ML13142A186

May 13 and May 17, 2013, Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank Conference Call Meeting Summary

ML13142A186
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	05/21/2013
From:	Jack Giessner Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4
To:
References
Download: ML13142A186 (14)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210 LISLE, IL 60532-4352 May 21, 2013 LICENSEE: Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

FACILITY: Palisades Nuclear Plant

SUMMARY

OF THE MAY 13 AND MAY 17, 2013, MEETINGS REGARDING PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SAFETY INJECTION REFUELING WATER TANK (SIRWT) LEAK On May 13, 2013, at 1:30 p.m. EDT, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) held a Conference Call Meeting with members of the Palisades management team at the licensees request. The purpose of the call was to discuss the current plant situation relative to the plant shut down on May 5, 2013. This shutdown was in response to leakage from the SIRWT of 90 gallons per day which exceeds a leak rate limit of 38 gallons per day established in the NRC confirmatory action letter (CAL EA 12-155; ADAMS No. ML12199A409). Specific discussion topics included:

1. Results of SIRWT leak inspections;

2. Repair plans going forward; and

3. Relief request for installing SIRWT liner.

The licensee stated that they had completed visual and dye penetrant examinations of all the nozzles, visual inspections of floor seams and welds inside the SIRWT. They were in the process of completing vacuum box testing of all the plate surfaces. They said that their visual and/or dye penetrant examinations identified four indications that exceeded their criteria:

1. Weld defect indication at the corner joint on plate #14;

2. Dye penetrant appearance on cover plate at N nozzle;

3. Weld porosity observation on J cover plate with dye penetrant; and

4. Linear defect observation on the 18 inch F east nozzle at weld seam with dye penetrant.

The licensee confirmed that all the above indications passed vacuum box testing requirements, indicating that the defects were not through wall and not the source of leakage. Additionally, the licensee identified three confirmed leak sources:

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 1. Pin hole leak in weld area between plates #3 and #4;

2. Pin hole leak at the corner joint on plate #8 with minor bubbling on vacuum box; and

3. 3/8 inch linear crack at the 18 inch F east nozzle which caused a water stream in the vacuum box.

The licensee observed the last indication to be a major source of leakage from the SIRWT. The crack is located at the mid line of the circumferential reinforcing plate to tank floor weld. This weld was installed in July, 2012. It was inspected following installation. No defects were identified. Based on the absence of indications in the weld post installation, the licensee is treating the observed crack as an in-service crack. The licensee also indicated that this crack may be due to fatigue because the F nozzle is embedded in concrete and is, therefore, fixed in place while the floor of the tank may experience flexing. The licensee also noted that this crack was not identified by the dye penetrant test conducted. The licensee theorized that the dye penetrant exam failed to detect the crack because the weld was wet as the crack was water filled. As a result, the dye was not drawn into the crack, as is normally the case.

The licensee stated that they were continuing vacuum box testing on all the nozzles inside the SIRWT as well as all the floor plates. The licensee also stated that it was conducting electromagnetic field testing on the weld joints. In response to the NRCs observation that the vacuum box testing of the plates themselves was not in the original test plan, the licensee stated that their contractor, Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. (CBI), recommended vacuum box testing the entire SIRWT floor. The licensee said that the electromagnetic field testing and vacuum box testing will be completed within a day.

In response to the NRCs question regarding why leakage from the weld at the F nozzle would have been observed from the roof outside the tank rather than in the catacombs, the licensee stated that the F nozzle is fully encased in concrete and other nozzles are either encased in concrete or have a leak resistant ring installed in the annular space around the nozzle. These fittings around the nozzles impede leakage into the catacombs. As a result, the path of least resistance for water flow is outward toward the grout ring upon which the shell of the tank rests.

Leakage may occur either between the grout ring and the cement pad on which the whole tank rests or between the top of the grout ring and the bottom of the tank.

The licensee stated that their repair options included core boring, replacing and reinstalling a reinforcing collar around the three nozzles (E, F east and F west) and weld repairing other nozzles as applicable. They also planned on removing a sample of material that contains the F east nozzle weld crack in order to conduct detailed analysis at a laboratory to investigate the mechanism of the crack. In response to an NRC question regarding whether rebar in the tank base and building roof would be affected by the core boring process, the licensee stated that the nozzle diameter is 18 inches and the core bore will be 22 inches. As a result, no rebar is expected to be affected by the core boring process. The licensee said that they were planning to replace the F east nozzle from the tank to the first flange. When the NRC asked if the licensee was planning a configuration change for the F East nozzle, the licensee stated that they were working with Sargent & Lundy to develop a configuration that satisfies the given stress requirements. The licensee said that they are not planning to install any additional tank

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. supports. The licensee said that they will meet the ASME Code requirements with the respective repairs.

The NRC asked if the licensee was planning to complete an apparent cause evaluation on the F east nozzle before starting up the plant. The licensee said that they were extracting a sample from the F east nozzle for this reason. They planned on continuing dialogue with the NRC as they acquire more information related to the sample. The licensee agreed to follow up when the NRC asked if the size of the flaw was less than the critical flaw size stated in ASME Code Case 705. The NRC asked if there were any flaws postulated in the areas between the floor plate and nozzles. The licensee said they believed the welds with highest stress in the Code Case and that these welds were no different than a floor lap seam and that the floor plate flaw was less sensitive compared to a nozzle weld crack.

The NRC asked if the licensee was planning a like-for-like replacement. The licensee said that the material around the collar was 6061 Aluminum and the replacement will be of the same material. However, the new pipe will be a seamless pipe.

In response to an NRC question whether the licensee was planning to make code compliant repairs and a subsequent question regarding the need for relief relative to the repair of the tank, the licensee stated that code required post repair leak testing may not be feasible. Given the inability to complete code required testing, the licensee was likely requesting relief to install the liner to ensure, without leak testing, that the tank was leak tight.

In support of its relief request, the licensee provided a brief summary of the evaluations they had performed thus far related to the suitability of the proposed liner to ensure leak tightness of the tank:

1. The material of the proposed liner is identical to the one at the St. Lucie nuclear plant which has been in service since 1994; the material will be tested to ensure that chloride concentrations will meet current acceptance criteria at Palisades;

2. Despite the fact that adhesion testing for St. Lucie was conducted on new material which had not been subjected to long exposure to water, the product manufacturer indicated that the material of the proposed liner had a long history of exposure to water without loss of adhesion;

3. Could the material be ingested in the down comer region? The licensee noted that the nozzles openings are 4 inches above the tank floor, that the liner is much denser than water, and that the flow velocity of water along the tank floor approaches zero. As a result, it is highly unlikely that any liner, even if it disbanded from the walls or floor of the tank would be carried out of the tank;

4. The tanks ability to withstand tank flexing will be determined once E and F nozzles are bored out;

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 5. The coefficient of expansion of the material will be very similar to that of Aluminum.

Therefore, expansion and contraction will be similar. This material has also been used successfully in places such as Minnesota where the range of ambient temperatures is at least as great as Palisades;

6. There will be a follow up of items related to SIRWT contents including chloride concentrations;

7. The SIRWT is not located on a concrete ring foundation as is the tank at St. Lucie. At Palisades, a large concrete disc (48) is placed on the concrete roof structure of the turbine building. A grout ring approximately 1 1/2 inches thick is placed around the edge of the concrete disk. A layer of sand, also about 1 1/2 inches thick is placed on top of the concrete disk and inside of the grout ring. The shell of the tank is placed on, and anchored to, the grout ring. The tank floor rests on the sand bed.

The NRC mentioned that grout has a high pH and asked about its interaction between the aluminum tank shell and wet grout ring. The licensee said that the grout surface was wet due to leaks, but is not normally so. The licensee noted that the joint between the concrete disc and the grout ring is a cold joint, and, therefore, not waterproof. The licensee proposed that most, if not all, of the leakage occurred between the concrete and the grout and that it did not occur between the grout and the tank. As a result, the licensee noted that the tank to grout joint was not substantially wet and would not experience significant corrosion.

The NRC asked the licensee to submit information related to the relief request on a docket. The licensee agreed if the request was processed, that additional information would be docketed.

The NRC asked if the licensee has established acceptance criteria and quality assurance requirements for liner inspections and considered qualifications for personnel performing these inspections. The NRC said that it considered factors such as fatigue and fracture toughness important to this process since the licensee suggested the crack to be an in-service crack.

Although the NRC observed that the Palisades case can be compared to the St. Lucie case and the liner performed well at St. Lucie, it considers the Palisades in-service fatigue crack to be a concern and questioned whether the fatigue forces inside the SIRWT were similar to those of the St. Lucie tank. The licensee said that replacing the E and F nozzles aligns them with the St. Lucie tank since the tank will be allowed to flex after the replacement.

The NRC asked if the licensee planned to install sand in any other areas under the tank. The licensee said that they planned to fill sand only in core-bored areas. They said that CBI is knowledgeable on several designs of tanks and had the expertise to suggest that they did not need to fill any other areas with sand.

The licensee asked the NRC for additional information that will be required for a relief request.

The NRC said that it needs to understand the cause of the crack, and if the crack is a fatigue crack as the licensee suggested, it will need more information related to the fatigue resistance of the coating. Additionally, the NRC said that the licensee should review interim staff guidance to ensure that the tank meets its license renewal requirements. The licensee said that the causal analysis will be ready before the end of the week after which they plan on asking for a

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. relief request from the NRC. The licensee mentioned that they will need a relief request before installing the liner.

The NRC concluded the conference by suggesting the licensee provide additional details as they proceed with their investigation and provide specific responses related to the relief request on the docket. The licensee said that they will request another conference call with the NRC later during the week.

The call lasted about an hour. Enclosure 1 is a list of attendees for the meeting.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. On May 17, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. EDT, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) held a Conference Call Meeting with members of the Palisades management team at both groups request. The purpose of the call was to inform the licensee of NRCs comments and questions related to the SIRWT inspection and repairs. The NRC informed the licensee that it did not expect the licensee to address its questions during the conference call.

The licensee provided a brief status of the SIRWT Non Destructive Examination (NDE) inspection results, planned repairs, destructive test results of the failed F east nozzle weld, cause of recent leakage and relief request supplement progress:

Leaks identified by vacuum box testing The licensee stated that they had completed all the NDE examinations in the tank and identified five through wall indications via vacuum box testing:

1. A crack in the F east nozzle weld (crack that resulted in the largest leakage from the tank);

2. Three small indications on weld seams; and

3. An indication on plate #12 possibly originating from the initial weld strike.

The licensee stated that they had completed vacuum box testing of all SIRWT weld seams, all floor plates, all reinforcing plate to floor welds and the lower two feet of the side walls. They were unable to inspect the pipe to the reinforcing plate weld via vacuum box testing due to the geometry of this weld.

Non-Leaking defects identified by dye-penetrant and visual examinations They stated that they visually inspected all the areas inside the tank and performed dye-penetrant inspections of all the nozzle areas. They identified one rejectable indication via visual and dye penetrant testing:

1. Outside plate #6, at the corner joint of plate #14.

Indications identified through Testex The licensee used Testex methodology, a balanced field electromagnetic testing method that uses eddy current to identify sub surface flaws up to 3/4 inch, and identified 27 indications. The three weld seam indications identified via vacuum box testing aligned with the indications identified via this technique. The licensee stated that they intend to grind these three indications, perform dye penetrant examinations as grinding proceeds and finally perform dye penetrant, vacuum box and electromagnetic testing of these locations once the re-welding is complete. When the NRC asked the licensee if they were planning to harvest a sample of the floor plate areas or walls of floor joints where these indications were identified, the licensee responded that they werent planning to perform metallurgical sampling of these locations since most of these flaws were possibly embedded from original construction.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. The licensee stated that, in 1988, they core bored the G and H nozzles which were locked in the concrete below the floor plate and that, in 2012, they core bored nozzles K, L, and M using the same method. The intent behind this procedure was to reduce the stresses at the weld between the floor plate and the area outside the nozzle. The licensee planned to apply the same methodology to repair the current leak. They stated that they core bored the last three nozzles that remained embedded in the concrete below the floor plate (F east and west and E nozzles) in order to free them from the concrete and reduce the stresses between the floor plate and the nozzles. The licensee stated that, during this outage, they planned to replace plate 6 of the tank bottom in its entirety. Both nozzles F east and F west enter the tank through this floor plate. The licensee stated that they would replace the sand bed under this plate with a grout pad to provide for a continuous level surface and prevent the possibility of the sand layer being washed away. This will be accomplished by cutting the existing plate #6 and leaving sufficient remnant to install the new plate #6 with a sufficient lap joint around its periphery. The licensee stated that each nozzle will have a reinforcement ring around it and the new floor plate.

The licensee stated that they obtained a sample from the F east vacuum box indication and shipped it to the Babcox &Wilcox (B&W) laboratory in Lynchburg, VA. The results from the laboratory indicated a lack of fusion at the weld (only had 20 percent of the required fusion/penetration on the weld). The results showed that it was not a fatigue failure, and the poor weld ultimately fractured due to mechanical overload. The licensee stated that the mechanical and chemical properties of all the materials (floor plate, reinforcing plate and weld) contained in the sample removed for testing were found to be within specified limits. The licensee concluded that the fracture was the result of mechanical overload of a poor weld completed in 2012.

The licensee stated that in addition to having significant discussions with PCI welding, they had welders get extensive practice on welding aluminum and were planning to obtain and interrogate the test coupons with the Testex electromagnetic testing method. They said they were making significant efforts to ensure improvement in their weld quality.

The licensee stated that, initially, they planned to stay in line with the approved St. Lucie relief request, that is, to request a repair alternative to IWA-4221 to permit the installation of the liner.

However, the licensee stated that at this point, because repairs would be per Code, they were considering requesting a testing alternative to IWA-4540 which would permit them to perform the required system leakage test after the proposed fiber glass reinforced vinyl liner is installed.

The licensee said that they would submit a draft of the relief request to the NRC by the end of the day and submit a request on the docket on the Monday of the following week. They requested the NRC to provide their decision before they installed the liner on Wednesday, May 22, 2013. The NRC said that they will not be able to commit to the requested schedule until they review the final relief request. When the NRC asked the licensee when they were planning on applying the coating, the licensee stated that they will complete all the repairs and then plan on applying the coating.

The NRC stated that there were still a number of issues that remain to be resolved although the licensee did not have to address them during the conference call. The NRC listed these as:

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Grout:

1. Acceptability of the grout pad: The grout pad is planned to be installed under plate #6 in the middle of the tank per the licensees construction standard, B96.1.

2. The effect of the grout pad to sand boundary: Does the fact that you have a rigid grout next to a sand spot create a hinge or a hard spot which will affect the fatigue life of the tank floor?

3. The effect of loss of sand cushion on the tank bottom: Will this cause an abrasion issue or other similar issues to the tank bottom?

4. The effect of aluminum residing over the grout, which has a high pH, especially if the grout should become moist: The concern is corrosion of aluminum.

Nozzle Design:

5. Acceptability of nozzle design and location per B96.1: This will require examination of the licensing basis documents on the NRCs part. The NRC will review this information and request documentation from the licensee.

6. The interaction of the nozzle, the nozzle piping supports and the tank floor for the system: Are pipe supports sufficiently compliant to avoid vertical stresses at the nozzle to floor joints? Is the nozzle to floor connection designed sufficiently to withstand the applied forces? The licensee suggested a new design by freeing the nozzles from the concrete, and the NRC stated that it needed to understand technical sufficiency of the proposed design.

7. The current crack in the F east nozzle floor to reinforcing plate weld appears to be due, at least in part, to a lack of parallelism between the floor and the reinforcing plate. Does this exist in the other nozzles and how will this be addressed in the current repairs?

Liner:

8. There currently appear to be substantial differences between St. Lucie and Palisades relative to the SIRWT and liner application. The number and the extent of those differences appear to be growing as the inspection and repair process proceed. The relief request needs to address those differences.

The NRC said that the St. Lucie tank rested on the ground (although this was not an important difference) and had a bottom that did not have any penetrations. The cause or need for establishing the liner at St Lucie was external corrosion due to an aluminum bottom being electrically in contact with the copper grounding grid and water infiltrating under the tank. It was reasonable for St. Lucie to conclude that they had eliminated the water around the tank by re-grading around the tank and sealing the tank bottom. Therefore, the corrosion/degradation mechanism had ceased. The coating/liner at the tank bottom was established only to contain

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. the leakage and there was no reason to believe that the tank bottom would continue to degrade.

The NRC stated that it appears that Palisades had an active degradation mechanism and if they installed a liner, the degradation of the tank bottom could continue. The NRC was not fully assured that the direction of the Palisades repairs was consistent with the requirements of the original construction procedure, B96.1. Some of the NRC observations pertained to the design of the SIRWTs nozzles and the grout.

9. Given the existence of active, albeit unknown degradation mechanism, will the liner be able to withstand that mechanism? i.e., if this is a fatigue issue, will the liner be able to withstand fatigue loading?

10. Can growth of a crack under the liner result in a crack for which growth could be unstable without showing early evidence of the existence of the crack through leakage?

Will the application of the coating create a safety concern where now only a leakage concern exists? i.e., could applying the liner create a larger safety concern due to potential for continued cracking in the aluminum under the liner?

Aluminum materials:

11. Aluminum 5454 and 6061 are substantially different materials. While it is probable that it can be demonstrated that 6061 may be substituted for 5454, the material contained in the Engineering Change (EC) does not appear sufficient for that purpose.

Schedule:

12. The NRC plans to thoroughly review the EC. This may require some time, especially for some of the more complex issues. The NRC will review some information prior to startup to ensure the tank supports safe operations.

When the licensee asked the NRC if its intent was to issue a CAL, the NRC stated that the intent is for the licensee to update the commitment letter with new information, and the NRC will issue a revised CAL before the startup. Upon requesting a clarification, the NRC stated that a separate CAL would not be issued, at this time, to review the EC; however, the intent was to inform the licensee of which items the NRC will review to ensure the modification is safe before startup. The licensee asked the NRC if it is going to issue a startup hold letter if they did not have all the above issues resolved before starting up. The NRC said that it was difficult to currently determine the breadth of the NRCs review; however, it will need time to perform a thorough review. The NRC stated it does not currently plan on issuing a startup CAL or order.

The licensee stated that they will share information related to the EC as it progressed. The NRC said that it needed to understand the failure mechanism and that the modifications being developed by the licensee were not a safety concern.

Code Case N-705:

13. Given the shape and length of the crack of the F nozzle as illustrated in the B&W findings, did the plant remain within the acceptable crack length as determined in the Code Case N-705?

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. The licensee noted they still had all repair actions on the table, and would decide which path to take in the near future.

The NRC concluded the conference by suggesting that the NRC does not review draft documents for the relief request with the exception of certain cases and the current issue may qualify as one of those cases. However, the NRC did not plan to perform a rigorous review of the draft information submitted by the licensee. The NRC said that it would review the scope and extent of the information submitted by the licensee. The licensee informed the NRC that their evaluations and discussions were currently preliminary and that they would submit final docketed information to the NRC.

The call lasted about an hour. Enclosure 2 is a list of attendees for the meeting.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John B. Giessner, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-255 and 72-007 License No. DPR-20

Enclosures:

1. List of Meeting Attendees for the May 13, 2013, Conference Meeting

2. List of Meeting Attendees for the May 17, 2013, Conference Meeting cc w/encl: Distribution via List Serv

LIST OF MEETING ATTENDEES FOR THE MAY 13, 2013 CONFERENCE MEETING NRC Attendees John Giessner, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 4 David Hills, Chief, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch 1 Mel Holmberg, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch 1 Thomas Taylor, Palisades Senior Resident Inspector April Scarbeary, Palisades Resident Inspector David Alley, Senior Materials Engineer, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Piping and NDE Branch Swetha Shah, Reactor Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 4 Thomas Wengert, Senior Project Manager, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Scott Wall, Senior Project Manager, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Russell Haskell, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Operating Experience Branch Licensee Attendees Anthony Vitale, Palisades Site Vice President Dave Mannai, Senior Manager Nuclear Safety & Licensing Entergy Northeast Charlie Arnone, Palisades Nuclear Safety Assurance Director Otto Gustafson, Licensing Manager Jeff Ericson, Palisades Engineering Licensing Jim Miksa, Palisades Engineering Licensing Jody Haumersen, Palisades Manager of Engineering Systems Dane Richards, Palisades Systems Engineer Tim Crocker, Palisades Design Engineer Andrew Barnett, HQN Programs Engineer Steve Brown, HQN Engineering Programs Supervisor Ron Williams, HQN In Service Inspection Program Engineer George Sleeper, Palisades Programs Engineer Ken Novotney, Sargent & Lundy Project Manager Enclosure 1

LIST OF MEETING ATTENDEES FOR THE MAY 17, 2013 CONFERENCE MEETING NRC Attendees John Giessner, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 4 David Hills, Chief, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch 1 Mel Holmberg, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch 1 Thomas Bilik, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch 1 Thomas Taylor, Palisades Senior Resident Inspector David Alley, Senior Materials Engineer, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Piping and NDE Branch Swetha Shah, Reactor Engineer, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 4 Thomas Wengert, Senior Project Manager, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Tim Lupold, Branch Chief, Division of Engineering, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Joe Giantelli, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Licensee Attendees Anthony Vitale, Palisades Site Vice President Dave Mannai, Senior Manager Nuclear Safety & Licensing Entergy Northeast Charlie Arnone, Palisades Nuclear Safety Assurance Director Otto Gustafson, Licensing Manager Tom Fouty, Palisades Systems Engineering Supervisor Jim Miksa, Palisades Engineering Licensing Jody Haumersen, Palisades Manager of Engineering Systems Kevin OConner, Palisades Design Engineering Manager Dave MacMaster, Palisades Design Engineering Supervisor Steve Brown, HQN Engineering Programs Supervisor Steve Scott, HQN Engineering Programs Supervisor Paul Bruke, Lucius Pitkin Inc.

Ken Novotney, Sargent & Lundy Project Manager Enclosure 2

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. The licensee noted they still had all repair actions on the table, and would decide which path to take in the near future.

The NRC concluded the conference by suggesting that the NRC does not review draft documents for the relief request with the exception of certain cases and the current issue may qualify as one of those cases. However, the NRC did not plan to perform a rigorous review of the draft information submitted by the licensee. The NRC said that it would review the scope and extent of the information submitted by the licensee. The licensee informed the NRC that their evaluations and discussions were currently preliminary and that they would submit final docketed information to the NRC.

The call lasted about an hour. Enclosure 2 is a list of attendees for the meeting.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John B. Giessner, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-255 and 72-007 License No. DPR-20

Enclosures:

1. List of Meeting Attendees for the May 13, 2013, Conference Meeting

2. List of Meeting Attendees for the May 17, 2013, Conference Meeting cc w/encl: Distribution via List Serv DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRPIII\PALI\Palisades meeting summary 2013 May 13 and 17_final.doc Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII NAME Swetha:dtp JGiessner DATE 05/21/13 05/21/13 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Letter to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. from J. Giessner dated May 21, 2013.

SUMMARY

OF THE MAY 13 AND MAY 17, 2013, MEETINGS REGARDING PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT SAFETY INJECTION REFUELING WATER TANK (SIRWT) LEAK DISTRIBUTION:

Doug Huyck RidsNrrPMPalisades Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl3-1 Resource RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource Chuck Casto Cynthia Pederson Steven Orth Allan Barker Carole Ariano Linda Linn DRPIII DRSIII Patricia Buckley Tammy Tomczak ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov