ML20079R245

Comments on H Dieckamp 830527 & 0610 Ltrs Re Immediate Effectiveness of Restart.Dieckamp Concealment of Info Detrimental to Mgt Evidences Util Policy of Expediency. Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20079R245
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	06/18/1983
From:	Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS
To:
References
ISSUANCES-SP, TAC-65149, NUDOCS 8306220142
Download: ML20079R245 (8)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF A! ERICA 4

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BEFORE TE COMMISSIONERS

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In the Matter of ETROFOLIT!di EDIS0li COMPLITY Docket 50-289 SP (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1)

AAKODT COMIElITS CONCERNIIIG HERM!.E DIECKAMP, TE TOP OF TE GPU ORG1.!TIZI. TION on May 27 and on June 10, Herman Dieckamp, Chairman of the Doard of GPU, parent organisation of GPU Huclear, the licensee of the TMI-Unit 1 plant, wrote to the Commissioners to urge their decision to make restart of Unit 1 immediately effective.

The Dicchamp letters provide significant information concerning the top of the GPU organisation.

Whereas Die' champ denied any significance of the Hartman matter to restart of Unit 1 in his May 27 letter, just 13 days later, on June 10, Diechamp considered it expedient to offer the Commission

' proof' that the Unit 1 organi=ation was free of the taint of the Hartman allegations.

The June 10 letter proceeded on the basis that the Hartman allegations were verified although Diechamp (or his counsel) had denied such knowledge on three occasions in the past vechs.

Diechamp's heated denial during the May 24 Commission meeting appeared believable -- it appeared to stem from conviction.

Lgain,on May 27, Diechamp's concern expressed in his letter about IIRC's verification of the Hartman allegations appeared genuine.

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~2-Then, Diechamp appeared to be seeking information wnich he did not have when his counsel requested on June 1 that the liRC Staff czplain where in GIU's consultants' report the Staff found a conclusion of verification of the Eartman allegations.

There has been no provision of information nor was there any need l

to provide this information.

GIU had prepared and published the consultants' report in September of 1980.

Despite its i

volume of caterial (over 1200 pages) and its careful wording, the Faegre & Benson conclusions clearly verify Hartman.

Dieckamp could not have misunderstood his own consultants' report.

(See our summary of Faegre & Benson conclusions, attached.)

His denials on May 24, 27 and June 1 can only be viewed as an attecpt to ' coverup".

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Diecknap s behavior is the best evidence of GIU policy concerning operation of Unit 1.

His behavior parallels the Eartman tatter in principle.

It is a policy of crpediency.

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l operators appear to understand this fanctional policy.

i:ccording to the EHR study of operators' attitudes a majority of the trainecs disagreed that top management is more concerned about public safety than it is about generating electricity.

The operators felt.' that

" putting safety ahead of efficiency is..a difficult adjustment to make..It requires undoing of habits and values one has grown accustomed to take for granted."

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The functional policy molds the attitudec and behavior of employees.

The GPU handling of the Hartman matter reinforced a policy of expediency which has and will continue to speak louder than the carefully artienlated policies presented to the URO Staff.

Further evidence of the GPU - Dieckamp functional policy of concealment of D1 formation detrimental to management was the misleading information provided to the Commonwealth concerning the severity of the TMI-2 accident.

Later, the Licensee concealed their test administration practices from the Licensing Board and then from the Special Easter.

As with the Eartman matter, when faced with the incontrovertible evidence, this Licensee ' flip-flopped' to admit " looseness" in their test administration.

The Licencing Board characterised this Licensee as " forthright" when, in principle, Licensee was backed into a corner and had no choice but to admit S what was already well-established.

The deceptive tactics of GPU

. management, including Robert Arnold and his attorney John Wilson, did not escap6. Judge Milhollin during the reopened proceeding on cheating.

Thic Licensee even set up their operatorr to testify to protect management.

In Dieckamp's May 27 letter, the following excerpts cpeak louder than any arguments concerning GIU's unwillingness to face the facts of the Hartman allegations:

Un fortunately, during the Commission meeting on May 24 tne purpose and results of the revalidation effort became clouded by references to the Hartman allegations.

The above score is not narrow 1v conntrained to the-Hartman allegations.

The cignificance and strength of these conclusions can

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- not be dimished hv some narrowlv defined nexus to the Hertcan allenations.

f.ny corporate organization can be compared to a s

Christman tree where the chairman of the board ic at the top, the star whose light falls down on the balls, placed on the tree like an organization chart.

To concern ourselves with the balls,in reach of the dog's tail,is not realistic when the etcr on the top of the tree -- who was there at the time of the TIII-2 accident and has given multiple indications of lack of integrity -- remains.

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I Respectfull s bmitted, y bi4 &

IStW?lI' Horman O. Aamodt

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Marjobe H. Aamodt June 18, 1983 4

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J.ttachsint SUMFIRY Faegre & Benson Investigation of Allegations by Harold W. Eartman, Jr.

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Results of Faecre & 3ensen Investi ation of.illerations ov heroic

w. hart =an.

Jr. Concern 1nc Enree i.ile islanc Unit 2, Volumes 1-4, dette=oer 17. 1950 This independent investigation instigated by GPU came to the following conclusions (page 36):

2.1 3a sed on Eart=an 's statement, their corrobora tion in I&E interviews and upon our review of the effect of the -

omissions, errors and oscillations, we have little doubt that leak rate tests were run frequently, producing an unknown nu=ber of unidentified leak rates in excess of lgpt.

1 2.2 To the extent that " bad" leak rate results occurred, they wara all thrown away because none have survived in the regular file.

The deliberateness of the failure to report tests in excess of technical specifications was drawn (page 25):

2.3 In view of the underlying policy rationale establishing a 1 gps litit on unidentified leakage, namely, plant safety, it would be difficult to justify a conclusion that when the test is run tore frequently than required results outside of the 1 gpa li=it can be ignored, unless they are rejected as invalid' indications of leakage.

The extent of the failure to report leak rate calculations in excess of technical specifications was indicated by notes cf I&E interviews provided to the investigators.

It appears that from one to five tests were perforced per shift (page 10) over a period exceeding six conths.

The evidence (2.1, 2.2, 2.3) forces e conclusion that the failure of the opera tions staff to record " bad" tests, 1

to validate these tests and report any valid " bad" tests to l

the NEC was deliberate and so extensive to involve the entire opera tions staff.

i Concerning the ca tter of " fudging" the calculF tions, the censultants were denied a ccess to the best source of this inforre tion -- the opera tors.

legel barriers were pro-:-ided 1

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by F.etropolitan Idison canagement to prevent full access to the operators.

(pages 9, 13)

However, notes from I63 interviews provided corroboration of Fart =an's allegations of addition of water. shd' hydrogen to give e low false readin5 ipeges 10, 11).

Tne consultants also verified that all the cethods Ear:can alleged were used -to " fudge" the calculation were effective.

(pages 37-4 9) 9.

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This is to certify that the document AAMODT COMfETTS CONCERNING HERI2N DIECKAMP, THE TOP OF THE GPU ORGARIETION was served through the NRC internal mail from Bethesda on June 20, 1983 to those marked

• or by hand, d by d posit in U. S. Mail first class to the remainder.

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June 20, 1983 Norman O. Aamodt Service list

• Ser ice' & Docketing Branch

• TMIA U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1037 Meclay Street Washington, D. C. 20555 Harrisburg, PA 17103 Chairman Nunzio Palladino

• Union of Concerned Scientists U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Farmon & Weiss Washington, D. C. 20555 1725 I Street, N. W.

Wa shington, D. C. 20006 Commissioner John Ahearne U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Robert Adler, Esq.

Washington, D. C. 20555 505 Ixecutive House P. O. Box 2357

• ~ Commissioner Victor Gilinsky Harrisburg, PA 17120 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa shington, D. C. 20555 Judge Gary L. Milhollin 4412 Greenwich Iarkway, N. W.

• Commissioner 'Ihomas Roberts Weshington, D. C. 20007 U. S. Nuclear Legulatory Commission Wa shington, D. C. 20555 Jane Iee 183 Valley Road Commissioner James Asselstine Etters, PA 17319 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.

C.

20555 Marvin I. Iewis 6504 3radford Terrace

• Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Philadelphia PA 19149 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 James Hurst Att:

Chairman Administrative Judge PASE Gary J. Edles 617 Briarcliff Road E ltomic Safety & licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John E. Minnich Wa shington, D. C. 20555 Chair =an, Dauphin County Att:

Chairman Administrative Judge Board of Commissioners Ivan W. dmith Dauphin County Courthouse Front & Market Streets

• Jack Goldberg, Esq.

Harrisburg, PA 17101 legal Offices U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa shington, D. C. 20555 G. P. Trowbridge, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Pottt; & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.

W.

Washington, D. C. 20036

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