ML13057A183
ML13057A183 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Diablo Canyon |
Issue date: | 12/05/2012 |
From: | Garchow S Operations Branch IV |
To: | |
Laura Hurley | |
References | |
Download: ML13057A183 (50) | |
Text
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 11/26/2012 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L111 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*
Determine if the RIL has been Exceeded Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, M, R curves, tables, etc.
(NRCL111-A1) (3.9)
(modified from L061Audit ADMRO1 and LJACO-04R)
Determine Turbine Ramp Rate Restrictions Conduct of Operations 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and M, R precautions.
(NRCL111-A2) (3.8)
(modified from L061 Audit ADMRO2 and LJACO-12R)
Verify AFD is Within Tech Spec Limits Equipment Control 2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-M, R level conditions for Technical Specifications.
(NRCL111-A3) (3.9)
(modified from L081 Audit ADMRO3 and LJAEC-11)
Calculate Maximum Stay Time Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or M, R emergency conditions.
(NRCL111-A4) (3.2)
(modified from L081 NRC ADMRO4 and LJARC-04)
Emergency Procedures/Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)
Page 1 of 50
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 11/26/2012 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: L111 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*
Determine if the RIL has been Exceeded Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, M, R curves, tables, etc.
(NRCL111-A5) (4.2)
(modified from L061Audit ADMSRO1 and LJACO-04S)
Approve Movement of Spent Fuel Assemblies Conduct of Operations 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations M, R associated with reactivity management.
(NRCL111-A6) (4.6)
(modified from L061 NRC and LJACO-14S)
Determine 230KV Operability (OP J-2:VIII)
Equipment Control 2.2.37 Ability to determine Operability and/or availability of N, R safety-related equipment.
(NRCL111-A7) (4.6)
(new)
Calculate Maximum Stay Time Radiation Control 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or M, R emergency conditions.
(NRCL111-A8) (3.7)
(modified from L081 NRC ADMSRO4 and LJARC-04)
Classify a Security Event Emergency Procedures/Plan D, R 2.4.41 Knowledge of emergency action level thresholds and classifications.
(NRCL111-A9) (4.6)
(from bank JPM LJE-031)
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)
Page 2 of 50
ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 2 Rev 2: rev follows initial submittal Page 3 of 50
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 11/26/2012 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L111 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*
Function
- b. (C2) (026.A4.01) Check if Containment Spray should be Stopped ** C,E,EN,L,N 5
- c. (S1) (006.A1.13) Respond to High Accumulator Pressure (LJC-009) D,EN,S 3
- d. (S2) (064.A4.06) Parallel DG 1-2 to Startup Power (LJC-087M) M,S 6
- e. (S3) (024.AA1.03) Emergency Borate due to Stuck Rods (LJC-063M) E,L,M,S 1
- f. (S4) (068.AA1.11/21) Perform Control Room Actions prior to Evacuation D,E,L,S 8 (LJC-021)
- g. (S5) (006.A4.06) Terminate High Head ECCS Following a Safety Injection A,E,EN,L,N,S 2
- h. (S6) (E05.EA1.1) Initiate Bleed and Feed During a LOSHS Event (LJC-122) A,E,D,L,S 4S In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. (P1) (064.A4.01) Perform Local Start of a DG (LJP-038) ** A,D,E,L 6
- j. (P2) (028.A4.01) Operate the Hydrogen Recombiners (LJP-004M) ** E,L,M 5
- k. (P3) (011.EA1.11) Establish CCW Train Separation (LJP-158) ** A,D,E,L,R 8
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U Page 4 of 50
(A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 11/26/2012 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L111 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*
Function
- b. (C2) (026.A4.01) Check if Containment Spray should be Stopped ** C,E,EN,L,N 5
- c. (S1) (006.A1.13) Respond to High Accumulator Pressure (LJC-009) D,EN,S 3
- d. (S2) (064.A4.06) Parallel DG 1-2 to Startup Power (LJC-087M) M,S 6
- e. (S3) (024.AA1.03) Emergency Borate due to Stuck Rods (LJC-063M) E,L,M,S 1 f.
- g. (S5) (006.A4.06) Terminate High Head ECCS Following a Safety Injection A,E,EN,L,N,S 2
- h. (S6) (E05.EA1.1) Initiate Bleed and Feed During a LOSHS Event (LJC-122) A,E,D,L,S 4S In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. (P1) (064.A4.01) Perform Local Start of a DG (LJP-038) ** A,D,E,L 6
- j. (P2) (028.A4.01) Operate the Hydrogen Recombiners (LJP-004M) ** E,L,M 5
- k. (P3) (011.EA1.11) Establish CCW Train Separation (LJP-158) ** A,D,E,L,R 8
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U Page 6 of 50
(A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Examination: 11/26/2012 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: L111 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*
Function a.
b.
c.
d.
- e. (S3) (024.AA1.03) Emergency Borate due to Stuck Rods (LJC-063M) E,L,M,S 1 f.
- g. (S5) (006.A4.06) Terminate High Head ECCS Following a Safety Injection A,E,EN,L,N,S 2 h.
In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. (P1) (064.A4.01) Perform Local Start of a DG (LJP-038) ** A,D,E,L 6
- j. (P2) (028.A4.01) Operate the Hydrogen Recombiners (LJP-004M) ** E,L,M 5
- k. (P3) (011.EA1.11) Establish CCW Train Separation (LJP-158) ** A,D,E,L,R 8
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / > 1 (control room system (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3/ <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator Page 8 of 50
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: 28 May 2012 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4
- Total
- 1. 1 2 3 3 3 3 4 18 3 3 6 Emergency &
Abnormal 2 0 2 1 N/A 2 2 N/A 2 9 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 2 5 4 5 5 6 27 5 5 10 1 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 28 3 2 5 2.
Plant 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 10 0 1 2 3 Systems Tier Totals 4 3 4 4 2 3 5 3 4 3 3 38 4 4 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.
The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.
Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
Page 10 of 50
ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space X Knowledge of the operational 3.1 1 Accident / 3 implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:
(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)
AK1.02 Change in leak rate with change in pressure 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X Knowledge of the interrelations 3.0 2 between the small break LOCA and the following:
(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)
EK2.03 S/Gs 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X Knowledge of the reasons for the 3.8 3 following responses as the apply to the Large Break LOCA:
(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)
EK3.13 Hot-leg injection/recirculation 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X Ability to determine and interpret the 3.4 4 following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow):
(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)
AA2.09 When to secure RCPs on high stator temperatures 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.
(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal 4.0 5 operating condition procedures.
(CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)
Page 11 of 50
000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X Ability to operate and / or monitor the 3.2 6 following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:
(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)
AA1.09 LPI pump control switch, indicators, ammeter running lights, and flow meter 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X Ability to determine and interpret the 2.8 7 System Malfunction / 3 following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions:
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
AA2.14 RCP injection flow 000029 ATWS / 1 X Knowledge of the operational 3.6 8 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ATWS:
(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)
EK1.03 Effects of boron on reactivity 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X Knowledge of the interrelations 2.6* 9 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat between the Steam Line Rupture and Transfer / 4 the following:
(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)
AK2.01 Valves 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X Ability to operate and monitor the 3.3 10 following as they apply to a Station Blackout:
(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)
EA1.05 Battery, when approaching fully discharged 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant 4.4 11 performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)
Page 12 of 50
000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X Knowledge of the reasons for the 4.1 12 following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:
(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)
AK3.01 Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X Knowledge of the reasons for the 4.0 13 following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:
(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.1)
AK3.02 Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and 3.6 14 limitations in the facility license.
(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X 2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator 4.2 15 alarms, indications, or response procedures.
(CFR: 41.10 / 45.3)
W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant X Ability to determine and interpret the 3.4 16 Recirc. / 4 following as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.
BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat X Knowledge of the interrelations 3.9 17 Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)
EK2.2 Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
Page 13 of 50
000077 Generator Voltage and Electric X Ability to operate and/or monitor the 3.6 18 Grid Disturbances / 6 following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances:
(CFR: 41.5 and 41.10 / 45.5, 45.7, and 45.8 )
AA1.01 Grid frequency and voltage K/A Category Totals: 2 3 3 3 3 4 Group Point Total: 18/6 Page 14 of 50
ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 X Ability to determine and 3.4 19 interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration:
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
AA2.04 Availability of BWST 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X 2.1.32 Ability to explain and 3.8 20 apply system limits and precautions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 X Knowledge of the interrelations 2.7 21 between the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release and the following:
(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)
AK2.02 Auxiliary building ventilation system 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 X Knowledge of the reasons for 3.5 22 the following responses as they apply to the High Containment Pressure:
(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)
EK3.3 manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.
Page 15 of 50
000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X Ability to operate and / or 3.2 23 monitor the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity:
(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)
AA1.04 Failed fuel-monitoring equipment W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 X 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific 3.3 24 bases for EOPs.
l (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)
W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 X Knowledge of the interrelations 2.7 25 between the (Containment Flooding) and the following:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)
EK2.2 Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.
W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 X Ability to operate and / or 3.6 26 monitor the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Cooldown)
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)
EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.
BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures Page 16 of 50
CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 X Ability to determine and 3.4 27 interpret the following as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 0 2 1 2 2 2 Group Point Total: 9/4 Page 17 of 50
ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Knowledge of the effect of a 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X 2.8 28 loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45/5)
K6.04 Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation Ability to predict and/or 004 Chemical and Volume X 2.9 29 Control monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CVCS controls including:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)
A1.01 Activity levels in primary system Knowledge of the effect that 005 Residual Heat Removal X 3.7 30 a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)
K3.05 ECCS Ability to monitor automatic 006 Emergency Core Cooling X 4.1 31 operation of the ECCS, including:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)
A3.02 Pumps Knowledge of the physical 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench X 3.0 32 Tank connections and/or cause effect relationships between the PRTS and the following systems:
(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)
K1.03 RCS Page 18 of 50
2.1.30 Ability to locate and 008 Component Cooling Water X 4.4 33 operate components, including local controls.
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)
Knowledge of bus power 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X 2.5 34 supplies to the following:
(CFR: 41.7)
K2.02 Controller for PZR spray valve Knowledge of RPS design 012 Reactor Protection X 3.2 35 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
(CFR: 41.7)
K4 06 Automatic or manual enable/disable of RPS trips Ability to manually operate 013 Engineered Safety Features X 4.5 36 Actuation and/or monitor in the control room:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)
A4.01 ESFAS-initiated equipment which fails to actuate Ability to (a) predict the 022 Containment Cooling X 2.9* 37 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /
45.13)
A2.04 Loss of service water 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and X Knowledge of the operational 3.4 38 Purge System implications of the following concepts as they apply to the HRPS:
(CFR: 41.5/45.7)
K5.02 Flammable hydrogen concentration Page 19 of 50
Ability to predict and/or 026 Containment Spray X 3.1 39 monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)
A1.04 Containment humidity Knowledge of the physical 039 Main and Reheat Steam X 3.4* 40 connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MRSS and the following systems:
(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)
K1.07 AFW Ability to monitor automatic 059 Main Feedwater X 3.2* 41 operation of the MFW, including:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)
A3.06 Feedwater isolation Knowledge of the operational 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X 3.6 42 Feedwater implications of the following concepts as the apply to the AFW:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)
K5.01 Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer Knowledge of bus power 062 AC Electrical Distribution X 3.3 43 supplies to the following:
(CFR: 41.7)
K2.01 Major system loads Knowledge of the effect that 063 DC Electrical Distribution X 3.7* 44 a loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)
K3.01 ED/G Page 20 of 50
Ability to manually operate 073 Process Radiation X 3.9 45 Monitoring and/or monitor in the control room:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)
A4.01 Effluent release Knowledge of the effect of a 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X 2.7 46 loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)
K6.07 Air receivers Knowledge of SWS design 076 Service Water X 2.9* 47 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
(CFR: 41/7)
K4.03 Automatic opening features associated with SWS isolation valves to CCW heat exchanges 2.1.38 Ability to explain and 078 Instrument Air X 3.8 48 apply system limits and precautions.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12)
Ability to (a) predict the 103 Containment X 3.5* 49 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /
45.13)
A2.03 Phase A and B Isolation Page 21 of 50
Ability to predict and/or 005 Residual Heat Removal X 2.5 50 monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHRS controls including:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)
A1.03 Closed cooling water flow rate and temperature Ability to monitor automatic 039 Main and Reheat Steam X 3.1 51 operation of the MRSS, including:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)
A3.02 Isolation of the MRSS Knowledge of MFW design 059 Main Feedwater X 3.2 52 feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
(CFR: 41.7)
K4.19 Automatic feedwater isolation of MFW Knowledge of the effect that 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X 4.2 53 Feedwater a loss or malfunction of the AFW will have on the following:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)
K3.02 S/G Knowledge of the effect of a 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X 3.2 54 loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)
K6.08 Fuel oil storage tanks Knowledge of the physical 103 Containment X 3.6 55 connections and/or cause effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems:
(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)
K1.01 CCS K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 Group Point Total: 28/5 Page 22 of 50
ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant Ability to (a) predict the 011 Pressurizer Level Control X 3.8 56 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)
A2.03 Loss of PZR level 014 Rod Position Indication Knowledge of the physical 015 Nuclear Instrumentation X 4.1 57 connections and/or cause effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems:
(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)
K1.01 RPS Ability to manually operate 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation X 2.9* 58 and/or monitor in the control room:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)
A4.01 NNI channel select controls 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and 017 In-core Temperature Monitor X 4.6 59 execute procedure steps.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)
Knowledge of bus power 027 Containment Iodine Removal X 3.1* 60 supplies to the following:
(CFR: 41.7)
K2.01 Fans Page 23 of 50
028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control Ability to predict and/or 029 Containment Purge X 3.4 61 monitor changes in parameters to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Containment Purge System controls including:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)
A1.02 Radiation levels Knowledge of design feature(s) 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling X 2.6 62 and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:
(CFR: 41.7)
K4.03 Anti-siphon devices 034 Fuel Handling Equipment Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Fuel Handling System, including:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)
A3.01 Travel Limits Ability to predict and/or 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X 2.9 63 monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Fuel Handling System controls including:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)
A1.02 Water level in the refueling canal 035 Steam Generator Knowledge of the effect that a 041 Steam Dump/Turbine X 3.8 64 Bypass Control loss or malfunction of the SDS will have on the following:
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)
K3.02 RCS 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal Page 24 of 50
Ability to predict and/or 072 Area Radiation Monitoring X 3.4 65 monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ARM system controls including:
(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)
A1.01 Radiation levels 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 10/3 Page 25 of 50
ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal 4.2 76 condition procedures.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X Ability to determine or interpret the 3.2 77 following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:
(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)
EA2.07 That equipment necessary for functioning of critical pump water seals is operable 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X Ability to determine and interpret the 3.4 78 System Malfunction / 3 following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions:
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
AA2.18 Operable control channel 000029 ATWS / 1 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability 4.6 79 and/or availability of safety related equipment.
(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12)
Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 Page 26 of 50
000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X Ability to determine and interpret the 3.9 80 following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
AA2.03 DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 EPE 007 Reactor Trip X 2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal 4.5 81 operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 Group Point Total: 18/
6 Page 27 of 50
ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 X 2.4.2 Knowledge of system set 4.6 82 points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.
(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X Ability to determine and 3.9 83 interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents:
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
AA2.01 ARM system indications 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 X 2.4.41 Knowledge of the 4.6 84 emergency action level thresholds and classifications associated with Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 X Ability to determine and 3.5 85 interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms:
(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)
AA2.04 Whether an alarm channel is functioning properly 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 Page 28 of 50
000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 Group Point Total: 9/4 Page 29 of 50
ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 003 Reactor Coolant Pump Knowledge of EOP entry 004 Chemical and Volume X 4.8 86 Control conditions and immediate action steps.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling Ability to (a) predict the 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench 4.2 88 Tank impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Pressurizer Relief Tank; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
(CFR: 41.5 /43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)
A2.01 Stuck open PORV or Code Safety 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control Ability to (a) predict the 012 Reactor Protection X 3.7 87 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)
A2.07 Loss of dc control power 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooling 025 Ice Condenser Page 30 of 50
026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 2.1.23 Ability to perform 076 Service Water X 4.4 89 specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) 078 Instrument Air Ability to (a) predict the 103 Containment X 3.6* 90 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)
A2 04 Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)
K/A Category Point Totals: 3 2 Group Point Total: 28/5 Page 31 of 50
ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)
System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G K/A Topic(s) IR #
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive Ability to (a) predict the impacts 002 Reactor Coolant X 4. 91 of the following malfunctions or 1 operations on the RCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)
A2.03 Loss of forced circulation 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 2.4.21 Knowledge of the 035 Steam Generator X 4. 92 parameters and logic used to 6 assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.
(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator Page 32 of 50
055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water 2.4.4 Ability to recognize 079 Station Air X 4. 93 abnormal indications for system 7 operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.6) 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 1 2 Group Point Total: 10/3 ES 301, Page 22 of 27 Rev 2 Rev 2: rev follows initial submittal Page 33 of 50
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:
Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #
2.1. 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance 4.4 66 and make operational judgments based on 1.
Conduct operating characteristics, reactor behavior, of Operations and instrument interpretation.
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 2.1. 2.1.9 Ability to direct personnel activities 2.9* 67 inside the control room.
(CFR: 41.10 / 45.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 2.1. 2.1.36 Knowledge of procedures and 4.1 94 limitations involved in core alterations.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.7) 2.1. 2.1.45 Ability to identify and interpret 4.3 95 diverse indications to validate the response of another indication.
(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.4) 2.1.
2.1.
Subtotal 2 2 2.2. 2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for 3.9 68 controlling equipment configuration or 2.
status.
Equipment (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)
Control 2.2. 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and 3.6 69 limitations in the facility license.
(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 2.2. 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room 4.2 70 indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.
(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12)
Page 34 of 50
2.2. 2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of 4.2 96 maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 2.2.
2.2.
Subtotal 3 1 2.3. 2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring 2.9 71 systems, such as fixed radiation monitors 3.
and alarms, portable survey instruments, Radiation personnel monitoring equipment, etc.
Control (CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 2.3. 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety 3.4 72 procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10) 2.3. 2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring 2.9 73 systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.
(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 2.3. 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work 3.6 97 permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.
(CFR: 41.12 / 45.10) 2.3. 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety 3.7 98 principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
(CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10) 2.3.
Subtotal 3 2 Page 35 of 50
2.4. 2.4.20 Knowledge of operational implications 3.8 74 of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.
4.
Emergency (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)
Procedures / 2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions 2.4. 4.6 75 Plan and immediate action steps.
(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5/45.13) 2.4. 2.4.22 Knowledge of the bases for 4.4 99 prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.
(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 2.4. 2.4.37 Knowledge of the lines of authority 4.1 100 during implementation of the emergency plan.
(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 2.4.
2.4.
Subtotal 2 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 7 Page 36 of 50
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 1/1 APE 062 K1 KA catalog lists none. Replaced with G.
1/1 APE 038 G - Unable to write a test question for the system using this topic.
2.2.36 Randomly selected a new KA.
1/2 APE 051 K1 Only KA has importance rating of less than 2.5. Randomly selected a new KA.
1/2 APE 051 G - Unable to write a test question for the system using this topic.
2.4.41 Randomly selected a new KA.
2/2 APE 029 K6 All KA have importance rating of less than 2.5. Randomly selected a new KA.
1/1 APE 062 2.2.38 KA selected for RO section of exam. KA is a SRO level question. Randomly selected a new KA 1/1 EPE W/E11 KA selected for RO section of exam. KA is a SRO level EA2.1 question. Randomly selected a new KA 1/1 APE 025 AA1.20 Unable to write question for this system interaction.
Randomly selected a new KA.
1/2 APE 051 2.1.25 Unable to write a discriminatory question on KA. Randomly selected new KA.
2/1 025 K5.02 Unable to write a discriminatory question on KA due to not applicable to the plant. Randomly selected new KA.
1/1 EPE 029 EK1.02 KA selected is GFE level topic. Randomly selected new KA 2/2 034 A3.01 KA selected is SRO knowledge level. Randomly selected new KA.
2/2 034 A1.02 KA selected is SRO knowledge level. Randomly selected new KA.
1/1 WE05 Unable to write a discriminatory question on KA. Randomly selected new KA.
2/1 026 A2.09 Unable to write a discriminatory question on KA. Randomly selected new KA.
1/2 069 AK3.01 Unable to write a discriminatory RO question on KA.
Randomly selected new KA.
2/2 068 2.4.21 Unable to write a discriminatory question on KA. Randomly selected new KA 3 2.4.37 KA selected for questions 75 and 100. Randomly selected new KA for question 75.
Page 37 of 50
1/2 012 A2.07 KA selected is similar to 3 other selected KAs. Selected new KA.
1/1 022 G2.4.21 Unable to write a discriminatory question on KA. Randomly selected new KA 2/1 103 A2.04 This was a duplicate system and KA with question #90.
Randomly selected new KA.
Page 38 of 50
Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: L111-NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: 75%, MOL, steady-state conditions, 838 ppm boron Turnover: Maintain current power level (for Htr #2 Drip Pp monitoring); place 120 gpm letdown in service (per chemistry) for minor crud burst cleanup. DG 1-3 is OOS.
Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 OP B-1A:XII, N (ATC, Places 120 gpm letdown in service (including 2nd CCP) sec 6.3 BOP) 2 pmp asw1/2 C (SRO, ASW Pp 1-1 trips on OC (1-2 ASW Pp fails to start in auto, and is started BOP) manually) (TS) 3 mal gen4 C (ALL) Full Load Rejection (from 75%); stabilizes @ 20-30% power R (ATC) 4 xmt rms23 I (SRO, S/G Blowdown RM-23 fails high (with blowdown isolation; valves vlv sgb13,14 BOP) (FCV-498 & FCV-499) fails to isolate, but can be manually closed) (ECG) 5 xmt cvc19 I (SRO, VCT level LT-112 fails low (causes continuous makeup; is stopped manually)
ATC) 6 mal mss3b M (ALL) Steamline 1-2 break OC (with ATWS on SI); the 1-2 S/G must be isolated mal ppl3a C (BOP) (CT) ** (see next page); terminates SI once the faulted S/G is isolated; Train A SI does not actuate, and must be manually aligned (including Phase A components) 7 mal ppl5a/5b C (ATC) Reactor must be manually tripped on safety injection (CT)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 7
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Rev 2 comments: rev follows initial submittal DC-2012-12-DRAFT-Outlines.docx Page 39 of 50 Rev 2
Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- NRC #1
- 1. (Normal Evolution) Crew places 120 gpm letdown in service per OP B-1A:XII, section 6.3 (for RCS cleanup)
- 2. Auxiliary Salt Water (ASW) Pump 1-1 trips on overcurrent (OC). ASW Pump 1-2 fails to start in automatic, but the BOP can place the pump in manual and start it.
Actions will be per AR PK01-03 (for OC trip of 1-1 ASW PP); actions may also be taken per OP AP-10, Loss of Auxiliary Salt Water. (TS)
- 3. A full load rejection occurs on Unit 1 (due to a grid disturbance) (from 75% power).
OP AP-2, Full Load Rejection, is implemented to stabilize the plant between 20-30% power on steam dumps.
- 4. The S/G Blowdown radiation monitor (RM-23) fails high, causing a blowdown isolation. Isolation valves (FCV-498 & 499, blowdown to discharge tunnel) fails to operate in automatic; the BOP recognizes the failure and completes the isolation manually; actions are taken per AR PK11-17, S/G Blowdown Hi Rad. The crew diagnoses that the high reading on the radiation monitor is a failure (due to comparisons with other monitors, the rate of failure, etc), and applies the appropriate Equipment Control Guideline (ECG) ECG 39.3.B). (ECG)
- 5. Volume Control Tank (VCT) level channel LT-112 fails low, causing a continuous (and erroneous) makeup signal. The crew diagnoses the level channel failure by comparing other VCT parameters, and by using OP AP-19, Malfunction of the Reactor Makeup Control System. The makeup system is secured, and makeup is accomplished (if needed) by using the manual mode (or enabling the auto mode for short periods).
- 6. A steamline break (outside containment) occurs on the 1-2 S/G, almost immediately causing the need for a Safety Injection (SI) and reactor trip**. Train A of SI does not occur automatically, and must be manually actuated. The S/G will be isolated per EOP E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation (CT), and ECCS will be terminated per EOP E-1.1, SI Termination.
- 7. On the Safety Injection, Reactor Trip does not automatically occur (ATWS),
causing the need for a manual reactor trip (which is successful) (CT); transition to EOP FR-S.1 is, therefore, not required, and EOP E-0 is continued.
The scenario is terminated once RHR pumps have been stopped in E-1.1 (approximately step 8 completed), at the discretion of the lead examiner.
- CT / TCOA note: Steam break was evaluated against Time Critical Operator Actions (TCOAs) #
18 & 19 (MSLB IC & OC); the break sizes, ramp times, initial power levels, and other conditions differ significantly from the conditions used in this scenario. For these reasons, the S/G isolation will remain critical (a critical task, per WOG), but no TCOA time limits are applied to this scenario.
DC-2012-12-DRAFT-Outlines.docx Page 40 of 50 Rev 1
Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: L111-NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: 2% with MFW in service, BOL, 1575 ppm boron Turnover: OP L-3, @ step 6.29, ready to raise power to 8%
Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A R (ATC) Raise reactor power from 2% to 8% power 2 ser 0232 C (SRO, At 3% power, Pzr PORV PCV-455C block valve 8000B causes ground, vlv pzr2 BOP) shorts out/goes mid-position, and then breaker trips (can't be closed) (TS) dsc pzr2 3 xmt cvc16 I (SRO, TE-130 fails low (causes TCV-130 to close in auto), causing high letdown BOP) temperature; manual control is used to restore letdown temperature 4 mal sei1 C (SRO) Earthquake (mod) causes construction crane impact on RWST about 35%
asisrwst level (TS only) (later will cause ECA-1.1 entry and CT) 5 cnv rcs2 C (ALL) PCV-455B (Pzr spray valve) opens slightly on earthquake (mech bound, can't control from C/R); will fail fully open (requiring reactor trip and RCP S/D) (once RWST TS addressed) 6 mal rcs3d M (ALL) RCS leak starts and escalates (on aftershock), requiring manual SI 7 vlv sis3/sis4 C (BOP) 8801A/B fail to open on SI, requiring manual opening to establish high head ECCS injection (CT) 8 mal rcs3d M (ALL) SBLOCA and Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (ECR): with low asisrwst RWST level, causes transfer to cold leg recirc procedure and then loss of ECR procedure; M/U to RWST is directed, and ECCS flow is reduced (CT)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes
- 8. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6
- 9. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 10. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
- 11. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 12. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2
- 13. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
- 14. Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Rev 2 comments: rev follows initial submittal DC-2012-12-DRAFT-Outlines.docx Page 41 of 50 Rev 2
Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- NRC #2
- 1. Control Rods are pulled one full step at a time to raise power slowly from 2% to 8%
power, in preparation for rolling the main turbine.
- 2. At 3% power, a 480v Bus G ground alarm will signal a malfunction of Pzr PORV block valve 8000B. The valve will (shortly after the alarm) simulate a short/electrical problem, and move to mid-position (and not move thereafter); a few minutes later, the breaker for the valve (8000B) will trip open (and the ground alarm will clear. Tech Spec actions for TS 3.4.11.C will apply (1 hr to place associated PORV in MAN/CLOSED). (TS)
- 3. Letdown heat exchanger temperature element TE-130 will fail low, causing actual letdown temperature to rise and causes alarms, letdown divert from the demineralizers, and rising VCT temperature. OP AP-11, Malf of the CCW System, Sec D, will be used to take manual control of letdown temperature (TCV-130), and control temperature manually.
- 4. A moderate seismic event causes a large crane in the 115' tank area to tip over and puncture the RWST, about 1/3 of the way up from the bottom of the tank (and it drains slowly to that level). Tech Spec 3.5.4.B will be implemented (1 hr to restore, which is not possible). This failure sets up the final event (loss of emergency coolant recirc capability). (TS)
- 5. Also, one Pzr Spray Valve (PCV-455B) fails partially open (but remains within the ability of the pressure control system at this point). Once the RWST Tech Spec is addressed, the spray valve will fail full open, causing the need for a manual reactor trip, and trip of the 1-1 and 1-2 RCPs. The crew will stabilize in EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
- 6. An RCS leak starts (aftershock) (slow ramp to 900 gpm), requiring actions to try to keep up with the leak, and then initiate a manual Safety Injection (SI) when those efforts fail.
- 7. On the SI, two of the charging injection isolation valves fail to open, but are opened manually in order to supply high-head ECCS injection. (CT)
- 8. The RCS leak escalates to a SBLOCA, and the crew proceeds (eventually) to ECA-1.1, Loss of Coolant Recirc Capability, where the crew will direct makeup to the RWST, and throttle ECCS flow to conserve RWST inventory. (CT)
The scenario is terminated once RWST makeup has been directed, and ECCS flow has been reduced, per EOP ECA-1.1.
DC-2012-12-DRAFT-Outlines.docx Page 42 of 50 Rev 1
Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: L111-NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: 2% with MFW in service, BOL, 1575 ppm boron Turnover: OP L-3, @ step 6.29, ready to raise power to 8%
Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A R (ATC) Raise reactor power from 2% to 8% power 2 ser 0232 C (SRO, At 3% power, Pzr PORV PCV-455C block valve 8000B causes ground, vlv pzr2 BOP) shorts out/goes mid-position, and then breaker trips (can't be closed) (TS) dsc pzr2 3 xmt cvc16 I (SRO, TE-130 fails low (causes TCV-130 to close in auto), causing high letdown BOP) temperature; manual control is used to restore letdown temperature 4 mal sei1 C (SRO) Earthquake (mod) causes construction crane impact on RWST about 35%
asisrwst level (TS only) (later will cause ECA-1.1 entry and CT) 5 cnv rcs2 C (ALL) PCV-455B (Pzr spray valve) opens slightly on earthquake (mech bound, can't control from C/R); will fail fully open (requiring reactor trip and RCP S/D) (once RWST TS addressed) 6 mal rcs3d M (ALL) RCS leak starts and escalates (on aftershock), requiring manual SI 7 vlv sis3/sis4 C (BOP) 8801A/B fail to open on SI, requiring manual opening to establish high head ECCS injection (CT) 8 mal rcs3d M (ALL) SBLOCA and Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (ECR): with low asisrwst RWST level, causes transfer to cold leg recirc procedure and then loss of ECR procedure; M/U to RWST is directed, and ECCS flow is reduced (CT)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes
- 15. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6
- 16. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 17. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
- 18. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 19. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2
- 20. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
- 21. Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Rev 2 comments: rev follows initial submittal DC-2012-12-DRAFT-Outlines.docx Page 43 of 50 Rev 2
Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- NRC #2
- 1. Control Rods are pulled one full step at a time to raise power slowly from 2% to 8%
power, in preparation for rolling the main turbine.
- 2. At 3% power, a 480v Bus G ground alarm will signal a malfunction of Pzr PORV block valve 8000B. The valve will (shortly after the alarm) simulate a short/electrical problem, and move to mid-position (and not move thereafter); a few minutes later, the breaker for the valve (8000B) will trip open (and the ground alarm will clear. Tech Spec actions for TS 3.4.11.C will apply (1 hr to place associated PORV in MAN/CLOSED). (TS)
- 3. Letdown heat exchanger temperature element TE-130 will fail low, causing actual letdown temperature to rise and causes alarms, letdown divert from the demineralizers, and rising VCT temperature. OP AP-11, Malf of the CCW System, Sec D, will be used to take manual control of letdown temperature (TCV-130), and control temperature manually.
- 4. A moderate seismic event causes a large crane in the 115' tank area to tip over and puncture the RWST, about 1/3 of the way up from the bottom of the tank (and it drains slowly to that level). Tech Spec 3.5.4.B will be implemented (1 hr to restore, which is not possible). This failure sets up the final event (loss of emergency coolant recirc capability). (TS)
- 5. Also, one Pzr Spray Valve (PCV-455B) fails partially open (but remains within the ability of the pressure control system at this point). Once the RWST Tech Spec is addressed, the spray valve will fail full open, causing the need for a manual reactor trip, and trip of the 1-1 and 1-2 RCPs. The crew will stabilize in EOP E-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.
- 6. An RCS leak starts (aftershock) (slow ramp to 900 gpm), requiring actions to try to keep up with the leak, and then initiate a manual Safety Injection (SI) when those efforts fail.
- 7. On the SI, two of the charging injection isolation valves fail to open, but are opened manually in order to supply high-head ECCS injection. (CT)
- 8. The RCS leak escalates to a SBLOCA, and the crew proceeds (eventually) to ECA-1.1, Loss of Coolant Recirc Capability, where the crew will direct makeup to the RWST, and throttle ECCS flow to conserve RWST inventory. (CT)
The scenario is terminated once RWST makeup has been directed, and ECCS flow has been reduced, per EOP ECA-1.1.
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Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Diablo Canyon (PWR) Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: L111-NRC Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL, 774 ppm boron Turnover: DG 1-2 OOS Event Malf Event Event No No. Type* Description 1 N/A N (BOP) Swap to CCP 1-1 from CCP 1-3 per OP B-1A:V, sec 6.1 2 xmt pzr24 I (SRO, Pzr Press transmitter PT-474 fails low (makes (2) PORVs inoperable) (TS)
BOP) 3 xmt cvc4 I (SRO, FT-128 (charging flow transmitter) fails low (actual charging flow goes high);
ATC) manual control of FCV-128 is required 4 mal mfw2b C (ALL) MFP 1-2 vibrations rise until ramp is required; the pump trips during the ramp ovr xc3i196o R (ATC) (at 93% power), which causes a faster programmed ramp ( 50% power after ramp) 5 mal eps4d C (SRO, Loss of 4KV Vital Bus G (diff trip); alternate equipment is placed in service, BOP) and Tech Specs are implemented (TS) 6 Ser 1244 C (ALL) RCP 1-3 vibration coincident with motor bearing temperature increase Xmt rcp38 (requires reactor trip and trip of RCP 1-3) 7 mal sei1 M (ALL) Earthquake causes loss of Loss of all AC Power; the unit is backfed from mal deg1a,c 500KV power (CT, TCOA), and RCS inventory control is established mal syd2 (TCOA). RCP seal injection is isolated prior to starting a CCP (CT, TCOA) 8 vlv afw7 C (BOP) TDAFP does not auto start on trip/loss of AC; must be manually started
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) (from form ES301-4) Actual Attributes
- 22. Total malfunctions (5-8) 7
- 23. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1
- 24. Abnormal events (2-4) 5
- 25. Major transients (1-2) 1
- 26. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1
- 27. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2
- 28. Critical tasks (2-3) 2 Rev 2 comments: rev following initial submittal DC-2012-12-DRAFT-Outlines.docx Page 45 of 50 Rev 2
Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-2 SCENARIO
SUMMARY
- NRC #3
- 2. Pressurizer pressure channel PT-474 fails low. System control is not affected (control is 2nd highest chan select), but since this channel provides the low press interlock for two Pzr PORVs (PCV-474 and PCV-455C), they must be declared INOPERABLE (block valves must be closed, and power removed). OP AP-5, is used to respond to the failure. (TS)
- 3. FT-128 (charging flow) fails low, causing actual charging flow to rise. FCV-128 (or HC-459D) must be taken to manual, and charging flow controlled by alternate indications for the remainder of the scenario. OP AP-17, section B, may be used to respond to the failure.
- 4. MFP 1-2 develops vibrations (moderate level) requiring the plant be ramped to 50% power
@ 50-200 mw/min (per AR PK09-14). At 93% power, the 1-2 MFP will trip, initiating an even faster automatic programmed ramp down to 50% power. OP AP-25 and OP AP-15 will be used to respond to the ramp/trip.
- 5. Once the plant is stable at 50% power, 4KV bus G will trip on differential. OP AP-27 will be used to stabilize and respond to the loss of the bus, and restoration of equipment. (TS)
- 6. RCP 1-3 develops vibrations (Danger level) coincident with motor bearing temperature increase. The crew will respond by using AR PK05-05 and will trip the reactor and RCP 1-3 (stabilizing the plant in EOP E-0.1).
- 7. An earthquake will cause sequential electrical failures (loss of 230KV, DGs 1-1 & 1-3) which will result in a loss of all AC to the vital busses. Since backfeed (500KV) is available, the crew will backfeed the unit to restore power (CT, part of TCOA), and eventually restore RCS inventory control (part of TCOA), using EOP ECA-0.0 and ECA-0.1. The turbine driven AFW pump (TDAFP) does not auto-start from the trip of loss of busses, and must be started to restore AFW flow to the S/Gs. RCP seal cooling is isolated prior to restarting a CCP.
(CT, and part of TCOA). The TCOA is to backfeed the unit, isolate RCP seal cooling, and restore inventory control within 54 minutes (of loss of all AC). ***
The scenario is terminated once the unit is backfed, vital buss(es) are restored, and RCS inventory control is restored.
- (TCOA) The loss of all AC was evaluated against TCOA #37 (station blackout); the conditions of the scenario are close enough to the TCOA conditions that both the TCOA and time limits are applicable: must complete 500KV backfeed, RCP seal isolation (just direction w/I 42 min), and restore RCS inventory control within 54 minutes (of loss of power).
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Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-2 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 5 (I3, R5, S1)
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: Nov 26, 2012 Operating Test Number: L111 A E Scenarios P V 1 (I3,R5,S1) 2 (S1,I3,R5) 3 4 P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)
E R I U RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 2* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C *,3,4,5 5,6 5 SRO-U MAJ 6 8 2 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RX 3 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C 5,7 2,3,5,6,7 7 SRO-U MAJ 6 8 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
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Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-2 ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 1 Rev 1 - rev follows initial submittal DC-2012-12-DRAFT-Outlines.docx Page 48 of 50 Rev 1
Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-2 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Group 6 (I4, R4, S1)
Facility: Diablo Canyon Date of Exam: Nov 26, 2012 Operating Test Number: L111 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 (I4,R4,S1) 3 (S1,I4,R4) 4 P E T M L N CREW CREW CREW CREW O I I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T N C A I A T S A B S A B S A B S A B L M N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O U T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)
E R I U RX 4 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 2* 1 1 1 1 SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C *,3,4,5,6 3,6 6 SRO-U MAJ 8 7 2 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C 5,6 2,4,5,6,8 7 SRO-U MAJ 8 7 2 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 0 RO NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I 4 4 2 I/C SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:
- 4. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 5. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 6. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
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Appendix D (rev 9) Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-2 ES-301, Page 26 of 27 Rev 1 Rev 1 - rev follows initial submittal DC-2012-12-DRAFT-Outlines.docx Page 50 of 50 Rev 1