Text

Handouts to Applicants (Folder 3)
	ML13228A283
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	08/01/2013
From:	D'Antonio J; Operations Branch I
To:	; Public Service Enterprise Group
	Jackson D
References
	TAC U01868
	Download: ML13228A283 (97)
	v • d • e

- able 0 Hazards & Other Conditions Category Security Events Control Room Evacuation Page 2 of 42 GENERAL EMERGENCY OG1 (Pg 114)

IC Security Event Resulting in Loss of Physical Control of the Facility.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value (1 or 2)

A HOSTILE FORCE has taken control of plant equipment such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions as indicated by :

1. Loss of physical control of a vital area such that operation of equipment required for safe shutdown is lost.

OR

2. Loss of physical control of spent fuel pool cooling systems if imminent fuel damage is likely. (e.g., freshly off-loaded reactor core in the pool)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY OS1 (Pg 115)

IC Confirmed Security Event in a plant VITAL AREA.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value Any act of SABOTAGE, HOSTAGE OR EXTORTION as confirmed by Security Supervision which results in actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public as judged by the Shift Manager I Emergency Director.

OS2 (Pg 116)

IC Site Site Attack.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value A notification from the Site Security Force that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact, or other HOSTILE ACTION is occurrir1g_ or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA.

OS4 (Pg 126)

IC Control Room Evacuation has been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot be Established.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value (1 and 2)

1. Control room evacuation initiated AND

2. Control of either unit per ON-1 00(200)-009 at the Remote Shutdown Panels not established within 15 minutes.

ALERT OA1 (Pg 118)

IC Confirmed Security Event in a PLANT PROTECTED AREA.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value Any act of SABOTAGE, HOSTAGE, EXTORTION as confirmed by Security Supervision which results in an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant as judged by the Shift Manager I Emergency Director.

OA2 (Pg 120)

IC Notification of an Airborne Attack Threat.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat less than 30 minutes away.

OA3 (Pg 121)

IC Notification of HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value A notification from the site Security Force that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact or other HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

OA4 (Pg 127)

IC Control Room Evacuation has been Initiated.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value Control room evacuation initiated per ON-1 00(200)-009.

EP-TP-001 Revision 6 Page 111 of 194 NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT OU1 (Pg 123)

IC Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value (1 or 2 or 3)

1.

A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the SECURITY SUPERVISION.

OR

2.

A credible site specific security threat notification OR

3.

A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

"" 'able 0 Hazards & Other Conditions Category GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT Natural or Man-Made OA5 (Pg 128)

Events IC Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the plant VITAL AREAS.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6)

1. Earthquake at greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) levels based on seismic instrumentation in the Control Room recording level greater than an Operating Basis Earthquake.

OR

2. Tornado or SUSTAINED HIGH WINDS of greater than 80 mph within the PROTECTED AREA boundary resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant VITAL AREA. (Table 0-1) OR Control Room indication of degraded performance of the systems within those structures.

OR

3. Vehicle crash within PROTECTED AREA boundary resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant VITAL AREAS. (Table 0-1) OR Control Room indication of degraded performance of the systems within those structures.

OR

4. Turbine failure-generated missiles resulting in any VISIBLE DAMAGE to or penetration of any plant VITAL AREAS.

(Table 0-1)

OR

5. Uncontrolled flooding in areas of the plant (Table 0-1) that results in degraded safety system performance as indicated in the control room or that creates industrial safety hazards (e.g.,

electric shock) that precludes access necessary to operate or monitor safety equipment.

OR

6. Report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant VITAL AREAS (Table 0-1) caused by other natural or destructive phenomena.

FIRE I EXPLOSION OA6 (Pg 137)

IC FIRE or EXPLOSION Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value FIRE or EXPLOSION in any of the following areas (Table 0-1)

AND Affected system parameter indications show degraded performance or plant personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or equipment within a vital area.

I Page 3 of 42 EP-TP-001 Revision 6 Page 112 of 194 NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT OU5 (Pg 132)

IC Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the PROTECTED AREA.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6)

1. Earthquake detected by seismic instrumentation systems.

OR

2. Tornado or SUSTAINED HIGH WINDS greater than 80 mph impact ON SITE within the PROTECTED AREA.

OR

3. Vehicle crash causing damage to plant structures or systems within PROTECTED AREA boundary.

OR

4. Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structures or equipment.

OR

5. Report of turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

OR

6. Uncontrolled flooding in areas of the plant that has the potential to affect safety related equipment needed for the current operating mode (Table 0-1).

OU6 (Pg 139)

IC FIRE within PROTECTED AREA Boundary not Extinguished within 15 Minutes of Detection.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value FIRE in buildings or areas contiguous to any of the following areas not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room alarm:

Control Structure Diesel Generator Buildings ESSW Pump House Radwaste Building Reactor Buildings Turbine Buildings Interim Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

Securitv Control Center (SCC)

I I

I i

"' :*able 0 Hazards & Other Conditions Category Toxic or Flammable Gases Discretionary Page 4 of 42 GENERAL EMERGENCY OGS (Pg 147)

IC Other Conditions Existing which in the Judgement of the Emergency Director I Recovery Manager Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director I Recovery Manager indicate that events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY OSS (Pg 148)

IC Other Conditions Existing which in the Judgement of the Emergency Director I Recovery Manager Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director I Recovery Manager indicate that events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Releases, if any, are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY.

ALERT OA7 (Pg 141)

IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases within or Contiguous to a plant VITAL AREA which Jeopardizes Operation of Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value (1 or 2)

1. Report or detection of toxic gases within or contiguous to a plant VITAL AREA in concentrations that may result in an atmosphere IMMEDIATELY DANGEROUS TO LIFE AND HEALTH (IDLH).

OR

2. Report or detection of gases in concentrations greater than the LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT within or contiguous to a plant VITAL AREA OAS (Pg 150}

IC Other Conditions Existing which in the Judgement of the Emergency Director I Recovery Manager Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director I Recovery Manager indicate that events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Releases, if any, are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

Table 0-1 VITAL AREAS Reactor Buildings Control Structure Diesel Generator Buildings Spray Pond ESSW Pump House Security Control Center EP-TP-001 Revision 6 Page 113 of 194 NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT OU7 (Pg 145)

IC Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value (1 or 2)

1.

Report or detection of Toxic or Flammable gases that have or could enter the SITE BOUNDARY in amounts that can affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

OR

2.

Report by Local, County or State Officials for evacuation or sheltering of site personnel based on an offsite event.

OUS (Pg 151)

IC Other Conditions Existing which in the Judgement of the Emergency Director I Recovery Manager Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Ev.ent.

Mode: ALL EAL Threshold Value Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director I Recovery Manager indicate that events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

ONE HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS

1.

Activation of the Emergency Plan

2.

Technical Specification Deviations

3.

Contaminated/Radioactive Shipments

4.

Loss or Theft of Material/Accidental Criticality

5.

Exposure to Individuals or Releases

6.

Security Threats Page 1 of 6 Attachment E NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 55 of 142

ONE HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS Any deviation from the plant's Technical Specifications authorized pursuant to 1 OCFR50.54(X).

Reference 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(b )(1) 10CFR50.72(c)

NUREG-1 022 Rev. 2

p. 37-38 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP

3. CONTAMINATED/RADIOACTIVE SHIPMENTS Removable contamination from a received package containing radioactive material in excess of the limits per NDAP-QA-0648.

Radiation levels from a received package of radioactive material in excess of the limits per NDAP-QA-0648.

Page 2 of 6 1 OCFR20.1906( d)( 1,2)

Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attachment E NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 56 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

60 Day Written Report None

ONE HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

4. LOSS OR THEFT OF MATERIAL/ACCIDENTAL CRITICALITY Any lost, stolen or missing licensed material in an aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 1000 times the quantity specified in Appendix C (to 1 OCFR20) and under such circumstances that it appears to the licensee that an exposure could result to persons in unrestricted areas.

A theft or unlawful diversion of Special Nuclear Material.

Any case of accidental criticality and any loss, other than normal operating loss, of special nuclear material. Any case of actual or attempted theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material.

Accidental criticality or loss of special nuclear material associated with Dry Fuel Storage

Not required if reported under 1 OCFR73. 71 Page 3 of 6 Reference 1 OCFR20.2201 (a)(i) 10CFR20.2201(b)

NUREG-1736 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP 1 OCFR73. 71 (a);

1 OCFR73 Appendix G Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP 1 OCFR70.52(a)*

10CFR70.52(b)*

10CFR72.74(a)*

Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP 10CFR72.74(a)*

Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attachment E NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 57 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

30 Day Written Report 60 Day Written Report

Attachment E NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 58 of 142 ONE HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event Reference

5. EXPOSURE TO INDIVIDUALS OR RELEASES C> Any events involving byproduct source or special nuclear material possessed by the licensee that may have caused or threatens to cause:

a.

or

b. The release of radioactive material inside or outside of a restricted area, so that, had an individual been present for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the individual could have received an intake of 5 times the occupational annual limit on intake (the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to locations where personnel are not normally stationed during routine operations, such as hot cells or process enclosures)

6. SECURITY THREATS Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause:

a. A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or Page 4 of 6 1 OCFR20.2202(a)

NUREG-1736 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP 1 OCFR73; Appendix G Reg Guide 5.62 NUREG-1304 Generic Letter 91-03 Information Notice 96-71 Region I Instruction

0960.2/0 Nuclear Security Instruction SI-S0-016 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Additional Reporting Req.

30 Day Written Report 60 Day Report Written

ONE HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

6. SECURITY THREATS (Cont'd)

b. Significant physical damage to a power reactor or any facility possessing strategic special nuclear material (20% U-235, U-233 or plutonium) or its equipment or carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel a facility or carrier possesses; or Reference Attachment E NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 59 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

NOTE:

Reporting under the following criteria includes cyber attacks or evidence of cyber intrusions. Any cyber security event in which there is reason to believe that an adversary has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a credible threat to commit or cause malicious exploitation of a critical digital asset should be reported.

c.

Interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system.

NOTE:

A tailgating event is not reportable under the below criteria if a person tailgates into a protected or vital area for which he/she is authorized,.Q!

unauthorized and the tailgating was inadvertent or was without malevolent intent.

An actual entry of an unauthorized person into a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport.

Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

Page 5 of 6

ONE HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event Reference Attachment E NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 60 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

6. SECURITY THREATS (Cont'd)

NOTE:

Compensatory measures must be employed within 10 minutes or within the time prescribed in NRC-approved plans such as Susquehanna's Security Plan. The 1-hour reporting clock does not start until the time allotted for establishing compensatory measures has expired.

The actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a protected area, material access area, vital area, or transport; that is a significant threat (e.g., a few bullets is not considered a significant threat).

NOTE:

Page 6 of 6 The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) must be notified of those events described in Attachment V, Events of Potential Public Interest (EPPI). While a particular event may be reportable to PEMA, the event may not require ENS reporting under the Security Threat criterion established above. However, notification to PEMA may be reportable to the NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) (See Attachment F, Item #4 for more details).

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

FOUR HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS

1.

Shutdown Required by the Technical Specifications

2.

ECCS Injection/Failure to Inject

3.

Unplanned RPS Actuation while Reactor is Critical

4.

Offsite Notification Has or Will Be Made

5.

Certificate of Compliance Deviations (Dry Fuel Storage)

Page 1 of 5 Attachment F NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 61 of 142

Attachment F NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 62 of 142 FOUR HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

1. SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.

(Call to be made upon physical commencement of power reduction.)

2. ECCS INJECTION/FAILURE TO INJECT Any event that results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.

NOTE:

Page 2 of 5 RCIC is not an ECCS.

Reference Attachment G, Initiating Event #5 for unplanned RCIC actuations.

Reference 1 OCFR50.72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(b)(2)(i) 10CFR50.72(c) 10CFR50.36(c)(1)

NUREG-1022 Rev. 2

p. 29-32 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(A) 10CFR50.72(c) 1 OCFR50. 73(a)(2)(iv)

NUREG-1 022 Rev. 2

p. 45-52 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attach. K of this NDAP (Item 4, 5)

Additional Reporting Req.

60 Day Written Report (Only if plant shutdown is completed).

8 Hour ENS 60 Day Written Report

Attachment F NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 63 of 142 FOUR HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

3. UNPLANNED RPS ACTUATION WHILE REACTOR IS CRITICAL Any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.

NOTE:

Page 3 of 5 Actuation of RPS is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete a full scram.

Reference 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(b)(2}(iv}(B) 10CFR50.72(c)

NUREG-1 022 Rev. 2

p. 45-52 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attach. K of this NDAP (Item 4)

Additional Reporting Req.

8 Hour ENS 60 Day Written Report

FOUR HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event Reference Attachment F NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 64 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

4. OFFSITE NOTIFICATION HAS OR WILL BE MADE Any event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.

Such an event may include an onsite fatality or inadvertent release of radioactive contaminated materials.

1 OCFR50. 72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFRSO. 72(b}(2)(xi) 10CFR50.72(c) 1 OCFR72. 75(b )(2)

NUREG-1022 Rev. 2

p. 72-75 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attach. M of this NDAP None NOTE (1):

NOTE (2):

The purpose of the criterion stated above is to ensure the NRC is made aware of any onsite fatality or issues related to the radiological health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment that will cause heightened public or government concern.

An event requiring notification to other government agencies (such as the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) as described in Attachment V, Events of Potential Public Interest (EPPI)), that does not meet the ENS reporting guidelines described in NOTE (1 ), will require voluntary reporting unless Security has already reported the event to the NRC Ops Center. See Attachment U, Voluntary Reports and Phone Calls, for guidance.

Spills of hazardous substances or petroleum products which are reportable to offsite agencies. Refer to Attachment Q for guidance on determining the reportability of spills.

Attachment Q, Determining the Reportability of a Spill to a State or Local Agency NOTE:

Page 4 of 5 If an event or situation related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment receives media attention, despite the absence of a press release, the event is reportable under this criterion.

FOUR HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

5. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE DEVIATIONS Any action taken in an emergency that departs from a condition contained in Certificate of Compliance for Dry Spent Fuel Storage Casks

1 004 to protect public health and safety when no action consistent with Certificate of Compliance for Dry Spent Fuel Storage Casks #1 004 can provide adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent.

Page 5 of 5 Reference 10CFR72.32(d) 10CFR72.75(b)(1)

Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attachment F NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 65 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

60 Day Written Report

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

EIGHT HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS

1.

Serious Degradation of the Plant

2.

Loss of Emergency Response Capability

3.

Transport of Contaminated Individuals

4.

Loss of Entire Safety Function Attachment G NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 66 of 142

5.

Unplanned Actuations of Systems that Mitigate Consequences of Significant Events

6.

Defect in Spent Fuel Storage Cask Structure

7.

Reduction in Effectiveness of a Spent Fuel Confinement System Page 1 of 7

Attachment G NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 67 of 142 EIGHT HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

1. SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF THE PLANT Any event or condition that results in:

(42)

a. The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or

b. The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

NOTE:

This report is required for conditions discovered while the reactor is shut down also.

NOTE:

Characterization of events as "serious" or "significant" can create undue public response.

When reporting under this criteria, the following statement should be used: This event is being reported as a degraded or unanalyzed condition pursuant to 1 OCRF50. 72(b)(3)(ii).

Page 2 of 7 Reference 1 OCFR50.72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFRSO. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(b)(3)(ii}

10CFR50.72(c)

NUREG-1022 Rev. 2

p. 38-42 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attach. R of this NDAP (Containment Leakage Reportability Guidance)

Additional Reporting Req.

60 Day Written Report

Attachment G NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 68 of 142 EIGHT HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

2. LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability <1l, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g. significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system) <2l

<1l lnoperability of CRrrsc SPINGs are not reportable as a loss of all vent stack monitoring capability if alternate methods are available (ref. AR 11 07333).

<2l Major loss of the offsite notification system is defined in EP-AD-011 as the inoperability of 50%

or more of the public Notification System sirens or

> 50% of the public inside the EPZ cannot be notified due to siren failure.

3. TRANSPORT OF CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUALS Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.

Reference Additional Reporting Req.

1 OCFR50.72(a)(1 )(ii)

None 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(b)(3)(xiii) 10CFR50.72(c)

NUREG-1022 Rev. 2

p. 75-79 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attach. K of this NDAP (Item 2)

AttachmentS of this NDAP for guidance regarding loss of phone circuits and/or computer systems that send information to offsite agencies (e.g. Emergency Notification System, Health Physics Networks, etc.)

1 OCFR50. 72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(b)(3)(xii) 10CFR50.72(c) 1 OCFR72. 75( c)(3)

NUREG-1 022 Rev. 2

p. 71-72 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP NOTE:

The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) must be notified of those events described in Attachment V, Events of Potential Public Interest (EPPI).

Page 3 of?

EIGHT HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

4. LOSS OF ENTIRE SAFETY FUNCTION Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:

a.

Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or

b.

Remove residual heat,

c.

Control the release of radioactive material*,

or

d.

Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

These events may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies.

Page 4 of 7 Reference 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(b)(3)(v) 1 OCFR50. 72(b)(3)(vi) 10CFR50.72(c)

NUREG-1022 Rev. 2

p. 52-64 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attach. K of this NDAP (Items 1,5)

Attachment G NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 69 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

60 Day Written Report

EIGHT HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

4. LOSS OF ENTIRE SAFETY FUNCTION (Cont'd)

However, individual component failures need not be reported per this requirement if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.

NOTE:

Attachment P provides guidance for identifying safety functions.

ENS notification per this criteria is necessary only if the event or condition could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time the event or condition was discovered.

Equipment can be considered INOPERABLE per Technical Specifications yet maintain the capability for performing its intended safety function.

Circumstances associated with each situation must be assessed to determine system capabilities and reporting needs.

Secondary containment in-leakage that does not exceed 4000 scfm is not reportable as a Loss of Safety Function. Reference CRA460976.

Page 5 of 7 Reference Attachment G NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 70 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

Attachment G NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 71 of 142 EIGHT HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event

5. UNPLANNED ACTUATIONS OF SYSTEMS THAT MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed below, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.

a. Reactor Protection System (RPS) including:

Reactor scram and reactor trip.

b. General primary containment isolation signals affecting primary containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

c.

ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: core spray system; high-pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.

d. BWR reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC)

e. Primary containment heat removal and depressurization systems, including containment spray and fan cooler systems.

Page 6 of?

Reference 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(1 )(ii) 1 OCFR50. 72(a)(5)(ii) 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 1 OCFRSO. 72(b)(3)(iv)(B) 10CFR50.72(c)

NUREG-1 022 Rev. 2

p. 45-52 and p. 85-86 Attach. J of this NDAP Attach. N of this NDAP Attach. K of this NDAP (Item 4, 5, appendix A,B

&C)

Additional Reporting Req.

60 Day Written Report Four Hour ENS (if actuation of RPS occurred when the reactor was critical)

Four Hour ENS (if valid actuation resulted in or should have resulted in discharge into the reactor coolant system)

EIGHT HOUR ENS NOTIFICATIONS Initiating Event Reference

5. UNPLANNED ACTUATIONS OF SYSTEMS THAT MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (Cont'd)

f.

Emergency AC electrical power systems, including Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)

6. DEFECT IN SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASK STRUCTURE A defect in any spent fuel storage structure, 10CFR72.75(c)(1) system, or component which is important to safety.

7. REDUCTION IN EFFECTIVENESS OF A SPENT FUEL CONFINEMENT SYSTEM A significant reduction in the effectiveness of 1 OCFR72. 75(c)(2) any spent fuel storage cask confinement Attach. J of this NDAP system during use.

Attach. N of this NDAP Page 7 of?

Attachment G NDAP-QA-0720 Revision 20 Page 72 of 142 Additional Reporting Req.

60 Day Written Report 60 Day Written Report

PROCEDURE COVER SHEET PPL SUSQUEHANNA, LLC PROCEDURE 03/08/2013 RESPONSE TO FIRE ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 1 of 65 ADHERENCE LEVEL: CONTINUOUS USE QUALITY CLASSIFICATION:

APPROVAL CLASSIFICATION:

( X ) QA Program

(

)

Non-QA Program (X)

Plant

(

)

Non-Plant

(

)

Instruction EFFECTIVE DATE:

PERIODIC REVIEW FREQUENCY:

2 YEARS PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE:

RECOMMENDED REVIEWS:

Procedure Owner:

A Shift Responsible Supervisor:

Shift Manager-A Shift Responsible FUM:

Manager-Nuclear Operations Responsible Approver:

Manager-Nuclear Oeerations

D ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 2 of 65

1.

SYMPTOMS AND OBSERVATIONS 1.1 Confirmation of fire within the protected area.

1.2 FIRE DET 106_Z4 alarm actuates at Simplex Panel (Control Structure Outside Air Intake) 1.3 Smoke detected in Control Room 1.4 When directed from a Pre-Fire Plan

2.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS None

3.

OPERA TOR ACTIONS NOTE:

D 3.1 D

3.2 3.3 D

D D

D 3.4 Subsections within Section 3 may be performed in any order as determined by Shift Supervision based on the nature of the event and the priority of required operator actions. Steps within each subsection must be performed in the order written.

Activate Fire Brigade, if not already activated, in accordance with Attachment L.

(HC)

Implement appropriate Pre-Fire Plan, as required, if not already being implemented.

Enter appropriate procedures within 15 minutes:

3.3.1 EP-PS-1 00 Emergency Director, Control Room 3.3.2 EP-TP-001 Emergency Classification Level Manual 3.3.3 G0-1 00(200)-004, Plant Shutdown to Minimum Power 3.3.4 G0-1 00(200)-005, Plant Shutdown to Cold Shutdown 3.3.5 ON-1 00(200)-1 01, SCRAM, SCRAM IMMINENT Continue with this ON and other emergency operating, off normal or operating procedure(s) as appropriate.

3.5 D

D D

3.6 D

D D

3.7 3.8 D

D D

D ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 3 of 65 If ON-100(200)-009, Control Room Evacuation, is implemented:

3.5.1 Operate the plant in accordance with ON-100-(200)-009.

3.5.2 Continue fire fighting activities as appropriate.

3.5.3 Direction provided in this procedure is no longer applicable; Enter appropriate EOP to control the plant. Exit this procedure.

Ensure the following Control Structure HVAC Systems are operating: ()

3.6.1 Computer Room Floor Cooling System 3.6.2 Control Room Floor Cooling System 3.6.3 Control Structure H&V System 3.6.4 Battery Room Exhaust System IF one or more of the preceding systems are found inoperable, Enter ON-030-002, Loss of Control Structure HVAC within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months .

er901 *902*9031)()

Refer to Attachments A, 8, and K, as described below, for safe shutdown (s) information specific to mitigating the possible effects of a fire in each fire zone.

3.8.1 Refer to Table 1-1 in Attachment K for information on the specific safe shutdown path protected in each plant fire zone and the potential operator actions required to mitigate the effects of a fire on the protected safe shutdown path in that fire zone. Section 3.9 provides a reference to attachments that provide a description of the operator action designators provided in Table 1-1.

NOTE:

3.8.2 3.8.3 The operator actions listed in Table 1-1 may or may not need to be performed depending on the extent of fire damage. Even in the event of a worst case fire, however, the safe shutdown path, when accompanied by the operator actions listed, for each fire zone will ensure the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown to cold shutdown.

Refer to Table 1-2, 1-3a, and 1-3b in Attachment K for a description of the systems and equipment associated with each safe shutdown path.

Refer to Attachment A for a list of the instrumentation protected on each safe shutdown path.

D D

D 3.8.4 ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 4 of65 Refer to Attachment B for potential operator actions which may be needed to mitigate the effects of a fire in any fire zone. The number in brackets listed with Reference 2 in this Attachment is the specific operator action number from drawing E-690.

3.9 Refer to appropriate attachments for a description of the operator actions listed in Table 1-1. The number in brackets listed with Reference 2 in this Attachment is the specific operator action number from drawing E-690.

3.10 3.11 3.12 I NOTE:

3.9.1 3.9.2 3.9.3 3.9.4 3.9.5 3.9.6 3.9.7 Bases for each action are given in Section 5.0.

Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Fire - Attachment C Unit 2 Reactor Bldg Fire -Attachment D Control Structure (excluding Control Room) Fire Effects on Unit 1 Equipment - Attachment E Control Structure (excluding Control Room) Fire Effects on Unit 2 Equipment -Attachment F Unit 1 Turbine Bldg Fire or Main Transformer Fire -Attachment G Unit 2 Turbine Bldg Fire or Main Transformer Fire -Attachment H Diesel Generator Bldg Fire - Attachment I Refer to Attachm~nt J for Sound Powered Phone locations, if needed for communication. ( )

IF fire was in Control Structure, Unit 1 or Unit 2 Reactor Building, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Implement DC-OP-001, Post Fire Recovery Actions.

e)

Notify SE-HVAC that fire has occurred and determination must be made if in place penetration and bypass leakage testing for HVAC filters is required. C) 3.13 Exit this procedure, WHEN:

3.13.1 3.13.2 3.13.3 Fire extinguished.

Determined that Reactor can be maintained in a safe condition without use of this procedure.

Fire Protection Engineer contacted.

0 3.13.4 AR written to document the event.

ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 5 of 65 3.14 Forward completed copy of this procedure to following for review:

3.14.1 3.14.2 3.14.3 Unit Supervisor Shift Manager Assistant Operations Manager -

Shift Operations 3.15 Forward copy of this reviewed procedure to:

3.15.1 None Signature Date

~---------~---=-----

Signature Date

4.

REFERENCES 4.1 TS 5.5.7 4.2 Fire Protection Review Report 4.3 NRC Generic Letter 86-10 Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements 4.4 E-690 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Manual Actions List 4.5 M-1002 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Component List 4.6 PLA-4505 Appendix R Spurious Operations Criteria

4. 7 EC-013-0788, Inadvertent Reactor Vessel Injection Resulting from Spurious Operation of the HPCI or RCIC Systems 4.8 EC-013-1048, Impact of Inadvertent RPV Overfill on SRV Discharge Piping (6) 4.9 EC-013-0843, SSES 1 OCFR50 Appendix R Compliance Manual

()

4.10 EC-013-0561, Appendix R-HVAC Study 4.11 EC 738965 Unit 1 Appendix R Residual Heat Removal Logic Change 4.12 EC 739001 Unit 2 Appendix R Residual Heat Removal Logic Change 4.13 EC 739040 UHS Large Spray Array Nozzle Reduction

(8) 4.14 EC-013-0858 Appendix R Required Cables For MSIVs ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 6 of65

( 9) 4.15 EC-013-1887, Multiple Spurious Operations Development of Plant Specific MSO List, including the Expert Panel Review Process

5.

DISCUSSION 5.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 5.2 The Appendix R Safe Shutdown Paths and associated Operator Actions for fire zones outside the Control Room are described in Tables 1-1, 1-2, 1-3a and 1-3b of Attachment K.

5.3 5.4 This ON is used as guidance, providing information of what equipment may be affected and what is available, if a fire occurs in a particular plant location.

5.5 5.6 Bases for the manual actions are as follows:

ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 7 of 65 Attachment A-Protected Safe Shutdown Path Instrumentation - General Requirements for All Plant Areas 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5

8.6(8.7) 8.8 ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 8 of 65

8.9 8.10 8.11 Attachment C and D - Unit 1 (2) Reactor Bldg. Fire C.1 (0.1)

C.2(D.2)

C.3(D.3)

C.4(D.4)

C.5(D.5)

ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 9 of 65

C.6(D.6)

C.7(D.7)

C.8(D.8)

ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 10 of 65 Attachments E and F - Control Structure (Excluding Control Room Fire Effects on Unit 1 (2) Equipment)

E.1(F.1)

E.2(F.2)

E.3(F.3)

E.4(F.4)

E.5(F.5)

E.6(F.6)

E.7(F.7)

ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 11 of 65 Attachment G and H-Unit 1 (2) Turbine Bldg. on Main Transformer Fire G.1(H.1)

G.2(H.2)

G.3(H.3)

Attachment I - Diesel Generator Building Fire 1.1 Attachment J - Sound Powered Phone Locations Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 12 of 65 Table 1-1 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Paths and Operator Actions Table 1-2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Paths Table 1-3a Shutdown Paths and Methodology by Fire Location, Fire Outside Control Room (except Fire Zones 1-58 and 2-58.)

Table 1-3b Shutdown Paths and Methodology by Fire Location, Fire Zones 1-58 and 2-58.

Attachment A ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 13 of 65 PROTECTED SAFE SHUTDOWN PATH INSTRUMENTATION PARAMETER PATH 1 (DIV I}

PATH 3 (DIV II}

1C601

1.

RPV LEVEL DIV 1 (2)

LI-14201A Ll-142018

2.

RPV PRESS DIV 1 (2)

PI-14202A Pl-142028

3.

SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL UR-15776A UR-157768 SPOTMOS DIV 1 SPOTMOS DIV 2

4.

SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE (TIAH-15751)

(TIAH-15752)

5.

CORE SPRAY DSCH FLOW FI-E21-1 R601A FI-E21-1 R601 8

6.

RHR A/C (8/D) FLOW FI-E11-1 R603A FI-E11-1 R6038

7.

RHR HX A(8) OUTLET TEMP TI-15127A Tl-151278

8.

RHRSW HX A(8) INLET FLOW FI-E11-1 R602A FI-E11-1R6028 2C601

1.

RPV LEVEL DIV 1 (2)

LI-24201A Ll-242018

2.

RPV PRESS DIV 1 (2)

PI-24202A Pl-242028

3.

SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL UR-25776A UR-257768

4.

SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE SPOTMOS DIV 1 SPOTMOS DIV 2 (TIAH-25751)

(TIAH-25752)

5.

CORE SPRAY DSCH FLOW FI-E21-2R601A FI-E21-2R601 8

6.

RHR A/C (8/D) FLOW FI-E11-2R603A FI-E11-2R6038

7.

RHR HX A(8) OUTLET TEMP TI-25127A Tl-251278

8.

RHRSW HX A(8) INLET FLOW FI-E11-2R602A FI-E11-2R6028 Page 1 of 1

D D

J NOTE:

Attachment B ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 14 of 65 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL PLANT AREAS Step numbers in this attachment are repeated in Attachment K, Table 1-1. Do not make any changes in these step numbers without changing this attachment and Table 1-1.

B.1 To prevent smoke intrusion into Control Room:e[

9001

)

a.

b.

c.

d.

IF Alarm FIRE DET 106_Z4 ALM (Control Structure Outside Air Intake) actuates at Simplex Panel.

Fire outside the Control Structure occurs Smoke detected in Control Room.

Place CREOASS in Recirculation mode per OP-030-002.

D B.2 To prevent smoke and combustible gas intrusion into lso-Phase bus ducts during Main Transformer Fire, lso-Phase Bus Duct Cooling System should be shutdown via OP-187 -001 for Unit 1 transformer or OP-287 -001 for Unit 2 transformer.

D D

B.3 IF Core Spray required to inject into Unit 1(2) vessel and CORE SPRAY LOOP A(B) IB INJ SHUTOFF HV-1 (2)52-F005A(B) will not open, then Bypass low pressure interlock by Performing following at 1 (2)C601: e[

9041)

a.

b.

Remove protective cover from respective LO RX PRESS PERM switch HS1 (2)5249A(B).

Place respective LO RX PRESS PERM switch to BYPASS.

D B.4 A fire in one unit can result in loss of individual SRV depressurization capability from the Control Room for Safe Shutdown Path 3 in the other unit. IF SRV depressurization capability is lost, Manually Depressurize the reactor by individually opening ADS/SRVs using the key lock SRV control switches in the Lower Relay Room, depending on the fire location, to depressurize the RPV. The timing of this action should be as required by the Emergency Operating Procedures. e[

9121

)

D IF the fire affects a Fire Zone whose protected path in Attachment K Table 1-1 is Path 3, individually Operate SRV's G, J, K, L, M, or N (ADS valves) to depressurize the non-fire unit from the Lower Relay Room Panei1C631 for Unit 1 and 2C631 for Unit 2 using key lock switches.

Page 1 of 3

Attachment B ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 15 of 65 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL PLANT AREAS 8.5 IF RCIC initiates and cannot be overridden in accordance with OP-150(250)-001, Perform the following:

D D

D

a.

b.

c.

0 NOTE:

Close RCIC STM SUPPLY 08 ISO HV-149(249)-FOOB.

Close RCIC STM SUPPLY 18 ISO I-IV-149(249)-FOO?.

IF RCIC cannot be isolated by any means, then promptly Depressurize the RPV to 0 psig using available SRV's prior level reaching the MSL (118").

D 8.6 IF RHR PUMP 1 (2)P202A(C) required to be started and will not start OR starts spuriously, THEN at 1(2)C601 Place HSS-1(2)5193A(C), RHR Pp A(C) App R Fire Logic Byps switch in BYPASS.

D

a.

D

b.

0 NOTE:

Confirm the white light at HSS-1(2)5192A(C) RHR Pp A(C) App R Fire Logic Byps switch is ON.

Start/Stop RHR Pump as required.

D B. 7 IF RHR PUMP 1 (2)P202B(O) required to be started and will not start OR starts spuriously, THEN at 1(2)C601 Place HSS-1(2)51938(0), RHR Pp 8(0) App R Fire Logic Byps switch in BYPASS.

D

a.

D

b.

Page 2 of 3 Confirm the white light at HSS-1 (2)51928(0) RHR Pp 8(0) App R Fire Logic Byps switch is ON.

Start/Stop RHR Pump lAW OP-149 (249) -001 OR OP-149 (249) -005 as required.

ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 16 of 65 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL PLANT AREAS D

8.8 IF fire has caused damage to HV-01222A(B}, ESW Pond Spr Bpv A(B},

HV-01224A1(81), ESW Pond Spr In A1(81), or HV-01224A2(82}, ESW Pond Spr In A2(82}, that impacts the ability to properly align the ESW Spray Pond Return Valves for optimal cooling, D

D D

D 8.9 D

&..J D

8.10 THEN Evaluate the need for Spray Pond Spray Arrays and if needed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , on the fire effected loop, using OP-116-001, Operation Using Spray Pond Network OR OP-216-001, Operation Using Spray Pond Network:

a.

Establish a flow path through a large spray array ESW Pond Spr In A 1 (8 1 ).

b.

Close HV-01222A ESW Pond Spr Bpv A

c.

Close HV-012228 ESW Pond Spr Bpv B.

IF FEEDWATER starts AND cannot be shutdown OR isolated, Perform the following:(a)

a.

Close MAIN Steam Line A-D 18 ISO HV 141(241) F022A-D.

b.

Close Main Steam Line A - D 08 ISO HV 141 (241) F028A - D.

Fire involving Turbine-Generator Lube Oil can cause significant damage to the Turbine due to loss of lube oil to the Turbine-Generator bearings. To lessen this damage, Condenser Vacuum can be broken immediately under this emergency condition in accordance with OP-1 (2)43-001.

D 8.11

!f fire-induced multiple spurious operations result in a spurious ADS, Operate Core Spray manually in accordance with OP-151 (251 )-001 to provide makeup if adequate makeup is not available. (9)

Page 3 of 3

D D

D fJ NOTE (1):

NOTE (2):

UNIT 1 REACTOR BLDG FIRE Time referenced is from time fire started.

Attachment C ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 17 of 65 Step numbers in this attachment are repeated in Attachment K, Table 1-1. Do not make any changes in these step numbers without changing this attachment and Table 1-1.

C.1 IF Reactor Recirc Pump 1 P401A(B) must be tripped, Manually Trip Recirc by Either a, b, c, d ORe:

a.

Stop Reactor Recirculation Pump 1 P401A(B) by depressing MG SET A DRV MTR BKR HS-14001A(B) STOP pushbutton.

e[141,142J)

b.

At M.G. SetA(B) Drive Motor 1S134A(B) Cubicle 1A10110(1A10210):

(2[118])

(1)

(2)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to Open."

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting due to fire, Control and Trip DC Power Knife switch can be opened.

c.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Purnp 1A 1 P401A (RPT) Bkr 1A20501 (1A20502):

(1)

(2)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

d.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 1 B 1 P401 B (RPT) Bkr 1A20601 (1A20602):

e.

Page 1 of 3 (1)

(2)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

At Reactor Recirc Pp MG Set A( B) Exciter & Local Bkr Cubicle 1 C062A(B):

I NOTE:

(1)

(2)

Open MG Set A(B) Gen Local Ckt Bkr (Field Breaker) by Depressing Trip pushbutton.

Observe MG Set A(B) Gen Fld Current DECREASES.

D D

UNIT 1 REACTOR BLDG FIRE Attachment C ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 18 of 65 (3)

IF desired, M.G. Set A(B) Drive Motor 1 S 134A(B) Cubicle 1 A 10110 (1A10210) can be opened (with no load on pump) by:

(a)

(b)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to OPEN."

IF desired, Open Control and Trip DC Power knife switch.

C.2 IF RHRSW Pump 1 P506B spuriously trips: e[

1281

)

a.

Place RHRSW PUMP B LOCA TRIP HS-1120283 to RESET.

b.

Start RHRSW Pump 1 P506B in accordance with OP-116-001.

D C.3 IF SRVs spuriously initiates and adequate makeup is not available, Perform ON-183-001 to depressurize the reactor and Manually Initiate Core Spray in accordance with OP-151-001, to provide makeup, depending on location of fire. e[130*1311)

D

..J D

D D

a.

b.

IF fire in following Fire Zones, utilize Division 1 Core Spray:

(1)

Fire Zone 1-28 Div 2 Core Spray Area (25-670')

(2)

Fire Zone 1-2D Remote Shutdown Panel Room (25-670')

(3)

Fire Zone 1-38-N General An~a (25,28-683')

(4)

Fire Zone 1-4A-N North Side HCU (25,28-719')

(5)

Fire Zone 1-48 TIP Area (25-'719')

IF fire in following Fire Zones, utilize Division 2 Core Spray:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Fire Zone 1-2A Div 1 Core Spray Pump Room (27 -670')

Fire Zone 1-3A RBCCW Hx Area (27-683')

Fire Zone 1-4A-S South Side HCU (27,29-719')

Fire Zone 1-5A-S General Area (27,29-749')

D C.4

[Merged with Action C.3 in Revision 34]

Page 2 of 3

UNIT 1 REACTOR BLDG FIRE Attachment C ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 19 of 65 0

C.5 IF SCRAM has occurred AND all rods are in, AND open/close indication is Either LOST OR Indicated OPEN on SDV Vent and Drain Valves AND/OR with no SCRAM Pilot Valve Air Header low pressure alarm, then within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Close 147002A AND 1470028 AND Uncap AND Open 147007 to vent air header.

et 1371

)

D J

D D

C.6 A fire in the following Fire Zones can result in loss of ADS capability from the Control Room. IF ADS capability is lost, Manually Initiate ADS using the key lock SRV control switches in the Upper or Lower Relay Room, depending on the fire location, to depressurize the RPV. The timing of this action should be as required by the Emergency Operating Procedures. [Note: If the need to perform this action is determined when ADS initiation is attempted from the Control Room in response to reactor level reaching TAF, this follow up action should be completed within 8 minutes of level reaching TAF.]

et13s. 139,1401)

a.

IF the fire is in the following Fire Zone, Operate SRV's G, J, K, L, M, or N (ADS valves) individually from the Upper Relay Room Panel 1 C628 or from the Lower Relay Room Panei1C631 using key lock switches (1)

(2)

Fire Zone 1-6C Electrical Equipment Room (28, 779')

Fire Zone 1-6D HVAC Equipment Room (28,29-779')

b.

IF the fire is in the following Fire Zones, Operate SRV's G, J, K, L, M, OR N (ADS valve) individually from the Lower Relay Room Panei1C631 using key lock switches.

(1)

(2)

Fire Zone 1-4A-S South Side HCU (27,29-719')

Fire Zone 1-5A-S General Area (27,29-749')

c.

IF the fire is in the following Fire Zones, Operate SRV's G, J, K, L, M, or N (ADS valve) individually from the Upper Relay Room Panel 1 C628 using key lock switches.

(1)

(2)

Fire Zone 1-28 Access Corridor (25,28-670')

Fire Zone 1-2D Remote Shutdown Panel (25-670')

D C. 7 IF HPCI inadvertently starts and the 54" high water level trip is disabled, take control of HPCI per OP-152-001 OR Close valve HV-155-F002 to terminate HPCI injection prior to level reaching the bottom of the MSL (118"). et134l)

D C.8 IF HPCI inadvertently starts and the 54" high water level trip is disabled, take control of HPCI per OP-152-001 OR Close valve HV-155-F003 to terminate HPCI injection prior to level reaching the bottom of the MSL (118"). et134l)

Page 3 of 3

D D

D NOTE (1):

NOTE (2):

UNIT 2 REACTOR BLDG FIRE Time referenced is from time fire started.

Attachment D ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 20 of 65 Step numbers in this attachment are repeated in Attachment K, Table 1-1. Do not make any changes in these step numbers without changing this attachment and Table 1-1.

D.1 IF Reactor Recirc Pump 2P401A(B) must be tripped, Manually Trip Recirc by EITHER a, b, c, d OR e:

a.

Stop Reactor Recirculation Pump 2P401A(B) by g~pcf~1~ing MG SET A DRV MTR BKR HS-24001A(B) STOP pushbutton.

(

)

b.

At M.G. Set A(B) Drive Motor 2S134A(B) Cubicle 2A10110(2A10210).

(2[219])

(1)

(2)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to Open."

IF concern regarding a pump automatically restarting due to fire, control and trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

c.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 2A 2P401A (RPT) Bkr 2A20501 (2A20502):

(1)

(2)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton.

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

d.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 2B 2P401 B (RPT) Bkr 2A20601 (2A20602):

e.

Page 1 of 3 (1)

(2)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton.

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

At Reactor Recirc Pp MG Set A(B) Exciter & Local Bkr Cubicle 2C062A(B):

I NOTE:

(1)

Open MG Set A(B) Gen Local Ckt Bkr (Field Breaker) by Depressing Trip pushbutton.

(2)

Observe MG Set A(B) Gen Fld Current Decrease.

0 0

..J 0

0 0

(3)

UNIT 2 REACTOR BLDG FIRE Attachment D ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 21 of 65 IF desired, MG Set A(B) Drive Motor 2S134A(B) Cubicle 2A10110 (2A 1021 0) can be opened (with no load on pump) by:

(a)

(b)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to Open."

IF desired, Open control and Trip DC Power knife switch.

D.2 IF RHRSW Pump 2P506A spuriously trips: e[22a1)

a.

Place RHRSW PUMP 8 LOCA TRIP HS-21202A3 to RESET.

b.

Start RHRSW Pump 2P506A in accordance with OP-216-001.

D.3 IF SRVs spuriously initiates and if adequate makeup not available, Perform ON-283-001 to depressurize the reactor and Manually Initiate Core Spray in accordance with OP-251-001 to provide makeup, depending on location of fire: e[230*2311)

a.

IF fire is in following Fire Zones, utilize Division 1 Core Spray:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Fire Zone 2-4A-N General Area (30,33-719').

Fire Zone 2-48 TIP Room (30-719').

Fire Zone 2-5A-N General Area (30,33-749').

b.

IF fire is in following Fire Zones, utilize Division 2 Core Spray:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Fire Zone 2-2A Remote Shutdown Panel Room (32-670').

Fire Zone 2-3A RBCCW Hx Area (32-683').

Fire Zone 2-4A-S South Side HCU's (32,34-719').

Fire Zone 2-4G Main Steam Pipeway (30,32-719).

0 D.4

[Merged with Action D.3 in Revision 34]

0 D.5 IF SCRAM has occurred AND all rods are in, AND open/close indication is Either LOST OR Indicated OPEN on SDV Vent and Drain Valves AND/OR with no SCRAM Pilot Valve Air Header low pressure alarm, THEN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Close 247002A AND 2470028 AND Uncap AND Open 247007 to vent air header. e[2351)

Page 2 of 3

UNIT 2 REACTOR BLDG FIRE Attachment D ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 22 of65 D

D.6 A fire in the following Fire Zones can result in loss of ADS capability from the Control Room. IF ADS capability is lost, Manually Initiate ADS using the key lock SRV control switches in the Upper or Lower Relay Room, depending on the fire location, to depressurize the RPV. The timing of this action should be as required by the Emergency Operating Procedures. [Note: If the need to perform this action is determined when ADS initiation is attempted from the Control Room in response to reactor level reaching TAF, this follow up action should be completed within 8 minutes of level reaching TAF.] er2381)

D D

a.

IF the fire is in the following Fire Zones, Operate SRV's G, J, K, L, MorN (ADS valve) individually from the Upper Relay Room Panel 2C628 using key lock switches.

(1)

(2)

Fire Zone 2-5A-N General Area (30,33-749')

Fire Zone 2-6C Electrical Equipment Room (33-779')

D D.7 IF HPCI inadvertently starts and the 54" high water level trip is disabled, take control of HPCI per OP-252-001 OR Close valve HV-255-F002 to terminate HPCI injection prior to level reaching the bottom of the MSL (118"). er2361) t.J D.8 IF HPCI inadvertently starts and the 54" high water level trip is disabled, take control of HPCI per OP-252-001 OR Close valve HV-255-F003 to terminate HPCI injection prior to level reaching the bottom of the MSL (118"). er2361)

Page 3 of 3

D D

D a.]

D D

D J

Attachment E ON-013-001 CONTROL STRUCTURE (EXCLUDING CONTROL ROOM)

Revision 35 NOTE (1):

NOTE (2):

NOTE (3):

FIRE EFFECTS ON UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT Page 23 of 65 This attachment shall be used for fire in Control Structure but outside of Control Room.

Time referenced from time fire started.

Step numbers in this attachment are repeated in Attachment K, Table 1-1. Do not make any changes in these step numbers without changing this attachment and Table 1-1.

E.1 IF Reactor Recirc Pump 1 P401A(B) must be tripped, Manually Trip Recirc by Either a, b, c, d ORe:

a.

b.

Stop Reactor Recirculation Pump 1 P401A(B) by depressing MG SET A DRV MTR BKR HS-14001A(B) STOP pushbutton. er971)

At M.G. Set A(B) Drive Motor 1S134A(B) Cubicle 1A10110(1A10210):

(1)

(2)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to OPEN."

IF concern regarding pump restarting automatically due to fire, Control and Trip DC Power Knife switch can be opened.

c.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 1A 1 P401A (RPT) Bkr 1A20501 (1A20502): (2 142D (1)

(2)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton.

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

d.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 1 B 1 P401 B (RPT) Bkr 1A20601 (1A20602): (2 142D

e.

Page 1 of 3 (1)

(2)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton.

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

At Reactor Recirc Pp MG Set A( B) Exciter & Local Bkr Cubicle 1 C062A(B):

I NOTE:

(1)

Open MG Set A(B) Gen Local Ckt Bkr (Field Breaker) by Depressing Trip pushbutton.

D D

J E.2 E.3 Attachment E ON-013-001 CONTROL STRUCTURE (EXCLUDING CONTROL ROOM)

Revision 35 FIRE EFFECTS ON UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT Page 24 of 65 (2)

Observe MG Set A(8) Gen Fld Current DECREASE.

(3)

IF desired, MG SetA(8) Drive Motor 1S134A(8) Cubicle 1A10110 (1A10210) can be opened (with no load on pump) by:

(a)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to OPEN."

(b)

IF desired, Open Control and Trip DC Power knife switch.

IF RHR INJ 18 ISO HV-151-F015A(8) spuriously open, Close RHR INJ CTL 08 VLV HV-151-F017 A(8). e[54'551)

IF ADS or SRVs spuriously initiate and if adequate makeup not available, Manually Initiate Core Spray in accordance with OP-'151-001 to provide makeup, depending on location of fire: e[64*65])

a.

IF fire in following Fire Zones, utilize Division 1 Core Spray:

(1)

Fire Zone 0-24D Div 2 Lower Relay Room (12-698')

b.

IF fire in following Fire Zones, utilize Division 2 Core Spray:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Fire Zone 0-26D North Cable Chase (12-728')

Fire Zone 0-26V North Cable Chase (12-741')

Fire Zone 0-27E Div 1 Upper Relay Room (12-754')

Fire Zone 0-27H North Cable Chase (12-753')

Fire Zone 0-27C Div 1 Upper Cable Spreading Room E.4 IF a SCRAM condition exists and more than one control rod is greater than position 00, Close 147002A AND 1470028 AND Uncap AND Open 147007 to vent air header. IF SCRAM has occurred and all rods are in, and open/close indication is Either LOST OR Indicated OPEN on SDV Vent and Drain Valves AND/OR with no SCRAM Pilot Valve Air Header low pressure alarm, THEN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Close 147002A AND 1470028 AND Uncap AND Open 147007 to vent air header. e[901)

E.5 IF there is indication Main Condenser not available, Close OR Check CLOSED 2[78]

following valves: (

)

a.

MN STM LINE A 08 ISO HV-141-F028A

b.

MN STM LINE 8 08 ISO HV-141-F0288 Page 2 of 3

D D

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

Attachment E ON-013-001 CONTROL STRUCTURE (EXCLUDING CONTROL ROOM)

Revision 35 FIRE EFFECTS ON UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT Page 25 of 65 MN STM LINE C 08 ISO HV-141-F028C MN STM LINED 08 ISO HV-141-F028D MN STM LINE A 18 ISO HV-141-F022A MN STM LINE 8 18 ISO HV-141-F0228 MN STM LINE C 18 ISO HV-141-F022C MN STM LINED 18 ISO HV-141-F022D MN STM LINE 08 DRAIN HV-141-F019 MN STM LINE 18 DRAIN HV-141-F016 D

E.6 IF HPCI inadvertently starts and the 54" high water level trip is disabled, take control of HPCI per OP-152-001 OR Close valve HV-*155-F002 to terminate HPCI injection prior to level reaching the bottom of the MSL (118"). e[BO])

E.?

IF HPCI inadvertently starts and the 54" high water level trip is disabled, take control of HPCI per OP-152-001 OR Close valve HV-155-F003 to terminate HPCI injection prior to level reaching the bottom of the MSL (118"). e[BO])

Page 3 of 3

D D

0 CONTROL STRUCTURE (EXCLUDING CONTROL ROOM)

FIRE EFFECTS ON UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT Attachment F ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 26 of 65 NOTE (1):

NOTE (2):

NOTE (3):

This attachment shall be used for fire in the Control Structure but outside of Control Room.

Time referenced from time fire started.

Step numbers in this attachment are repeated in Attachment K, Table 1-1. Do not make any changes in these step numbers without changing this attachment and Table 1-1.

F.1 IF Reactor Recirc Pumps 2P401A/B must be tripped, Manually Trip Recirc by Either a, b, c, d ORe:

a.

Stop Reactor Recirculation Pump 2P401A(B) by depressing MG SET A DRV MTR BKR HS-24001A(B) STOP pushbutton. er981)

b.

At M.G. Set A(B) Drive Motor 2S134A(B) Cubicle 2A10110(2A10210): e1451)

(1)

(2)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to OPEN."

IF concern regarding pump restarting automatically due to fire, Control and Trip DC Power Knife switch can be opened.

c.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 2A 2P401A (RPT) Bkr 2A20501 (2A20502):

(1)

(2)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

d.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 28 2P401 B (RPT) Bkr 2A20601 (2A20602):

e.

Page 1 of 3 (1)

(2)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

At Reactor Recirc Pp MG Set A(B) Exciter & Local Bkr Cubicle 2C062A(B):

I NOTE:

(1)

(2)

Open MG Set A(B) Gen Local Ckt Bkr (Field Breaker) by Depressing Trip pushbutton.

Observe MG Set A(B) Gen Fld Current DECREASE.

D D

D

_]

D CONTROL STRUCTURE (EXCLUDING CONTROL ROOM)

FIRE EFFECTS ON UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT Attachment F ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 27 of 65 (3)

IF desired, MG Set A(8) Drive Motor 2S134A(8) Cubicle 2A10110 (2A10210) can be opened (with no load on pump) by:

(a)

(b)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to OPEN."

IF desired, Open Control and Trip DC Power knife switch.

F.2 IF RHR INJ 18 ISO HV-251-F015A(8) spuriously open, Close RHR INJ CTL 08 VLV HV-251-F017A(8). e[56'571)

F.3 IF ADS or SRV spuriously initiate and if adequate makeup not available, Manually Initiate Core Sprat. in accordance with OP-251-001 to provide makeup, depending on location of fire: e[s '671)

a.

IF fire in following Fire Zones, utilize Division 1 Core Spray:

(1)

(2)

Fire Zone 0-24G Div 2 Lower Relay Room (21-698')

Fire Zone 0-25A Div 2 Lower Cable Spreading Room (21-714')

b.

IF fire in following Fire Zones, utilize Division 2 Core Spray:

(1)

(2)

Fire Zone 0-27A Div 1 Upper Relay Room (21-754')

Fire Zone 0-278 Unit 2 Div 1 Upper Cable Spreading Room (21-753')

D F.4 IF a SCRAM condition exists and more than one control rod is greater than position 00, Close 247002A AND 2470028 AND Uncap AND Open 247007 to vent air header. IF SCRAM has occurred and all rods are in, and open/close indication is Either LOST OR Indicated OPEN on SDV Vent and Drain Valves AND/OR with no SCRAM Pilot Valve Air Header low pressure alarm, THEN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ~J~se 247002A AND 2470028 AND Uncap AND Open 247007 to vent air header. (

)

D D

D 1

F.5 IF there is indication Main Condenser not available, Close or Check CLOSED following valves: e[791)

a.

MN STM LINE A 08 ISO HV-241-F028A

b.

MN STM LINE 8 08 ISO HV-241-F0288

c.

MN STM LINE C 08 ISO HV-241-F028C

d.

MN STM LINED 08 ISO HV-241-F028D

e.

MN STM LINE A 18 ISO HV-241-F022A

f.

MN STM LINE 8 18 ISO HV-241-F0228 Page 2 of 3

D D

CONTROL STRUCTURE (EXCLUDING CONTROL ROOM)

FIRE EFFECTS ON UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT

g.

h.

i.

j.

MN STM LINE C 18 ISO HV-241-F022C MN STM LINED 18 ISO HV-241-F022D MN STM LINE 08 DRAIN HV-241-F019 MN STM LINE 18 DRAIN HV-241-F016 Attachment F ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 28 of 65 D

F.6 IF HPCI inadvertently starts and the 54" high water level trip is disabled, take control of HPCI per OP-252-001 OR Close valve HV-255-F002 to terminate HPCI injection prior to level reaching the bottom of the MSL (118"). e[801)

D F.7 IF HPCI inadvertently starts and the 54" high water level trip is disabled, take control of HPCI per OP-252-001 OR Close valve HV-255-F003 to terminate HPCI injection prior to level reaching the bottom of the MSL ( 118"). e[BO])

Page 3 of 3

D D

w D

D D

UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG OR MAIN TRANSFORMER FIRE Attachment G ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 29 of 65 NOTE:

Step numbers in this attachment are repeated in Attachment K, Table 1-1. Do not make any changes in these step numbers without changing this attachment and Table 1-1.

G.1 IF Reactor Recirc Pump 1 P401A(B) must be tripped and cannot be tripped from Control Room, Manually Trip Recirc Pump by Either a, b, cord:

a.

b.

C.

d.

Page 1 of 2 IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 1A 1 P401A (RPT) Bkr 1A20501 (1A20502): e[421)

(1)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton.

(2)

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 1 B 1 P401 B (RPT) Bkr 1A20601 (1A20602): e[421)

(1)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton (2)

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

At M.G. Set A(B) Drive Motor 1S134A(B) Cubicle 1A10110(1A10210) IF accessible:

(1)

IF DC power not available, Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to Open."

(2)

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power Knife switch can be opened.

At Reactor Recirc Pp MG Set A( B) Exciter & Local Bkr Cubicle 1 C062A(B):

I NOTE:

(1)

Open MG Set A( B) Gen Local Ckt Bkr (Field Breaker) by Depressing Trip pushbutton.

(2)

Observe MG Set A(B) Gen Fld Current DECREASE.

D D

J D

D D

G.2 G.3 UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG OR MAIN TRANSFORMER FIRE Attachment G ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 30 of 65 (3)

IF desired, MG Set A(B) Drive Motor S134A(B) Cubicle 1A10110 (1A10210) can be opened (with no load on pump) by:

(a)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to OPEN."

(b)

IF desired, Open Control and Trip DC Power knife, switch.

Moved to Action B. 1 0 in Revision 34.

IF there is indication Main Condenser not available, Close OR Check CLOSED following valves: e[?BJ)

a.

MN STM LINE A OB ISO HV-141-F028A

b.

MN STM LINE BOB ISO HV-141-F028B

c.

MN STM LINE COB ISO HV-141-F028C

d.

MN STM LINED OB ISO HV-141-F028D

e.

MN STM LINE A IB ISO HV-141-F022A

f.

MN STM LINE BIB ISO HV-141-F022B

g.

MN STM LINE C IB ISO HV-141-F022C

h.

MN STM LINED IB ISO HV-141-F022D

i.

MN STM LINE OB DRAIN HV-141-F019

j.

MN STM LINE IB DRAIN HV-141-F016 Page 2 of 2

Attachment H ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 31 of 65 UNIT 2 TURBINE BLDG. OR MAIN TRANSFORMER FIRE D

NOTE:

Step numbers in this attachment are repeated in Attachment K, Table 1-1. Do not make any changes in these step numbers without changing this attachment and Table 1-1.

H.1 IF Reactor Recirc Pump 2P401A(B) must be tripped and cannot be tripped from Control Room, Manually Trip Recirc by Either a, b, cORd:

a.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 2A 2P401A (RPT) Bkr 2A20501 (2A20502):e[44J)

D (1)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton D

D J

D D

D 0

b.

c.

d.

(2)

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

IF accessible, at Reactor Recirc Pump 2B 2P401 B (RPT) Bkr 2A20601 (2A20602): e[44J)

(1)

Depress AND Release red pushbutton (2)

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power knife switch can be opened.

At M.G. Set breaker at M.G. Set A(B) Drive Motor 2S134A(B) Cubicle 2A 1 011 0(2A 1 021 0) if accessible:

(1)

Push Up on the plunger marked "Lift Plunger to OPEN."

(2)

IF concern regarding pump automatically restarting, Control and Trip DC Power Knife switch can be opened.

At Reactor Recirc Pp MG Set A(B) Exciter & Local Bkr Cubicle 2C062A(B):

I NOTE:

(1)

(2)

Open MG Set A(B) Gen Local Ckt Bkr (Field Breaker) by Depressing Trip pushbutton.

Observe MG Set A(B) Gen Fld Current DECREASE.

(3)

IF desired, MG Set A(B) Drive Motor S134A(B) Cubicle 2A10110 (2A10210) can be opened (with no load on pump) by:

(a)

Push Up on plunger marked "Lift Plunger to OPEN."

(b)

IF desired, Open Control and Trip DC Power knife switch.

H.2 Moved to Action B.1 0 in Revision 34.

Page 1 of 2

Attachment H ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 32 of 65 UNIT 2 TURBINE BLDG. OR MAIN TRANSFORMER FIRE H.3 IF there is indication Main Condenser not available, Close OR Check Closed following valves: (2 [?9D 0

a.

MN STM LINE A OB ISO HV-241-F028A D

D D

b.

C.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

Page 2 of 2 MN STM LINE BOB ISO HV-241-F028B MN STM LINE COB ISO HV-241-F028C MN STM LINED OB ISO HV-241-F028D MN STM LINE A IB ISO HV-241-F022A MN STM LINE BIB ISO HV-241-F022B MN STM LINE C IB ISO HV-241-F022C MN STM LINED IB ISO HV-241-F022D MN STM LINE OB DRAIN HV-241-F019 MN STM LINE IB DRAIN HV-241-F016

DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING FIRE Attachment I ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 33 of 65 0

NOTE (1):

D D

D NOTE (2):

Consider shutdown of Unit 1 first.

NOTE (3):

Step numbers in this attachment are repeated in Attachment K, Table 1-1. Do not make any changes in these step numbers without changing this attachment and Table 1-1.

1.1 IF a fire in A DIG Room: Unit 1 HPCI automatic operation and CST low level signal input to HPCI pump suction automatic transfer logic from CST to Suppression Pool may be lost due to fire damage. Manual transfer of Unit 1 HPCI Pump suction may be required depending on CST level. IF CST level instrumentation is not available, Transfer Unit 1 HPCI suction to the Suppression Pool within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months lAW section SETUP FOR TAKING SUCTION FROM SUPPRESSION POOL of OP-152-001. (2 l91D Page 1 of 1

D D

D NOTE (1):

NOTE (2):

NOTE (3):

UNIT 1 SOUND POWERED PHONE LOCATIONS Attachment J ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 34 of 65 Headsets are stored in a storage box located near the Sound Powered Phone Jack, except as noted.

Sound Powered Phone Jacks and storage boxes are color coded Pink.

Headsets must be plugged into the same communications loop.

LOOP 1 SAFE SHTDWN DIV 1 JP1101 JP1102 JP1103 JP1104 JP1105 1A201 4.16 KV Switchgear Room 1 Y236 120 VAC Panel 1A203 4.16 KV Switchgear Room Unit 1 Control Room (PCO Desk)

OC879 Local Control Structure HVAC Panel LOOP 3 SAFE SHTDWN DIV 2 JP1301 JP1302 JP1303 JP1304 JP1305 Page 1 of 4 1A202 4.16 KV Switchgear Room 1 Y246 120 VAC Panel 1A204 4.16 KV Switchgear Room (located by 8 CRM panel)

Unit 1 Control Room (PCO Desk)

OC879 Local Control Structure HVAC Panel (29-749')

(29-719')

(12-729')

(21-783')

(28-749')

(28-719')

(12-729')

(21-783')

(Headset located in 1A203 Switchgear room)

(Headset located in Shift Supervisor Locker)

(Headset located in 1A204 Switchgear room)

(Headset located in Shift Supervisor Locker)

SOUND POWERED PHONE LOCATIONS LOOP 4 CTL-REMOTE SHTDWN PNL JP1401 JP1402 Unit 1 Control Room (PCO Desk)

Unit 1 Remote Shutdown Panel (located by RSP 1 C201)

LOOP 5 CTL-TURBINE BUILDING JP1501 JP1502 Unit 1 Control Room (PCO Desk) 1A 101 (1A 1 02)(2A 101 )(2A 1 02) 13.8 KV Aux Bus LOOP 6 CTL-UPPER RELAY ROOM JP1601 Unit 1 Control Room (PCO Desk)

JP1602 1 C628 Upper Relay Room LOOP 7 CTL-LOWER RELAY ROOM JP1701 Unit 1 Control Room (PCO Desk)

JP1702 1 C631 Lower Relay Room Page 2 of 4 (12-729')

(25-670')

(12-729')

(4-699')

(12-729')

(12-754')

(12-729')

(12-698')

Attachment J ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 35 of 65 (Headset located in Shift Supervisor's Locker)

(Headset Located in 1A101/1A102 13.8 KV Switchgear room)

(Headset located in Shift Supervisor's Locker)

(Headset located in hallway directly outside URR door)

(Headset located in Shift Supervisor's Locker)

(Headset located in hallway directly outside LRR door)

D Attachment J ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 36 of 65 SOUND POWERED PHONE LOCATIONS UNIT2 NOTE:

For communication with Unit 2 13.8 KV Switchgear Room, must use Loop 5, JP1501 to JP1502 (Unit 1 Control Room to Unit 1 13.8 KV Switchgear Room)

LOOP 1 SAFE SHTDWN DIV 1 JP2101 2A201 4.16 KV Switchgear Room JP2102 2Y236 120 VAC Panel JP2103 2A203 4.16 KV Switchgear Room JP2104 Unit 2 Control Room (PCO Desk)

LOOP 3 SAFE SHTDWN DIV 2 JP2301 2A202 4.16 KV Switchgear Room JP2302 Unit 2 Control Room (PCO Desk)

JP2303 2Y246 120 VAC Panel LOOP 4 CTL-REMOTE SHTDWN PANEL JP2401 Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel JP2402 Unit 2 Control Room (PCO Desk)

Page 3 of 4 (34-749')

(34-719')

(Headset located in 2A203 Switchgear room (34-719')

(21-729')

(33-749')

(21-729')

(33-719')

(32-670')

(21-729')

(Headset located in Shift Supervisor's Locker)

(Headset located in 2A204 Switch gear room)

(Headset located in Shift Supervisor's Locker)

Attachment J ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 37 of 65 SOUND POWERED PHONE LOCATIONS LOOP 6 CTL-UPPER RELAY ROOM JP2601 Unit 2 Control Room (PCO Desk)

JP2602 2C628 Upper Relay Room LOOP 7 CTL-LOWER RELAY ROOM JP2701 Unit 2 Control Room (PCO Desk)

JP2702 2C631 Lower Relay Room Page 4 of 4 (21-729')

(Headset located in Shift Supervisor's Locker)

(21-754')

(Headset located in URR directly inside door)

(21-729')

(21-698')

(Headset located in Shift Supervisor's Locker)

(Headset located in LRR on east wall)

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 38 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Descri~tion Path Notes Actions Remarks Control 656' 0-21A 12,21 Common Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

None Structure Egui~ment Area 0-218 12,21 Freight Elev &

Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI Protected on None Stairwell No. 221 and 3 both units (#)

676' 0-22A 12,21 Central Access Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

None Area 0-228 12 Passenger Elev &

Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Stairwell No. 120 and 3 both units {#}

0-22C 12, 21, Entrance Corridor&

Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

None 30, 33 Lobb:t 687' 0-23 21 Control Structure Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

None Egress Corridor 698' 0-24A 21 UPS Panei Path i RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

None Room(U2}

0-248 12,21 Corridor (C-200, Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

E.S, F.1, F.S C-204 0-24C 12 UPS Panel Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

None Room(U1)

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 1 of 27

TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Control 698' 0-240 12 U1 Div II Lower Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2 (#)

Structure Relay Room 0-24E 12,21 Computer Room Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

0-24F 12, 21 Computer Maint.

Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

Room & Office 0-24G 21 U2 Div II Lower Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

Relay Room

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 2 of 27 Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 39 of 65 Operator Actions E.1, E.2, E.3, E.4, E.5, E.6 E.5, F.1, F.5, F.6 E.5, F.1, F.5 F.1, F.2, F3, F.4, F.5, F.6 Remarks Pumps 1P401A and 1 P401 B can be tripped from the Control Room.

Pumps 2P401A and 2P401B can be tripped from the Control Room.

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 40 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Control 698' 0-241 21 HVAC Duct Chase Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Offsite Structure and 3 Unit 1 (#)

Power (T-10 & T-20 Protected}

0-24J 21 South Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on both units F.1, F.S Chase

(#)

0-24K 12,21 HVAC Duct Chase Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Offsite and 3 Unit 1 (#)

Power (T-10 & T-20 Protected}

0-24L 12 Center Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

E.S Chase 0-24M 12 North Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Chase

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 3 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 41 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Control 714' 0-25A 21 U2 Div II Lower Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

F.1, F.3, F.4, F.6 Structure Cable Spreading Room 0-258 21 South Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on both units None Chase

(#)

0-25C 12 Center Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Chase 0-250 12 North Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Chase 0-25E 12, 21 U1 Div II Lower Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2 (#)

E.1, E.2, E.4, E.6 Cable S~reading 729' 0-268 21 South Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on both units None Chase

(#)

0-26C 12 Center Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Chase 0-260 12 North Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

E.3 Chase 741' 0-26S 12 South Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on both units None Chase

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 4 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 42 of65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Control 714' 0-26T 12 Center Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Structure Chase 0-26V 12 North Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

E.3 Chase 754' 0-27A 21 U2 Div I Upper Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1 (#)

F.1, F.2, F.3 F.4, F.5, Pumps Relay Room F.?

2P401A and 2P401B can be tripped from the Control Room.

0-278 21 U2 Div I Upper Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1 (#)

F.1, F.2, F.3, F.5, F.?

Cable Spreading Room 0-27C 12,21 U1 Div I Upper Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

E.1, E.2, E.3, E.4, Pumps Cable Spreading E.5, E.?, F.1

1P401A, Room 1 P401B, 2P401A and 2P401B can be tripped from the Control Room.

Control 754' 0-270 12 Electricians Office Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Structure

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 5 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 43 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Descri~tion Path Notes Actions Remarks 0-27E 12 U1 Div I Upper Path 3 SID Unit 1 first, HPCI E.1, E.2, E.3, E.4, Pumps Relay Room protected on Unit 2 (#)

E.5, E.?

1P401A and 1P401B can be tripped from the Control Room.

0-27F 21 South Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on both units F.1 Chase

{#}

0-27G 12 Center Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Chase

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 6 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 44 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Descrietion Path Notes Actions Remarks Control 754' 0-27H 12 North Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

E.3 Structure Chase 771' 0-28A-21 U2 Div II Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

None I

Egui~ment Room 0-28A-21 U2 Div I Equipment Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1 (#)

F.1 II Room 0-28B-12 U1 Div II Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2 (#)

None I

Egui~ment Room 0-28B-12 U1 Div Equipment Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

E.1 II Room I 0-28C 21 U2 Div I 125V Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1 (#)

None Batte~ Room 0-280 21 U2 Div II 125V Path 1 RCIC protected on both units None Batte~ Room

{#}

0-28E 21 U2 Div II 125V Path 1 RCIC protected on both units None Batte~ Room

{#}

0-28F 21 U2 Div 1250V Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1 (#)

F.1 Battery Room

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 7 of 27

TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Control 771' 0-28G 21 U2 Div II 250V Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

Structure BatterY Room 0-28H 12, 21 Cold lnstr. Repair Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

Sho 0-281 12 U1 Div 1250V Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

BatterY Room 0-28J 12 U1 Div II 250V Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2 (#)

BatterY Room 0-28K 12 U1 Div 1125V Path 3 HPCI protected on both units.

BatterY Room

(#)

0-28L 12 U1 Div 1125V Path 3 HPCI protected on both units.

Battery Room

(#)

0-28M 12 U1 Div II 125V Path 1 RCIC protected on both units.

BatterY Room

(#)

0-28N 12 U1 Div II 125V Path 1 RCIC protected on both units.

BatterY Room

(#)

0-28P 21 South Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on both units.

Chase

{#}

0-280 12 Center Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

Chase

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 8 of 27 Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 45 of65 Operator Actions None E.1, F.1 E.1 None None None None None None None Remarks

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 46 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Buildin!i!

Elev Zone Area Descrietion Path Notes Actions Remarks Control 771' 0-28R 12 North Elec Cable Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Structure Chase 0-28S 12 HVAC Duct Chase Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Offsite and 3 Unit 1. (#)

Power (T-10

& T-20 Protected) 0-28T 21 U2 Div I 125V Path 3 HPCI protected on both units.

None Batte~ Room

{#}

783' 0-29A 21 Stairwell Vestibule Paths 1 HPCI and RCIC protected on None and 3 both units. {#}

~-~---*--

0-298 12,21 Fan Room &

Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Offsite Assoc. HVAC And 3 Unit 1. (#)

Power (T-10 Equipment

& T-20 Protected}

0-29C 12 Stairwell Vestibule Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 both units. {#}

0-29D 12 Pipe & Duct Chase Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Offsite and 3 Unit 1. (#)

Power (T-10

& T-20 Protected) 806' 0-30A 12,21 C.S. HVAC&

Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Offsite SBGTS and 3 Unit 1. (#)

Power (T-10

& T-20 Protected) 0-308 21 Stairwell No. 125 Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Offsite and 3 Unit 1. (#)

Power (T-10

& T-20 Protected)

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 9 of 27

TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Diesel All 0-41A 44 Diesel Generator Path 3 HPCI protected on both units Generator Bay A

(#)

0-41B 43 Diesel Generator Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

Ba B 0-41C 44 Diesel Generator Path 3 HPCI protected on both units.

BayC

(#)

0-41D 43 Diesel Generator Path 1 RCIC protected on both units.

Bay D

{#}

0-41E 81 Diesel Generator Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on "E" Bldg And 3 both units (#}

ESSW 0-51 55 East Side of ESSW Path 3 HPCI protected on both units.

Pumphouse Pum~house

{#}

0-52 56 West Side of Path 1 RCIC protected (#)

ESSW Pumphouse

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 10 of 27 Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 47 of 65 Operator Actions Remarks 1.1 None None Offsite Power (T-20

~rotected}

None None Offsite Power(T -1 0/

T-20 are also

~rotected}

None None

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 48 of65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Descrietion Path Notes Actions Remarks Outside All 0-00 71-80, Outside/Yard Areas Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Areas 82-97 and 3 Unit 2 {#)

Radwaste All 37-42 Radwaste Building Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 both units (#)

Turbine All 1-24 Unit 1 and 2 Paths 1, 2 RCIC and HPCI protected on B.9, G.1, G.3, H.1, Turbine Buildings and 3 Unit 1 (#)

H.3 Unit 1 645' 1-1A 25,27 Core Spray 'A' Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Reactor Pum~ Room 1-1 B 25 Core Spray 'B' Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Pum~ Room 1-1C 25,28 HPCI Pump Room Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

None 1-10 28 RCIC Pump Room Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

None 1-1 E 28 RHR 'B' Pump Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Room 1-1 F 29 RHR 'A' Pump Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Room

(#}

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 11 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 49 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit 1 645' 1-1G 29 Sump Room Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Reactor 1-11 25 Elev Shaft &

Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Stairwell No. 1 02 1-1 J 28 Stairwell No. 101 Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 Unit 2. (#}

648' 1-1H 26 Suppression N/A None PC is Chamber inerted 670' 1-2A 25,27 Core Spray 'A' Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.3 Pump Room Access 1-28 25,28 Access Corridor Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.3, C.6 1-2C 29 RR Airlock! Access Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Shaft 1-20 25 Remote Shutdown Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.3, C.6 Panel 683' 1-3A 25,27 Heat Exch. & Pump Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.1, C.3 Room

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 12 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 50 of65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Descrietion Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit 1 683' 1-38-N 25,28 Equipment Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2 (#)

C.1, C.3, C.?

Reactor Removal Area 1-38-S 29 Equipment Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Removal Area 1-38-W 28,29 Equipment Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Removal Area and 3 Unit 2. {#}

1-3C-N 25,28 Equipment Access Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Area 1-3C-S 27,29 Equipment Access Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Area 1-3C-W 28,29 Equipment Access Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Area and 3 Unit 2. (#)

704' 1-4F 26 Drywell N/A None 715'-

0-6H 29, 33 Cask Storage Pit Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None 818' and 3 Unit 2. (#)

719' 1-4A-N 25,28 Containment Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.1, C.3, C.?

Pump 1P401A Access Area can be tripped from the Control Room.

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 13 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 51 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit 1 719' 1-4A-S 27,29 Containment Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

C.1, C.2, C.3, Reactor Access Area C.6, C.8 1-4A-W 28,29 Containment Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on C.1, C.5 Pump 1P401B Access Area and 3 Unit 2. (#)

can be tripped from the Control Room.

1-48 25 Pipe Penetration Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2 (#)

C.1, C.3, C.?

Pump 1P401A Room can be tripped from the Control Room.

1-4C 28 4.16 KV Switchgear Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Room Div. II 1-40 28,29 4.16 KV Switchgear Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Room Div. i 1-4E 29 CRD Rebuild Room Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

None 1-4G 11' 12, Main Steam Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

None 25,27 Pi~ewa~

749' 1-5A-N 25,28 SLC Area Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.?

1-5A-S 27,29 General Access Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.1, C.2, C.3, Area C.6, C.8

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 14 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 52 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit 1 749' 1-5A-W 28,29 Access Corridor Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on C.1, C.2 Pump 1P401A Reactor and 3 Unit 2 (#)

can be tripped from the Control Room.

1-5D 25,28 RWCU Pump Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Room & Heat Exch.

and 3 Unit 2. (#)

Room 1-5E 28,29 Penetration Room Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.2 1-5F 28 4.16 KV Switchgear Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.1 Room Div. II 1-5G 28,29 4.16 KV Switchgear Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.1 Pump 1P4018 Room Div. I can be tripped from the Centro!

Room.

1-5H 29 I&C lnstr. Repair Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2. (#)

None Shop 761' 1-58 25,27 Valve Access Area Paths 1 RCIC for inventory control &

None Both division CS and 3 RHR SDC for decay heat injection valves removal SID Unit 2 with Path In fire zone. See

3. (also refer to Table 1-3b).

Table 1-3b.

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 15 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 53 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit 1 761' 1-5C 25 RWCU Backwash Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2 (#)

C.7 Reactor Receiving Tank Room 779' 0-6G 27, 29, Surge Tank Vault Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None 30,33 and 3 Unit 2. (#}

1-6A 25,27 General Access Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2. (#)

C.7 Area & Pump Room 1-68 25,28 Load Center Room Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 Unit 2. (#}

1-6C 28 Electrical Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on C.2, C.6, C. 7 Equipment Room and 3 Unit 2 (#}

1-60 28,29 HVAC Equipment Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on C.6, C.7 Room and 3 Unit 2. (#}

1-6E 29 HVAC Plenum Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Area 1-6F 27,29 Spent Fuel Pool Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 Unit 2. (#)

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 16 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 54 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit 1 779' 1-61 27,30 Fuel Pool Holding Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 2 (#)

None Reactor Pum~ Room 1-78 29 Recirc Fan Room Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 Unit 2. (#}

799' 1-7A 28,29 HVAC Equipment Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Area and 3 Unit 2 (#}

818' 0-8A 25-29, Refueling Floor Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None 31-34 and 3 Unit 2. (#}

Unit 2 645' 2-1A 30, 32 Core Spray '8' Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

None Reactor Pum~ Room 2-18 32 Core Spray 'A' Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

None Pump Room 2-1C 30, 33 HPCI Pump Room Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

None 2-1D 33 RCIC Pump Room Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

None 2-1E 33 RHR '8' Pump Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

None Room

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 17 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 55 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit2 645' 2-1F 34 RHR 'A' Pump Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1 (#)

None Reactor Room 2-1G 34 Sump Room Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

None 2-1H 31 Suppression N/A None PC is inerted Chamber 2-11 32 Elev Shaft &

Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Stairwell No. 202 and 3 Unit 1. (#)

2-1J 33 Stairwell No. 201 Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 Unit 1. (#)

670' 2-2A 32 Remote Shutdown Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

D.3 Panel Room 2-28 30, 32, Personnel Access Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

None 33 Corridor 2-2C 34 Vehicle Airlock Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

None 683' 2-3A 32, 34 Access Area Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

D.1, D.3

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 18 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 56 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Descrietion Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit 2 683' 2-38-N 30, 32, Equipment Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1 (#)

D.1, D.?

Reactor 33 Removal Area 2-38-S 34 Equipment Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. {#)

None Removal Area 2-38-W 33,34 Equipment Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Removal Area and 3 Unit 1. (#)

2-3C-N 30, 33 Equipment Access Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

None Area 2-3C-S 32, 34 Equipment Access Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

None Area 2-3C-W 33,34 Equipment Access Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Area and 3 Unit 1. (#)

704' 2-4F 31 Drywell N/A None PC is inerted 719' 2-4A-N 30,33 Containment Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

D.1, D.3, D.?

Pump 2P401A Access Area can be tripped from the Control Room.

2-4A-S 32, 34 Containment Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

D.1, D.3 Pump 2P401B Access Area can be tripped from the Control Room.

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 19 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 57 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit2 719' 2-4A-W 33, 34 Containment Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on 0.1, 0.5 Pump 2P401B Reactor Access Area and 3 Unit 1 (#)

can be tripped from the Control Room.

2-48 30 Pipe Penetration Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

0.1, 0.3, 0.7 Room 2-4C 33 4.16 KV Switchgear Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

None Room Div. II 2-40 33, 34 4.16 KV Switchgear Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

None Room Div. I 2-4E 34 CRD Rebuild Room Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

None 2-4G 21, 22, Main Steam Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

D 1, 03 Pumps 2P401A 30, 32 Pipeway and 2P401 B can be tripped from the Control Room.

749' 2-SA-N 30,33 SLC Area Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

0.1' 0.2, 0.3, 0.6, 0.8 2-SA-S 32, 34 General Access Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

0.1 Pumps 2P401A Area and 2P401 B can be tripped from the Control Room.

2-SA-W 33,34 Access Corridor Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on 0.1, 0.2 Pump 2P401B and 3 Unit 1 (#)

can be tripped from the Control Room.

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 20 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 58 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit2 749' 2-50 32, 34 RWCU Pump Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on 0.2 Reactor Room & Heat Exch.

and 3 Unit 1 (#)

Room 2-5E 33,34 Pipe Penetration Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

0.1 Pumps 2P401A Room and 2P401 B can be tripped from the Control Room.

2-5F 33 4.16 KV Switchgear Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

0.1 Pump 2P401A Room Div. II can be tripped from the Control Room.

2-5G 33, 34 4.16 KV Switchgear Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1. (#)

0.1 Pump 2P401B Room Div. I can be tripped from the Control Room.

2-5H 34 I&C lnstr. Repair Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Sho~

and 3 Unit 1. (#)

761' 2-58 30, 32 Valve Access Area Paths 1 RCIC for inventory control &

None Both division CS and 3 RHR SOC for decay heat injection valves removal SID Unit 1 with Path In fire zone.

3. (also refer to Table 1-3b).

See Table 1-3b

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 21 of 27

Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 59 of 65 TABLE 1-1 APPENDIX R SSD PATHS AND OPERATOR ACTIONS Fire Plant Fire Zone Protected Clarifying Operator Building Elev Zone Area Description Path Notes Actions Remarks Unit 2 761' 2-SC 32 RWCU Backwash Path 3 HPCI protected on Unit 1 (#)

None Reactor Receiving Tank Room 779' 2-6A 30, 32 General Access Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

D.2, D. 7 Area & Pump Room 2-68 32, 34 Load Center Room Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 Unit 1. {#}

2-6C 33 Electrical Path 1 RCIC protected on Unit 1. (#)

D.6, D. 7 Egui~ment Room 2-6D 33,34 HVAC Equipment Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Room and 3 Unit 1. {#}

2-6E 34 HVAC Plenum Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Area and 3 Unit 1. {#}

2-6F 30, 33 Spent Fuel Pool Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None and 3 Unit 1. {#}

799' 2-7A 33, 34 HVAC Equipment Paths 1 RCIC and HPCI protected on None Area and 3 Unit 1. (#)

(#)

The table above indicates where HPCI AND/OR RCIC is protected from the effects of fire.

Page 22 of 27

TABLE 1-2 Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 60 of 65 APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN PATHS Path 11 Reactivity Control CRD (Scram Function)

Manual Scram from Control Room or by venting the instrument air header locally on Elevation 719 of the Reactor Building Reactor Pressure Control Manual ADS from Control Room or from the Upper Relay Room Manual SRVs from Control Room (Non-Fire Unit)

Inboard MSIVs Reactor Coolant Makeup Core Spray RCIC (Non-Fire Unit)

Reactor Heat Removal Process RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Mode RHRSW Notes:

Reactivity Control CRD (Scram Function)

Manual Scram from Control Room or by venting the instrument air header locally on Elevation 719 of the Reactor Building Reactor Pressure Control Manual ADS from Control Room or from the Lower Relay Room Manual SRVs from LRR (Non-Fire Unit)

Outboard MSIVs Reactor Coolant Makeup Core Spray HPCI (Non-Fire Unit}4 Reactor Heat Removal Process RHR Suppression Pool Cooling Mode RHRSW D

1.

These Paths are not completely divisionalized.

D

2.

This note has been deleted.

D

3.

Loop No. 5 installed between Turbine Building and Unit 1 Control Room may be used for safe shutdown for both units.

D

4.

HPCI is credited for high pressure make-up along with ADS and Core Spray in Fire Areas D-1 and D-3.

D

5.

Diesel Generator E can be substituted for Diesel Generator A, B, C or D Page 23 of 27

TABLE 1-2 Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 61 of 65 APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN PATHS Path 11 Monitoring Suppression Pool Monitoring Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation Control Room Indication Associated Support Functions RHR Room Coolers RCIC Room Coolers (Non-Fire Unit)

Passive Keepfill System Tank 1T274 for Unit 1 Tank 2T274 for Unit 2 Common Required Components ESW ESSW Pumphouse HVAC D. G. HVAC & Aux. Systems Notes:

Monitoring Suppression Pool Monitoring Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation Control Room Indication Associated Support Function RHR Room Coolers HPCI Room Coolers (Non-Fire Unit)

Passive Keepfill System Tank 1T274forUnit 1 Tank 2T274 for Unit 2 Common Required Components ESW ESSW Pumphouse HVAC D. G. HVAC & Aux. Systems D

1.

These Paths are not completely divisionalized.

D

2.

This note has been deleted.

D

3.

Loop No. 5 installed between Turbine Building and Unit 1 Control Room may be used for safe shutdown for both units.

D

4.

HPCI is credited for high pressure make-up along with ADS and Core Spray in Fire Areas D-1 and D-3.

D

5.

Diesel Generator E can be substituted for Diesel Generator A, B, C or D Page 24 of 27

TABLE 1-2 Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 62 of 65 APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN PATHS Electrical EDGs A&C or Offsite Power (T-10} 5 Respective Distribution Equipment App. R Comm. System (Unit 1)

Communication Loop No. 1 Communication Loop No. 53 Communication Loop No. 6 App. R Comm. System (Unit 2)

Communication Loop No. 1 Communication Loop No. 4 Communication Loop No. 53 Communication Loop No. 6 Notes:

Electrical EDGs B&D or Offsite Power (T-20) 5 Respective Distribution Equipment App. R Comm. System (Unit 1)

Communication Loop No. 3 Communication Loop No. 4 Communication Loop No. 53 Communication Loop No. 7 App. R Comm. System (Unit 2)

Communication Loop No. 3 Communication Loop No. 53 Communication Loop No. 7 D

1.

These Paths are not completely divisionalized..

D

2.

This note has been deleted.

D

3.

Loop No. 5 installed between Turbine Building and Unit 1 Control Room may be used for safe shutdown for both units.

D

4.

HPCI is credited for high pressure make-up along with ADS and Core Spray in Fire Areas D-1 and D-3.

D

5.

Diesel Generator E can be substituted for Diesel Generator A, B, C or D Page 25 of 27

TABLE 1-*3a Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 63 of 65 SHUTDOWN PATHS AND METHODOLOGY BY FIRE LOCATION FIRE OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM (EXCEPT FIRE ZONES 1-5B AND 2-5B)

Unit 1 (Fire Unit)

Path 1 [Use RHR Pump 1A]

Path 3 [Use RHR Pump 1 D]

Unit 1 (Non-Fire Unit)

Path 1 [Use RHR Pump 1A]

RCIC [Is also protected-see note 3]

No Spurious SRV or ADS Path 1 Path 3 [Use RHR Pump 1 D]

HPCI [Is also protected - see note 3]

No Spurious SRV or ADS Path 3 NOTES:

Unit 2 (Non-Fire Unit)

Path1 [Use RHR pump 2C]

RCIC [Is also protected-see note 3]

No Spurious SRV or ADS Path 1 Path 3 [Use RHR Pump RHR 28]

HPCI [Is also protected-see note 3]

No Spurious SRV or ADS Path 3 Unit 2 (Fire Unit)

Path 1 [Use RHR pump 2C]

Path 3 [Use RHR Pump RHR 28]

D

1. Table 1-1 lists the required safe shutdown path (Path 1 or 3) and which unit is to be shutdown first for all fire zones.

D

2. High pressure make-up along with ADS and Core Spray is available for both units when the "Clarifying Notes" column of Table 1-1 states either unit may be shutdown first.

D

3. Based on changes made for the Extended Power Uprate Project to add ESW Cooling for the RHR C and D Pump Motor Oil Coolers, both units could be safely shutdown using ADS and CS using path 1 or 3 as described above. During the implementation of the RHR Pump motor oil cooling changes made as part of the Extended Power Uprate Project, however, a conscious decision was made to maintain the availability of HPCI or RCIC for the non fire unit. Use of HPCI or RCIC during fire conditions, could minimize the transient on the affected unit. If HPCI or RCIC, however, is not available, use path 1 or 3, as appropriate.

Page 26 of 27

TABLE 1-3b Attachment K ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 64 of 65 SHUTDOWN PATHS AND METHODOLOGY BY FIRE LOCATION FIRE ZONES 1-5B AND 2-5B FIRE ZONE 1-5B UNIT 1 FIRE ZONE 2-5B

.\\)NIT 2 Path 1 With Following Changes:

Path 1 With Following Changes:

A.

CS Not Available For Vessel Makeup A.

CS Not Available For Vessel Makeup B.

C.

Spurious SRV Or ADS Must Be Prevented RCIC And Division I RHR SPC Used Until Division I RHR SOC Can Be Entered (Reactor Pressure <98 Psig)

To Achieve Cold Shutdown (Note 1)

13.

C.

Spurious SRV Or ADS Must Be Prevented RCIC And Division I RHR SPC Used Until Division I RHR SOC Can Be Entered (Reactor Pressure <98 Psig) To Achieve Cold Shutdown (Note 1)

UNIT2 UNIT 1 Path 3 Path 3 NOTES:

D

1. As an alternative to the use of RCIC, RHR (LPCI) may be used in the alternative shutdown cooling mode. ADS/SRV's must be available for depressurization and vessel flow to the suppression pool. The main steam line drain valves must be capable of being closed.

D

2. Both units could be safely shutdown using Path 1. The fire unit could use Path 1 components with the modifications as described above. The non-fire unit could use the traditional Path 1 safe shutdown methodology for the fire unit (ADS/Core Spray) with or without the availability of RCIC typically used for non fire unit. During the implementation of the RHR Pump motor oil cooling changes made as a part of the Extended Power Uprate Project, however, a conscious decision was made to maintain the availability of Path 3 for the non fire unit.

Page 27 of 27

D Attachment L ON-013-001 Revision 35 Page 65 of 65 FIRE BRIGADE NORMAL RESPONSE Activity Hard Card PERFORM THE FOLLOWING CONCURRENTLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY UPON CONFIRMATION OF ACTUAL FIRE D

Record Date and Time of fire notification.

D Dispatch Fire Brigade Leader to area of reported fire.

D Sound Fire Alarm for-10 seconds. Make plant page announcement.

Example:

"ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL: THERE IS A FIRE IN (UNIT/BUILDING/ELEVATION/AREA AND ROOM/AREA NAME IF APPROPRIATE). STATION FIRE BRIGADE HAS BEEN ACTIVATED; STAY CLEAR OF AFFECTED AREAS."

REPEAT ANNOUNCEMENT.

D Fire Brigade Leader reports location of Command Post:

D Fire Brigade Shed #1 - Unit 1 Turbine Building 729' D

Fire Brigade Shed #2-Unit 2 Tool Room 676' D

Fire Brigade Garage D

Mobile Fire Pumper OP911' Channel Command Post location----------

NOTE:

Effluents Fire Brigade members will normally be selected to the "Facilities" Radio Channel and will transfer to "OPS1" Radio Channel upon the sounding of the Fire Alarm and pager activation.

D Activate the Fire Brigade pagers using the central desk phoneset by pressing blue button and lifting the handset for at least 30 seconds.

D IF the Fire Brigade does not respond when activated via the plant page or pagers, Activate the Fire Brigade by contacting them using OPS 1 radio channel.

D Fire Brigade Leader report the following to the Fire Brigade members:

1.

Location of fire

2.

Location of Command Post

3.

IF Fire Pumper OP911 is being used as the Command Post, location of pumper

4.

Radio Channel (N/A if already on channel 1)

D Direct a Fire Brigade Member to take Pre-Fire plan for the applicable building to the Command Post.

D Inform Security (X3114 or X3115) of fire and OPS radio channel being used.

FORM ON-013-001-2, Rev. 10, Page 1 of 1

D D

D 9

8 7

~ 6

' f! 5

s Ill

~

Ci. 4 Ill

s

~ 3

~

2 0

I I I I 1-7.5 in HgA 3.8 in HgA 0

NOTE (1):

NOTE (2):

NOTE (3):

)1 of 1 SSES Turbine Exhaust Pressure Alarm and Trip Level

~.,

.,., ~

.,. ~

II"""'

~

II"""'

.... ~.,

.,. ~

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Load-%

Any changes made to this attachment must also be made to OP-193-001, Attachment H.

Attachment E ON-143-001 Revision 34 Page 33 of 34

........ ~

80 90

_...,. ~

100

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)

LCO 3.4.3 APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A.1 One or more required A.1 Be in MODE 3.

S/RVs inoperable.

A.2 Be in MODE 4.

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 3.4-8 PPL Rev. 2 S/RVs 3.4.3 COMPLETION TIME 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours Amendment 1}t(, 246

PPL Rev. 1 ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 EGGS-Operating LCO 3.5.1 APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS

N()TE-----------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI.

CONDITI()N REQUIRED ACTI()N COMPLETION TIME A One low pressure ECCS A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS 7 days injection/spray subsystem injection/spray subsystem to inoperable for reasons other OPERABLE status.

than Condition B.

B. One LPCI pump in one or B.1 Restore LPCI pump(s) to 7 days both LPCI subsystems OPERABLE status.

inoperable.

C. Required Action and C. 1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or Condition B AND not met.

C.2 Be in MODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS /3.5-1 Amendment 1 fa, 219

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION D. HPCI System inoperable.

D.1 AND D.2 E. HPCI System inoperable.

E.1 AND OR Condition A or Condition B E.2 entered.

F. One ADS valve inoperable.

F.1 G. One ADS valve inoperable.

G.1 AND OR Condition A or Condition B G.2 entered.

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 REQUIRED ACTION Verify by administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE.

Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Restore ADS valve to OPERABLE status.

Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

3.5-2 PPL Rev. 1 ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 COMPLETION TIME Immediately 14 days 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 72 hours 14 days 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 72 hours (continued)

Amendment 178

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION H. Two or more ADS valves inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition D, E, F, or G not met.

I.

Two Core Spray subsystems inoperable.

OR One LPCI subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B and One Core Spray subsystem inoperable.

OR Two LPCI subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

OR HPCI System and one or more ADS valves inoperable.

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 REQUIRED ACTION H.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND H.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to ::;; 150 psig.

1.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

3.5-7 PPL Rev. 1 ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 COMPLETION TIME 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours Immediately Amendment 178

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS PPL Rev. 1 RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.1 Two RHRSW subsystems and the UHS shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------------NOTE---------------

A.1 Declare the associated Immediately Separate Condition entry is RHRSW subsystems allowed for each valve.

inoperable One valve in Table 3.7.1-1 inoperable.

One valve in Table 3.7.1-2 inoperable.

OR One valve in Table 3.7.1-3 inoperable.

OR Any combination of valves in Table 3.7.1-1, Table 3.7.1-2, or Table 3.7.1-3 in the same return loop inoperable.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 A.2 Establish an open flow path to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months the UHS.

A.3 Restore the inoperable valve(s) 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months from the to OPERABLE status.

discovery of an inoperable RHRSW subsystem in the opposite loop from the inoperable valve(s)

TS /3.7-1 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (continued)

Amendment~

~246

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION B. One Unit 1 RHRSW 8.1 subsystem inoperable.

C. Both Unit 1 RHRSW C.1 subsystems inoperable.

D. Required Action and D. 1 associated Completion Time not met.

AND OR D.2 UHS inoperable SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 REQUIRED ACTION Restore the Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Restore one Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE4.

TS /3.7-2 PPL Rev. 1 RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 COMPLETION TIME 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from discovery of the associated Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem inoperable AND 7 days 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months from discovery of one Unit2 RHRSW subsystem not capable of supporting associated Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Amendment-na., tiQ 206

3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS PPL Rev. 1 RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.1 Two RHRSW subsystems and the UHS shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System-Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A ---------------NOTE---------------

A.1 Declare the associated Immediately Separate Condition entry is RHRSW subsystems allowed for each valve.

inoperable One valve in Table 3.7.1-1 inoperable.

One valve in Table 3.7.1-2 inoperable.

One valve in Table 3.7.1-3 inoperable.

Any combination of valves in Table 3.7.1-1, Table 3.7.1-2, or Table 3. 7.1-3 in the same return loop inoperable.

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 A.2 Establish an open flow path to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months the UHS.

A.3 Restore the inoperable valve(s) 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months from the to OPERABLE status.

discovery of an inoperable RHRSW subsystem in the opposite loop from the inoperable valve( s)

TS /3.7-1 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (continued)

Amendment~

"200., 246

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION B. One Unit 1 RHRSW B.1 subsystem inoperable.

C. Both Unit 1 RHRSW C. 1 subsystems inoperable.

D. Required Action and D.1 associated Completion Time not met.

AND OR D.2 UHS inoperable SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 REQUIRED ACTION Restore the Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Restore one Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Be in MODE 3.

Be in MODE4.

TS /3.7-2 PPL Rev. 1 RHRSW System and UHS 3.7.1 COMPLETION TIME 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from discovery of the associated Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem inoperable AND 7 days 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months from discovery of one Unit2 RHRSW subsystem not capable of supporting associated Unit 1 RHRSW subsystem AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Amendment~ t82 206

DEVICE TAG NO.

62A-20102 62A-20202 62A-20302 62A-20402 62A-20102 62A-20202 62A-20302 62A-20402 E11A-K2028 E11A-K120A E11A-K1208 E11A-K202A E11A-K120A E11A-K2028 E11A-K1208 E11A-K202A E21A-K116A E21A-K1168 E21A-K125A E21A-K1258 E21A-K116A E21A-K1168 E21A-K125A E21A-K1258 E21A-K16A E21A-K168 E21A-K25A E21A-K258 E21A-K16A E21A-K168 E21A-K25A E21A-K258 62AX2-201 08 62AX2-20208 62AX2-20303 62AX2-20403 62X3-20404 62X3-20304 62X-20104 62X-20204 62X-5653A 62X-5652A 262X-20204 262X-20104 TABLE 8 3.8.1-1 (page 1 of 2)

UNIT 1 AND UNIT :2 LOAD TIMERS NOMINAL SETIING SYSTEM LOADING TIMER LOCATION (seconds)

RHRPump 1A 1A201 3

RHR Pump 18 1A202 3

RHR Pump 1C 1A203 3

RHR Pump 10 1A204 3

RHR Pump2A 2A201 3

RHRPump28 2A202 3

RHRPump2C 2A203 3

RHR Pump20 2A204 3

RHR Pump 1 C (Offsite Power Timer) 1C618 7.0 RHR Pump 1 C (Offsite Power Timer) 1C617 7.0 RHR Pump 10 (Offsite Power Timer) 1C618 7.0 RHR Pump 1D (Offsite Power Timer) 1C617 7.0 RHR Pump 2C (Offsite Power Timer) 2C617 7.0 RHR Pump 2C (Offsite Power Timer) 2C618 7.0 RHR Pump 20 (Offsite Power Timer) 2C618 7.0 RHR Pump 20 (Offsite Power Timer) 2C617 7.0 CS Pump 1A 1C626 10.5 CS Pump 18 1C627 10.5 CS Pump 1C 1C626 10.5 CS Pump 10 1C627 10.5 CS Pump2A 2C626 10.5 CS PU!l}Q_ 28 2C627 10.5 CS Pump2C 2C626 10.5 CS Pump20 2C627 10.5 CS Pump 1A (Offsite Power Timer) 1C626 15 CS Pump 1 8 (Offsite Power Timer) 1C627 15 CS Pum_Q_ 1 C (Offsite Power Timer) 1C626 15 CS Pump 10 (Offsite Power Timer) 1C627 15 CS Pump 2A (Offsite Power Timer) 2C626 15 CS Pump 28 (Offsite Power Timer) 2C627 15 CS Pump 2C (Offsite Power Timer}

2C626 15 CS Pump 20 (Offsite Power Timer) 2C627 15 Emergency Setvice Water 1A201 40 Emergency Setvice Water 1A202 40 Emergency Setvice Water 1A203 44 Emergency Setvice Water 1A204 48 Control Structure Chilled Water System OC8778 60 Control Structure Chilled Water System OC877A 60 Emergency Switchgear Rm Cooler A &

OC877A 60 RHR SW Pump H&V Fan A Emergency Switchgear Rm Cooler 8 &

OC8778 60 RHR SW Pump H&V Fan 8 OG Room Exhaust Fan E3 08565 60 OG Room Exhausts Fan E4 08565 60 Emergency Switchgear Rm Cooler 8 OC8778 120 Emerg_e11cy Switchgear Rm Cooler A OC877A 120 SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS I 8 3.8-36 PPL Rev. 6 AC Sources - Operating 8 3.8.1 ALLOWABLE VALUE (seconds)

> 2.7 and< 3.6

~ 2.7 and~ 3.6

> 2.7 and< 3.6

~ 2.7 and ~ 3.6

~ 6.5 and ~ 7.5

~ 6.5 and< 7.5

> 6.5 and< 7.5

~ 6.5 and ~ 7.5

~ 6.5 and~ 7.5

> 6.5 and< 7.5

~ 6.5 and ~ 7.5

> 9.4 and < 11.6

~ 9.4 and ~ 11.6

> 9.4 and < 11.6

> 9.4and < 11.6

> 9.4 and < 11.6

> 14.0 and< 16.0

~ 14.0 and~ 16.0

> 14.0 and< 16.0

~ 14.0 and~ 16.0

> 14.0 and< 16.0

> 36 and< 44

> 39.6 and ~ 48.4

> 43.2 and < 52.8

>54

~54

>54

~54

>54

>54 (continued)

Revision 2

DEVICE TAG NO.

62X-546 62X-536 62X-526 62X-516 CRX-5652A 62X2-20410 62X1-20304 62X2-20310 62X1-20404 62X2-20304 62X2-20404 62X-K1188 62X-K11A8 TABLE 8 3.8.1-1 (page 2 of 2)

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 LOAD TIMERS NOMINAL SETTING SYSTEM LOADING TIMER LOCATION

_(seconds)

DG Rm Exh Fan D 08546 120 DG Rm Exh Fan C 08!i36 120 DG Rm Exh Fan 8 08526 120 DG Rm Exh Fan A 08516 120 DG Room Supply Fans E1 and E2 08565 120 Control Structure Chilled Water System OC8768 180 Control Structure Chilled Water System OC877A 180 Control Structure Chilled Water System OC876A 180 Control Structure Chilled Water System OC8778 180 Control Structure Chilled Water System OC877A 210 Control Structure Chilled Water System OC8778 210 Emergency Switchgear Rm Cooling 2C82508 260 Compressor B Emergency Switchgear Rm Cooling 2C8250A 260 Compressor A SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS I 8 3.8-37 PPL Rev. 6 AC Sources - Operating 8 3.8.1 ALLOWABLE VALUE (seconds)

~54

~54 Revision 2

v t e Letter Sequence Other
TAC:U01868, (Open)
Initiation Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval... Other: ML13228A279, ML13228A283, ML13228A288, ML13228A290, ML13228A293, ML13296A325
MONTHYEAR2013-03-13 [Table View]

ML13228A283

Text

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