Letter Sequence Response to RAI |
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TAC:ME2609, Control Room Habitability, Deletion of E BAR Definition and Revision to RCS Specific Activity Tech Spec (Approved, Closed) |
Results
Other: L-PI-10-076, Calculation No. GEN-PI-083, Revision 1, Locked Rotor Accident (LRA) Analysis Using AST, Attachment 5, L-PI-11-060, Response to Requests for Additional Lnformation (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology, L-PI-11-079, Response to Requests for Additional Lnformation (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology, L-PI-13-111, Notification of Alternative Source Term (AST) Implementation and Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement, ML102300296, ML102300297, ML102300298, ML111822669
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MONTHYEARL-PI-09-114, License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology2009-10-27027 October 2009 License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology Project stage: Request ML0935704512009-12-23023 December 2009 Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt Alternative Source Term Methodology (TAC Nos. ME2609 & ME2610) Project stage: Acceptance Review L-PI-10-041, Response to Requests for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology2010-04-29029 April 2010 Response to Requests for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology Project stage: Response to RAI L-PI-10-046, Response to Requests for Additional Lnformation License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology2010-05-25025 May 2010 Response to Requests for Additional Lnformation License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology Project stage: Request L-PI-10-054, Response to Requests for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology2010-06-23023 June 2010 Response to Requests for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology Project stage: Response to RAI L-PI-10-076, Calculation No. GEN-PI-083, Revision 1, Locked Rotor Accident (LRA) Analysis Using AST, Attachment 52010-07-23023 July 2010 Calculation No. GEN-PI-083, Revision 1, Locked Rotor Accident (LRA) Analysis Using AST, Attachment 5 Project stage: Other ML1023002982010-07-23023 July 2010 Calculation No. GEN-PI-082, Revision 1, Control Rod Ejection Accident - AST, Attachment 4 Project stage: Other ML1023002972010-07-23023 July 2010 Calculation No. GEN-PI-081, Revision 1, Eab, LPZ, and CR Doses Due to Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident - AST, Attachment 3 Project stage: Other ML1023002962010-07-23023 July 2010 Calculation No. GEN-PI-078, Revision 1, Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Accident Analysis Using AST, Attachment 2 Project stage: Other ML1022200872010-08-10010 August 2010 Forthcoming Meeting with Northern States Power Company - Minnesota (Nspm), to Discuss the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Steam Generator Margin-to-Overfill Analysis as It Relates to Pingp'S License Amendment Request to Adopt... Project stage: Meeting ML1023002952010-08-12012 August 2010 Response to Requests for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology Project stage: Response to RAI ML1023805712010-08-25025 August 2010 Meeting Presentation Alternative Source Term Steam Generator Tube Rupture Margin to Overfill Evaluation - Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Project stage: Request ML1025903972010-09-23023 September 2010 Prairie Island, Summary of Meeting with Northern States Power Company to Discuss the Alternative Source Term License Amendment Request Project stage: Meeting ML1032205572010-11-15015 November 2010 Draft RAI Concerning AST SGTR Mto Analysis Project stage: Draft RAI ML1032205552010-11-15015 November 2010 Draft RAI Concerning AST SGTR Mto Analysis Project stage: Draft RAI L-PI-10-112, Prairie Lsland Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology (TAC Nos. ME2609 and ME26102)2010-12-17017 December 2010 Prairie Lsland Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt the Alternative Source Term Methodology (TAC Nos. ME2609 and ME26102) Project stage: Response to RAI ML1110400212011-04-0404 April 2011 NRR E-mail Capture - Prairie Island - Revised Alternative Source Term LAR Draft RAI 4-4-2011 Project stage: Draft RAI ML1035404332011-05-12012 May 2011 Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term Project stage: RAI L-PI-11-060, Response to Requests for Additional Lnformation (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2011-06-22022 June 2011 Response to Requests for Additional Lnformation (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology Project stage: Other ML1118226692011-06-29029 June 2011 PINGP - AST Methodology - ME2609 and ME2610 Project stage: Other L-PI-11-068, Response to Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2011-07-11011 July 2011 Response to Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology Project stage: Response to RAI ML1120819672011-07-20020 July 2011 E-mail Prairie Island - Request for Clarification of June 22, 2011 Request for Additional Information (RAI) Response Project stage: RAI L-PI-11-079, Response to Requests for Additional Lnformation (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2011-08-0909 August 2011 Response to Requests for Additional Lnformation (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology Project stage: Other ML1125503562011-09-0101 September 2011 Ngp - Draft RAI Concerning SGTR Instrumentation for Alternative Source Term LAR Project stage: Draft RAI ML1125503572011-09-0101 September 2011 PINGP Draft RAI - AST Instrumentation Project stage: Draft RAI ML1131100842011-11-0202 November 2011 Alternative Source Term Draft Request for Additional Information Project stage: Draft RAI ML1131100942011-11-0202 November 2011 RAI Prairie PINGP, Units 1 and 2 Project stage: RAI L-PI-11-099, Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 Instrumentation Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2011-12-0808 December 2011 Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 Instrumentation Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology Project stage: Response to RAI L-PI-12-010, Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term Methodology2012-02-13013 February 2012 Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term Methodology Project stage: Response to RAI L-PI-12-013, Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2012-02-24024 February 2012 Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology Project stage: Response to RAI L-PI-12-082, Response to Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2012-09-13013 September 2012 Response to Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology Project stage: Response to RAI ML1125212892013-01-22022 January 2013 Issuance of Amendments Adoption of Alternative Source Term Methodology Project stage: Approval L-PI-13-111, Notification of Alternative Source Term (AST) Implementation and Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement2014-01-13013 January 2014 Notification of Alternative Source Term (AST) Implementation and Unit 2 Steam Generator Replacement Project stage: Other 2011-12-08
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Category:Letter type:L
MONTHYEARL-PI-24-036, – Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2024-06-28028 June 2024 – Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations L-PI-24-031, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Conditions 23(a), 24(A)(2), and 24(B)(2)2024-06-0505 June 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Conditions 23(a), 24(A)(2), and 24(B)(2) L-PI-24-014, License Amendment Request to Revise the Technical Specification Definition of Reactor Trip System (RTS) Response Time and Apply Response Time Testing to RTS Trip Functions with Time Delay Assumption2024-06-0303 June 2024 License Amendment Request to Revise the Technical Specification Definition of Reactor Trip System (RTS) Response Time and Apply Response Time Testing to RTS Trip Functions with Time Delay Assumption L-PI-24-030, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.12024-05-22022 May 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1 L-PI-24-012, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - License Amendment Request: Revise Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Conditions 23(a), 24(A)(2), and 24(B)(2)2024-04-0202 April 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - License Amendment Request: Revise Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) License Conditions 23(a), 24(A)(2), and 24(B)(2) L-PI-24-004, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Annual Effluent Report, January Through December 20232024-02-29029 February 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Annual Effluent Report, January Through December 2023 L-PI-24-009, Response to Request for Additional Information Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2, Alternative RR-09 Safety Injection System and Volume Control System Category C Check Valve Quarterly Testing2024-02-13013 February 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 2, Alternative RR-09 Safety Injection System and Volume Control System Category C Check Valve Quarterly Testing L-PI-23-034, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Cooling Water (Cl) System,2024-01-0202 January 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8, Cooling Water (Cl) System, L-PI-23-035, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report2023-12-20020 December 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report L-PI-23-033, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 32023-12-0505 December 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 3 L-PI-23-025, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 32023-09-28028 September 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.2, Note 3 L-PI-23-023, Baffle Former Bolts Alternate Aging Management Strategy2023-09-11011 September 2023 Baffle Former Bolts Alternate Aging Management Strategy L-PI-23-018, License Amendment Request to Revise ISFSI Technical Specification 4.4 to Allow Use of a Code Alternative to ASME Code, NB-5130, Examination of Weld Edge Preparation Surfaces, for the TN-40HT2023-07-14014 July 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise ISFSI Technical Specification 4.4 to Allow Use of a Code Alternative to ASME Code, NB-5130, Examination of Weld Edge Preparation Surfaces, for the TN-40HT L-PI-23-006, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 Required Actions2023-06-22022 June 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 Required Actions L-PI-23-016, 2022 10 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report2023-06-14014 June 2023 2022 10 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report L-PI-23-010, Annual Report of Individual Monitoring2023-04-27027 April 2023 Annual Report of Individual Monitoring L-PI-23-007, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2023-03-28028 March 2023 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) L-PI-23-005, CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-15 and 2-RR-5-15, Proposed Use of Subsequent ASME Code Edition and Addenda in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4)(iv)2023-03-0303 March 2023 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-15 and 2-RR-5-15, Proposed Use of Subsequent ASME Code Edition and Addenda in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4)(iv) L-PI-23-001, Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-01-30030 January 2023 Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-PI-22-047, Resubmittal of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) 2018 Unit 1 180-Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2022-12-21021 December 2022 Resubmittal of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) 2018 Unit 1 180-Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-PI-22-020, Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2022-12-0202 December 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) L-PI-22-040, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections2022-10-0606 October 2022 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections L-PI-22-037, Updated Approach for Prairie Island Unit 1 and Unit 2 Baffle Former Bolts2022-09-20020 September 2022 Updated Approach for Prairie Island Unit 1 and Unit 2 Baffle Former Bolts L-PI-22-032, CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report2022-06-16016 June 2022 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report L-PI-22-033, Response to Request for Additional Information Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendment to Adopt 24-Month Operating Cycles2022-06-10010 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendment to Adopt 24-Month Operating Cycles L-PI-22-003, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections2022-06-0707 June 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections L-PI-22-024, Supplement to Application for License Amendment to Implement 24-Month Operating Cycle2022-03-0707 March 2022 Supplement to Application for License Amendment to Implement 24-Month Operating Cycle L-PI-21-047, Response to Request for Additional Information 24-Month Cycle Amendment Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 22021-12-0707 December 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information 24-Month Cycle Amendment Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 L-PI-21-045, Response to Request for Additional Information Cooling Water System License Amendment Request2021-11-0404 November 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Cooling Water System License Amendment Request L-PI-21-029, Exigent License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 to Allow a One-Time Extension of the Completion Time of Required Action B.12021-10-0707 October 2021 Exigent License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 to Allow a One-Time Extension of the Completion Time of Required Action B.1 L-PI-21-006, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, to Incorporate Installed Bypass Test Capability for the Power Range RTS Functions2021-10-0202 October 2021 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, to Incorporate Installed Bypass Test Capability for the Power Range RTS Functions L-PI-21-032, Response to Request for Additional Information Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-471 and 571-T for Prairie Island2021-09-30030 September 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-471 and 571-T for Prairie Island L-PI-21-016, Application for License Amendment to Implement 24-Month Operating Cycle2021-08-0606 August 2021 Application for License Amendment to Implement 24-Month Operating Cycle L-PI-21-027, 2020 10 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report2021-06-28028 June 2021 2020 10 CFR 50.46 LOCA Annual Report L-PI-21-023, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Report2021-05-14014 May 2021 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Report L-PI-21-007, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-471, Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes2021-04-19019 April 2021 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-471, Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes L-PI-20-050, Request for a One-Time Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise Requirements, Due to COVID-19 Pandemic2020-10-0707 October 2020 Request for a One-Time Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise Requirements, Due to COVID-19 Pandemic L-PI-20-051, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements2020-09-28028 September 2020 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements L-PI-20-026, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiativ2020-09-0101 September 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4 L-PI-20-035, = Request for Revision to Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule Removal Schedule2020-07-28028 July 2020 = Request for Revision to Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule Removal Schedule L-PI-20-023, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)2020-06-10010 June 2020 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) L-PI-20-014, Supplement to License Amendment Request: Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI2020-04-29029 April 2020 Supplement to License Amendment Request: Expand the Storage Capacity of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI L-PI-20-004, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Remove Note I from Limiting Condition for Operating (LCO) 3.4.12 and LCO 3.4.132020-03-30030 March 2020 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Remove Note I from Limiting Condition for Operating (LCO) 3.4.12 and LCO 3.4.13 L-PI-20-001, License Amendment Request to Address Issues Identified in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-09-5, Revision 1, and NSAL-15-12020-01-29029 January 2020 License Amendment Request to Address Issues Identified in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-09-5, Revision 1, and NSAL-15-1 L-PI-19-041, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements2019-12-23023 December 2019 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements L-PI-19-031, License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b2019-12-16016 December 2019 License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b L-PI-19-040, License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specification 5.5.14 to Permanently Extend Containment Leakage Rate Test Frequency2019-10-0707 October 2019 License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specification 5.5.14 to Permanently Extend Containment Leakage Rate Test Frequency L-PI-19-038, Submittal of Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report2019-09-19019 September 2019 Submittal of Revised Pressure and Temperature Limits Report L-PI-19-037, Response to Request for Additional Information: 10 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-10 and 2-RR-5-10, Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection (ISI) Intervals2019-09-16016 September 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information: 10 CFR 50.55a Requests Nos. 1-RR-5-10 and 2-RR-5-10, Proposed Alternative to Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection (ISI) Intervals L-PI-19-025, Request to Approve Site-Specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Model for Flowserve N-Seal Abeyance Seal and Dynamic Testing for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP)2019-08-27027 August 2019 Request to Approve Site-Specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Model for Flowserve N-Seal Abeyance Seal and Dynamic Testing for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) 2024-06-05
[Table view] Category:Technical Specification
MONTHYEARL-PI-24-010, Revisions 255 Through 264 for Technical Specification Bases2024-04-30030 April 2024 Revisions 255 Through 264 for Technical Specification Bases L-PI-22-020, Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR)2022-12-0202 December 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specification Section 5.6.6, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) ML22243A1822022-10-28028 October 2022 Correction Letter for Amendments 239 and 227 to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses - Enclosure - TS Page 5.5-5 L-PI-22-040, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections2022-10-0606 October 2022 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections L-PI-21-006, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, to Incorporate Installed Bypass Test Capability for the Power Range RTS Functions2021-10-0202 October 2021 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, to Incorporate Installed Bypass Test Capability for the Power Range RTS Functions L-PI-21-007, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-471, Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes2021-04-19019 April 2021 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-471, Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes ML20118D3182020-04-27027 April 2020 Enclosure 4 - Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program L-PI-19-041, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements2019-12-23023 December 2019 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements L-PI-19-031, License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b2019-12-16016 December 2019 License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b ML18155A4312018-05-18018 May 2018 Changes to Technical Specification Bases ML18106A0412018-04-0505 April 2018 ISFSI - Technical Specifications Updating Instructions, Amendment 10 L-PI-16-045, Revisions to Technical Specifications Bases2016-05-20020 May 2016 Revisions to Technical Specifications Bases ML15327A2282015-11-17017 November 2015 License Amendment Request for Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Technical Specification Changes L-PI-15-087, Enclosures 7 & 8: Modeling of Fuel Assemblies Containing Both Ifba and Gadolinia Absorber Rods with Westinghouse Core Design Code Systems and Affidavit2015-10-31031 October 2015 Enclosures 7 & 8: Modeling of Fuel Assemblies Containing Both Ifba and Gadolinia Absorber Rods with Westinghouse Core Design Code Systems and Affidavit ML15209A5122015-07-17017 July 2015 Technical Specifications - Updating Instructions -Effective Date: 7/24/2015 ML14058A2512014-02-19019 February 2014 3801 Markup Bases L-PI-12-013, Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2012-02-24024 February 2012 Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology ML1021001982010-07-16016 July 2010 Licensing Bases for Turbine Building Internal Flooding L-PI-10-001, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.3, Diesel Fuel Oil, Storage Requirements2010-01-27027 January 2010 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.3, Diesel Fuel Oil, Storage Requirements L-PI-09-125, License Amendment Request and Exemption Request to Support the Use of Optimized Zirlotm Fuel Rod Cladding2009-11-24024 November 2009 License Amendment Request and Exemption Request to Support the Use of Optimized Zirlotm Fuel Rod Cladding L-PI-09-076, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications in Accordance with TSTF-448, Revision 3 - Control Room Habitability2009-06-24024 June 2009 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications in Accordance with TSTF-448, Revision 3 - Control Room Habitability ML0910506192009-04-15015 April 2009 License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-511, Rev. 0, Eliminate Working Hour Restrictions from TS 5.2.2 to Support Compliance with 10 CFR Part 26 ML0827402262008-11-0606 November 2008 License Amendment, Revise Containment Spray Nozzle Surveillance Requirements ML0828105432008-10-17017 October 2008 Correction of Error in Amendment No. 6 of Material License SNM-2506 for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Regarding the Transfer of Operating Authority (Tac Nos. L24245, MD9622, and MD9623) ML0823409202008-08-15015 August 2008 Tech Spec Page for Amendment 187 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Load Test Surveillance Requirement L-PI-08-047, License Amendment Request for Technical Specifications Changes to Allow Use of Westinghouse 0.422-inch OD 14x14 Vantage+ Fuel2008-06-26026 June 2008 License Amendment Request for Technical Specifications Changes to Allow Use of Westinghouse 0.422-inch OD 14x14 Vantage+ Fuel L-PI-07-060, Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) for Miscellaneous Technical Specification (TS) Improvements (TAC Nos. MD 2822 and MD 2823)2007-07-16016 July 2007 Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) for Miscellaneous Technical Specification (TS) Improvements (TAC Nos. MD 2822 and MD 2823) L-PI-07-048, License Amendment Request (LAR) Incorporating Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Industry Travelers TSTF-479, TSTF-485, and TSTF-4972007-07-0303 July 2007 License Amendment Request (LAR) Incorporating Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Industry Travelers TSTF-479, TSTF-485, and TSTF-497 L-PI-07-028, Application for Technical Specification Change TSTF-491, Removal of the Main Steam and Main Feedwater Valve Isolation Time from Technical Specifications Using Consolidated Line Item Improvement..2007-05-10010 May 2007 Application for Technical Specification Change TSTF-491, Removal of the Main Steam and Main Feedwater Valve Isolation Time from Technical Specifications Using Consolidated Line Item Improvement.. ML0708101312007-03-20020 March 2007 Technical Specification Pages Re Steam Generator Tube Integrity L-PI-06-058, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) in Support of Containment Sump Resolution2006-12-14014 December 2006 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) in Support of Containment Sump Resolution L-PI-04-112, Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Inspection Interval for Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2004-10-15015 October 2004 Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Extend the Inspection Interval for Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process ML0412102562004-04-28028 April 2004 Technical Specifications for Amd 162 and 153, Respectively ML0403707272004-02-0303 February 2004 Technical Specification for Amendment Nos. 161 and 152, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 ML0404204242004-01-30030 January 2004 Application for Technical Specification Improvement to Eliminate Requirements for Hydrogen Recombiners and Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitors Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process L-PI-03-026, License Amendment Request (LAR) Dated March 19, 2003 Clarification of Licensed Operator Qualifications2003-03-19019 March 2003 License Amendment Request (LAR) Dated March 19, 2003 Clarification of Licensed Operator Qualifications 2024-04-30
[Table view] Category:Bases Change
MONTHYEARL-PI-24-010, Revisions 255 Through 264 for Technical Specification Bases2024-04-30030 April 2024 Revisions 255 Through 264 for Technical Specification Bases L-PI-21-006, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, to Incorporate Installed Bypass Test Capability for the Power Range RTS Functions2021-10-0202 October 2021 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, to Incorporate Installed Bypass Test Capability for the Power Range RTS Functions ML20118D3182020-04-27027 April 2020 Enclosure 4 - Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program L-PI-19-041, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements2019-12-23023 December 2019 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements L-PI-19-031, License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b2019-12-16016 December 2019 License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b ML18155A4312018-05-18018 May 2018 Changes to Technical Specification Bases L-PI-16-045, Revisions to Technical Specifications Bases2016-05-20020 May 2016 Revisions to Technical Specifications Bases ML15327A2282015-11-17017 November 2015 License Amendment Request for Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Technical Specification Changes L-PI-15-087, Enclosures 7 & 8: Modeling of Fuel Assemblies Containing Both Ifba and Gadolinia Absorber Rods with Westinghouse Core Design Code Systems and Affidavit2015-10-31031 October 2015 Enclosures 7 & 8: Modeling of Fuel Assemblies Containing Both Ifba and Gadolinia Absorber Rods with Westinghouse Core Design Code Systems and Affidavit ML15209A5122015-07-17017 July 2015 Technical Specifications - Updating Instructions -Effective Date: 7/24/2015 ML14058A2512014-02-19019 February 2014 3801 Markup Bases L-PI-12-013, Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2012-02-24024 February 2012 Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology ML1021001982010-07-16016 July 2010 Licensing Bases for Turbine Building Internal Flooding L-PI-08-047, License Amendment Request for Technical Specifications Changes to Allow Use of Westinghouse 0.422-inch OD 14x14 Vantage+ Fuel2008-06-26026 June 2008 License Amendment Request for Technical Specifications Changes to Allow Use of Westinghouse 0.422-inch OD 14x14 Vantage+ Fuel L-PI-07-048, License Amendment Request (LAR) Incorporating Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Industry Travelers TSTF-479, TSTF-485, and TSTF-4972007-07-0303 July 2007 License Amendment Request (LAR) Incorporating Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Industry Travelers TSTF-479, TSTF-485, and TSTF-497 L-PI-06-058, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) in Support of Containment Sump Resolution2006-12-14014 December 2006 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) in Support of Containment Sump Resolution 2024-04-30
[Table view] Category:Technical Specifications
MONTHYEARML24071A1162024-05-0101 May 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 244 and 232 Revise TS 3.7.8, Cooling Water (Cl) System ML22357A1002023-03-31031 March 2023 and Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Standard Emergency Plan and Consolidated Emergency Operations Facility ML22181A0002022-08-17017 August 2022 Issuance of Amendments Reactor Trip System Power Range Instrumentation Channels L-PI-22-003, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections2022-06-0707 June 2022 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML22061A2062022-04-0101 April 2022 Issuance of Amendments TSTF-471, Rev. 1, TSTF-571-T, and Administrative Changes to Technical Specification Section 5.0 L-PI-21-029, Exigent License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 to Allow a One-Time Extension of the Completion Time of Required Action B.12021-10-0707 October 2021 Exigent License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.8 to Allow a One-Time Extension of the Completion Time of Required Action B.1 ML20346A0202021-03-15015 March 2021 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 235 and 223, Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b ML20356A0022021-02-0505 February 2021 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 234 and 222, Revise Technical Specifications 3.2.1 and 5.6.5 Identified in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letters NSAL-09-05, Revision 1, and NSAL-15-1 ML20210M0142020-09-0808 September 2020 and Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendment Nos. 204, 231, and 219 TSTF-529 Clarify Use and Application Rules L-PI-20-001, License Amendment Request to Address Issues Identified in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-09-5, Revision 1, and NSAL-15-12020-01-29029 January 2020 License Amendment Request to Address Issues Identified in Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-09-5, Revision 1, and NSAL-15-1 L-PI-19-041, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements2019-12-23023 December 2019 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-547, Clarification of Rod Position Requirements L-PI-19-040, License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specification 5.5.14 to Permanently Extend Containment Leakage Rate Test Frequency2019-10-0707 October 2019 License Amendment Request: Revise Technical Specification 5.5.14 to Permanently Extend Containment Leakage Rate Test Frequency ML19045A4802019-04-16016 April 2019 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 226 and 214 Adoption of TSTF-425, Revision 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - RITSTF Initiative 5B ML19029A0942019-01-29029 January 2019 Issuance of Amendment No. 213, One-Time Technical Specification Change to Extend Completion Time for EDGs D5 and D6 (Emergency Circumstances) ML17362A2022018-03-0505 March 2018 Issuance of Amendment Concerning Revision to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Emergency Plan (CAC Nos. MF9345 and MF9346; EPID L-2017-LLA-0175) ML16133A4062016-06-16016 June 2016 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 217 and 205, Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force TSTF-523, Revision 2, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation (CAC Nos. MF6449 and MF6450) ML15264A2092015-11-30030 November 2015 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 216 and 204 Regarding Revisions to Technical Specification 3.3.3 and Renewed Facility Operating License ML15229A1762015-08-26026 August 2015 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 215 and 203 Regarding Revision to Licensing Basis Analysis for a Waste Gas Decay Tank Rupture ML15209A5122015-07-17017 July 2015 Technical Specifications - Updating Instructions -Effective Date: 7/24/2015 ML15209A5092015-07-17017 July 2015 Technical Specifications - Updating Instructions L-PI-15-030, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process2015-06-29029 June 2015 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process ML15086A0462015-05-21021 May 2015 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 214 and 202 Regarding Revisions to Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating ML15062A0132015-05-20020 May 2015 Issuance of Amendments 213 and 201 to Revise TS 3.5.3, ECCS - Shutdown L-PI-15-004, Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3, ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System)- Shutdown2015-02-26026 February 2015 Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.3, ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System)- Shutdown L-PI-14-034, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3, Event Monitoring (EM) Instrumentation, and Additional Conditions Related to Alternative Source Term License Amendment Implementation2014-12-11011 December 2014 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3, Event Monitoring (EM) Instrumentation, and Additional Conditions Related to Alternative Source Term License Amendment Implementation ML14058A2072014-02-19019 February 2014 Technical Specifications (3801 TS Markup) ML13214A0292013-08-0202 August 2013 Correction Letter for License Amendment Nos. 207 (Unit 1) and 194 (Unit 2) ML13113A4002013-07-0202 July 2013 License Amendments TSTF-510 L-PI-13-030, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Add a Methodology to Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.5, Core Operating Limits Report (Colr).2013-05-23023 May 2013 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Add a Methodology to Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.5, Core Operating Limits Report (Colr). ML13093A3442013-05-0909 May 2013 License Amendments for Fuel Oil System and TSTF-501 L-PI-12-028, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Limits2012-05-15015 May 2012 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Limits L-PI-12-013, Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology2012-02-24024 February 2012 Response to Requests for Additional Information Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology ML1129011152011-12-0101 December 2011 Issuance of Amendments Revision of Technical Specifications 5.2.1, Onsite and Offsite Organizations and TS 5.3, Plant Staff Qualifications. L-PI-11-037, License Amendment Request to Add Diesel Fuel Oil License Bases and Revise Technical Specifications 3.7.8 Re Cooling Water System & 3.8.3 Re Diesel Fuel Oil2011-08-11011 August 2011 License Amendment Request to Add Diesel Fuel Oil License Bases and Revise Technical Specifications 3.7.8 Re Cooling Water System & 3.8.3 Re Diesel Fuel Oil ML11172A0222011-06-27027 June 2011 Technical Specifications, Unit 2, Renewed Facility Operating License for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML11172A0202011-06-27027 June 2011 Technical Specifications, Unit 1, Renewed Facility Operating License for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant L-PI-11-016, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Surveillance Requirement (SR) Footnote in Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating.2011-02-0303 February 2011 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Surveillance Requirement (SR) Footnote in Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating. L-PI-10-104, Supplement to Exigent License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.102010-10-20020 October 2010 Supplement to Exigent License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.10 ML1025715492010-09-16016 September 2010 Correction to Amendment Nos. 195 and 184 Regarding Technical Specification Changes to Control Room Habitability Requirements ML0925703672009-09-15015 September 2009 Correction to Technical Specifications (TAC Nos. MD9142 and MD9143) L-PI-08-080, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Test Loads in Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.3 and SR 3.8.1.92008-11-0404 November 2008 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Test Loads in Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.3 and SR 3.8.1.9 ML0826815912008-09-22022 September 2008 (PINGP-1 and 2), Technical Specifications ISFSI, Issuance of Amendments to Conform the Facility Operating Licenses to Reflect Transfer of Operating Authority (TAC L24245) ML0826812912008-09-22022 September 2008 Revised Operating Licenses & Technical Specifications, Issuance of Amendments to Conform the Facility Operating Licenses to Reflect Transfer of Operating Authority (TAC L24245, MD9622 and MD9623) ML0820504452008-07-18018 July 2008 Tech Spec Pages for Amendments 186 & 176 Adopting Provisions of Regulatory Guide (Rg) 1.52 Revision 3 ML0818402342008-06-27027 June 2008 Prairie, Units 1 and 2, Tech Spec Pages for Amendments 185 and 175 Regarding Incorporation of TS Task Force Travelers TSTF-479, TSTF-485 and TSTF-497 ML0812705062008-05-0101 May 2008 Submittal of Entire Re-Issue of ISFSI Technical Specifications ML0801404252008-01-28028 January 2008 Issuance of Amendments (TAC Nos. MD4209 & MD4210) - Tech Specs ML0735204002007-12-14014 December 2007 Technical Specifications in Support of Containment Sump Resolution L-PI-07-086, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Containment Spray Nozzle Surveillance Requirements (SR)2007-11-19019 November 2007 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise Containment Spray Nozzle Surveillance Requirements (SR) ML0728403542007-10-31031 October 2007 Tech Spec Page for Amendments 181 and 171, Revise TS 3.7.2 Main Steam Valves Closure Times by Relocating the Isolation Valve Closure Times to a Licensee-Controlled Document Identified as a Bases Reference 2024-05-01
[Table view] |
Text
@ Xcel EnergyB L-PI-12-013 FEB 2 4 2012 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Dockets 50-282 and 50-306 Renewed License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 Response to Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Associated with Adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodolonv (TAC Nos. ME2609 and ME2610)
In a letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated October 27, 2009 (Agencywide Documents and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML093160583), the Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation doing business as Xcel Energy (hereafter "NSPM"), requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP). The proposed amendment requested adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) methodology, in addition to TS changes supported by AST design basis accident radiological consequence analyses.
Recently, the NRC staff conducted several conference calls with NSPM staff to discuss the technical details of NSPMJsmain steam line break atmospheric dispersion model, which was submitted in the subject AST application. To complete their review, the NRC staff requested additional information by electronic mail dated November 2, 201 1 (ADAMS Accession No. MLI 13110094). to this letter provides the NSPM response to questions 2 and 4 of the November 2, 201 1 request for additional information. Enclosure 2 provides a proposed markup to the TS and Enclosure 3 provides a description and justification of the TS changes. Enclosure 4 provides a proposed markup of the TS Bases for your information. Final TS Bases changes will be implemented pursuant to TS 5.5.12, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program," at the time the amendment is implemented. Enclosure 5 provides a draft markup of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) for your information.
NSPM submits this supplement in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90.
The supplemental information provided in this letter does not impact the conclusions of the Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Environmental Assessment presented in the October 27, 2009 submittal, supplemented by letters dated April 29,2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200083), May 25,2010 (ADAMS 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, Minnesota 55089-9642 Telephone: 651.388.1121
Document Control Desk Page 2 Accession No. ML101460064), June 23,2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101760017),
August 12,2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102300295), December 17,2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML103510322), June 22, 201 1 (ADAMS Accession No. MLI 11740145),
July 11,2011 (ADAMS Accession No. MLI 11930157), August 9,201 1 (ADAMS Accession No. MLI 12220098), December 8, 201 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113430091), and February 13,2012.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, NSPM is notifying the State of Minnesota of this License Amendment Request (LAR) supplement by transmitting a copy of this letter to the designated State Official.
If there are any questions or if additional information is needed, please contact Glenn Adams at (612) 330-6777.
Summaw of Commitments This letter contains two new commitments:
Commitment Due Date
- 1. Implement a plant modification that will either block Within 90 days after the 121 Laundry Fan exhaust flow path permanently or completion of the outage in will otherwise remove the 121 Laundry Fan exhaust which the Unit 2 path as a potential source of post-accident radioactive Replacement Steam release through the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Generators are installed.
Exhaust stack.
- 2. Implement an administrative control to require Within 90 days after
~ u x i l i aBuilding r~ Special Ventilation Zone boundary completion of the outage in integrity during movement of heavy loads over an which the Unit 2 open reactor vessel containing irradiated fuel Replacement Steam assemblies when the containment atmosphere is open Generators are installed.
to the outside (as described in USAR 12.2.12).
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Mark A. Schimmel Site Vice President, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Enclosures (5) cc: Administrator, Region Ill, USNRC Project Manager, Prairie Island, USNRC Resident Inspector, Prairie Island, USNRC State of Minnesota
Enclosure 1 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls ENCLOSURE 1 In a letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated October 27, 2009 (Agencywide Documents and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML093160583), the Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota corporation doing business as Xcel Energy (hereafter "NSPM"), requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP). The proposed amendment requested adoption of the Alternative Source Term (AST) methodology, in addition to TS changes supported by AST design basis accident radiological consequence analyses.
Recently, the NRC staff conducted several conference calls with NSPM staff to discuss the technical details of NSPM1smain steam line break atmospheric dispersion model, which was submitted in the subject AST application. To complete their review, the NRC staff provided a request for additional information (RAI) by electronic mail dated November 2,201 1 (ADAMS Accession No. M L I 13110094). For clarity, the NRC RAI information is provided below in italics font and the NSPM response is provided in plain font.
Background:
Following a conference call with the NRC staff on September 22, 201 1, the licensee provided the following information concerning the design criteria for the Common Area of the Auxiliary Building (CAAB):
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Table 12.2-1, Page 1 indicates that the Common Area of fhe Auxiliary Building is a Design Class Ill* structure (i.e., above the concrete part of the structure). The CAAB is referred to as Xuxiliary Building (Except Class I or I*)" in the Table. This is a Design Class Ill* structure. USAR Table 12.2-4 indicates that Class Ill* structures are designed for Dead + Live +
Wind or Snow normal operating loads and Dead + Live + Uniform Building Code Zone I (earthquake) Loads. USAR Section 12.2.1.3.1 defines snow loading as 50 Ibs per sq-ft and the design wind speed as 100 mph. USAR Section 12.2.1.4.I d describes the load combinations for Class Ill* structures. These structures are designed for the greater of the above load combinations, where the Uniform Building Code Zone I earthquake loads are 0.05g. Although the CAAB is a corrugated steel building, it is structurally sound with fairly rigorous design criteria.
RAI 2
The NRC staff's understanding is that the common area of the auxiliary building (CAAB) is from elevation 755' to 809' and between columns 7 to 1I and J to Q (from USAR Figure 1.1-8 and Figure 1.1-16). The CAAB has metal siding between elevations 775' and 809'. There are no ventilation systems directly supplying fresh air to or providing exhaust from this area. Under normal operation the CAAB pressure is maintained Page 1 of 6 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls negative relative to atmosphere through indirect connection to one of the two unit's auxiliary building exhaust systems. Below elevation 775: the CAAB walls are concrete construction or have adjacent unit specific auxiliary building spaces. Please verify if the NRC staff's understanding is correct or provide information needed to correct the staff's understanding.
NSPM Response:
The Staff's understanding is correct as stated in RAI 2 with the following exceptions:
The paragraph describes that "under normal operation the CAAB pressure is maintained negative relative to atmosphere through indirect connection to one of the two unit's auxiliary building exhaust systems." This is not correct. There is no connection between the CAAB atmosphere and the auxiliary building exhaust system that would significantly reduce CAAB pressure below atmosphere. Under normal operation the CAAB pressure is atmospheric.
The paragraph describes that "thereareno ventilationsystemsdirectlysupplying fresh air to orproviding exhaust from this area". In fact, there are ventilation systems that could (under certain conditions) exhaust air from the CAAB.
o Under normal operating conditions, a low-capacity fan draws from laundry dryers and tank vents (located in the CAAB) and exhausts into the Auxiliary Building Normal Ventilation System (ABNVS) downstream of Unit 2 exhaust fan.
o Also, by an indirect and improbable means, it can be postulated that the ABNVS could draw air from the CAAB if boundary integrity is not established for the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone (ABSVZ) during extraordinary plant shutdown conditions.
Both of these exhaust paths are described later in the reply to RAI 4, in context of potential accident release paths.
The paragraph also describes the CAAB boundary as 755' to 809' elevations; however, with elimination of Spent Fuel Pool Special Ventilation System (SFPSVS) boundary requirements (TS 3.7.13), the CAAB may be expanded to include the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Enclosure. Thus, the CAAB is open from the ground elevation 695' to the roof elevation 809' on the south end of the building between approximately Columns Q to P.3 bordering the spent fuel pool enclosure. The CAAB boundary then extends north along the top of the spent fuel pool enclosure, down the north wall of the Spent Fuel Pool Enclosure to the roof of the filter room at approximately M.3. The boundary then extends north along the filter room roof (el.
755') and down the north wall of the filter room to elevation 735'. There is an open stairwell and other openings around ventilation ductwork that allow communication between elevation 755' and elevation 735' in this area, such that the Laundry and Dressing Area communicates with the CAAB. There is no direct communication with rooms below these areas.
Page 2 of 6
Enclosure 1 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls
RAI 4
Please discuss releases from the Auxiliary Building Exhaust stacks (USAR Fig. 10.3-6).
The auxiliary building exhaust stacks are identified on USAR Figure 10.3-6 at approximate coordinates A-9 and A-10. These exhaust stacks are not identified as a potential release point in Table 3.1-2, "Release Points and Receptor LocationsJ',of the LAR. These exhaust stacks are not discussed in LAR section 3.1.3. Discussion of the auxiliary building exhaust stacks was not identified in any other section of the LAR, however, such discussion may have been missed by the reviewer. The discussion should indicate why the auxiliary building exhaust stacks are not considered a release point. If the justification is the exhaust fans are tripped on a safety related signal at the onset of an accident (e.g., emergency diesel load sequencing), verify the fans are shut down on an accident with no loss of offsite power. If potential releases are enveloped by a more conservative release-receptor combination, please indicate so.
NSPM Response:
No post-accident radiological releases from the Auxiliary Building Exhaust stacks are considered in the radiological consequence analysis because control systems ensure that (1) the normal large-capacity exhaust fans are tripped off (removing the primary driving mechanism), (2) the associated discharge dampers are isolated (providing positive isolation to prevent the passive migration of gases from the exhaust system),
and (3) actuation of the special ventilation system draws a negative pressure on the ABNVS. These control functions are described more fully below, along with the special features that prevent the unique Unit 2 exhaust stack from becoming a limiting release source during radiological accidents.
At the initiation of radiological events that affect the Auxiliary Building, the ventilation system control circuit is designed to automatically actuate the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System (ABSVS) and isolate the ABNVS to prevent radiological release from the Auxiliary Building Exhaust Stacks. System logic circuitry ensures that these systems are actuated in the above manner whether or not offsite power is available.
Thus, the analysis does not rely on a loss of offsite power to ensure that ABNVS exhaust fans are secured.
Both trains of ABSVS are actuated by either a Safety Injection (SI) signal in either unit or a High Radiation signal (in the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust ductwork).
Actuation of either Train A or Train B ABSVS fan will secure the ABNVS make-up fans and the general exhaust air fans, in addition to closing the make-up dampers and major exhaust dampers. Thus, the fans are shutdown and the flow path isolated automatically as part of the response to an accident that generates an SI signal or a High Radiation Signal. Thus, the ABNVS is automatically isolated for these events.
Page 3 of 6
Enclosure 1 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls As described in the response to RAI 2, two possible paths have been identified where radioactivity could bypass the isolation of the ABNVS and be released to the ABNVS exhaust stack.
e Under normal operating conditions, a low-capacity fan draws from laundry dryers and tank vents (located in the CAAB) and exhausts into the ABNVS downstream of Unit 2 exhaust fan.
e Also, by an indirect and improbable means, a scenario could be postulated that the ABNVS could draw air from the CAAB if boundary integrity is not established for the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone (ABSVZ) during extraordinary plant shutdown conditions.
Each of these potential paths is discussed below.
ABNVS Exhaust throuqh 121 Laundrv Drver Exhaust Fan For a Fuel Handling Accident (FHA), Heavy Load Drop (HLD), or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) accident, the radionuclides released into the CAAB could migrate to a small ventilation exhaust path that originates at the laundry dryers and the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Monitor Tank vents (in the CAAB). Ventilation ductwork for this exhaust path penetrates the CAAB / Auxiliary Building boundary and exhausts through the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Normal Ventilation (ABNV) Stack through the 121 Laundry and Monitor Tank Room fan. For simplicity, the 121 Laundry and Monitor Tank Room Fan will be referred to as the 121 Laundry Fan in this response.
The exhaust from the 121 Laundry Fan is directed into the Unit 2 ABNVS exhaust line downstream of the isolation damper and is released through the Unit 2 ABNV Stack.
Thus, if the 121 Laundry Fan were running, it could provide a potential path to the environment. The 121 Laundry Fan draws air from the Laundry Dryers and the three CVCS Monitor Tanks (small exhaust from the atmosphere above the liquid inside the three tanks) on the 735' elevation of the CAAB at a low volumetric flowrate (less than 2000 cfm).
Activity released from a FHA, HLD, or MSLB event would need to traverse through a relatively tortuous path to be released through the 121 Laundry Fan. In order to reach this area of the 735' elevation, the activity needs to first reach the 755' elevation of the CAAB and go down through three relatively small openings (one stairwell and two openings provided for ductwork traverse).
Notwithstanding the likelihood that dilution in the auxiliary building would significantly mitigate a radioactive release via the 121 Laundry Fan, this specific release path is not recognized and has not been analyzed in the current licensing basis. Therefore, the issue is being addressed in NSPM's corrective action program (CAP). NSPM commits to implement a plant modification that will either block the subject flow path permanently Page 4 of 6
Enclosure 1 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls or will otherwise remove the 121 Laundry Fan exhaust path as a potential source of post-accident radioactive release through the Auxiliary Building Normal Ventilation Exhaust stack.
Conclusion As described above, the flow paths for the radioactivity from a FHA, HLD or MSLB to reach the 121 Laundry Fan are relatively tortuous and would be diluted prior to reaching the release point. However, rather than crediting this dilution, or analyzing the ABNVS stack as a release point, NSPM has committed to install a modification that precludes a release that might be otherwise propagated by the operation of the 121 Laundry Fan.
By precluding this release path, the modification will preserve the integrity of the ABSVS zone and the AST analyses that assume the CAAB as the limiting release point.
ABNVS Exhaust When ABSVZ Integritv Is Not Established In response to the RAI question, NSPM staff re-examined the radiological accidents and the possible operating conditions of the ABNVS to identify any other potential for accident release from the auxiliary building normal exhaust stacks. The only additional vulnerability stemmed from having a common ABSVS shared between the two units, in conjunction with a common Technical Specification for that system. This vulnerability is discussed below.
Normally, with either unit in Modes 1-4, TS 3.7.12 would ensure the integrity of the ABSVZ prior to the accident and thereby ensure that the radiological release from a FHA and a HLD' would not escape from the CAAB into the ABSVZ. With respect to the proposed AST LAR, this ABSVZ integrity ensures the CAAB is the limiting release point for a FHA and a HLD.
However, TS 3.7.12 is inadequate for the proposed amendment in that it does not ensure ABSVZ integrity for the unlikely event that neither PlNGP unit is operating in Modes 1-4. For example, if Unit 1 experienced a Mode 6 FHA when Unit 2 was in Mode 5 (or 6) with the ABSVZ compromised, the radioactive plume could be drawn from containment or the SFP into the CAAB, through the compromised ABSVZ boundary, and into the ABNVS exhaust. This path would compromise the assumption that the CAAB was the limiting release path for the FHA.
To remedy this condition and restore the viability of the proposed radiological analysis that assumes the CAAB is the limiting release point, NSPM proposes a revised TS 3.7.12 to extend the ABSVZ operability statement to include the fuel handling operations that are precursors to the FHA. Thus, TS 3.7.12 will be revised to require that the ABSVS be OPERABLE during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
' The HLD of concern is a non-design basis event described in USAR Section 12.2.12 involving a HLD over the reactor with the containment atmosphere open to the outside. This event evokes a -/-day minimum wait after subcriticality, and assumes a release from the CAAB.
Page 5 of 6
Enclosure 1 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls In this manner, it can be assured that the radioactive release from the FHA will be enveloped by the CAAB until released from the point assumed in the analysis. The revised TS markup is attached as Enclosure 2 to this letter.
Also, for the HLD event in containment (a non-design basis event described in USAR 12.2.12), the current set of administrative restrictions does not ensure ABSVZ operability during movement of heavy loads over an open reactor vessel containing irradiated fuel assemblies (when the containment is open to atmosphere). Without ABSVZ integrity, the plume from this non-design basis event could migrate from the containment, through the compromised ABSVZ boundary, and into the ABNVS exhaust.
This path would compromise the assumption that the CAAB was the limiting release path for this particular HLD event.
To remedy this condition and restore the viability of the proposed radiological analysis that assumes the CAAB is the limiting release point, NSPM commits to a revised administrative restriction to require ABSVZ operability during heavy load handling operations that are a precursor to this specific HLD event. Thus, NSPM commits to implement an administrative control to require Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone boundary integrity during movement of heavy loads over an open reactor vessel containing irradiated fuel assemblies when the containment atmosphere is open to the outside (as described in USAR 12.2.12).
In this manner, it can be assured that the radioactive release from the HLD will be enveloped by the CAAB until released from the point assumed in the analysis. For information, the revised USAR markup is attached as Enclosure 4 to this letter.
The effect of this condition on the current radiological analysis of FHA and HLD has been identified in the NSPM CAP. Note that the aforementioned condition is not applicable to the MSLB because a logical precursor to the MSLB is the operation of the accident unit in an operating Mode 1-4, which would invoke TS 3.7.12.
Conclusion As described above, TS 3.7.12 and USAR 12.2.12 do not ensure that the ABSVZ integrity will be established prior to a FHA and HLD respectively. However, the proposed TS and USAR revisions will extend the ABSVZ operability statement to include fuel handling operations that are precursors to the FHA, and the heavy load handling operations that are precursors to the HLD. In this manner, it can be assured that the radioactive release from the FHA and HLD will be enveloped by the CAAB until released from the point assumed in the analysis. By precluding this release path, the TS and USAR revisions will preserve the integrity of the ABSVZ and the AST analyses that assume the CAAB as the limiting release point.
Page 6 of 6 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls Technical Specification Pages (Markup) 3 pages follow
'3,7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Auxilinly Builcling Special Ventilation System (ABSVS)
LCO 3.7.12 Two ABSVS trains shall be CIPERABLB
*----------------------- NOTE---------------------------------------
Tile ABSVS boundary inay be opelied under nrlministrntive cont~~ol.
APPLICABILITY: ':MODES 1, 2, 3, and ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COh,IPLE.TION TIME A. One ABSVS train A, 1 Restore ABSVS train to 7 rlrlys itieyerahle. OPERABLE status.
- 13. Two ABSLTStraills B. I Restore ARSVS botailclary 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> inoperable clue to to OPERABLE status.
inoprrablr ABSVS boundary ie~b8lt"1P3F51,
-- L4%111 4.
Prairie Islatld U~lit1 - Ain~ndlne111No. -G; Units I iliicl 2 3.7.12-1 LJilit 2 - Amenrlmcnt No. Jr4JL
ABSVS 3.7.12 ACTIONS (coatinilerl)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CORtlPLETION TIME (I'. 1CE;q~irrdA~tiallnllcl (2.1 BeinRIIODE3. 6 haws associated Cotl~pl~tio~l AND not 111et- RglrSDE ?a . 2, j, ial - -
-A 01, *,
-- 2 Be in h,IOK)E 5. 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />'s SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.12.1 Olzet.ntr each ABSVS t ~ n i afor 2 15 nrinutes witla 31 clays the t~e;itet'sopeiv<iting.
Ysnirie Island U~litsI nncl 2
ABSVS 3.7.12 SR 3.7.12.2 Pen'.iilm~iaquilrd ABSVS filter testing i l l In ~ccard:\!lre nccosdnnce with the Ventilation Filter Testing with the VFTP Program (VFTP).
SR 3.7.12.3 Verify each ABSVS trnin can produce I? negtrtive pressure within Ak ~~liiltitesafter' initiation.
SR 3.7.12.4 Verify each ABSVS trnin nctilntes oil an ~ctiialor simi~li~ted actuation signal.
LJnit 1 - Amelldment Nn.
Unit 2 - Amenrlment No.
NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls ENCLOSURE 3 Evaluation of the Proposed TS Changes PROPOSED CHANGES Brief descriptions of the associated proposed TS changes are provided below along with discussions of the justification for each change. The specific wording changes to the TS are provided in Enclosure 2.
TS 3.7.12, "Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Svstem (ABSVS)"
APPLICABILITY: The APPLICABILITY is expanded to include movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Justification: Whereas the APPLICABILITY was previously limited to MODES 1-4, the proposed change would ensure ABSVS operability for all times that irradiated fuel is being moved (regardless of either unit's operating MODE). This change will ensure that the supporting ventilation boundaries are established during fuel movement to ensure that any release from a fuel handling accident (FHA) will be confined to the areas assumed in the radiological analyses.
CONDITION B: Consistent with the expansion of the APPLICABILITY to include movement of irradiated fuel, CONDITION B is revised to apply only during MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.
Justification: This change retains the original intent of the CONDITION, which originally applied these ACTIONS and COMPLETION TIMES only to MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. A new CONDITION D has been created to specifically address the two-train ABSVS inoperability during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
CONDITION C: Consistent with the expansion of the APPLICABILITY to include movement of irradiated fuel, CONDITION C is revised to apply only during MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.
Justification: This change retains the original intent of the CONDITION, which originally applied these ACTIONS and COMPLETION TIMES only to MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. A new CONDITION D has been created to specifically provide ACTIONS and COMPLETION TIMES during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
CONDITION D: The proposed change would add a new CONDITION to describe the REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME for ABSVS inoperability during movement of irradiated fuel.
Page 1 of 2 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls Justification: Whereas CONDITION A allows irradiated fuel movement for 7 days with one ABSVS train inoperable, the REQUIRED ACTIONS and COMPLETION TIMES of CONDITION D require immediate suspension of fuel movement when the ABSV boundary is inoperable. In this CONDITION, the ABSVS boundary would not perform the isolation function required by the radiological analyses, so the prudent action is to suspend without delay the activity that would be the initiating event for a fuel handling accident. This REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME is consistent with a similar TS (3.7.10).
In summary, these changes are acceptable because they conservatively expand the APPLICABILITY of ABSVS operability to include movement of irradiated fuel assemblies; a potential accident initiator that had not been considered previously. The proposed CONDITIONS, REQUIRED ACTIONS, and COMPLETION TIMES are consistent with similar Technical Specifications.
Page 2 of 2 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls TS Bases Pages (Markup)
For Information Only Note that this markup includes the draft changes provided in the license amendment request dated October 27, 2009 8 pages follow
ABSVS B 3.7.12 I3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS I3 3.7.12 Auxiliary Btillrliilg Sl>ecialVentilation Systein (ABSVS)
BASES BAC'I<GRQLhTl The ABSVS is a standky wntilation system, coil~~llor~ to the two units, thnt is designed to collect anrl filter air from the Auxiliary Building S1xcial Ventilation (ABSV) tlounclary followitl~a loss of coolant accirle~~t (LUC'A). T l ~ ABSV e bounclary contnins those areas within the auxiliary building which have thc. potential for coilecting significant containme nt leakage that coufcl bypass the sltielrl builrling ancl leakage from systems which coulrl ~rcirculatc.primary conlnnt durifig LOC"A mitigatiuii.
The ABSVS col~sistsof two il~deprildrtitand trdunclt~nttrains. Ear11 train coilsists of a I ~ a t e r;i, prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air THEPA) filter, an acticra~erlcharcoal ndsorkcr section for removal of gaseous activity (principally indines), and n fan.
LIuctwsl.k, danlpers, and instl,umentation stlscr form past of the system. Tlie systenl initiates filter~clventilation of the ABSV boullclary following ~ ~ c e iof p ta safety iiljecfioll (SI) signal, high rudiation signal or manual initiation. The radiation signal is tloi utrcl ited iii tlre LJSAR for accidetit mit igatiutl.
Prairie Islailcl LJnit 1 - Revision -&&
Units 1 ancl 2 B 3.7.12- 1 IJtiit2 - Revision 4+y
ABSVS B 3.7.12 BASES EACI<GROITFJT) Tile exhaust fro111 the nuin cantlenses nirqjector is cliti.ctec1to the (continued) ABSVS for filtering prior to ex11;iustirlg from the plnnt via tile shield builrling stack to mitigate steallm generator tubc leakage, i%irlle~lthe ABSVS actuates, tile nonnal nonsafeguards supply and extlaust rlnmpers close automatically, nncl thc Auxiliary Buifiiing Normal Ventilatioa Systenm supply and eshatlst fans trip. Thc prefilters lanloc.e ally large parlicles in the air, and with the heatel~s, seduce tile level of entrained water rlroplets present, to p~vvent excessive Ionding of the HEPA filters nucl charcoal adsarbess. The heatcrs alp rlesig~ledto dry incoming air at iOO?l-) sntu~.ationby inweasing the tetmlj~eraf~ire of the air ~nteringtl~echnrcoal becl. The air is the11 clry enouph tn sitppo~-tthe char~uoaladsorber ioiliile removal efficiency requireinents.
TIP ABSVS would typically only be used fur post accirlent atn~rrsphericclemlul~ftunclions, Tlw ABSVS and ABSV boundary are discussed in t i p LJSAR tRcfercnces 1.2 arlcl 3).
APPLICABLE The clesigrl basis of the ABSVS is rstnblished by the large blank SAFETY LOC'A. The potelltin1 leakage yatlls fro111the containment to the ANALYSES auxiliary building are disct~ssedin Referrnce 1. The system evaluntion assumes n passive hi1nr.e of the ECC'S outside containtnent, such ils an R H R l~umyseal failure, cluring the recirci~lationmorle (Ref. 4). In such a case, the system limits rndioactive release to within the 10 CFR --[Lo7 (Ref. 5 ) Iiinits.
Tire aaalysis uf the effects nnil consequenws of n Inrge bs~nkLOCA is p~setlterlis) References 3 n1lc14. The ABSVS also actr~ntes following n small break LOCA, in tilose sascs iv11cre the ECCS goes into the secirculntiotm mode of long tenn cooling, to clenn up releases of smaller leaks, such as fro111valve stet11packing.
Prairie Islanil Utmit 1 - Revisioll Units 1 and 2 Utllt 2 - Revision -?--USA
1,r~l 'TWEIi o ~ ~ c 3 1 ~amdt c R~ dumdan~
t 1rai11t;01kk ARSVS arc ~ t j u i l r d10 tv O&3EE~2fS1,[4 1c-t ~nsarc ih:~t 34 &:as! CIIICis availai~lc,assulriiisg ~hak a singk hiiilu~2dis~ii311;"~ kh: c~lkizrtrain.
ABSVS B 3.7.12 BASES L(30 An ABSVS tt*ainis considereel OPERABLEwlleil its nssocinterl:
(co~ltii~i~eii)
- a. Fnn is OPERABLE;
- b. HEPA filter nnd c11nrcoal aclsorbers are c a p n b l ~of passing their clesig~lflow n~lclperforming their Siltsation functions;
- c. Heater, cluctwosk, nncl dnn~persare OPERABLE a ~ t dair circulation crul Lw maintai~lrd;nncl
- d. Instsunlentatict~ln~ldc~lltrolsn l OPERABLE.
~
The ABSV t~at~ndary is OPERABLE if both of the followin~g canelitions call he 111~1:
- a. Ol~wGingsit1 t he ARSV bounclt~ryare under ilirect ndministrat ive cunt1.01t~ndcan be redtrced to less than 10 square feet within 6-+3 miilu tes Sollawillg ml ncciilent : nnil
- b. Dampers rz~~d nctuntinn circuits that isolate tile Auxiliary Builcling Nor~nalVentilation System following an accident are CIPERABLE or can be martunlly isolated witIlillk2 minutes following an oucident.
The W O is tlaodified by 11 Note allowing the ABSV houticlary to be o j ~ n e dunclcr ndministr:ltive controls. As cliscussecl above, oyeaitlgs must be closecl to less tllan 10 scjunw k e t witllin - minulrs following an accident.
APPLIC14131LITY In MOLIES 1 , 2, 3, and 4 for either unit, tllc" ABSVS is required 10 be OPERARLE.
Prniric Islni~rl 1-Jnits I nncl 2
ARSVS B 3.7.12 BASES (conlinued)
ACTIONS
?trith one ABSVS train inoperable, actiotl must be taketi to iestore OPERABLE status within 7 days. Dirring this time, tile reillainiug OPERAI3LE train is adequate to pwfosin the ABSVS functiotr.
The 7 day Camplet ion Ti nre is rippso~~riate becnusr the ABSVS risk contribution is sutistantialfy less than that for the EC'CS (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Clonrplction Time j. The 7 clay Co~lryletiollTitm is basrcl 011i l ~ elow probability of rr DRA occurring during this time periocl, and ability of thc reinaiaing train to provide the requirecl capability.
Coacurrent Saililse of two ABSVS h i n s wuulil result in the loss of fitnctioanl caj~ability;tllei~fore,LC0 3.0-3 nrust br ente~ecl im~lrecliately.
a11 inoperable ABSV baundnry, actiol~~uustbr taken to i ~ s t o l e OPERABLE status withi1124 houi*s.
Tllr 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Con~ylerionTinre is lrnso~labfrhnsed on tlre lo\+!
prohnbility of n DBA ooct~rringduriag this time yeriorl, arlcl i11e availability of the ABSVS to provide a Silterrd relensr (albrit with putrnt ial for some unfiltesecl leakagej.
If the ABSV bounrlniy cannot be ~ s t o l r dto OPERABLE status within the associatecl Cotnyletion Time, tlre z l ~ l i t nus st tic placrcl in n MCIDE in which the LC0 clues not apply.
Prairie Island Units I nrlcl 2
ABSVS B 3.7.12 RASES AC'TIONS C.1 and (3.2 (continued) 1' at1 ABSVS train cannot be ~storecito OPERABLE status or the ABSV boundary cnllilot Izr restored to OPERABLE statits within tlao :tssocinted Conlplrtion Tiulc, tile unit njttst br placed in n MODE in which thc LCO does not nplsly.
To acllievc this status, the unit tnust be placed in at least M(=IT)E3 within 6 Ilours, anrl in MODE S witl~i~l 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
TIE allnweri Co1ily1etiol-iTimes are sensunable, baser1 on opwatisg esyeiiencr, to sench thc rrquirecl unit co~lriitioilsfrom fill1 power conclitio~lsin nn orrlrrly manner nltd without cilalle~lginlgunit sy strnls.
SLRVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1 2.1 IiEQIOREh,ENB This SR verifies that ear11 ABSVS t ~ a i ucan b~ manually stwtccl and the rtssnciateil filter heater energizrs.
Standby systenls slroufrl Ire cllrckerl periurlically to ensure that thcy fitnction proper1y. As the envirc7nrneat atlcl no1.111alcq~rrating raruiitiuns an this syste~na18 11ot srvere, testitlg each train once u inonth provides at1 adeq\~atrcheck 1711 this systcm. Each ABSVS, tnnin must br opel.atrrl 2 IS minutes yrr illontl~wit11 the t~rnters I
ABSVS B 3.7.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1 2.1 (continuecl)
REic..lrlRElvENTs energized, Tlte 31 clay Flaquency is baser1 011 the kmw 11reliability of eqrlip~lle~lt ancl tile two train redunclnncy avnilnble This SR verifies that 111erecjui~~cl ABSVS testing is performed in accorcln~lcewith the Ver~tilrttio~l Filter Testing Program (VFTP).
TIE VFTP inclucles testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal aclsnrL.rs cfficiency, minimum sy stem flow rate, nncl the phy sicnl prol~rtiesof t1= activatecl chnrcc~al(geilertal ust. nilel following sl3wific oyrsations).
Spcific test F~ec~iiencies ancl nclrlitio~~alinfomat ion ma eliscussed in detail in t 1 1 ~VFTP.
This SR verifies proper ftinctiuaiag of tlte ABSVS by verifying t11c integrity of the ABSV bounclary and the ability of t1x ABSVS to maintaii~n negative pi,irssiit.r \vit11 ~ r s p r c 10 t potentially i.~~lcn~lta~l~it~ntedadjacent arras.
During the l~ostacciclcnt morle of operation, the ABSVS is desig~lecl to maintain ti slight aegative plassi1t.e within the AQSV bounclnry with respect to the uontainnlent arltl shielcl builcling.
Each ABSVS trail) is starled f i u n ~tile co~~trol room n11d the followi~~g nre verified:
- a. Associateel Auxiliary Building Normal Ve~ltilntiotlSystetn fans trip ntlcl claml)ers close; and
- b. A mrasurahle nrgntive prrssurr is drawn withiu tile ABSV boi111dat.ywilllin ,Irbminutes after inilialion, with a I0 scjt~al'tz foot opellillg w i l l z ille ABSV bo1111da1-y.
Prairie Isfanrl 1Jnits I nncl 2
ABSVS B 3.7.13 BASES SLJRLrEILLANCE SR 3.7.1 2.11 Ccontinueill REQLJIRER,m The 92 clap Ftaquency is bnseil on the lil~owtlselittbilitp of equiylnent and t 1 two
~ train redundiuicy available.
The ABSVS initiates on a safety i~!jection signal, high rficliation sign" or mt~ilualactt~atiotl,This SR verifies that each ABSVS train starts mil q~ernteson an actual or simiilatt3il safety ir!jection actuation signal or on manual ini tintion.
The 24 month Frequency is consistent wit11 iadustly reliability exyrsience for. si~l~ilar equipment. The 24 1nont11Flaquencp is acceptable since this systenl usually pilsses the Surveillnncr when yrrforlllecl.
REFERENCES I. USAR. Apyenilis G.
- 2. LJSAR, Section 10.3.
3, USAR, Section 14,
- 4. USAR,Sectiotl6.7.
- 5. 10CaFRM&Mi;Ei.i-17~
Prairie Islaild Units I ancl 2 NSPM Alternative Source Term - Response to RAls USAR Page (Markup)
For Information Only Ipage follows
PRAlREE ISLAND UPDA TED SAFETY ANAL YSCS REPORT USAR Section 12 Revisioti 31 Pncre 12.2.12-6
- c. A load drop analysis was completed for lifting the Reactor Vessel Head over irradiated f w l in a11open vessel. Tlie botto~tiof tlie reactor vessel heacl sliall not be lifted higher than an elevation of 756.5 feet (Reference 56).
Tlie residual heat piping is protected from lieavy loacl clrop hazards by structural ttiembers of overlieacf floor levels; tlierefore, heavy loads tiiay be moved over tlie reactor caol~intpiimp vaults without atiniinistrative control.
Safe shutclown equipment is that equipment reclilireci for continuecl clecay heat removal ancl for maintaining tke plant shirtclo\~n.The steam generators andlor residi~alheat ret-riovalsystems are recli~ireclper TS 3:l. Since no single loacl can be carried over both steam generators, the ai~xilia~y feedwater, main feeelwater ancf steam piping in containt~ientare considered part of tlie safe load path.
With the reactor coolant systena tempet-atul-e tlljove Rilocle 5, Cold SIintdt:)~vn,the Containment Building polar crane will not be usecf for riiovirig Ioacls ~ i t l i o ispecific
~t written grocedures.
During heavy loacl lifts over the open fueled reactor vessel, at least one isolation valve will be closecl in each line penetrating tlie containment which provicies a direct path from the containttient atmosphere to tlie outside, except as ctescl-ibed below.
hlovement of tlie reactor vessel heacl and i~lsperinternals over the open fileled reactor after the fuel has beers si~f~cl'itical in excess of seven days is perniissible witti containment atmosphere open to the outside with tlie following restrictions (Reference 6'1):
- a. Tlie bottom of the upper internals sli~lllnot be lifteci liigher than an elevation of 735'-6".
- 1. Administrative controls shall lje in place to provicle containment closure witliin
'I hour of a clroplled load.
g C:ranes were pur-chaseclfrom Whiting Corporation of specification against which these cl-aneswei-e purchased s #TO. However, tile cranes were cliralifieci against EOSl 30.2-1967. A review verifiecl the cranes substantially Specification #7U.
- c. Adtiiinistrative cantrols shall be in place to ensure Auxiliary Bi~ildingSpecial Ventilation Zotie laoirndary integrity.