ML12284A480

2012 Dresden Nuclear Power Plant Initial License Examination Proposed Simulator Scenarios

ML12284A480
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	09/26/2012
From:	Nelson J, David Reeser Operations Branch III
To:	Exelon Generation Co
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ML11354A123	List: ML12284A346 ML12284A451 ML12284A455 ML12284A460 ML12284A463 ML12284A470 ML12284A480 ML12291A697 ML12291A698 ML12291A700 ML12291A701
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Dresden Generating Station 11-1 (2012-301) NRC - SCENARIO 01 RECIRC - LOWER REACTOR POWER USING RECIRCULATION FLOW INST AIR - COMPRESSOR SWAP DUE TO OIL LEAK AUX POWER - EDG INOP DUE TO COOLING WATER PUMP FAILURE CRD - PUMP SWAP DUE TO SUCTION FILTER PLUGGING NBI - MR LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILS WITH PARTIAL HALF SCRAM CIRC WATER - PUMP TRIP DUE TO OVERCURRENT MANUAL SCRAM - LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM FLOODING - LOSS OF RPV LEVEL INDICATION DUE TO LOSS OF INSTRUMENT POWER AND TRANSMITTER FAILURES EXAM MATERIAL Rev. 00 04/12 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Station Scenario No.: 11-1 (2012-301) NRC - Scenario 01 Evaluators Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Initial Power = 80%

Turnover: Power Reduction to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow (~620 MWe)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description RECIRC - Reactivity, Lower Power Using Recirculation 1 NONE R ATC Flow 2 NONE C BOP INST AIR - Compressor, Swap Due To Oil Leak SER1589 AUX POWER - EDG Inop Due To Cooling Water Pump 3 SER0710 C/T BOP Failure T18 4 RDFILTB C ATC CRD - Pump, Swap Due To Suction Filter Plugging B15 5 I/T ATC NBI - MR Level Inst, Fails With Partial Half Scram NVM100BP 6 HP6 C BOP CIRC WATER - Pump, Trip Due To Overcurrent 7 HP5 M TEAM Manual Scram - Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum AT5 NVM100BP FLOODING - Loss of RPV Level Indication Due to Loss of 8 NVML29AP M TEAM Instrument Power and Transmitter Failures NVML29BP NVML112P

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec ILT-N-1 Page 2 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Scenario Objective Evaluate the operators in Flooding DEOP procedure.

Scenario Summary Initial Conditions:

1. Unit is at 80% power.

2. The following equipment is OOS:

a. None

3. LCOs:

a. None Scenario Sequence

• The Team continues reactor power reduction using recirculation flow.

• 2B IAC develops an oil leak requiring it to be secured. The Team starts 3C IAC and aligns it to Unit 2. Then the Team secures 2B IAC.

• The Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cooling water pump breaker fails rendering the EDG Inoperable.

The Team prevents the EDG from starting and references Tech. Specs

• 2B CRD pump suction filter clogs causing the Team to swap CRD pumps, placing 2A CRD pump in service. If the operators do not swap CRD pumps in a timely manner, 2B CRD pump eventually trips.

• B Medium Range Level Instrument fails low and a partial half scram occurs. The Team manually inserts a B RPS channel half scram and References the Tech Specs.

• The 2A Circulating water pump trips on overload. The Team starts the 2B Circulating water pump.

• Air leakage causes a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum. The Team manually scrams the reactor prior to an automatic scram.

• The Team recognizes and responds to loss of RPV level indication. The Team will perform RPV flooding. LPCI injections valves will fail to open from the control room. The Team sends an operator to open one of them locally.

Event One - Lower Reactor Power Using Recirculation Flow

• The Team continues reactor power reduction using recirculation flow.

Malfunctions required: 0

• (None)

Success Path:

• The Team continues reactor power reduction using recirculation flow.

ILT-N-1 Page 3 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Two - Loss of an Instrument Air Compressor

• 2B IAC develops an oil leak requiring it to be secured.

Malfunctions required:

• (None)

Success Path:

• 3C IAC running aligned to unit two and 2B IAC secured.

Event Three - Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable

• The Unit 2 EDG cooling water pump breaker fails rendering the EDG Inoperable.

Malfunctions required: 1

• U2 EDG cooling water pump breaker trip.

Success Path:

• Places U2 EDG control switch to STOP.

• Determines Technical Specifications requirements.

Event Four - CRD Suction Filter Plugging / Swap CRD Pumps

• 2B CRD pump suction filter clogs causing the Team to swap CRD pumps, placing 2A CRD pump in service. If the operators do not swap CRD pumps in a timely manner, 2B CRD pump eventually trips.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (CRD pump suction filter Plugging)

Success Path:

• Swap CRD pumps.

Event Five - B Med Range Level Instrument Fails Low with a Partial Half Scram

• B Medium Range Level Instrument fails low and a partial half scram occurs.

Malfunctions required: 2

• (Failure of Medium Range B level Instrument)

• (Partial Half Scram on the B channel)

Success Path:

• Manually inserts a B RPS channel half scram.

• References the Tech Specs for an inoperable level instrument and the partial half scram.

ILT-N-1 Page 4 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Six - Circulating Water Pump Trip

• The crew should recognize and respond to Circulating water pump 2A tripping on overload.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Circulating Water Pump trip)

Success Path:

• Start 2B Circulating Water Pump.

Event Seven - Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum / Manual Scram

• Air leakage causes a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Condenser Air In-Leakage)

Success Path:

• Manual Scram the reactor prior to an automatic scram.

Event Seven - Loss of RPV Water Level Indication / RPV Flooding

• The Team recognizes and responds to loss of RPV level indication. LPCI injections valves fail to open from the control room.

Malfunctions required: 2

• Failure Of RPV Level Indication

• LPCI injection valves fail to open Success Path:

• The Team performs RPV Flooding.

• The Team sends an operator to locally open the LPCI injection valves.

ILT-N-1 Page 5 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.

b. Provide the Team with a copy of DGP 03-01, Power Changes, marked up for load drop through inserting control rods to reduce FCL prior to reducing Recirc flow.

c. Provide a marked up CRSP for the rod insertion including a REMA for routine load drop.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in an IC which allows establishing the following: (Jump Drive IC 156 can be used)

1) Adjust control rods to establish FCL @ ~95%.

2) Adjust Recirc flow to establish ~760 MWe.

b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.

c. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.

d. Advance the chart recorders.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. Verify 2B CRD PP running with 2A CRD PP available.

b. 2A and 2B RFPs running with 2C RFP in STBY on Bus 22.

c. Verify Zinc Injection label in place for lined up to 2A RFP.

d. Verify 2A, 2B and 2C Cond/Boost pumps running with 2D in STBY.

e. Verify 2A and 2C Circ Wtr pumps running with 2B available.

f. Verify 2A and 2B IACs running with 3C IAC OFF.

g. 2B and 3B Service Water pumps running.

4 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None NOTE: Perform the above setup prior to running the setup CAEP file.

5 Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-1.cae 6 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Time Critical Tasks Required Actions Optional Actions ILT-N-1 Page 6 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event One - Lower Reactor Power Using Recirculation Flow Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

The turnover directs the crew to reduce load using recirc flow to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow.

1 FLOOR INSTRUCTOR / SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

If the team announces that they will adjust gains, inform them an extra NSO will perform the adjustment. Then:

Tell the team you are time compressing.

Direct the SIMULATOR OPERATOR to activate trigger 1 and verify gains within limits.

Inform the team the gains are adjusted.

(NOTE: trigger 1 can be toggled OFF, then back ON as many times as necessary to adjust gains)

CRS Directs NSO to reduce load to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow using recirculation flow.

ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 03-01, Power Changes, and DOP 0202-03, Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation, as directed:

Uses MASTER RECIRC FLOW CONTLR, 2(3)-262-22, potentiometer to reduce flow AND control reactor power.

Notifies CRS when at 58 Mlbm/hr core flow.

BOP Monitors Panels.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

• Core flow dropped to 58 Mlbm/hr AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-1 Page 7 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Two - Loss of an Instrument Air Compressor Trigger Position Actions or Behavior Role Play:

Call the control room as the U-2 EO and report, While I was on rounds, I found 2B IAC has an oil leak which will not stop. The oil is contained on the bed plate and I plugged the drain before the oil reached it. The oil level is at the bottom of the sight glass. I recommend securing 2B IAC as soon as possible.

If asked to quantify the leak, There is a steady drip.

BOP Acknowledges report from the field and relays it to the CRS.

CRS May enter DOA 4700-01, Instrument Air System Failure.

Directs BOP to start 3C IAC and secure 2B IAC.

BOP Starts 3C IAC per DOP 4700-08, 3C Instrument Air System Operation.

Directs EO to complete steps G.1.a through G.1.k.

Starts 3C IAC at panel 923-1.

Directs EO to complete steps G.1.m through G.1.t.

Directs EO to complete step G.2 placing the 3C IA dryer in operation Directs EO to complete step G.3 aligning 3C IAC and dryer to Unit 2 IA system.

Secures 2B IAC per DOP 4700-01, Instrument Air System Startup.

Directs EO to complete steps G.13.b through G.13.e.

Verifies sufficient system pressures.

Stops 2B IAC at panel 923-1.

Directs EO to complete step G.13.

Role Play:

Acknowledge request to perform procedural steps for 3C and 2B IACs. After a few minutes, report that the steps are completed.

Simulator Operator:

When needed for Role Play above, activate trigger 10, which ensures 3C IAC is at 10 pressure.

11 Verify 3C IAC Hdr Press >90 psig. then activate trigger 11, which opens the 3C IAC X-tie to 2B IAC.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

• 3C IAC started and lined up,

• 2B IAC secured AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-1 Page 8 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Three - Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 2, which simulates Unit 2 EDG 2

cooling water pump breaker control power transformer failure.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

EO to U2 EDG to check Trouble alarm: wait 3 min, activate trigger 3, which clears the U2 3

EDG Trouble alarm. Then report I acknowledged the local alarm on panel DG2A Tile C-3 which is Diesel Clg Wtr Pump Failure Or Locked Out. It will not reset.

Role Play:

EO in U2 EDG room to check cooling water pump control switch: report, the cooling water pump control switch is in its normal position and all control switch indicating lights are OFF.

EO to verify fuse 2-3903-F1 in EDG 2 Aux Control Panel: wait 2 min, the report that fuse 2-3903-F1 is NOT blown.

EO to check the U2 EDG cooling water pump breaker: Wait 2 min, then report the U2 EDG cooling water pump breaker is closed, but there is an acrid smell coming from the cubicle.

Support personnel: Acknowledge requests.

BOP Announces alarms:

902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

902-7 G-8, U2 Diesel Gen Clg Wtr PP Trip/Lkout Sends an operator to check the U2 EDG Trouble alarm.

Directs operator to verify fuse 2-3903-F1 in EDG 2 Aux Control Panel.

Sends an operator to check the U2 EDG cooling water pump breaker.

Performs DOA 6600-01, Diesel Generator Failure, as directed:

Places the U2 EDG output breaker to the Pull-To-Lock position. (Optional /

required only if EDG is running)

Places the U2 EDG control switch to STOP.

Informs the Unit Supervisor of the field reports.

ATC Monitors panels, provide assistance as directed.

CRS Enters DOA 6600-01, Diesel Generator Failure, and directs actions.

Declares the U2 EDG inoperable.

TEAM May enter DOP 6700-20, 480V Circuit Breaker Trip May direct EO to open U2 EDG cooling water pump breaker.

May direct EO to place the U2 EDG cooling water pump control switch in PTL.

ILT-N-1 Page 9 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Three - Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Role Play:

EO to open U2 EDG cooling water pump breaker: wait 1 min, and then report the U2 EDG cooling water pump breaker is open.

EO to place the U2 EDG cooling water pump control switch in PTL: wait 1 min, and then report the U2 EDG cooling water pump control switch is in PTL.

CRS Determines following Technical Specifications apply:

• TS 3.7.2, Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) System, Condition A.1:

Declare associated DG inoperable immediately.

• TS 3.8.1, AC SourcesOperating, Condition:

B.1: Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuit(s) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

B.3.1: Determine OPERABLE DG(s) are not inoperable due to common cause failure OR B.3.2: perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG(s) within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

B.4: Restore required DG to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

CRS Directs performance of DOS 0040-08, Unit 2 Operating Power Sources and Distribution.

Directs Engineering to determine the EDG is not inoperable due to common cause failure OR directs performing operability surveillance for the 2/3 EDG.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

• U2 EDG declared inoperable; and,

• Technical Specification determination completed, AND / OR,

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-1 Page 10 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Four - CRD Suction Filter Plugging / Swap CRD Pumps Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

4 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4. This will cause a simulated Plugging of 2B CRD pump suction filter, and finally trip the pump on low suction pressure if the crew has not swapped the pump yet. NOTE: It may take several minutes before an alarm occurs.

As the EO, if asked, wait 2 min. and then report: The 2B CRD pump suction pressure is 14 in. Hg and getting worse.

NSO may follow DOP 0300-01 and have the EO check 2A CRD pump ready to start. Wait 1 min, then report: 2A CRD pump is ready to start.

ATC Announces alarms 902-5 D-2, 2B ROD DRIVE PP SUCT LO AND 902-5 F-2, ACCUMULATOR CHARGING WTR PRESS LO, and degrading CRD system parameters.

Carries out actions of DOP 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Start Up And Operation:

Directs EO vent 2A CRD pump casing.

Directs EO vent 2A CRD pump suction filter.

Directs EO to verify 2A CRD pump oil levels.

Directs EO to verify 2A CRD pump suction and discharge valves open.

Starts 2A CRD pump.

Secures 2B CRD pump.

Verifies normal CRD system pressures and flow.

ROLE PLAY:

As the EO, if asked, report: 2A CRD pump is operating normally.

CRS Directs swapping CRD pumps per DOP 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Start Up and Operation, due to degrading operation of 2B CRD pump.

BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

NOTE:

If the Team waits until the 2B CRD pump trips, the following actions apply:

ATC Announces 2B CRD pump trip.

Per immediate action of DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, starts the standby CRD pump.

CRS Enters DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, due to failure of 2B CRD pump.

Enters DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip, due to trip of 2B CRD pump.

May reference TRM 3.3.h Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation System (RVWLIS) Backfill System due to short loss of RVWLIS supply.

ILT-N-1 Page 11 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Four - CRD Suction Filter Plugging / Swap CRD Pumps Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 4 Completion Criteria:

• 2A CRD pump has been started and the immediate actions of DOA 300-01 are complete, AND/OR

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-1 Page 12 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Five - B Med Range Level Instrument Fails Low with a Partial Half Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 5, which fails B medium range 5

downscale and inserts B RPS partial half scram.

ATC Notices and reports the B Medium Range level instrument trending down.

Announces:

The partial half scram condition on the B RPS channel.

Scram Solenoid Group lights B2 and B3 did NOT extinguish.

Refers to DOA 0500-02, Partial 1/2 or Full Scram Actuation. (May insert the manual half scram as an immediate action of DOA 0500-02 then refer to the procedure).

Depresses RPS Channel B Manual Scram pushbutton.

Acknowledges appropriate annunciators.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

As the EO sent to the ATS Panel (wait 2 min AND the 902-4 G-20 alarm is up), then report: The B medium range level instrument MTU LIS 2-263-140B is reading full downscale and its gross failure light is lit.

As the EO sent to the MCC 28-1 circuit 15 and/or 125vdc Bus 2A-1 Dist Panel, circuit 27 (wait 3 min), then report: The breaker is NOT tripped and looks normal.

IF asked: The Yarway LI-2(3)-263-59A on the 2202-5 rack is indicating 30 inches and steady.

ATC / Refers to DAN 902-4 G-20:

BOP Dispatches an operator to inspect the Div 1 ATS panel 2202-73A Notifies the Unit Supervisor of inspection results.

CRS Announces entry into DOA 0500-02, Partial 1/2 or Full Scram Actuation and performs/directs:

Directs NSO to insert manual scram on RPS Channel B.

May refer to DOP 0010-10, Unit 2(3) Technical Specification Instrumentation Operability Manual.

CRS References Technical Specifications and determines:

• TS 3.3.1.1 Action A1 or A2 apply.

• TS 3.3.3.1 Action A1. Restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

• TS 3.3.6.1 Condition A1. Place channel in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

• TS 3.3.6.2 Condition A1. Place channel in trip within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

ILT-N-1 Page 13 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Five - B Med Range Level Instrument Fails Low with a Partial Half Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 4 Completion Criteria:

• Half Scram inserted, and

• Appropriate Tech Specs referenced, AND/OR

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-1 Page 14 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Six - Circulating Water Pump 2A Trips on Overload.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

6 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 6, which trips 2A Circulating Water pump.

BOP Performs the following actions per DAN 902-7 A-15, Circ Wtr PP Trip, DOA 4400-01, Circulating Water System Failure, and DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip, as directed:

Starts 2B Circulating Water pump. (immediate action)

Verifies condenser vacuum returning to normal.

Verifies 2A Circulating Water pump discharge valve closes.

Sends EO to check 2A Circulating Water pump breaker and operation of 2B Circulating Water pump.

Places 2A Circulating Water pump control switch in PTL.

Verifies Circulating Water Flow reversal valves lined up normally.

May send EO to check Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens.

Role Play:

As the EO sent to 2A Circulating Water pump breaker (wait 3 min), then report: 2A Circulating Water pump breaker has an overcurrent target up.

As the EO sent to 2A Circulating Water pump (wait 3 min), then report: 2A Circulating Water pump motor is hot to the touch.

As the EO sent to check 2B Circulating Water pump operation (wait 2 min), then report:

2B Circulating Water pump is operating normally.

As the EO sent to check Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens (wait 3 min), then report: the Cribhouse bar racks and traveling screens are clear.

CRS Enters and directs performance of DOA 4400-01, Circulating Water System Failure, and DOA 6500-10, 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip.

Notifies the Shift Manager and EMD.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 6 Completion Criteria:

• 2B Circulating Water pump started, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-1 Page 15 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Events Seven -Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum / Manual Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the direction of the Lead Examiner activate trigger 7, which causes air in-leakage to the 7 Main Condenser.

ROLE PLAY:

Acknowledge requests as support personnel.

BOP May diagnose slowly decreasing vacuum by observing condenser vacuum recorder or increase in SJAE / Off Gas flow.

BOP Announces the following alarms indicating continued air leakage:

902-7 C-13 2A OFF GAS SYS FLOW HI/LO.

902-7 D-13, OFF GAS FILT DP HI 902-7 H-3, TURB VACUUM LO.

902-5 F-5, CONDR VACUUM LO.

CRS Directs team to enter and execute DOA 3300-02, Loss of Condenser Vacuum ATC If directed, performs DOA 3300-02, Loss of Condenser Vacuum:

Trips Hydrogen addition, Checks condenser water box DP, Verifies Turbine Vacuum Breaker closed.

CRS May direct Team to perform scram preparations per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

ATC / Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, scram preparatory actions as directed:

BOP Starts the motor suction pump and the turning gear oil pump.

Trips hydrogen addition.

CRS Directs team to scram the reactor per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed:

Places Mode Switch to Shutdown and depresses the Scram pushbuttons.

Checks rods inserted and observes they are inserted CRS Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control, Directs actions of DEOP 100.

Verification of all isolations, ECCS and EDG starts.

Holding RPV/L +8 to +48 inches.

Maintaining RPV/P <1060 psig using the Isolation Condenser.

ATC / If directed, maintains RPV/P <1060 psig using the Iso Cond to control RPV/P (may BOP use Hardcard)

ILT-N-1 Page 16 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Events Seven -Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum / Manual Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 7 Completion Criteria:

• Reactor scrammed and plant stabilized, AND / OR,

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-1 Page 17 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Eight - Loss of RPV Level Indication / RPV Flooding Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

After the team has stabilized the unit following the reactor scram, and at the discretion of the 8

Lead Evaluator, activate trigger 8, which:

• Simulates a trip of the MCC 29-1 supply to ATS Panel 2202-73B which causes loss of MR A and FZ B RPV level instruments.

• After 2 min, fails the remaining RPV level instruments in a way that simulates a leak in the common sensing leg for the 2202-5 instrument rack (MR B, NR A & WR) causing them to ramp downscale. Bailey System NR B circuit card fails causing it to ramp upscale.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

EO to open/close the CRD 2-0301-25 valve: On Instructor Station drawing RD2, change the CRD 2-0301-25 valve position to the requested position and then report its position.

Role Play:

When dispatched to the ATS Panel, wait a few minutes, and then report that all instruments in the top row of panel 2202-73B are downscale and no indicating lights on the top row are lit. All other indications are normal.

EO sent to MCC 29-1. Wait two minutes then report from MCC 29-1 that the breaker for circuit 4 is tripped.

If sent to 125 VDC Main Bus Dist. Panel 2B-1 to check breaker 17, report that it is closed.

When/if directed to close the ATS Panel supply breaker, wait ~20 seconds, then report that you attempted to reclose the breaker and it immediately tripped again.

BOP Reports annunciator 902-4 H-20, ATS Div 2 2202-73B Trouble, in alarm and references DAN.

Sends an EO to inspect ATS panel 2202-73B.

May direct an EO to MCC 29-1 to check the feed breaker (circuit 4) to ATS.

May direct the closure of the ATS Panel power supply breaker.

TEAM Begins to determine the equipment affected by loss of the ATS feed.

CRS May refer to DOP 6800-05, Power Restoration to Analog Trip System Feeds to check for restoration requirements.

TEAM Determines that RPV level indications are diverging.

TEAM May send operators to local instrument panels.

Role Play:

EO to Reactor Bldg to get local RPV level indication: wait 2 min, and then report there is steam around all the instrument racks and I am unable to get local RPV level readings.

ILT-N-1 Page 18 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Eight - Loss of RPV Level Indication / RPV Flooding Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Based on diverging RPV level indication, exits DEOP 0100 and enters DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding, and performs / directs:

Verifying Torus level above 6 feet.

Opening all 5 ADSVs.

Isolating the following steam lines:

MSIVs.

Main Steam line drains.

IC.

HPCI.

Flooding the RPV to the Main Steam lines.

Directs defeating the RFP trips.

Keeping the RPV flooded to the Main Steam lines with injection flow as low as possible.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

9 Operator to defeat RFP trips: wait 2 min, activate Trigger 9 and then report that the RFP trips are defeated ATC / Performs DEOP 0400-01, RPV Flooding, as directed:

BOP Verifies Torus level above 6 feet.

Opens all 5 ADSVs (only 4 open, since fuses pulled for one).

Isolates the following steam lines:

MSIVs.

Main Steam line drains.

IC.

HPCI.

Floods the RPV to the Main Steam lines.

Keeps the RPV flooded to the Main Steam lines with injection flow as low as possible.

ATC / Slows down RPV injection once ERV tailpipe temperatures drop below saturation and BOP pressure is steady.

CRS Enters DEOP 02-01, Primary Containment Control due to the flowing:

Torus Water Level high.

Torus Temperature high.

CRS Requests IMD to restore RPV level instruments.

Event 8 / Scenario Completion Criteria:

• RPV has been flooded AND / OR,

• At the discretion of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-1 Page 19 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Critical Tasks:

When RPV water level cannot be determined, INITIATE emergency (RPV 2.1) depressurization.

When reactor water level cannot be determined, INJECT into the RPV to (RPV 2.2) flood up to the Main Steam Lines.

ILT-N-1 Page 20 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-4 G-20 Analog Trip Sys Div 1 2202 73A Trouble DAN 902-4 H-20 ATS Div 2 2202-73B Trouble DAN 902-5 D-2 2B Rod Drive PP Suct Lo DAN 902-5 F-2 Accumulator Charging Wtr Press Lo DAN 902-5 F-5 Condr Vacuum Lo DAN 902-7 A-15 Circ Wtr PP Trip DAN 902-7 C-13 2A Off Gas Sys Flow HI/LO DAN 902-7 D-13 Off Gas Filt DP HI DAN 902-7 G-8 U2 Diesel Gen Clg Wtr PP Trip/Lkout DAN 902-7 H-3 Turb Vacuum Lo DAN 902-8 A-7 U2 Diesel Gen Trouble DEOP 100 RPV Control DEOP 0400-01 RPV Flooding DGP 02-03 Reactor Scram DGP 03-01 Power Changes DOA 0300-01 Control Rod Drive System Failure DOA 0500-02 Partial 1/2 or Full Scram Actuation DOA 3300-02 Loss of Condenser Vacuum DOA 4400-01 Circulating Water System Failure DOA 4700-01 Instrument Air System Failure DOA 6500-10 4KV Circuit Breaker Trip DOA 6600-01 Diesel Generator Failure DOP 0010-10 Unit 2(3) Technical Specification Instrumentation Operability Manual DOP 0202-03 Reactor Recirculation Flow Control System Operation DOP 0300-01 Control Rod Drive System Start Up And Operation DOP 4700-01 Instrument Air System Startup DOP 4700-08 3C Instrument Air System Operation DOP 6700-20 480V Circuit Breaker Trip DOP 6800-05 Power Restoration to Analog Trip System Feeds DOS 0040-08 Unit 2 Operating Power Sources and Distribution TS 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation TS 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation TS 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation TS 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation TS 3.7.2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) System TS 3.8.1 AC SourcesOperating TRM 3.3.h Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation System (RVWLIS) Backfill System ILT-N-1 Page 21 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

EXAM 11-1 (2012-301) NRC - SCENARIO 01 QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

ILT-N-1 Page 22 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Computer Aided Exercise Programs

1. ILT-N-1.cae

1. For ILT Class 11-1 NRC Exam

1. Written by MP

1. Rev 00

1. Date 05/12

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Sets APRM Master Gain pot to 1.0 irf niagain 1.0

1. Inserts CH B RPS partial half scram.

imf b15

1. Closes the IA 3C to 2B X-tie valve.

irf vp6 0.0

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.

trgset 1 "0" trg 1 "irf niagainf true"l2

1. Event trigger 2 Simulates U2 EDG cooling water pump breaker control power transformer failure:

1. Inserts U2 Diesel Gen Clg Wtr PP Trip malfunction.

1. Forces up alarm 902-7 G-8, U2 Diesel Gen Clg Wtr PP Trip/lkout.

1. Forces up alarm 902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

Trgset 2 "0"l2 imf t18 (2)l2 imf ser0710 (2) onl2 imf ser1589 (2) onl4

1. Event trigger 3 Acknowledges alarm 902-8 A-7, U2 Diesel Gen Trouble.

Trgset 3 "0"l4 trg 3 "mmf ser1589 normal"l4

1. Event Trigger 4 Ramps the 2B CRD suction filter isolation valves closed over 8 min. to simulate clogging.

1. This will cause the low suct pres alarm and eventually trip the 2B CRD pump.

1. After 8 min, isolates the 2B CRD pump suction filter to ensure the CRD pump trips.

trgset 4 "0"l4 trg 4 "ramp rdvstrnr(2) 0.25 .01 8:00"l6 irf rdfiltb (4 8:00) falsel6

1. Event Trigger 5 fails B medium range downscale.

trgset 5 "0"l6 imf nvm100bp (5) -120.0 4:00l6

1. Event Trigger 6 Trips 2A Circ Water pump.

trgset 6 "0"l8 imf hp6 (6)l8

1. Event Trigger 7 Inserts Main Condenser air in-leakage.

trgset 7 "0"l8 imf hp5 (7) 30.0l8

1. Event Trigger 8 Blows the fuse for the MCC 29-1 feed to ATS panel 2202-73B.

ILT-N-1 Page 23 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

1. This causes a loss of RPV MR A and FZ B.

1. After 2 min, fails RPV MR B level instrument downscale on 5 min. ramp.

1. After 2 min, fails RPV NR A level instrument to downscale on 5 min. ramp.

1. After 2 min, fails RPV NR B level instrument to upscale on 5 min. ramp.

1. After 2 min, fails RPV Wide Range level instrument to downscale on 5 min. ramp.

trgset 8 "0"l10 imf at5 (8)l10 imf nvml57ap (8 2:00) -120.0 5:00l10 imf nvml23ap (8 2:00) -120.0 5:00l10 imf nvml23cp (8 2:00) -120.0 5:00l12 imf nvml29ap (8 2:00) -75.0 5:00l12 imf nvml29bp (8 2:00) 75.0 5:00l12 imf nvml112p (8 2:00) -400.0 5:00l12

1. Event Trigger 9 bypasses the RFP high level trip.

trgset 9 "0"l14 irf fwknife (9) openl14

1. Event Trigger 10 Opens the IA 3C to 2B X-tie valve.

trgset 10 "0"l14 trg 10 "set iap2 = 110.0"l14

1. Event Trigger 11 Opens the IA 3C to 2B X-tie valve.

trgset 11 "0"l16 irf vp6 (11) 100.0l16

1. END ILT-N-1 Page 24 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 760 MWe, Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at Full Power Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.881 Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action limit: 0.980 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started: LCO Expires:

TS Cause:

Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Seperator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.

Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:

HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut with fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.

HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throwing its belts. WO 1156150.

HVAC -1 ON.

HV-2 running.

Switchyard Status Today 138 KV Bus 1 Feed To TR 22 Combi Units has low oil in the 'C' phase, ComEd WO #276162 Today HVO: Exercise CAUTION while in the 345 KV Yard due to excavation being performed in the area.

Marv Evans reports holes being dug near manual switch disconnects 345KV Blue Bus. Plywood will be installed over the holes if access is needed, but be aware there are holes under the plywood.

SSC called from the 345KV yard reporting that the cable trough covers are removed to prep for upcoming work. Be careful.

ILT-N-1 Page 25 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

• • • • Shift 1 Activities ****

?

?

• • • • Shift 2 Activities ****

? Load was dropped last shift for the TSO. The TSO requests load dropped at beginning of shift. Drop power to 58 Mlbm/hr core flow using Recirc flow. Do not secure additional RFPs or Condensate/booster pumps. Load is expected to be picked up early next shift.

?

?

?

• • • • Shift 3 Activities ****

?

?

Today **** Unit 2 Procedures In-Progress **** Do Not Delete ****

?

?

ILT-N-1 Page 26 of 26 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Dresden Generating Station 11-1 (2012-301) NRC - SCENARIO 02 HVAC - REACTOR BUILDING FANS, SWAP FOR MAINTENANCE FW - FWRV, REMOVE FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE HVAC - RECIRC MG VENT FAN, DEGRADES CAUSING LOW FLOW HPCI - SYSTEM, INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF TURNING GEAR TO ENGAGE DWEDS - ALARM FAILURE, MANUALLY PUMP SUMPS MAIN STEAM - ERV, SPURIOUS OPENING MANUAL SCRAM - LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE - ON 2 AREAS ABOVE MAX SAFE RADIATION LEVELS DUE TO HPCI STEAM LINE LEAK INTO THE HPCI ROOM.

EXAM MATERIAL Rev. 00 04/12 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Station Scenario No.: 11-1 (2012-301) NRC - Scenario 02 Evaluators Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Initial Power = 70%

Load dropped to support FRV Maintenance Turnover: Remove 2B FWRV From Service For Maintenance Swap Reactor Building Fans For Maintenance Place HPCI on the Turning Gear Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 NONE N BOP HVAC - Reactor Building Fans, Swap For Maintenance 2 NONE N ATC FW - FWRV, Remove From Service For Maintenance 3 RRMFAEXH C ATC HVAC - Recirc MG Vent Fan, Degrades Causing Low Flow HPCI - System, Inoperable Due to Failure of Turning Gear to 4 HPTGFAIL C/T BOP Engage 5 SER0512 C ATC DWEDS - Alarm Failure, Manually Pump Sumps ADS3CBN 6 C/T BOP MAIN STEAM - ERV, Spurious Opening ADS3CSD 7 NP2 M TEAM Manual Scram - Loss Of Instrument Air System EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZE - On 2 Areas Above Max 8 HPRMBRKP M TEAM Safe Radiation Levels Due To HPCI Steam Line Leak into the HPCI Room.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec ILT-N-2 Page 2 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Scenario Objective Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with a steam leak requiring Emergency Depressurization.

Scenario Summary Initial Conditions:

1. Unit is at 70% power.

2. The following equipment is OOS:

a. None

3. LCOs:

a. None Scenario Sequence

• The Team swaps Reactor Building Supply Fans.

• The Team removes 2B FWRV from service.

• 2A Recirc MG vent fan degrades causing low ventilation flow. Recirc MG Set temperatures will rise. The Team starts 2B Recirc MG vent fan and secures 2A Recirc MG vent fan.

• The Team attempts to place the HPCI Turbine on the turning gear. The turning gear fails to engage causing the HPCI System to be inoperable. The Team addresses Tech Spec requirements.

• The Drywell Equipment Drain Sump level alarm fails which requires the Drywell Sumps pumped. The Team determines from the sump pumping that actual Drywell leakage has not increased.

• An ERV spuriously opens due to an electrical failure. Pulling its fuses closes the ERV.

• A large leak develops in the Instrument Air system. The Team will scram the reactor and close the outboard MSIVs due to the leak severity.

• A Fuel Element Failure (FEF) and an unisolable HPCI steam line leak in the HPCI Room occur. When the HPCI Room temperature reaches Max Normal Level, (150 °F) the Team will enter DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control. The HPCI Room High Temperature isolation fails and the crew will attempt to close the HPCI steam line isolation valves MO 2301-4 & 5 manually. Failures in the control logic for the MO 2301-4 & 5 valves prevent closing the valves. The Team will Emergency Depressurize when 2 or more reactor building radiation levels exceed Max Safe Levels.

Event One - Swap Reactor Building Supply Fans

• When directed, swaps Reactor Building Supply Fans.

Malfunctions required:

• (None)

Success Path:

• Swaps Reactor Building Supply Fans.

ILT-N-2 Page 3 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Two - Remove 2B FWRV from Service

• The Team removes 2B FWRV from service.

Malfunctions required: 0

• (None)

Success Path:

• Performs DOP 0600-06, Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV) Operation, to remove 2B FWRV from service.

Event Three - Recirc MG Vent Fan Degrades Causing Low Flow

• 2A Recirc MG vent fan degrades causing low ventilation flow. Recirc MG Set temperatures will rise.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Degraded Recirc MG vent fan)

Success Path:

• The Team will start 2B Recirc MG Vent Fan and secure 2A Recirc MG vent fan.

Event Four - HPCI Inoperable Due to Failure of Turning Gear to Engage

• The Team attempts to place the HPCI Turbine on the turning gear. The turning gear fails to engage causing the HPCI System to be inoperable.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (HPCI Turbine turning gear failure to engage)

Success Path:

• The Team declares HPCI inoperable.

• The Team references Tech Specs.

Event Five - Drywell Equipment Sump Level Alarm Failure

• The Drywell Equipment Drain Sump level alarm fails Malfunctions required: 1

• (Drywell Equipment Drain Sump level alarm fail)

Success Path:

• Pumps the Drywell Equipment Sump.

• Determines from the sump pumping that actual Drywell leakage has not increased ILT-N-2 Page 4 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Six - Spurious ERV Opening

• An ERV spuriously opens.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (ERV fails open)

Success Path:

• Performs DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, and pulls the ERVs control power fuses.

Event Seven - Loss of Instrument Air / Reactor Scram

• A large leak develops in the Instrument Air system Malfunctions required: 1

• (Instrument Air Leak)

Success Path:

• Performs a manual scram.

• Closes the outboard MSIVs.

Event Eight - FEF / Steam Leak in HPCI Room / Secondary Containment High Radiation / Emergency Depressurization

• A fuel element failure and an unisolable HPCI steam line leak in the HPCI Room occur Malfunctions required: 2

• (Fuel Element Failure)

• (Unisolable HPCI steam line leak in the HPCI Room)

Success Path:

• Performs DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control.

• Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization ILT-N-2 Page 5 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ-JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

2 Provide the Team with marked up copies of the following:

a. DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation.

b. DOP 0600-06, Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV) Operation. Mark Step G.11.h as N/A.

c. DOP 2300-02, HPCI System Turning Gear Operation 3 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. a. Initialize simulator in an IC which allows establishing the following: (Jump Drive IC 157 can be used)

1) Reactor power at ~70%.

2) Generator at ~630 MWe.

b. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.

c. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.

d. Advance the chart recorders.

4 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. Verify 2A Recirc MG Vent fan running with 2B in standby.

b. Verify BOTH 2A & 2B FWRVs in Master Auto.

c. 2A and 2B RFPs running with 2C RFP in STBY on Bus 22.

d. Verify Zinc Injection label in place for lined up to 2A RFP.

e. Verify 2A & 2B IACs are operating with 3C IAC OFF.

f. Verify 2A & 2B Reactor Building Vent fans running with 2C in standby.

5 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None NOTE: Perform the above setup prior to running the setup CAEP file.

6 Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-2.cae 7 Load but DO NOT RUN CAEP file: ILT-N-2 Rad.cae 8 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

9 The Rad Malfunctions used in CAEP file ILT-N-2 Rad.cae do not reset when the IC is reset. Therefore, when the scenario is completed, EITHER:

a. Run CAEP file: ILT-N-2 Clear Rad.cae; OR,

b. Stop and Restart MST.

ILT-N-2 Page 6 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Time Critical Tasks Required Actions Optional Actions ILT-N-2 Page 7 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event One - Swap Reactor Building Supply Fans Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

1 If requested to set APRM gains to 1, (wait 3 min) activate trigger 1, then report: APRM gains are set to 1. (This trigger can be toggled OFF, then back ON to adjust the gains more than once).

ROLE PLAY:

At the direction of the Lead Examiner, call as the Shift Manager and direct the Team to start 2C Reactor Building Vent Fan and secure 2B Reactor Building Vent Fan.

EO stationed at Reactor Building Vent Fans: If asked, report that the Reactor Building Vent Fans operated as expected.

CRS Directs starting 2C Reactor Building Vent Fan and securing 2B Reactor Building Vent Fan per DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation.

BOP Performs DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation, as follows.

Places switch 2B RBX vent fan C/S in TRIP.

IMMEDIATELY places switch for 2C RBX vent fan C/S in CLOSE.

ATC Monitors panel, provides assistance as directed.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

• Reactor Building Vent Fans swapped, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-2 Page 8 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Two - Remove B FWRV from Service Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAY:

At the direction of the Lead Examiner, call as the Shift Manager and direct the Team to remove 2B FWRV from service for maintenance.

CRS Directs ATC to remove 2B FWRV from service for maintenance per DOP 0600-06, Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV) Operation.

ATC Removes 2B FWRV from service for maintenance per DOP 0600-06, Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV) Operation.

Verifies total Feedwater flow is 8.3 Mlbm/hr.

Verifies reactor level stable.

Places 2B FWRV REG VLV CONTROL STATION in MAN.

Verifies 2A FWRV operating in MASTER AUTO.

Slowly reduces 2B FWRV DEMAND to close 2B FWRV while verifying 2A FWRV automatically adjusts.

Closes isolation valve MO 2-3206B, 2B FW REG ISOL.

Places 2B FWRV in test at the OIS. (The OIS is not modeled in the simulator)

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

When the operator goes to the OIS station, which is not modeled in the simulator, then:

2 o When the operator indicates he/she is placing the 2B FWRV in test, activate trigger 2, which forces up alarm 902-6 H-3, FW Control System Panel Trouble. Cue the operator that 2B FWRV is in test.

3 o When the operator indicates he/she is acknowledging the OIS alarm, activate trigger 3, which returns alarm 902-H-3 to normal. Cue the operator that the OIS alarm is acknowledged.

BOP Assist ATC as directed.

Event 2 Completion Criteria:

• 2B FWRV removed from service, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-2 Page 9 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Three - Recirc MG Vent Fan Degrades Causing Low Ventilation Flow.

Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE: Ensure the ATC operator performs this Event Simulator Operator:

4 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4 which causes reduced Recirc MG Set ventilation flow.

Verify trigger 5 automatically activates when a Recirc MG Set temperature alarm is 5

received. This adjusts the ventilation flow so temperatures remain below levels requiring speed to be reduced.

6 After the Team has successfully transferred to 2B Recirc MG Set Vent Fan, activate trigger 5. This deletes the reduced Recirc MG Set ventilation flow malfunction.

Role Play:

EO to check Recirc MG Set ventilation: Wait 2 min, and then report that 2A Recirc MG vent fan is making a lot of noise and is severely vibrating.

EO to check operation of 2B Recirc MG vent fan: Wait 2 min, and then report that 2B Recirc MG vent fan is operating normally.

ATC Acknowledges and announces alarms:

902-4 E-4, 2A Recirc M-G Temp Hi.

902-4 E-9, 2B Recirc M-G Temp Hi.

902-4 B-9, 2A/B Recirc M-G Mtr/Gen Temp Hi Sends operator to check status of the Recirc MG ventilation system.

Starts 2B Recirc MG vent fan.

Secures 2A Recirc MG vent fan.

Sends operator to check operation of the 2B Recirc MG vent fan.

CRS Directs swapping Recirc MG vent fans.

TEAM May reference DOA 5750-01, Ventilation System Failure.

BOP Assists as directed.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

• Swapped to 2B Recirc MG vent fan, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-2 Page 10 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Four - HPCI Inoperable Due to Loss of Oil Pumps Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAY:

At the discretion of the Lead examiner, as the Shift Manager, direct the CRS to place U2 HPCI on the turning gear per DOP 2300-02 step G.2. Engineering and an extra EO are standing by in the U2 HPCI room.

CRS Directs BOP to place U2 HPCI on the turning gear per DOP 2300-02, HPCI System Turning Gear Operation, step G.2.

BOP Performs DOP 2300-02, HPCI System Turning Gear Operation, step G.2.

Verifies the TURNING GEAR control switch is in NORMAL.

Starts the EMERG OIL PP.

Resets the TURNING GEAR with the TURNING GEAR RESET pushbutton.

Places the TURNING GEAR Control Switch to start.

Observes that the TURNING GEAR ENGAGE light is NOT illuminated, THEN turns the TURNING GEAR control switch to ENGAGE.

Observes that the Turning Gear Motor automatically stopped after 5 seconds.

May notify the CRS and request concurrence with repeating the steps to engage the turning gear.

Repeats the necessary above steps up to 3 times to attempt to engage the turning gear..

BOP Notifies the CRS that the U2 HPCI turning gear did not engage and DOP 2300-02 directs proceeding to step G.4.

CRS May direct BOP to place U2 HPCI on the turning gear per DOP 2300-02, HPCI System Turning Gear Operation, step G.4; OR, May declare HPCI inoperable at this point.

BOP Notifies the CRS that the U2 HPCI turning gear still did not engage and DOP 2300-02 has a Caution which states the HPCI System must be declared inoperable if the Turning Gear can NOT be engaged from the Control Room.

ROLE PLAY:

Respond as Engineering / EO in the U2 HPCI room about turning gear status:

Report that The U2 HPCI turning gear motor ran for about 5 seconds, but the turning gear did not engage. The U2 HPCI turning gear appears to be damaged and cannot be engaged locally.

CRS Declares HPCI inoperable.

References Technical Specifications and determines:

TS 3.5.1 Action G applies. Verify Isolation Condenser is OPERABLE immediately AND restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

ATC Monitors panels and assists as directed.

ILT-N-2 Page 11 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Four - HPCI Inoperable Due to Loss of Oil Pumps Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 4 Completion Criteria:

• HPCI declared inoperable,

• Tech Specs addressed, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-2 Page 12 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Five - Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Alarm Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

To ensure the ATC Operator performs these actions, call the Control Room as the WEC supervisor requesting the BOP report back which Service Water pumps are operating.

NOTE:

This event simulates failure of the alarm circuit; actual sump level is below the alarm setpoint. Therefore the sump pumps will not automatically start when the AO 2-2001-5 AND AO 2-2001-6, DW EQUIP DRN ISOL VLV(s), are opened. The sump pumping is intended to result in about a 3 gpm leak rate calculation.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

7 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 7, which forces up alarm 902-4 B-17, Drywell Equip Sump Lvl Hi.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to check Drywell CAM: Wait 2 min, and then report that the Drywell CAM reading is unchanged.

NOTE / ROLE PLAY:

When the ATC opens AO 2-2001-5 AND AO 2-2001-6, DW EQUIP DRN ISOL VLV(s), the recorder 2-2040-2, D/W EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP FLOW, does not reset to approximately zero as expected. It does reset when a pump is started.

When AO 2-2001-5 AND AO 2-2001-6, DW EQUIP DRN ISOL VLV(s), are open, cue the ATC that recorder 2-2040-2, D/W EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP FLOW, reset to zero.

FLOOR INSTRUCTOR ROLE PLAY:

As U3 CRS, inform the U2 CRS that I will perform the leakage rate calculation.

Cue the Team that it has been 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> since the Drywell Equipment Sump was last pumped.

ATC Announces alarm:

902-4 B-17, Drywell Equip Sump Lvl Hi.

CRS Directs pumping the Drywell Equipment Drain Sump per DOP 2000-24, Drywell Sump Operation.

ILT-N-2 Page 13 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Five - Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Alarm Failure Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC Pumps the Drywell Equipment Drain Sump per DOP 2000-24, Drywell Sump Operation:

Verifies ONE of the following conditions exists:

o The Drywell CAM indicates normal activity with no unexplained changes.

o Obtains an acceptable drywell air sample.

o Verifies reactor water level, drywell pressure, and main steam line radiation monitors are within normal limits with NO unexplained changes.

Verifies open AO 2-2001-3, DW EQUIP SUMP DISCH VLV.

Opens AO 2-2001-5 AND AO 2-2001-6, DW EQUIP DRN ISOL VLV(s).

Verify recorder 2-2040-2, D/W EQUIPMENT DRAIN SUMP FLOW:

o Indicates RCD on digital display.

o Integrator value resets to approximately zero.

Manually starts 2A OR 2B EQUIP DRN PP.

ATC WHEN pumping is complete OR level has reach the desired point, THEN:

Verify EQUIP DRN PP stops.

Close AO 2-2001-5 AND AO 2-2001-6, DW EQUIP DRN ISOL VLV(s).

Places the 2A OR 2B EQUIP DRN PP control switch in NORMAL-AFTER-STOP.

Reset the annunciators associated with the Drywell Equipment and Drywell Floor drain valves.

BOP Assists as directed.

Event 5 Completion Criteria:

• Drywell Equipment Sump pumped and leak rate determined to be unchanged.

AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-2 Page 14 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Six - Spurious ERV Opening Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

8 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 8, which causes E ERV to spuriously open due to an electrical failure.

As the EO sent to pull control power fuses for the E ERV (wait 3 min) activate trigger 9, 9 which removes control power fuses for the E ERV, then call the control room on the phone and report: I have pulled the E ERV fuses.

As the QNE called to evaluate core parameters (wait 2 min) then report: core parameters are within limits.

BOP Determines/announces that E ERV is open. Performs DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, immediate actions:

Places the E ERV control switch to OFF.

ATC Verifies FWLCS has stabilized level.

CRS Enters DOA 0250-01, Relief Valve Failure, and directs actions.

BOP Determines that E ERV is still open and performs subsequent actions of DOA 0250-01:

Cycles E ERV control switch to MAN and OFF twice.

Cycles the ADS INHIBIT switch from NORMAL to INHIBIT to NORMAL several times.

Directs E ERV control power fuses pulled.

If torus temp is greater than circulating water inlet temperature, starts torus cooling as directed.

If > 95° and DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, entry is required.

Monitors Turbine Bypass Valve Operation.

May check hydrogen addition operation.

May monitor torus temp per DOS 1600-20, Suppression Pool Temp Monitoring.

Resets the acoustic monitor.

CRS May direct scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

May enter DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, for high Torus level.

If Torus temperature reaches 95°F, then enters DEOP 0200-1, Primary Containment Control, and performs/directs:

Monitoring of PC/P Initiation of torus cooling. (May already be started per DOA 0250-01)

Monitoring of Torus level.

Verifying initiation of drywell and torus H2/O2 monitors.

ATC Performs scram preparatory actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed.

o Scram preparatory conditions already exist.

BOP Determines/announces that E ERV closed when fuses pulled.

ILT-N-2 Page 15 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Six - Spurious ERV Opening Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS Declares E ERV inoperable.

Determines following Technical Specifications apply:

• 3.0.3, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> place the unit, in:

MODE 3 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

• 3.4.3, Safety and Relief Valves, Condition A.1: Restore the relief valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

• 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, Condition K.1: With HPCI System and one or more ADS valves inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately.

• 3.6.1.8, Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker, SR 3.6.1.8.2:

Perform a functional test of each required vacuum breaker within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

CRS Directs performance of Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker testing.

TEAM May enter and perform DGA-07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition Event 6 Completion Criteria:

• The failed ERV is closed,

• Technical Specification determination completed, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-2 Page 16 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Seven - Instrument Air Leak / Reactor Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

At the direction of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 10 to initiate a large Instrument Air 10 leak.

11 Verify trigger 11 automatically activates when IA pressure drops <40.0 psig. This binds the A MSIVs.

ROLE PLAY:

EO sent to check air compressor and air dryer operation, wait 3 min. then report, The air compressors are all running loaded and there are no problems at the air dryers.

Personnel sent to inspect IA system for rupture, acknowledge the order.

If asked, U1 air system is not is service If directed to perform other actions as plant personnel, acknowledge the request. If asked later for progress, report that you are on the way to perform the task.

BOP Announces alarm 923-1 F-4, U2 INST AIR PRESS LOW.

Verifies U2 SA to IA Auto Crosstie Valve opens at 85 psig CRS Announces entry into DOA 4700-01, Instrument Air System Failure, and directs team actions.

Briefs team to be prepared to manually scram the reactor and close the outboard MSIVs IF Instrument Air pressure drops to 55 psig.

Announces entry into DOA 0600-01, Transient Level Control, and directs concurrent performance with DOA 4700-01, IA System Failure.

BOP Directs EO(s) to check air compressors and air dryers for proper operation Directs in-plant personnel to inspect U2 IA system for proper lineup and leaks.

May direct EO to cross-connect U2 to U3 IA Systems per DOP 4700-03, U2/3 IA Cross-Connect Operation.

May direct EO to cross-connect U2 to U3 SA Systems CRS May direct scram preparations per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

ATC Performs scram preparations per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, as directed:

o Reduces power with Recirc flow to 56 Mlbm/hr core flow o Starts the turbine motor suction pump AND turning gear oil pump.

o Trips H2 addition.

CRS When IA pressure drops to 55 psig, directs team to:

Scram the reactor per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

Close the outboard MSIVs.

ILT-N-2 Page 17 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Seven - Instrument Air Leak / Reactor Scram Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC Performs the following actions per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, and DEOP 0100, RPV Control, as directed:

Places Mode Switch to Shutdown and depresses the Scram pushbuttons.

Determines all rods are inserted.

Maintains RPV level as directed by CRS.

Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

CRS Enters DEOP 0100, RPV Control, Directs actions of DEOP 0100.

Directs actions of DGP 02-03.

Verification of all isolations, ECCS and EDG starts.

Holding RPV/L +8 to +48 inches.

Maintaining RPV/P <1060 psig using the Isolation Condenser.

BOP Closes the outboard MSIVs.

If directed, maintains RPV/P <1060 psig using the Iso Cond to control RPV/P (may use Hardcard)

Performs Reactor Scram actions per his Hardcard.

Event 7 Completion Criteria:

• Team has performed a reactor scram and stabilized the plant, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-2 Page 18 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Eight - FEF / Steam Leak In HPCI Room / Secondary Containment High Radiation / Emergency Depressurization Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

12 At the discretion of the Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator, activate trigger 12. This causes:

• A FEF.

• A HPCI Room steam line break.

When trigger 12 is activated, immediately RUN CAEP file ILT-N-2 Rad.cae.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

EO to reinstall E ERV fuses: wait 2 min, activate trigger 13, and then report E ERV 13 fuses are installed.

Role Play:

EO sent to HPCI: wait 2 min, then report the HPCI room is filled with steam. I left the area.

Several minutes after above report, report as one of the EOs sent to the Rx Bldg there is steam coming from the West LPCI Corner Room stairway; I am leaving the Rx Bldg. For any subsequent requests to enter the Unit 2 Rx Bldg, report I cannot enter the Rx Bldg due to the presence of steam.

EO to Panel 902-39 in AEER: wait 3 min, call on the phone and report there is an acrid odor coming from the 902-39 panel, but there is no indication of a fire..

Role Play:

RP to take local RX Bldg radiation readings: Report I cannot enter the Unit 2 RX Bldg due to the steam leak. I am able to get radiation levels through the doorways. The highest reading is on the 1st floor through the door from Unit 3. The reading is (provide the value from the W. CRD area ARM on the Monitor screen).

Once the W CRD area ARM is full upscale (100 mr/hr), for further reports provide EITHER:

• The W. CRD ARM value; OR,

• Value provided by the Floor Instructor.

Note: Use time compression if desired and report that radiation levels are .2500 mr/hr.

Floor Instructor / Lead Evaluator:

If desired once the W. CRD area ARM is full scale, provide the Communicator with field radiation levels. A W.CRD area radiation level of >2500 mr/hr will provide the crew a second area above Max Safe.

BOP Announces alarm 902-3 G-2 for Area High Temperature.

Checks back panel and determines HPCI Room temperatures are rising. Reports values to Unit Supervisor.

ILT-N-2 Page 19 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Eight - FEF / Steam Leak In HPCI Room / Secondary Containment High Radiation / Emergency Depressurization Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS When Rx Bldg Area High Temp alarm is received for the HPCI area, enters DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control.

Directs operator to isolate the HPCI system.

Determines steam leak cannot be isolated.

BOP When directed, attempts to close HPCI MO 2301-4 & 5 to isolate the HPCI system.

Reports the valves will not close. May send operator to check its breaker.

BOP Announces alarm 902-3 A-1 for Rx Bldg Rad Hi.

Obtains DEOP related ARM readings and reports values to Unit Supervisor.

CRS Reenters DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control, due to Vent Rad above 4 mr/hr.

Verifies Reactor Building Vent Isolation and SBGT start.

Enters DGA-16, Coolant High Activity/Fuel Element Failure and directs:

Directs Manual Actions for 15 min. Off-Gas Timer.

Within 40 minutes, isolate Main Control Room Ventilation AND start the air filtration unit per DOA 5750-04, Smoke, Noxious Fumes or Airborne Contaminants in the Control Room.

CRS Reenters DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control, due to Rx Bldg Radiation above Max Normal. (HPCI Room >150 mr/hr)

ATC / Performs DGA 16, Coolant High Activity/Fuel Element Failure as directed:

BOP Performs Manual Actions for 15 min. Off-Gas Timer.

Isolates Main Control Room Ventilation AND starts the air filtration unit per DOA 5750-04, Smoke, Noxious Fumes or Airborne Contaminants in the Control Room.

ATC / Announces Drywell, Main Steam Line, SPING Radiation alarms.

BOP CRS When two Rx Bldg Radiation levels exceed Max Safe (>2500 mr/hr), enters DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, and performs / directs:

If Drywell Pressure above 2 psig, preventing Core Spray and LPCI injection not needed for core cooling Initiating IC to maximum flow Verifying Torus level above 6 Opening all ADSVs (SC-1.2) (E ERV has its fuses pulled)

May direct reinstalling E ERV fuses.

ILT-N-2 Page 20 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Eight - FEF / Steam Leak In HPCI Room / Secondary Containment High Radiation / Emergency Depressurization Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Performs DEOP 0400-02, Emergency Depressurization, as directed:

Prevents Core Spray and LPCI injection not needed for core cooling Initiates IC to maximum flow Verifies Torus level above 6 Opens all available ADSVs (SC-1.2) (E ERV has its fuses pulled)

Event 7 / Scenario Completion Criteria:

• Emergency Depressurization in Progress,

• RPV stabilized, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-2 Page 21 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Critical Tasks:

With a loss of instrument air in progress, when instrument air header pressure drops to 55 psig then INITIATE a manual reactor scram AND CLOSE the outboard MSIVs.

(SC 1.2) With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE emergency depressurization. (May anticipate Blowdown)

ILT-N-2 Page 22 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 A-1 Rx Bldg Rad Hi DAN 902-3 G-2 Area High Temperature DAN 902-4 B-9 2A/B Recirc M-G Mtr/Gen Temp Hi DAN 902-4 B-17 Drywell Equip Sump Lvl Hi DAN 902-4 B-4(9) 2A(B) Recirc M-G Temp Hi DAN 923-1 F-4 U2 Inst Air Press Low DEOP 0100 Reactor Control DEOP 0200-01 Primary Containment Control DEOP 0300-01 Secondary Containment Control DEOP 0400-02 Emergency Depressurization DEOP 100 RPV Control DGA-16 Coolant High Activity/Fuel Element Failure DGA-07 Unpredicted Reactivity Addition DGP 02-03 Reactor Scram DOA 0250-01 Relief Valve Failure DOA 0600-01 Transient Level Control DOA 4700-01 Instrument Air System Failure DOA 5750-01 Ventilation System Failure DOA 5750-04 Smoke, Noxious Fumes or Airborne Contaminants in the Control Room DOP 0600-06 Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV) Operation DOP 2000-24 Drywell Sump Operation DOP 2300-02 HPCI System Turning Gear Operation DOP 4700-03 U2/3 IA Cross-Connect Operation DOP 5750-02 Reactor Building Ventilation DOP 6700-20 480V Circuit Breaker Trip DOS 1600-20 Suppression Pool Temp Monitoring TS 3.4.3 Safety and Relief Valves TS 3.5.1 ECCS Operating 3.5.1.8 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker ILT-N-2 Page 23 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

EXAM ILT-N-1 QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES 7 Total malfunctions (5-8) 1 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

ILT-N-2 Page 24 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Computer Aided Exercise Programs

1. ILT-N-2.cae

1. For ILT Class 11-1 NRC Exam

1. Written by MP

1. Rev 00

1. Date 05/12

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Sets APRM Master Gain pot to 1.0 irf niagain 1.0

1. E ERV bind malfunction is set to 25%

imf ads3ebn 25.0

1. Prevents HPCI turbine turning gear from engaging from the control room.

imf hptgfail ior hpdngtgm 1 set hpzngtgm = falsel2

1. Closes 3C to 2B IA X-tie.

irf vp6 0.0l2

1. Binds HPCI 4 valve @ 90%.

1. Overrides HPCI 5 valve control switch to prevent closing.

imf hp4vlbn 90.0l2 ior hpdcl5 1l2

1. Lifts Leads to HPCI Isolation Relays.

irf hpgp4rly liftedl4

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.

trgset 1 "0"l4 trg 1 "irf niagainf true"l4

1. Event Trigger 2 Forces up alarm 902-6 H-3, FW Control System Panel Trouble.

trgset 2 "0"l4 imf ser1274 (2) onl6

1. Event Trigger 3 Returns alarm 902-6 H-3, FW Control System Panel Trouble, to NORMAL.

trgset 3 "0"l6 trg 3 "imf ser1274 normal"l6

1. Event Trigger 4 Inserts Recirc MG Set 2A/B Vent Fan Filter Clogged.

Trgset 4 "0"l6 imf rrmfaexh (4)l8

1. Event Trigger 5 Activates when a Recirc MG Set high temp alarm is received.

1. Slows the temperature rise so load drop is not required.

Trgset 5 "sezpoint(341) .or. sezpoint(388)"l8 trg 5 "set rrkwvfan = 20.0"l8

1. Event Trigger 6 Deletes Recirc MG Set 2A/B Vent Fan Filter Clogged.

Trgset 6 "0"l8 trg 6 "dmf rrmfaexh"l10 ILT-N-2 Page 25 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

1. Event Trigger 7 Forces up alarm 902-4 B-17, Drywell Equip Sump Lvl Hi.

1. Sets mass in DWEDS to simulate a 3 gpm leak rate over 2 hrs.

trgset 7 "0"l10 trg 7 "set pcmdwes = 4200.0"l10 imf ser0512 (7) onl10

1. Event trigger 8 causes the E ERV setpoint to drift to fail it open.

Trgset 8 "0"l12 imf ads3esd (8) 75.0l12

1. Event Trigger 9 Deletes E ERV binding malfunction so valve will close and removes fuses for the E ERV.

Trgset 9 "0"l12 trg 9 "dmf ads3ebn"l12 irf adsrfe (9) pulledl14

1. Event trigger 10 Inserts a large IA leak.

trgset 10 "0"l14 imf np2 (10) 87.0 10:00 40.0l14

1. Event Trigger 11 Acivates when U2 IA pressure <40.0 psig".

1. Binds 1A & 2A MSIVs.

trgset 11 "ppf285 .lt. 40.0"l14 imf i12 (11)l16 imf i16 (11)l16

1. Event Trigger 12 Initiates a HPCI Room steam line break of 5%.

trgset 12 "0"l16 imf hprmbrkp (12) 100.0 15:00 5.0l16 imf radffd (12) 4.0 15:00 1.0l18

1. Event Trigger 13 Installs E ERV fuses.

Trgset 13 "0"l18 trg 13 "irf adsrfe in"l18

1. END

1. ILT-N-2 Rad.cae

1. For ILT Class 11-1 NRC Exam

1. Written by MP

1. Rev 00

1. Date 05/12

1. This CAEP ramps Rad level for a HPCI room unisolable leak with a FEF.

1. Starts a ramp of the HPCI CUBICAL ARM.

set RMARMFAILF(2) = true ramp RMARMFAILD(2) 5.0 3000.0 8:00

1. After 1 min, starts a ramp of the WEST LPCI PUMP AREA ARM.

set RMARMFAILF(3) = truel1:00 ramp RMARMFAILD(3) 2.0 1000.0 5:00l1:00

1. After 2 min, starts a ramp of the WEST CRD MODULE AREA ARM.

set RMARMFAILF(5) = truel2:00 ramp RMARMFAILD(5) 0.2 100.0 2:00l2:00

1. After 2 min, starts a ramp of the REACTOR BUILDING SOUTH ACCESS ARM.

ILT-N-2 Page 26 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

set RMARMFAILF(7) = truel2:00 ramp RMARMFAILD(7) 1.0 100.0 2:00l2:00

1. END

1. ILT-N-2 Clear Rad.cae

1. For ILT Class 11-1 NRC Exam

1. Written by MP

1. Rev 00

1. Date 05/12

1. This CAEP Clears the Rad level ramps.

1. Reseting the IC does not clear them.

1. Restarting MST will also clear them.

1. Stops ramp of the HPCI CUBICAL ARM.

set RMARMFAILF(2) = false

1. Stops ramp of the WEST LPCI PUMP AREA ARM.

set RMARMFAILF(3) = false

1. Stops ramp of the WEST CRD MODULE AREA ARM.

set RMARMFAILF(5) = false

1. Stops ramp of the REACTOR BUILDING SOUTH ACCESS ARM.

set RMARMFAILF(7) = false

1. END ILT-N-2 Page 27 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 630 MWe, Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at Full Power Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.881 Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action limit: 0.980 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started: LCO Expires:

TS Cause:

Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Seperator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.

Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:

HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut with fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.

HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throwing its belts. WO 1156150.

HVAC -1 ON.

HV-2 running.

Switchyard Status Today 138 KV Bus 1 Feed To TR 22 Combi Units has low oil in the 'C' phase, ComEd WO #276162 Today HVO: Exercise CAUTION while in the 345 KV Yard due to excavation being performed in the area.

Marv Evans reports holes being dug near manual switch disconnects 345KV Blue Bus. Plywood will be installed over the holes if access is needed, but be aware there are holes under the plywood.

SSC called from the 345KV yard reporting that the cable trough covers are removed to prep for upcoming work. Be careful.

ILT-N-2 Page 28 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

• • • • Shift 1 Activities ****

?

?

• • • • Shift 2 Activities ****

? Load dropped last shift per TSO. Load pickup expected late next shift.

? When directed by the Shift Manager, start 2C Reactor Building Vent Fan and secure 2B Reactor Building Vent Fan per DOP 5750-02, Reactor Building Ventilation

? When directed by the Shift Manager, remove B FWRV from service per DOP 0600-06, step G.15.

? When requested by Engineering, place the HPCI turbine on the turning gear per DOP 2300-02, step G.2

?

• • • • Shift 3 Activities ****

?

?

Today **** Unit 2 Procedures In-Progress **** Do Not Delete ****

?

?

ILT-N-2 Page 29 of 29 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Dresden Generating Station 11-1 (2012-301) NRC - SCENARIO 03 CRD - CONTROL ROD, DRIFTS OUT CRD - CONTROLLER, INDICATION FAILS UPSCALE CORE SPRAY - SYSTEM LEAK / LOCALIZED FLOODING FW - COND/BSTR PUMP, TRIPS DUE TO OVERCURRENT MANUAL SCRAM - LOSS OF ALL FEEDWATER, DUE TO TRIP OF ALL RFPS.

ATWS - ELECTRICAL, ARI UNSUCCESSFUL / TEAM INSERTS RODS BY PULLING SCRAM FUSES.

EXAM MATERIAL Rev. 00 04/12 Developed By:

Exam Author Date Approved By:

Facility Representative Date

Scenario Outline Station: Dresden Station Scenario No.: 11-1 (2012-301) NRC - Scenario 03 Evaluators Operators / crew position

/ ATC

/ BOP

/ CRS Initial Conditions: Initial Power = 5%

Turnover: Startup in Progress. On hold for QNE direction.

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RODK08DO C/T ATC CRD - Control Rod, Drifts Out 2 RDFCFHI C ATC CRD - Controller, Indication Fails Upscale 3 CSPPBBRK C/T BOP CORE SPRAY - System Leak / Localized Flooding 4 H21 C ATC FW - Cond/Bstr Pump, Trips Due To Overcurrent Manual Scram - Loss Of All Feedwater, Due To Trip of All 5 H32/H33/H34 M TEAM RFPs.

B12 SER1026 ATWS - Electrical, ARI Unsuccessful / Team Inserts Rods 6 M TEAM SER1060 By Pulling Scram Fuses.

AW4

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (T)ech Spec ILT-N-3 Page 2 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Scenario Objective Evaluate the Teams ability to operate the plant with an electrical ATWS Scenario Summary Initial Conditions:

1. Unit is at 5% power.

2. The following equipment is OOS:

a. None

3. LCOs:

a. None Scenario Sequence

• A control rod begins to drift out. The NSO must insert the rod to position 00 and it fails to latch when fully inserted.

The Team will give it an individual scram signal and reference Tech Spec requirements.

• The indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low. If the team does not recognize the failure quickly and restore CRD cooling flow, the ROD DRIVE TEMP HI alarm comes up. The Team takes manual control of the CRD Flow Controller to restore system parameters to normal.

• A small, isolable break occurs on the 2B Core Spray pump piping, rendering the pump inoperable.

• 2A Condensate/Booster Pump trips with failure of the STBY pump to auto start. Also, the first pump the Team attempts to start will trip. The other non-running pump will start.

• 2A RFP trips and when 2B RFP auto starts, but after a short time, it also trips. The 2C RFP can be started manually, but it also trips a short time later. The Team will manually scram the reactor.

• An electrical ATWS occurs when the reactor is scrammed. ARI is unsuccessful. The SBLC system fails to inject boron. The Team inserts control rods by pulling scram fuses, venting the scram air header, and / or driving control rods.

Event One - Control Rod Drift Out

• A Control Rod will drift out Malfunctions required: 1

• Control Rod K-08 drift out Success Path:

• Control Rod fully inserted and individual scram signal applied.

• The Control Room Supervisor references appropriate Tech Specs and makes correct LCO call.

ILT-N-3 Page 3 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Two - Indicated Flow to CRD Flow Controller Fails High

• Indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low.

Malfunctions required: 1

• Indicated flow to the CRD Flow Controller fails high Success Path:

• The crew takes manual control of the CRD Flow Controller Event Three - Core Spray Leak / Localized Flooding

• A leak occurs on the 2B Core Spray pump casing.

Malfunctions Required: 1

• 2B CS pump casing weld failure.

Success Path:

• Isolates the leak per DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in the Plant.

• References Tech. Specs.

Event Four - Condensate/Booster Pump Trip with Failure of STBY to Auto Start

• 2A Condensate/Booster Pump trips with failure of the STBY pump to auto start. Also the first pump the Team attempts to start will trip.

Malfunctions required: 1

• (Condensate/Booster pump trip with failure of STBY to auto start)

Success Path:

• Starts a Condensate/Booster pump.

Event Five - Loss of Feedwater

• All RFPs trip resulting in insufficient Feedwater flow.

Malfunctions required: 1

• Loss of Feedwater Success Path:

• The Team performs a manual scram ILT-N-3 Page 4 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Six - Electrical ATWS / ARI Unsuccessful.

• An electrical ATWS occurs when the reactor is scrammed. ARI is unsuccessful. The SBLC system fails to inject boron.

Malfunctions required: 2

• Electrical ATWS

• Failure of SBLC system Success Path:

• The Team inserts control rods by pulling scram fuses, venting the scram air header, and / or driving control rods ILT-N-3 Page 5 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

PRE-SCENARIO ACTIVITIES 1 If applicable, conduct pre-scenario activities in accordance with TQ- JA-150-08, SIMULATOR EXAMINATION BRIEFING.

a. Inform the crew that the QNE (Floor Instructor) is present in the Control Room.

b. Direct the crew to perform their briefs prior to entering the simulator.

c. Provide the crew with a copy of applicable procedure(s) marked up and completed through the appropriate steps:

1) DGP 01-01, Unit Startup, marked up for Reactor at 5% power.

2) DOP 0400-01, Reactor Manual Control System Operation.

3) DOP 0400-02, Rod Worth Minimizer.

4) DOP 5600-06, Unit 2 Turbine Startup.

2 Simulator Setup (the following steps can be done in any logical order)

a. Initialize simulator in an IC with ~5% power (IC 149 on the jump drive can be used) and perform the following before continuing below:

1) Verify control rod sequence XI.1.0 with step 20 fully withdrawn.

2) Verify Reactor power ~5%.

3 Verify the following simulator conditions:

a. Verify Torus to Drywell DP within limits (vent Torus as needed).

b. Verify Torus level >-3.5 in. (Variable PPC232) if necessary, water can be quickly added by opening and closing valve 1402-2A on Instructor Station drawing CS1.

c. In each RPS Channel, select one APRM for recording.

d. Verify 2A RFP running with 2B RFP in STBY.

e. Verify Zinc Injection label in place for lined up to 2A RFP.

f. Verify 2A and 2C Condensate pumps running.

g. Verify 2B and 2D Condensate pumps OFF.

h. Verify 2D Condensate pump in STBY.

i. Verify Cond/Booster min flow to 75%.

j. Ensure running Condensate pump amps within limits.

k. Cut in/out Cond Demins as needed, to maintain DP within limits.

l. Verify TR 86 LTC in MANUAL.

m. Advance the chart recorders.

4 Place the following equipment out of service:

a. None NOTE: Perform the above setup prior to running the setup CAEP file.

5 Run the initial setup CAEP file: ILT-N-3.cae ILT-N-3 Page 6 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

6 Complete the Simulator Setup Checklist.

Symbols are used throughout the text to identify specific items as indicated below:

Critical Tasks Time Critical Tasks Required Actions Optional Actions ILT-N-3 Page 7 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event One - Control Rod Drift Out Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

2 At the discretion of the Lead examiner, activate trigger 2, which causes Control Rod K-08 to drift out.

3 Verify trigger 3 automatically activates when EITHER control rod K-08 passes position 10 so it settles at position 12; OR, the scram toggle switch for CRD K-08 is placed to the UP position. This deletes control rod K-08 drift out malfunction so it stops adjacent to control rods already at position 12 and it does not drift out later when the reactor is scrammed.

Role Play:

EO to check K-08 accumulator: Wait 2 min, then report I see nothing abnormal at K-08 accumulator.

WEC/EO to disarm K-08: acknowledge the request. It is not intended to complete the request.

QNE to evaluate core limits: Acknowledge the request. Wait 2 min. and report, core parameters are within limits.

EO to close CRD K-08s 2-0305-102, WITHDRAW VLV: Wait 2 min. and report, CRD K-08s 2-0305-102 is closed.

ATC Notices and announces that Control Rod K-08 is drifting out.

Performs actions of DOA 0300-05, Inoperable Or Failed Control Rod Drives as directed.

Immediate:

Bypasses the Rod Worth Minimizer.

Inserts the CRD to 00 using Emergency Rod In.

Subsequent:

Due to the CRD failing to remain at the FULL IN OR OVERTRAVEL IN position, continuously applies an emergency insert signal using EMERG ROD IN on RONOR switch.

CRS Enters DOA 0300-05, Inoperable or Failed Control Rod Drives, and directs actions.

May refers to Tech. Spec 3.3.2.1 Condition C.

BOP At back panel 902(3)-16, places the scram toggle switch for CRD K-08 to the UP position.

ATC Releases RONOR switch.

Announces that procedure directs entering DOA 0300-12, Mispositioned Control Rod.

Discontinues ALL non-emergency control rod motion and notifies CRS and QNE to evaluate core parameters.

Directs EO to close CRD K-08s 2-0305-102, WITHDRAW VLV, to prevent CRD discharge volume from filling.

ILT-N-3 Page 8 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event One - Control Rod Drift Out Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior CRS References TS 3.1.3, Condition C, and determines the following actions are required:

• C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. (DOA 0300-05, Inoperable or Failed Control Rod Drives, directs inserting the rod)

• C.2 Disarm the associated CRD within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Directs disarming rod K-08.

CRS Enters DOA 0300-12, Mispositioned Control Rod.

CRS Directs taking rod K-08 OOS on the RWM.

ATC Takes rod K-08 OOS on the RWM.

TEAM May enter DGA 07, Unpredicted Reactivity Addition.

Event 1 Completion Criteria:

• When Control Rod K-08 Has Been Inserted To Position 00, AND

• Tech Specs Have Been Addressed, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-3 Page 9 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Two - Indicated Flow to CRD Flow Controller Fails High Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 4, which causes the indicated flow 4

to the CRD Flow Controller to fail high. This causes the controller demand to the CRD FCV to fail low.

NOTE: If the team does not recognize the failure quickly and restore CRD cooling flow, the ROD DRIVE HI TEMP alarm comes up after ~ 5 min.

Simulator Operator:

If CRD Temperature variable rdgtemp(21) reaches 250.0 deg. F, verify the following automatic triggers:

5 Trigger 5: automatically activates when variable rdgtemp(21) is >250.0 deg. F.

Forces up alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRIVE HI TEMP.

6 Trigger 6: automatically activates alarm 902-5 F-3 is up and variable rdgtemp(21) is

<245.0 deg. F. Returns alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRIVE HI TEMP, TO NORMAL.

ATC From panel monitoring or alarm 902-5 F-3, ROD DRIVE HI TEMP, notices and announces loss of CRD system flow.

Diagnoses failure of the CRD Flow Controller.

Performs DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure, actions as directed by the CRS.

Restores CRD system flows and pressures to normal.

Places CRD Flow Controller in manual and adjusting as needed.

BOP May obtain CRD temperatures on the back panel.

CRS Directs entering and performing actions of DOA 0300-01, Control Rod Drive System Failure.

Notifies Shift Manager and IMD of CRD Flow Controller failure.

Enters TRM 3.3.h for CRD FCV closed causing loss of RVWLIS.

Role Play; EO to check CRD FCV operation: (wait 2 min)

Report, the CRD FCV appears to be operating normally and is at position is:

(Use position displayed on Instructor Station drawing RD2; report as percent).

EO to check CRD system flow locally (FI 2-302-56); (wait 1 min)

Report CRD system flow indicates >100 gpm (pegged high).

EO to check drive water flow locally (FI 2-302-64): (wait 1 min)

Report, CRD drive water flow indicates (same as control room meter).

EO to check cooling water flow locally (FI 2-302-65): (wait 1 min)

Report, CRD cooling water flow indicates (same as control room meter).

EO to check CRD pumps locally: (wait 1 min)

Report, CRD Pumps appear to be operating normally.

Respond as groups notified.

ILT-N-3 Page 10 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Two - Indicated Flow to CRD Flow Controller Fails High Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Event 2 Completion Criteria:

• Team has taken manual control of the CRD Flow Controller, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-3 Page 11 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Three - Core Spray Leak / Localized Flooding Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE: Torus level drops slowly, so the Tech Spec Torus level low limit is not expected to be reached.

Simulator Operator:

7 Activate trigger 7 to start a 2B Core Spray pump casing to piping weld rupture at 1%. It takes about 1 minute for the sump alarm to come in.

Role Play:

EO sent to the west corner room, wait approx. 3 min. then report:

There is a leak on the casing weld of 2B Core Spray pump. It is not spraying on other equipment. All of the water is going to the sump and both sump pumps are operating properly. Water in the sump is about 2 ft. from the top and steady.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

8 If directed to isolate keep fill to 2B CS, initiate trigger 8 to close 2-1402-36B, ECCS Keep Fill to 2B Core Spray system. Then report The keep fill supply valve(s) 2-1402-36B(37B) are closed.

Role Play:

EO 2B CS: If the suction valve is NOT full closed, then if asked, there is still water spraying from the casing weld.

IF MO 2-1402-3B, PP Suct Vlv is closed, then report: The leak is almost stopped and the sump level is dropping.

EO to shut 2-1402-8B, PP disch vlv: wait 5 min. then report, the 2-1402-8B is closed.

Maintenance estimate to repair 2B Core Spray pump: Report it will take 3 days to repair the crack.

BOP Receives and announces alarm 902-4 D-19, LPCI/CS West Sump Lvl Hi.

Dispatches an in-plant operator to the west corner room to check for leaks and/or verify proper sump operation.

CRS Enters DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in the Plant, and directs team response.

BOP Performs DOA 0040-02, Localized Flooding in the Plant:

Makes PA announcement.

Monitor plant equipment and parameters in the west corner room.

CRS Refers to P&ID M27, Diagram of Core Spray Piping, determines leak isolation points, and directs:

Placing 2B Core Spray PP in PTL.

MO 2-1402-3B, PP Suct Vlv, closed, and 2-1402-36B(37B) Keep Fill Supply valve(s), closed. (Not required to stop leak)

ILT-N-3 Page 12 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Three - Core Spray Leak / Localized Flooding Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Isolates leak as follows:

Places 2B Core Spray PP in PTL.

Closes MO 2-1402-3B, PP Suct Vlv.

May direct 2-1402-36B(37B), Keep Fill Supply valve(s), closed.

CRS May refer to DEOP 0300-01, Secondary Containment Control, due to water on the floor going to the sump, and determines entry condition is not met.

BOP If receives annunciator 902-4 C-23, Torus Narrow Range Wtr Lvl Lo:

Checks Torus level on panel 902-3.

Refers to DOP 1600-02, Torus Water Control, to restore Torus level.

CRS Enters DEOP 0200-01, Primary Containment Control, if Torus level drops to -4.5 and directs team actions. (Not expected as level drops slowly)

CRS Enters DOP 1600-02, Torus Water Level Control, and directs restoring Torus water level.

BOP Restores Torus level per DOP 1600-02, Torus Water Level Control, as directed:

Verifies MO 2301-35, -36 closed.

Verifies MO 2301-6 open.

Verifies CST level adequate.

Opens MO 2301-14.

Closes MO 2301-14 when Torus level rises to -2.5 in. to -4.0 in.

CRS Declares 2B Core Spray PP inoperable.

References Tech Specs:

TS 3.5.1, Condition B: Return the CS subsystem to operable within 7 days or must be in Mode 3 within 12 hrs and Mode 4 within 36 hrs.

If torus level drops to -4.5, enters TS 3.6.2.2 Condition A. Restore suppression pool water level to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Enters TRM 3.4.a Structural Integrity Condition B.

Event 3 Completion Criteria:

The localized flooding is stopped, and Tech Specs and TRM are referenced, OR, At the discretion of the Floor Instructor/Lead Evaluator.

ILT-N-3 Page 13 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Five - Condensate/Booster Pump Trip with Failure of STBY to Auto Start Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior NOTE:

The first Cond/Boost pump the ATC attempts to start will also trip. The other non-running Cond/Boost pump will start and remain running.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

9 At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, activate trigger 9. This will cause a trip of 2A Cond/Boost pump.

25 Verify trigger 25 automatically activates when 2B Cond/Boost PP breaker closes and if 2D Cond/Boost PP trip malfunction is not true. This trips 2B Cond/Boost PP.

Verify trigger 26 automatically activates when 2D Cond/Boost PP breaker closes and if 2B 26 Cond/Boost PP trip malfunction is not true. This trips 2D Cond/Boost PP.

ROLE PLAY:

EO to check operation of started Cond/Boost pump: wait 2 min, the report the 2B (or 2D)

Cond/Boost pump is operating normally.

EO to check the breaker for tripped pump: wait 2 min, and then report the breaker has an overcurrent target up.

If another Cond/Boost pump trips, report: the breaker is open, but no flags are up.

ATC Announces alarm:

• 902-6 F-5, CONDENSATE BOOSTER PP TRIP.

Determines STBY pump (2D) did not start.

May place STBY PP SELECTOR switch to OFF.

Attempts to start either 2B or 2D Condensate Booster pump.

Determines Condensate Booster pump started tripped.

Starts other non-tripped pump.

Determines it started and is operating properly.

CRS Enters DOA 0600-01, TRANSIENT LEVEL CONTROL.

Enters DOA 6500-10, 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP.

Directs starting an available Condensate Booster pump.

ATC Refers to DOA 6500-10, 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP and:

Directs an EO to check the Condensate Booster pump just started and inspect tripped Condensate Booster pumps.

Direct an EO to check the breakers of tripped Condensate Booster pumps.

Places 2A Condensate Booster pump control switch in Pull to Lock.

Notifies Ops Shift Supervisor.

Requests EMD to troubleshoot.

ILT-N-3 Page 14 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Five - Condensate/Booster Pump Trip with Failure of STBY to Auto Start Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior BOP Monitors panels and assists as directed.

Event 5 Completion Criteria:

• An available Condensate Booster pump started, AND/OR

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-3 Page 15 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Five - Loss of Feedwater Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

After completion of the previous Event, and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator, 10 activate trigger 10, which trips 2B RFP. Note: 2C RFP is prevented from starting.

Simulator Operator / Role Play:

EO to open/close the CRD 2-0301-25 valve: On Instructor Station drawing RD2, change the CRD 2-0301-25 valve position to the requested position and then report its position.

BOP Reports annunciator 902-6 F-7, RFP Trip.

Determines Standby RFP did not auto start as expected.

Attempts to start the Standby RFP. (Unsuccessful)

TEAM Determines that reactor will scram automatically on low RPV level due to insufficient Feedwater flow.

CRS Directs team to perform a manual reactor scram per DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram.

ATC Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, actions as directed:

Depresses BOTH Scram buttons.

Places RX MODE SW in SHUTDOWN.

Observes that control rods did not go in and initiates ARI.

Announces:

• Rods did NOT go in.

• ARI actuated.

• Electrical ATWS.

Controls RPV level as directed.

Note:

HPCI is one of the Preferred ATWS Injection systems. If it is used, the operator must inject in a controlled manner to prevent causing a power spike and complicating the accident mitigation strategy.

BOP Performs DGP 02-03, Reactor Scram, actions as directed:

Silences annunciators at Panel 902(3) 8, until the NSO reports reactor level and pressure trends.

Silences Panels 902(3) 54 and 902(3) 65 annunciator alarms.

Event 5 Completion Criteria:

• Reactor has been manually scrammed, AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-3 Page 16 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Six - Electrical ATWS / ARI Unsuccessful Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

11 Operator to pull scram fuses: wait 4 min, then activate trigger 11. This sequentially pulls the scram fuses.

12 Operator to vent the scram air header: wait 5 min, the activate trigger 12. This vents the scram air header.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR / ROLE PLAY:

13 Operator to bypass Low RPV water level MSIV and High Radiation Offgas isolations: wait 3 min, activate trigger 13, and then report the Low RPV water level MSIV and High Radiation Offgas isolations have been defeated.

CRS Enters DEOP 100, RPV Control.

Due to report of ATWS condition, exits DEOP 100 AND enters DEOP 0400-05, Failure to Scram, and directs/performs:

Placing ADS to inhibit. (Not expected to be a Critical Task for this scenario)

Placing Core Spray pumps in PTL.

Inserting control rods using Alternate Rod Insertion.

Directs driving control rods.

Directs pulling scram fuses.

Directs venting scram air header.

Verifying required auto actions.

Installing of the jumpers for the MSIV low level isolations and the Off Gas high Rad isolations.

Stabilizing RPV pressure below 1060 psig.

ATC Inserts control rods per DEOP 500-05, Alternate Insertion Of Control Rods, as follows: (RPV-6.1)

Pulling scram fuses.

Venting scram air header.

Drives rods by:

Bypassing the RWM.

Maximizing CRD drive water pressure.

Uses either the ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch or the EMERG ROD IN position of the ROD OUT NOTCH OVERRIDE switch.

CRS Based on report that all control rods are inserted, exits DEOP 0400-05 and enters DEOP 0100.

ILT-N-3 Page 17 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Event Six - Electrical ATWS / ARI Unsuccessful Trigger Position Crew Actions or Behavior ATC / Performs as directed:

BOP Re-establishes injection using available injection systems to MAINTAIN RPV water level above -143 (in band directed by Unit Supervisor).

Event 6 Completion Criteria:

• Control rods inserted, (Or in progress)

AND/OR,

• At the direction of the Lead Examiner.

ILT-N-3 Page 18 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Critical Tasks:

With a control rod drifting out to a position where core damage could occur, TAKE ACTION TO PLACE THE CONTROL ROD AT A SAFE POSITION (00).

(RPV-6.1) With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE POWER by injecting boron and/or inserting control rods, to prevent exceeding the primary containment design limits.

ILT-N-3 Page 19 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

REFERENCES PROCEDURE TITLE DAN 902-3 D-7 2A/B CORE SPRAY HDR PRESS LO DAN 902-5 A-3 ROD DRIFT ALARM DAN 902-5 F-3 ROD DRIVE HI TEMP DAN 902-6 F-5 CONDENSATE BOOSTER PP TRIP DAN 902-6 F-7 RFP TRIP DEOP 0100 RPV CONTROL DEOP 0400-05 FAILURE TO SCRAM DEOP 0500-05 ALTERNATE INSERTION OF CONTROL RODS DGA-07 UNPREDICTED REACTIVITY ADDITION DGP 01-01 UNIT STARTUP DGP 02-03 REACTOR SCRAM DOA 0300-01 CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM FAILURE DOA 0300-05 INOPERABLE OR FAILED CRDS DOA 0300-12 MISPOSITIONED CONTROL ROD DOA 6500-10 4KV CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIP DOP 0400-01 REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION DOP 0400-02 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER DOP 5600-06 UNIT 2 TURBINE STARTUP TS 3.1.3 CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY TS 3.5.1 ECCS OPERATING ILT-N-3 Page 20 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

EXAM ILT-N-1 QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES 7 Total malfunctions (5-8) 1 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

ILT-N-3 Page 21 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Computer Aided Exercise Programs

1. ILT-N-3.cae

1. For ILT Class 11-1 NRC Exam

1. Written by MP

1. Rev 00

1. Date 05/12

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS

1. Sets APRM Master Gain pot to 1.0 irf niagain 1.0

1. Inserts an Electrical ATWS imf b12

1. Prevents ARI from working.

imf ser1026 off imf ser1060 off irf aw4 pulledl4

1. Prevents 2D Cond/Boost PP from Auto starting by

1. Overriding OFF the PUMP 2D position of the STBY SELECT switch,

1. and overriding ON the 2D Cond/Boost PP STANDBY light.

ior fwdselcb2 (6) 1l2 ior fwdselcb4 (6) 1l2 ior fwlsbycb4 (6) onl2

1. EVENT TRIGGERS

1. Event Trigger 1 sets gain for all 6 APRMs.

trgset 1 "0"l2 trg 1 "irf niagainf true"l4

1. Event Trigger 2 Causes control rod K-08 to drift out.

trgset 2 "0"l4 trg 2 "imf rodk08do"l4

1. Event Trigger 3 Activates when EITHER:

1. Control rod K-08 passes position 10; OR,

1. Control rod K-08 individual scram switch is placed to the SCRAM position.

1. Deletes control rod K-08 drift out malfunction.

trgset 3 "(rdzactls(91) .gt. 30.5).or. (.not. rpdtscrm_drw(91))"l28 trg 3 "dmf rodk08do"l6

1. Event Trigger 4 inserts a failure high of the indicated flow to the CRD flow controller.

1. Sets one of the CRD"s enthalpy higher, so alarm 902-5 F-3 comes up sooner.

trgset 4 "0"l6 imf rdfcfhi (4)l6 trg 4 "set rdhmech(21) = 190.0"l8

1. Event trigger 5 Activates when CRD temp high is reached.

1. Forces alarm 902-5 F-3 up.

trgset 5 "rdgtemp(21) .gt. 250.0"l8 imf ser0973 (5) onl8

1. Event trigger 6 Returns alarm 902-5 F-3 to normal.

trgset 6 "sezpoint(973) .and. (rdgtemp(21) .lt. 245.0)"l8 ILT-N-3 Page 22 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

trg 6 "imf ser0973 normal"l10

1. Trigger 7 Initiates a 1% break at the 2B core spray pump casing.

1. Sets West LPCI Corner Room sump level to just below first pump start.

trgset 7 "0"l10 trg 7 "set wamwlps = 6500.0"l10 imf csppbbrk (7) 1.0l10

1. Trigger 8 Shuts the ECCS keep fill to the 2B CS pump (closes the 2-1402-36B valve) trgset 8 "0"l12 irf csbfilof (8) closedl12

1. Event Trigger 9 Trips 2A Cond/Boost PP.

trgset 9 "0"l12 imf h21 (9)l12

1. Event Trigger 25 Activates when 2B Cond/Boost PP breaker closes and

1. if 2D Cond/Boost PP trip malfunction is not true.

1. Trips 2B Cond/Boost PP.

trgset 25 "et_array(9) .and. fwsacbcb(2) .and. (.not. fwm433f(4))"l24 imf h22 (25)l14

1. Event Trigger 26 Activates when 2D Cond/Boost PP breaker closes and

1. if 2B Cond/Boost PP trip malfunction is not true.

1. Trips 2B Cond/Boost PP.

trgset 26 "et_array(9) .and. fwsacbcb(4) .and. (.not. fwm433f(2))"l26 imf h24 (26)l14

1. Event Trigger 10 Trips RFPs.

trgset 10 "0"l14 imf h31 (10)l14 imf h32 (10 1:00)l16 imf h33 (10 2:00)l16 imf h34 (10 2:00)l16

1. Event trigger 11 Simulates pulling RPS scram fuses.

Trgset 11 "0"l16 irf rpfusea1 (11) pulledl18 irf rpfusea2 (11 20) pulledl18 irf rpfusea3 (11 40) pulledl18 irf rpfusea4 (11 60) pulledl18 irf rpfuseb1 (11 1:20) pulledl20 irf rpfuseb2 (11 1:40) pulledl20 irf rpfuseb3 (11 2:00) pulledl20 irf rpfuseb4 (11 2:20) pulledl20

1. Event trigger 12 Simulates venting scram air header.

trgset 12 "0"l22 irf rdscrair (12) openl22

1. Event Trigger 13 installs MSL Group 1 RPV level byp and Offgas High Rad byp jumpers.

trgset 13 "0"l22 irf ci59jp (13) inl22 irf ogogjp (13) inl22

1. END ILT-N-3 Page 23 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Unit 2 Risk: GREEN Unit 3 Risk: GREEN Unit 2 is in Mode 1 at 695 MWe, Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 913 MWe Leading Thermal Limit: MFLCPR @ 0.881 Leading Thermal Limit: MAPRAT @ 0.819 Action limit: 0.980 Action Limit: 0.980 Equipment Unavailable: None Equipment Unavailable: None Protected Equipment: None Protected Equipment: None Current Action Statements None LCO Started: LCO Expires:

TS Cause:

Unit 1 Plant Status Today U1 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Transfer House has grating removed. Currently roped off with pump installed to pump to U1 Oil Seperator Pit as required. Outside operator monitor and pump as necessary.

Today Chem Cleaning ventilation status:

HV-1A/EF-1A are secured due to HV-1A inlet and outlet dampers being shut with fan on, IR# 913157, WO 1239746.

HV-1B/EF-1B are secured due to HV-1B throwing its belts. WO 1156150.

HVAC -1 ON.

HV-2 running.

Switchyard Status Today 138 KV Bus 1 Feed To TR 22 Combi Units has low oil in the 'C' phase, ComEd WO #276162 Today HVO: Exercise CAUTION while in the 345 KV Yard due to excavation being performed in the area.

Marv Evans reports holes being dug near manual switch disconnects 345KV Blue Bus. Plywood will be installed over the holes if access is needed, but be aware there are holes under the plywood.

SSC called from the 345KV yard reporting that the cable trough covers are removed to prep for upcoming work. Be careful.

ILT-N-3 Page 24 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)

Unit 2 Plant Status Today Unit 2 Activities

• • • • Shift 1 Activities ****

?

?

• • • • Shift 2 Activities ****

? Startup in progress. On hold for Steam Tunnel inspection.

? After Steam Tunnel Inspection, and when directed by the Shift Manager, resume the startup per DGP 01-01.

?

• • • • Shift 3 Activities ****

?

?

Today **** Unit 2 Procedures In-Progress **** Do Not Delete ****

? DGP 01-01, Unit Startup

?

ILT-N-3 Page 25 of 25 Rev. 00 (04/12)