AEP-NRC-2023-45, Unit 2 - Schedular Exemption for Enhanced Weapons, Firearms, Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation

Unit 2 - Schedular Exemption for Enhanced Weapons, Firearms, Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation

ML23320A233
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	11/16/2023
From:	Ferneau K Indiana Michigan Power Co, (Formerly Indiana & Michigan Power Co)
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
AEP-NRC-2023-45
Download: ML23320A233 (1)

Text

Indiana Michigan Power INDIANA Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place MICHIGAN Bridgman, Ml 49106 POWER indianamichiganpower.com An AEP Company B O U N D L E S S E N E R G Y-November 1 6 , 2023 AEP-NRC-2023-45 10 CFR 7 3 . 5 Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U . S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant U ni t 1 and Unit 2 Schedular Exemption for Enhanced Weapons, Firearms, Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation On March 1 4 , 2023, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) noticed in the Federal Register, Final Rule, Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications. This final rule became effective April 1 3 , 2023, with a compliance date of J a n u a ry 8, 2024.

In response to the publication of this final rule, I n d i a n a Michigan Power Company ( l & M ) , the licensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant U ni t 1 and U n i t 2, reviewed the new rule against current requirements, NRC endorsed documents, and other guidance documents published by the NRC. l&M also assessed the broad impact across multiple organizations and the change management scope.

In accordance with 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 5 , l&M is requesting an exemption from the specific requirements in 1 0 CFR Part 73, Subpart T, "Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping," 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 0 0 ( a )

through 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 0 0 ( t ) , "Notification of Physical Security Events," 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 0 5 ( a ) ( 1 ) through 10 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 0 5 ( e ) , "Written Follow-up Reports of Physical Security Events," 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 10 ( a ) ( 1 )

through 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 10 ( h ) , "Recordkeeping of Physical Security Events," and 10 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 1 5 ( a )

through 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 1 5 ( f ) , "Suspicious Activity Reports," until the later of December 3 1 , 2024, or 1 8 0 days after publication of the final implementing Regulatory Guides.

l&M is requesting an exemption from using the definitions for the terms "Contraband," and "Time of Discovery" as recently revised in 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 2 , "Definitions," until the later of December 3 1 , 2024, or 1 8 0 days after publication of the final implementing Regulatory Guides. The exemption would not apply to the definitions of those terms that were in effect prior to the issuance of the 2023 revisions.

l&M is not requesting an extension to the compliance date for l&M for specific requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations ( 10 CFR) Part 73, Subpart B, "Enhanced Weapons, Preemption, and Firearms Background Checks," described in 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 5 , "Authorization for Use of Enhanced Weapons and Preemption of Firearms Laws," and 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 7 , "Firearms Background Checks for Armed Security Personnel."

U . S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page 2 Based on NRC's projected timeline for completion of revision to the applicable Regulatory Guides associated with this final rule, and the time necessary for I&M to go through the change management processes adequately to include the number of training weeks that will be required, l&M is requesting a new compliance date of December 3 1 , 2024, or 1 8 0 days after publication of final Regulatory Guides, whichever is later.

The enclosure to this letter provides the justification and rationale for the exemption request. The requested exemption from the specific requirements in 1 0 CFR Part 73, is permissible under 1 0 CFR 73.5 because it is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security.

l&M requests approval of this exemption by December 3 1 , 2023, so actions can be taken to ensure consistent and reliable reporting procedures.

There are no new regulatory commitments made in this letter. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Director, at (269) 466-2649.

Sincerely, Kelly J. Ferneau Site Vice President RAW/sjh

Enclosure:

Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements in New 2023 Security Rule c: EGLE -- RMD/RPS J . B . G i e s s n e r - NRC Region I ll NRC Resident Inspector N. Quilco - MPSC R. M. Sistevaris - AEP Ft. Wayne S. P. Wall - NRC Washington, D . C .

A. J. Williamson - AEP Ft. Wayne

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements in New 2023 Security Rule A. BACKGROUND On March 1 4 , 2023, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Final Rule entitled "Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications." This final rule became effective April 1 3 , 2023, with a compliance date of January 8, 2024. The final rule contains several new elements such as:

• New terminology and associated requirements covering "conditions adverse to security."

• New definitions of the terms "contraband" and "time of discovery" in 1 0 CFR 73.2.

• New point of contact requirements with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

• Changes reporting requirements applicable to security events from:

o 1 - h o u r notifications and 24-hour recording of security events, to 1-hour, 4-hour, 8-hour notifications and 24-hour recording of security events.

o Codifies the accelerated call to the NRC from NRC Bulletin 2005-02 to a new 1 5 - m i n u t e notification.

Concurrently, with the publication of the final rule, the NRC issued the following Regulatory Guides (RG) to support the implementation requirements set forth in the final rule:

• 5 . 6 2 , "Physical Security Event Notifications, Reports, and Records," Revision 2

• 5.86, "Enhanced Weapons Authority, Preemption Authority, and Firearms Background Checks," Revision 0

• 5.87, "Suspicious Activity Reports," Revision 0 During the August 23, 2023, public meeting, the NRC recognized there are ambiguities and inconsistencies contained by the final rule language and associated guidance. The discussed revision date for clarifying guidance publication was April 2024, which is three months after the compliance date of January 8, 2024. Additionally, the NRC recognized the need for rulemaking to address the issues with the final rule language.

Accordingly, Indiana Michigan Power Company ( l & M ) is requesting an exemption from the specific requirements in 10 CFR Part 73, Subpart T, "Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping," 10 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 0 0 ( a ) through 10 CFR 73.1200(t), "Notification of Physical Security Events," 10 CFR 73.1205(a)(1) through 10 CFR 73.1205(e), "Written Follow-up Reports of Physical Security Events," 10 CFR 73.1210(a)(1) through10 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 10 ( h ) ,

"Record keeping of Physical Security Events," and 10 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 1 5 ( a) through 10 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 1 5 ( f ) , "Suspicious Activity Reports," until the later of December 3 1 , 2024, or 1 8 0 days after publication of the final Regulatory Guides.

l&M is requesting an exemption from using the definitions for the terms "Contraband," and "Time of Discovery," as recently revised in 10 CFR 73.2, "Definitions," until the later of December 31, 2024, or 180 days after publication of the final Regulatory Guides. The exemption would not apply to the definitions of those terms that were in effect prior to the issuance of the 2023 revisions.

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page 2 l&M is not requesting an extension to the compliance date for specific requirements in Title 1 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations ( 1 0 CFR) Part 73, Subpart B, "Enhanced Weapons, Preemption, and Firearms Background Checks," described in 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 5 , "Authorization for Use of Enhanced Weapons and Preemption of Firearms Laws," and 10 CFR 73.17, "Firearms Background Checks for Armed Security Personnel."

B. BASIS FOR EXEMPTION REQUEST 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 5 allows the Commission to grant exemptions from the requirements of Part 73 "as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest." As explained below, this exemption request meets the criteria provided in 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 5 .

l&M has identified several issues in the final rule and the supporting Regulatory Guides that require clarification from the NRC in order for l&M to successfully implement the requirements.

As mentioned above, the NRC is currently developing a resolution for code language issues and addressing guidance revisions. The NRC plans to issue additional guidance in April 2024, three months after the compliance date of January 8, 2024. Without additional guidance, enforcement relief, or the approval of this exemption, it is likely that l&M will need to make changes to its physical security plans and processes twice -- once to come into compliance with its own interpretation of the final rule (without the benefit of the additional guidance being developed by NRC), and again once the additional guidance is issued. The ambiguity and conflict created by the final rule language and existing guidance, which is described below, could result in unnecessary confusion and distraction that detract from the current high level of assurance provided by l&M's existing physical security program. Thus, implementation of the final rule prior to issuance of additional clarifying guidance, at a minimum, is not in the best interest of the public. The following are several issues that have been identified as examples:

1. CONDITIONS ADVERSE TO SECURITY The introduction of the term "conditions adverse to security" within 10 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 10 is undefined, and ambiguous. l&M has established, as required, a formal Corrective Action Program in accordance with 1 0 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI. N E I 16-07, Improving the Effectiveness of Issue Resolution to Enhance Safety and Efficiency, provided recommended approaches to the industry to enhance corrective actions, and facilitate a better organizational focus on conditions affecting safety and reliability. As a result, l&M has developed procedures/processes to determine conditions adverse to quality as it relates to the security organization, ( e . g . , Condition Adverse to Regulatory Compliance).

• l&M's procedure PMP-7030-MOP-001, Corrective Action Program Management Oversite Process, defines specific events, situations or occurrences that result in a condition adverse to regulatory compliance. Security-related items are included.

Given the robust nature of l&M's Corrective Action Program, the additional duplication of procedures and/or revision of procedures to accommodate a new term is unnecessary, adds burden, and provides no increased value, safety margin or improvements to security programs or the Corrective Action Program.

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page 3

2. D E F I N I T I O N S IN 1 0 CFR 73.2 New definitions in $ 73.2 expand existing definitions provided in NRC endorsed guidance, N E I 03-12, "Template for the Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, [and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program],"

Revision 7, and RG 5 .7 6 , "Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors." l&M has used the existing definitions to design its Security Plan and associated programs and procedures. Examples of the issues include:

• Contraband: Specifically, the exempli gratia or " e . g . " parenthetical describing "other dangerous materials" as specifically including "disease causing agents" requires licensees to protect against circumstances beyond the current Design Basis Threat (DBT) as described in 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 . Unless this exemption is issued, the application of this expanded definition will require changes to l&M methods of compliance with the requirements of 1 0 CFR 73.55(g)(1 ) (ii ) (B ) . Paragraphs ( g )( 1 ) ( i i ) ( B ) re q uires ( emphasis added ):

$ 73.55(g) Access controls.

( 1 ) Consistent with the function of each barrier or barrier system, the licensee shall control personnel, vehicle , and material access, as applicable , at each access control point in accordance with the physical protection program des ig n re q uirements o f § 73.55 ( b ).

( i i ) Where vehicle barriers are established, the licensee s h a ll :

( B ) Search vehicles and materials for contraband or other items which co u ld be used to commit radiological sabotage in accordance with paragrap h ( h ) of this section.

§ 7 3.55 ( h ) Search programs.

( 1 ) The objective of the search program is to detect, deter, and prevent the introduction of firearms, explosives, incendia ry devices , or o t her items which could be used to commit radiological sabotage. To accomplish this the licensee shall search individuals , vehicles, and materials consistent with the physical protection program design re q uirements in paragraph ( b )

of this section , and the function to be performed at each access control point or po rt al before granting access.

(2) Owner controlled area searches.

( iv) V eh i cle searches must be accomplished th ro ugh the use of e q uipment capable of detecting firearms, explosives , incendia ry de v ices , or other items which could be used to commit radiological sabotage, or throug h visual and ph y sical searches, or both, to ensure that all items are identified before grantin g access.

(3) Protected area searches. Licensees shall search all personnel , vehi cl es and materials requesting access to protected areas.

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page4

() The search for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items which could be used to commit radiological sabotage shall be accomplished through the use of equipment capable of detecting these items, or through visual and physical searches, or both, to ensure that all items are clearly identified before granting access to protected areas. The licensee shall subject all persons except official Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel on official duty to these searches upon entry to the protected area. Armed security officers who are on duty and have exited the protected area may re-enter the protected area without being searched for firearms.

§ 7 3 . 5 5 ( g ) uses the term contraband, while § 7 3 . 5 5 ( h ) uses terminology consistent with that found in the definition of contraband in N E I 0 3 - 1 2 (and RG 5.76). The specific inclusion of "disease causing agents" in the new regulatory definition of contraband will require l&M to modify its programs and procedures describing the methods of compliance with paragraph § 73.55(g). l&M understands that the NRC is looking at potential resolutions for this issue, but until further guidance is issued, or rulemaking occurs, l&M is unable to come into compliance with this requirement as written without making significant changes to its physical security program.

• Time of Discovery. Specifically, the term "cognizant individual" and "is considered anyone who, by position, experience, and/or training, is expected to understand that a particular condition or event adversely impacts security." Currently, security plans incorporate the definition for Time of Discovery, that is found in NEI 0 3 - 1 2 and RG

5. 76, being "a supervisor or manager makes a determination that a verified degradation of a security safeguards measure or a contingency situation exists," to establish T=0 for a security related event.

The new definition expands the pool of personnel previously used by licensees to determine T=0 for an event, due to the undefined nature of "position, experience, and/or training." Additionally, the broader nature and lower threshold for recognition of something that simply "adversely impacts security," versus "recognition of verified degradation of a security safeguards measure or a contingency situation" contributes to the expansion of pool of personnel. l&M is confident, the term in N E I 0 3 - 1 2 and RG

5. 76, is the appropriate threshold for T=0 for security related events.

The application of this expanded definition will require l&M to expand current security programs to incorporate the expanded and revised training modules onsite for general plant employees, (potentially with INPO and the NANTeL course they facilitate), and the responsibility for implementation of the expanded training across a broad spectrum of personnel at the station.

3. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) LOCAL CONTROL TOWER P O I N T OF CONTACT 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 1 5 establishes reporting requirements for suspicious activities involving aircraft to a licensee's FAA local control tower. Specifically, licensees are required to:

• Establish a point of contact with their local FAA control tower, and

• Document the point of contact in written communication procedures.

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page 5 The code language is very specific in regard to establishing a point of contact with the local control tower. Based on current experience, l&M will be challenged to obtain a point of contact from a Federal Agency.

The requirement of establishing and documenting a FAA local control tower point of contact does not add additional safety margin to the protection or operation of l&M and adds difficulty for compliance due to the lack of participation from our local control tower.

4. REGULATORY G U I D E S Examples of clarification needed in the supporting RG 5.62, Revision 2, "Physical Security Event Notifications, Reports, and Records," include: ,

4-hour vs. 1 5 - m i n u t e notification requirement:

• § 7 3 . 1 2 0 0 ( e ) ( 1 )(iii) and (iv) requires a 4-hour notification for contraband attempted or actual introduction of contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA.

o The definition of contraband contains the term "incendiaries."

• § 7 3 . 1 2 0 0 ( a ) required a 15-minute notification for hostile actions .

o RG 5.62, Revision 2, Section 7.1, Page 24, provides examples of hostile actions:

• ( 4) The discovery of unauthorized explosive materials, incendiary materials, or an improvised explosive device within the licensee's site boundary.

The code language requires a 4-hour notification for an incendiary device at or inside the Protected Area (PA), Vital Areas (VA), or Material Access Area (MAA). The regulatory guide drives licensee to a 15-minute notification for an incendiary device at the site boundary, which is further away from safety related equipment.

The notification conflict the regulatory guide introduced between a 15- minute and 4-hour notification is burdensome, confusing, and makes the consistency and success for this notification unpredictable. Station personnel are trained in referencing published Regulatory Guides, station procedures and guidance, and other industry documents, as a best practice, to support the accuracy of determination of notification events.

The inconsistency created by RG 5.62 unnecessarily creates the potential for confusion and human performance error.

4-hour notification vs. 24-hour recording of "lost or uncontrolled weapon:"

• § 73.1200(e)(1)(v) requires a 4-hour notification for a lost or uncontrolled weapon.

• § 7 3 . 1 2 1 0(f) requires recording within 24-hours "physical security events or conditions that decreases the effectiveness of the physical security program."

o RG 5 . 6 2 , Revision 2, Section 1 8 . 2 , Page 38, provides examples of the "Recordable Events and Conditions Regarding Decreases in Effectiveness," that 7 3 . 1 2 1 0(f) requires. The regulatory guide includes

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page 6 o an event involving the loss of control of an authorized security weapon within a PA. V A, MAA, or Controlled Access Area (CAA)

The conflict between the notification and recording of a lost or uncontrolled weapon only exists because of the regulatory guidance in RG 5 . 6 2 . As a best practice, and to support accurate determination of notification events, station personnel are trained in referencing published Regulatory Guides, station procedures and guidance, and other industry documents.

Additional clarity is needed to support the implementation of notifications and recordkeeping in a consistent and successful manner.

Malevolent intent discussion:

• 10 CFR 7 3 . 1 2 0 0 only refers to the term "malevolent intent" in § 7 3 . 1 2 0 0 ( q)(2) as exempli gratia or " e . g ." parenthetical describing a circumstance where a licensee may desire to retract a previous physical security event notification.

o RG 5.62, Revision 2, Section 2, Page 21, titled, "Malevolent Intent and Credible Bomb Threat Considerations," states the NRC's position that only government officials have the necessary resources and qualifications to determine whether malevolent intent was present in a security event.

o During the May 2, 2023, and August 23, 2023, public meetings, the NRC was unable to consistently describe when licensees were capable of this determination, and when licensees were required to have government officials make this determination.

o Within the NRC Response to Public Comments, "Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Rule, M L 16264A004," comment K-21 contains the discussion regarding "credible", and puts into context, the circumstances of the NRC's position, as it relates to the determination of malevolent intent.

• It is clear, that as of the publication date of March 14", 2023, the discussion revolves around the 15-minute notification requirements, and not blanketly across all security related events.

l&M is aligned that in certain circumstances, external government agencies would be the most appropriate to determine malevolent intent, (e.g., credible bomb threat, credible threat).

However, l&M's position on the capability to determine intent as it relates to identifying Human Performance errors, as well as determining Trustworthy and Reliability for Access purposes remains with l & M .

The lack of clarity of the scope and/or intent of when it is appropriate for external government officials to determine malevolent intent creates ambiguity. Final clarity is needed to prevent l&M having to unnecessarily change security programs and procedures, such as access authorization, to incorporate a process to await investigation results from NRC's Office of Investigations ( 0 1 ) , the intelligence community, or a federal, State, or local law enforcement agency.

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page 7 C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXEMPTION As highlighted in the selected examples above, l&M achieving a compliance date of January 8, 2024, without full clarity on key parts of the final rule would result in an inadequate implementation. Unknown success path towards compliance with the final rule, as written, in current code language; along with the conflict and confusion the published, publicly available, stated positions of the NRC, are key elements for this request. l&M would find themselves in a situation where the modification to security plans and procedures would be required at least twice, based on interpretation of this new rule. l&M is requesting the following considerations be taken into account during review of this request:

• l& M 's site security plan implements the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71, "Reporting of Safeguards Events" for reporting the suspension of security measures.

• l&M will continue to comply with security event reporting, as previously required in 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 7 1 , "Reporting of Safeguards Events" and Appendix G to Part 73, "Reportable Safeguards Events."

• l&M will use the definitions for the terms "Contraband" and "Discovery (time of)," in its current site Security Plan consistent with how these terms are currently defined in Regulatory Guide 5 .7 6 , Revision 1 , "Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors."

• l&M is currently implementing a formal Corrective Action Program and has identified Conditions Adverse to Quality as they relate to Security Programs and items that are Conditions Adverse to Regulatory Compliance.

• l&M can currently contact the FM via a contact number for the South Bend Air Traffic Control Tower.

• l&M is currently capable of making voluntary reports of suspicious activities, and this will not change in the interim until the new compliance date and allow for final revised regulatory guidance issuance.

o l&M's procedure, SPP-2060-SFl-219 "Responding to UAV/UAS in the OCA and PA,"

contains voluntary reporting guidance. This includes the accelerated call to the NRC as it pertains to NRC Bulletin 2005-02.

• The burden associated with rework for l&M is unnecessary while awaiting final clarity with publication of associated Regulatory Guides. Several examples of where rework will be required are:

o Revisions of associated procedures/processes, job aids, training materials and lesson plans that are used to describe and elaborate on reporting requirements.

o Coordination of work management and resources to align with station outage schedule(s). l&M has completed one outage in the Fall of 2023 and one outage is scheduled for the Spring of 2024.

o The re-training of impacted station personnel with updated information contained within the revised guidance documents:

• Security

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page 8

• Regulatory/Compliance

• Emergency Response

• Radiation Protection

• Operations -Accredited Training Program, requiring the use of the Systematic Approach to Training process. Examples of elements that drive the number of available weeks to train operators within a year are:

• l&M executes approximately 6 cycles per year.

l&M requires 5 weeks for each cycle of training, based on the number of operating crews, and licensed operators we have.

• l&M is required to administer an exam cycle for our licensed operators each year.

• l&M is required to incorporate certain elements within our 2-year training cycle, that include outage applicable objectives, ( i n cl u d i n g , but not limited to: core changes, plant modifications, Lower Mode operations).

D. JUSTIFICATION FOR EXEMPTION Based on NRC's projected timeline for completion of revision to the applicable Regulatory Guides associated with this final rule, l&M is requesting a new compliance date of December 3 1 , 2024, or 1 8 0 days after publication of final Regulatory Guides, whichever is later.

As stated above, l&M will continue to implement the Security Plan as documented. Since it has been reviewed and approved by the NRC, l&M's Security Plan provides reasonable assurance of safety and security. The delay in implementation of the final rule will not impact proper implementation of the current Security Plan and will ensure that the final rule is effectively implemented. Thus, granting of this exemption will not endanger the life or property or common defense and security.

Implementation of the final rule without further interface, clarity, and refined guidance may result in unintended consequences which could reduce the effectiveness of the current Security Plan. Therefore, it is in the public's interest that l&M's Security Plan and associated procedures/processes comprehensively and accurately implement the regulation and guidance documents once resolution is obtained of identified issues.

The granting of this exemption would not violate the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as the compliance date for the final rule is not required nor specified in the AEA as amended, any provisions of the Commission's regulations, or any other legally binding requirements imposed by the Commission.

Thus, issuance of this exemption request would be consistent with 1 0 CFR 7 3 . 5 because it is "authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and [is] otherwise in the public interest."

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2023-45 Page 9 E. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT l&M is requesting an exemption from the compliance date of January 8, 2024, for the Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications. The following information is provided in support of an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact for the proposed exemption.

l&M has determined that the exemption involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite; that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; that there is no construction impact; and there is no significant increase in the potential for or consequences from a radiological accident. Accordingly, the proposed one-time exemption meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 1 0 CFR 5 1 . 2 2 ( c ) ( 2 5 ) . Pursuant to 1 0 CFR 5 1 . 2 2 ( b ) , no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this proposed exemption request.