ML13311A729
| ML13311A729 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1988 |
| From: | Medford M SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| TAC-65149, NUDOCS 8807280312 | |
| Download: ML13311A729 (63) | |
Text
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON SALT WATER COOLING SYSTEM RELIABILITY STUDY SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT I Introduction By letter dated November 24, 1987, from John 0. Bradfute, NRC, to Mr. Kenneth P. Baskin, SCE, several questions were posed regarding SCE's Reliability Evaluation of the Saltwater Cooling System submitted by SCE letter dated April 1, 1987. This response first restates the NRC question and then provides an appropriate answer.
Responses Responses to NRC questions are attached.
Question No. 1 The SWCS reliability study does not address specifically the responses of the SWCS to various initiating events (for example, the loss of offsite power event).
Show that the estimated SWCS unreliability is bounding for all the initiating events that would affect the SWCS unreliability.
Response to Question No. 1 The Saltwater Cooling System (SWC) reliability study specifically addresses the response of the SWC System to random failures in the system and its support systems, and a conditional loss of offsite power given a turbine trip. Other initiating events were not specifically considered in the analysis since there are limited support system dependencies on the SWC System. However, in response to the question, a more complete review of initiating event impacts on SWC System reliability has been performed.
The initiating events listed in Table 1 were evaluated for their affect on the Saltwater Cooling System (SWCS) operation and reliability. In many cases, various groups of initiating events evoke similar system responses, or none at all.
Events grouped under such categories as reactivity control, core heat removal, RCS heat removal, and RCS inventory and pressure control, do not affect the Saltwater Cooling System in any manner. Initiating events such as reactivity excursions or RCS pressure/level faults coupled with a single system failure would not result in the loss of Saltwater Cooling System function. Initiating events which have no impact on the Saltwater Cooling System or any of its support systems will not have an affect on system reliability. Thus, the bounds established by the current reliability study, which focuses on random failures, envelope the initiating events identified above.
However, initiating events affecting the Saltwater Cooling System or its vital support systems can affect overall system reliability. Such events as loss of offsite power or loss of service air will reduce SWCS reliability.
In this study, a loss of service air is considered because service air supplies the eductor in the primary system for the auxiliary saltwater cooling pump. The service air compressors are primarily dependent on AC power.
However, in accordance with technical specifications, the auxiliary saltwater cooling pump can only be used as a backup to a normal saltwater cooling pump.
That is, the plant will not be permitted to remain at power if only the auxiliary saltwater cooling pump is available. Further, the compressed air system is needed only to start the auxiliary pump; not to keep it running.
Hence, the likelihood that a loss of service air would affect overall SWCS reliability is small in that it would require not only a loss of air but also a loss of both normal and alternate means of saltwater water cooling. While the loss of service air was considered in this analysis, it was not subsequently analyzed quantitatively.
-1
Since the primary contributors to SWC System unreliability in the current study are power related, the SWCS was further evaluated under a loss of offsite power condition. In a loss of offsite power, the Saltwater Cooling System is dependent upon.the Onsite AC Power System. A loss of the diesels (as SWCS support systems) results in similar failure combinations as those currently seen in the study.
To further assess the influence of AC power on the SWCS, a sensitivity analysis was conducted assuming that AC power was always available. Thus, the failure combinations obtained were a direct result of SWC system random component failures such as pump, and valve mechanical failures, and were not driven by support system failures.
The results indicate that the primary contributor to the reliability and operation of the Saltwater Cooling System is the AC power support system.
The attached computer printouts from the IMPORTANCE code show the significant basic events and the dominant minimal cutsets for cases analyzed. The following list will help the reader review the attached output:
Case 1:
Loss of Offsite Power, Normal Heat Load Case 2:
AC Power Available, Normal Heat Load Case 3:
Loss of Offsite Power, Maximum Heat Load Case 4:
AC Power Available, Maximum Heat Load The top event probability for the loss of offsite power case under a normal SWCS heat load (CASE 1) is 3.64 x 10-2 failure/ hour. The top event probability for the separate case where it is assumed that AC power is 100%
available (CASE 2) for the normal heat load condition is 4.2 x 10-8 failure/hour. The contribution of SWCS failures related to the support power systems is the difference between the two values presented:
3.64 x 10 4.2 x 10-8 = 3.64 x 10-2 failure/hour The maximum heat load cases behave similarly to the normal heat load case.
The top event probability given loss of offsite power (CASE 3) is 3.64 x 10-2 failure/hour. The top event probability for the maximum heat load case (CASE 4) with AC power assumed to be 100% available is 3.58 x 10-6 failure/hour. Again, the major difference between these two values is the power support system contribution to the SWCS failures:
3.64 x 10 3.58 x 10-6 = 3.64 x 10-2 failure/hour Note that the resultant failure probabilities for both the normal heat load case and the maximum heat load case are the same. This is due to the fact that the AC power support systems are the major contributors to the SWCS reliability regardless of heat load condition.
Table 1 Initiating Events Considered For The SWCS Reliability Study Loss of RCS Flow (1 or 2 Loops)
Total Loss of RCS Flow Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal CRDM Malfunction, Break, or Failure Dropped Rod Core Power Excursion Leakage in Primary System High Pressurizer Pressure Low Pressurizer Pressure Pressurizer Leakage Pressurizer Spray Failure Pressurizer Heater Failure Pressurizer Relief or Safety Valve Opening Inadvertent Safety Injection/Signal Containment Pressure Problems CVCS Malfunction - Boron Dilution Pressure, Temperature, Power Imbalance-Rod Position Error Startup of Inactive Coolant Pump Loss or Reduction in Feedwater Flow (1 or 2 Steam Generators)
Total Loss of Feedwater Flow (All Steam Generators)
Reduction in Feedwater Temperature Increase in Feedwater Flow (1 or 2 Steam Generators)
Feedwater Flow Instability - Operator Error Feedwater Flow Instability - Miscellaneous Mechanical Causes Loss of Condensate Pumps (1 pump)
Loss of Condensate Pumps (All pumps)
Loss of Condenser Vacuum Steam Generator Leakage Steam Generator Tube Rupture Condenser Leakage Miscellaneous Leakage in Secondary System Table 1 -
continued One or More Steam Generator Safety Valves Fails Open One or More Steam Dump Valves Fails Open Loss of Circulating Water Loss of Component Cooling Water Loss of Saltwater Cooling Throttle Valve Closure*- EHC Problems Throttle Valve Opening -
EHC Problems Generator Trip or Generator-caused Faults Reduction of External Load on Generator Loss of External Load on Generator Turbine Generator Overload Loss of Offsite Power/Station Blackout Loss of Power to Necessary Plant Systems Loss of One or More DC Buses Loss of One or More Emergency AC Buses Loss of One or Any Combination of Vital Buses Automatic Reactor Trip - No Transient Condition Auto/Manual Trip Due to Operator Error Spurious Reactor Trip - Cause Unknown Manual Trip Due to False Signals Manual Scram -
No Transient Condition Spurious Trip -
Cause Unknown Planned Shutdown Loss of Coolant Accidents Large, Medium, Small, and Small-Small Feedwater Line Break Steam Line Break Loss of Instrument Air System Loss of Decay Heat Removal Reactor Vessel Rupture Interfacing System LOCA Ouestion No. 2 The common-cause failures are not treated explicitly in the fault tree for the SWCS unreliability. Show that the estimated SWCS unreliability includes the contribution of common-cause failure that may affect the operation of pumps, valves and other components in the SWCS.
Response to Question No. 2 Common-cause failure of the diesel generators was treated explicitly in the fault tree models. By use of POSTPROCESSOR code, the common-cause contribution to the diesel failures was factored in the model.
Common-cause failure of the valves in the Saltwater Cooling System was also considered, but was not modeled since the valves in the SWC System are all normally open, manually operated valves. To this extent, there are no failures modes, other than "left closed after test or maintenance," which are common to these valves. Failure of the valves to be in the correct position following test or maintenance is specifically included in the fault tree models.
Common-cause failure of the SWC pumps was also considered. In this regard, it was determined that the pumps do not have significant design, operation, or maintenance features in common for the conditions analyzed. Pumps G-13A and G-13B are of a different design than pump G-13C, and as such do not employ similar types of maintenance or control features. Pump G-13A and G-13B are vertically mounted centrifugal pumps capable of pumping 4620 gpm.
Each pump is powered by a 100 HP 480V AC induction motor. Pumps G-13A and G-13B are designed for continuous operation. Pump G-13C is a horizontally mounted suction lift centrifugal pump. A suction lift pump must be primed by an air operated eductor in conjunction with a vacuum priming tank. Pump G-13C is not designed for continuous operation because it takes suction before the screen and rakes. Pumps G-13A and G-13B are functionally different since one pump is normally running while the other is normally in standby (the pumps are usually alternated on a monthly schedule, i.e., G-13A is run for a month then shutdown, G13B is then run for a month, etc.).
The causes for one pump failing to start from a standby configuration would not be common to those of the other pump which had previously demonstrated a successful start and run period. In the case of common-cause failure to run, it is assumed that maintenance is not performed simultaneously or sequentially on both SWC pumps. This results in the conclusion that common-cause failures to run would not be expected to affect the standby pump for the same time period during which the normally operating pump successfully ran.
Common-cause failure of the screen wash pumps and firewater pumps was also considered. Based on the requirement that both pumps of either set operate to provide sufficient heat removal capability in place of the normal SWCS pumps, common-cause failure of the second pump is inconsequential given the first fails.
Question No. 3 The SWCS unreliability may be affected by testing. For example, an operator may leave a manual valve in the closed position after a test. Show that the testing contribution to the SWCS unreliability is not significant.
Response to Question No. 3 In accordance with "Operations In-Service Valve Testing Procedure" (No. 501-12.4-2) the auxiliary saltwater cooling pump valve SWC-381 is cycled for testing. This valve is opened to verify flow through the discharge check valve. If left in the open position, there would not be any adverse affects on the SWC System. Other SWCS valves are aligned in the open position by normal operating procedures and have valve position verified monthly. They are not required to be cycled for their respective check valve flow verification since they are normally open. Hence, the SWC System reliability is not affected by testing.
Question No. 4 It is not obvious whether the SWCS fault tree includes failures of pump breakers and their instrumentation and controls. Determine their contribution to the SWCS unreliability.
Response to Question No. 4 Modifications were made to the Saltwater Cooling System fault trees to include pump breakers. The pressure switch which starts the adjacent pump on low discharge pressure was already included in the model.
The results of the modifications are included in the analysis output for the cases specified in Question No. 1.
Question No. 5 The SWCS at SONGS-1 has experienced many failure events relating to its pumps and valves. Hence, provide a technical basis that the generic failure rates in the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) data base are appropriate for use in the SWCS reliability study for SONGS-1.
Response to Question No. 5 While SONGS-1 has experienced several failures to start of its pumps, records indicate that the failures were generally attributable to design features of the system, and not the pumps. Further, the design features contributing to the failures have been modified to eliminate the failures.
The most significant incident which resulted in a total loss of Saltwater Cooling System flow occurred on March 10, 1980. This event involved a triple failure consisting of (1) shearing of the south saltwater cooling pump shaft, (2) failure of the redundant pump's discharge power operated valve to open, and (3) excessive air in-leakage to the auxiliary saltwater cooling pump air priming system.
The operators cross-connected the backup screen wash pumps to the SWC System in order to provide cooling flow to the component cooling water heat exchangers.
Shearing of the pump shaft was determined to be due to excessive vibration caused by worn bearings. The loss of that pump due to shaft failure in itself would have resulted in the subsequent starting of the standby SWCS pump and opening of the pump discharge power operated valve. The standby pump did start but flow was prevented due to the discharge power operated valve failing to open. This condition has since been corrected by removing the discharge valve power operators (on both pumps), installing manual operators, and leaving the valves normally open. Additionally, since the discharge valves remain open during normal operation, a check valve has been installed upstream of each discharge valve to prevent back flow through the idle pump. The auxiliary saltwater cooling pump was started upon loss of saltwater cooling flow but was prevented from supplying saltwater due to air leaks in the air priming system. Leaks in the air priming system have since been identified and resealed and the priming system upgraded. To date, there have been no further reported failures of the air priming system.
The failures identified above have been addressed specifically by design changes. Each of these is a unique failure which has been corrected and is not expected to re-occur in the future. Hence, the probabilistic models developed to support this analysis did not include these failures.
Pump failure rates and associated error factors are taken directly from the generic data base defined in the IREP Procedures Guide. This data is consistent with the plant specific data analyzed. For example, plant personnel indicated that the SWC pumps have failed four times while running over the past ten years, resulting in a failure to run rate of 4.6 x 10-5/hr. This value is consistent with the IREP Procedures Guide failure rate of 3.0 x 10-5/hr. Because of the lack of sufficient plant-specific data, the values from IREP were used throughout the study for component failure rates. The significant amount of failure data incorporated in the IREP Procedures Guide data base makes its importance to this analysis more valuable than the plant-specific data. However, the plant specific data trend is generally consistent with the IREP Procedure Guide data.
9303F DSN=NUSAFL.S1.ERIN.REL.SHCS.CASE1.JA88.IS.DATA 7/88 12:03:16 PAGE 1
BASIC EVENTS EXHIBITING SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE BASIC FUSSELL-VESELY RANK.
EVENT NAME BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION IMPORTANCE 1
UNASDGEH 1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 0.829 2
UGE10.5Y 1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 HIN 0.425 2
UGEOOO1S DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 0.425 3
UGE0001R 1-AC-DG 81 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 0.403 4
UGE205Y 1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 0.289 5
DG2/1R 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO RUN 24HR GIVN DG1 FAILS 0.278 6
DG2/1S 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO START GIVN DG1 FAILS 0.224 7
1,.
UGEOOOR 1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 0.196 a
UGE0002M DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 0.177 9
UOPSDGEV 1-AFN-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS 62 TO SDGE LINE 0.176 10 UGEOOO1M DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 IN MAINTENANCE 0.119 11 UGE0002S
'DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO START 0.065 12 UOPDGCMN 1-AC-OPERATORS INADVERT PARALLEL 4160V BUS 0.032 13 UOPCB15N 1-AC-OP INCORRECTLY CLOSES BKR 12C15 0.027 14 UOPCB14V 1-AC-OP FAILS TO CORRECTLY CLOSE BKR 11C14 0.020 15 UCB2C15N 1-AC-BREAKER 12C15 FAILS TO CLOSE 0.016 16 UCB1C14N 1-AC-CIRCUIT BREAKER 11C14 FAILS TO CLOSE 0.012
E DSN=NUSAF1.S1. ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE1.JA88.IS.@DATA 0
7/88 12:03:16 PAGE 2
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 8.360E-03 DG2/1R 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO RUN 24HR GIVN DG1 FAILS 1.600E-01 0.2297 0.2297 UGE0001R -
1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01 6.726E-03 DG2/1S 1-AC-DG2 FAILS 1T START GIVN DG1 FAILS 1.200E-01 0.1848 0.4146 UGE0001S -- DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 UGE10.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+00 UGE20.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UNASDGEN AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL'AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01 3.083E-03 UGE0001S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0847 0.4993 UGE0002R -
1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 UGE10.5Y 1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO.
1 T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+00 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01 2.578E-03 UGEOOO1S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0709 0.5702 UGE0002M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 UGE10.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+00 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01
DSN=NUSAF1.Sl.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASEl.JA88.IS.DATA
/88 12:03:16 PAGE 3
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 2.403E-03 UGE0001M -DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 0.0661 0.6362 UGEOOO2R -
1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 2.403E-03 UGE0001R -
1-AC-DG 81 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 0.0661 0.7023 UGE0002M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 1.760E-03 DG2/1R AC-DGZ FAILS TO RUN 24HR GIVN DGI FAILS 1.600E-01 0.0484 0.7506 UGEOOO1R -
1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 UOPSDGEV -
1-AFH-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS #2 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 1.416E-03 DG2/1S 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO START GIVN DG1 FAILS 1.200E-01 0.0389 0.7896 UGE0001S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 UGE1O.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+00 UGE2O.SY -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UOPSDGEV -
1-AFH-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS 12 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 9.927E-04 UGEOO01R -
1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 0.0273 0.8168 UGE0002S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO START 1.900E-02 UGE2O.SY -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UNASDGEH -,
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01
DSN=NUSAF.Sl.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE1.JA88.IS.DATA @0 7/88 12:03:16 PAGE 4
DOMIINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 9.500E-04 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 0.0261 0.8429 UOPDGCMH -
1-AC-OPERATORS INADVERT PARALLEL 4160V BUS 1.000E-03 8.303E-04 UGEO00M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 0.0228 0.8658 UGE002S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO START 1.900E-02 UGE2O.5Y'- 1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+00 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SOGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01 6.490E-04 UGEOOO1S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0178 0.8836 UGEOOO2R -
1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 UGE1O.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+00 UOPSDGEV -
1-AFN-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS 82 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 5.428E-04 UGE0001S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0149 0.8985 UGE0002M-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 UGE10.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UOPSDGEV -
1-AFN-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS 82 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 5.060E-04 UGEOQOIR -
1-AC-DG 91 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 0.0139 0.9124 UGE0002M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 UOPSDGEV:- 1-AFM-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS 62 TO SOGE LINE 2.000E-01
DSN=NUSAF.S1.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE1.JA88.IS.DATA 7/88 12:03:16 PAGE 5
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 5.060E-04 UGE0001M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 0.0139 0.9263 UGE0002R -
1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 UOPSOGEV -
1-AFN-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS 62 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 2.802E-04 UGE0001S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0077 0.9340 UGE10.5Y AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 UOPCB15H -
1-AC-OP INCORRECTLY CLOSES BKR 12C15 5.000E-03 2.612E-04 UGE0002R-1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 0.0072 0.9412 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 UOPCB14V -
1-AC-OP FAILS TO CORRECTLY CLOSE BKR 11C14 5.000E-03 2.612E-04 UGE0001R -
1-AC-DG 11 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 0.0072 0.9484 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.5OOE-01 UOPCB15H -
1-AC-OP INCORRECTLY CLOSES BKR 12C15 5.00OE-03 2.185E-04 UGE0002M -,DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 0.0060 0.9544 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 UOPCB14V -
1-AC-OP FAILS TO CORRECTLY CLOSE BKR 11C14 5.000E-03
DSN=NUSAFl.S1.ERIN.REL.SHCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA 6/88 19:27:05 PAGE BASIC EVENTS EXHIBITING SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE BASIC FUSSELL-VESELY RANK EVENT NAME BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION IMPORTANCE 1
PHV720AP MOV-720A FAILS TO OPEN (RAND CAUSES) 0.429 2
PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 0.325 3
FCVO382N 1-SHC-FLON DIV-CHECK VLV SWC382 FAILS TO CLOSE 0.299 4
PFOREBYJ 1-SNC-NO WATER IN FOREBAY 0.275 5
POPDIASH OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SHC SYSTEM 0.252 5
POPOS26U 1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOH PROC SO1-2.4-1 0.252 6
PPMG13BR 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 0.173 7
G13A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 0.168 8
PHEE20BE HEAT EXCH. E-20B TUBE SIDE FOULED 0.157 9
PPMG13CM 1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOWN DUE TO MAINT.
0.119 10 PCBG13CN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 0.096 10 POPO381U 1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 0.096 10 PPMG13CS 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 0.096 10 POPG13CU 1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 (G13C 0.096 11 PPMG13AR 1-SHC-SNC PUMP SWC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN 0.075 12 PPMG13BM 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B 0OHN DUE TO MAINT 0.033 13 PPMG13BS 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO START 0.027 13 PCBG13BN BREAKER TO SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO CLOSE 0.027 14 PPMG13CR 1-SHC-AUX SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN 0.022 15 PXVO301X 1-SHC-MANUAL VALVE SDH-301 LEFT CLOSED AFTR MA 0.015 16 PXVO303X MAN VALVE SHC-303 LEFT CLOSED AFTR MAINT 0.014 16 PXVO331X MAN VALVE CCH-331 LEFT CLOSE AFTR MAINT.
0.014
DSNllhNAF A
S1.ERIN. REL.SHCS.CASE.JA88.XS.DATA 19:27-05 PAGE 2
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 9.OOOE-09 FCVO382N -
1-SHC-FLON DIV-CHECK VLV SHC382 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.000E-03 0.2134 0.2134 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 PHV720AP -
MOV-720A FAILS TO OPEN (RAND CAUSES) 3.OOOE-03 6.OOOE-09 PHEE20BE -
HEAT EXCH. E-20B TUBE SIDE FOULED 2.OOOE-06 0.1422 0.3556 PHV72OAP -
MOV-720A FAILS TO OPEN (RAND CAUSES) 3.OOOE-03 2.160E-09 FCVO382N -
1-SNC-FLON DIV-CHECK VLV SWC382 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.OOOE-03 0.0512 0.4068 PHV720AP -
MOV-720A FAILS TO OPEN IRAND CAUSES) 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13AR -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 1.110E-09 PFOREBYJ -
1-SHC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.00OE-04 0.0263 0.4331 POP0526U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13C DONN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 1.110E-09 PFOREBYJ -
1-SNC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.000E-04 0.0263 0.4595 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOWN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 9.OOOE-10 PCBG13CN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0213 0.4808 PFOREBYJ -
1-SNC-NO WATER IN FOREBAY.
1.000E-04 POP0526U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03
DSN=NUSAF.Sl.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA 6/88 19:27:05 PAGE 3
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 9.000E-10 PFOREBYJ 1-SNC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.000E-04 0.0213 0.5021 POPDIASH OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SHC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 POPO381U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 3.OOOE-03 9.000E-10 PFOREBYJ-1-SHC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.OOOE-04 0.0213 0.5235 POPG13CU -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 (G13C 3.OOOE-03 POP0526U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 9.000E-10 PFOREBYJ -
1-SNC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.00OE-04 0.0213 0.5448 POPO381U 1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 3.OOOE-03 POP0526U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 9.000E-10 PFOREBYJ -
1-SNC-NO WATER IN FOREBAY 1.000E-04 0.0213 0.5661 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS.TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 POPGl3CU -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOH PROC S01-7-11 (G13C 3.OOOE-03 9.000E-10 PFOREBYJ,- 1-SHC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.00OE-04 0.0213 0.5875 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CS -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03
DSN=NUSAF.S1.ERIN.REL.SWCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA 0
06/88 19:27:05 PAGE 4
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 9.OOOE-10 PFOREBYJ 1-SHC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.000E-04 0.0213 0.6088 POP0526U-1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC SO1-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CS -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 9.OOOE-10 PCBG13CN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0213 0.6302 PFOREBYJ -
1-SNC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.000E-04 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SHC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 7.992E-10 Gl3A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.000E-O1 0.0189 0.6491 POPDIASN -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 PPMG13CM -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOHN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 7.992E-10 G13A/BR -
1-SHC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.000E-01 0.0189 0.6681 POP0526U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 PPMG13CM -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C DONN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 6.480E-10 G13A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.000E-01 0.0154 0.6834 POPO381U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 3.OOOE-03 POP0526U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC SO1-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR.- 1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04
DSN=NUSAF1.S1. ERIN. REL.SNCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA 10 06/88 19:27:05 PAGE 5
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 6.480E-10 G13A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.OOOE-01 0.0154 0.6988
-.POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 POPG13CU -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC SO1-7-11 (G13C 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 6.480E-10 G13A/BR 1-SHC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.OOOE-01 0.0154 0.7141 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 POPO381U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 6.480E-10 G13A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.000E-01 0.0154 0.7295 POPG13CU -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 (G13C 3.OOOE-03 POPOS26U 1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC SO1-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SNC-SHC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 6.480E-10.
G13A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.000E-01 0.0154 0.7449 POP0526U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 PPMG13CS -
1-SWC-SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03
DSN=NUSAFl.S1.ERIN.REL.SHCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA @
/06/88 19:Z7:05 PAGE 6
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 6.480E-10 G13A/BR 1-SWC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.00OE-01 0.0154 0.7602 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 PPMG13CS -
1-SHC-SHC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 6.480E-10 G13A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.OOOE-01 0.0154 0.7756 PCBG13CN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 POP0526U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-2.4-1 3.000E-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 6.480E-10 G13A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.OOOE-01 0.0154 0.7910 PCBG13CN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR 1-SWC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04
- 3. OOOE-10 FCVO382N -
1-SNC-FLON DIV-CHECK VLV SHC382 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.000E-03 0.0071 0.7981 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 PXVO303X-MAN VALVE SHC-303 LEFT CLOSED AFTR MAINT 1.00OE-04 3.000E-10 FCVO382N -
1-SHC-FLON DIV-CHECK VLV SWC382 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.000E-03 0.0071 0.8052 PFOREBYJ SNC-NO NATER IN FOREBAY 1.000E-04 PHV720AP -
MOV-720A FAILS TO OPEN (RAND CAUSES) 3.OOOE-03
DSN=NUSAFLS1.ERIN.REL.SHCS.CASE.JA88.IS.DAT 06/88 19:27:05 PAGE 7
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION.
CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OFTOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 3.OOOE-10 FCVO382N -
1-SHC-FLON DIV-CHECK VLV SNC382 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.OOOE-03 0.0071 0.8123 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 PXVP331X R
BMAN VALVE CCR-331 LEFT CLOSE AFTR MAINT.
1.UVE-04 3.OOOE-10 FCVO382N -
1-SNC-FLON DIV-CHECK VLV SHC382 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.OOOE-03 0.0071 0.8194 PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 PXVO301X -
1-SHC-MANUAL VALVE SDN-301 LEFT CLOSED AFTR MA 1.00OE-04 2.160E-10 PFOREBYJ -
1-SNC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.OOOE-04 0.0051 0.8245 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CR -
1-SNC-AUX SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN 7.20OE-04 2.160E-1o PFOREBYJ 1-SNC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.00OE-04 0.0051 0.8296 POPOS26U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOH PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CR -
1-SNC-AUX SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 2.OOOE-10 PHEE20BE.- HEAT EXCH. E-20B TUBE SIDE FOULED 2.OOOE-06 0.0047 0.8344 PXVO331X -
MAN VALVE CCH-331 LEFT CLOSE AFTR MAINT.
1.000E-04 2.OOOE-10 PHEE20BE -
HEAT EXCH. E-20B TUBE SIDE FOULED 2.000E-06 0.0047 0.8391 PXVO303X -
MAN VALVE SHC-303 LEFT CLOSED AFTR MAINT 1.00OE-04
DSN=NUSAFL.S1.ERIN.REL.SHCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA 06/88 19:e7:05 PAGE 8
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 2.000E-10 PHEE2OBE -
HEAT EXCH. E-20B TUBE SIDE FOULED 2.000E-06 0.0047 0.8439 PXVO301X -
1-SWC-MANUAL VALVE SDN-301 LEFT CLOSED AFTR.MA 1.OOOE-04 1.555E-10 Gl3A/BR 1-SWC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.000E-01 0.0037 0.8476 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SHC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR-1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 PPMG13CR -
1-SHC-AUX SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 1.555E-10 G13A/BR -
1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.OOOE-01 0.0037 0.8512 POP0526U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC 501-2.4-1
.3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BR -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 PPMG13CR -<1-SNC-AUX SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 1.232E-10 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0029 0.8542 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -. 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-138 DOHN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C DONN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 1.232E-10 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0029 0.8571 POP0526U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC 501-2.4-1 3.000E-03 PPMG13BM -
I-SNC-SHC PUMP G-13B DONN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C DONN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03
DSN=NUSAFL.S1.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA
/06/88 19:27:05 PAGE 9
DOMINANT HINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8595 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SWC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B DOWN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 PPMG13CS -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8618 POP0526U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC SO1-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -
1-SWC-SHC PUMP G-13B DOWN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 PPMG13CS -
1-SNC-SHC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8642 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BS -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SWC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOWN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN - BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8666 PCBG13BN -
BREAKER TO SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 POP0526U -
1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC SO1-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SWC-SWC PUMP G-13C DON DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03
DSNlUSAF.S1.ERIN.REL.SHCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA @
06/88 19:27:05 PAGE 10 DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 0.0024 0.8689 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 POPO381U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B DONN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8713 POPDIASH OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 POPG13CU -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW-PROC S01-7-11 (G13C 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -. 1-SNC-SWC PUMP G-13B DONN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8737 POPO381U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 3.OOOE-03 POPOS26U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC SO1-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B DOWN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8760 POPG13CU -
1-SWC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC SO1-7-11 (G13C 3.OOOE-03 POP0526U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -
1-SWC-SWC PUMP G-13B DOWN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03
DSN=NUSAF1.S1.E RIN.REL.SNCS.CASE2.JA88.IS.DATA 06/88 19:27:05 PAGE 11 DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8784 PCBG13BN -
BREAKER TO SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13C DONN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8808 PCBG13CN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 POPDIASH -
OP FAILS TO DIAGNOSE LOSS OF SNC SYSTEM 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B DONN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN - BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8831 POPOS26U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC SO1-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BS 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOHN DUE.TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 9.990E-11 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0024 0.8855 PCBG13CN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 POP0526U -
1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC S01-2.4-1 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -
1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B DOWN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03
DSN=NUSAFl.S1.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE3.JA88.IS.DATA @
6/88 19:27:45 PAGE BASIC EVENTS EXHIBITING SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE BASIC FUSSELL-VESELY RANK EVENT NAME BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION IMPORTANCE 1
UNASDGEH 1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 0.828 2
UGE0001S DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 0.425 2
UGE10.5Y 1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 0.425 3
UGEOOO1R 1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 0.403 4
UGE20.5Y 1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO.
2 BY T=30 MIN 0.289 5
DG2/1R 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO RUN 24HR GIVN DG1 FAILS 0.278 6
DG2/1S 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO START GIVN DGI FAILS 0.224 7
UGE0002R 1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 0.196 8
UGE0002M DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 0.177 9
UOPSDGEV 1-AFH-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS #2 TO SOGE LINE 0.176 10 UGE0001M DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 IN MAINTENANCE 0.119 11 UGE0002S DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO START 0.065 12 UOPDGCMH 1-AC-OPERATORS INADVERT PARALLEL 4160V BUS 0.032 13 UOPCB15N 1-AC-OP INCORRECTLY CLOSES BKR 12C15 0.027 14 UOPCB14V 1-AC-OP FAILS TO CORRECTLY CLOSE BKR 11C14 0.020 15 UCB2C1SN 1-AC-BREAKER 12C15 FAILS TO CLOSE 0.016 16 UCB1C14N 1-AC-CIRCUIT BREAKER 11C14 FAILS TO CLOSE 0.012
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 8.360E-03 DG2/1R 1-AC-DGZ FAILS TO RUN 24HR GIVN DG1 FAILS 1.600E-01 0.2297 0.2297 UGEOOO1R -
1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 UNASDGEH 1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 6.726E-03 DG2/IS 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO START GIVN DGi FAILS 1.200E-01 0.1848 0.4145 UGEOOO1S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 UGE10.SY -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+0O UGE20.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+00 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01 3.083E-03 UGEOOO1S - DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0847 0.4991 UGE0002R -
1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 UGE10.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01 2.578E-03 UGE0001S - DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0708 0.5700 UGE0002M - DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 UGE1O.5Y -.1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-O1
DSN=NUSAF1.S1.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE3.JA88.IS.DATA 06/88 19:27:45 PAGE 3
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 2.403E-03 UGEOOO1R -
1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 0.0660 0.6360 UGE0002M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 2.403E-03 UGE0001M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 0.0660 0.7020 UGE0002R -
1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SKYRD 9.500E-01 1.760E-03 DG2/1R 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO RUN 24HR GIVN DGI FAILS 1.600E-01 0.0484 0.7504 UGE0001R -
1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 UOPSDGEV -
1-AFN-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS #2 TO SOGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 1.416E-03 DG2/1S 1-AC-DG2 FAILS TO START GIVN DG1 FAILS 1.200E-01 0.0389 0.7893 UGE0001S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 UGE10.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 HIN 1.OOOE+00 UGE20.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 1.OOOE+00 UOPSDGEV -
1-AFM-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS #2 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 9.927E-04 UGEOOIR -
1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 0.0273 0.8166 UGE0002S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO START 1.900E-02 UGE20.5Y -
1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 U4ASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01
DSN=NUSAF1.S1.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE3.JA88.IS.DATA
/88 19:27:45 PAGE 4
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY S9.500E-04 UNASDGEH 1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 0.0261 0.8427 OPOGCHN 1-AC-OPERATORS INADVERT PARALLEL 4160V BUS 1.000E-03 8 303E-04 UGE0001M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 0.0228 0.8655 UGE0002S DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO START 1.900E-02 UGE20 SY AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UNASDGEH 1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 6-490E-04 UGEOOO1S -DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0178 0.8833 UGEOOO2R 1-AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 UGE1O.5Y 1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO' 1 T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UPSDGEV 1-AFW-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS 12 TO SOGE LINE 2.000E-01 5 428E 04 UGE001S DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0149 0.8982 UGE002M DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 UGE10.SY 1-AC-NO REPAIR OF DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UOPSDGEV 1 AFH-OP FAILS TO REALIGN BUS 12 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 5.060E-04 UGEO001H -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO.
1 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 0.0139 0.9121 UGE0002R AC-DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 U0PSDGEV 1-AFH-0P FAILS TO REALIGN BUS #t2 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-O1
DSN=NUSAF1.S1.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE3.JA88.IS.DATA
/88 19:27:45 PAGE 5
DOMINANT HINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL.
OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 5.060E-04 UGE0001R -
1-AC-DG #1 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.500E-02 0.0139 0.9260 UGEO002M -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 2 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 UOPSDGEV-1-AFH-0P FAILS TO REALIGN BUS #2 TO SDGE LINE 2.OOOE-01 2.802E-04 UGEOOO1S -
DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 FAILS TO START 5.900E-02 0.0077.
w 0.9337 UGE1O.5Y-- 1-AC-NOREPAIR O DIESEL NO. 1 T=30 MIN 1.000E+00 UNASDGEH 1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAILAFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 UOPCB15H 1-AC-OP INCORRECTLY CLOSES BKR 12C15 5.000E-03 r'.
A'<AAA,~
2 612E-04 UGE0001R AC-DG 81 FAILS TO RUN FOR 24 HOURS 5.S00E-02 0.0072 0.9409 UNASDGEH 1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 UOC1 1AC-OP INCORRECTLY CLOSES BKR 12C15 5.OOOE-03 2.612E-04 UGE0002R-1.-ACDIESEL GENERATOR NO.
2 FAILS TO RUN 5.500E-02 0.0072 0.9481 UNASDGEH -
1-AC-SDGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SHYRD 9.500E-01 UOPCB14V 1-AC-OP FAILS TO CORRECTLY CLOSE BKR 11C14 5.0 E-03 2.185E-04 UGE0O1H DIESEL GENERATOR NO. 1 IN MAINTENANCE 4.600E-02 0.0060 0.9541 UNASDGER 1-AC-SOGE 12KV LINE UNAVAIL AFTR LOSS OF SNYRD 9.500E-01 U0PCB15N 1-AC-OP INCORRECTLY CLOSES BKR 12C15 5.000E-03
DSN=NUSAFL.S1.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE4.JA88.IS.DATA 6/88 19:28:34 PAGE BASIC EVENTS EXHIBITING SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE BASIC FUSSELL-VESELY RANK EVENT NAME BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION IMPORTANCE 1
PFOREBYJ 1-SNC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 0.462 2
PPMG13BR 1-SHC-SHC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 0.342 3
G13A/BR 1-SC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 0.332 4
PPMG13CM 1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOHN DUE TO MAINT.
0.218 5
PCBG13CN
'BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 0.177 5
PPMG13CS 1-SHC-SHC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 0.177 5
POPO381U 1-SHC-OPER FAILS'TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 0.177 5s.
POPG13CU 1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 G13C 0.177 6
PCBGI3AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 0.166 7
PPMG13BM 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B DONN DUE TO MAINT 0.064 PCBG13BN BREAKER TO SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO CLOSE 0.051, 8
PPMG13BS 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO START 0.051 9
PPMG13CR 1-SNC-AUX SWC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN 0.042 10 PPMG13AR 1-SNC-SNC PUMP SHC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN 0.038 11 PHV720AP MOV-720A FAILS TO OPEN (RAND CAUSES) 0.024 12 POPo3O2U 1-S C-FLOW DIV OPER FAILS TO CLOSE SWC-302 0.011 12 POPO300U 1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11(SNC-3 0.011
DSN=NUSAF1.Si.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE4.JA88.IS.DATA 6/88 19:28:34
. PAGE 2
- - m---.
t...
I
- 1.
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION.
- .FRACTION csT EVENT OF TOTAL' OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY.
3.700E-07 PFOREBYJ*
1-SWC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.00E-04 0.1032 0.1032
. PPMG13CM 1-SNC-SWC PUMP G-13C DOWN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03.
- 3. OOOE07 2
PCBG13CN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0837 0.1869 3.000E-07 2PFOREBY' 1-SWC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 2
1.000E-04 0.083 027 POG13CU 1-SNC-0PE AILS TO FOLLNPRCE1--1G1C 300E0 000OE-07 IPFRB 17N-0NFRI OEA 1.000E-04 0.0837 0.3544 222222224.
2:SCT OLWPO 0
AI 0 TOLIL01--11 G1C 3.000E-03 3.OOOE 07 PFOREBYJ 1-SWC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY, 1000E-04 2
0.0837 0.2381 PPG13CU SHC-OPER FAILS TOFOLLOW PROC S1-7-11 0E-03 2.664E-072 PFREBYJ' SHC-N-1HATERIN FOREBAY GIVN13BFAIS 1.00E-04 2
-0.072 0.351 PPMG13BR-, 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS.TO R
7.00E1-04,.
PMG13CH
-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13CDON DUETO MAINT.
-3.700E-03 2..160E-07 G13A/BR 1I-SHC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS
'1.000E-01:
0.0603 0.5727.
PPG SCSK.PM G-1BFAILSJ RUN.
7.200E-04 P1PG1 1-SHC-SP FAILS TO FLO POSTART7 3.00E-03
.2
..22
.22
DSN NUSAF1.S1.ERINREL.SNCS.CASE4.JA88.IS.DATA
/88 19:28:34 PAGE DOMINANT HINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION UTSET EVENT OFTOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY
- 2. 160E-07 ',
G13A/BR 1 SNC G 13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.00E-01 0.0603 0.6329 POPG13CU 1 SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOWIPROC SO 11 (G13C 3.000E-03
'.2 4 160E 07 G13A/BRo
-,1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.000E-01 0.0603,0.6932
~~.
POPO381U -1SNC-0PER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 3.000E-03 7
PPMG13BR 1 -SNC-SNC PUMP G-138 FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 60E-07 G13A/BR 1-SC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1 000E-01 0.0603 0.7535 PCBG13CN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE
- 3. OOOE-03 PPMG13BR 1-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04
7.200E-08 PFOREBYJ-1-SNC-NO HATER IN FOREBAY 1.000E-04 0.0201 0.7736
.5
- 1,~
PPMG13CR '1-SNC-AUX SHC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN
.7
- 7
- 200E-04'.
- 5. 184E08 G13A/BR 1-SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN GIVN 13B FAILS 1.OOOE-01 0.0145 0.7880 PPMG13CN -B 1-SHP-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200 E-04 PPMGi3CR 1-SNC-AUX SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 107E-08 PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.00E-03 0.0115 0.7995 PPMG13BM'1-SC-SNC PUMP G-13B DOHN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 oPPMG13CM 1
-SHC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOFIN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 55MGkR5 7
' s
'.5.
ild5l..
M,,
- dl sw w
- 1.
If
~
.S.
I.~'.5.I S.~
5 5. ~ SI 1 S~.5 5.~S S..
C~ %S..S..S.. ~~
5 5S 5 5~ 5 ~
5 54.5
~
~
le 0
SN=NUSAF1.S1.ERIN.REL.SNCS.CASE4.JA88.IS.DATA6 19:28:4 PAGE 4
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION TSET EVENT OF TOTAL
"'OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY
'4
'3 330E-08.CBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP
-13A FAILS TO CLOSE
- 3. OOE-03 0.0093 0.808 a,
.4 4B1Ak88 PPMG13BS -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO START,,
3.OOOE-03x-.
S1-SNC-SC PUMP G-13C DON DUE' TO MAINT.
3
-3 3.330E-08
-'PCBG13AN, BREAKER TO PUMPIG-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 009 088 PCBG13CN -
RAE OPUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE.
3.000E-03 PPMG13CM -
1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOWN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 3.330E 08 PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0093 0.887 B
3BN REAK TO PUMP13B GO 138FI O
CLIN 3.000E-03 1
.SW S
P 1
ON ETMAT 3.7O44-034.
3.330-08 CB~iAN BEAKE TO UMP
-13AFAILS TO CLSS300E0A.09R086 3.330E-08 PCBG13AN Z44 BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-0360 POPO381U, 1-SHC-0PER FAILSjTO FOLLOW PROC 01-7-1 3.0001OOE-03 PMGBM 1
C NC, PP B
PIG13BM 1-SNC-SN PM G-13B DUON DUE TO AINT
- 3. 700E-03
OSN=NUSAF.S1.ERIN.REL.SHCS.CASE4.JA88.IS.DATA
/88 19:28:34 PAGE 5
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION ACUTSET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 3.330E-08 PCBG13AN' BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 0.0093 0.8552 POPG13CU 1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC SO1-7-11 (G13C 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13BM -
1-SHC-SWC PUMP G-13B DONN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 2.700E-08 PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0075 0.8628 PCBG13CN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 PPMG13BS 1 -SWC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 2.700E -08 PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0075 0.8703 PCBG13BN,-
BREAKER TO SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 POPO381U 1-SHC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLON PROC S01-7-11 3.000E-03 700E-08 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 0.0075 0.8778 PCBG13BN -
BREAKER TO SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 PPMG13CS-1-SWC-SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 2.700E-08 PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0075 0.8854 PM(13BS 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO START 3.000E-03 PPMG13CS 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03
DSN=NUSAFL1.5.ERIN.REL.SWCS.CASE4.JA88.IS.DATA
/88 19:28:34 PAGE 6
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CUTSET
'EVENT OF TOTAL,
.OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY 2.700E-08 PCBG13AN -7BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 0.0075 0.8929 PCBG13BN BREAKER TO SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO CLOSE
- 3. 000E-03 POPG13CU 1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC S01-7-11 1G13C 3.OOOE-03 2.700E-08 PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE.
3.OOOE-03 0.0075 0.9004 PHV720AP -
MOV-720A FAILS TO OPEN (RAND CAUSES) 3.000E-03 POPO300U 1-SWC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC SOl-7-11(SWC-3 3.OOOE-03 2.700E-08'
'N PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS' TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 0.0075 0.9080 PCBG13BN BREAKER TO SNC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 PCBG13CN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 f~Cf
.700E-08 PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03
'0.0075 0.9155 POPO381U 1-SNC-OPER FAILS'TO FOLLOW PROC SO1-7-11
- 3. OOOE-03 PPMG13BS 1-SWC-SWC PUMP G 138 FAILS TO START 3.000E-03 2.700E-08 PCBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 0.0075 0.9230 POPG13CU 1-SNC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC SOI-7-11 (G13C 3.O0E -03 PPMG13BS 1-SNC-SNC PUMP 6-13B FAILS TO START 3.000E-03
-; I
uoN=NUSArI.SA.CKAN.REL..
D.CAD4.JADD..LDUAA 6/88 19:28:34 PAGE 7
DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION CuTsrT EVENT OF TOTAL '.
OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY
'2.700E-08.
C PCBG13AN -
BREAKER TO PUMP'G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 0.0075
.*0.9306 POPO302U-1-SHC-FLON DIV -
OPER FAILS TO CLOSE SNC-302 3.000E-03 1.OOOE-08 PCVO338P -
1-SNC-CHECK VALVE SHC-338 FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOOE-04 0.0028 0.9334 PFOREBYJ 1-SNC-NO NATER IN FOREBAY 1.000E-04 9.857E-09 PPMGl3AR 1-SNC-SHC PUMP SHC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 0.0028 0.9361 PPMG13BM-1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B DOWN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 PPMG13CM 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C DOWN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 9.000E-09 FCVO382N -
1-SNC-FLON DIV-CHECK VLV SNC382 FAILS TO CLOSE 1.000E-03
- 0. 0025 0.9386 PCBG13AN -, BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 PHV72OAP-- MOV-720A FAILS TO OPEN (RAND CAUSES) 3.OOOE-03' 7.992E 09 PPMG13AR 1-SNC-SHC PUMP SHC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 0.0022 0.9409 PPMG13BM 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B DON DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 PPMG13CS 1 -SNC-SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO START 3.OOOE-03 7.992E-09 PCBG13AN - BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 3.OOOE-03 0.0022 0.9431 PPMG13BM 1-SHC-SHC PUMP G-13B DONN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03 PPMG13CR 1-SHC-AUX SNC PUMP G-13C FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04
DSN=NUSAF1.Sl.ERIN. REL.SNCS.CASE4.JA88.IS.DATA 6/88 19:28:34 PAGE 8
-- -- - -- -- -- - -- -- - -- I-- - -- -- -- - -
- DOMINANT MINIMAL CUTSETS CUMULATIVE BASIC FRACTION FRACTION uET EVENT OF TOTAL OF TOTAL PROBABILITY BASIC EVENTS IN CUTSET PROBABILITY UNAVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY N12 7 992E 09 PBG13AN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13A FAILS TO CLOSE 1
3.00E-03 0.0022 0.9453 PPMG13BR 1 -SHC-SWC PUMP G-13B FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 7 PPMG13CM 1-SNC-SWC PUMP G-13C DOWN DUE TO MAINT.
3.700E-03 7 992E-09 PCBG13CN BREAKER TO PUMP G-13C FAILS TO CLOSE 3.000E-03 0.0022 0. 9 4 7 6 PPMG13AR 1-SWC-SWC PUMP SWC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 PPMG13BM -
1-SC-SNC PUMP G-13B DOWN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E -03 C...
41.7992E-09 YPOPO381U 1-SWC-OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC SO1-7-11 3.000E-03 0.0022 0.9520 PPMG13AR 1-SWC-SNC PUMP SNC-G-13A FAILS TO RUN 7.200E-04 PPMG13BM 1-SNC-SNC PUMP G-13B DOWN DUE TO MAINT 3.700E-03
"'1, 7
9 2E 0
- 10.
0.05 7.9E0 POPG13CU 1
ISWC7'OPER FAILS TO FOLLOW PROC S01-7-11 (G13C 3.OOOE 03 00022
-7:.92 1
3
,j. 1<}
'PPMG13A I
W PM I
3 FAILSTO RUN-'
7.200E 04.
PPMG13B 1 I
I UP 6 138 DOWN'DUE-TO MAINT 3.700E-03
FIGURE P-: SALTWATER COOLING SYSTEM FAULT TREE UNr 1 INT INSUUFICIENT HEAT REMOVAL BY LOOP A
SVCSLCOSYSTEMC P-SI-BaPP-01-01 INSUFFICIENT HEATC INSUFFICIENT HT REMOVAL By RMVLB LDOP ASVCS LOP B SCS P-01-02 jP-01-03 OR OR INSUFFICIENT CCV INSUFFICIENT SVCS INSUFFICIENT SVCS CCV HEAT EXCH.
FLOV THRU CCV HEAT FLOV THRU CCV HEAT FLOW THRU CCS HEAT E-20B FOULED EXCHANGER E-20A EXCHANGER E-20A EXCHANGER E-20B (SHELL SIDE)
P-01-04 COP13 OR 2OE-06 CCV FLOW NOT CCV HEAT EXCH ALIGNED THRU CC E-20A FOULED HEAT E7XCH. E-20A SHELL SIDE) 20E-06' MOTOR DPER. VALVE IMANUAL VALVE CV MOV-720A IS NOT 331 LEFT CLOSED OPEN (ALL CAUSES)
AFTER MAINTENANCE 1/5/88 10E-04
FIGURE P-i1 SHEET 2 UNIT 1 INSUFFIENT SVCS FLOV THRU CCV HEAT EXCH, E-20A COP2 P-02-01 OR INSUFICENTVALVHEATEXCANGEFMAUALEALV FLOW TO CCV HEAT E_20A F1ULED SWC-303 LEFT CLOSED EXCH. E-20A (TUBE SIDE)
AFTER MAINTENANCE P-02-02 2COE-06 10E-04 MANUAL VALVE INSUFFICIENT SVC-301 LEFT CLOSED FLOV TO AEHER MAINT. (NAR)T 8P AND 1.0E-04 INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT INSUFF. FLOW THRU FLOV FROM FLOV FROM FLOV FROM MANUAL VALVE Svc HEADER IA HEADER 18 HEADER IC 300 TO TEE I 1588
RE Pi SHEET 3 UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM HEADER IA COP3 P-03-01 OR L.O. MANUAL VALVE CHECK VALVE SVC PUMP ND VATER SVC-379 LEFT CLOSED SWC-383 FAILS SWC-G-13B FAILS IN AFTER MAINTENANCE TO STAR TO START BR RUN FOREBAY CXV0379X MPU-P-03-020R P-P-3AND 3or-3 3oE-03 7.2E-04 37E-03 PRESSURE SWITCH OPERATOR FAILS TO PS-28TAILSFOLLOW PROCEDURE
.0E-04 3.0E-03 1/5/88
-FIGURE P-i1 SHErT 4
UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM HEADER IB COP4 P-04-01 OR INSUFF FLOP OPER.
FAILS TO UX SC PUMP CHECK VALVE TO AVX SVC PUMP FOLLOV PROCEDURE FSC-G-1 FAILS TO SVC-338 PAILS SVC-G-13C,OS01-7-1 (SC391)
START ORRUN TO OPEN P-04-02 3.OE-03 10E-04 CONTROLBREAKER INSUFFICIENT SC P P SVC PUMP INSUFFICIENT OPER.
FAILS TOS FO C UM G-3 POWER FO -13C 1C AIS SV--3C FAILS POWER ON 480V FDLLOV PROCEDURE SCG1CDW FAILS TOCDED BU NDIT STRTORNUSN.3SL71(G
- 3)
CONU NI 1LCP CLOS RU SOL7-1 (G-3C)DUE TO MAINT.
30OE-03 30OE-03 7.2E-04 3.0E-03 3,7E-03 1/5/87
-IGLRE P 1) SHEET 5 UNIT I INSUFF FLOV TO AUX SVC PUMP COPS P-05-01 AND VACUUM PRIMING BACKUP PRIMING SYSTEM FDR FROM SERVICE WATER G C FAIS SUPPLY FAILS P-05-02 P-05-03 DR OR SOLENOID VALVE PRESSURE SWITCH INSUFFICIENT AIR RELEASE INSTRUMENT SERVICE WATER OPER. FAILS TO SV-37A FAILS
.PS-144 FAILS FLOW TO VALVE AR-341 AIR SUPPLY OPEN MANUAL TO OPERATE TO OPERATE PRIMING SYSTEM FAILS TO OPERATE FAILURE FAILURE VALVE SVC-348 P-05-04 D
PRPO34R U
LE-03 1.E 04 1.OE-03 LOE-03 I.OE-03 3.OE-03 LOW SUCTION AUX SWC PUMP LIFT AVAIL. TO BASKET STRAINER G-13C (LOW TIDE) i SVC-BS-50 FOULS 2.OE-05 I.0E-03 6/26/87
FIGURE P-1 SHEET 6 UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM HEADER IC COP6 P-06-01 OR OPER. FAILS TO OPER. FAILS TO FLOV DIV -
CHECK INSUFFICIENT FOLLOW PROCEDURE DIAGNOSE LOSS OF VALVE SVC-383 LOV TO MANUAL So1-7-11 SVC SYSTEM FAILS TO CLDSE VALVE C VS-2 30CE-03 30OE-03 10E-03 FROM HEADERS FOLLOW.PROCEDURE FOLLOW PROCEDURE 3 AND 4 501-2,4-1 S01-2.4-1 Z
P-6-4COP22 COP23 AND.
10OE-03 10OE-04 INSUFF. FLOV INSUFF FLOV 3
1/5/88
FIGURE R-)SHEET 7 UNIT 1 INSUFF. FLOV FROM HEADER 3
COP7 P-07-01 OR INSUFT. FLOV FROM INSUFF. FLOV FROM SCREEN VASH PUN
.SRNVASH.UM CVS-G43 CS-G-43S SCREEN VASH PUMP CHECK VALVE SCREEN VASH PUMP CHECK VALVE CVS 0G43 FAILS TO FCS-598 rAILS CVSG-43S FAILS TO CWS-587 FAILS START OR RUN TO OPEN START OR RUN TO OPEN 1OE-04.
L.OE-04 BASKET TRAINER MANUAL VALVE MANUAL VALVE BASKET STRAINER MANUAL VALVE MANUAL VALVE CVS-BS-X59A CVS-586 LEFT CLOSED CVS-590 LEFT CLOSED CVS-BS-X59B CWS-585 LEFT CLOSED CVS-589 LEFT CLOSED FOULS AFTER MAINTENANCE AFTER MAINTENANCE FOULS AFTER MAINTENANCE AFTER MAINTENANCE 10E-03 I0E-04 1.OE-04 1.0E-03 1.OE-04 IOE-04 6/26/87
FIGURE P-1) SHEET 8 UNIT 1 INSUFF. FLOV FROM HEADER COpe P-08-01 OR DPER. FAILS TO MANUAL VALVE INSUFFICIENT FOLLOW PROCEDURE CVS-621 LEFT CLOSED FLOV TO MANUAL SO01-a4_1 AFTER MAINTENAC VAV V-622 30E-03 1OE-04 6/26/87
FIGURE P-1 SHEET 9
UNIT 1
INSUFF. FLOW TO MANUAL VALVE CWS-622 COP9 P-09-01 OR NSU FFI'CIENT FLOW IN SUFFI'CIENT FLOV FRDM FIREVATER FROM FIREVATER PUMPils PUMP G 11
-0
-0P-09-03 CHECK VALVE INSUFFICIENT FLOW rFIR.EVATER PUMP L.11 MANUAL VALVE LD 0 MANUAL VALVE CHECK VALVE INSUFFICIENT FLOV FIREVATER PUMP FPV-356 FAILS TO rIREVATER G-llS rAILS TO TPV-364 INADVER-FPV-363 [NADVER-FPW-355 FAILS TO FIREVATER G-ll FAILS TO TO OPEN PUMP G-IlS STR RRUN TENTLY CLOSED TENTLY CLDSED TD OPEN PUMP G-11 START OR RUN 1.0E-04 10E-04 10E-04 10IE-04 M4ANUAL VALVE L.O.
MANUAL VALVE INSM ERVICE MANUAL VALVE LO. MANUAL VALVE INSUFF SERVICE SDW-301 LEFT CLDSED FP - 352 IADVER-VAE UPLY SDV-301 LEFT CLOSED FPV-S NAVRVATE UPPLY AFTER MAINTENA NCEJ TENTLY CLOSED IFROM RESERVDIR AFTER MAINTENANCE TENTLY CLDSED IFROM RESERVOI R 10E-04 10E-04 10OE-07 10OE-04 10E-04 10E-07 0.E-04 6/26/87
FI-URE Pi1) SHEET 10 UNIT 1 INSUFF. FLO THRU MANUAL VALVE SVC 300 TO TEE 1 CDP10 P 01 OR FLOV DIV -
PER.
INSUFF. FLO OPER S
FAILS TO F CHECK FAILS TO CLDSE FROM HEADERS FOLLOV PROCEDURE VALVE SVC-383 SVC-302 2AAN01 D-7-11 (SVC-300>
FAILS TD CLOSE 10GE-03 10OE-03 1.0E-03 INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM4 FLOV TFROM HEADER 2A HEADER 23 k/26/87
FIGURE P-1 SHEET 11 UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM HEADER 2A COPil P-1l-01 OR SV UMP ND VATER SVC-G-13A FAILS IN 1E0E-04 Svc PUMP INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT CONTROL BREAKER SVC PUMP SVC-G-13A POWER ON.480V DC POVER ON TO PUMP G13A SVC-G-13A FAILS 0 RUNBUS NO I BUS NO. I FAILS TD CLOSE FAILS TO RESTART 7.2E-04 30OE-3 00OE-4
FIGURE P-i SHEET 12 UNIT I INSUFFICIENT FLOW FROM HEADER 2B COPl2 P-12-01 OR FOLLOW PROCEDURE DIAGNDSE LOSS OF VALVE SWC-382 TD HANUAL VALVE S01-7-11 NDRMAL SVC SYSTEM FAILS TO CLOSE CVS-529 3.0E-03 30OE-03 LDE-03 INSUFFICIENT OPER. FAILS TOFLOV DIV
-MANUAL FLOV FROM FDLVPROCEDURE VALVE CWS-529 LEFT HEADRS AND4 SI-2,-1OPEN (ALL CAUSES) 30E-03 15/8 8
FIGURE P 1) SHEET 13 UNIT 1 INSUFF. SVCS FLOV THRU CCV HEAT EXCHANGER E-20B COP13 P-13-01 DR INSUFFICIENT HEAT EXCHANGER FLOV THRU E-20B FLOV FROM FLOV FROM
.MANUAL VALVE SVC HEADER 2A HEADER 23 1 5/88
FIGURE P-1 SHEET 14 UNIT 1 INSUFF. FLOV THRU MANUAL VALVE SVC 300 TO TEE 2 CDP14 P-14-01 OR INSUFFICIENT FLDV DIV -OPER.
OPER. FAILS TO FLOW DIVS-CHECK FLOW FROM FAILS TO CLOSE FOLLOW PROCEDURE VALVE SV-382 HEADER DA I
ND IC SC30 501-300)
FAIL TCLSE 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 1.0E-03 INSUFFICIENT INSUFFICIENT INSUFFI'CIENT FLOV FROM FLOW FROM FLOV FROM HEADER IA HEADER IBHEDRC k/26/871
FIGURE P 1 SHEET 15 UNIT 1 MOTOR OP. VALVE.
MDV-720A IS NOT OPEN (ALL CAUSES)
P-15-01 DR MOTOR OP VALVE MOTOR OP VALVE INSUFFICIENT MOV-720A FAIL TO M V-720A FAIL TO RECEI E POVER ON 480V OPEN (RAND CAUSES)AUT BUS NO, 2 P-15-02COU4 PSAND 3.0E-03 DTO D VALVE 72AMOTOR OP VALVE 720Al FALS TS RIECIEIVE FAILS TO RECEIVE AUTDIGNAL TO ONANUAL SIGNAL TD DPE P-15-030 PRESSURE SWITCH MOTOR STARTER TD P-8AILS NDV-720A FAIL S TD L TO OPERATE OPERATE ON DEMAND IOE-04 1.OE-04 1/5/88
FIGURE P 1) SHEET 1 UNIT 1 FIREVATER PUMP G-llS FAILS TO START OR RUN COPl6 P-16-01 OR CONTROL BREAKER OPERATOR FAILS TO FIREWATER PUMP FIREWATER PUMP INSUFFICIENT POWER INSUFFICIENT POVER FIREVWATER PUMP TO PUMP G-11S FOLLOW PROCEDURE G-US FAILS G-11S FAIlS FROM DC BUS ON 480V G-llS DOWN DUE FAILS TO CLOSE S01-7-11 (G-llS)
TO START TO RUN NO. I BUS #2 TO MAINTENANCE 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 7.2E-04 3.7E-03 1/5/88
FIGURE P-1) SHEET 17 UNIT 1
.FIRE VATER PUMP G-1I FAILS TO START OR RUN P-17-01 OR CONTROL REAKER TO OPERATOR FAILS TO FIREVJATER PUMP FIREVATER PUMP INSUFFICIENT POVER INSUFFICIENT FIREVATER PUMP PUMP G-ll FAILS FOLLDW PROCEDURE G-Il FAILS TO 6-11 FAILS FROM DC BUS POVER ON 490V G-11 DON DUE TO CLOSE SDI 11 (G-I1) (G-Il)
START TO RUN NO. I BUS hi T0 MAINTENANCE PCBOOIIN POPO0IIU PPMO0II PPMOGIIR C~
O~PMGI 3OE-03 3.OE-03 3.OE-03 72E-04 3.7E-03 1/5/88
FIGURE P-1 SHEET 18 UNIT 1 SCREEN WASH PUMP CVS-G-43 FAILS TO START OR RUN COPl8 P-19-01 OR CONTROL BREAKER TO INSUFFICENT POWER SCREEN WASH PUMP SCREEN WASH PUMP SCREEN WASH PUMP INSUFFICIENT POWER OPERATOR FAILS TO PUMP G-43 FAILS FROM 480V CVS-G-43 FAILS CVS-G-43 FAILS CVS-G-43 DOWN FROM DC FOLLOW PROCEDURE TO CLOSE BUS #1 TO START TD RUN DUE TO MAINT BUS NO. I 501-7-11 (G-43) (G-43) 3.0E-03 3.OE-03 7.2E-04 3.7E-03 3.OE-03 1/5/88
FIGURE P-1) SHEET 19 UNIT 1 SCREEN WASH PUMP CWS-G-43S FAILS TO START OR RUN COPI9 P-19-OI OR CONTROL BREAKER TO OPERATOR FAILS TO SCREEN WASH PUMP SCREEN WASH PUMP INSUFFICIENT POVER INSUFFICIENT POVER SCREEN WASH PUMP PUMP G-43S FAILS FOLLOV PROCEDURE CVS-G-43S FAILS CVS-G-43S FAILS ON DC BUS ON 480V BUS NO. 2 CWS-G-43S DOWN TO CLOSE SOI-7-11 (G-43S) 10START TO RUN NO. I DUE TO MAINT 3.OE-03 3.0E-03 3.0E-03 7.2E-04 3.7E-03 1/5/88
FIGURE U-1: AC PO/ER FAULT TREE UNIT I LOSS OF OFFSITE POVER SAURCES AND NO RECOVERY N EMERGENCY INSUFFICIENT POWER COU6 POVER FRDM 4KV ON 4KV BUSFRO01-10 COU9 COU
.A U-01-12 U-01-01 7OR ORCONDITIONAL LDSS OF NONRECOVERY OIF OFFSITE POWER GNVEN OFFSITE POWER BY f
TURBINE TRIP T=30 MINUTES INSUFFICIENT PDV IE PER OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN OR SHORT LOSS OF POWER FROM DIESEL ALIGN B IC TO CIRCUIT ON BUS SOURCES T 4KV BUS ONLOOP2ESUNPCP.5Y GENERATOR NO.2 IBUS 2C IC IC COLS UPICCUUBSO01CH U-01-02 10E-03 0.51 AND 5.8E-03 2.4E-07 INSUFFICIENT PDVER NO POWER FROM NO EMERGENCY
.FROM DIESEL 220 KV PGVE R FROM 4KV ENERTOR O.1SVITCHYARD BUS 2C E
01 CU7U-01-04ANDU OPERATORS INADVER-ICIRCUIT BREAKER 114 OPEN DR SHORT IN DIESEL GENERATOR DIESEL GENERATOR DIESEL GEEAORN 0V ER RURMAU TENTLY PARALLEL
,FAILS TO CLOSE POVER CABLE FRM NDI I IN NO. I FAILS TO NO. I FAILS TO RUN FROM AUX TRANSFORMER A GIVEN POVER SOURCES OR REMAIN CLDSED IGENERATOR ND. 1I I
K NACSTR-FOR 24 HOURS TRANSFOIRMKER C TRANSFORMER C FAILS U-01-05 U-10 EU0-2J
-11 1.0E-03 7.9E-05 4.6E-02 5.5E-02 CIRCUIT BREAKER ISFIIN DE PRTRFIST ISLGNRTRLVSATSGA OSO FST U
RNFRE 11C14 FAILS TO DNDC BUS CLOSE BKR 11C14 OR NO. 1 FAILS TO START TO DG #1 FAILS &POWER SOURCES AND C FAILS
.CLOSE NDI. I INCORRECT CLOSURE NO OPERATOR BACKUP NO RECOVERY TO DPERATE U-0 -07 0 U-01-08AN 10OE-03 50OE-03 2.4E-05 BATTERY NO. 1, DC BUS NO. I DIEFSEL GENERATO1,R NO REPAIR OF DIESEL PLOISS DIF DEFSITE AUX TRANSFORMER OPERATOR FAILS TO UNAVAILABLE AT FAILURE N.I FAILS TOGENERATOR NO. 1 POWER SOURCES AND A FAILS ALIGN BUS IC TO T=0 STAR T BY T= 30 MINUTES NEI RECOVERY TOOEAEAUX XFMR A 2.4E-05 2.4E-07 5.9E -02 1.n 2.4En0 lOne-16 / 6/
7
FIGURE U-1) SHEET 2 UNIT 1 NO EMERGENCY INSUFFICIENT POVER POWER FROM 4KV DN 4 KV BUS U-02-12 CO~l0U-02-01 CU OR DR INSUFFICIENT POWER OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN OR SHORT LOSS OF POWER FROM DIESEL ALIGN BUS IC TO CIRCUIT ON 480V BUS SOURCES TO 4KV BUS UBS002CH U-O2-O AND 5.8E-03 2.4E-07 INSUFFICIENT POWER NO POWER FROM NO EMERGENCY FROM DIESEL 220 KV POWER FROM 4KV GENERATOR NO. 2 SVITCHYARD BUS IC U-02-03 COUS OPERATORS INADVER-CIRCUIT BREAKER 12C15 OPEN OR SNORT IN DIESEL GENERATOR DIESEL GENERATOR DIESEL GENERATOR NO POWER NO POWER FROM AUX TENTLY PARALLEL FAILS TO CLOSE OR POWER CABLE FROM NO. 2 IN N. 2 FAILS rO START NO. 2 FAILS TO RUN FROM AUX TRANSFORMER B GIVEN POWER SOURCES REMAIN CLOSED GENERATOR NO. 2 MAINTENANCE OR RUN R 2 URS TRANSFORMER C
TRANSFORMER C FAILS UOIGCWU-02-05 U-20 S-20 TR TAN 2
IL S
OR O
RO LOE-03 7.9E-05 4.6E-02 5,5E-02 CIRCUIT BREAKER 12CI5 INSUFFICIENT POWER OPERATOR FAILS TO DIESEL GENERATOR LDV START SIGNAL LOSS OF OFFSITE AUX TRANSFORMER FAILS TO CLDSE ON DC BUS CLOSE BR 1S TR NO. 2 FAILS TO TO DG #2 FAILS &
POWER SOURCES AND C FAILS NO. 2 INCORRECT CLOSURE START & NO REPAIR-ND OPERATOR BACKUP N
EOE PRT T
3.0E - 03 50OE-03 2.4E-05 BATTERY ND. 2 BSNG2 DIESEL GENERATOR NO REPAIR D3F UNAVAIL ABLE FAILURE NO. 2 FAILS U2-"DIESEL GENERATOR AT T-0 TD START NO. 2 BY T=30 MIN IBY002 IS002HUGE005 UE2LOSS OF OFFSITE AUX TRANSFORMER OPERATOR FAILS TO P OVER SOURCES AND B FAILS ALIGN BUS 2C TO NOI RECOVER Y TO0 OPERAT E AUX XFMR B CDUS OP2CBXU 2.4E-05 2.4E-07 1.9E-02 LO0 2AE05 OE-2 6/26/87
FIGURE U-1) SHEET 3 UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT POER INSUFFICIENT POWER ON 480V BUS ON 40V BUS NO. I NO. 2 COU3 COU4 U-03-01 U-03-04 OR OR OP O
VER INSUFFUIEN PUTS TO POVER INPUTS TO EPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT ON 480V O 48V BUS ND. 1 480V BUS NO. 2 CIRCUIT ON 480V NO. 1 UNAVAILABLE UNAVAILABLE BUS NO, 2 NU 3-0 2.4E-07 2.4E-07 NP PDER INSUFFICIENT PO RER NO POWER FROM SDGE 12KV LINE OPLER R L
INSUFFICIENTPDE FROM 480V O
N 4KV BUS 480V BUS UNAVAILABLE ON 4KV BUS FROM 480OAV BUS ND. 3 ICND.
2
<ALL CAUSES) 2C BUS NDO U-03-07 U-03-030 U-03-06D.
U-03-08 DE.FAIL S TO INSUFFICIENT OPERATOR FAILS To INSUFFICIENT PDVER SDGE 12KV LINE PERATOR FAILS TO INSUFFICIENT OPER. FAILS AINBS ND. 1 POWER ON 480V ALIGN 4BOV BUS ON 48DV BUS UNAVAILABLE AFTER REALIGN BUS #2 FROM POWER ON 480oV TO ALIGN BUS NO. 2 BT BUS NO. 3 US NO. 3 NO. 1 TO BUS NO. 2 NO. 2 LOSS OF SWITCHYARDI BUS 2C TO SDGLE LINE BUS N. 33 COU4U UNASIIGEN OSDE l.1E-02 5.0E-02 0.95 0.2
.1E-02 6/26/8
FIGURE U-1) SHEET 4
UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT POWER ON 480V BUS NO.3 COUS U-04-01 OR OPEN OR SHORT POWER INPUTS TO CIRCUIT DN 480V BU 480V BUS NO. 3 NO.
3FAIL U-04-020R OR-O 2.4E-07 BUS #3 DEENERGIZED
.BACKUP 4KV PDVER DUE To LOSS (IF UNAVAILABLE OFFSITE POVER U-04-04 U-04-03 AND AND CONDITIONAL LOSS OPERATOR FAILS TO INUFIIN PDE N
OER OF OFSITE POVER RESET BREAKER DN 4KV BUS FROM 4KV LGIVEN TUBN RP1C11 IC BUS 2C 1.0E-03 30E-03
-S T
INSUFFICIENT OE.FIST POVER FROM ALIGN BUS NO. 3 4KV B US 2C TO BUS ND. 2C 1
6/26/8
FIGURE U-1) SHEET 5
UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT POWER INSUFFICIENT POWER ON 125 DC BUS ON 12V DC BUS N.INO.1 2
1-05-01 coil 1-05-05 CoIa OR OR OPEN DR SHORT LDSS [IF OPEN DR SHORT LOSS [IF CIRCUITN NDC BU POVER SOURCES CIRCUITNON2DC BUS POWER SOURCES 2.4E-07 2.4E-07 INADEQUATE AC POVER BATTERY ND.
INADEQUATE AC POVER INADEQUATE AC POWER BATTERY NO. 2 INADEQUATE AC POWER NPUT THROUGH BATTER UNAVAILABLE NPUT THROUGH BATTER NPUT THROUGH BATTER)
UNAVAILABLE NPUT THROUGH BATTER CHARGER SET A ATT0CHARGER SET B CHARGER SET D AT T-0 CHARGER SET C 1-05-03 D 1-05-04 08 0 1 070R 2,4E-05 2.4E-05 BATTERY CHARGER INSUFFICIENT POWER BATTERY CHARGER INSUFFICIENT POWER BATTERY CHARGER INSUFFICIENT POWER BATTERY CHARGER INSUFFICIENT POWER SET A FAILS TO ON 480V BUS SET B ON 480V BUS SET D ON 480V BUS SET C ON 480V BUS OPERATE NO, I FAILS TO OPERATE NO. 2 FAILS TO OPERATE NO. 2 FAILS TO OPERATE N I 2.4E-05 2,4E-05 2.4E-05 2.4E-05 6/26/87
FIGURE U-1) SHEET 6 UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT POVER ON 1,20VAC BUS NO. I U-06-01 ol AND INSUFFICIENT
-AUTO TRANSFER POVER FROM SVITCH FAILS TO INVERTER SUPPLY BACKUP P OVER 7R DR INSUFFICIENT INVERTER FAILS AUTD TRANSFER BACK up POWER POV NO L2VD TO FNTNSWITCH No. I FAILS SUPPLIES NDT BSN.1FOR 24 HOURS T
T R
.AVIAL 2.0E-03-10E00 A INI ALTERNATE INSUFFICIENT 480VAC BUS POVER ON 490VAC UNAVAILABLE BUS NO, 2
.OPERATOR FAILS INSUFFICIENT TO MANUALLY POVER ON 480VAC SWITCH POWER SUPPLY BUS NO.I 30OE-03 6/26/8
FIGURE U-1) SHEET 7 UNIT 1 INSUFFICIENT POVER UN 120VAC BUS NDB S
CDUl2 U-07-01 AND INSUFFICIENT AUTD TRANSFER R
POWER FROM SWITCH FAILS TO INVERTER ISUPPLY BACKUP PoVE
.INS UFFICIENT.
INVERTER FAILS AUTO TRANSFER BACKUP POWER PDVER ON 12VCTO F UNCTI ON SVITCH FAILS
.SUPPLIES NOT BUS NO. 2 FOR 24 HOURS
.TO TRANSFER AVAILABLE 20OE-03 3.0E-04 ALTERNATE INSUFFICIENT 480VAC BUS POVER ON 480VAC UNAVALABLEBUS ND. I INVIAL I
V OPERATOR FAILS INSUFFICIENT TO MANUALLY PDVER ON 480VAC SWITCH POWE R SULPPLY BUS ND. 2 3.0E-03 6/26/