, apply TR 13.9.5 (when FHBI is reset per the SOP)
TR 13.9.5, FHB Post-Accident Ventilation System, CONDITION B, immediately (if both Trains of FHBI are reset) OR CONDITION A, 7 days (if one Train of FHBI is reset - Required Action is to place the remaining FHB Post-Accident Ventilation system in operation)
If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T and the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
END OF EVENT 5 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 9 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 13320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System, Section 4.2, Manual Actuation of FHB Isolation 1-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 10 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 2-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 11 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 2 - (CONTINUED)
SS / UO 3-UO 4-UO 5-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 12 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 6-NOTE TO EXAMINER: Only one Train is required to be reset in order to stop one FHB Post-Accident Filter Unit, but both Trains are normally reset at this point.
UO 7-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 13 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO / SS 8-NOTE TO EXAMINER: Either Post-Accident Filter Unit can be stopped.
UO 9-SS 10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 14 of 14 Event: 5 Event
Description:
Spent Fuel Assembly is dropped in the SFP, causing a Fuel Handling Building Isolation. The crew will respond using 18006-C, Fuel Handling Event, and the applicable ARP to verify proper FHB HVAC alignment.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 11 -
UO 12 -
This completes the actions of 13320-C, Fuel Handling Building HVAC System.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 5 14
Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation TR 13.3.6 13.3 Instrumentation TR 13.3.6 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation (common system).
TR 13.3.6 The fuel handling building (FHB) post accident ventilation actuation instrumentation identified in Table 13.3.6-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.
APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in either storage pool.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Apply Required Actions of In accordance with FHB ventilation actuation TR 13.9.5. TR 13.9.5.
instruments nonfunctional.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT SURVEILLANCES SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TRS 13.3.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> TRS 13.3.6.2 Perform COT 18 months TRS 13.3.6.3 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS TRS 13.3.6.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION 18 months TRS 13.3.6.5 Perform TADOT 18 months Vogtle Units 1 and 2 13.3 - 19 REVISION 35 Technical Requirement
Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation TR 13.3.6 Table 13.3.6-1 FHB Post Accident Ventilation Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Instruments Required Channels Requirements Trip Setpoint
- 1. Manual Initiation 1 TRS 13.3.6.5 NA
- 2. FHB Exhaust Duct 1 TRS 13.3.6.1 (a)
Radiation Signal TRS 13.3.6.2 (ARE-2532 A&B TRS 13.3.6.4 ARE-2533 A&B)
- 3. Automatic 1 TRS 13.3.6.3 NA Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (a) Setpoints will not exceed the limits of TS 5.5.4.g.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 13.3 - 20 REVISION 31 Technical Requirement
Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System TR 13.9.5 13.9 Refueling Operations TR 13.9.5 Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System (common system)
TR 13.9.5 Two independent Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation Systems shall be FUNCTIONAL.
APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in either storage pool.
NOTE---------------------------------------------------------
TR 13.0.3 is not applicable.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Fuel Handling A.1 Place the remaining Fuel 7 days Building Post Accident Handling Building Post Ventilation System Accident Ventilation System nonfunctional. in operation discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.
OR (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 13.9 - 6 REVISION 35 Technical Requirement
Fuel Handling Building Post Accident Ventilation System TR 13.9.5 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.2 Suspend all operations 7 days involving movement of irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building, movement of new fuel over irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building, or crane operation with loads over irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building until Required Action A.1 above is met.
B. Two Fuel Handling B.1 Suspend all operations Immediately Building Post Accident involving movement of Ventilation Systems irradiated fuel in the fuel nonfunctional. handling building, movement of new fuel over irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building, or crane operation with loads over irradiated fuel in the fuel handling building until Required Action A.1 above is met.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT SURVEILLANCES SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TRS 13.9.5.1 Verify system operation by initiating each system from 15 days on a the control room with flow through the HEPA filters and STAGGERED TEST charcoal adsorbers and operating each system for 10 BASIS continuous hours with the heater circuit energized.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 13.9 - 7 REVISION 35 Technical Requirement
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 4 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, fails open due to a 1PIC-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve Controller, malfunction. The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the 1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, failing open.
Alarms:
ALB11-D02 PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HEATERS ON ALB12-D03 PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK Indications:
Lowering pressurizer and RCS pressure.
1PIC-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve Controller, high demand.
Loop #4 Spray Valve position indication has both green and red lights lit.
The annunciator listed above.
SS / 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve OATC Malfunction Crew update for entry into 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction. This normally occurs following the board operators initial IOA response.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1-Critical Task #1 - Manually close 1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop
- 4 Spray Valve, before an automatic reactor trip occurs is satisfied by completion of this step.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 6 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 4 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, fails open due to a 1PIC-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve Controller, malfunction. The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS OATC 3-OATC 4-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 6 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 4 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, fails open due to a 1PIC-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve Controller, malfunction. The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 5-OATC Figure 1 NOTE TO EXAMINER: With back-up heaters on, the controller output will shift from the normal. The crew may take manual control until pressure stabilizes.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 6 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 4 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1PV-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve, fails open due to a 1PIC-455B, Pressurizer Loop #4 Spray Valve Controller, malfunction. The crew will enter 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, or Relief Valve Malfunction.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 6-SS 7-3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (if RCS pressure lowers to 2199 psig)
FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
SS 8-If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
END OF EVENT 6 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Event 6 4
RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:
- a. Pressurizer pressure 2199 psig;
- b. RCS average temperature 592.5°F; and
- c. RCS total flow rate 384,509 gpm.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
NOTE---------------------------------------------------
Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:
- a. THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or
- b. THERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> parameters not within parameter(s) to within limits. limit.
B. RCS total flow rate B.1. Perform SR 3.4.1.4. 7 days degraded.
C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.1-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1 Verify pressurizer pressure is 2199 psig. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.4.1.2 Verify RCS average temperature is 592.5°F. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.4.1.3 Monitor RCS total flow rate for degradation. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.4.1.4 ---------------------------NOTE-------------------------------
Not required to be performed until 7 days after 90% RTP.
Verify by precision heat balance that RCS total In accordance with flow rate is 384,509 gpm. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.1-2 Amendment No. 158 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 140 (Unit 2)
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 1 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the Main Generator and Main Turbine trip.
Alarms:
ALB09-C06 TURBINE TRIP/P9 REACTOR TRIP ALB20-B02 MAIN TURBINE TRIPPED Multiple Electrical and Secondary Alarms Indications:
Main Turbine Stop Valves closed.
Steam Dumps open.
RCS temperature and pressure rising.
Reactor power lowering.
The annunciators listed above.
SS / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 2 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT OATC The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after the Immediate Operator Actions.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 1-Critical Task #2 - Insert negative reactivity using control rods within 1.1 minutes from the receipt of a First Out annunciator and continue manual Control Rod insertion until reactor power is less than 5% or until the Reactor trip Breakers are opened locally is satisfied by completion of this step.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Automatic rod insertion will NOT occur, so manual rod insertion is required to meet the Critical Task.
UO 2-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 3 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 3-EVENT 8: MDAFW Pumps fail to automatically start is procedurally addressed in this step.
OATC / 4-UO EVENT 9: NCP trip when the Main Generator trips is procedurally addressed in this step.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 4 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / 5-UO NOTE TO EXAMINER: CVI automatically actuates in response to high containment radiation or an SI, which are NOT present, so it has NOT malfunctioned.
CREW 6-CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE OATC 7-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 5 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / 8-UO NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: When requested, open the Reactor Trip Breakers after a 5-minute delay by deleting malfunction ES01.
SS / 9-OATC NOTE TO EXAMINER: Step 22 is on Page 7.
UO NOTE TO EXAMINER: The following Steps are included if reactor power is NOT less than 5% at this point.
10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 6 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 11 -
UO 12 -
OATC / 13 -
UO OATC / 14 -
UO Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 7 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 20 -
OATC 21 -
OATC 22 -
OATC 23 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 11 for 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree, actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 8 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 24 -
END OF SCENARIO 4 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE WITH CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER. THE FOLLOWING STEPS FROM 19000-1 ARE FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 9 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC Crew update for entry into 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
1-UO 2-UO 3-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 10 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4-SS / UO 5-SS 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response Crew update for entry into 19001-1, Reactor Trip Response.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: This is the end of the additional EOP procedure steps.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 11 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree OATC 1-Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 4 Page 12 of 12 Events: 7 - 9 Event
Description:
The Main Generator trips and the reactor fails to automatically trip, which leads to an ATWT. The crew will initially enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19211-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, when the reactor will not trip from the Control Room. After the reactor is tripped locally, the crew will return to 19000-1.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-OATC 3-OATC 4-This completes the applicable actions of 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree.
Southern Company l Scenario 4 - Events 7 - 9 12
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 5 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Examiners: _________________________ Operators: _________________________
Initial Conditions: Stable at 3.5% reactor power BOL; Tavg is 557 F (+/- 2 F) with Steam Dumps in Steam Pressure Mode (AUTO); Control Rods are in MANUAL; Letdown is 120 gpm; Boron concentration is 1241 ppm.
Equipment OOS: ACCW pump #1 is tagged out due to an oil leak - RTS in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Turnover: Containment Mini-Purge is in service for containment entry on the next shift.
Crew is performing a fuel shuffle at the Unit 1 SFP.
Thunderstorms are expected in the area.
MFP A is in service.
Mode 1 sign-offs are complete with the exception of AFW in standby readiness.
AFW is secured and in standby alignment except for MDAFW Pump B.
Place MDAFW Pump B in standby. System Operators are available as required.
When AFW is in standby readiness, raise power to Mode 1 beginning at Step 4.1.16 of 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1).
Critical Tasks:
- 1. Manually close Pressurizer Spray Valves
- 2. Manually stop all RCPs
TP02B TPCW Pump #2 Fails to Auto Start SI08A 1HV-10958, RWST Sludge Mixing Valve, Fails to Auto Close SI08B 1HV-10957, RWST Sludge Mixing Valve, Fails to Auto Close ES10 SLI Train A Fails to Auto Actuate ES11 SLI Train B Fails to Auto Actuate CV23 NCP Fails to Auto Trip on SI Triggered Malfunctions:
(3) TP01A TPCW Pump #1 Trips (5) PR02A (100%) 1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, Fails High (6) CV03 1LV-460, Letdown Isolation Valve, Fails Closed (7) AC02B ACCW Pump #2 Trips (8) MS02C (25%) Main Steam Line on Loop #3 Faults Between Containment and MSIVs Triggered Remote Function:
(4) TK02RF Percent Liquid Mass in RWST (95-88% - 20 minute ramp) [BOOTH OPERATOR will set Final Value to the RWST level indicated when the leak is isolated]
Southern Company l Scenario 5 1
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 N/A N-UO Operating crew will shutdown MDAFW Pump B and place it in N-SS standby per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System. Once MDAFW 10 min Pump B is in standby, the Shift Supervisor will continue raising reactor power to Mode 1.
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: When requested, report that the AFW Standby Checklist is complete in the field.
2 N/A R-OATC Raise reactor power from 3.5% to Mode 1 beginning with Step 4.1.16 R-SS of 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1). Mode 1 sign-offs are 20 min complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
3 Trigger 3 C-UO TPCW Pump #1 trips and the standby TPCW Pump #2 fails to C-SS automatically start (pre-loaded malfunction). The crew will enter 5 min 18023-C, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water System and Loss of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System.
4 Trigger 4 C-UO RWST sludge mixing line breaks with a failure of 1HV-10957 and C-SS 1HV-10958, RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves, to automatically 10 min TS-SS close (pre-loaded malfunctions).
3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION C, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION E, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (applies if RWST level lowers to less than 94%)
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Set final value of TK02RF to the RWST level indicated when the leak is isolated.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 2
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 5 Trigger 5 I-OATC 1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high. The crew will enter I-SS 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
15 min TS-SS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, immediately o Function 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8a (Pressurizer Pressure - Low)
CONDITION M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8b (Pressurizer Pressure - High)
CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, immediately o Function 1d (SI - Pressurizer Pressure - Low)
CONDITION D, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8b (ESFAS Interlocks - Pressurizer Pressure, P-11) CONDITION L, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (if RCS pressure lowers to 2199 psig)
Critical Task:
Manually close Pressurizer Spray Valves 6 Trigger 6 C-OATC 1LV-460, Letdown Isolation Valve, fails closed, resulting in a loss of C-SS Letdown. The crew will enter 18007-C, Chemical and Volume 10 min Control System Malfunction. The next event will occur before Excess Letdown is established.
7 Trigger 7 M-ALL ACCW Pump #2 trips with standby ACCW Pump #1 tagged out. The crew will enter 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling 20 min Water, which will require the reactor to be tripped and all RCPs stopped. The crew will enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Critical Task:
Manually stop all RCPs 8 Trigger 8 M-ALL After all RCPs are stopped, SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, causing an SI to occur. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
Critical Task:
Isolate the faulted SG #3 Southern Company l Scenario 5 3
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 9 N/A C-OATC NCP fails to automatically trip during the SI (pre-loaded malfunction).
C-SS 10 N/A C-UO SLI fails to automatically actuate (pre-loaded malfunction).
C-SS
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Southern Company l Scenario 5 4
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 1:
Crew will shutdown MDAFW Pump B and place it in standby per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
Once MDAFW Pump B is in standby, the Shift Supervisor will continue raising reactor power to Mode 1.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Directs the UO placing AFW in standby readiness per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
UO - Stops MDAFW Pump B.
Fully opens 1HV-5132 and 1HV-5134, MDAFW Pump B Discharge Throttle Valves.
Completes Checklist 2 for MDAFW Pump B.
Technical Specifications:
None Event 2:
Raise reactor power from 3.5% to Mode 1 beginning with Step 4.1.16 of 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1). Mode 1 sign-offs are complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
Verifiable actions:
SS - Directs OATC and UO to raise power to Mode 1 from current power level.
OATC - Withdraws control rods.
Dilutes the RCS for temperature control.
UO - Monitors and controls RCS temperature by adjusting Steam Dumps as necessary.
Technical Specifications:
None Event 3:
TPCW Pump #1 trips and the standby TPCW Pump #2 fails to automatically start (pre-loaded malfunction).
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18023-C, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water System and Loss of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System, for a TPCW Pump trip.
UO - Determines TPCW Pump #1 is tripped.
Starts TPCW Pump #2 and verifies system parameters return to normal.
Technical Specifications:
None Southern Company l Scenario 5 5
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 4:
RWST sludge mixing pipe breaks with a failure of 1HV-10957 and 1HV-10958, RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves, to automatically close (pre-loaded malfunctions).
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters ARP 17006-1 for ALB06-E04 RWST LO LEVEL and directs action to isolate the RWST Sludge Mixing Valves.
UO - Closes 1HV-10957 and 1HV-10958, RWST Sludge Mixing Isolation Valves, to isolate the leak and conserve RWST inventory.
Technical Specifications:
3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION C, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION E, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (applies if RWST level lowers to less than 94%)
Event 5:
1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high, requiring entry into 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, and verifies Immediate Operator Actions.
OATC - Closes both Pressurizer Spray Valves.
Closes 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV.
Selects Channels 457/456 for pressurizer pressure control.
Returns pressurizer pressure control system to automatic.
Technical Specifications:
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, immediately o Function 6 (Overtemperature T), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8a (Pressurizer Pressure - Low) CONDITION M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8b (Pressurizer Pressure - High) CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, immediately o Function 1d (SI - Pressurizer Pressure - Low) CONDITION D, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8b (ESFAS Interlocks - Pressurizer Pressure, P-11) CONDITION L, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (if RCS pressure lowers to 2199 psig)
Southern Company l Scenario 5 6
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 6:
1LV-460, Letdown Isolation Valve, fails closed, resulting in a loss of Letdown.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, for a total loss of Letdown.
OATC - Isolates the Letdown relief flow path by closing 1HV-8149A-C, Letdown Orifice Isolations, and 1LV-459 and 1LV-460, Letdown Isolations.
Manually adjusts charging flow and seal injection flow to control pressurizer level rise.
Technical Specifications:
None Event 7:
ACCW Pump #2 trips, which causes a loss of all ACCW due to the ACCW Pump #1 tag out. The crew will manually trip the reactor and stop all RCPs.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Enters 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water, and directs the OATC to trip the reactor and stop all RCPs.
Enters 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and verifies Immediate Operator Actions.
OATC - Manually trips the reactor.
Performs 19000-1 Immediate Operator Actions.
Stops all RCPs.
UO - Performs 19000-1 Immediate Operator Actions.
Throttles AFW to limit RCS cooldown.
Technical Specifications:
None Southern Company l Scenario 5 7
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Events 8, 9, 10:
After all RCPs are stopped, SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, causing an SI to occur.
The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
Verifiable Actions:
SS - Performs 19000-1, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, and then transitions to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
OATC - Performs 19000-1 OATC Initial Actions.
Trips the NCP.
UO - Performs 19000-1 UO Initial Actions.
Actuates SLI.
Technical Specifications:
None The scenario may be stopped after the crew has completed 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, or at the Chief Examiners discretion.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 8
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL TASKS:
- 1. Manually close Pressurizer Spray Valves For a failed open Pressurizer Spray Valve, failure to take action to close the valve will result in an unintentional RPS and ESF actuation. Specifically, a reactor trip will occur at 1960 psig pressurizer pressure followed by a Safety Injection at 1870 psig pressurizer pressure. Therefore, not closing both Pressurizer Valves before an automatic reactor trip occurs constitutes task failure.
- 2. Manually stop all RCPs Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) provides cooling to RCP motors and to the RCP Thermal Barriers. Therefore, a total loss of ACCW precludes operation of the RCPs. Per the Vogtle FSAR, Section 7.3.1.2.2.8, the plant design does not provide any circuitry which will directly trip the RCPs on a loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water. Indication in the Control Room is provided whenever Auxiliary Component Cooling Water is lost. The RCPs can run about 10 minutes after a loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water. This provides adequate time for the operator to correct the problem or trip the plant if necessary. Furthermore, based on NMP-OS-014-003, VNP Time Critical Operator Action Program, the RCPs are required to be tripped within 10 minutes of a loss of all ACCW. Therefore, failure to stop all RCPs within 10 minutes of the ACCW Pump #2 trip constitutes task failure.
- 3. Manually isolate the faulted SG #3 Per the Westinghouse PWR Emergency Response Guideline-Based Critical Tasks, failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate the faulted SG such that multiple SGs are allowed to blow down for an extended time can significantly worsen the power excursion. Similarly, failure to isolate all feedwater flow, including AFW, to the faulted SG such that it continues to blow down for an extended time can significantly worsen the power excursion.
Manipulation of controls is required to isolate the faulted SG. These include indication that MSIVs are closed, indication that feedwater control and isolation valves are closed, indication that the MFPs are tripped, and indication that AFW flow to the faulted SG is stopped (control valves closed).
For this critical task, the faulted SG is considered to be isolated when both of the following conditions are met:
MSIV for the faulted SG is closed or MSIVs for all non-faulted SGs are closed All feedwater flow, including AFW flow, to the faulted SG is stopped Isolating AFW flow to the faulted SG is always a part of this critical task. If AFW flow to the faulted SG is isolated, the RCS cooldown imposed by the blowdown of the faulted SG stops when that SG has blown dry. If AFW flow is not isolated, the RCS cooldown will continue (unless the decay heat rate happens to exceed the combined heat removal rate of all SG effluents and influents). Continued RCS cooldown contributes to thermal stresses in the reactor pressure vessel and can constitute a challenge to the integrity CSF. Continued RCS cooldown also tends to worsen any reactor power excursion. Therefore, failure to close the MSIV and BSIV for SG
- 3 and to isolate all AFW flow to the faulted SG before transition to 19241-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, due to any RCS WR cold leg temperature lowering to less than 240 F constitutes task failure.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 9
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Target Quantitative Attributes per Scenario (See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes
- 1. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 2. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 3. Major transients (1-2) 2
- 4. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 5. Entry into a contingency EOP requiring substantive actions (1 0 per scenario set)
- 6. Pre-identified critical tasks (2) 3 (Revision 11)
Southern Company l Scenario 5 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event: 1 Event
Description:
With reactor power at approximately 3.5%, the UO will be directed to place MDAFW Pump B in standby readiness per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1) 4.1.16 -
UO 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System 4.3.1.2.1 -
UO 4.3.1.2.1 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 1 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 4 Event: 1 Event
Description:
With reactor power at approximately 3.5%, the UO will be directed to place MDAFW Pump B in standby readiness per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4.3.1.2.1 -
UO 4.3.1.2.2 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Checklist 2,Section II, begins on the following page.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 1 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 4 Event: 1 Event
Description:
With reactor power at approximately 3.5%, the UO will be directed to place MDAFW Pump B in standby readiness per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO CHECKLIST 2 NOTE TO EXAMINER: The crew will request the Outside Area Operator (OAO) and/or the Control Building Operator (CBO) to complete the field actions of Checklist 2.
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: When requested, report that the AFW Standby Checklist is complete in the field.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 1 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 4 Event: 1 Event
Description:
With reactor power at approximately 3.5%, the UO will be directed to place MDAFW Pump B in standby readiness per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4.3.1.2.3 -
END OF EVENT 1 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 1 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 7 Event: 2 Event
Description:
Raise power from 3.5% to Mode 1 per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), beginning with Step 4.1.16. Mode 1 signoffs are complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1)
The crew may hold a briefing at this point to ensure the crew is aligned moving forward through the power ascension.
4.1.16 -
OATC 4.1.17 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 7 Event: 2 Event
Description:
Raise power from 3.5% to Mode 1 per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), beginning with Step 4.1.16. Mode 1 signoffs are complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / 4.1.18 -
UO NOTE TO EXAMINER: 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, covering RCS dilution during the power ascent begins on Page 6.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 7 Event: 2 Event
Description:
Raise power from 3.5% to Mode 1 per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), beginning with Step 4.1.16. Mode 1 signoffs are complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS 4.1.19 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: CSFST annunciator will alarm when power reaches 5% due to the IPC indicating Mode 2. The crew will change the Mode on the IPC to Mode 1. If referred to, 13505-1, Integrated Plant Computer, actions are below.
SS / 13505-1, Integrated Plant Computer OATC 4.3.3 -
This completes the applicable actions of 13505-1, Integrated Plant Computer.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 7 Event: 2 Event
Description:
Raise power from 3.5% to Mode 1 per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), beginning with Step 4.1.16. Mode 1 signoffs are complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1) (CONTINUED) 4.1.20 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 7 Event: 2 Event
Description:
Raise power from 3.5% to Mode 1 per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), beginning with Step 4.1.16. Mode 1 signoffs are complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4.1.21 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The scenario should proceed to the next event before the crew begins Step 4.1.22, which occurs at 12%
reactor power. Step 4.1.22 contains multiple actions to place the MFRVs in automatic and this is NOT desired for this scenario.
END OF EVENT 2 - WHEN ADEQUATE REACTIVITY CONTROL HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED, PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 6 of 7 Event: 2 Event
Description:
Raise power from 3.5% to Mode 1 per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), beginning with Step 4.1.16. Mode 1 signoffs are complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.7, Frequent Dilutions While Controlling Reactor Power 4.7 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 7 of 7 Event: 2 Event
Description:
Raise power from 3.5% to Mode 1 per 12004-1, Power Operation (Mode 1), beginning with Step 4.1.16. Mode 1 signoffs are complete except for AFW in Standby readiness.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4.7 - (CONTINUED)
This completes the applicable actions of 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 2 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 5 Event: 3 Event
Description:
TPCW Pump #1 will trip with TPCW Pump #2 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18023-C, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water System and Loss of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System, to respond to the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of TPCW Pump #1 trip with failure of the standby TPCW Pump #2 to automatically start.
Alarms:
ALB01-A03 TPCW PUMP 1 TRIPPED ALB01-B03 TPVW PMP DISCH HDR LO PRESS ALB33-A03 4160 V SWGR 1NA01 TROUBLE Indications:
TPCW Pump #1 handswitch amber trip light is lit.
TPCW supply header flow lowering on 1FI-7093.
TPCW supply header pressure lowering on 1PI-7235.
High temperatures on equipment cooled by TPCW (time dependent).
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 3 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 5 Event: 3 Event
Description:
TPCW Pump #1 will trip with TPCW Pump #2 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18023-C, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water System and Loss of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System, to respond to the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 18023-C, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water System and Loss of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System, Section A, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water Crew update for entry into 18023-C, Section A, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The crew may start TPCW Pump #2 prior to addressing the procedural guidance of 18023-C. The guidance to perform this early action is in NMP-OS-007-001, Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations.
A.1 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 3 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 5 Event: 3 Event
Description:
TPCW Pump #1 will trip with TPCW Pump #2 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18023-C, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water System and Loss of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System, to respond to the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO A2 -
Table 1 UO A3 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 3 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 5 Event: 3 Event
Description:
TPCW Pump #1 will trip with TPCW Pump #2 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18023-C, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water System and Loss of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System, to respond to the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO A4 -
UO A5 -
UO A6 -
UO A7 -
UO A8 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: This is TPCCW temperature, not TPCW.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 3 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 5 Event: 3 Event
Description:
TPCW Pump #1 will trip with TPCW Pump #2 failing to automatically start.
The crew will enter 18023-C, Loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water System and Loss of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water System, to respond to the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO A9 -
UO A10 -
SS A11 -
If not already completed, the crew may conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant. The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager END OF EVENT 3 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 3 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event: 4 Event
Description:
RWST sludge mixing line break results in an RWST low level alarm with an associated failure of 1HV-10958 and 1HV-10959, RWST Sludge Mixing Isolations, to automatically close. The crew will respond using ARP 17006-1 for ALB06-E04 RWST LO LEVEL.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the RWST sludge mixing line break.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: RWST LO LEVEL will be received approximately 3 minutes after insertion of the leak.
Alarms:
ALB06-E04 RWST LO LEVEL Indications:
IPC indication of RWST level lowering. Board indication can be referenced as well; however, it may be difficult to discern the level change from the meter.
The annunciator listed above.
UO 17006-1 for ALB06-E04 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS UO INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 4 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event: 4 Event
Description:
RWST sludge mixing line break results in an RWST low level alarm with an associated failure of 1HV-10958 and 1HV-10959, RWST Sludge Mixing Isolations, to automatically close. The crew will respond using ARP 17006-1 for ALB06-E04 RWST LO LEVEL.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: When 1HV-10957 and 1HV-10958 are closed by the UO, then set final value of TK02RF to the RWST level indicated when the leak is isolated.
3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION C, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 3.5.4, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), CONDITION E, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (applies if RWST level lowers to less than 94%)
FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
END OF EVENT 4 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 4 2
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 7 Event: 5 Event
Description:
1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high causing 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, and the Pressurizer Spray Valves to open. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of 1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, failing high.
Alarms:
ALB11-B03 PRZR HI PRESS ALB11-C03 PRZR HI PRESS CHANNEL ALERT ALB12-E04 PV-455A OPEN SIGNAL Indications:
1PI-455A indicating off-scale high.
Pressurizer Spray Valves open.
1PIC-455A, Pressurizer Pressure Control, demanding 100%
(spray valves open and all heaters de-energized).
1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, open.
The annunciators listed above.
SS / 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, OATC Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation Crew update for entry into 18001-C, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation. This normally occurs following the board operators initial IOA response.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS C1 -
Critical Task #1 - Manually close the Pressurizer Spray Valves before an automatic reactor trip occurs is satisfied by completion of this step.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 5 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 7 Event: 5 Event
Description:
1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high causing 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, and the Pressurizer Spray Valves to open. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS C2 -
CREW C3 -
CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE OATC C4 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 5 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 7 Event: 5 Event
Description:
1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high causing 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, and the Pressurizer Spray Valves to open. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC C5 -
OATC C6 -
SS / C7 -
OATC Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 5 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 7 Event: 5 Event
Description:
1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high causing 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, and the Pressurizer Spray Valves to open. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC C8 -
The crew may also contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager. Also, the crew may ask for permission from the Shift Manager for placing controllers associated with this failure back in AUTO.
OATC C9 -
OATC C10 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 5 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 7 Event: 5 Event
Description:
1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high causing 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, and the Pressurizer Spray Valves to open. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC C11 -
SS / C12 -
OATC SS C13 -
Crew will initiate repairs, if not already done. The crew may also conduct a briefing, updating the status of the plant.
SS C14 -
SS C15 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 5 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 6 of 7 Event: 5 Event
Description:
1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high causing 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, and the Pressurizer Spray Valves to open. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS C16 -
3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation o CONDITION A, immediately o Function 6 (OTT), CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8a (Pressurizer Pressure - Low),
CONDITION M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8b (Pressurizer Pressure - High),
CONDITION E, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
Instrumentation o CONDITION A, immediately o Function 1d (Pressurizer Pressure - Low),
CONDITION D, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> o Function 8b (Pressurizer Pressure, P-11),
CONDITION L, 1hour 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, CONDITION A, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (if RCS pressure lowers to 2199 psig)
FOR TECH SPEC BREAKDOWN, SEE ATTACHED TECH SPEC REFERENCE.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 5 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 7 of 7 Event: 5 Event
Description:
1PT-455, Pressurizer Pressure, fails high causing 1PV-455, Pressurizer PORV, and the Pressurizer Spray Valves to open. The crew will enter 18001-C, Primary Systems Instrumentation Malfunction, Section C, Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Instrumentation, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS C17 -
END OF EVENT 5 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 5 7
RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:
- a. Pressurizer pressure 2199 psig;
- b. RCS average temperature 592.5°F; and
- c. RCS total flow rate 384,509 gpm.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
NOTE---------------------------------------------------
Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:
- a. THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or
- b. THERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> parameters p not within parameter(s) p to within limits. limit.
B. RCS total flow rate B.1. Perform SR 3.4.1.4. 7 days degraded.
C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.1-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
ACTIONS
NOTE-------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more referenced in required channels Table 3.3.1-1 for the inoperable. channel(s).
B. One Manual Reactor Trip B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> channel inoperable. OPERABLE status.
OR B.2 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> C. ----------NOTE-------------- C.1 Restore channel or train 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> While this LCO is not met to OPERABLE status.
for Functions 1, 17, 18, or 19 in MODES 3, 4, OR or 5, closing the reactor trip breakers is not C.2 Open RTBs. 49 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> permitted.
One channel or train inoperable.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE---------------------
A channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
E.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR E.2 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> F. THERMAL POWER F.1 Reduce THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
> P-6 and < P-10, one POWER to < P-6.
Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel OR inoperable.
F.2 Increase THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> POWER to > P-10.
G. THERMAL POWER G.1 Suspend operations Immediately
> P-6 and < P-10, two involving positive reactivity Intermediate Range additions.
Neutron Flux channels inoperable. AND G.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> POWER to < P-6.
H. THERMAL POWER H.1 Restore channel(s) to Prior to increasing
< P-6, one or two OPERABLE status. THERMAL POWER Intermediate Range to > P-6 Neutron Flux channels inoperable.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-3 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME M. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTES-------------------
- 1. For RCP bus undervoltage or underfrequency instrument functions; the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels.
- 2. For other instrument functions; a channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-7.
N. One Reactor Coolant ---------------------NOTE--------------------
Flow-Low (single loop) A channel may be bypassed for up channel inoperable. to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
N.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR N.2 Reduce THERMAL 76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> POWER to < P-8.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-5 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 2 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 5. Source Range 2(d) 2 I,J SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5 Neutron Flux SR 3.3.1.8(n)(o) cps cps (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.11 2 J,K SR 3.3.1.1 1.7 E5 1.0 E5 3(a), 4(a), 5(a) SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o) cps (n)(o) cps SR 3.3.1.11 1 L SR 3.3.1.1 3(e), 4(e), 5(e) SR 3.3.1.11 (n)(o)
NA NA
- 6. Overtemperature T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 1 Refer to Note 1 SR 3.3.1.3 (Page 3.3.1-20) (Page 3.3.1-20)
SR 3.3.1.6 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
- 7. Overpower T 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 Refer to Note 2 Refer to Note 2 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (Page 3.3.1-21) (Page 3.3.1-21)
(n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)
(a) With RTBs closed and Rod Control System capable of rod withdrawal.
(d) Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlocks.
(e) With the RTBs open. In this condition, source range Function does not provide reactor trip but does provide input to the High Flux at Shutdown Alarm System (LCO 3.3.8) and indication.
(n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-15 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 3 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 8. Pressurizer Pressure
- a. Low 1(f) 4 M SR 3.3.1.1 1950 psig 1960(g) psig SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
(n)(o)
- b. High 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 2395 psig 2385 psig (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
- 9. Pressurizer Water 1(f) 3 M SR 3.3.1.1 93.9% 92%
(n)(o)
Level - High SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.10
- 10. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low
- a. Single Loop 1(h) 3 per loop N SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
SR 3.3.1.7(n)(o)
(n)(o)
- b. Two Loops 1(i) 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
(n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.7 (n)(o)
SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)
(f) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
(g) Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Pressurizer Pressure-Low are 10 seconds for lead and 1 second for lag.
(h) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(i) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(n) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(o) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page 7 of 9)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Note 1: Overtemperature Delta-T The Allowable Value of each input to the Overtemperature Delta-T function as defined by the equation below shall not exceed its as-left value by more than the following:
(1) 0.5% T span for the T channel (2) 0.5% T span for the Tavg channel (3) 0.5% T span for the pressurizer pressure channel (4) 0.5% T span for the f1(AFD) channel T {1 + 1s} 1 º {1 + 4 s} 1 º (p) º
<<100 >> << K1 - K 2 << T - T >> - K 3{P - P} - f 1 (AFD) >>
¬ T0 {1 + 2 s} {1 + 3 s} 1/4 ¬ {1 + 5 s} ¬ {1 + 6 s} 1/4 1/4 Where: T measured loop specific RCS differential temperature, degrees F T0 indicated loop specific RCS differential at RTP, degrees F 1+1s lead-lag compensator on measured differential temperature 1+2s 1, 2 time constants utilized in lead-lag compensator for differential temperature: 1 = 0 seconds, 2 = 0 seconds Pressurizer 1 pressure is an 1+3s lag compensator on measured differential temperature input to OTdeltaT 3 time constant utilized in lag compensator for differential temperature, 6 seconds K1 fundamental setpoint, 114.9% RTP K2 modifier for temperature, = 2.24% RTP per degree F 1+4s 1+5s lead-lag compensator on dynamic temperature compensation 4, 5 time constants utilized in lead-lag compensator for temperature compensation: 4 28 seconds, 5 4 seconds T measured loop specific RCS average temperature, degrees F 1
1+6s lag compensator on measured average temperature 6 time constant utilized in lag compensator for average temperature, 6 seconds T indicated loop specific RCS average temperature at RTP, 588.4 degrees F K3 modifier for pressure, = 0.177% RTP per psig P measured RCS pressurizer pressure, psig P reference pressure, 2235 psig s Laplace transform variable, inverse seconds Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-20 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2 1.
ACTIONS
NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Enter the Condition Immediately with one or more required referenced in Table channels inoperable. 3.3.2-1 for the channel(s) or train(s).
B. One channel inoperable. B.1 Restore channel to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
OR B.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> AND B.2.2 -------------NOTE-------------
LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4.
Be in MODE 4. 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-1 Amendment No. 179 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 160 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One train inoperable. --------------------NOTE-------------------
One train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.
C.1 Restore train to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
OR C.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> AND C.2.2 -------------NOTE-------------
LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 4.
Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> D. One channel inoperable. --------------------NOTE-------------------
A channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
D.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-2 Amendment No. 179 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 160 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L. One or more Pressurizer L.1 Verify interlock is in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Pressure, P-11 channels required state for existing inoperable. unit condition.
OR L.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> AND L.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-6 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 7)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 1. Safety Injection
- a. Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 3.3.2.6 NA NA Initiation
- b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 C SR 3.3.2.2 NA NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.3 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.5 Relays
- c. Containment 1,2,3 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 4.4 psig 3.8 psig (i)(j)
Pressure - SR 3.3.2.4 (i)(j)
High 1 SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.8
- d. Pressurizer 1,2,3(a) 4 D SR 3.3.2.1 1856 psig 1870 psig (i)(j)
Pressure - Low SR 3.3.2.4 (i)(j)
SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.8
- e. Steam Line 1,2,3(a) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 570(b) psig 585(b) psig (i)(j)
Pressure - Low line SR 3.3.2.4 (i)(j)
SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.8 (continued)
(a) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.
(b) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are t1 50 seconds and t2 5 seconds.
(i) If the as-found channel setpoint is outside its predefined as-found tolerance, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service.
(j) The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left tolerance around the Nominal Trip Setpoint (NTSP) at the completion of the surveillance; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. Setpoints more conservative than the NTSP are acceptable provided that the as-found and as-left tolerances apply to the actual setpoint implemented in the Surveillance procedures (field setting) to confirm channel performance. The methodologies used to determine the as-found and the as-left tolerances are specified in NMP-ES-033-006, Vogtle Setpoint Uncertainty Methodology and Scaling Instructions.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-9 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 7 of 7)
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT
- 8. ESFAS Interlocks
- a. Reactor Trip, P-4 1,2,3 1 per train, 2 F SR 3.3.2.9 NA NA trains
- b. Pressurizer 1,2,3 3 L SR 3.3.2.4 2010 psig 2000 psig Pressure, P-11 SR 3.3.2.7 Tech Spec Basis page indicating which channels are required is at the end of this reference Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.2-15 Amendment No. 165 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 147 (Unit 2)
RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow DNB Limits 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:
- a. Pressurizer pressure 2199 psig;
- b. RCS average temperature 592.5°F; and
- c. RCS total flow rate 384,509 gpm.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
NOTE---------------------------------------------------
Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:
- a. THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or
- b. THERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more RCS DNB A.1 Restore RCS DNB 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> parameters not within parameter(s) to within limits. limit.
B. RCS total flow rate B.1. Perform SR 3.4.1.4. 7 days degraded.
C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.1-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE a. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks SAFETY ANALYSES, Reactor Trip, P-4 (continued)
LCO, and APPLICABILITY This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 when the reactor may be critical, approaching criticality, or the automatic SI function is required to be OPERABLE. This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, 5, or 6 because the main turbine, the MFW System, and the automatic SI function are not required to be OPERABLE. The P-4 function to trip the turbine and isolate main feedwater are only required in MODES 1 and 2 when these systems may be in service.
- b. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks Pressurizer Pressure, P-11 The P-11 interlock (PT-0455, PT-0456, PT-0457) permits a normal unit cooldown and depressurization without actuation of SI or main steam line isolation. With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels (discussed previously) less than the P-11 setpoint, the operator can manually block the Pressurizer Pressure Low and Steam Line Pressure Low SI signals and the Steam Line Pressure Low steam line isolation signal PT-455 is one of the three (previously discussed). When the Steam Line Pressure Low required pressurizer steam line isolation signal is manually blocked, a main steam pressure channels isolation signal on Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate High is enabled. This provides protection for an SLB by closure of the MSIVs. With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels above the P-11 setpoint, the Pressurizer Pressure Low and Steam Line Pressure Low SI signals and the Steam Line Pressure Low steam line isolation signal are automatically enabled. The operator can also enable these trips by use of the respective manual reset buttons. When the Steam Line Pressure Low steam line isolation signal is enabled, the main steam isolation on Steam Line Pressure Negative Rate High is disabled. The NTSP (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.2-34 REVISION 20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 5 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1LV-460, Letdown Isolation, fails closed. The crew will enter 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the total loss of Letdown.
Alarms:
ALB08-F06 RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW ALB11-C01 PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON Indications:
1LV-460 handswitch green light is lit.
Rising pressurizer level.
Letdown flow is 0 gpm on 1FI-132C.
Reduced charging flow due to rising pressurizer level.
Lowering VCT level.
The annunciators listed above (event may be diagnosed before alarms are received).
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 5 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1LV-460, Letdown Isolation, fails closed. The crew will enter 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow Crew update for entry into 18007-C, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow.
A1 -
OATC A2 -
UO may coordinate with the OATC to adjust charging flow and RCP seal injection flow.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 5 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1LV-460, Letdown Isolation, fails closed. The crew will enter 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC A3 -
CREW A4 -
CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 5 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1LV-460, Letdown Isolation, fails closed. The crew will enter 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / A5 -
UO OATC A6 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 5 Event: 6 Event
Description:
1LV-460, Letdown Isolation, fails closed. The crew will enter 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section A, Total Loss of Letdown Flow, to mitigate the event.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC A7 -
SS / A8 -
OATC The crew may contact C&T in order to generate a Condition Report (CR) and a work order, and dispatch maintenance to investigate, as well as inform the Shift Manager and Ops Duty Manager.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The intent of the scenario is to proceed to the next event BEFORE placing Excess Letdown in service.
END OF EVENT 6 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 6 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 4 Event: 7 Event
Description:
ACCW Pump #2 trips with ACCW Pump #1 tagged out. The crew will enter 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water, which requires tripping the reactor and stopping all RCPs. The crew will then enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of the loss of ACCW.
Alarms:
ALB04-A02 ACCW LO HDR PRESS ALB04- Multiple ACCW low flow alarms ALB37-A01 4160 V SWGR 1BA03 TROUBLE Indications:
Temperatures rising on ACCW cooled components.
1HS-1957 handswitch amber light is lit.
The annunciators listed above.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 7 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 4 Event: 7 Event
Description:
ACCW Pump #2 trips with ACCW Pump #1 tagged out. The crew will enter 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water, which requires tripping the reactor and stopping all RCPs. The crew will then enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Crew update for entry into 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water.
1-CONTINUOUS ACTIONS PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 7 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 4 Event: 7 Event
Description:
ACCW Pump #2 trips with ACCW Pump #1 tagged out. The crew will enter 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water, which requires tripping the reactor and stopping all RCPs. The crew will then enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 2-OATC Critical Task #2 - Manually stop all RCPs within 10 minutes of the ACCW Pump #2 trip is satisfied by completion of this step.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: It is expected that the crew will proceed through the EOP network before returning to 18022-C.
Additional steps from 18022-C are included for reference on the next page.
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Trigger 8 (SG #3 fault) when all RCPs are stopped with Chief Examiner concurrence.
END OF EVENT 7 - PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CHIEF EXAMINER.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 7 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 4 Event: 7 Event
Description:
ACCW Pump #2 trips with ACCW Pump #1 tagged out. The crew will enter 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water, which requires tripping the reactor and stopping all RCPs. The crew will then enter 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (CONTINUED) 4-UO 5-OATC 6-This completes the applicable actions of 18022-C, Loss of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Event 7 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 1 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW Diagnosis of SG #3 fault between containment and the MSIVs.
Alarms:
ALB09-F02 LO STM PRESS SLI SI - RX TRIP ALB13-A04 to D04 STM GEN 1-4 LO STEAMLINE PRESS ALERT ALB13-F05 STM GEN 3 DIGITAL FW CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE ALB14-A02 to D02 STM GEN 1-4 HI STM PRESS RATE ALERT Indications:
SG pressures lowering.
Steam flow - feed flow mismatch as read on the QMCB.
The annunciators listed above.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 1
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 2 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OATC IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS The crew will normally make a plant page announcement after the Immediate Operator Actions.
1-UO 2-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 2
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 3 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 3-OATC 4-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 3
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 4 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 6-FOLDOUT PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 4
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 5 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 6 - (CONTINUED)
CONTINUOUS ACTION PAGE Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 5
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 6 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC OATC INITIAL ACTIONS 1-OATC 2-OATC 3-EVENT 9: NCP fails to automatically trip during the SI is procedurally addressed in this step.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 6
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 7 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 4-OATC 5-OATC 6-OATC 7-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 7
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 8 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 8-OATC 9-OATC 10 -
OATC 11 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 8
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 9 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 12 -
OATC 13 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Crew may contact C&T to attempt to release the ACCW Pump #1 clearance, but the pump will NOT be restored.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 9
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 10 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 14 -
OATC 15 -
This completes the OATC Initial Actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 10
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 11 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO UO INITIAL ACTIONS 1-UO 2-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 11
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 12 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 3-EVENT 10: Main Steam Line Isolation fails to automatically actuate is procedurally addressed in this step.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The crew may have already done this as an Early Operator Action.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 12
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 13 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4-UO 5-UO 6-UO 7-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 13
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 14 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 8-UO 9-This completes the UO Initial Actions.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 14
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 15 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC / 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (CONTINUED)
UO 7-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 15
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 16 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 8-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 16
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 17 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 9-SS / UO 10 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The crew will enter 19020-1 even if the SG #3 pressure has stabilized.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 17
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 18 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior SS / 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation OATC Crew update for entry into 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
1-NOTE TO EXAMINER: See Page 25 for 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree, actions.
SS 2-UO 3-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 18
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 19 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 4-UO 5-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 19
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 20 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 6-Critical Task #3 - Manually isolate the faulted SG #3 by closing the MSIV and BSIV for SG #3 and isolating AFW flow to the faulted SG before any RCS WR cold leg temperature lowers to less than 240 F (PTS transition) is satisfied by completion of this step.
UO 7-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 20
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 21 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 8-UO 9-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 22 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 10 -
UO 11 -
END OF SCENARIO 5 - THE SIMULATOR MAY BE PLACED IN FREEZE WITH CONCURRENCE FROM THE CHIEF EXAMINER. THE FOLLOWING STEPS FROM 19020-1 ARE FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 22
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 23 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior UO 12 -
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 23
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 24 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior CREW 13 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Pressurizer level will be recovering, but may not be greater than 5% at this point.
SS 14 -
NOTE TO EXAMINER: This is the end of the additional EOP procedure steps.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 25 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree OATC 1-Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 25
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-301 Scenario: 5 Page 26 of 26 Events: 8 - 10 Event
Description:
SG #3 faults between containment and the MSIVs, which will result in an SI. The crew will progress through 19000-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transition to 19020-1, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. The NCP will fail to automatically trip during the SI and both Trains of SLI will fail to automatically actuate.
Time Position Applicants Action and/or Behavior OATC 2-OATC 3-OATC 4-This completes the applicable actions of 19200-1, Critical Safety Function Status Tree.
Southern Company l Scenario 5 - Events 8 - 10 26
NRC Job Performance Measure a Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-09029 Task
Title:
Initiate Emergency Boration in Response to Three Stuck Rods (Alternate Path)
JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13009-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
024AA2.02 RO 3.9 SRO 4.4 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor is tripped.
Three control rods do NOT fully insert.
19001-1, Reactor Trip Response, is in progress.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to initiate emergency boration beginning with Step 4.9.1 of 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System.
1
Task Standard: The applicant uses 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, to initiate emergency boration of the RCS through 1HV-8104, Emergency Borate Valve, but determines it will NOT open. The applicant then aligns the makeup control system to emergency borate the RCS from the BAST through the normal charging flow path. The total charging flow rate is required to be greater than 42 gpm and the boration flow rate is required to be greater than 30 gpm.
Required Materials: 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System (ver. 51.5)
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 8 minutes 2
SIMULATOR SETUP:
Reset to IC370 for ILT22 NRC Exam Simulator Setup from Scratch:
- 1. Reset to IC14 (100% MOL with 806 ppm boric acid concentration)
- 2. Insert the following malfunctions:
RD10E stuck rod (remains full out)
RD17H with final value of 100 RD17N with final value of 208
- 3. Override handswitch 1HS-8104, Emergency Borate, to CLOSE
- 6. Trip the reactor
- 7. Verify 75 gpm letdown is in service
- 8. Reduce TDAFW pump speed to minimum
- 10. Adjust charging flow to stabilize pressurizer level
- 11. Place 1FIC-121 in AUTO
- 12. Acknowledge / Reset alarms
- 13. Freeze the simulator Setup time: 15 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 4.9 Emergency Boration NOTE Table 1 provides a convenient tool for checking Emergency Boration flow path alternatives.
TABLE 1 EMERGENCY BORATION FLOW PATH ALTERNATIVES Valve Other Pump Flow path BATP Flows Flow Note Alignments Required At least OPEN Any charging pump 42 GPM 30 GPM HV8104 Operate heaters one 1HV-8104 1FI-0121C 1FI-0183A OPEN Any charging pump Charging Flow At least 42 GPM 30 GPM 1FV-0110A Operate heaters path one 1FI-0121C 1FI-0110A 1FV-0110B OPEN 1LV-0112D 1LV-0112E 8 to 13 GPM RWST to 100 GPM NA CLOSE Any charging pump seal injection Operate heaters Regen Hx 1FI-0121C 1LV-0112B flow 1HV-0182 1LV-0112C 1LV-0112A OPEN BIT flow Adjust 1HV-8801A (1FI-0917A) + total 1FIC-0121C to RWST to BIT NA 1HV-8801B Any charging pump seal flow Operate heaters
- seal return flow 13 GPM per RCP 87.5 GPM OPEN RHR other than S/D Establish water RHR HV-8812A/B Cooling removal path to NA >100 gpm See Proc.
(Mode 6) HV-8809A/B prevent vessel overflow OPEN Establish water SI HV-8923A/B removal path to NA SI >100 gpm See Proc.
(Mode 6) HV-8821A/B prevent vessel or HV-8835 cavity overflow Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE and may refer to Table 1, if necessary.
Comment:
4
- JPM 2. 4.9.1 Emergency Boration through 1HV-8104
- 1. Start one (1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump Standard: Applicant starts Boric Acid Transfer Pump #1 or Boric Acid Transfer Pump
- 2 by placing 1HS-276A or 1HS-277A to START (for the running pump - red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because a running Boric Acid Transfer Pump is required to transfer borated water to the Charging Pump suction.
Comment:
JPM 3. 4.9.1 Emergency Boration through 1HV-8104
- 2. Verify a Charging Pump is running Standard: Applicant determines that the NCP is running by checking QMCB charging flow or 1HS-275 (green light OFF, red light ON).
Comment:
Begin alternate path JPM 4. 4.9.1 Emergency Boration through 1HV-8104
- 3. Open EMERGENCY BORATE valve, 1HV-8104 Standard: Applicant attempts to open 1HV-8104 by placing 1HS-8104 to OPEN, but the valve will NOT open (green light ON, red light OFF).
Comment:
5
JPM 5. Select emergency boration flow path alternative.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1LV-112D and 1LV-112E, RWST to CCP Suction, and 1HV-8801A and 1HV-8801B, BIT Discharge Isolation, are also failed closed, so Section 4.9.2 must be used to initiate the boration.
Standard: Applicant determines that Section 4.9.1 can NOT be performed and goes to Section 4.9.2.
Comment:
JPM 6. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 1. Start one (1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump Standard: Applicant verifies that the Boric Acid Transfer Pump started in the previous procedure section is running by checking 1HS-276A or 1HS-277A (for the running pump - red light ON, green light OFF).
Comment:
JPM 7. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 2. Verify a Charging Pump is running Standard: Applicant determines that the NCP is running by checking QMCB charging flow or 1HS-275 (green light OFF, red light ON).
Comment:
6
- JPM 8. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 3. Open the following valves:
1FV-110A, BA TO BLENDER 1FV-110B, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT Standard: Applicant opens 1FV-110A and 1FV-110B by placing 1HS-110A and 1HS-110B to OPEN (red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because the two valves are in series and must be open to create a path between the BAST and the Charging Pump suction.
Comment:
JPM 9. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 4. Place 1FIC-121 in MANUAL Standard: Applicant places 1FIC-121 in MANUAL by depressing the UP or the DOWN arrow (MAN light ON, AUTO light OFF).
Comment:
7
- JPM 10. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 5. Adjust 1FIC-121 to maintain flow greater than 42 gpm.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1FI-121C, Charging Flow, is on the QMCB vertical A panel. Applicant may also check charging flow rate on the IPC or on 1FI-121A, which is on the QMCB vertical C panel, for diverse indications.
Standard: Applicant depresses the UP arrow on 1FIC-121 as necessary to establish a charging flow rate greater than 42 gpm as indicated on 1FI-121C, 1FIC-121A, or the IPC. NOTE: Step is critical because a minimum of 42 gpm of charging flow is required to ensure the minimum boric acid flow rate of 30 gpm is achieved.
Comment:
JPM 11. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 6. Verify Emergency Boration flow on 1FI-110A is greater than 30 gpm.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1FI-110A, Boric Acid Flow, is on the QMCB vertical A panel. Applicant may also check boric acid flow rate on the IPC. It is expected that boric acid flow rate will be greater than 30 gpm if charging flow is maintained above 42 gpm.
Standard: Applicant verifies that the boric acid flow rate is greater than 30 gpm as indicated on 1FI-110A or the IPC.
Comment:
8
JPM 12. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 7. If flow is less than 30 gpm, start a second Boric Acid Transfer Pump.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: It is expected that Boric Acid Flow will be greater than 30 gpm if charging flow is maintained above 42 gpm. If the applicant wants additional margin on the boric acid flow rate, it is acceptable to start the second Boric Acid Transfer Pump.
Standard: Applicant verifies that the boric acid flow rate is greater than 30 gpm as indicated on 1FI-110A or the IPC. Applicant may start the second Boric Acid Transfer Pump if a higher boric acid flow rate is desired.
Comment:
JPM 13. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 8. Operate the Pressurizer Backup Heaters as necessary to equalize boron concentration between the RCS and the Pressurizer.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: If no Pressurizer Back-up Heater Bank is energized, the applicant is expected to energize at least one Back-up Heater bank to promote boron mixing.
Standard: Applicant energizes Pressurizer Backup Heaters as necessary by placing 1HS-10469A, 1HS-10470A, and/or 1HS-10472 to ON (red light ON, green light OFF for energized bank).
Comment:
9
JPM 14. 4.9.2 Emergency Boration through the Normal Charging Flow Path
- 9. Check plant conditions are consistent with RCS boration:
RCS Tavg may be dropping NIS may be dropping CUE: An Extra Operator will monitor the RCS boration and complete 13009-1.
Standard: Applicant checks that the emergency boration is in progress.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
10
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13009-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: ____________________________ _________________
11
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor is tripped.
Three control rods do NOT fully insert.
19001-1, Reactor Trip Response, is in progress.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to initiate emergency boration beginning with Step 4.9.1 of 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System.
NRC Job Performance Measure b Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-60017 Task
Title:
Place Safety Grade Charging in Service Using CCP B JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13006-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
022AA1.01 RO 3.4 SRO 3.3 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: With Examiner approval, the applicants may pre-brief prior to starting the JPM.
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in Mode 3.
1FV-121, Charging Flow Control, is failed closed.
18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, is in progress.
Operations Management determines Safety Grade Charging will be used for RCS inventory control.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to place Safety Grade Charging in service with CCP B at a flow rate of 30 +/-10 gpm using 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System.
All system Precautions and Limitations have been verified.
1
Task Standard: Applicant establishes Safety Grade Charging using CCP B in accordance with 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System, at a flow rate of 30 +/-10 gpm as read on 1FI-917, BIT Flow, or as indicated by the IPC, or as calculated by the change in pressurizer level. NOTE: The allowable flow rate range is based on the sensitivity of throttling flow by jogging open a solenoid valve and the increments on the flow rate indicator (first mark is 20 gpm).
Required Materials: 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System (ver. 107.3)
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 15 minutes 2
SIMULATOR SETUP:
Reset to IC371 for ILT22 NRC Exam Simulator Setup from Scratch:
- 1. Reset to IC14
- 2. Manually trip the reactor
- 3. Reduce TDAFW pump speed to minimum
- 5. Isolate letdown
- 7. Allow conditions to stabilize
- 8. Acknowledge / reset alarms
- 9. Freeze simulator NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Remote Function CV20 is used to close valve 1-1208-U6-153.
Setup time: 20 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 4.4.10 Safety Grade Charging when Directed by an AOP, EOP, or Operations Management CUE: If requested, The Shift Supervisor is addressing the Tech Specs and the TRM.
4.4.10.1 In preparation for local control of seal injection, dispatch an operator to one of the following valves:
If placing A Train CCP in service: 1-1208-U6-152 (AB-C113)
OR If placing B Train CCP in service: 1-1208-U6-151 (AB-C120)
Standard: Applicant reads NOTES and dispatches an operator to 1-1208-U6-151 (AB-C120). Applicant may use the telephone or the plant paging system.
Comment:
4
JPM 2. 4.4.10.2. Go to the appropriate step:
Step 4.4.10.5, Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available Standard: Applicant determines that Step 4.4.10.5 is the appropriate step to go to using CCP B.
Comment:
JPM 3. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- a. Verify ACCW in service for RCP Thermal Barrier cooling NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant can check multiple parameters and indications to verify ACCW is in service such as ACCW system pressure and flow, ACCW component handswitch lights, and the absence of ACCW alarms.
Standard: Applicant verifies ACCW is in service for RCP Thermal Barrier cooling using QMCB indications.
Comment:
5
JPM 4. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- b. Verify letdown isolated NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant can check multiple parameters and indications to verify letdown is isolated such as 1LV-459 and 1LV-460, Letdown Isolation Valves, closed and 1FI-132, Letdown Flow Rate, indicating 0 gpm.
Standard: Applicant verifies letdown is isolated using QMCB indications.
Comment:
- JPM 5. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
1LV-112D AND/OR 1LV-112E NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1LV-112D and 1LV-112E are in parallel.
Standard: Applicant opens 1LV-112D and 1LV-112E (opening either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-112D and 1HS-112E to OPEN (green light OFF, red light ON). NOTE: Step is critical in order to provide a suction source for CCP B with letdown to the VCT isolated.
Comment:
6
- JPM 6. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- d. Verify at least one VCT OUTLET ISOLATION shut:
1LV-112B AND/OR 1LV-112C NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1LV-112B and 1LV-112C are in series.
Standard: Applicant closes 1LV-112B and 1LV-112C (closing either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-112B and 1HS-112C to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical in order to isolate the VCT while shifting CCP suction to the RWST.
Comment:
- JPM 7. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- e. Align CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION as follows:
(1) Place 1HS-8508B ENABLE PTL (2) Verify 1HV-8509A open Standard: Applicant places 1HS-8508B in ENABLE PTL (green light ON, red light OFF, white light ON) and checks 1HV-8509A is open on 1HS-8509A (green light OFF, red light ON). NOTE: Step is critical because 1HV-8508B will only cycle open to provide mini-flow protection for CCP B if it is ENABLED.
Comment:
7
- JPM 8. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- f. Verify shut:
CCP-A MINIFLOW, 1HV-8111A CCP-B MINIFLOW, 1HV-8111B Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-8111A and 1HV-8111B by placing 1HS-8111A and 1HS-8111B to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical in order to shift CCP B mini-flow to the RWST from the VCT (1HV-8111B is CCP B mini-flow to VCT isolation).
Comment:
JPM 9. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- g. Stop CCP B, if running.
Standard: Applicant determines that CCP B is NOT running by checking QMCB charging flow or 1HS-274A (green light ON, red light OFF).
Comment:
- JPM 10. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- h. Shut the following Charging Isolation Valves:
(1) CCP-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION, 1HV-8485B (2) CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION, 1HV-8105 Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-8485B and 1HV-8105 by placing 1HS-8485B and 1HS-8105 to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical in order to isolate the normal charging path (BIT flow path will be used).
Comment:
8
JPM 11. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- h. Shut the following Charging Isolation Valves:
(3) Dispatch operator to shut CVCS CHG PMPS DISCH 1FV-121 OUT ISO, 1-1208-U6-153 (AB-C112)
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted to close 1-1208-U6-153, insert Remote Function CV20 at 0%, then notify applicant when complete.
Standard: Applicant dispatches operator to close 1-1208-U6-153. Applicant may use the telephone or the plant paging system.
Comment:
JPM 12. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- h. Shut the following Charging Isolation Valves:
(4) If 1HV-8105 could not be shut in (2) above, close CVCS CHARGING SEAL INJ CONTROL HV-182 INLET ISO 1-1208-U6-134 (AB-C112)
Standard: Applicant closed 1HV-8105 in Step h.(2) above, so this step can be marked N/A.
Comment:
- JPM 13. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- i. Verify OPEN Train B BIT DISCH ISOLATION, 1HV-8801B Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-8801B by placing 1HS-8801B to OPEN (green light OFF, red light ON). NOTE: Step is critical in order to establish the safety grade charging flow path through the BIT.
Comment:
9
JPM 14. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- j. Verify CCP B Auxiliary Lube Oil pump (ALOP) red indicating lamp is lit on QMCB NOTE TO EXAMINER: Red indicating light is on the QMCB near ALB06.
Standard: Applicant checks that the CCP B ALOP red indicating lamp is lit on the QMCB.
Comment:
- JPM 15. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- k. Start CCP B NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may make a page announcement prior to starting CCPB, but it is not required.
Standard: Applicant starts CCP B by placing 1HS-274A to START (green light OFF, red light ON). NOTE: Step is critical in order to establish safety grade charging through CCP B.
Comment:
JPM 16. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- l. Verify CCP B ALOP red indicating lamp goes off on QMCB shortly after the pump is started Standard: Applicant checks that the CCP B ALOP red indicating lamp is NOT lit shortly after CCP B is started.
Comment:
10
- JPM 17. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available
- m. Throttle OPEN CCP B SAFETY GRADE CHG, 1HV-190B, to establish the desired charging flow as indicated by trends of:
1FI-917A Pressurizer level instrumentation NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-190B is opened using controller 1HC-190B, which is on the vertical QMCB panel.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may determine flow rate using 1FI-917A, BIT Flow, on the QMCB, or by checking the IPC, or by calculating the change in pressurizer level. The allowable flow rate range is based on the sensitivity of throttling flow by jogging open a solenoid valve and the increments on the flow rate indicator (first mark is 20 gpm).
Standard: Applicant throttles open 1HV-190B by depressing the UP arrow on the 1HC-190B manual controller and establishes a flow rate of 30 +/-10 gpm as read on 1FI-917, BIT Flow, or as indicated by the IPC, or as calculated by the change in pressurizer level. NOTE: Step is critical in order to establish the required safety grade charging flow rate for RCS inventory control.
Comment:
JPM 18. 4.4.10.5 Establish Charging with Train B CCP Available CUE: An Extra Operator will monitor charging and complete 13006-1.
Standard: N/A Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
11
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13006-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ _______________
12
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in Mode 3.
1FV-121, Charging Flow Control, is failed closed.
18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, is in progress.
Operations Management determines Safety Grade Charging will be used for RCS inventory control.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to place Safety Grade Charging in service with CCP B at a flow rate of 30 +/-10 gpm using 13006-1, Chemical and Volume Control System.
All system Precautions and Limitations have been verified.
NRC Job Performance Measure c Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-13009 Task
Title:
Transfer ECCS Pumps to Cold Leg Recirculation (Alternate Path)
JPM No: V-NRC-JP-19013-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
011EA1.11 RO 4.2 SRO 4.2 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA.
19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.
RWST level has lowered to 29%.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to transfer the ECCS pumps to cold leg recirculation using 19013-1, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.
1
Task Standard: Applicant transfers both Trains of ECCS pumps to cold leg recirculation using 19013-1, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. 1HV-8811B, Containment Sump to RHR Pump B, does NOT open automatically, so the applicant stops RHR pump B, opens 1HV-8811B, then re-starts RHR pump B to align Train B for cold leg recirculation.
Required Materials: 19013-1, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation (ver. 3.0)
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 10 minutes 2
SIMULATOR SETUP:
Reset to IC372 for ILT22 NRC Exam Simulator Setup from Scratch:
- 1. Reset to IC14
- 3. Insert Malfunction ES18B (1HV-8811B does NOT automatically open)
- 4. Trip all RCPs
- 6. Reset SI
- 8. When RWST level is < 29%, set RF TK09 to 0 gpm, and then delete RF TK09
- 9. Verify containment sump levels are > 12 inches
- 10. Verify 1HV-8811A is fully OPEN
- 11. Acknowledge / reset alarms
- 12. Freeze simulator Setup time: 20 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1.
NOTE FRPs should not be implemented until at least one flow path exists from the CNMT Sump to the RCS Cold Legs and the completion of Step 13.
CAUTIONS SI recirculation flow to RCS must be maintained at all times.
If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:
RHR Pumps SI Pumps Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).
ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CRI is reset).
- 1. Verify SI reset.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: SI will have been reset at this point. Applicant may check that the SI ACTUATED light on the BPLB is NOT lit or that the SI indicator at the top of the IPC screen is NOT lit.
Standard: Applicant determines that SI is reset by checking the IPC or QMCB indications.
NOTE: The applicant may take 1HS-40066 and 1HS-40067, SI Reset Handswitches, to RESET. This is acceptable and will not affect any of the following actions.
Comment:
4
JPM 2. 2. Containment Emergency Sump level - GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 12 INCHES:
1LI-764 1LI-765 Standard: Applicant checks that Containment Emergency Sump levels are greater than 12 inches on 1LI-764 and 1LI-765 on the QMCB.
Comment:
JPM 3. 3. Initiate Attachment 1 to align ECCS Pumps to the Cold Leg Recirculation flow path.
Standard: Applicant initiates Attachment 1 of 19013-1.
Comment:
____________________________________________________________________________ , Cold Leg Recirculation Valve Alignment JPM 4. 1. Check CCW Cooling for RHR Heat Exchangers:
- a. CCW pumps - TWO RUNNING IN EACH TRAIN
- b. CCW pump discharge pressures and flows - NORMAL
NSCW pumps - TWO RUNNING IN EACH TRAIN NSCW CLG TOWER fans - FOUR IN AUTO EACH TRAIN Standard: Applicant checks two CCW pumps running in each Train with normal discharge pressures and flows on the QMCB. Applicant also checks two NSCW pumps running in each Train with four NSCW Cooling Tower fans in AUTO in each Train on the QMCB. NOTE: Systems may also be checked on the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC).
Comment:
5
JPM 5. 2. Align RHR pump A flow path:
- a. Check RHR pump A - RUNNING Standard: Applicant checks RHR pump A is running by checking discharge pressure and flow or by checking 1HS-620 (green light OFF, red light ON).
Comment:
JPM 6. 2. Align RHR pump A flow path:
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-8811A is open on 1HS-8811A (green light OFF, red light ON).
Comment:
JPM 7. 2. Align RHR pump A flow path:
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-8809A is open on 1HS-8809A (green light OFF, red light ON).
Comment:
6
JPM 8. 2. Align RHR pump A flow path:
Standard: Applicant checks that RHR flow on 1FI-618A is greater than 1000 gpm.
Comment:
JPM 9. 3. Align RHR pump B flow path:
- a. Check RHR pump B - RUNNING.
Standard: Applicant checks RHR pump B is running by checking discharge pressure and flow or by checking 1HS-621 (green light OFF, red light ON).
Comment:
Begin Alternate Path JPM 10. 3. Align RHR pump B flow path:
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-8811B and determines it is NOT open on 1HS-8811B (green light ON, red light OFF). Applicant goes to Step 3.b. RNO.
Comment:
7
- JPM 11. 3.b. RNO. If 1HV-8811B is NOT open, then perform the following:
(1) Stop RHR pump B Standard: Applicant stops RHR pump B by placing 1HS-621 to STOP (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical to protect RHR pump B because its suction source is isolated in the next step.
Comment:
- JPM 12. 3.b. RNO. If 1HV-8811B is NOT open, then perform the following:
(2) Close RWST TO RHR PMP-B SUCTION, 1HV-8812B Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-8812B by placing 1HS-8812B to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because if 1HV-8812B is not closed when 1HV-8811B is opened in the next step, the RWST can drain to the sump.
Comment:
- JPM 13. 3.b. RNO. If 1HV-8811B is NOT open, then perform the following:
(3) Open 1HV-8811B Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-8811B by placing 1HS-8811B to OPEN (green light OFF, red light ON). NOTE: Step is critical to ensure RHR pump B has a suction source when it is started in the next step.
Comment:
8
- JPM 14. 3.b. RNO. If 1HV-8811B is NOT open, then perform the following:
(4) Start RHR pump B (5) Go to Step 3.c of this Attachment Standard: Applicant starts RHR pump B by placing 1HS-621 to START (green light OFF, red light ON) and goes to Step 3.c. NOTE: 1HV-8811B must be open from the previous step before RHR pump B is started to meet the critical step of establishing Train B recirculation capability.
Comment:
JPM 15. 3. Align RHR pump B flow path:
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-8809B is open on 1HS-8809B (green light OFF, red light ON).
Comment:
JPM 16. 3. Align RHR pump B flow path:
Standard: Applicant checks that RHR flow on 1FI-619A is greater than 1000 gpm.
Comment:
9
JPM 17. 4. Check if SI Pumps should be stopped.
- a. RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1675 PSIG Standard: Applicant checks that RCS pressure is less than 1675 psig by observing QMCB or IPC indications.
Comment:
- JPM 18. 5. Align SI pump(s) mini-flow isolations:
Standard: Applicant places lockout selector switch 1HS-8813A to ON (white light ON).
NOTE: Step is critical in order to close 1HV-8813 in the following step.
Comment:
- JPM 19. 5. Align SI pump(s) mini-flow isolations:
- b. Close SIP mini-flow isolations valves:
1HV-8813, SIS PMPS COMMON MINI FLOW ISO VLV 1HV-8814, SI PMP-A MINI FLOW ISO VLV 1HV-8920, SI PMP-B MINI FLOW ISO VLV NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-8813 is in series with 1HV-8814 and 1HV-8920, which are in parallel.
Standard: Applicant closes the SIP Mini-Flow Isolations (closing 1HV-8813 or both 1HV-8814 and 1HV-8920 meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-8813, 1HS-8814, and 1HS-8920 to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF).
NOTE: Step is critical to prevent high activity Containment Sump water from entering the RWST through the mini-flow lines.
Comment:
10
- JPM 20. 6. Align CCP(s) mini-flow isolations:
- a. Close CCP alternate mini-flow isolation valves:
1HV-8508A, CCP-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION 1HV-8508B, CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION 1HV-8509A, CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION 1HV-8509B, CCP-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-8508A and 1HV-8509B are in series for isolating CCP A mini-flow. 1HV-8508B and 1HV-8509A are in series for isolating CCP B mini-flow. 1HV-8508A and 1HV-8508B will already be closed, but the white lights will be lit indicating they are in AUTO. The applicant will place 1HS-8508A and 1HS-8508B to CLOSE in this step or the next step to de-activate the Pressure Control Mode (white light).
Standard: Applicant closes the CCP Alternate Mini-Flow Isolations by placing 1HS-8508A and 1HS-8509B (closing either valve meets the critical step), and 1HS-8508B and 1HS-8509B (closing either valve meets the critical step) to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF). NOTE: Step is critical to prevent high activity Containment Sump water from entering the RWST through the mini-flow lines.
Comment:
JPM 21. 6. Align CCP(s) mini-flow isolations:
- b. Verify white Pressure Control Mode light - NOT lit:
1HV-8508A, CCP-A RV TO RWST ISOLATION 1HV-8508B, CCP-B RV TO RWST ISOLATION Standard: Applicant verifies white Pressure Control Mode lights are NOT lit by momentarily placing 1HS-8508A and 1HS-8508B to CLOSE as required to extinguish the light (green lights ON, red lights OFF, white lights OFF).
Comment:
11
- JPM 22. 7. Align ECCS cross-connect and system isolation valves:
- a. Close RHR pump discharge cross-connect isolation valves:
1HV-8716A, RHR TRAIN A TO HOT LEG CROSSOVER ISO 1HV-8716B, RHR TRAIN B TO HOT LEG CROSSOVER ISO Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-8716A and 1HV-8716B by placing 1HS-8716A and 1HS-8716B to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because RHR is designed such that each Train can only supply injection to two cold legs while providing suction to the CCPs and SIPs.
Comment:
- JPM 23. 7. Align ECCS cross-connect and system isolation valves:
1HV-8924, SI PMP-A SUCTION XCONN TO CCP SUCTION HEADER 1HV-8807A, SI PMP-A SUCTION XCONN TO CCP SUCTION HEADER 1HV-8807B, SI PMP-A SUCTION XCONN TO CCP SUCTION HEADER NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-8924 is in series with 1HV-8807A and 1HV-8807B, which are in parallel.
Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-8924, 1HV-8807A, and 1HV-8807B (1HV-8924 is already open, so opening 1HV-8807A or 1HV-8807B meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-8924, 1HS-8807A, and 1HS-8807B to OPEN (green lights OFF, red lights ON). NOTE: Step is critical because it aligns the SI suction header to the CCP suction header to provide a suction source from the RHR pump discharge during recirculation.
Comment:
12
JPM 24. 7. Align ECCS cross-connect and system isolation valves:
1HV-8813 1HV-8920 1HV-8814 1HV-8508A 1HV-8509B 1HV-8508B 1HV-8509A NOTE TO EXAMINER: All of these valves were closed in previous steps.
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-8813, 1HV-8920, 1HV-8814, 1HV-8508A, 1HV-8509B, 1HV-8508B, and 1HV-8509A closed by checking 1HS-8813, 1HS-8920, 1HS-8814, 1HS-8508A, 1HS-8509B, 1HS-8508B, and 1HS-8509A (green lights ON, red lights OFF).
Comment:
- JPM 25. 7. Align ECCS cross-connect and system isolation valves:
1HV-8804A, RHR PMP-A DISCH TO CHG PMPS SUCT 1HV-8804B, RHR TO SI PMP-B ISO VLV Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-8804A and 1HV-8804B by placing 1HS-8804A and 1HS-8804B to OPEN (green lights OFF, red lights ON). NOTE: Step is critical because it aligns the RHR pump discharge to the SI and CCP suction headers to provide a suction source to the pumps during recirculation.
Comment:
13
- JPM 26. 8. Isolate ECCS pumps from RWST:
1LV-112D 1LV-112E NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1LV-112D and 1LV-112E are in parallel.
Standard: Applicant closes 1LV-112D and 1LV-112E by placing 1HS-112D and 1HS-112E to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF). NOTE: Step is critical in order to isolate the ECCS pump suctions from the RWST.
Comment:
- JPM 27. 8. Isolate ECCS pumps from RWST:
Standard: Applicant places lockout selector switch 1HS-8806A to ON (white light ON).
NOTE: Step is critical in order to close 1HV-8806 in the following step.
Comment:
- JPM 28. 8. Isolate ECCS pumps from RWST:
Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-8806 by placing 1HS-8806 to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical in order to isolate the ECCS pump suctions from the RWST.
Comment:
14
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Attachment 1 is complete, so the applicant returns to 19013-1, Step 4.
JPM 29. 4. Initiate the following:
Notify RP that radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building will change when Cold Leg Recirculation is established.
Make a page announcement to clear personnel from the Auxiliary Building prior to initiating Cold Leg Recirculation.
Initiate Continuous Actions page.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Since applicant was performing Attachment 1, RP personnel were NOT contacted before initiating cold leg recirculation. This is acceptable.
Standard: Applicant notifies RP, makes a page announcement, and initiates the Continuous Actions page.
Comment:
JPM 30. 5. Check RWST level - GREATER THAN 8%
Standard: Applicant checks that RWST level is greater than 8% by observing the QMCB indicators or the IPC.
Comment:
JPM 31. 6. Check Attachment 1 - COMPLETE Standard: Applicant checks that Attachment 1 is complete.
Comment:
15
JPM 32. 7. Restart the ECCS pumps AND CS pumps in the following order as necessary:
- a. RHR
- b. SI
- c. CCP
Comment:
JPM 33. 8. Check RWST level - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 8%
Standard: Applicant checks that RWST level is NOT less than 8% by observing the QMCB indicators or the IPC and goes to the Step 8. RNO.
Comment:
JPM 34. 8. RNO When RWST level lowers to less than 8%, then return to Step 8 of this procedure.
Go to Step 15.
CUE: An Extra Operator will complete 19013-1.
Standard: Applicant reads Step 8 RNO and then goes to Step 15.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
16
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-19013-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ _______________
17
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA.
19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.
RWST level has lowered to 29%.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to transfer the ECCS pumps to cold leg recirculation using 19013-1, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.
NRC Job Performance Measure d Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-37008 Task
Title:
Isolate Accumulators During Post-LOCA Cooldown (Alternate Path)
JPM No: V-NRC-JP-19012-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
WE03EA1.01 RO 4.0 SRO 4.0 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA.
The crew is in 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, preparing to isolate the SI Accumulators.
System Operator has been dispatched and has closed the SI Accumulator isolation valve breakers.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to isolate the SI Accumulators beginning with Step 31 of 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
1
Task Standard: Applicant uses 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, to isolate SI Accumulators #1, #2, and #3 by closing their isolation valves.
SI Accumulator #4 isolation valve, 1HV-8808D, will NOT close, so the applicant will vent Accumulator #4 to lower its pressure.
Required Materials: 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization (ver. 1.1), with steps prior to Step 31 signed off by the Exam Team.
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 7 minutes 2
SIMULATOR SETUP:
Reset to IC373 for ILT22 NRC Exam Simulator Setup from Scratch:
- 1. Reset to IC14
- 2. Close accumulator breakers using RFs SI1 through SI4
- 3. Override 1HS-8808D to OPEN
- 4. Insert malfunction RC05A at 50%
- 5. Verify SI is actuated
- 7. Stop RCPs
- 8. Reset SI
- 9. Reset CIA
- 10. Open 1HV-9378
- 11. Lower malfunction RC05A severity as required to restore subcooling greater than 22 F and pressurizer level greater than 5% [34% adverse]
- 12. Acknowledge / reset alarms
- 13. Freeze simulator Setup time: 15 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 31. Check if SI Accumulators should be isolated:
- a. RCS Subcooling - GREATER THAN 22 F [22 F ADVERSE]
Standard: Applicant determines that RCS subcooling is greater than 22 F by checking the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC).
Comment:
JPM 2. 31. Check if SI Accumulators should be isolated:
- b. Pressurizer level - GREATER THAN 5% [34% ADVERSE]
Standard: Applicant determines that pressurizer level is greater than 5% by checking the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC) or the QMCB meters. NOTE: Containment pressure is less than 3.8.psig, so adverse values are not required.
Comment:
JPM 3. 31. Check if SI Accumulators should be isolated:
- c. Dispatch an operator to close ACCUM ISO VLV MOV breakers NOTE TO EXAMINER: The initial conditions state the breakers are closed.
The applicant may also check the valve handswitch lights are lit.
Standard: Applicant determines from the Initial Conditions that the Accumulator Isolation valve breakers are closed.
Comment:
4
JPM 4. 31. Check if SI Accumulators should be isolated:
- d. Reset SI if necessary NOTE TO EXAMINER: SI will have been reset at this point. Applicant may check that the SI ACTUATED light on the BPLB is NOT lit or that the SI indicator at the top of the IPC screen is NOT lit.
Standard: Applicant determines that SI is reset by checking the IPC or QMCB indications.
Comment:
Begin Alternate Path
- JPM 5. 31. Check if SI Accumulators should be isolated:
1HV-8808A 1HV-8808B 1HV-8808C 1HV-8808D NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-8808D is failed and will NOT close. The valve positions can also be determined using the IPC.
Standard: Applicant closes Accumulator Isolation valves 1HV-8808A, 1HV-8808B, and 1HV-8808C by placing 1HS-8808A, 1HS-8808B, and 1HS-8808C to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF) and goes to the Step 31.e. RNO. 1HV-8808D is failed open and will NOT close (green light OFF, red light ON). NOTE:
Step is critical because it isolates the Accumulator contents, including nitrogen, from the RCS.
Comment:
5
JPM 6. 31.e. RNO. Vent any non-isolable Accumulators:
(1) Verify N2 supply valve 1HV-8880 is closed.
Standard: Applicant verifies that 1HV-8880 is closed by checking 1HS-8880 or the IPC (green light ON, red light OFF).
Comment:
- JPM 7. 31.e. RNO. Vent any non-isolable Accumulators:
(2) Open ACCUM N2 SUPPLY/VENT VLVs:
ACCUM #4 1HV-8875D 1HV-8875H NOTE TO EXAMINER: Accumulator #4 is the non-isolable Accumulator.
1HV-8875D and 1HV-8875H are in parallel.
Standard: Applicant opens Accumulator Nitrogen Vent valves 1HV-8875D and 1HV-8875H (opening either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-8875D and 1HS-8875H to OPEN (green light OFF, red light ON). NOTE: Step is critical because it allows Accumulator #4 to be vented in order to prevent the Accumulator contents, including nitrogen, from injecting into the RCS.
Comment:
6
- JPM 8 31.e. RNO. Vent any non-isolable Accumulators:
(3) Open common vent valve 1HV-943A or 1HV-943B.
If an Accumulator can NOT be isolated or vented, then consult the TSC to determine contingency actions.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-943A and 1HV-943B are opened using controllers 1HC-943A and 1HC-943B, which are on the vertical QMCB panel. Accumulator pressure may be checked on the vertical QMCB panel or on the IPC.
CUE: If applicant is waiting for Accumulator to fully depressurize, An Extra Operator will monitor Accumulator pressure during venting.
Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-943A or 1HV-943B to vent Accumulator #4 by depressing the UP arrow on 1HC-943A or 1HC-943B manual controller.
NOTE: Step is critical because it allows Accumulator #1 to be vented in order to prevent the Accumulator contents from injecting into the RCS.
Comment:
7
JPM 9. 31. Check if SI Accumulators should be isolated:
- f. Open ACCUM ISO VLV MOV breakers NOTE TO EXAMINER: This step can be performed with the Accumulator venting in progress.
CUE: A System Operator will be dispatched to open the Accumulator Isolation valve breakers.
Standard: Applicant dispatches System Operator to open the Accumulator Isolation valve breakers.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
8
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-19012-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ _______________
9
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA.
The crew is in 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, preparing to isolate the SI Accumulators.
System Operator has been dispatched and has closed the SI Accumulator isolation valve breakers.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to isolate the SI Accumulators beginning with Step 31 of 19012-1, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
NRC Job Performance Measure e Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-29008 Task
Title:
Place Containment Hydrogen Monitors in Service (Alternate Path)
JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13130-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
028A4.03 RO 3.1 SRO 3.3 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA.
19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to place the Train A and Train B Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service using 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control. The Containment Hydrogen Monitors have been in standby for 45 days.
1
Task Standard: Applicant places Containment Hydrogen Monitor Train A in service using 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control. The applicant then places Containment Hydrogen Monitor B in service, but the Common Failure light illuminates, so the applicant is required to return Containment Hydrogen Monitor B to Standby.
Required Materials: 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control (ver. 21.0)
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 10 minutes 2
SIMULATOR SETUP:
Reset to IC374 for ILT22 NRC Exam NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Annunciators can be silenced for this JPM.
Simulator Setup from Scratch:
- 1. Reset to IC14
- 2. Insert malfunction RC05C at 100% (hot leg break)
- 3. Stop RCPs
- 6. Energize stub buses and establish instrument air to containment
- 7. Override Lamp PCP-LO_H2B_MON_COM_A_COMMON ALARM 2 A530P26-A11 to ON set for Trigger 1 (Hydrogen Monitor B Common Failure amber light ON)
- 8. Allow conditions to stabilize
- 9. Acknowledge / reset alarms
- 10. Freeze simulator Setup time: 10 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Annunciators will be silenced during this JPM. No alarm will be caused by the applicants actions.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 4.2.1 Containment Hydrogen Monitor A 1-1513-P5-HMA Operation (Hydrogen Measurement)
NOTE The Hydrogen Monitors require a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> warm-up period in STANDBY before accurate readings may be obtained.
CAUTION The Hydrogen Monitor Isolation Valves must remain closed except during Hydrogen Monitor operation while in Modes 5 or 6 or during post-accident conditions to ensure containment integrity is maintained.
4.2.1.1 If the following conditions exist, then notify maintenance to implement 28834-1, to provide power to Containment Isolation Valves 1HV-2791B and 1HV-2793B:
- a. A post-accident condition (LOCA) exists AND
- b. 125 VDC Bus 1BD11 is NOT available AND
- c. Containment Hydrogen Concentration is required.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may look at 1HV-2791B and 1HV-2793B handswitch lights or electrical board indications for verification that 1BD11 DC power is available.
Standard: Applicant determines that 125 VDC Bus 1BD11 power is available and that maintenance assistance is NOT required.
Comment:
4
- JPM 2. 4.2.1.2 Open the H2 MONITOR A SPLY ISO IRC:
- a. 1HV-2792A
Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-2792A and 1HV-2792B (opening either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-2792A and 1HS-2792B to OPEN (red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because it opens the Hydrogen Monitor supply path from containment.
Comment:
Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-2791B by placing 1HS-2791B to OPEN (red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because it opens the Hydrogen Monitor supply path (single valve outside containment in series with 1HV-2792A and 1HV-2792B).
Comment:
Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-2793B by placing 1HS-2793B to OPEN (red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because it opens the Hydrogen Monitor return path to containment (single valve outside containment in series with a check valve).
Comment:
5
- JPM 5. 4.2.1.5 Place Mode Switch 1HS-22900 in ANALYZE.
Standard: Applicant places Switch 1HS-22900 in ANALYZE (switch turned clockwise).
NOTE: Step is critical in order for the Hydrogen Monitor to analyze the hydrogen concentration.
Comment:
JPM 6. 4.2.1.6 Verify Function Selector Switch 1HS-22904 in Sample position.
Standard: Applicant checks that Function Selector Switch 1HS-22904 is in the Sample position (switch pointing upper-left towards SAMPLE lamp).
Comment:
- JPM 7. 4.2.1.7 Momentarily depress Remote Control Selector Pushbutton 1HS-22944 and verify Sample Light LIT.
Standard: Applicant momentarily depresses Remote Control Selector Pushbutton 1HS-22944 and verifies Sample Light lit (red light ON). NOTE: Step is critical in order for the Hydrogen Monitor to begin sample analysis.
Comment:
JPM 8. 4.2.1.8 If the COMMON FAILURE light is lit, perform the following:
Standard: Applicant determines that the COMMON FAILURE light is NOT lit.
Comment:
6
JPM 9.
4.2.1.9 Note containment hydrogen concentration as indicated by CONTAIN H2 MONITOR TRN A, 1AI-12979, on QMCB when indications stabilize.
CUE: An Extra Operator will monitor the Train A hydrogen concentration on the QMCB.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Actions for placing Containment Hydrogen Monitor B in service begin on the next page of the JPM.
Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE and initiates hydrogen concentration monitoring.
Comment:
7
JPM 10. 4.2.2 Containment Hydrogen Monitor B 1-1513-P5-HMB Operation (Hydrogen Measurement)
NOTE The Hydrogen Monitors require a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> warm-up period in STANDBY before accurate readings may be obtained.
CAUTION The Hydrogen Monitor Isolation Valves must remain closed except during Hydrogen Monitor operation while in Modes 5 or 6 or during post-accident conditions to ensure containment integrity is maintained.
4.2.2.1 If the following conditions exist, then notify maintenance to implement 28834-1, to provide power to Containment Isolation Valves 1HV-2791A and 1HV-2793A:
- a. A post-accident condition (LOCA) exists AND
- b. 125 VDC Bus 1AD11 is NOT available AND
- c. Containment Hydrogen Concentration is required.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may look at 1HV-2791A and 1HV-2793A handswitch lights or electrical board indications for verification that 1AD11 DC power is available.
Standard: Applicant determines that 125 VDC Bus 1AD11 power is available and that maintenance assistance is NOT required.
Comment:
8
- JPM 11. 4.2.2.2 Open the Hydrogen Monitor Supply Isolations Inside Reactor Containment:
- c. 1HV-2790A
Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-2790A and 1HV-2790B (opening either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-2790A and 1HS-2790B to OPEN (red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because it opens the Hydrogen Monitor supply path from containment.
Comment:
Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-2791A by placing 1HS-2791A to OPEN (red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because it opens the Hydrogen Monitor supply path (single valve outside containment in series with 1HV-2790A and 1HV-2790B).
Comment:
Standard: Applicant opens 1HV-2793A by placing 1HS-2793A to OPEN (red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because it opens the Hydrogen Monitor return path to containment (single valve outside containment in series with a check valve).
Comment:
9
- JPM 14. 4.2.2.5 Place Mode Switch 1HS-22901 in ANALYZE.
Standard: Applicant places Switch 1HS-22901 in ANALYZE (switch turned clockwise).
NOTE: Step is critical in order for the Hydrogen Monitor to analyze the hydrogen concentration.
Comment:
JPM 15. 4.2.2.6 Verify Function Selector Switch 1HS-22905 in Sample position.
Standard: Applicant checks that Function Selector Switch 1HS-22905 is in the Sample position (switch pointing upper-left towards SAMPLE lamp).
Comment:
Begin Alternate Path NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Trigger 1 when 1HS-22945 is depressed.
- JPM 16. 4.2.2.7 Momentarily depress Remote Control Selector Pushbutton 1HS-22945 and verify Sample Light LIT.
Standard: Applicant momentarily depresses Remote Control Selector Pushbutton 1HS-22945 and verifies Sample Light lit (red light ON). NOTE: Step is critical in order for the Hydrogen Monitor to begin sample analysis.
Comment:
10
JPM 17. 4.2.2.8 If the COMMON FAILURE light is lit, perform the following:
- a. Momentarily depress the remote reset pushbutton 1HS-87024B (QPCP).
Standard: Applicant momentarily depresses the remote reset pushbutton, 1HS-87024B.
NOTE: The COMMON FAILURE light will remain ON.
Comment:
- JPM 18. 4.2.2.8 If the COMMON FAILURE light is lit, perform the following:
- b. If the COMMON FAILURE light does NOT reset, (1) Record the status of indicator lights.
(2) If the monitor is in ANALYZE, place 1HS-22901 (QPCP) to STANDBY.
(3) Notify TSC of status indication and that the monitor is returned to standby until a team can be dispatched to local panel.
CUE: TSC is notified and will dispatch a team to the local panel.
Standard: Applicant notes the status of the indicator lights, contacts the TSC, and returns 1HS-22901 to STANDBY (switch turned counterclockwise one click). NOTE:
Step is critical in order to prevent potentially erroneous hydrogen concentration indications and to protect the Hydrogen Monitor from additional failure.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
11
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13130-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ _______________
12
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA.
19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to place the Train A and Train B Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service using 13130-1, Post-Accident Hydrogen Control. The Containment Hydrogen Monitors have been in standby for 45 days.
NRC Job Performance Measure f Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-11007 Task
Title:
Discontinue Parallel Operation by Removing DG1A from Bus 1AA02 (Alternate Path)
JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13427-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
064A2.02 RO 2.7 SRO 2.9 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: With Chief Examiner approval, the applicants may pre-brief prior to starting the JPM.
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
DG1A was Slow Started and paralleled with RAT 1A supplying 1AA02 for a post-maintenance test.
The post-maintenance test is complete with satisfactory results.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to discontinue parallel operation by removing DG1A from bus 1AA02 by performing Section 4.2.5 of 13427A-1, 4160 VAC Bus 1AA02 1E Electrical Distribution System.
1
Task Standard: Applicant begins reducing DG1A load using 13427A-1, 4160 VAC Bus 1AA02 1E Electrical Distribution System. During the load reduction, a DG1A underfrequency condition will occur, so the applicant will open the DG1A output breaker and then stop DG1A.
Required Materials: 13427A-1, 4160 VAC Bus 1AA02 1E Electrical Distribution System (ver. 9.1) 17035-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB35 on EAB Panel (ver. 36.2)
Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 8 minutes 2
SIMULATOR SETUP:
Reset to IC375 for ILT22 NRC Exam Simulator Setup from Scratch:
- 1. Reset to IC14
- 2. Open normal incoming breaker to 1AA02 using 1HS-1AA0205
- 3. After DG1A ties to 1AA02, stop the AFW pumps
- 4. Stop CCP A
- 5. Stop ACCW pump #2
- 6. Shut 1HV-5106
- 7. Reset DG1A emergency start using RF DG07A
- 8. Parallel DG1A with RAT 1A using 13427A-1, Section 4.2.2
- 9. Lower DG1A load to approximately 4000 kW using 13427A-1, Section 4.2.5
- 10. Raise DG1A kVARs to at least 2000 kVAR (half of kW load)
- 11. Set ALB35-D06 to ON with a 15 second delay on Trigger 1
- 12. Override meter EAB-FMDG1A (DG1A frequency) from 50% to 42% over 15 seconds on Trigger 1
- 13. Override meter EAB-FM1EA (1AA02 frequency) from 50% to 42% over 15 seconds on Trigger 1
- 14. Override meter B-S140126 MAIN GEN FREQ METER (grid frequency) from 50% to 42%
over 15 seconds on Trigger 1
- 15. Acknowledge / reset alarms
- 16. Freeze simulator Setup time: 15 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 4.2.5 Discontinue Parallel Operation by Removing the DG1A from Bus 1AA02 CUE: If requested, An Extra Operator is standing by to shutdown DG1A using 13145A-1.
Standard: Applicant reviews NOTES and CAUTION.
Comment:
4
- JPM 2. 4.2.5.1 If Load is greater than 3000 kW:
- a. Lower load to 3000 kW in increments up to 1000 kW and 500 kVAR in time increments of 5 minutes using DSL GEN 1A LOADING SET PT CONTROL, 1SE-4915.
- b. Concurrently lower kVAR load to maintain kVAR loading positive (Out) and NO more than half the kW load using DG1A VOLTAGE CONTROL pushbuttons.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: DG1A is loaded to 4000 kW and 2000 kVAR when the JPM begins. If applicant does NOT lower kVARs, then kVARs will exceed half of the kW load, which is NOT allowed.
Standard: Applicant lowers DG1A load to 3000 kW using 1SE-4915 and concurrently lowers kVAR load using the DG1A VOLTAGE CONTROL pushbuttons to maintain kVAR loading positive (Out) and less than or equal to half the kW load. NOTE: Step is critical because the kVAR loading on the DG shall be maintained positive [Lagging/Out] and less than half of the kW load within the Vogtle Administrative Limit in Figure 1.
Comment:
NOTE TO BOOTH OPERATOR: When DG1A load is approximately 3000 kW, insert Trigger 1.
Begin Alternate Path JPM 3. Acknowledge incoming alarm and enter Annunciator Response Procedure.
ALB35-D06 DG1A GEN UNDER FREQ is received.
Standard: Applicant acknowledges incoming alarm and enters 17035-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB35 on EAB Panel, for window ALB35-D06.
Comment:
5
JPM 4. 17035-1, Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB35 on EAB Panel 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE Standard: Applicant reviews Section 1.0 and determines that DG1A frequency is below the alarm setpoint of 59.5 Hz by checking DG1A Frequency Meter or 1AA02 Frequency Meter on the QEAB.
Comment:
6
JPM 5. 2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NOTE TO EXAMINER: At this point, the applicant may open 1AA02-19, DG1A Output, by placing 1HS-1AA0219 to TRIP because an automatic action failed to occur as expected. If done, the action will meet the critical step required by JPM Step 7 that follows.
Standard: Applicant checks that 1AA02-19, DG1A Output, did NOT automatically trip.
Comment:
JPM 6. 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTION NONE Standard: Applicant checks that no initial operator action is required.
Comment:
7
- JPM 7. 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 1. Diesel Generator in Parallel Operation:
- a. Check bus frequency. If less than or equal to 59.5 Hz, ensure Diesel Generator Breaker, 1AA02-19, has tripped.
Standard: Applicant checks the DG1A Frequency Meter or the 1AA02 Frequency Meter on the QEAB and determines that frequency is less than 59.5 Hz. The applicant then opens 1AA02-19, DG1A Output, by placing 1HS-1AA0219 to TRIP (this may have been done earlier during JPM Step 5). NOTE: The step is critical to protect DG1A from exceeding its administrative operating limits and to prevent potential motoring of DG1A if its frequency is below the grid frequency.
Comment:
- JPM 8. 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 1. Diesel Generator in Parallel Operation:
- b. Stop Diesel Generator.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Performing a Normal Stop of DG1A is preferred.
However, an applicant may also stop DG1A by performing an Emergency Stop if there are concerns about an automatic re-start occurring.
Standard: Applicant stops DG1A by depressing 1HS-4571B, DG1A Stop, or by simultaneously depressing 1HS-4567B and 1HS-4567C, DG1A Emergency Stop, on the QEAB.
Comment:
8
JPM 9. 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 2. Diesel Generator in Isolated Operation:
- a. Check DG1A frequency on QEAB and adjust frequency to 60 Hz with SPEED CONTROL Switch, 1HS-4518B, on QEAB if required.
- b. Verify load does NOT exceed 7000 kW and remove non-essential loads if necessary.
Standard: Applicant determines this Step is NOT applicable.
Comment:
JPM 10. 5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE Standard: Applicant determines this Step is NOT applicable.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
9
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13427-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ______________
10
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
DG1A was Slow Started and paralleled with RAT 1A supplying 1AA02 for a post-maintenance test.
The post-maintenance test is complete with satisfactory results.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to discontinue parallel operation by removing DG1A from bus 1AA02 by performing Section 4.2.5 of 13427A-1, 4160 VAC Bus 1AA02 1E Electrical Distribution System.
NRC Job Performance Measure g Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-60047 Task
Title:
Perform Control Room Actions Prior to Evacuation JPM No: V-NRC-JP-18038-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
068AA1.23 RO 4.3 SRO 4.4 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: There is a fire in the Control Room.
The fire is causing potential equipment degradation.
Personnel safety is in jeopardy.
The Shift Supervisor orders a Control Room evacuation.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to perform the actions of 18038-1, Operation From Remote Shut Down Panels, beginning at Step 1.
Task Standard: Applicant performs all actions of Steps 1 - 3 of 18038-1, Operation From Remote Shut Down Panels, to include tripping the reactor, shifting suction of the CCPs to the RWST, tripping the RCPs, tripping the MFPs, and isolating main steam and main feedwater prior to evacuating the Control Room.
Required Materials: 18038-1, Operation From Remote Shut Down Panels (ver. 35.1)
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 5 minutes
SIMULATOR SETUP:
Reset to IC376 for ILT22 NRC Exam Simulator Setup from Scratch:
Reset to IC14 Set up time: 2 minutes
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
- JPM 1.
- 1. Trip the reactor.
Standard: Applicant reads NOTE and trips the reactor by placing 1HS-40002 or 1HS-40007, Reactor Trip, on the QMCB to TRIP. NOTE: Step is critical in order to place the reactor in a safe condition.
Comment:
JPM 2. 2. Check the following:
- a. Control Room fire in progress.
Standard: Applicant continues to Step 3 due to the Control Room fire in progress.
Comment:
- JPM 3. 3. Perform the following:
- a. Shift CCP suction to RWST:
(1) Open RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION valves:
1LV-112D 1LV-112E NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1LV-112D and 1LV-112E are in parallel.
Standard: Applicant opens 1LV-112D and 1LV-112E (opening either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-112D and 1HS-112E to OPEN (red light ON, green light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because the VCT automatic swap-over to the RWST will NOT occur with components at the Shut Down Panels in LOCAL.
Comment:
- JPM 4. 3. Perform the following:
- a. Shift CCP suction to RWST:
(2) Close VCT OUTLET ISOLATION valves:
1LV-112B 1LV-112C NOTE TO EXAMINER: Valves are in series, so closing either valve meets the critical step.
Standard: Applicant closes 1LV-112B and 1LV-112C (closing either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-112B and 1HS-112C to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical because the VCT automatic swap-over to the RWST will NOT occur with components at the Shut Down Panels in LOCAL.
Comment:
- JPM 5. 3. Perform the following:
- b. Close Pressurizer PORV Block Valves:
1HV-8000A 1HV-8000B Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-8000A and 1HV-8000B by placing 1HS-8000A and 1HS-8000B to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical to maintain the RCS isolated if a PORV fails open due to the fire.
Comment:
- JPM 6. 3. Perform the following:
- c. Stop all RCPs.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant is required to first open the RCP non-1E breakers (1HS-495B, 1HS-496B, 1HS-497B, and 1HS-498B). The applicant may also place 1HS-495A, 1HS-496A, 1HS-497A, and 1HS-498A to STOP. These are 1E breakers in series with the non-1E breakers, so opening these breakers is NOT required to meet the critical step.
Standard: Applicant stops all RCPs by placing 1HS-495B (RCP #1), 1HS-496B (RCP
- 2), 1HS-497B (RCP #3), and 1HS-498B (RCP #4) to STOP (green lights ON, red lights OFF). NOTE: Step is critical to maintain RCS pressure control (pressurizer spray valves can fail open in a fire).
Comment:
- JPM 7. 3. Perform the following:
- d. Trip MFPs.
Standard: Applicant trips both MFPs by simultaneously depressing pushbuttons 1HS-3169A and 1HS-3169B (MFP A) and by simultaneously depressing pushbuttons 1HS-3170A and 1HS-3170B (MFP B). NOTE: Step is critical in order to limit the RCS cooldown and maintain shutdown margin following the reactor trip.
Comment:
JPM 8. 3. Perform the following:
- e. Isolate main feedwater:
MFIVs BFIVs Standard: Applicant checks MFIVs and BFIVs, 1HV-5227, 1HV-5228, 1HV-5229, 1HV-5230, 1HV-15196, 1HV-15197, 1HV-15198, and 1HV-15199, are closed (green lights ON, red lights OFF).
Comment:
- JPM 9. 3. Perform the following:
- f. Verify SG Blowdown Isolation Valves - CLOSED WITH HANDSWITCHES IN CLOSE POSITION.
Standard: Applicant places 1HS-7603A, 1HS-7603B, 1HS-7603C, and 1HS-7603D to CLOSE (green lights ON, red lights OFF). NOTE: Step is critical in order to limit the RCS cooldown (valves will automatically re-open if AFW actuation signal clears while in AUTO) and to maintain shutdown margin following the reactor trip.
Comment:
- JPM 10. 3. Perform the following:
- g. Isolate main steam:
MSIVs BSIVs NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant should actuate Steam Line Isolation (SLI), but may close the MSIVs and BSIVs individually to accomplish the step.
Standard: Applicant closes MSIVs and BSIVs by taking 1HS-3007A or 1HS 3007B, SLI, to ACTUATE (MSIV and BSIV green lights ON, red lights OFF). NOTE: Step is critical in order to limit the RCS cooldown and maintain shutdown margin following the reactor trip.
Comment:
JPM 11. 4. If personnel safety is NOT in jeopardy, then align AFW system:
CUE: If personnel safety is questioned, Refer to the Initial Conditions.
Standard: Applicant determines personnel safety is in jeopardy and goes to the Step 4 RNO.
Comments:
JPM 12. 4. RNO. Go to Step 6.
Standard: Applicant continues to Step 6.
Comments:
JPM 13. 6. Isolate shutdown sound powered phone system from the Control Room (outside east entrance to Unit 1 Control Room).
Cue: An Extra Operator will complete 18038-1.
Standard: Applicant notifies Shift Supervisor of status.
Comments:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-18038-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _________________
Initial Conditions: There is a fire in the Control Room.
The fire is causing potential equipment degradation.
Personnel safety is in jeopardy.
The Shift Supervisor orders a Control Room evacuation.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to perform the actions of 18038-1, Operation From Remote Shut Down Panels, beginning at Step 1.
NRC Job Performance Measure h Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-32007 Task
Title:
Respond to Containment High Radiation JPM No: V-NRC-JP-19253-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
WE16EA1.01 RO 3.1 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA.
19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.
CSFSTs indicate a YELLOW path on Containment for high radiation level.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to perform 19253-1, Response to High Containment Radiation Level.
1
Task Standard: Applicant manually closes all required Containment Ventilation Isolation dampers and starts the Containment Pre-Access Filter Units per 19253-1, Response to High Containment Radiation Level, and 13125-1, Containment Purge System.
Required Materials: 19253-1, Response to High Containment Radiation Level (ver. 1.0) 13125-1, Containment Purge System (ver. 55.1)
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 12 minutes 2
SIMULATOR SETUP:
Reset to IC377 for ILT22 NRC Exam Simulator Setup from Scratch:
- 1. Reset to IC14 (100% MOL)
- 2. Insert malfunctions ES19A and ES19B (CVI auto actuate failure)
- 3. Override handswitches 1HS-40004, 1HS-40005, 1HS-40006, 1HS-40009, 1HS-40010, and 1HS-40011 to NORMAL
- 4. Insert RC04A with a Final Value of 100%
- 5. Trip the reactor and actuate SI
- 6. Reduce TDAFW pump to minimum speed
- 8. Insert RM06 for high radiation in containment
- 11. Acknowledge / Reset alarms and freeze simulator Setup time: 15 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
CVI MLB indication
-OR-Reference ATTACHMENT 1 as necessary NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may attempt to actuate CVI using CIA/CVI handswitch 1HS-40006 or 1HS-40009, but CVI will NOT actuate.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Applicant may align components in any order. The JPM steps are written in the Attachment 1 order (see Page 12 of JPM to grade using Attachment 1).
Standard: Applicant checks CVI MLB indication on the QMCB and determines that a CVI did NOT occur.
Comment:
- JPM 2. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-12975 CNMT AIR RAD MON SPLY ISO IRC 1HV-12976 CNMT AIR RAD MON SPLY ISO ORC NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-12975 and 1HV-12976 are in series.
Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-12975 and 1HV-12976 (closing either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-12975 and 1HS-12976 to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: The step is critical in order to isolate the containment ventilation penetrations.
Comment:
4
- JPM 3. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-12977 CNMT AIR RAD MON RTN ISO ORC 1HV-12978 CNMT AIR RAD MON RTN ISO IRC NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-12977 and 1HV-12978 are in series.
Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-12977 and 1HV-12978 (closing either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-12977 and 1HS-12978 to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: The step is critical in order to isolate the containment ventilation penetrations.
Comment:
JPM 4. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-2626A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MAIN 1HV-2627A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORC ISO VLV-MAIN NOTE TO EXAMINER: These dampers are de-energized closed when the unit is at power. Diverse indication is available on the MLBs or IPC.
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-2626A and 1HV-2627A are closed on 1HS-2626A and 1HS-2627A and determines they are de-energized closed (no handswitch light indication).
Comment:
5
JPM 5. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-2626B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MINI 1HV-2627B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORC ISO VLV-MINI NOTE TO EXAMINER: Containment Mini-Purge was NOT in service, so these dampers were closed.
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-2626B and 1HV-2627B closed on 1HS-2626B and 1HS-2627B (green light ON, red light OFF).
Comment:
JPM 6. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-2628A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MAIN 1HV-2629A CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORC ISO VLV-MAIN NOTE TO EXAMINER: These dampers are de-energized closed when the unit is at power. Diverse indication is available on the MLBs or IPC.
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-2628A and 1HV-2629A are closed on 1HS-2628A and 1HS-2629A and determines they are de-energized closed (no handswitch light indication).
Comment:
6
JPM 7. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-2628B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MINI 1HV-2629B CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORC ISO VLV-MINI NOTE TO EXAMINER: Containment Mini-Purge was NOT in service, so these dampers were closed.
Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-2628B and 1HV-2629B closed on 1HS-2628B and 1HS-2629B (green light ON, red light OFF).
Comment:
JPM 8. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-2624A CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV 1HV-2624B CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV Standard: Applicant checks 1HV-2624A and 1HV-2624B closed on 1HS-2624A and 1HS-2624B (green light ON, red light OFF).
Comment:
7
- JPM 9. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-12604 PIPING PEN RM OUTLET ISO DMPR 1HV-12607 PIPING PEN RM OUTLET ISO DMPR NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-12604 and 1HV-12607 are in series.
Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-12604 and 1HV-12607 (closing either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-12604 and 1HS-12607 to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: The step is critical in order to isolate the containment ventilation penetrations.
Comment:
- JPM 10. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-12605 PIPING PEN RM INLET ISO DMPR 1HV-12606 PIPING PEN RM INLET ISO DMPR NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-12605 and 1HV-12606 are in series.
Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-12605 and 1HV-12606 (closing either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-12605 and 1HS-12606 to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: The step is critical in order to isolate the containment ventilation penetrations.
Comment:
8
- JPM 11. 1. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED:
1HV-12596 RECYCLE HOLD-UP TANK ISO VENT VLV 1HV-12597 RECYCLE HOLD-UP TANK ISO VENT VLV NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1HV-12596 and 1HV-12597 are in series.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Attachment 1 is complete at this time.
Standard: Applicant closes 1HV-12596 and 1HV-12597 (closing either valve meets the critical step) by placing 1HS-12596 and 1HS-12597 to CLOSE (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: The step is critical in order to isolate the containment ventilation penetrations.
Comment:
JPM 12. 2. Place the Containment Atmosphere Filtration Systems - IN SERVICE
- a. Check Piping Penetration Filtration and Exhaust Units - BOTH RUNNING.
Standard: Applicant checks the Piping Penetration Filtration and Exhaust Units running on 1HS-2548 and 1HS-2549 (green lights OFF, red lights ON).
Comment:
JPM 13. 2. Place the Containment Atmosphere Filtration Systems - IN SERVICE
- b. Containment Pre-access Filter units in service by initiating 13125-1, Containment Purge System.
Standard: Applicant selects Section 4.2 of 13125-1 to place the Containment Pre-access Filter units in service.
Comment:
9
- JPM 14. 13125-1, Containment Purge System 4.2 System Operation 4.2.1 Pre-access Filter Unit Operation NOTE The Containment Coordinator should be notified prior to start if filters are to be started as part of outage activities.
4.2.1.1 As directed by SS, start one OR both Pre-access Filter Unit Fans:
1HS-2620 for Fan 1 (A30) 1HS-2621 for Fan 2 (C30)
Cue: When requested, The Shift Supervisor directs the start of both Pre-access Filter Unit Fans.
Standard: Applicant starts both Pre-access Filter Unit Fans by placing 1HS-2620 and 1HS-2621 to START (green lights OFF, red lights ON). NOTE: Step is critical to mitigate the event by reducing the activity levels in containment.
Comment:
JPM 15. 4.2.1.2 When containment airborne cleanup is no longer required, stop the Pre-access Filter Unit Fans:
1HS-2620 for Fan 1 (A30) 1HS-2621 for Fan 2 (C30)
Standard: No action is required (N/A).
Comment:
10
JPM 16. 19253-1, Response to High Containment Radiation Level (CONTINUED)
- 3. Notify TSC of Containment radiation level to obtain recommended action.
Cue: If requested, The Shift Supervisor will contact the TSC for recommended action.
Standard: Applicant ensures the TSC is notified.
Comment:
JPM 17. 4. Return to procedure and step in effect.
Standard: Applicant notifies the Shift Supervisor of procedure completion.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
11
Attachment 1 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION NOTE TO EXAMINER: Critical steps components are bolded.
PLANT VALVE COMPUTER (LOCATION) N/A POINT UNIT 1 UNIT 2 DESCRIPTION ZD9044 HV-12975 HV-12975 *CNMT AIR RAD MON SPLY ISO IRC OR (CNMT) (CNMT)
ZD9046 HV-12976 HV-12976 *CNMT AIR RAD MON SPLY ISO ORC (AB-B08) (AB-B131)
ZD9048 HV-12977 HV-12977 *CNMT AIR RAD MON RTN ISO ORC OR (AB-B08) (AB-B131)
ZD9050 HV-12978 HV-12978 *CNMT AIR RAD MON RTN ISO IRC (CNMT) (CNMT)
ZD9204 HV-2626A HV-2626A **CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MAIN (CNMT) (CNMT)
ZD9208 HV-2627A HV-2627A **CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORC ISO VLV-MAIN (EB-125) (EB-125)
ZD9206 HV-2626B HV-2626B **CTB NORM PURGE SPLY IRC ISO VLV-MINI (CNMT) (CNMT)
ZD9210 HV-2627B HV-2627B **CTB NORM PURGE SPLY ORC ISO VLV-MINI (EB-125) (EB-125)
ZD9212 HV-2628A HV-2628A **CTB NORM PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV-MAIN (CNMT) (CNMT)
ZD9216 HV-2629A HV-2629A **CTB NORM PURGE EXH ORC ISO VLV-MAIN (EB-117) (EB-116)
ZD9214 HV-2628B HV-2628B **CTB NORM PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV-MINI (CNMT) (CNMT)
ZD9218 HV-2629B HV-2629B **CTB MINI PURGE EXH ORC ISO VLV-MINI (EB-117) (EB-116)
ZD9236 HV-2624A HV-2624A **CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV (CNMT) (CNMT)
ZD9238 HV-2624B HV-2624B **CTB POST LOCA PURGE EXH IRC ISO VLV (CNMT) (CNMT)
ZD9583 HV-12604 HV-12604 **PIPING PEN RM OUTLET ISO DMPR OR (AB-209) (AB-220)
ZD9587OR HV-12605 HV-12605 **PIPING PEN RM INLET ISO DMPR (AB-209) (AB-220)
ZD9589 HV-12606 HV-12606 **PIPING PEN RM INLET ISO DMPR (AB-209) (AB-220)
ZD9585 HV-12607 HV-12607 **PIPING PEN RM OUTLET ISO DMPR (AB-209) (AB-220)
NONE*** HV-12596 HV-12596 **RECYCLE HOLD-UP TANK ISO VENT VLV OR (AB-C83 Above (AB-C49 Above Block Out To Tank) Block Out To Tank)
NONE*** HV-12597 HV-12597 **RECYCLE HOLD-UP TANK ISO VENT VLV (AB-C83 Above (AB-C49 Above Block Out To Tank) Block Out To Tank)
- HANDSWITCH ON QPCP
- HANDSWITCH ON QHVC
- USE QHVC INDICATION IF AVAILABLE OR LOCALLY VERIFY 12
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-19253-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: __________________________________________________________________
Response: _________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ____________
13
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor trip and SI occurred due to a LOCA.
19010-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, is in progress.
CSFSTs indicate a YELLOW path on Containment for high radiation level.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to perform 19253-1, Response to High Containment Radiation Level.
NRC Job Performance Measure i Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-20010 Task
Title:
Reset the TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve Following an Overspeed Trip JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13610-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
WE05EA1.01 RO 4.1 SRO 4.0 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
The recommended starting point for this JPM is adjacent to the main RP Control Point. The applicants can be sequestered in the TSC, OEC, or OSC Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor tripped due to a loss of feedwater.
TDAFW pump started, but tripped on overspeed due to a misaligned trip mechanism.
Maintenance has realigned the trip mechanism and the TDAFW pump is ready to be reset.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to reset the Unit 1 TDAFW pump Trip and Throttle valve using Section 4.4.7 of 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
1
Task Standard: Applicant resets the Unit 1 TDAFW pump Trip and Throttle valve by verifying the tappet is not bound, verifying the tappet is properly aligned, and by pushing the mechanical trip linkage until the trip lever latches per 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
Required Materials: 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System, pages 1 - 12 and 66 - 70 (ver.
51.3)
PPE, including ear plugs General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 10 minutes 2
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 4.4.7 Resetting of TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve Following an Overspeed Trip Actuation (Actual Overspeed or Surveillance / Maintenance Testing)
CAUTION If this reset of the Trip and Throttle valve is following an actual overspeed trip and the potential exists to initiate AFW flow to a hot, dry S/G, closing of the TDAFW discharge valves should be considered prior to reset of the Trip and Throttle valve.
4.4.7.1 If directed by Shift Supervisor, close the SG Isolation Valves from TDAFW.
CUE: If requested, All SG isolation valves from the TDAFW pump are closed.
Standard: Applicant reviews the CAUTION and contacts the Control Room to request the status of the SG Isolation Valves.
Comment:
JPM 2. 4.4.7.2 Verify motor actuator has driven the shaft to approximately 80% closed as indicated by T&T VALVE OPERATOR CLOSED green light lit on the local valve panel (PAFT).
CUE: Green light is ON and red light is OFF.
Standard: Applicant verifies that the T&T VALVE OPERATOR CLOSED green light is lit on the local valve panel (PAFT).
Comment:
3
- JPM 3.
NOTE In the following step, the trip linkage bar may have to be moved (Figures 3 and 4) 4.4.7.3 On the governor, lift and release tappet several times to ensure that there is no binding.
tappet Standard: Applicant lifts and releases the tappet several times while checking for binding. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the trip lever engages and then operates correctly when reset.
Comment:
4
JPM 4. 4.4.7.4 If binding is observed, contact the Shift Supervisor.
Standard: Applicant may N/A the step (no binding is observed).
Comment:
- JPM 5. 4.4.7.5 Verify that the flat part of the tappet nut is in contact with the head lever (See Figures 4 and 4a).
CUE: Indicate that the tappet nut is slightly above the head lever.
When applicant presses on the tappet, indicate that the flat part of the tappet nut is in contact with the head lever.
proper tappet nut alignment Standard: Applicant verifies that the flat part of the tappet nut is in contact with the head lever. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the trip lever engages and operates correctly when reset.
Comment:
5
- JPM 6. 4.4.7.6 Reset the mechanical linkage by pushing the trip linkage towards the Trip And Throttle Valve and observe trip lever moves up (see Figures 3 and 4).
CUE: If requested while pushing, Trip lever is latched.
Standard: Applicant resets the mechanical linkage by pushing the trip linkage towards 1PV-15129, TDAFW Trip and Throttle Valve, and observing that the trip lever moves up and latches. NOTE: Step is critical because it re-latches the trip linkage, which allows the valve to open.
Comment:
6
JPM 7. 4.4.7.7 Push the tappet down to ensure proper seating.
CUE: If requested, Tappet is as you see it.
Standard: Applicant verifies that the tappet is properly seated.
Comment:
JPM 8. 4.4.7.8 Verify mechanical overspeed trip indicator limit switch roller arm is properly positioned (Figure 4).
CUE: Limit switch roller arm is as you see it.
CUE: If the trip status light is checked on the PAFT, indicate that the light is NOT lit (NOT tripped).
limit switch roller arm Standard: Applicant verifies that the mechanical overspeed trip indicator limit switch roller arm is properly positioned.
Comment:
7
JPM 9. 4.4.7.9 Check AFW Actuation signal is present.
CUE: The UO will complete the rest of Section 4.4.7.
Standard: Applicant contacts the Control Room to check AFW Actuation signal status.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
8
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13610-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ _______________
9
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor tripped due to a loss of feedwater.
TDAFW pump started, but tripped on overspeed due to a misaligned trip mechanism.
Maintenance has realigned the trip mechanism and the TDAFW pump is ready to be reset.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to reset the Unit 1 TDAFW pump Trip and Throttle valve using Section 4.4.7 of 13610-1, Auxiliary Feedwater System.
NRC Job Performance Measure j Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-60012 Task
Title:
Startup 120 VAC 1E Vital Inverter Following Corrective Maintenance JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13431-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
057AA1.01 RO 3.7* SRO 3.7 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
The recommended starting point for this JPM is adjacent to the main RP Control Point. The applicants can be sequestered in the TSC, OEC, or OSC.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: With Chief Examiner approval, the applicants may pre-brief prior to starting the JPM.
1
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power.
Inverter 2BD1I2 tripped early in the shift.
18032-2, Loss of 120 VAC Instrument Power, is in progress.
Electrical Maintenance completed repairs and is ready to re-energize the inverter.
Battery 2BD1B is aligned to bus 2BD1.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to startup inverter 2BD1I2 by performing Section 4.1.2 of 13431-2, 120 VAC 1E Vital Instrument Distribution System.
All system Precautions and Limitations have been verified.
2
Task Standard: Applicant re-energizes inverter 2BD1I2 using 13431-2, 120 VAC 1E Vital Instrument Distribution System.
Required Materials: 13431-2, 120 VAC 1E Vital Instrument Distribution System, pages 1 - 28 (ver. 30.3)
Photographs of the inside of 2BY1B and 2BD12 may be used for breaker position cues General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 12 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. Section 4.1.2, 2AD1I1, 2AD1I11, 2BD1I2, 2BD1I12, 2CD1I3, or 2DD1I4 Inverter Startup 4.1.2.1 At the associated 125 VDC switchgear, verify closed the applicable Battery Breaker:
PANEL INVERTER BATT BKR 2AY1A 2AD1I1 2AD1-01 2AY2A 2AD1I11 2AD1-01 2BY1B 2BD1I2 2BD1-01 2BY2B 2BD1I12 2BD1-01 2CY1A 2CD1I3 2CD1-01 2DY1B 2DD1I4 2DD1-01 NOTE TO EXAMINER: The breaker is expected to be closed during the JPM, so cues should not be necessary. If the breaker is open, however, cue with the following indications in the Standard.
Standard: Applicant checks closed 2BD1-01 using available indications (on 2HS-2BD101 red light ON, green light OFF, red flag visible, or CLOSED flag visible on face of breaker).
Comment:
4
JPM 2. 4.1.2.2 At the associated 120 VAC distribution panel, verify open the Instrument Distribution Panel AC Breaker from the selected inverter:
PANEL INVERTER PANEL AC BKR 2AY1A 2AD1I1 2AY1A-02 2AY2A 2AD1I11 2AY2A-02 2BY1B 2BD1I2 2BY1B-02 2BY2B 2BD1I12 2BY2B-02 2CY1A 2CD1I3 2CY1A-02 2DY1B 2DD1I4 2DY1B-02 NOTE TO EXAMINER: This distribution panel is closed with a Unit Trip Hazard warning on the door. The applicant will NOT open the panel, so the use of a photograph or a verbal description of the breaker is allowed.
CUE: Indicate breaker switch is in the OFF position.
Standard: Applicant verifies breaker 2BY1B-02 is in the OFF position (open) on panel 2BY1B.
Comment:
JPM 3. 4.1.2.3 At the selected Inverter, verify open the following inverter breakers:
DC INPUT Breaker INVERTER OUTPUT Breaker CUE: Indicate breaker switches are in the OFF (down) position.
Standard: Applicant verifies the DC INPUT and INVERTER OUTPUT breakers are in the OFF position (down) at Inverter 2BD1I2.
Comment:
5
- JPM 4. 4.1.2.4 At the associated 125 VDC switchgear, close the Inverter DC Supply Breaker at the associated 125 VDC switchgear:
INVERTER DC SUPPLY DC BREAKER 2AD1I1 SWGR 2AD1 2AD1-10 2AD1I11 SWGR 2AD1 2AD1-04 2BD1I2 SWGR 2BD1 2BD1-10 2BD1I12 SWGR 2BD1 2BD1-04 2CD1I3 SWGR 2CD1 2CD1-09 2DD1I4 SWGR 2DD1 2DD1-09 CUE: If requested before breaker is closed, Green flag visible, red light OFF, green light ON.
CUE: If requested after breaker is closed, Red flag visible, red light ON, green light OFF.
Standard: Applicant closes 2BD1-10 by placing 2HS-2BD110 to CLOSE. NOTE: Step is critical to energize the inverter from the DC switchgear.
Comment:
6
- JPM 5.
4.1.2.5 At the selected Inverter, press and hold the Precharge Pushbutton, maintain depressed for at least five seconds AFTER the Precharge light illuminates, THEN release.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The LOW DC VOLTAGE and LOW AC OUTPUT VOLTAGE lights would NOT be lit. After the inverter is energized they provide alarm indication if the nominal DC and AC voltages are not within a prescribed tolerance.
CUE: Before depressing Pushbutton, Precharge light is NOT lit.
CUE: After Precharge Pushbutton is depressed, Precharge light is LIT.
Standard: Applicant reviews NOTES and depresses the Precharge Pushbutton for at least five seconds after the Precharge light is lit and then releases the Pushbutton. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the capacitor bank is adequately charged prior to closing the Inverter Input Breaker.
Comment:
7
- JPM 6. 4.1.2.6 Close the inverter DC INPUT Breaker (WITHIN 3 seconds AFTER releasing the Precharge Pushbutton).
Standard: Applicant closes the DC INPUT Breaker by placing the breaker switch in the ON position (up) within three seconds after releasing the Precharge Pushbutton at Inverter 2BD1I2. NOTE: Step is critical to energize 2BD1I2.
Comment:
JPM 7. 4.1.2.7 Check proper inverter operation by observing approximately 120 VAC on the AC OUTPUT Voltmeter and 60 Hz on the AC OUTPUT frequency meter.
CUE: When checked, indicate 120 VAC on the AC OUTPUT voltmeter and 60 Hz on the AC OUTPUT frequency meter.
Standard: Applicant checks for 120 VAC on the AC OUTPUT voltmeter and 60 Hz on the AC OUTPUT frequency meter.
Comment:
- JPM 8. 4.1.2.8 Close the INVERTER OUTPUT Breaker.
Standard: Applicant closes the INVERTER OUTPUT Breaker by placing the breaker switch in the ON position (up). NOTE: Step is critical in order to re-energize the Inverter loads.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
8
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13431-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: ____________________________ ________________
9
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power.
Inverter 2BD1I2 tripped early in the shift.
18032-2, Loss of 120 VAC Instrument Power, is in progress.
Electrical Maintenance completed repairs and is ready to re-energize the inverter.
Battery 2BD1B is aligned to bus 2BD1.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to startup inverter 2BD1I2 by performing Section 4.1.2 of 13431-2, 120 VAC 1E Vital Instrument Distribution System.
All system Precautions and Limitations have been verified.
NRC Job Performance Measure k Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-25013 Task
Title:
Respond to a Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level JPM No: V-NRC-JP-18030-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
036AA1.04 RO 3.1 SRO 3.7 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
NOTE: The recommended starting point for this JPM is adjacent to the main RP Control Point.
The applicants may be sequestered in the TSC, OEC, or OSC.
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 SFP level is lowering. The crew is performing the actions of 18030-C, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling.
Makeup to the SFP has been initiated, but SFP level continues to lower.
SFP level is currently 214 feet, 4 inches, and slowly lowering.
Train A SFP Cooling System is in service.
1-1213-U6-086, Transfer Canal Gate Valve, is closed and the SFPs are NOT cross-tied.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to shut down and isolate the Unit 1, Train A SFP Cooling System by performing Steps 10 through 14 of 18030-C, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling.
1
Task Standard: The applicant shuts down the Unit 1, Train A SFP Cooling System by stopping the Unit 1, Train A SFP cooling pump and the Unit 1 SFP skimmer pump, and closing valves 1-1213-U6-001, 1-1213-U6-014, and 1-1213-U4-021 using 18030-C, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling.
Required Materials: 18030-C, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling (ver. 24.1)
RWP and proper dosimetry for an RCA entry Hearing protection General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 16 minutes 2
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
- JPM 1. 10. Stop SFP cooling pump(s).
UNIT 1 (At door to AB-A53 and FHB-A06)
UNIT 2 (At door to AB-A91 and FHB-A05)
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The Unit 1, Train A SFP cooling pump handswitch is at the door to AB-A53.
CUE: If requested prior to operating handswitch, 1HS-10627 red light is ON, and green light is OFF.
CUE: After handswitch is taken to STOP, 1HS-10627 green light is ON, and red light is OFF.
Standard: Applicant stops the Unit 1, Train A SFP cooling pump by placing 1HS-10627 to STOP (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical to protect the SFP cooling pump from a loss of suction (suction valve will be closed in a later step).
Comment:
3
- JPM 2. 11. Stop SFP skimmer pump(s).
UNIT 1 (AB-A53)
UNIT 2 (AB-A91)
CUE: If requested prior to depressing button, 1HS-10630 red light is ON, and green light is OFF.
CUE: When red STOP pushbutton is depressed, 1HS-10630 green light is ON, and red light is OFF.
Standard: Applicant stops the Unit 1 SFP skimmer pump by depressing the 1HS-10630 red STOP pushbutton (green light ON, red light OFF). NOTE: Step is critical to protect the SFP skimmer pump from a loss of suction (suction valve will be closed in a later step).
Comment:
- JPM 3. 12. Close SFP cooling pump suction valve(s).
UNIT 1 1213-U6-001 (FHB-A06) 1213-U6-003 (FHB-A07)
UNIT 2 1213-U6-001 (FHB-A05) 1213-U6-003 (FHB-A04)
NOTE TO EXAMINER: 1-1213-U6-003 is the Unit 1, Train B SFP cooling pump suction valve. The applicant may want to check that it is closed, which is acceptable (Train B is NOT in service).
Standard: Applicant locates and closes 1-1213-U6-001 (handwheel turned fully clockwise). NOTE: Step is critical to ensure that a potential SFP drain path through the pump is isolated.
Comment:
4
- JPM 4. 13. Close SFP skimmer pump(s) suction isolation.
UNIT 1 1213-U6-014 (AB-A53)
UNIT 2 1213-U6-014 (AB-A91)
Standard: Applicant locates and closes 1-1213-U6-014 (handwheel turned fully clockwise). NOTE: Step is critical to ensure that a potential SFP drain path through the pump is isolated.
Comment:
UNIT 1 1213-U4-021 (AB-D102 beside RX-0016 in hall)
UNIT 2 1213-U4-021 (AB-D111)
Standard: Applicant locates and closes 1-1213-U4-021 (handwheel turned fully clockwise). NOTE: Step is critical to ensure that a potential SFP drain path through the pump is isolated.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
5
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-18030-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ _____________
6
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 SFP level is lowering. The crew is performing the actions of 18030-C, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling.
Makeup to the SFP has been initiated, but SFP level continues to lower.
SFP level is currently 214 feet, 4 inches, and slowly lowering.
Train A SFP Cooling System is in service.
1-1213-U6-086, Transfer Canal Gate Valve, is closed and the SFPs are NOT cross-tied.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to shut down and isolate the Unit 1, Train A SFP Cooling System by performing Steps 10 through 14 of 18030-C, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling.
NRC RO Admin Job Performance Measure a Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-27003 Task
Title:
Determine Available Shutdown Margin Following a Failed Control Rod Operability Test JPM No: V-NRC-JP-14005-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
G2.1.43 RO 4.1 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power.
During control rod operability testing, Control Bank D rods D4 and M4 did NOT move when demanded.
Tech Spec LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, is entered.
TR 13.1.1, Shutdown Margin, requires shutdown margin to be greater than or equal to 1.30% k/k in Modes 1 and 2.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to use 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations, and the provided references to perform the following:
- 1) Calculate the available Shutdown Margin for the current plant conditions.
- 2) Based on your calculated Shutdown Margin, determine if the 14005-2 required Acceptance Criteria are met.
1
Current conditions:
Unit 2 power history: 100% reactor power for the last 30 days Cycle burn-up: 8,500 MWD/MTU Control Bank D rods D4 and M4 did NOT move when demanded and are considered untrippable RCS boron concentration: 1450 ppm Power level: 100%
Tavg: 584.3 F ARO position: 228 steps Axial Offset Reactivity Correction: 0 pcm Rod Bank Demand Positions: DRPI Indication Positions:
Control Bank A - 228 Control Bank A - 228 Control Bank B - 228 Control Bank B - 228 Control Bank C - 228 Control Bank C - 228 Control Bank D - 220 Control Bank D - 222 (Rod D4 - 228)
(Rod M4 - 228)
Shutdown Bank A - 228 Shutdown Bank A - 228 Shutdown Bank B - 228 Shutdown Bank B - 228 Shutdown Bank C - 228 Shutdown Bank C - 228 Shutdown Bank D - 228 Shutdown Bank D - 228 Shutdown Bank E - 228 Shutdown Bank E - 228 2
Task Standard: The applicant calculates an available Shutdown Margin of 0.409 - 0.41%
k/k for the given conditions using 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations. The applicant then determines that the 14005-2 required Acceptance Criteria are NOT met because the available Shutdown Margin is less than the limit specified in the COLR per TR 13.1.1 (1.30%
k/k).
Required Materials: 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations (ver. 22.0)
Current conditions sheet Unit 2 PTDB, Tab 1 (ver. 33.0)
Calculator General
References:
Unit 2 COLR (ver. 1.0, June 2017)
Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 16 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 4.1.1 If Shutdown Margin is to be calculated in Mode 1 or 2, complete Data Sheet 1. Data Sheet 1 accounts for: (a) one or more untrippable rods, (b) one or more individual rods not aligned within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position below the insertion limit for their respective bank(s) and (c) one or more shutdown or control banks below insertion limits specified in the COLR.
Standard: Applicant determines Data Sheet 1 is to be used to calculate Shutdown Margin.
Comment:
JPM 2. Data Sheet 1: Shutdown Margin in Modes 1 and 2 Section A: Record current conditions Standard: Applicant records the current conditions on Data Sheet 1, Section A, of 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations.
Comment:
- JPM 3. Data Sheet 1: Shutdown Margin in Modes 1 and 2 Section B: Calculate available Shutdown Margin Standard: Applicant calculates an available Shutdown Margin of 0.409 - 0.41% k/k using Data Sheet 1 of 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations.
NOTE: Step is critical in order to determine if the available Shutdown Margin meets the TRM required minimum.
Comment:
4
- JPM 4. Determine if the 14005-2 required Acceptance Criteria are met.
Standard: Applicant determines that the 14005-2 required Acceptance Criteria are NOT met because the calculated available Shutdown Margin is less than the limit specified in the COLR per TR 13.1.1 (1.30% k/k). NOTE: Step is critical in order to determine if the available Shutdown Margin meets the TRM required minimum, so the Required Actions can be taken.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: The Answer Key begins on the following page.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
5
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Data entered in Section A is NOT critical.
A.1 Cycle Burnup __8500__ MWD/MTU (From Reactor Engineering)
A.2 Rod bank demand positions CBA _228___ CBB _228___ CBC _228___ CBD _220__
SBA _228___ SBB _228___ SBC _228___ SBD _228___ SBE _228___
A.3 Individual rods not aligned within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position
__N/A__ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
A.4 Rod Bank Insertion Limit (COLR 2.4 and 2.5)
CBA 225 CBB 225 CBC 225 CBD 161 SBA 225 SBB 225 SBC 225 SBD 225 SBE 225 A.5 Number of steps (by demand position) each control rod bank in A.2 is BELOW its insertion limit CBA _N/A___ CBB _______ CBC _______ CBD _______
Number of steps (by demand position) each shutdown rod bank in A.2 is BELOW its insertion limit SBA _N/A___ SBB _______ SBC _______ SBD _______ SBE _______
A.6 Review A.3 and record below the number of steps (by DRPI indication) each individual rod in A.3 is BELOW the rod insertion limit A.4 for its bank
_N/A___ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
A.7 Number of Actual Untrippable Rods __2__
A.8 Boron Concentration _1450__ ppm A.9 Power Level _100__ %
6
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
Critical step data is highlighted B.1 Worth of rods at ARI-1 Rod Worth For SDM at Power Level (A.9) and Burnup (A.1) (PTDB TAB 1.5.2-T1) + __5524__ pcm B.2 Worth of rod banks below insertion limit:
(Summation of A.5) x 18
__0__ x 18 = + ____0___ pcm B.3 Worth of individual rods misaligned below the insertion limit for their bank:
(Summation of A.6) x 4
__0__ x 4 = + ____0___ pcm B.4 Worth Of Most Reactive Rod For SDM at Burnup (A.1)
(PTDB TAB 1.5.3-T1) + ___968__ pcm B.5 Worth of Actual Untrippable Rods:
IF HAVE UNTRIPPABLE RODS:
[(A.7) x (B.4) x 1.35] + [(B.4) x 0.35]
[__2___ x __968__x 1.35] + [_968__ x 0.35] =
OR IF ALL RODS ARE TRIPPABLE: 0 + 2952 - 2953 pcm (NOTE: Range is based on rounding before and after the addition)
B.6 Adjusted rod worth considering untrippable rods, misaligned rods, rods below the insertion limit, and uncertainty:
[(B.1) - (B.2) - (B.3) - (B.5)] x 0.93
[_5524_ - __0__ - __0__ - _2952_] x 0.93 = + 2391 - 2392 pcm (NOTE: Using 2952 and 2953 as B.5)
B.7 Power Defect For Shutdown Margin at Power Level (A.9) and Burnup (A.1) (PTDB TAB 1.1.2-T1) + __1932__ pcm B.8 Void Collapse Defect + 50___ pcm (Continued on next page) 7
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
Critical step data is highlighted B.9 Axial Offset Reactivity Correction (From Reactor Engineering) + ____0___ pcm B.10 Available Shutdown Reactivity:
(B.6) - (B.7) - (B.8) - (B.9)
_2391 - _1932_ - __50___ - __0__ = ( + ) 409 - 410 pcm (NOTE: Using 2391 and 2392 as B.6)
B.11 Shutdown margin: (B.10) / 1000.0 ( + ) 0.409 - 0.41 %
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Shutdown Margin (B.11) shall be greater than or equal to limit specified in the COLR per Technical Requirement Manual TR 13.1.1 (COLR 2.1.1).
YES NO Completed By: Applicant Todays date / time Signature Date/Time Verified By:
Signature Date/Time 8
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-14005-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ___________________________________________________________________
Response: __________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: ____________________________ ________________
9
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power.
During control rod operability testing, Control Bank D rods D4 and M4 did NOT move when demanded.
Tech Spec LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, is entered.
TR 13.1.1, Shutdown Margin, requires shutdown margin to be greater than or equal to 1.30% k/k in Modes 1 and 2.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to use 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations, and the provided references to perform the following:
- 1) Calculate the available Shutdown Margin for the current plant conditions.
- 2) Based on your calculated Shutdown Margin, determine if the 14005-2 required Acceptance Criteria are met.
Current conditions:
Unit 2 power history: 100% reactor power for the last 30 days Cycle burn-up: 8,500 MWD/MTU Control Bank D rods D4 and M4 did NOT move when demanded and are considered untrippable RCS boron concentration: 1450 ppm Power level: 100%
Tavg: 584.3 F ARO position: 228 steps Axial Offset Reactivity Correction: 0 pcm Rod Bank Demand Positions: DRPI Indication Positions:
Control Bank A - 228 Control Bank A - 228 Control Bank B - 228 Control Bank B - 228 Control Bank C - 228 Control Bank C - 228 Control Bank D - 220 Control Bank D - 222 (Rod D4 - 228)
(Rod M4 - 228)
Shutdown Bank A - 228 Shutdown Bank A - 228 Shutdown Bank B - 228 Shutdown Bank B - 228 Shutdown Bank C - 228 Shutdown Bank C - 228 Shutdown Bank D - 228 Shutdown Bank D - 228 Shutdown Bank E - 228 Shutdown Bank E - 228
NRC RO Admin Job Performance Measure c Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-09037 Task
Title:
Perform Boron Injection Flow Path Verification in Response to Equipment Failure JPM No: V-NRC-JP-14405-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
G2.2.12 RO 3.7 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
1
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
1HV-8801A, BIT Discharge Isolation, is tagged out.
Subsequently, 1FV-121, Charging Flow Control, fails closed.
RWST temperature is 78 F.
VCT pressure is 24 psig.
Shift Supervisor initiates surveillance 14405-1, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification During Operation.
Manual valve positions were checked as shown on the following page.
All required surveillances in 14405-1, Step 5.1, are active and satisfactory.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to use surveillance 14405-1, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification During Operation, to provide a written response for the following:
- 1) Based on the information given, complete 14405-1, Figure 1, Charging Pump Boration Path.
- 2) Using your completed Figure 1, determine if the Acceptance Criteria of 14405-1 are met.
2
The following manual valve positions were checked as follows:
Valve Identifier Position 1-1204-U4-135 Locked Open 1-1204-U4-207 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-169 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-285 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-287 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-292 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-300 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-482 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-501 Locked Open 1-1208-U6-125 Locked Open 1-1208-U6-131 Open 1-1208-U6-134 Open 1-1208-U6-135 Open 1-1208-U6-153 Open 1-1208-U6-154 Open 1-1208-U6-279 Locked Open 1-1208-U6-280 Locked Open 1-1208-U6-282 Locked Open 3
Task Standard: The applicant correctly completes 14405-1, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification During Operation, Figure 1, Charging Pump Boration Path, and determines that the Acceptance Criteria are NOT met (two independent boration flow paths are NOT available).
Required Materials: 14405-1, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification During Operation (ver.
16.3)
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 12 minutes 4
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 1.0 Purpose.
1.1 The purpose of this procedure is to verify that the valves in two operable boron injection flow paths described in Technical Requirement Manual TR 13.1.3 are in the required position.
1.2 This surveillance satisfies Technical Requirements Surveillance TRS 13.1.3.2.
1.3 The frequency of this surveillance is at least once every 31 days.
Standard: Applicant reviews purpose statements.
Comment:
JPM 2. 2.0 Applicability This surveillance is required for Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Standard: Applicant verifies that the unit is in Mode 1.
Comment:
JPM 3. 3.0 Precautions and Limitations VCT pressure must be equal to or less than 45 psig if credit is taken for Boric Acid Transfer pumps as the required flow path.
Standard: Applicant verifies that VCT pressure is less than 45 psig (in Initial Conditions).
Comment:
5
JPM 4. 4.0 Prerequisites or Initial Conditions The SS shall ensure this surveillance test does not affect other tests presently in progress or jeopardize plant operation prior to granting approval to perform this surveillance test.
Standard: Applicant verifies Shift Supervisor has approved the surveillance (in Initial Conditions).
Comment:
JPM 5. 5.0 Instructions TEST STARTED ________ ________ ________
DATE TIME MODE Standard: Applicant records the date, time, and Mode when beginning the surveillance and reads the NOTES.
Comment:
6
JPM 6. 5.1 Verify operable borated water sources and pumps by performing the following:
- a. For each operable boric acid source, check 14225-1, "Operations Weekly Surveillance Logs," is active and initial Figure 1
- b. If the Normal Charging Pump is operable, check 14705-1, "Boron Injection Flow Rate Verification," is active and initial Figure 1
- c. If the Boric Acid Transfer Pump(s) are operable, check 14811A/B-1, "Boric Acid Transfer Pumps and Discharge Check Valves In-service Test," is active and initial Figure 1
- d. If the Centrifugal Charging Pump(s) are operable, check 14808A/B-1, Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valves IST and Response Time Test, is active and initial Figure 1 Standard: Applicant verifies the surveillances are active and satisfactory (in Initial Conditions) and initials the corresponding lines on Figure 1.
Comment:
JPM 7. 5.1 Verify operable borated water sources and pumps by performing the following:
- e. Verify RWST Temperature per 14000-1, "Operations Shift and Daily Surveillance Logs," and initial Figure 1.
Standard: Applicant verifies RWST Temperature (in Initial Conditions) and initials the corresponding line on Figure 1.
Comment:
7
JPM 8. 5.2 For each operable power operated valve, complete Figure 1 by placing initials in the appropriate blocks.
Standard: Applicant initials the blocks for operable power operated valves on Figure 1.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: An example of a completed Figure 1 begins on Page 9 of this JPM.
Comment:
JPM 9. 5.3 Verify each manual valve is open and complete Figure 1 by placing initials in the appropriate blocks.
Standard: Applicant initials the blocks for open manual valves (in Initial Conditions) on Figure 1.
Comment:
8
- JPM 10.
5.4 Using Figure 1, verify at least two independent flow paths from borated water source(s) through operable pump(s) to the RCS exist.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Based on the NOTE, the independent flow paths must NOT share any active component. In the current configuration, both paths would share 1HV-8801B, BIT Discharge Isolation.
Standard: Applicant reviews NOTE and correctly completes Figure 1 to determine if at least two independent boron injection flow paths are available. NOTE:
Step is critical because the completion of Figure 1 is required in order to determine if surveillance TRS 13.1.3.2 is met.
Comment:
- JPM 11. 6.0 Acceptance Criteria The valves in the boron injection flow paths shown on Figure 1 were found to be in the required status to provide at least two independent flow paths of borated water to the Reactor Coolant System. All required surveillances are active.
Standard: Applicant reviews the completed Figure 1 and determines that the Acceptance Criteria are NOT met because two independent boron injection flow paths are NOT available. NOTE: Step is critical in order to determine that surveillance TRS 13.1.3.2 is NOT met.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
9
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS) 10
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-14405-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ______________
11
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.
1HV-8801A, BIT Discharge Isolation, is tagged out.
Subsequently, 1FV-121, Charging Flow Control, fails closed.
RWST temperature is 78 F.
VCT pressure is 24 psig.
Shift Supervisor initiates surveillance 14405-1, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification During Operation.
Manual valve positions were checked as shown on the following page.
All required surveillances in 14405-1, Step 5.1, are active and satisfactory.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to use surveillance 14405-1, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification During Operation, to provide a written response for the following:
- 1) Based on the information given, complete 14405-1, Figure 1, Charging Pump Boration Path.
- 2) Using your completed Figure 1, determine if the Acceptance Criteria of 14405-1 are met.
The following manual valve positions were checked as follows:
Valve Identifier Position 1-1204-U4-135 Locked Open 1-1204-U4-207 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-169 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-285 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-287 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-292 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-300 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-482 Locked Open 1-1208-U4-501 Locked Open 1-1208-U6-125 Locked Open 1-1208-U6-131 Open 1-1208-U6-134 Open 1-1208-U6-135 Open 1-1208-U6-153 Open 1-1208-U6-154 Open 1-1208-U6-279 Locked Open 1-1208-U6-280 Locked Open 1-1208-U6-282 Locked Open
NRC RO Admin Job Performance Measure d Facility: Vogtle Task No: N/A Task
Title:
Assess Radiological Conditions, Calculate Projected Dose to Determine Lowest Dose Route, and Determine if Task Can be Performed Without Exceeding the Task Dose Limit JPM No: V-NRC-JP-00930-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
G2.3.12 RO 3.2 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: ______________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
1
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor is tripped with fuel damage.
You have been assigned to manually open a de-energized MOV in the Unit 1, RHR A Pump Room.
Your allowable dose limit is 150 mrem (emergency dose limits will NOT be used).
Two routes are available for you to access the MOV.
- 1) Route 1 consists of two segments:
- Segment A is through a 100 mrem/hour area for 2 minutes.
- Segment B is through a 270 mrem/hour area for 2 minutes.
- 2) Route 2 consists of two segments:
- Segment C is through a 200 mrem/hour area for 3 minutes.
- Segment D is through a 180 mrem/hour area for 3 minutes.
It will take you 6 minutes inside the Pump Room to open the valve.
After operating the MOV, the same route will be used to return (exit) as was used for entering (either Route 1 or Route 2 with the same dose rates and times).
Initiating Cue: Based on the given conditions and room maps provided, answer the following questions:
- 1) Which is the lowest dose (ALARA) route for you to take to the Unit 1, RHR A Pump Room (Route 1 or Route 2)?
- 2) Can you reach the Unit 1, RHR A Pump Room, open the MOV, and return to your original starting location without exceeding your allowable dose limit?
2
Task Standard: The applicant calculates the total dose for both Route 1 and Route 2 and determines that Route 1 is the lowest dose route (144 - 146 mrem). The applicant then determines that the task can be performed without exceeding the assigned dose limit of 150 mrem.
Required Materials: Calculator General
References:
00930-C, Radiation and Contamination Control (ver. 27.0)
NMP-HP-001, Radiation Protection Standard Practices (ver. 6.2)
Auxiliary Building Level C Map Auxiliary Building Level D Map Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 10 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. Calculate dose received while opening the MOV.
RHR Pump A is in AB-D48 (RHR A Heat Exchanger is in AB-C90).
Dose rate at the valve is 1200 mrem/hour.
The task will take 6 minutes.
1200 mrem/hour x (1 hour/60 minutes) x (6 minutes) = 120 mrem [no range on calculated value]
Standard: Applicant determines that the dose to open the MOV is 120 mrem [no range on calculated value].
Comment:
- JPM 2. Calculate total dose received using Route 1 to open the MOV.
Segment A is 100 mrem/hour x (1 hour/60 minutes) x (2 minutes) = 3.33 mrem one way [3 - 4 mrem range on calculated value]
Segment B is 270 mrem/hour x (1 hour/60 minutes) x (2 minutes) = 9 mrem one way [no range on calculated value]
Total dose received is 3.33 (entry) + 9 (entry) + 120 (valve) + 9 (exit) + 3.33 mrem (exit) = 144.66 mrem [144 - 146 mrem range on calculated value]
Standard: Applicant calculates the total dose received using Route 1 is 144.66 mrem
[144 - 146 mrem range on calculated value]. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the ALARA decision is based on correct data.
Comment:
4
- JPM 3. Calculate total dose received using Route 2 to open the MOV.
Segment C is 200 mrem/hour x (1 hour/60 minutes) x (3 minutes) = 10 mrem one way [no range on calculated value]
Segment D is 180 mrem/hour x (1 hour/60 minutes) x (3 minutes) = 9 mrem one way [no range on calculated value]
Total dose received is 10 (entry) + 9 (entry) + 120 (valve) + 9 (exit) + 10 mrem (exit) = 158 mrem [no range on calculated value]
Standard: Applicant calculates the total dose received using Route 2 is 158 mrem [no range on calculated value]. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the ALARA decision is based on correct data.
Comment:
JPM 4. Determine the lowest dose route to travel to open the MOV.
Route 1 total dose is 144.66 mrem.
Route 2 total dose is 158 mrem.
Standard: Applicant determines that Route 1 is the lowest dose route to travel to open the MOV.
Comment:
5
- JPM 5. Determine if the MOV task can be completed without exceeding the allowable dose limit.
Route 1 total dose is 144.66 mrem.
Allowable dose limit is 150 mrem.
Standard: Applicant determines the MOV task can be performed using Route 1 without exceeding the allowable dose limit. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the task can be performed without exceeding the allowable dose limit (ALARA).
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
6
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
- 1) Which is the lowest dose (ALARA) route for you to take to the Unit 1, RHR A Pump Room (Route 1 or Route 2)?
Route 1
- 2) Can you reach the Unit 1, RHR A Pump Room, open the MOV, and return to your starting location without exceeding your allowable dose limit?
Yes 7
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-00930-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ______________
8
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 reactor is tripped with fuel damage.
You have been assigned to manually open a de-energized MOV in the Unit 1, RHR A Pump Room.
Your allowable dose limit is 150 mrem (emergency dose limits will NOT be used).
Two routes are available for you to access the MOV.
- 1) Route 1 consists of two segments:
- Segment A is through a 100 mrem/hour area for 2 minutes.
- Segment B is through a 270 mrem/hour area for 2 minutes.
- 2) Route 2 consists of two segments:
- Segment C is through a 200 mrem/hour area for 3 minutes.
- Segment D is through a 180 mrem/hour area for 3 minutes.
It will take you 6 minutes inside the Pump Room to open the valve.
After operating the MOV, the same route will be used to return (exit) as was used for entering (either Route 1 or Route 2 with the same dose rates and times).
Initiating Cue: Based on the given conditions and room maps provided, answer the following questions:
- 1) Which is the lowest dose (ALARA) route for you to take to the Unit 1, RHR A Pump Room (Route 1 or Route 2)?
- 2) Can you reach the Unit 1, RHR A Pump Room, open the MOV, and return to your original starting location without exceeding your allowable dose limit?
NRC SRO Admin Job Performance Measure a Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-27003 Task
Title:
Determine Available Shutdown Margin and Evaluate Tech Spec / TRM Required Actions JPM No: V-NRC-JP-14005-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
G2.1.43 SRO 4.3 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power.
During control rod operability testing, Control Bank D rods D4 and M4 did NOT move when demanded.
Tech Spec LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, is entered.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to use 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations, and the provided references to perform the following:
- 1) Calculate the available Shutdown Margin for the current plant conditions.
- 2) Based on your calculated Shutdown Margin, determine which Tech Spec / TRM Required Action(s) apply, if any.
1
Current conditions:
Unit 2 power history: 100% reactor power for the last 30 days Cycle burn-up: 8,500 MWD/MTU Control Bank D rods D4 and M4 did NOT move when demanded and are considered untrippable RCS boron concentration: 1450 ppm Power level: 100%
Tavg: 584.3 F ARO position: 228 steps Axial Offset Reactivity Correction: 0 pcm Rod Bank Demand Positions: DRPI Indication Positions:
Control Bank A - 228 Control Bank A - 228 Control Bank B - 228 Control Bank B - 228 Control Bank C - 228 Control Bank C - 228 Control Bank D - 220 Control Bank D - 222 (Rod D4 - 228)
(Rod M4 - 228)
Shutdown Bank A - 228 Shutdown Bank A - 228 Shutdown Bank B - 228 Shutdown Bank B - 228 Shutdown Bank C - 228 Shutdown Bank C - 228 Shutdown Bank D - 228 Shutdown Bank D - 228 Shutdown Bank E - 228 Shutdown Bank E - 228 2
Task Standard: The applicant calculates an available Shutdown Margin of 0.409 - 0.41%
k/k for the given conditions using 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations. The applicant then determines that TRM 13.1.1, Shutdown Margin (SDM), is NOT met because the available Shutdown Margin is less than the limit specified in the COLR (1.30% k/k), so Condition A will require boration to be initiated within 15 minutes.
Required Materials: 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations (ver. 22.0)
Tech Specs / TRM (TR 13.1.1, ver. 1.0)
Tech Spec Bases Current conditions sheet Unit 2 PTDB, Tab 1 (ver. 33.0)
Unit 2 COLR (ver. 1.0, June 2017)
Calculator General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 19 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 4.1.1 If Shutdown Margin is to be calculated in Mode 1 or 2, complete Data Sheet 1. Data Sheet 1 accounts for: (a) one or more untrippable rods, (b) one or more individual rods not aligned within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position below the insertion limit for their respective bank(s) and (c) one or more shutdown or control banks below insertion limits specified in the COLR.
Standard: Applicant determines Data Sheet 1 is to be used to calculate Shutdown Margin.
Comment:
JPM 2. Data Sheet 1: Shutdown Margin in Modes 1 and 2 Section A: Record current conditions Standard: Applicant records the current conditions on Data Sheet 1, Section A, of 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations.
Comment:
- JPM 3. Data Sheet 1: Shutdown Margin in Modes 1 and 2 Section B: Calculate available Shutdown Margin Standard: Applicant calculates an available Shutdown Margin of 0.409 - 0.41% k/k using Data Sheet 1 of 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations.
NOTE: Step is critical in order to determine if the available Shutdown Margin meets the TRM required minimum.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: An example of the completed Data Sheet 1 begins on Page 8 of this JPM.
Comment:
4
- JPM 4. Determine if the 14005-2 required Acceptance Criteria are met.
Standard: Applicant determines that the 14005-2 required Acceptance Criteria are NOT met because the calculated available Shutdown Margin is less than the limit specified in the COLR per TR 13.1.1 (1.30% k/k). NOTE: Step is critical in order to determine if the available Shutdown Margin meets the TRM required minimum, so the Required Actions can be taken.
Comment:
5
- JPM 5. Determine Tech Spec / TRM Required Actions.
Standard: Applicant determines TR 13.1.1 is NOT met, so Condition A will require boration to be initiated within 15 minutes. NOTE: Step is critical to verify if the TRM minimum available Shutdown Margin is met and to determine the Required Action and Completion Time.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
6
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
NOTE TO EXAMINER: Data entered in Section A is NOT critical.
A.1 Cycle Burnup __8500__ MWD/MTU (From Reactor Engineering)
A.2 Rod bank demand positions CBA _228___ CBB _228___ CBC _228___ CBD _220__
SBA _228___ SBB _228___ SBC _228___ SBD _228___ SBE _228___
A.3 Individual rods not aligned within 12 steps of their group step counter demand position
__N/A__ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
A.4 Rod Bank Insertion Limit (COLR 2.4 and 2.5)
CBA 225 CBB 225 CBC 225 CBD 161 SBA 225 SBB 225 SBC 225 SBD 225 SBE 225 A.5 Number of steps (by demand position) each control rod bank in A.2 is BELOW its insertion limit CBA _N/A___ CBB _______ CBC _______ CBD _______
Number of steps (by demand position) each shutdown rod bank in A.2 is BELOW its insertion limit SBA _N/A___ SBB _______ SBC _______ SBD _______ SBE _______
A.6 Review A.3 and record below the number of steps (by DRPI indication) each individual rod in A.3 is BELOW the rod insertion limit A.4 for its bank
_N/A___ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______
A.7 Number of Actual Untrippable Rods __2__
A.8 Boron Concentration _1450__ ppm A.9 Power Level _100__ %
7
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
Critical step data is highlighted B.1 Worth of rods at ARI-1 Rod Worth For SDM at Power Level (A.9) and Burnup (A.1) (PTDB TAB 1.5.2-T1) + __5524__ pcm B.2 Worth of rod banks below insertion limit:
(Summation of A.5) x 18
__0__ x 18 = + ____0___ pcm B.3 Worth of individual rods misaligned below the insertion limit for their bank:
(Summation of A.6) x 4
__0__ x 4 = + ____0___ pcm B.4 Worth Of Most Reactive Rod For SDM at Burnup (A.1)
(PTDB TAB 1.5.3-T1) + ___968__ pcm B.5 Worth of Actual Untrippable Rods:
IF HAVE UNTRIPPABLE RODS:
[(A.7) x (B.4) x 1.35] + [(B.4) x 0.35]
[__2___ x __968__x 1.35] + [_968__ x 0.35] =
OR IF ALL RODS ARE TRIPPABLE: 0 + 2952 - 2953 pcm (NOTE: Range is based on rounding before and after the addition)
B.6 Adjusted rod worth considering untrippable rods, misaligned rods, rods below the insertion limit, and uncertainty:
[(B.1) - (B.2) - (B.3) - (B.5)] x 0.93
[_5524_ - __0__ - __0__ - _2952_] x 0.93 = + 2391 - 2392 pcm (NOTE: Using 2952 and 2953 as B.5)
B.7 Power Defect For Shutdown Margin at Power Level (A.9) and Burnup (A.1) (PTDB TAB 1.1.2-T1) + __1932__ pcm B.8 Void Collapse Defect + 50___ pcm (Continued on next page) 8
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
Critical step data is highlighted B.9 Axial Offset Reactivity Correction (From Reactor Engineering) + ____0___ pcm B.10 Available Shutdown Reactivity:
(B.6) - (B.7) - (B.8) - (B.9)
_2391 - _1932_ - __50___ - __0__ = ( + ) 409 - 410 pcm (NOTE: Using 2391 and 2392 as B.6)
B.11 Shutdown margin: (B.10) / 1000.0 ( + ) 0.409 - 0.41 %
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Shutdown Margin (B.11) shall be greater than or equal to limit specified in the COLR per Technical Requirement Manual TR 13.1.1 (COLR 2.1.1).
YES NO Completed By: Applicant Todays date / time Signature Date/Time Verified By:
Signature Date/Time 9
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-14005-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: ____________________________ _________________
10
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power.
During control rod operability testing, Control Bank D rods D4 and M4 did NOT move when demanded.
Tech Spec LCO 3.1.4, Rod Group Alignment Limits, is entered.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to use 14005-2, Shutdown Margin and Keff Calculations, and the provided references to perform the following:
- 1) Calculate the available Shutdown Margin for the current plant conditions.
- 2) Based on your calculated Shutdown Margin, determine which Tech Spec / TRM Required Action(s) apply, if any.
Current conditions:
Unit 2 power history: 100% reactor power for the last 30 days Cycle burn-up: 8,500 MWD/MTU Control Bank D rods D4 and M4 did NOT move when demanded and are considered untrippable RCS boron concentration: 1450 ppm Power level: 100%
Tavg: 584.3 F ARO position: 228 steps Axial Offset Reactivity Correction: 0 pcm Rod Bank Demand Positions: DRPI Indication Positions:
Control Bank A - 228 Control Bank A - 228 Control Bank B - 228 Control Bank B - 228 Control Bank C - 228 Control Bank C - 228 Control Bank D - 220 Control Bank D - 222 (Rod D4 - 228)
(Rod M4 - 228)
Shutdown Bank A - 228 Shutdown Bank A - 228 Shutdown Bank B - 228 Shutdown Bank B - 228 Shutdown Bank C - 228 Shutdown Bank C - 228 Shutdown Bank D - 228 Shutdown Bank D - 228 Shutdown Bank E - 228 Shutdown Bank E - 228
NRC SRO Admin Job Performance Measure b Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-09023 Task
Title:
Determine Boration Requirements with the Boric Acid Storage Tank Out of Service and Evaluate Tech Spec / TRM Required Actions JPM No: V-NRC-JP-13009-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
G2.1.23 SRO 4.4 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: ______________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
CCP A is tagged out for maintenance.
Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) is NOT available due to a high boron concentration.
RWST boron concentration is 2540 ppm.
A boration of the RCS is required to be performed.
1
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to use 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.11, and the information provided to perform the following:
- 1) Determine the volume of boric acid that is required to raise the RCS boron concentration to 1628 ppm.
[round answer to one decimal place]
- 2) Determine the length of time required to charge the calculated volume of boric acid into the RCS.
[round answer to one decimal place]
- 3) Based on the information provided, determine which Tech Spec /
TRM Required Action(s) apply, if any.
2
Task Standard: Using 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, the applicant determines that 801.9 gallons of boric acid are required to be added to the RCS and that 8.1 minutes of charging time are required to charge the calculated volume into the RCS. The applicant then evaluates the current plant conditions and determines that all applicable Tech Spec / TRM LCOs are met.
Required Materials: 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, pages 1 - 9 and 65 -
67 (ver. 47.5)
Integrated Plant Computer screenshots 14406-2, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification - Shutdown, Figure 1 (completed surveillance indicating CCP A is not available)
Tech Specs / TRM Tech Spec Bases Calculator General
References:
None Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 16 minutes 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
JPM 1. 4.11 Boration from the RWST with BAST out of service NOTES A stopwatch will be required for timing requirements in this section.
This section should only be used when the BAST is out of service.
- 1. Record the following data:
RWST Cb (CRWST) __2540__ ppm (Initial Conditions)
Initial RCS Cb (Cint) __1616__ ppm (IPC VCT screen)
Desired final RCS Cb (Cfin) __1628__ ppm (Initiating Cue)
Flow rate from RWST to RCS (gpm)
(Charging - Seal leak-off) ___99___ gpm (IPC VCT and RCP screens)
Volume of RCS (VRCS) 61346 gallons NOTE TO EXAMINER: From the IPC CVCS and RCP screens, total charging flow rate is 101.02 gpm and RCP seal leak-offs are 0.49 gpm, 0.51 gpm, 0.48 gpm, and 0.54 gpm for a total seal leak-off of 2.02 gpm.
Standard: Applicant reviews the NOTES, determines that the flow rate from the RWST to the RCS is 101.02 gpm - 2.02 gpm = 99 gpm, and records RWST and RCS boron concentrations.
Comment:
4
- JPM 2. 2. Calculate the volume of boric acid (Vba) to change Cint to Cfin.
C RWST C int Vba VRCS ln = _______ gal C RWST C fin Vba 61346 ln 2540 1616 = __801.9__ gal 2540 1628 NOTE TO EXAMINER: Per the initiating cue, answers are rounded to one decimal place.
Standard: Applicant calculates that 801.9 gallons of boric acid are required to raise RCS boron concentration from 1616 ppm to 1628 ppm. NOTE: Step is critical in order to inject the correct amount of boric acid for reactivity and shutdown margin control.
Comment:
- JPM 3. 3. Calculate time (T) required to charge volume determined in Section 4.11, Step 2.
Vba T = ________ minutes Flow 801.9 T = __8.1__ minutes 99 NOTE TO EXAMINER: Per the initiating cue, answers are rounded to one decimal place.
Standard: Applicant calculates that 8.1 minutes are required to charge the amount of boric acid calculated in Step 2 into the RCS. NOTE: Step is critical in order to inject the correct amount of boric acid for reactivity and shutdown margin control.
Comment:
5
- JPM 4. Evaluate conditions to determine Tech Spec / TRM impacts.
Though CCP A and the BAST are tagged out, it can be determined from 14406-2, Figure 1, Charging Pump Boration Flow Path, that a flow path from the RWST through CCP B or the NCP is available. Therefore, TR LCOs 13.1.2 and 13.1.4 are met (one boration flow path and one charging pump).
Though the BAST is not functional, the RWST is functional and meets the requirements of TR 13.1.6 (one borated water source is functional).
NOTE TO EXAMINER: A copy of 14406-2, Figure 1, showing one available highlighted flow path is on the next page of this JPM.
Standard: Applicant evaluates the given plant conditions and determines that all applicable Tech Spec / TRM LCOs are met. NOTE: Step is critical in order to determine if the applicable Tech Spec / TRM LCOs are met.
Comment:
6
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
7
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS) 8
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
Perform the following:
- 1) Determine the volume of boric acid that is required to raise the RCS boron concentration to 1628 ppm.
[round answer to one decimal place]
801.9 gallons of boric acid
- 2) Determine the length of time required to charge the calculated volume of boric acid into the RCS.
[round answer to one decimal place]
8.1 minutes of charging time
- 3) Based on the information provided, determine which Tech Spec / TRM Required Action(s) apply, if any All applicable Tech Spec / TRM LCOs are met.
9
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-13009-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ___________________________________________________________________
Response: __________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: ______________________________ ______________
10
Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is in Mode 5.
CCP A is tagged out for maintenance.
Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) is NOT available due to a high boron concentration.
RWST boron concentration is 2540 ppm.
A boration of the RCS is required to be performed.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Supervisor directs you to use 13009-2, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System, Section 4.11, and the information provided to perform the following:
- 1) Determine the volume of boric acid that is required to raise the RCS boron concentration to 1628 ppm.
[round answer to one decimal place]
- 2) Determine the length of time required to charge the calculated volume of boric acid into the RCS.
[round answer to one decimal place]
- 3) Based on the information provided, determine which Tech Spec / TRM Required Action(s) apply, if any.
NRC SRO Admin Job Performance Measure d Facility: Vogtle Task No: N/A Task
Title:
Assess Radiological Conditions, Calculate Projected Dose, and Determine if Responders can Complete Emergency Tasks JPM No: V-NRC-JP-NMP-EP-144-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
G2.3.04 SRO 3.7 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: ______________________
Facility Evaluator: _____________________ Date: ______________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ________________ Actual Performance ___________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator ______________ Plant _____________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
1
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in a General Emergency.
You are the Emergency Director.
You have authorized Emergency Exposure Limits in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits to perform lifesaving actions.
Three lifesaving actions are required to be performed as follows:
Task A is to enter a 65 Rem/hour area for 20 minutes.
Task B is to enter a 48 Rem/hour area for 30 minutes.
Task C is to enter a 78 Rem/hour area for 15 minutes.
The TOTAL round-trip TRANSIT dose will be 2 Rem for each task.
Three Responders are available as follows:
Responder Mary is a volunteer.
Responder John is NOT a volunteer.
Responder Tom is NOT a volunteer.
The Responders have NO previous emergency exposure.
The Responders have been briefed and are aware of the risks involved.
Initiating Cue: Based on the given conditions, answer the following questions:
- 1) What is the projected total dose to perform each task?
Task A:
Task B:
Task C:
- 2) Considering the applicable Emergency Exposure Limits, can all three tasks be performed with the three available Responders?
Assume each Responder can only perform one task.
2
Task Standard: The applicant calculates the projected dose for each task and determines:
- 1. Task A projected dose is 23.6 - 24 Rem.
- 2. Task B projected dose is 26 Rem.
- 3. Task C projected dose is 21.5 - 22 Rem.
The applicant also determines that all three tasks can be performed by the three available Responders.
Required Materials: Calculator NOTE: Applicant is NOT provided a copy of NMP-EP-144, Protective Actions.
General
References:
NMP-EP-144, Protective Actions (ver. 4.0)
NMP-EP-144-F02, Emergency Exposure Authorization (ver. 2.0)
Time Critical Task: No Validation Time: 10 minutes NOTE TO EXAMINER: JPM knowledge of Emergency Exposure Limits and their application are SRO-Only objectives. Therefore, the procedure reference is NOT provided to the applicants.
V-LO-LP-40101-34: State the emergency TEDE limits for the following: (SRO-Only)
- a. All activities
- b. Protecting valuable property
- c. Lifesaving actions or protection of large populations V-LO-LP-40101-35: Given a postulated set of emergency plant conditions and a list of available personnel, evaluate and determine which individuals should be considered as first choices for receiving emergency exposures per the guidance of NMP-EP-144, Protective Actions. (SRO-Only) 3
Performance Information Critical steps denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME: __________
- JPM 1. Calculate the projected total dose to perform Task A.
Task A will take 20 minutes.
(65 Rem/hour) x (1 hour/60 minutes) x (20 minutes) = 1.08 Rem/minute x 20 minutes = 21.6 Rem 21.6 Rem + 2 Rem (transit dose) = 23.6 Rem Standard: Applicant calculates the projected total dose to perform Task A will be 23.6 Rem [23.6 - 24 Rem range on calculated value]. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the ALARA decision is based on correct data.
Comment:
- JPM 2. Calculate the projected total dose to perform Task B.
Task B will take 30 minutes.
48 Rem/hour x (1 hour/60 minutes) x (30 minutes) = 24 Rem 24 Rem + 2 Rem (transit dose) = 26 Rem Standard: Applicant calculates the projected total dose to perform Task B will be 26 Rem [no range on calculated value]. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the ALARA decision is based on correct data.
Comment:
4
- JPM 3. Calculate the projected total dose to perform Task C.
Task C will take 15 minutes.
78 Rem/hour x (1 hour/60 minutes) x (15 minutes) = 19.5 Rem 19.5 Rem + 2 Rem (transit dose) = 21.5 Rem Standard: Applicant calculates the projected total dose to perform Task C will be 21.5 Rem [21.5 - 22 Rem range on calculated value]. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the ALARA decision is based on correct data.
Comment:
- JPM 4. Determine if all three tasks can be performed with the three available Responders without exceeding anyones Emergency Exposure Limit.
Emergency Exposure Limit for lifesaving is 25 Rem if NOT a volunteer.
Emergency Exposure Limit for lifesaving is greater than 25 Rem up to 100 Rem if a volunteer.
Responder Mary is a volunteer.
Responders John and Tom are NOT volunteers.
Total projected dose for Task B is greater than 25 Rem.
Total projected dose for Tasks A and C are less than 25 Rem.
Mary can perform Task B and John and Tom can perform Tasks A and C, so all three tasks can be performed by the three available Responders.
Standard: Applicant determines that all three tasks can be performed with the three available Responders without exceeding anyones Emergency Exposure Limit. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure the ALARA decision is based on correct data.
Comment:
STOP TIME: __________
Terminating cue: Applicant returns initiating cue sheet.
5
ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
- 1) What is the projected total dose to perform each task?
Task A: 23.6 Rem [23.6 - 24 Rem range on calculated value]
Task B: 26 Rem [no range on calculated value]
Task C: 21.5 Rem [21.5 - 22 Rem range on calculated value]
- 2) Can all three tasks be performed with the three available Responders without exceeding anyones Emergency Exposure Limit? Assume each Responder can only perform one task.
Yes 6
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-NMP-EP-144-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _______________________________ ______________
7
Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in a General Emergency.
You are the Emergency Director and you have authorized Emergency Exposure Limits in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits to perform lifesaving actions.
Three lifesaving actions are required to be performed as follows:
Task A is to enter a 65 Rem/hour area for 20 minutes.
Task B is to enter a 48 Rem/hour area for 30 minutes.
Task C is to enter a 78 Rem/hour area for 15 minutes.
The TOTAL round-trip TRANSIT dose will be 2 Rem for each task.
Three Responders are available as follows:
Responder Mary is a volunteer.
Responder John is NOT a volunteer.
Responder Tom is NOT a volunteer.
The Responders have NO previous emergency exposure.
The Responders have been briefed and are aware of the risks involved.
Initiating Cue: Based on the given conditions, answer the following questions:
- 1) What is the projected total dose to perform each task?
Task A:
Task B:
Task C:
- 2) Considering the applicable Emergency Exposure Limits, can all three tasks be performed with the three available Responders? Assume each Responder can only perform one task.
NRC SRO Admin Job Performance Measure e Facility: Vogtle Task No: V-LO-TA-40002 Task
Title:
Classify an Emergency Event and Complete the Emergency Notification Form JPM No: V-NRC-JP-NMP-EP-141-ILT22 K/A
Reference:
G2.4.41 SRO 4.6 Examinee: ___________________________ NRC Examiner: _____________________
Facility Evaluator: ______________________ Date: _____________________________
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance ______________ Actual Performance _________________________
Classroom ______________ Simulator _______________ Plant _______________________
Read to the examinee:
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and will provide initiating cues.
When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied.
1
THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM Initial Conditions: Unit 1 Seismic Monitoring System indicates the occurrence of a seismic event with its red OBE Exceedance light lit.
Unit 1 reactor tripped 15 minutes ago and is now stable in Mode 3.
RAT 1A and RAT 1B de-energize due to damage.
DG1A and DG1B start and re-energize their associated buses.
SAT is damaged and is NOT available.
1RE-008, Fuel Handling Building, is in INTERMEDIATE alarm and rising.
ARE-2532A/B and ARE-2533A/B, FHB Effluent, are in HIGH alarm and rising.
1RE-12442C, Plant Vent, is in HIGH alarm and rising.
Dose Assessment projections are NOT complete.
Unit 2 reactor tripped 12 minutes ago and is now stable in Mode 3 with no damage or abnormal indications.
Wind direction (10 meter, 15 min. avg.) is currently 20º at 4.5 mph.
Stability class is D with no precipitation.
WebEOC is NOT functional.
Initiating Cue: You are the Emergency Director. Based on the given conditions, perform the following:
- 1) Complete NMP-EP-141-F01, Emergency Classification Determination, Steps 1 - 6, and determine the current emergency classification level.
- 2) Complete NMP-EP-142-F01, Emergency Notification Form (ENF), for the current emergency classification.
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Task Standard: Applicant declares an Alert (RA2) within 15 minutes of the JPM start time and completes NMP-EP-142-F01, Emergency Notification Form (ENF),
within an additional 15 minutes (30 minutes total). No PARs are required for the classification.
Required Materials: NMP-EP-141, Event Classification (ver. 2.0)
NMP-EP-141-F01, Emergency Classification Determination (ver. 2.0)
NMP-EP-141-003, Vogtle 1&2 Emergency Action Levels and Basis (NEI 99-01 Revision 6) (ver. 3.0)
NMP-EP-141-003-F01, EAL Classification Matrix - Hot Conditions (ver.
1.0)
NMP-EP-141-003-F02, EAL Classification Matrix - Cold Conditions (ver.
1.0)
NMP-EP-142, Emergency Notification (ver. 2.1)
NMP-EP-142-F01, Emergency Notification Form (ENF) (ver. 1.0)
NMP-EP-144, Protective Actions (ver. 4.0)
NMP-EP-144-F01, PAR Worksheet (ver. 2.0)
General
References:
None Time Critical Task: Yes (15 minutes to declare the emergency and 15 minutes to notify authorities by completing the Emergency Notification Form)
Validation Time: 22 minutes NOTE: Lines 4, 5, 6, and 10 of the Emergency Notification Form (ENF) are critical based on NMP-TR-416, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program Administration, which requires satisfactory completion to meet the Emergency Preparedness (DEP) Performance Indicator.
Line 1 is critical, but only when transmitting the ENF to external agencies.
Line 9 is critical, but only if a PAR is required.
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Performance Information Critical steps are denoted with an asterisk and bolded.
START TIME CRITICAL FOR CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION: ________ (time JPM begins)
JPM 1. NMP-EP-141-F01, Emergency Classification Determination
- 1. Refer to the site specific IC/EAL Matrix Evaluation Charts.
Standard: Applicant reviews the NOTE and refers to the Vogtle Matrix Evaluation Charts.
Comment:
JPM 2. 2. Determine the appropriate IC/EAL Matrix Evaluation Chart for classification based on the current operating mode.
HOT IC/EAL Matrix Evaluation Chart (FNP/VEGP: Modes 1-4; HNP: Modes 1-3)
COLD IC/EAL Matrix Evaluation Chart (FNP/VEGP: Modes 5-6 & None; HNP:
Modes 4-5 & None)
Standard: Applicant NMP-EP-141-003-F01, EAL Classification Matrix - Hot Conditions.
Comment:
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JPM 3. 3. If the HOT IC/EAL Matrix Evaluation Chart is applicable, then evaluate the status of the Fission Product Barriers.
Fission Product Barrier LOSS POTENTIAL LOSS INTACT Fuel Clad Integrity Reactor Coolant System Containment Integrity 3.a. Determine the highest applicable Fission Product Barrier IC (select one)
FG1 FS1 FA1 None Standard: Applicant determines all Fission Product Barriers are intact (selects None).
Comment:
JPM 4. 4. Record the highest applicable IC/EAL.
Hot IC/EAL # __RA2__ Unit __1__ None Cold IC/EAL # ________ Unit _____ None Standard: Applicant determines that the highest IC/EAL is RA2 (Alert based on high FHB radiation monitors), which is higher than HU1 (NOUE based on seismic event), or SU1 (NOUE based on loss of off-site power) from the HOT IC/EAL Matrix Evaluation Chart.
Comment:
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- JPM 5. 5. Document the highest emergency classification level determined from either Step 3.a or 4.
Classification Based on IC# Classification Based on IC#
General Emergency ___________ Alert __RA2_____
Site-Area Emergency ___________ Unusual Event ___________
None Remarks (Identify the specific EAL threshold, as needed): _________________
Standard: Applicant checks the Alert Classification block and records IC# RA2. The applicant may N/A the Remarks line or may include the EAL description.
NOTE: Step is critical in order to ensure that the public is properly protected during the event.
Comment:
- JPM 6.
- 6. Approve the emergency classification and declare the event.
___Applicant_____ Date: __MM___/___DD__/__YY__ Time: _current time__
Emergency Director Standard: Applicant signs as Emergency Director and records the current date and a time that is within 15 minutes of the JPM start time. NOTE: Step is critical to ensure that the public can promptly respond to the event.
STOP TIME CRITICAL FOR CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION:
_______ (time of emergency declaration on Line 6)
Comment:
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JPM 7. NMP-EP-142, Emergency Notification, Attachment 3, Vogtle 1&2 ENF Completion, provides guidance for Emergency Notifications Form (ENF) completion.
NOTE TO EXAMINER: NMP-EP-142 is an Information Use procedure, so the applicant is not required to read the instructions line-by-line. The applicant may refer to it as necessary. The JPM includes all of the steps, but the task standard requires the correct completion of NMP-EP-141-F01 (Emergency Notification Form), not that each step of NMP-EP-142 is read and marked.
Standard: Applicant refers to NMP-EP-142 as required to complete NMP-EP-141-F01.
Comment:
START TIME CRITICAL FOR EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM:
___________ (same time as emergency declaration)
JPM 8. Line 1: Enter MESSAGE NUMBER. MESSAGE NUMBER is automatically assigned during the transmittal process if using the electronic EN Form tool.
Message numbers are sequential for the duration of the Event.
Standard: Applicant marks Block A (DRILL) and enters MESSAGE #1.
Comment:
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JPM 9. Line 2: Select the appropriate message type. INITIAL will be checked for any notification associated with the declaration and/or change of an emergency classification (including Termination) and identification or change of a PAR.
Standard: Applicant marks Block A (INITIAL). NOTE: Notification time and authentication number will be completed by the ENN communicator at a later time.
Comment:
JPM 10. Line 3: Enter or confirm the correct site and site call back number are displayed.
When using the electronic form the site location is automatically completed based on prior selections.
Standard: Applicant enters Vogtle for the site. NOTE: On the in-plant forms, the Vogtle phone number is already filled in.
Comment:
- JPM 11. Line 4: Select the appropriate EAL from the drop down list (for Termination, Select Termination). Confirm the brief description of the initiating conditions for the emergency classification declared is auto completed based on the EAL number selected. The event description block cannot be edited.
Additional information or information relative to competing events should be included on Line 13, REMARKS. If completing the form manually, a written description of the EAL must be added.
Standard: Applicant marks Block B (ALERT), enters EAL RA2, and provides a brief EAL description (FHB high radiation due to spent fuel damage - or similar wording). NOTE: Step is critical in order to ensure that the public is properly protected during the event.
Comment:
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- JPM 12. Line 5: Complete the appropriate line.
- a. Select box 5A if NOT in a General Emergency.
Standard: Applicant marks Block A (NONE) since PARs are not required for an Alert emergency. NOTE: Step is critical in order to ensure that the public is properly protected during the event.
Comment:
- JPM 13. Line 6: Select the appropriate box for EMERGENCY RELEASE using the following table to determine the status of a radiological release:
IF: THEN:
FMT readings or Dose assessment results (automated or manual) have been completed AND indicate an emergency radiological Check B Is Occurring release is underway At least one of the following effluent monitors at the applicable plant is in alarm:
Vogtle 1&2 Check B Is Occurring RE-12442C, RE-12444C, RE-12444D, RE-12444E, RE-12839C, RE-12839D, RE-12839E, RE-16980A, RE-018 Conditions exist indicating that a radiological release attributable to the event is occurring based on plant conditions (e.g. SGTR with known path to the environment, gaseous or liquid effluent radiation Check B Is Occurring monitor readings, radiological survey results, verified report of liquid release, etc.)
Any of the above conditions indicative of a radiological release Check C Has Occurred attributable to the event has occurred but are no longer present None of the above conditions for a radiological release attributable Check A None to the event has previously occurred or currently exist Standard: Applicant marks Block B (Is Occurring) due to 1RE-12442C in high alarm.
NOTE: Step is critical in order to ensure that the public is properly protected during the event.
Comment:
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JPM 14. Line 7: Select the appropriate box for RELEASE SIGNIFICANCE using the following table to determine the release significance:
IF: THEN:
Line 6A is selected on the ENF Check A Not applicable Line 6B or 6C of the ENF is marked and one of the following effluent monitors at the applicable plant is or has been elevated but not in high alarm:
Check B Within normal Vogtle 1&2 operating limits RE-12442C, RE-12444C, RE-12444D, RE-12444E, RE-12839C, RE-12839D, RE-12839E, RE-16980A, RE-0018 Line 6B or 6C of the ENF is marked and FMT readings, dose Check B Within normal assessment results or gaseous or liquid effluent sample results are available and indicate ODCM limits have not been exceeded operating limits 6B or 6C of the ENF is marked and any of the following effluent monitors at the applicable plant is or has been in high alarm or has exceeded ODCM limits: Check C Above normal Vogtle 1&2 operating limits RE-12442C, RE-12444C, RE-12444D, RE-12444E, RE-12839C, RE-12839D, RE-12839E, RE-16980A, RE-0018 6B or 6C of the ENF is marked and FMT readings, dose Check C Above normal assessment results or gaseous or liquid effluent sample results have exceeded ODCM limits operating limits Line 6B or 6C of the ENF is marked and information needed to characterize the release is not available, e.g.:
Elevated readings are not indicated on Vogtle 1&2 RE-12442C, RE-12444C, RE-12444D, RE-12444E, RE- Check D Under Evaluation 12839C, RE-12839D, RE-12839E, RE-16980A, RE-0018 Radiological survey results are not available Dose assessment results are not available Gaseous or liquid effluent sample results are not available Standard: Applicant marks Block C (Above normal operating limits) due to 1RE-12442C in high alarm.
Comment:
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JPM 15. Line 8: Select the appropriate box for EVENT PROGNOSIS using the following guidance:
Mark box A Improving if mitigation efforts appear successful, progressing toward termination.
Mark box B Stable if escalation to a higher classification is unlikely based on current conditions.
Mark box C Degrading if escalation to a higher emergency classification or PAR change is likely.
Standard: Applicant marks Block B (Stable) because escalation to a higher emergency is not imminent. NOTE: Applicant may mark Block C (Degrading) if, in his or her judgment, escalation to a higher classification is likely.
Comment:
JPM 16. Line 9: Enter the 15-minute averaged Wind Direction, Wind Speed, and Precipitation values, and check the appropriate Stability Class.
Standard: Applicant records the Met Tower Data provided in the Initial Conditions. Wind direction is from 20 degrees, wind speed is 4.5 mph, stability class is D, and there is no precipitation.
Comment:
- JPM 17. Line 10: Enter the time (HH:MM) and date (mm/dd/yy) when the current emergency classification was declared or terminated.
Standard: Applicant marks Block A (DECLARATION) and enters the time and date of the declaration from Line 6 of NMP-EP-141-F01. NOTE: Step is critical in order to ensure that the public is properly protected during the event.
Comment:
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JPM 18. Line 11: Select the unit(s) affected by the EAL indicated in Line 4. For events involving equipment that is common to more than one unit, select all affected units.
Standard: Applicant marks Block 1 for Unit 1. NOTE: Applicant may also mark both Unit 1 and Unit 2 since ARE-2532A/B and ARE-2533A/B, FHB Effluent, monitors are in high alarm and are common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2 FHBs.
Comment:
JPM 19. Line 12: Unit Status:
- a. Enter the % power.
- b. Enter the time (HH:MM) and date (mm/dd/yy) of the shutdown if applicable.
Standard: Applicant marks Block A (U1), enters 0% power, and enters shutdown time (15 minutes ago) and date. NOTE: The unaffected units status is not required for the initial notification, but if both Units were selected in Line 11, then the Unit 2 power should be recorded.
Comment:
JPM 20. Line 13: Record any current information related to the emergency such as significant events which have occurred, significant equipment which is out of service or malfunctioning, events occurring that may impact offsite resources (i.e., dismissal of non-essential personnel, etc.), updates on previously reported information (i.e., status of event which previously occurred), and/or additional information that is of lower importance. This section may also be utilized to clarify the EAL description provided in Line 4 or correct information provided in previous notifications. If Mix ID, which is used to calculate the dose projection, is known, add to this line.
Standard: Applicant may provide remarks about the emergency, but no specific information is required.
Comment:
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JPM 21. Line 14: Characterize the release as follows (if box A for Line 6 or Line 7 was checked or dose assessment information is not available, proceed to Line 17):
Standard: Applicant proceeds to Line 17 because dose assessment information is not available and leaves Lines 14, 15, and 16 blank.
Comment:
JPM 22. Line 17: Review and Approval
- a. Enter the name of the Emergency Director completing the emergency notification form.
- b. Enter the position of the person approving the emergency notification form.
- c. Enter the time (HH:MM) and date (mm/dd/yy) the emergency notification form is approved. The specified format is required to proceed.
Standard: Applicant signs for approval as the Emergency Director and records the current date and time.
STOP TIME CRITICAL FOR EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM:
_________ (same as time recorded on Line 17)
Comment:
Terminating cue: Applicant returns cue sheet and completed forms.
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ANSWER KEY (DO NOT PROVIDE TO APPLICANTS)
Critical step data is highlighted
- 1. X DRILL B ACTUAL EVENT MESSAGE # ___1___
- 2. X INITIAL B FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION: TIME________DATE_____/_____/__ AUTHENTICATION # _______
- 3. SITE: ___Vogtle___________ Confirmation Phone #1-706-848-3562(SIM)_
- 4. EMERGENCY A UNUSUAL EVENT X ALERT C SITE AREA EMERGENCY D GENERAL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
BASED ON EAL# __RA2________ EAL DESCRIPTION: _High radiation levels in FHB indicative of irradiated fuel damage (or similar wording__________________________________________________________________________________________
- 5. PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS: X NONE B EVACUATE________________________________________________________________________________________
C SHELTER _________________________________________________________________________________________
D Advise Remainder of EPZ to Monitor Local Radio/TV Stations/Tone Alert Radios for Additional Information and Consider the use of KI (potassium iodide) in accordance with State plans and policy.
E OTHER___________________________________________________________________________________________
- 6. EMERGENCY RELEASE: A None X Is Occurring C Has Occurred
- 7. RELEASE SIGNIFICANCE: A Not applicable B Within normal operating X Above normal operating D Under limits limits evaluation
- 8. EVENT PROGNOSIS: A Improving X Stable C Degrading
- 9. METEOROLOGICAL DATA: Wind Direction from_20___ degrees* Wind Speed _4.5___ mph*
(*May not be available for Initial Notifications)*
Precipitation _None_* Stability Class* A B C X E F G
- 10. X DECLARATION B TERMINATION Time __Line 6 of NMP-EP-141-F01__ Date _mm_/_dd__/_yy__
- 11. AFFECTED UNIT(S): X 2 All
- 12. UNIT STATUS: X U1 __0__% Power Shutdown at Time __T -15 min__ Date _Today_/__/___
(Unaffected Unit(s) Status Not Required B U2 _____% Power Shutdown at Time ____________ Date ___/_____/____
for Initial Notifications)
- 13. REMARKS:____________Off-Site Power is Lost to Unit 1________________________________________________________
EMERGENCY RELEASE DATA NOT REQUIRED IF LINE 6 A IS SELECTED.
- 14. RELEASE CHARACTERIZATION: TYPE: A Elevated B Mixed C Ground UNITS: A Ci B Ci/sec C Ci/sec MAGNITUDE: Noble Gases:__________ Iodines:___________ Particulates:__________ Other: ____________
FORM: A Airborne Start Time __________ Date ___/_____/____Stop Time _________ Date ___/_____/____
B Liquid Start Time __________ Date ___/_____/____Stop Time _________ Date ___/_____/____
- 15. PROJECTION PARAMETERS: Projection period: ________Hours Estimated Release Duration ________Hours Projection performed: Time _________ Date ___/_____/____ Accident Type: ________
Site boundary 2 Miles 5 Miles 10 Miles
- 17. APPROVED BY: __Applicant______ Title __ED___ Time _<T +15 from line 10 Date___/_TODAY__/____
NOTIFIED RECEIVED BY: ___________________________ BY: ___________________________ Time ________Date___/_____/____
(To be completed by receiving organization) 14
Verification of Completion Job Performance Measure No.: V-NRC-JP-NMP-EP-141-ILT22 Examinees Name:
Examiners Name:
Date Performed:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Question: ____________________________________________________________________
Response: ___________________________________________________________________
Result: Satisfactory / Unsatisfactory Examiners signature and date: _____________________________ _________________
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THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM Initial Conditions: Unit 1 Seismic Monitoring System indicates the occurrence of a seismic event with its red OBE Exceedance light lit.
Unit 1 reactor tripped 15 minutes ago and is now stable in Mode 3.
RAT 1A and RAT 1B de-energize due to damage.
DG1A and DG1B start and re-energize their associated buses.
SAT is damaged and is NOT available.
1RE-008, Fuel Handling Building, is in INTERMEDIATE alarm and rising.
ARE-2532A/B and ARE-2533A/B, FHB Effluent, are in HIGH alarm and rising.
1RE-12442C, Plant Vent, is in HIGH alarm and rising.
Dose Assessment projections are NOT complete.
Unit 2 reactor tripped 12 minutes ago and is now stable in Mode 3 with no damage or abnormal indications.
Wind direction (10 meter, 15 min. avg.) is currently 20º at 4.5 mph.
Stability class is D with no precipitation.
WebEOC is NOT functional.
Initiating Cue: You are the Emergency Director. Based on the given conditions, perform the following:
- 1) Complete NMP-EP-141-F01, Emergency Classification Determination, Steps 1 - 6 and determine the current emergency classification level.
- 2) Complete NMP-EP-142-F01, Emergency Notification Form (ENF), for the current emergency classification.