AEP-NRC-2012-92, Response to Second Round Request for Additional Information Regarding Application for Amendment to Transition the Fire Protection Program to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805

Response to Second Round Request for Additional Information Regarding Application for Amendment to Transition the Fire Protection Program to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805

ML12297A213
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	10/15/2012
From:	Carlson M American Electric Power, Indiana Michigan Power Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
AEP-NRC-2012-92, TAC ME6629, TAC ME6630
Download: ML12297A213 (68)

Text

INDIANA MICHIGAN Indiana Michigan Power POWER"* One Cook Place Bridgman, MI 49106 A unit of American Electric Power IndianaMichiganPower. com October 15, 2012 AEP-NRC-2012-92 10 CFR 50.90 Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Response to Second Round Request for Additional Information Regarding the Application for Amendment to Transition the Fire Protection Program to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (TAC Nos. ME6629 and ME6630)

This letter provides Indiana Michigan Power Company's (l&M's) response to a second U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) request for additional information (RAI) regarding a proposed license amendment to transition the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Units 1 and 2 to a new fire protection program based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805. Documents referenced in this transmittal letter are identified in Enclosure 2.

By Reference 1, I&M, the licensee for CNP Units 1 and 2, proposed to amend Facility Operating Licenses DPR-58 and DPR-74 to adopt a new fire protection program based on NFPA Standard 805, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and (c). Reference 1, Enclosure 2, hereafter referred to as the Transition Report, provided information associated with the CNP transition to NFPA 805. By References 2 and 3, the NRC transmitted RAIs regarding the proposed amendment. References 4, 5, and 6 transmitted I&M's responses to the Reference 2 and 3 RAIs. By Reference 7, the NRC transmitted a second round of RAIs. This letter provides I&M's responses to the Reference 7 second round RAIs, except for RAI-54.b. As stated in Reference 7, the response to RAI-54.b will be provided no later than November 9, 2012.

During preparation of this letter, a discrepancy was noted in the risk related values provided in Table W2, ("Fire Initiating Event Scenarios Contributing More than 1% of the Calculated Fire Risk for Unit 2") in the original amendment request (Reference 1). Risk related values in the three columns on the right side of the table were inadvertently transposed and are not consistent with the headings for these columns. The values in Table W2 are not used to address any quantitative acceptance criteria, but are intended solely for information, to identify the more significant contributors to overall risk. Initial review has determined that the discrepancy is limited to Table W2. The discrepancy does not exist in the corresponding table for Unit 1, Table WI. I&M will provide a revised Table W2 no later than November 9, 2012.

Security-Related Information -Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390.

Enclosures 3 and 8 to this letter contains security-related information.

Upon removal of Enclosure 3 and 8, this letter is uncontrolled.

I

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 2 to this letter provides an affirmation statement. Enclosure 2 identifies documents referenced in this letter and its enclosures. Enclosure 3 provides I&M's responses to the Reference 7 second round RAIs, except for RAI-54.b. Enclosures 4 through 11 provide revisions to portions of the Transition Report and its attachments in support of the RAI responses provided in Enclosure 3. The sequence of Enclosures 4 through 11 reflects the sequence in which the associated portions -of the Transition Report are presented in Reference 1. Enclosure 12 provides a list of NFPA codes and editions that will be in place following transition to NFPA 805. Enclosure 13 provides a compact disc containing an electronic copy of the CFAST input files for an updated Main Control Room fire modeling calculation.

Copies of this letter and its enclosures are being transmitted to the Michigan Public Service Commission and Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91. This letter contains no new or modified regulatory commitments. Should you have any questions regarding this proposed amendment, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager, at (269) 466-2649.

Sincerely, Michael H. Carlson Site Support Services Vice President JRW/dmb

Enclosures:

1. Affirmation

2. Identification of Documents Referenced in this Letter and its Enclosures

3. Responses to Second Round of Information Requests Re. NFPA 805 Transition

4. Revision 1 to Transition Report Pages 19 and 34 Provided in Response to RAI-59, and Revision 1 to Transition Report Pages 53 and 54 Provided in Response to RAI-60

5. Revisions of Section 3.2.3, Section 3.3.1.2, Section 3.3.1.2(1), Section 3.3.1.3.1, Section 3.4.2, and Section 3.4.3 of Transition Report Attachment A, Table B-i, "Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements (NFPA 805 Chapter 3)"

Provided in Response to RAI-09.01, RAI-10.01, RAI-18.01, and RAI-59

6. Revision 1 of Page B-88 of Transition Report Attachment B, 'Table B-2, "Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology Review," Provided in Response to RAI-59

7. Revision 1 of Page D-7 of Transition Report Attachment D, "NEI 04-02 Non-Power Operational Modes Transition ,"Provided in Response to RAI-59

8. Revision 1 of Transition Report Attachment I, "Definition of Power Block and Plant,"

Provided in Response to RAI-56

9. Revision 1 of Page K-22 of Transition Report Attachment K, "Existing Licensing Action Transfer," Provided in Response to RAI-57 Security-Related Information -Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390.

Enclosures 3 and 8 to this letter contains security-related information.

Upon removal of Enclosure 3 and 8, this letter is uncontrolled.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 3

10. Revision 1 of Transition Report Attachment L, "NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirement for Approval (10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii))," Provided in Response to RAI-05.01

11. Revision 3 of Attachment S, "Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed During Implementation," to the Transition Report, Provided in Response to RAI-09.01, RAI-10.01, RAI-18.01, RAI-44, RAI-59, and RAI-60

12. List of NFPA Codes and Editions that will be in Place Post Transition, Provided in Response to RAI-58.

13. Compact Disc Containing an Electronic Copy of the CFAST Input Files for an Updated Control Room Fire Modeling Calculation (JA1-Cook-1201 Rev. 2), Provided in Response to RAI-49 and RAI-51.

c: C. A. Casto, NRC Region III J. T. King, MPSC S. M. Krawec, AEP Ft. Wayne, w/o enclosures MDEQ - RMD/RPS NRC Resident Inspector T. J. Wengert, NRC Washington, DC Security-Related Information -Withhold From Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390.

Enclosures 2 and 4 to this letter contain security-related information.

Upon removal of Enclosures 2 and 4, this letter is uncontrolled.

Enclosure 1 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 AFFIRMATION I, Michael H. Carlson, being duly sworn, state that I am Site Support Services Vice President of Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M), that I am authorized to sign and file this request with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on behalf of I&M, and that the statements made and the matters set forth herein pertaining to I&M are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Indiana Michigan Power Company Michael H. Carlson Site Support Services Vice President SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS LS DAY OF C_,2012 Notary Public ( -

My Commission Expires *-*-

Enclosure 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Identification of Documents Referenced in this Letter and Its Enclosures Reference

1. Letter from M. H. Carlson, Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M), to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Document Control Desk, "Request for License Amendment to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition),"

AEP.-NRC-2011-1, dated July 1,2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML111188A145.

2. Letter from P. S. Tam, NRC, to L. J. Weber, I&M, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information on the Application for Amendment to Transition the Fire Protection Program to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (TAC Nos.

ME6629 AND ME6630)," dated January 27, 2012, ADAMS Accession Nos. ML113560709, ML12003A186, and ML12017A251.

3. E-Mail from P. S. Tam, NRC, to H. L. Etheridge,.J. R. Waters, M. K. Scarpello, I&M, et al.,

"D.C. Cook - Draft RAI re. Transition to NFPA 805, Questions in Health Physics (TAC ME6629 and ME6630)," dated March 22, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12082A043.

4. Letter from M. H. Carlson, I&M, to NRC Document Control Desk, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Application for Amendment to Transition the Fire Protection Program to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, (TAC Nos. ME6629 AND ME6630),"

AEP-NRC-2012-29, dated April 27, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12132A390.

5. Letter from J. P Gebbie, I&M, to NRC Document Control Desk, "Response to Second Request for Additional Information Regarding the Application for Amendment to Transition the Fire Protection Program to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (TAC Nos.

ME6629 AND ME6630)," AEP-NRC-2012-47, dated June 29, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12195A013.

6. Letter from M. H. Carlson, I&M, to NRC Document Control Desk, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Response to Request for Additional- Information Regarding the Application for Amendment to Transition the Fire Protection Program to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, (TAC Nos. ME6629 AND ME6630),"

AEP-NRC-2012-58, dated August 9, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12242A246.

7. Letter from T. J. Wengert, NRC, to L. J. Weber, I&M, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information on the Application for Amendment to Transition the Fire Protection Program to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (TAC Nos.

ME6629 AND ME6630)," dated October 11, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12276A356.

Enclosure 4 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Revision 1 to Transition Report Pages 19 and 34 Provided in Response to RAI-59 and Revision 1 to Transition Report Pages 53 and 54 Provided in Response to RAI-60 Changes are indicated by revision bars in the right margin.

Indiana Michýqan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Report

• The plant-specific methodology was compared to applicable sections of NEI 00-01 and one of the following potential alignment statements and its associated basis were assigned to the section:

0 Aligns 0 Aligns with intent 0 Not in Alignment 0 Not in Alignment, but Prior NRC Approval E Not in Alignment, but no adverse consequences The comparison of the CNP existing Appendix R post-fire SSA methodology to NEI 00-01 Chapter 3 (NEI 04-02 Table B-2) for transitioning to NFPA 805 was performed and documented in CNP Technical Evaluation 12.29, Nuclear Safety Capability Analysis Methodology Review.

Results from Evaluation Process The method used to perform the existing Appendix R post-fire SSA with respect to selection of systems and equipment, selection of cables, and identification of the location of equipment and cables, either meets the NRC endorsed guidance for transitioning to NFPA 805 directly or met the intent of the endorsed guidance with adequate justification as documented in Attachment B.

However, documentation enhancements to support conclusions to NEI 00-01, Section 3.5.2.1 regarding open circuit on current transformers are ongoing. These enhancements require additional CT manufacturer and model data that was not available at time of the LAR submittal and will be addressed prior to the implementation of the new NFPA 805 licensing basis (Attachment S, Item S-3.12).

Revision I Page 19

Indiana Michigan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Report 4.3.2 Results of the Evaluation Process Based on FAQ 07-0040 (Revision 4), the Plant Operating States (POS) considered for equipment and cable selection are defined in Technical Evaluation R1900-005-001 "Non-Power Operation Modes Transition Review". Components were identified to support the KSFs of Inventory Control, Decay Heat Removal Capability, Reactivity Control, Containment Closure, and associated support functions (process cooling and electrical power). A model was developed in the NFPA 805 Analysis Database (Genesis Solution Suite, SAFE Module).

Equipment was logically tied to the supported KSF. Power supplies, interlocks, and supporting equipment were logically tied to their parent component.

For those components which had not been previously analyzed in support of the at-power analysis or whose functional requirements may have been different for the non-power analysis, cable selection was performed in accordance with approved project procedures. Cables necessary to support the selected function of a component were selected and analyzed for fire impact.

Technical Evaluation R1900-005-001 contains the fire area assessment, the identified pinch points, and general recommendations for administrative controls to reduce that fire risk as well as a proposed strategy for recovering the KSF should a fire occur. In accordance with FAQ 07-0040, any area experiencing fire damage which eliminates all success paths for a KSF (without recovery actions outside the main control room) is considered a pinch point. Fire modeling was not used to eliminate any fire area from being a pinch point.

The list of generic recommendations specified in Technical Evaluation R1900-005-001 considers the following actions from FAQ 07-0040:

" Prohibition or limitation of hot work in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability

• Verification of operable detection and/or suppression in the vulnerable areas.

• Prohibition or limitation of combustible materials in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability

• Use of plant configuration changes (e.g., removing power from equipment once it is placed in its desired position)

• Provision of additional fire patrols at periodic intervals or other appropriate compensatory measures (such as surveillance cameras) during increased vulnerability

• Use of recovery actions to mitigate potential losses of key safety functions.

• Identification and monitoring in - situ ignition sources for "fire precursors" (e.g.,

equipment temperatures)

• Rescheduling of work to a period with lower risk or higher DID Refer to Attachment D for additional details. Based on consideration of the vulnerable areas and incorporation of generic recommendations from FAQ 07-0040 into appropriate plant procedures and practices, prior to implementation of NFPA 805 (See Attachment S, Item S-3.6),

the performance goals (KSFs) for Non-Power Operations will be fulfilled and the requirements of NFPA 805 will be met.

Page 34 Revision 1I Page 34

Indiana Michigan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Report Section 3.4 describes cases where an interim update may be appropriate. The CNP PRA model update procedure complies with ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Section 1-5 and ensures that CNP maintains an as-built, as-operated PRA model of the plant. The process has been peer reviewed. Quality assurance of the Fire PRA is assured via the same processes applied to the internal events model.

This process follows the guidance outlined in RG 1.174 which requires the use of qualified individuals, procedures that require calculations be subject to independent review and verification, record retention, peer review, and a corrective action program that ensures appropriate actions are taken when errors are discovered. Although the entire scope of the formal 10CFR50 Appendix B program is not applied to the PRA models or processes in general, often parts of the program are applied as a convenient method of complying with the requirements of RG 1.174. For instance, CNP Procedure 12-EHP-5040-DES-003, which addresses independent review of calculations for 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, is applied to the PRA model calculations, as well.

With respect to Quality Assurance Program requirements for independent reviews of evaluations, those existing requirements for FPP documents will remain unchanged. CNP specifically requires that the evaluations in support of the NFPA 805 LAR, exclusive of the Fire PRA, be performed within the scope of the FP QA program which requires independent review as defined by CNP Procedure PMP-2270-EVL-002, Evaluation of Fire Protection Program Changes.

As recommended by NUREG/CR-6850, the sources of uncertainty in the Fire PRA were identified and specific parameters were analyzed for sensitivity in support of the NFPA 805 Fire Risk Evaluation process. Specifically with regard to uncertainty, an uncertainty and sensitivity matrix was developed and included in the Fire PRA Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses, CNP Calculation PRA-FIRE-17663-015-LAR. In addition, sensitivity to uncertainty associated with specific Fire PRA parameters was addressed in this calculation. While the removal of conservatism inherent in the Fire PRA is a long-term goal, the Fire PRA results were deemed sufficient for evaluating the risk associated with this application. While I&M continues to pursue a more "realistic" estimate of fire risk, use of mean values continues to be the best estimate of fire risk. During the Fire Risk Evaluation process, the uncertainty and sensitivity associated with specific Fire PRA parameters were considerations in the evaluation of the change in risk relative to the applicable acceptance thresholds.

Specific Requirements of NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3 NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.1 - Review Analyses, calculations, and evaluations performed in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) have been and will be performed in accordance with CNP procedures that require independent review.

NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.2 - Verification and Validation Calculational models and numerical methods used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) have been and will be verified and validated as required by Section 2.7.3.2 of NFPA 805.

NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.3 - Limitations of Use Engineering methods and numerical models used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) were used and will be used appropriately as required by Section 2.7.3.3 of NFPA 805.

Revision 1 Page 53

Indiana Michigan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Report NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.4 - Qualification of Users Cognizant personnel who used and applied engineering analysis and numerical methods in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) were competent and experienced as required by Section 2.7.3.4 of NFPA 805. This requirement was met and will continue to be met by adherence to CNP procedures and project management of contractor support staff.

NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.5 - Uncertainty Analysis Uncertainty analyses have been and will be performed as required by 2.7.3.5 of NFPA 805 and the results have been and will be considered in the context of the application.

4.8 Summary of Results 4.8.1 Results of the Fire Area Review A summary of the NFPA 805 compliance basis and the required fire protection systems and features is provided in Table 4-3. The table provides the following information from the NEI 04-02 Table B-3 (which is provided in Attachment C):

• Fire Area / Fire Zone: Fire Area/Zone Identifier.

Description:

Fire Area/Zone Description.

• NFPA 805 Regulatory Basis: Post-transition NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance basis (Note: Compliance is determined on a Fire Area basis. Therefore a compliance basis is not provided for individual fire zones.)

• Required Suppression/Detection: Detection/suppression is required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance. The information is provided on a zone basis. The basis for the requirement for the fire protection system is designated as follows:

• S - Separation Criteria: Systems required for Chapter 4 Separation Criteria in Section 4.2.3.

• L - Licensing Action Criteria: Systems required for acceptability of NRC approved Licensing Actions (i.e., Exemptions and SEs) (Section 2.2.7).

• E - EEEE Criteria: Systems required for acceptability.of Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations (Section 2.2.7).

• R - Risk Criteria: Systems required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (Section 4.2.4).

• D - Defense-in-depth Criteria: Systems required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (Section 4.2.4).

Attachment W, Tables W-3 (Unit 1) and W-4 (Unit 2), contain the results of the Fire Risk Evaluations, additional risk of recovery actions, and the change in risk on a fire area basis.

Page 54 Revision 1I Revision Page 54

Enclosure 5 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Revisions of Section 3.2.3, Section 3.3.1.2, Section 3.3.1.2(1), Section 3.3.1.3.1, Section 3.3.1.3.4, Section 3.4.2, and Section 3.4.3 of Transition Report Attachment A, Table B-i, "Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements (NFPA 805 Chapter 3)"

Provided in Response to RAI-09.01, RAI-10.01, RAI-18.01, and RAI-59.

Note that these pages have been marked only to show changes to the Compliance Statements and the Compliance Bases for the affected NFPA 805 Elements. These are not replacement pages. A complete revision of Table B-1 reflecting these changes, changes resulting from Round 1 RAIs, the necessary repagination, and the appropriate revision number will be provided no later than November 9, 2012.

Changes are indicated by red text and revision bars in the right margin.

Indane AoNchiden Pbwer CNP NFPA 805 TransibnRawd - Alfadynent A Attachment A - NEI 04.02 Table B Transition of Fundanental Fire Protection Program and Deign Elements (NFPA 805 Chapter 3)

NFPA 805 Element NFPA 805 Requirsenut Comilance Statement Cowilance Basis Refmance Doemnent 3.2.3 Procedures, Procedures she be est*slied for Compies Canpole. PMI4-2270, Fire Pn:tection Progam',

irnopimenttion of the fre protecion Procedluss have been Rev. 30,Al Sections program. Inaddiion topmcedures .Cmpiesvh estabished for implementation Vhat coud be requred by other Requred Action of the FPP. These procedums sections of the standaid, the aconiplisti the requxemmnts proxed urns to accompish the oulined in the subsections of following "MI be established: tis element Compl*es with Required Aciom: FPE Technical dourments and RAI pvocedures that relate to now FP design and licensing basis (e.g., 59 FiRe Protecion Program Manual (FPPM), Technuc Requiremwet Manual, Design Basis Document, maitenance and sueillance, onfguratbon control, training and qualification glidelines, Quaity Assurance Program Document (QAPD),

etc-) wil be revised as needed for implementation of NFPA 805.

Refer to Implementation Item S-3.10.

I-ww%*t

hufAna Wnhimn Pbwer Atthmnt A-E TbB-TnooFdFere nPN NdPA 805 Trnsntn (NFPA - Afptedrnt A Afttchment A - NEI 04.02 Table 0 Transition of Fundanental Fire Protection Progran and Design Elements (NFPA S0S Chapter 3)

UFPA 805 Element MFPA 805 Requime rd Comliance Statemert Compliance Basi Referance Dociument 3.3.12 Contiri of Procedres for the control of .comples PMP-2270CCM-OO1, *Control of Gooriniustible Material genera houmkeeping practices Plant pmcedures for the control ContMustible Materials', Rev. 8, All and the control of transent

• Comples with of general housekeeping Sections oDntustibles shal be developed Requred Action practces and the control of and inplemnsne& These transient conbustibles have 12-PPP-2270.066.012, -Transient procedures shal include but not be been inplsmented. The Comxbustibe Monitoring', Rev. 7, Al Inted to the following program procedures address, at a Sections elemenrt rw*mum, the FPP elweents identiled in this section, but we PMP-22204SK-001, "lousekeeping not Ilntd to these elements. and Material Condition, Rev. 6, M befmves that the NFPA 805 Section 4 code requirerneft for this element am satisled at 0NP.

Comnplie with Required FPE Action: RAI Transient combustlile free 59 zones wil be established inihih rsk Rre Areas AA40, AA43, A48, AA50, AA51, arid AA52.

Referto Implementation Item S-3.3.

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hw4gamb Mýhlemn Dpm" rA# A190A Ang 7ýmngqkiftn PAnewt - ANAMmant A Attachment A - NEI 04-02 Table B- -Transition of Fundamntal Fire Protection Program and Design Elements (NFPA 805 Chapter 3)

NFPA 805 Element KFPA 005 RequirernsM Convlanc. Statement Coomplianc Basis Reference Doctment 3.3.1.2 Control of Wood used witin the power block

• Comples Crnp*s: PMP-2270CCM-001, Control of Conbusttle Materials shag be isted pmsume- Al wood smallerthan 6 inch by Conftlile Materials, Rev. 8, (1) impesgnated or coated with a listed

• Comples with 6 inch used i the power blockis Section 3.5 Ire-vatariant application. dedicatio required to be Irs-retardent treated.

Excepton: Crhbng timbers 6 in. by

• Complies with 6 in. (15.2 cm by 15.2cm) orlarger Required Action Comple with clarilcaon:

shal not be requiredto be 1rs- Altemate protection methds retardant treated. may be slowed with Fre Protection Coordinaor conent inkwding:

a. Appl*)ng a ee retardadt pant in accordance with manufectit'es cdiection Compiles with Required FPE Aclion: RAI Procedure PMP-2270-CCM-001, 10.01 "Confii of CQonbustile Materiels, will be revised and training will be requmd on the requirements of NFPA 805 Section 3.3.1.2(1 ). Refer to Infqlmeentation Item S-3.16.

3.3.1.2 Contrl of Plastic sheleting materilms used in

• Comples Al sheet plastic used in the PMP-2270CCM-001, -Control of Contutle Materias the power block "aIlbe fe- power block is required to meet Combustible Materials, Rev. 8, (2) retaWdant tWes that have passed the requirements of FPA 701. Section 3.A NFPA 701. "Standard Methods of F're Tests for RFame Propagation of Textiles and Films awmwv ma 1002012a

hu4jamm AAMIAmn DAL~ MAP AIPPA aAA; rmnoRkin Attachment A - NEI 04.42 Table B Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elemets (NFPA 805 Chapter 3)

NFPA 805 Elamont NFPA 805 Requirmenar Cowniance Statement Con~dame EBasi Referenc DOCwnent 3.3.1.3.1 .,ntrol of A hot vodk safety procedure shall eComplas with Canplis with dargedson: PMP-2270.WBG.O1, "Welding, irnilon Souces Code be developed, kvremnened, and daedicaton A hot work saty proedure and Buming and Gdndig Ac*ivities Rev.

Requisments] perfidcly updated as necesmsy a Ire watch procedure have 9, All Secions iaccodance with NFPA 51B,

• Complies with use of been deoloped, imieamnted, "Stadaid for Fire Prevention EEEEs and are pehroclcally updated as 12-FPP-2270-066-011, =Fire Watch Durki Weling, Cutting, and Other necessary. Rre watch pemonnel Actites', Rev. 5, NI Sections Hot Work", and NFPA 241, *Comples with may have nmidtle duties.

"Standad for Safeguwdhg Requied Action Engineern Eqalmicy Evaluation Consbuction, Alteration, and inmPUB withtme of s: 14.1.1, CNP Fin Pmtection Code Demoition Operations." The hot work safety Woceure Conmance Review?, Rev. 0 and fro watch procedum conply with the requimments of NFPA 518, 1971 Eition, and NFPA 241,2000 Edilion, as evaluated in Enomering Eq*ivaency Evaluation 14.1.1.

Compiles wkh RPequhmd FPE Actio: RAI Hot wod* restriction zones will 59 be estabished in high rsk Fro Areas AA40, AA43, AA48, AAS0, AA51, and AA52. Refer to Impimnentation Item S-3.4.

Procedue PMP-2270- FPE WSG-001, "Wedding, Burning RAI and Grindirg Actifties, wi be 9.01 mvised and traing wilN be mquked on dscontiumg the use of (1) video cameras for fim watch and (2) use of a singe fire watch for multiple hot work actiitims. Refer to Implementation Item S-3.15.

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IndianaMid)ican Power CMP NFPA 805 TransitionRepott - Alfachimnt A Attachment A - NEI 04-02 Table B Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements (NFPA 805 Chapter 3)

NFPA 805 Element NFPA 805 Requirement Compliance Statement Compliance Basis Reference Document 3.3.1.3.4 [Control of Plant adrinistrative procedure shah

• Compiles Complies: PMP-2270-CCM-001, "Control of Ignition sources on control the use of portable electrical CNP procedures control the use Combustible Materials', Rev. 8.

Portable Heaters] heaters in the plant. Portable fuel- , Compries with of portable electrical heaters in Section 3.3.15 and 3.3.14 fired heaters shall not be permitted Required Action the plant. CNP procedures also in plant areas containing equipment require that portable fuel-fired PMI-2270, "Fre Protecion Program",

important to nuclear safety or where heaters are not permitted in Rev. 30 there is a potential for radiological plant areas containing releases resulting from a fire. equipment important to nuclear safety or where there is a potential for radiological releases resulting from a fire.

Complies with Required Action:

I&M will establish an afternate approach for Control Room temporary ventilation that, FPE consistent with GDC-3 and RAI NFPA 805 Section 3.3.1.3.4, 18.01 does not use portable fuel-fired blowers. The alternate approach will be designed to comply with GDC-3, and to assure there is no impact on radiological releases resulting from a fire.

Technical Evaluation RI 900-0026-001, -Recovery Action Transition in Support of NFPA 805", Revision 1, will be revised. Refer to Implementation Item S-3.17.

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bdane Afthkon Fbwer CNP NFPA 805 TranallanRemd -Affadmnent A Attachment A - NE 04-02 Table B Transiton of Fundamental Fire Protection Pmogran and Design Elements (NFPA 805 Chapter 3)

NFPA 805 Elsment NFPA 805 Roqidremrkt ConVance Sttemwet Conilance Basis RefeIence Dc7mT7nt 3A.2 Fire Pro-Plans Current and detailed pro-ire plans °Cormies CompUls: PMI-2270, "Fre Pmection Programr, hall be availae to the industial Per Procedure PMI-2270, Fire Rev. 30, Section 4.6 fre brigade for all areas in which a

• Complies with Pre-Plans that detail all

• 8e couid jecpke the abilty to Required Action hazardous conditions in certain CNP Fire Pre-Plans, Voumnes I, 11, meet the perbmmnce ctiteria aeas are avala*3e to the Ire and III, Revisions 9, 7, and 12 described ki Section 1.5. brigade. Rer to Fire Pmo-Plans respectiv*-y Volumes I, II, and Ill. These Fin PrPlans "desmoe tho failty layoukt access, contents, construction, hazards, hazardous materials, types and Ins of r1# prctmin systems, and other infrnauion pertinent to the formduatlon, planting, and execution of emergency Ire resporse."

Compiles with Required FPE Action: RAI Pre-fire plans wil be revised to 59 mrfect changes requied to meet the NFPA 805 radioactive release performance criteria.

Refer to Implamentation Item S-3.7.

cwmw_%* Ia uwwmm TEIW*nr AdýCIM&Vwmbn

h)dana Ailkhkan Fbwer CAR NFPA 805 TransfibnReport - Affachment A Attachment A - NEI 0402 Table B Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements (NFPA 805 Chapter 3)

NFPA 805 Element NFPA 80 RquNiem d Copllanoce Statement Conw~lance Seals Refmrncim Docummnt 3.424 [Fl'. Pie-Plan Pro-fr plans " address

• Complies with Shte pice~dure PMP-2270- PMP-2270.FRP-001, Fire Response Coordination Mae&]s coordnation with other plant grous dadication FRP-001 is not specifically a t-e Rans, Rev. 11, Section 3.8.6 during fire emergencies- pee-pan, however, it provides specic instructions Ior actions CNP Fr'o Pro-Plans, Volumes 1,11, equtwed ftrm ley goups at and III, Revisions 9, 7, and 12 CNP supporting Oen brigadell respectively emergency aclions. Detaled tesponse coordination actions ar speciied for cntri morn peisonrel and the Secaity Group. Any other cooidsution actions would be initiated by contr room personnel as needed for any plant emergency.

3A.3 Training and Drills Training and Drds. Industrial Ore *Complies TPDO600-FP, aFe Protection Traning brigade merebers, and other plant Conmiance is demonstated in Progra Descriptions,Rev. 4 personnel who would respond to a

• Comples with the subsections to this element, Ire in coquneton with the brigade Required Action below.

shal be provided with trainig comnvuwaue Wth their Complies with Required FPE emorgency responsibilioies. Actlion: RAI RFe bogade traning matodals 59 wil be revioed to nflect ichanges rquoired to meet the NFPA 805 radoactivo relase perfmo anco citeria. Refer to Implernentation Item S-3.7.

3A,3 Trairng and Drills Plant Idustbial Fien Brigade Complies CNP procedures demonstrate TPD-600,FP, "Fire Pftecdon Training (a) Training. M of the folowing compliance in the subsections to Program Description!, Rev. 4 requiemmnts sha apply. tVs element, below.

1101112 Taoismm mlA M WOMl11*?01

Enclosure 6 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Revision 1 of Page B-88 of Transition Report Attachment B, Table B-2, "Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology Review Provided in Response to RAI-59.

Changes are indicated by revision bars in the right margin.

Indiana Michkqan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Report - Attachment B Attachment B - NEI 04-02 TABLE B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology Review NFPA 805 Section: 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis 3.5.2.1 Circuit Failures Due to an NEI 00-01 Section 3 Guidance Open Circuit This section provides guidance for addressing the effects of an open circuit for safe shutdown equipment. An open circuit is a fire-induced break in a conductor resulting in the loss of circuit continuity. An open circuit will typically prevent the ability to control or power the affected equipment. An open circuit can also result in a change of state for normally energized equipment. For example, a loss of power to the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) solenoid valves [for BWRs] due to an open circuit will result in the closure of the MSIV.

NOTE: The EPRI circuit failure testing indicated that open circuits are not likely to be the initial fire-induced circuit failure mode. Consideration of this may be helpful within the safe shutdown analysis. Consider the following consequences in the safe shutdown circuit analysis when determining the effects of open circuits:

- Loss of electrical continuity may occur within a conductor resulting in deenergizing the circuit and causing a loss of power to, or control of, the required safe shutdown equipment.

- In selected cases, a loss of electrical continuity may result in loss of power to an interlocked relay or other device. This loss of power may change the state of the equipment. Evaluate this to determine ifequipment fails safe.

- Open circuit on a high voltage (e.g., 4.16 kV) ammeter current transformer (CT) circuit may result in secondary damage.

[Refer to hardcopy of NEI 00-01 for Figure 3.5.2-1 that shows example of open circuits]

AR4abIk, Comments Applicable Alignment Statemein1 Aligns with Intent

Reference:

SSSA, Section 3.3.2.c. indicates open circuit failure modes were considered due to individual conductor(s) within a cable being capable of losing continuity due to fire damage.

Open circuiting of current transformer (CT) secondaries is addressed in the FPPM, Section 12.6 concluding that based on a review of industry standards and available test data, opening the secondary circuit of a current transformer loop will not cause a transient which would result in the initiation of a fire at the current transformer. Although this analysis found CTs to be acceptable, enhancements to the existing documentation were initiated (Attachment S., Item S-3.12) to further support the NFPA (continued)

Revision 1 Page B-88

Enclosure 7 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Revision 1 of Page D-7 of Transition Report Attachment D, "NEI 04-02 Non-Power Operational Modes Transition" Provided in Response to RAI-59.

Changes are indicated by revision bars in the right margin.

Indiana Michigan Power CNP NFPA 805 TransitionReport - Attachment D Attachment D - NEI 04-02 Non-Power Operational Modes Transition NFPA 805 Section 1.3.1 Nuclear Safety Goal

- Prohibition or limitation of hot work in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability.

- Verification of operable detection and /or suppression in the vulnerable areas.

- Prohibition or limitation of combustible materials in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability.

- Plant lineup modifications (removing power from equipment once it is placed in its desired position).

- Provision of additional fire patrols at periodic intervals or other appropriate compensatory measures (such as surveillance cameras) during increased vulnerability.

- Use of recovery actions to mitigate potential losses of key safety functions.

- Identification and monitoring in-situ ignition sources for "fire precursors" (e.g., equipment temperatures).

- Reschedule the work to a period with lower risk or higher DID.

In addition, for KSF Equipment removed from service during the HREs, the impact should be evaluated based on KSF Equipment status and the NPO Fire Area Assessment to develop needed contingency plans/actions.

Review Per PMP-2291-OUT-001, outage planning and implementation considers the potential introduction of hazards such as fire posed by the level and scope of activities in a given area of the plant and establishes compensatory measures and controls as appropriate.

In addition, due to the credited system cross-tie features at CNP, 1 (2)-OHP-4030-066-4025 provides guidelines that constitute the risk management requirements for Mode 5, Mode 6, or defueled outages in compliance with the Appendix R Alternate Safe Shutdown requirements.

These procedures provide instructions to demonstrate that Unit 1 (Unit 2) equipment required to support Unit 2 (Unit 1) Appendix R Safe Shutdown is available, while Unit 1 (Unit 2) remains in an extended outage status or Unit 1 (Unit 2) is transitioning down to Modes 4, 5, 6 or defueled during normal outages.

Each fire area was analyzed for NPO Modes as documented in Technical Evaluation R1 900-005-001. Fire areas with identified pinch points were evaluated and plant controls considered that are consistent with FAQ 07-0040 to minimize fire risk. In order to preclude or mitigate the KSF failures in certain fire areas, enhancements will be developed. These enhancements include planned revisions to the procedures identified above and other plant procedures (e.g., EOPs, etc), as necessary (Attachment S, Item S-3.6). These revisions will incorporate the insights and strategies documented in R1 900-005-001 for the plant to deal with a fire event during HREs. The strategies will include but not be limited to the following:

- Prohibition or limitation of hot work in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability.

- Verification of operable detection and /or suppression in the vulnerable areas.

- Prohibition or limitation of combustible materials in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability.

- Plant lineup modifications (removing power from equipment once it is placed in its desired position).

- Provision of additional fire patrols at periodic intervals or other appropriate compensatory Revision 1 Page D-7

Enclosure 9 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Revision 1 of Page K-22 of Transition Report Attachment K, "Existing Licensing Action Transfer" Provided in Response-to RAI-57.

Changes are indicated by revision bars in the right margin.

Indiana Michigan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Report - Attachment K Attachment K - Existing Licensing Action Transition Licensing Action Appendix R Exemption, RCP Lube Oil Collection System (Criteria 111.0) - Exemption 7.15 Basis Date: December 23, 1983 To Be Transitioned?: Yes Basis: Exemption approval per the NRC SER dated December 23, 1983 provides the following justification for RCP lube oil collection system as required by Section 111.0 of Appendix R, which was submitted by I&M Letter No. AEP:NRC:0692D dated December 30, 1982.

o No ignition sources at the floor level of the lower containment.

o Oil system is capable of withstanding a safe shutdown earthquake.

o Tank has the capacity to hold the total lube oil inventory for one pump.

Section 111.0 of Appendix R requires that the oil collection system be large enough to handle the largest potential oil leak without overflowing. The oil collection tanks have a capacity to collect the oil from 1 RCP therefore an exemption was required. This requirement is applicable to section 3.3.12(2) of NFPA 805. This exemption will be transitioned to the NFPA licensing basis.

Applicable Fire Areas:

Fire Area Fire Area Description AA58 Unit 2 Containment AA56 Unit 1 Containment Licensing Action Documentation:

Initial Exemption Request - I&M Letter No. AEP:NRC:0692D dated December 30, 1982 I&M Letter No. AEP:NRC:0692D dated December 30, 1982 stated:

"In our July 19, 1982 letter (AEP:NRC:0692C), we committed to re-evaluate the seismic characteristics of the existing oil drainage piping and collection tank installed in Units 1 and 2 of the Cook Plant and also to undertake an evaluation of the seismic capability of the RCP motor lube oil system. In the former evaluation, we committed to inspect the oil drainage piping during the next refueling outages of each unit and to undertake modifications to the oil drainage system as necessary. Both the-re-evaluation of the seismic characteristics of the oil drainage piping and collection tank and the evaluation of the seismic capability of the motor lube oil system have been completed. Based on the results of these evaluations and with the exception of the exemptions we are requesting, we have concluded that the oil collection system installed at the Cook Plant meets the requirements of Section 111.0 of Appendix R. A general summary of the results of our evaluations, the subsequent modifications we have taken on Unit 1 and are currently taking on Unit 2, and the areas where we are requesting exemptions from the specific requirements of Section 111.0 of Appendix R is presented below.

Based on our evaluation of the oil drainage piping and collection tank, utilizing inputs from EDS Nuclear with respect to the seismic capability of the oil collection tank and inputs from Stevenson &

Associates with respect to the oil drainage piping, it was decided that certain modifications were desirable to insure the adequacy of the system. The modifications included the addition of pipe Revision 1 Page K-22

Enclosure 10 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Revision 1 of Transition Report Attachment L, "NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirement for Approval (10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii))"

Provided in Response to RAI-05.01.

Changes are indicated by revision bars in the right margin.

Inrlinnn Mif-hirinn Pnininr (' P AIF:PA WA Trnncitinn onnrf - Affnrhminnt i L. NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval (10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii))

8 Pages Revision I Page L-1

Indiana Michioan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Reoort - Attachment L Approval Request I NFPA 805 Section 3.5.16 NFPA 805 Section 3.5.16 states:

"The fire protection water supply system shall be dedicated for fire protection use only.

Exception No. 1: Fire protection water supply systems shall be permittedto be used to provide backup to nuclearsafety systems, provided the fire protection water supply systems are designed and maintained to deliver the combined fire and nuclear safety flow demands for the duration specified by the applicable analysis.

Exception No. 2: Fire protection water storage can be provided by plant systems serving other functions, provided the storage has a dedicated capacity capable of providing the maximum fire protection demand for the specified duration as determined in this section."

NFPA 24 - 1987 Section 5-7 states:

"DomesticService Use Prohibited.The use of hydrants and hose for purposes other than fire-related services shall be prohibited."

Contrary to the requirements of NFPA 805 Section 3.5.16, and NFPA 24 Section 5-7, the fire protection water supply system at CNP may periodically be utilized to supply water for non-fire protection purposes under the following conditions:

" The non-fire protection use of the CNP fire protection water system requires prior approval from the CNP Fire Protection Staff. This process ensures that the fire water system will not be impaired and may be restored to full capacity during a fire scenario.

" Personnel utilizing fire protection water for non-fire protection purposes are in contact with the Control Room, therefore ensuring the ability to secure the full fire water system capacity should a fire occur.

Basis for Request:

The use of the fire protection water for non-fire protection system water demands would have no adverse impact on the ability of the fire protection system to provide required flow and pressure based on the following facts:

• Controls in place to cease the non-fire protection use should a fire condition occur.

• The fire water system at CNP consists of one 2,500 gpm electric motor driven fire pump and two redundant 2,500 gpm diesel engine driven fire.pumps connected by a common header to two 685,000 gallon (nominal capacity) fire protection water storage tanks. All fire pumps are electrically independent to ensure that failure of any pump will not impair the reliability of the water-based suppression systems. One 50 gpm electric motor driven pegging pump is provided to maintain fire water system pressure under normal conditions. The system is designed to provide water in excess of that required to suppress a fire.

• There is significant margin in the CNP fire water system above that required for fire suppression demands. There are three redundant 2,500 gpm pumps, providing up to 7,500 gpm, if required. The largest design demand of any sprinkler or fixed water spray system in the power block is the Unit 2 Transformer Sprinkler System which requires less than 3,200 gpm. Considering a 500 gpm fire hose allowance results in a total maximum fire protection flow demand of less than 3,700 gpm. During a design basis fire Revision 1 Page L-2

Indinnn IlAinhirinn Pnimar Indimnr~leA~ir#hici##*,fl P# ( P AWPA 80l.'i Trvnmition Report - Aftnthment I scenario, a safety margin of approximately 1,300 gpm is maintained even with only two of the three pumps in operation.

Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the maximum hydraulic demand for an automatic suppression system (plus allowance for 500 gpm for manual hose stream) will be available in the unlikely event that a delay in ceasing non-fire protection system operations was to occur.

Due to communications between Control Room and personnel utilizing fire protection water for non-fire protection purposes, it is reasonable to expect that non-fire protection system functions will be stopped at fire initiation, or very shortly thereafter, and prior to application of fire brigade manual hose streams.

Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:

Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:

The CNP fire water system has excess capacity to supply the combined demands of automatic and manual water-based fire suppression systems and non-fire protection uses in the event of a fire. Therefore there is no impact on the nuclear safety performance criteria.

The use of the CNP fire water system for non-fire protection uses has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria.

Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:

The CNP fire water system has excess capacity to supply the combined demands of the automatic and manual water-based fire suppression systems and non-fire protection uses in the event of a fire. Therefore, the safety margin inherent in the analysis for the fire event has been preserved.

The use of the CNP fire water system for non-fire protection uses does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. The fire water system pumps have excess capacity to supply demands of automatic and manual water-based fire suppression systems and non-fire protection uses in the event of a fire.

Conclusion:

NRC approval'is requested for the use of the CNP fire water system for purposes other than fire protection water supply with the following restrictions:

" Approval from the CNP Fire Protection Staff is obtained.

• Controls/communications are in place to ensure the non-fire protection system water demand can be secured immediately if a fire occurs.

The engineering analysis performed determined that the performance-based approach utilized to evaluate a variance from the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3:

(A) Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; (B) Maintains safety margins; and (C) Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).

Revision I Page L-3

Infti~nn Aki-hirn~n Pnwnr rflA PWIA Rfl'; Trnneitinn znrfrt-n Affnrhmcnnf I Approval Request 2 -

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii), "Performance based methods," the fire protection program elements and minimum design requirements of Chapter 3 may be subject to the performance-based methods permitted elsewhere in the standard.

In accordance with NFPA 805 Section 2.2.8, the performance-based approach to satisfy the nuclear safety, radiation release, life safety, and property damage/business interruption performance, criteria requires engineering analyses to evaluate whether the performance criteria are satisfied.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii), the engineering analyses performed shall determine that the performance-based approach utilized to evaluate a variance from the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3:

(A) Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; (B) Maintains safety margins; and (C) Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire nuclear safety capability).

I&M requests formal approval of performance based exceptions to the requirements in Chapter 3 of NFPA 805 as follows:

NFPA 805, Section 3.2.3(1)

NFPA 805, Section 3.2.3(1) states:

"Procedures shall be established for implementation of the fire protection program. In addition to procedures that could be required by other sections of the standard, the procedures to accomplish the following shall be established:

Inspection, testing, and maintenance for fire protection systems and features credited by the fire protection program.

I&M will utilize performance based methods to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805.

Performance-based inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies will be established as described in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Report TR-1006756, "Fire Protection Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide for Fire Protection Systems and Features", Final Report, July 2003.

Basis for Request 2:

NFPA 805 Section 2.6, "Monitoring," requires that:

"A monitoringprogram shall be establishedto ensure that the availability and reliabilityof the fire protection systems and features are maintained and to assess the performance of the fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria.Monitoring shaft ensure that the assumptions in the engineering analysis remain valid."

NFPA 805 Section 2.6.1, "Availability, Reliability, and Performance Levels," requires that:

"Acceptablelevels of availability,reliability, and performance shall be established."

NFPA 805 Section 2.6.2, "Monitoring Availability, Reliability, and Performance," requires that:

"Methods to monitor availability, reliability, and performance shall be established. The methods shall considerthe plant operating experience and industry operating experience."

Revision 1 Page L-4

Indiana Michiaan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Renort - Attachment L The scope and frequency of the inspection, testing, and maintenance activities for fire protection systems and features required in the fire protection program have been established based on the existing Technical Requirements Manual, Insurer requirements, and NFPA Codes. This request does not involve the use of EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 to establish the scope of those activities as that is determined by the required systems review identified in Transition Report Table 4-3, "Summary of NFPA 805 Compliance Basis and Required Fire Protection Systems and Features."

This request is specific to the use of EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features credited by the fire protection program. As stated in EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 Section 10.1, "The goal of a performance-basedsurveillance program is to adjust test and inspection frequencies commensurate with equipment performance and desired reliability."

This goal is' consistent with the stated requirements of NFPA 805 Section .2.6. The EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 provides an accepted method to establish appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies which ensure the required NFPA 805 availability, reliability, and performance goals are maintained.

The target tests, inspections, and maintenance will be those activities for the NFPA 805 required fire protection systems and features. The reliability and frequency goals will be established to ensure -the assumptions in the NFPA 805 engineering analyses remain valid.

The failure 'criterion will be established based on the required fire protection systems and features credited functions, and will provide assurance that those functions are maintained.

Data collection and analysis will follow the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 guidance. The failure probability will be determined based on the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 guidance and a 95% confidence level will be utilized. The performance monitoring will be performed in conjunction with the Monitoring program required by NFPA 805 Section 2.6, and will provide assurance that site specific operating experience is considered in the monitoring process. The following is a flow chart that identifies the basic process that will be utilized.

Revision 1 Page L-5

Indiana Michican Power CNP NFPA 805 Indiana Michiaan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Transition ReDort ReDort - Attachment

- Attachment L L

EPRI Technical Report-1006756 - Figure 10-1 Flowchart for Performance-Based Surveillance Program Program Framework d Tify* Tar Tst ard npOctn Eistablish Reliabflty and Frequency Goals Set Failure Criteria Assess Ucens*I Impact c nd! Other Corý ts Data Collection and Evaluation Esta~lsh Data Collcton Guidelnes ColletRequW Suveilance Data Assemble Data In Spreadeet or Database Anaiye Dat to Ideniy Fallures Reliablilty and Uncertainty Analysis Compute Filure Probabilities Compute Uncertainty Umits I

Confirm That Reabty Supports Target Frequency Program Implementation Modify Program Documents Revise Surveilanoe Procedures Conduct Ongoing Perlormaýne onitorin Refine and Modify Frequvies as ApproprIate Revision I Page L-6

Inli~nno lII A/Ih-hirmn flT.AI l1.l IVffIIf.I I LCJII Pnmmlr I 1JY *.f1

('AIP AIX:PA Pf)g Trnneitinn S..f1"Vll I~l I I ,../ I I411.4 ILftlt l I A3 nrf -

"tPJ1.S*J5 Affni-hmont I

.I *I.

LL* tttA* Ifhl I.--

I&M does not intend to revise any FPP surveillance, test or inspection frequencies until after transitioning to NFPA 805. Existing FPP surveillance, test and inspection will remain consistent with applicable CNP Technical Requirements Manual, Insurer and NFPA Code requirements I&M's intent is to obtain approval via the transition Safety Evaluation to use the EPRI Technical Report TR1006756 guideline in the future as opportunities arise. I&M plans to evaluate CNP FPP features with the intent of using the EPRI performance based methods to provide evidence.

of equipment performance beyond that achievable under traditional prescriptive maintenance practices to ensure optimal use of resources while maintaining reliability. A revised Transition Report Section 4.6.2 providing an overview of the post-transition NFPA 805 monitoring program was transmitted via Enclosure 4 to I&M letter dated April 27, 2012.

Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:

Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:

Use of performance based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1 006756 methods, combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, will provide assurance that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analyses. Therefore, there is no adverse impact to Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria by the use of the performance based methods in EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756.

The radiological release performance criteria are satisfied based on the determination of limiting radioactive release (Refer to Attachment E of this Transition Report). Fire protection systems and features are credited as part of that evaluation. Use of performance based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, Monitoring Program will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analyses which includes those assumptions credited to meet the Radioactive Release performance criteria. Therefore, there will be no adverse impact to Radioactive Release performance criteria.

Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:

Use of performance based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1 006756 methods combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, Monitoring Program will provide assurance that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analyses which includes those assumptions credited in the Fire Risk Evaluation safety margin discussions. In addition, the use of these methods in no way invalidates the inherent safety margins contained in the codes used for design and maintenance of fire protection systems and features. Therefore, the safety margin inherent and credited in the analyses will be preserved.

The three echelons of defense-in-depth described in NFPA 805 section 1.2 are 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls), 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions).

Revision 1 Page L-7

Indiana Michiýan Power

..n...ana. Micaa Poe CNP NFPA 805 Transition Rei)ort CN-FA85TaniinR r

- Attachment L

-Atcmn Echelon 1 is not affected by the use of EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods. Use of performance based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods, combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, will provide assurance that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features credited for Defense in Depth are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analyses. Therefore, there will be no adverse impact to echelons 2 and 3 for the defense in depth.

Conclusion:

NRC approval is requested for use of the performance based methods contained in EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756, "Fire Protection Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide for Fire Protection Systems and Features", Final Report, July 2003 to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805. As described above, this approach is considered acceptable because it:

(A) Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; (B) Maintains safety margins; and (C) Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire- prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire nuclear safety capability).

Revision I Page L-8

Enclosure 11 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Revision 3 of Attachment S, "Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed During Implementation," to the Transition Report Provided in Response to RAI-09.01, RAI-10.01, RAI-18.01, RAI-44, RAI 59, and RAI-60.

Changes are indicated by revision bars in the right margin.

CNP NFPA 805 Transition ReDort - Attachment S Inrlinna Michirynn Power S. Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed during Implementation 12 Pages Page S-i Revision 3 Revision Page S-1

Indiana Michiaan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition ReDort - Attachment S Tables S-1 and S-2, Plant Modifications, include a description of the modifications along with the following information:

• A problem statement,

" Risk ranking of the modification,

• An indication if the modification is currently included in the Fire PRA,

" Compensatory Measure in place, and

• A risk-informed characterization of the modification and compensatory measure.

The following legend applies to the risk ranking indicated in Tables S-1 and S-2:

• High = Modification would have an appreciable impact on reducing overall fire CDF.

• Medium = Modification would have a measurable impact on reducing overall fire CDF.

• Low = Modification would have either an insignificant or no impact on reducing overall fire CDF.

Page S-2 Revision 3 Revision Page S-2

Inrfinna Mirchirlan Power CNP AFPA 805F Trmnn-itihn Penort - Attacrhment S~

Attachment S - Table S-1 Plant Modifications Completed In Comp Risk Informed Item Rank Unit Problem Statement Proposed Modification FPRA Measure Characterization S-1.1 High 1,2 Cable in conduit associated Provide 1-hour ERFBS with Y N Fire PRA credits this with the credited train of dc automatic suppression & modification for electrical electrical power for Fire Area detection for cable of power redundancy AA39A and AA45A is concern in Fire Area AA39A Compensatorv measure:

unprotected and routed and AA45A None; modification through the area installed.

S-1.2 Low 1, 2 Actions identified in safe Revised safe shutdown N N Fire PRA does not credit shutdown procedure for procedures to reflect correct these actions transferring 600 volt Bus to actions. Compensatory measure:

alternate source in Fire Areas None; Procedures AA14, AA23, AA39B and updated.

AA45B were not accurately updated.

identified.

Page S-3 Revision 3 Page S-3

Indiana Michirarn Power CNP NFPA 80l5 Tr nsition enort - Attahme~nt S~

Attachment S - Table S-2 Plant Modifications Committed Proposed In Comp Risk Informed Item Rank Unit Problem Statement Modification FPRA Measure Characterization S-2.1 Medium 1, 2 Short circuits can occur in Modify the following ten Y N Circuit failures which result in the the control circuit for (10) valves to resolve inability of operators to perform a motor operated valves 92-18 issue: recovery action are significant between control wiring 1(2)-FMO-212 contributors to both fire risk as well and power sources as internal events risk. The leading to spurious 1(2)-FMO-222 proposed modification will improve operation of the valve. 1(2)-FMO-232 the ability of plant operators to The same postulated manually align certain motor short circuit may bypass 1(2)-FMO-242 operated valves ifrequired in order the torque/limit switches to maintain the plant in a safe and which, combined with the 1(2)-ICM-250 stable condition.

absence or bypass of Compensatory measure for NFPA contacts results in 805: None; This modification will be continuous energization completed prior to implementation of the valve motor and of NFPA 805 FP Program..

potential mechanical Compensatory measure for damage to the valve such 10 CFR 50 Appendix R: None; IN that manual operation via 92-18 concerns were addressed by handwheel would be the current licensing basis, which inhibited. This potential credits the "double break" circuit condition was described design, as described in NRC SE in Information Notice (IN) dated November 22, 1983.

92-18 Page S-4 Revision 3 Revision Page S-4

Indiana Michidan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition Penort- Affachment S

.n. iaa......a.Powr.C...FP... 805.. Tr....ns....

tion...Ren rt- Atta...hment...S Attachment S - Table S-2 Plant Modifications Committed Proposed In Comp Risk Informed Item Rank Unit Problem Statement Modification FPRA Measure Characterization S-2.2 High 1, 2 Electrical cabinet fire Modify the CO 2 system Y N This proposed modification will limit scenarios in fire areas from manual to the extent of damage predicted to AA40 and AA43 automatic actuation in occur for fire scenarios within the contribute significantly to the following fire areas: subject fire areas.

fire CDFadditional warrant and LERF and a) AA40 Compensatory measure for NFPA warrn a a 805: None; This modification will be mitigation b)AA43 completed prior to implementation of NFPA 805 FP Program.

Compensatory measure for 10 CFR 50 Appendix R: None; fire areas AA40 and AA43 are deterministically compliant with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

S-2.3 High 1, 2 There is a potential for Replace the associated N Y These modifications will provide assurance that secondary fires in secondary fires in 250 250 volt DC fuses with 250 volt DC control circuits would volt DC control circuits fuses having lower not occur. NUREG/CR-6850 due to existing fuse current ratings to methodology does not address ratings. An evaluation provide protection from secodaryfies theefre, regarding the potential for secondary fires. secondary fires. Therefore, secondary fires Perform applicable the CNP Fire PRA.

associated with other modifications if a types of circuits (e.g., 120 potential for secondary Compensatory measure for NFPA volt AC) will be fires in other types of 805:

completed. circuits is identified. To remain in effect until associated 250 volt DC fuses are replaced:

" Hourly fire watch tours in affected fire zones.

" Prohibition of hot work in affected fire zones without Fire Protection Revision 3 Page S-5

Indl.inn Mirhiynn Pnwigr ('AIP #1F:PA RfiV Trn mc.itinn P.cannrf - Affi'rhmpnt Rl Attachment S - Table S-2 Plant Modifications Committed Proposed In Comp Risk Informed Item Rank Unit Problem Statement Modification FPRA Measure Characterization Engineering evaluation and approval.

" Briefing of Operations staff and Fire Brigade personnel on the potential for secondary fires in the respective fire zones and that the procedure for emergency remote shutdown is credited as a proceduralized compensatory action.

" Once-per-shift fire watch tours for associated fire protection systems in the Turbine Building if the systems are impaired.

Implement appropriate compensatory measures if a potential for secondary fires in other types of circuits is identified.

Compensatory measure for 10 CFR 50 Appendix R: Same as for NFPA 805, if required.

Page S-6 Revision 3 Revision Page S-6

Indiana Michioan Power CNP NFPA 805 Transition ReDort - Attachment S Table S-3, identifies those implementation items (procedure changes, process updates, and training to affected plant personnel) that will be completed by I&M prior to the implementation of new NFPA 805 FP program. These items will be completed within six (6) months after NRC issuance of the NFPA 805 SE.

Revision 3 Page S-7

Inrtlinn Ak1rnhifymn jDntl^Fr t-AID hljýDA POR Tj noifinn Pp nrf - Affnr-hmonf _Q Inlin~ ~irirt+/-,,,I~rIA~scar(~AI~ IIZ~ ~ r~,c~ih~n ~r~ri, - A*~ihmr1f Attachment S - Table S-3 Implementation Items Item Unit Description LAR Section I Source S-3.1 1,2 Initial General Employee Training (GET) will be verified and / or 4.1.2 and Attachment A updated to include the minimum fire protection program elements as discussed in Section Kto NEI-04-02 (FAQ 06-0028).

S-3.2 1,2 The monitoring program required by NFPA 805 Section 2.6 will be 4.1.2, 4.6, and Attachment A developed in accordance with NFPA 805 FAQ 10-0059, and will include a process that reviews the FPP performance and trends in performance and implemented after the LAR approval as part of the FPP transition to NFPA 805.

S-3.3 1, 2 Transient Combustible Free Zones will be established in high risk 4.5 and Attachments Aand W Fire Areas AA40, AA43, AA48, AA50, AA51, and AA52.

S-3.4 1,2 Hot Work Restriction Zones will be established in high risk Fire 4.5 and Attachments Aand W Areas AA40, AA43, AA48, AA50, AA51, and AA52.

S-3.5 1, 2 Post-fire operating procedures will be updated to reflect new 4.2.1.3 and Attachment G NSCA strategies and training performed as necessary.

S-3.6 1,2 Technical and administrative procedures and documents that 4.3.2 and Attachment D relate to non-power modes of plant operating states will be revised as needed for implementation of NFPA 805.

Revision 3 Page S-8

Inli.nna Michirnnn Power (WP NFPA Rfl5; TrnncOinin o~nnrf - Attachment S~

Attachment S - Table S-3 Implementation Items Item Unit Description LAR Section I Source S-3.7 1, 2 Pre-fire plans and fire brigade training materials will be revised to 4.4.2 and Attachments A and E reflect changes required to meet the NFPA 805 radioactive release performance criteria.

S-3.8 12 Aconfirmatory demonstration (field verification walk-through) of 4.2.1.3 and Attachment G the feasibility for the credited NFPA 805 recovery actions will be performed. This will include field verification of:

(1) Transit times (i.e., travel times to/from recovery action manipulated plant equipment).

(2) Execution times (i.e., time required to physically perform the action, such as handwheel a valve open, open a breaker, etc.).

(3) Communications for adequacy between the controlling location and recovery action locations for areas which involve actions.

(4) Adequate lighting (either fixed or portable) for access/egress and local lights are provided for the component to be operated.

S-3.9 1, 2 CNP calculation Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)-FIRE- 4.2.1.3 and Attachment G 17663-012-LAR, "Post-Fire Human Reliability Analysis" and Technical Evaluation R1900-0026-001, "Recovery Action Transition for NFPA 805" will be reviewed and updated based on the results of the field walkdowns of the recovery actions (Item S-3.8) and procedure changes (Items S-3.5, S-3.11 and.S-3.14).

Page S-9 Revision 33 Revision Page S-9

India~na Mirchinan Power CNP FPA 805 Trans~ition Renott - Attachment S Attachment S - Table S-3 Implementation Items Item Unit Description LAR Section I Source S-3.10 1, 2 Technical documents and procedures that relate to new Fire 4.7.1, 4.7.2, 4.7.3, and Attachment W Protection (FP) design and licensing basis (e.g., Fire Protection Program Manual (FPPM), Technical Requirements Manual, Design Basis Document, maintenance and surveillance, configuration control, training and qualification guidelines, Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD), etc.) will be revised as needed for implementation of NFPA 805.

S-3.11 1,2 A new restoration procedure (1/2-OHP-4025-R-XX series) will be Attachment W developed to address re-powering the hydrogen igniters following a fire in Fire Areas AA40, AA43, AA46, AA47, AA48, AA50, AA51 and AA52 S-3.12 1,2 The current transformer evaluation (Technical Evaluation 12.6) will 4.2.1.1/Attachment B be updated to address those CTs that currently have not screened out as sufficient CT data becomes available.

S-3.13 1,2 UFSAR Section 9.8.1 will be revised as needed for 4.7.1 implementation of NFPA 805.

S-3.14 1,2 Applicable operating procedures will be revised to include the treatment of Fire PRA Actions added to the 'base fire PRA model' that mitigate 'fire induced failures - but are not associated with the NSCA success path. This includes isolation of containment purge line isolation valves, and procedure changes for Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water (TDAFW) pump battery charger re-alignment to address uncertainty considerations. This includes procedure changes associated with the NSCA (item S-3.5), field verification walk-throughs (item S-3.8), hydrogen igniters (item S-3.11) and temporary ventilation (item S-3.17)..

Revision 3 Page S-10

lnrlinnn Akf-hifynn Pnwor t'AIP UPPA Jqnx; Trnneifinn n nrf - Affmrhmant.4Z Attachment S - Table S-3 Implementation Items Item Unit Description LAR Section I Source S-3.15 1,2 Revise procedure PMP-2270-WBG-001, "Welding, Burning and Response to RAI-09.01 documented in I&M Grinding Activities," and procedure 12-FPP-2270-066-01 1, "Fire Letter dated October 15, 2012, and Watch Activities," and conduct training on discontinuing the use of Attachment A.

(1) video cameras for fire watch and (2) use of a single fire watch for multiple hot work activities.

S-3.16 1, 2 Revise Procedure PMP-2270-CCM-001, "Control of Combustible Response to RAI-10.01 documented in I&M Materials," and conduct training on the requirements of NFPA 805 Letter dated October 15, 2012, and Section 3.3.1.2(1). Attachment A.

S-3.17 1,2 Revise Technical Evaluation R1900-0026-001, Revision 1, Response to RAI-18.01 documented in I&M "Recovery Action Transition in Support of NFPA 805," and Letter dated October 15, 2012, and applicable procedures, to establish temporary MCR ventilation for Attachment A.

Recovery Actions associated with VFDRs for AA3-004, AA3-009, AA36/42.42-026, AA57A-001 and AA57B-001. The Implementation Item will also require that training be conducted.

S-3.18 1,2 Verify MOV circuit changes (Table S-2, Item S-2.1) have been Response to RAI-44 documented in I&M accomplished as credited in Attachment W and verify the Letter dated October 15, 2012.

associated valves are not credited in other areas where spurious operation could occur.

S-3.19 1,2 Update the associated Fire PRA task and revise the Fire PRA Response to RAI-44 documented in I&M ignition frequency and/or fire modeling to include re-evaluation of Letter dated October 15, 2012.

procedural actions/controls associated with control of automatic CO 2 actuation in certain areas (Table S-2, item S-2.2), Transient Combustible Fee Zones (Table S-3, Item S-3.3), establishing certain areas as Hot Work Restriction Zones (Table S-3, Item S-3.4).

Page S-lI Revision 3 Revision 3 Page S-1 1

Indn*inn Minhir"nn Pn*wmr (NP AIFPA 80l5 Tr*nmzitinn TPnnrrt - Atti-rhmcnt S Attachment S - Table S-3 Implementation Items Item Unit Description LAR Section / Source S-3.20 1,2 Upon completion of all Fire PRA credited implementation items in Response to RAI-44 documented in I&M Transition report Tables S-2 and S-3, verify the validity of the Letter dated October 15, 2012.

change-in-risk provided in Attachment W. This includes procedure changes affecting the fire PRA (item S-3.14), electrical circuit modifications (item S-3.18), fire ignition and suppression (item S-3.19) and PRA methods (item S-3.21).

Ifthis verification determines that the risk metrics have changed such that the RG 1.205 acceptance guidelines are not met, additional analytical efforts, and/or procedure changes, and/or plant modifications will be implemented to assure the RG 1.205 acceptance criteria are met.

S-3.21 1, 2 Conduct a Focused-Scope Peer Review of the PRA upgrade item Response to RAI-45 documented in I&M related to Reduced Mission Times for cutsets containing a Test Letter dated October 15, 2012.

and Maintenance event combined with a running failure.

S-3.22 1, 2 Revise program documents and procedures, and conduct Response to RAI-60 documented in I&M associated training, as necessary to implement specific Letter dated October 15, 2012.

requirements from NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3 as described in Transition Report Section 4.7.3.

Page S-12 Revision 3 Revision Page S- 12

Enclosure 12 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 List of NFPA Codes and Editions that will be in Place Post Transition Provided in Response to RAI-58 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 1 FireAreaFirie Zone Detecto!SprsinNP oeYa AA1 1 Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1983 AA1 1 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA1 1 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79

~NFPA 72E-1974/78 NFPA 72D-1 967/79 AA1 1A Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-197/78 72E-1974/78 AA1 1A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA1 1B Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 974/78 AA1 1B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA1 1C Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA1 1C Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA1 1D Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA-72E-1974/78 AA1 1D Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA1 1E Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 974/78 AA1 1E Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA1 1F Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 NFPA 72D-1967/79 AMI 1G Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA1 1H Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA1 1H Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 974/78 AA2 2N Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 2 F Area FMNARCod l AA2 2S Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 28 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 28 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 30 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 30 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 77 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 78 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 79 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 14-1971 NFPA AA2 79 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1 971 13-1983 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA2 79 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA2 80 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 80 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA NFPA 72D-1967 13-1971 967 AA2 81 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 72D-1 NFPA 13-1971 AA2 81 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 82 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 82 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 82 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 83 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 84 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1 967 AA2 84 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 3 Fýire Arqea7 Fire Zon [ctionl ;Supression, =r AA2 85 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 85 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 8eNFPA 72E-1982/84 NFPA 72D-1 967 AA2 85 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 NFPA 13-1983 AA2 86 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 86 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 87 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 87 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 88 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 89 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 90 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971

- NFPA 72D-1 967 AA2 90 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 90 Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1971 AA2 91 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1967 AA2 91 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 92 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 92 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 93 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 93 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 94 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 NFPA 12-1 968, AA2 95 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12 2005 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 4 Fire Area Fire Zone Detection/ Suppression Type NFPA Code- Year AA2 95 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 96 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D--1 967 AA2 96 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 97 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 97 Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1971 NFPA 72D-1967 AA2 97 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 98 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 98 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 99 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 99 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 100 Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 108 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 109 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 110 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 11i Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 126 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1 974 AA2 126 Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1971 AA2 127 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982 AA2 129 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 129 Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1971 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 5 Fire Area Fire Zone Detection/ Suppreson Type NFPA Code -Year AA2 129 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1 974 AA2 129 Suppression Manual C02 Generator Purge NFPA 12-1968 AA2 129 Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1971 AA2 129 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1 974 AA2 130 Suppression Manual C02 Generator Purge NFPA 12-1968 AA2 130 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 130 Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1971 AA2 130 Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1971 AA2 130 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1 974 AA2 131A Suppression Wet Pipe NFPA 13-1971 AA2 131A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2 131A Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974 AA2 142 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2C 112 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2C 113 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2C 114 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA2C 115 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA3 3 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 AoNFPA 72E-1974/78 AA3 3 Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1971 AA3 31 Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1971 AA3 32 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA3 32 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 6 Fir Ara FreZone Dei~ttet ion/SuppressionType NFPA CodeYa AA3 32 Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1971 AA3 48 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA3 49 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA3 49 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 974/78

-NFPA 15-1973 AA3 49 Suppression HVAC NFPA 15-1973 for 1-HV-AES-1 & 2, and 12-HV-AFX AA3 50 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 15-1973, AA3 50 Suppression HVAC NFPA 15-1973 for 2-HV-AES-1 & 2, and 12-HV-AFX AA3 50 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA3 51 Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1983 AA3 51 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA3 51 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA3 51 Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA3 52 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA3 52 Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1983 AA3 52 Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 NFPA 72D- 1967/79 AA3 52 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1 982/84 NFPA 14-19971 AA3 69 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1978 NFPA714-196787 AA3 69 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 7 Fire Area Fire Zone Detcton/Suppression TpeNP oe-Ya AA3 106 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA3 106 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA3 107 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA3 107 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 4 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 4 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 4 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 Curtain &

WaterHVAC NFPA 15-1973 AA5/6 5 Suppression NFPA 15-1973 for 12-HV-SATFU AA5/6 5 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 5 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 5 Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA5/6 5 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA5/6 6M Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA5/6 6M Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 6M Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA5/6 6N Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1983 AA5/6 6N Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA5/6 6N Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA5/6 6N Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA5/6 6S Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 6S Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1983 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 SPage 8 AA5/6 6S Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA5/6 6S Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA5/6 61 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 64A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA5/6 64A Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 64A Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA5/6 64B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA5/6 64B Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA5/6 64B Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 65A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA5/6 65A Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 65A Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA5/6 65B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA5/6 65B Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA5/6 65B Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA7 7 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA7 7 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA7 7 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA7 7 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1978 AA8 8 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA8 8 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA8 8 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1 967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 9 Fire Area Fire Zone Detection Suppr essionTyeNPCoe-Ya AA8 8 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1978 NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA99 Detection Ionization NFPA-72E-1974/78 -

AA9 9 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA9 9 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005.

AA9 9 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1986 AA9 10 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA9 10 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1 974/78 S1NFPA 12-1968 AA9 10 Suppression Manual 002 NFPA 12 2005 AA9 10 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1986 AA10 11 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1986 AA1 0 11 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA10 11 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA10 11 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA11 12 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1986 AA12 13 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA12 13 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA13 14 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA1 3 14 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA14 15 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 10 Fire Area Fire Zon Dee~ction/Suppression Tp FA oe-er AA14 15 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 NEPA 72D-1967/79 AA14 15 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA15 16 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA15 16 Detection Thermal NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA15 16 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA16 17A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA17 17B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA18 17C Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA18 17C Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA19 17D Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA20 17E Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA21 17F Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA22 17G Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA23 18 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA23 18 Detection Thermal NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 974/78 NFPA 12-1 968 AA23 18 Suppression -Automatic C02 NFPA 12 2005 NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA24 19 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA24 19 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA24 19 Feature Hose Station 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 11 Fire Area Fire Zone Deeto/SprsinTe Fk d -Ya AA24 19 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12-1968

____NFPA 12 2005 AA25 20 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA25 20 Detection Ionization 72D-1987/79 NFPA 72E-1 982/84 AA26 21 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA26 21 Detection Thermal NFPA 72D-1967/79 2DeNFPA 72E-1974/78.

AA27 22 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1986 AA29 23 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 NFPA 12-1968 AA29 23 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12 2005 AA29 23 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA29 24 SuppreIssion Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA29 24 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA29 24 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA29 25 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1986 NFPA 12-1968 AA29 25 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12 2005 AA29 25 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA29 25 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA30 26 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1978 AA30 26 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 NFPA 12-1 968 26 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12 2005 AA30 NFPA 12D-20057 AA30 26 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 974/78 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 12 F FireTZ"on~e, lgct-ioni;,uppr&sot 3e3ea NFA oe,,Ya AA31 27 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1978 AA31 27 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA31 27 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA'12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA31 27 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA32 29A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA32 29A Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA32 29B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA32 29B Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA32 29E Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA32 29E Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA32 29G Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA32 29G Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA33 29C Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 nIonization NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA33 29C Detection nNFPA 72E-1982/84.

AA33 29D Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA33 29D Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA33 29F Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA33 29F Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA34 33 Detection Infrared NFPA 72D-1967/79 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 13 FrAraFrZo e ection/JSuppression MWP Coe-ea AA34 33 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E- 1982/84 NFPA 14-1 971 33A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1978 AA34 AA34 33A Detection Infrared NFPA 72E- 1982/84 AA34 33A Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA34 33B Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 982/84 AA35 34 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA35 34 Detection *. Thermal NFPA 72E-1 982/84 34A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA35 NFPA 14-1978 AA35 34A Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA35 34A Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 34B Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA35 NFPA 72E-1982/84 37 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA36/42 NFPA 72E-1 982/84 AA36/42 43 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1 967 & 1979 43 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA36/42 AA36/42 44A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1 971 AA36/42 44B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA36/42 44C Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA36/42 44D Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA36/42 44G Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA36/42 44H Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 14 Fire Area Fire Zone Detection/ SuppressionTyeNPCoe-Ya AA36/42 44N Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1 967 & 1979 AA36/42 44N Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA36/42 44N Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA36/42 44N Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1983 AA36/42 44S Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA36/42 44S Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA36/42 44S Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA36/42 44S Suppression Water Curtain NFPA 13-1983 AA37 38 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 38 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 AA37 NFPA 12 2005 38 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA37 NFPA 72E-1 982/84 AA37 38 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA38 39 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA38 39 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA38 39 Detection Infrared NFPA 72D-1967/79 9Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1 967/79 AA38 3NFPA 72E-1982/84 NFPA 72D-1 967 & 1979 AA39A 40A Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA39A 40A Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1 982/84

" " NFPA 12-1 968 AA39A 40A Suppression IAutomatic C02 NFPA 12 2005 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 15 Fire Area Ire Zone D AA39A 40A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA39B 40B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA39B 40B Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 NFPA 12-1 968 40B Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12 2005 AA39B AA39B 40B Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA40 41 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 12-1968 AA40 41 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12 2005 AA40 41 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AnIonization NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA4 41 Detection nNFPA 72E-1982/84 AA41 42A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA41 42A Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA41 42A Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA41 42A Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA41 42B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA41 42B Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA41 42B Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84.

AA41 42B Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA41 42C Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA41 42C Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA41 42C Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 16 Fire Area Fire Zone Deeto/Sprsin yeNP oe-Ya NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA41 42C Suppression Manual C02. NFPA 12-1968

__ __ _NFPA 12 2005 AA41 42D Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA41 420 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA43 45 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 45 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12-1968 AA43 NFPA 12 2005 AA43 45 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA43 45 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA44 46A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 46A Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 AA44 NFPA 12 2005 NFPA 72D-1 967 & 1979 AA44 46A Detection Ionization NEPA 72D-1962&14 NFPA 72E-1 982/84 AA44 46A Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA44 46B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA44 46B Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA44 46B Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA44 46B Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA44 46C Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA44 46C Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA44 46C Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 17 Fire Area Fire Zone Detection uppresion Typ NFPA Code - Year AA44 46C Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA44 46D Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1 967 & 1979 AA44 46D Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982184 AA45A 47A Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA45A 47A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA45A 47A Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA45A 47A DetectionIoNFPA 72E-1982/84 AA45A 47A Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12-1968

" NFPA 12 2005 AA45B 47B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA45B 47B Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA45B 47B Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1.982/84 NFPA 12-1 968 AA45B 47B Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12 2005 AA46 53 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA46 53 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 982 AA47 54 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA47 54 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982 AA48 55 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1986 NFPA 12-1 968 55 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12 2005 AA48 AA48 55 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA48 55 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 18 Fire Area Fire Zone Detection/ SuppressionTyeNPCoe-Ya AA48 56 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1978 NEPA 12-1968 AA48 56 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12-2005 12 2005 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA48 56 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1 974/78 AA50 57 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 NFPA 14-1978 AA50 57 Suppression Halon NFPA 12A-1977 AA50 57 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 NFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA50 57 Detection Ionization NFPA NFPA72D-1974179 72E-1 974/78 AA50 144 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1 984 AA51 58 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA51 58 Suppression Manual C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA51 58 Suppression Halon NFPA 12A-1977 ANFPA 72D-1967 & 1979 AA51 58 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA51 145 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1 984 AA52 59 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 59 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12-1968 AA52 NFPA 12 2005 AA52 59 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA52 60 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1986 AA52 60 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA52 60 Suppression Automatic C02 NFPA 12-1968 NFPA 12 2005 AA52 60 Detection Infrared NFPA 72E-1982/84 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 19 Fire Area Fire Zone Detetion/Suppressio Type NP oe-Ya AA54 62A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA54 62A Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA54 62A Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA54 62B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA54 62B Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA54 62B Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA54 62C Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA54 62C Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA54 62C Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA55 63A Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971)

AA55 63A Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA55 63A Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA55 63B Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA55 63B Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA55 63B Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA55 63C Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA55 63C Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1974/78 AA55 63C Suppression Pre-Action NFPA 13-1983 AA56 66 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974 AA56 67 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1 974 AA56 68 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1 974 AA56 101 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974 AA56 103 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1 974 AA57A 70 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 2 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Page 20 Hre Ara Fir Zoe] IDetec~tioGnlSu~ppresýsion Type .,.,

NFPA 72D-1967/79 AA57A 70 Detection Ionization NFPA 72E-1 978 AA57A 71 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA57A 71 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA57B 72 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA57B 72 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1982/84 AA57B 73 Feature Hose Station NFPA 14-1971 AA57B 73 Detection Ionization NFPA 72D-1967/79 NFPA 72E-1 978 AA58 74 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974 AA58 75 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974 AA58 76 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1974 AA58 102 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1 974 AA58 104 Detection Thermal NFPA 72E-1 974 Unit 1 and 2 Turbine Building Wall Spray - NFPA YD Yard Suppression Deluge 72D-1967 NFPA 15-1973 Unit 1 Main Transformer, Unit 2 Main Transformer(phase 1-3), Transformer lAB & 2AB, YD Yard Detection Thermal 1CD and 2CD, 10lAB, 101CD, 201AB and 201CD,

- NFPA 72D-1967 NFPA 15-1973 YD Yard Suppression-Fire Pump Pre-Action NFPA 13-1991 House Suppression-Fire Pump NFPA 20-1990 YD Yard HPump YD Yard Suppression-Fire Pump Hose Station NFPA 14- 1990 House

Enclosure 13 to AEP-NRC-2012-92 Compact Disc Containing an Electronic Copy of the CFAST Input Files for an Updated Control Room Fire Modeling Calculation (JA1-Cook-1201 Rev. 2)

Provided in Response to RAI-49 and RAI-51.