IR 05000443/2011004

IR 05000443-11-004; 07/01/2011-09/30/2011; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine Integrated Report; Fire Protection; Operability Evaluations

ML11308B437
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	11/04/2011
From:	Arthur Burritt Reactor Projects Branch 3
To:	Freeman P NextEra Energy Seabrook
Burritt A
References
IR-11-004
Download: ML11308B437 (33)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

475 ALLENDALE ROAD

SUBJECT:

SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/201 1 004

Dear Mr. Freeman:

On September 30, 2011, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 10,2011, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

The report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low significance (Green) that was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report.

However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as NCVs, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. lf you contest any NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region l; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at (Site Name). In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region l, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Seabrook. a copy of this letter' its ln accordance with 10 cFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"

for public inspection in the enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically (PARS) component of the NRC public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records the NRC Web site at NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from (the Public Electronic Reading Room)'

Sincerely, Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86 Enclosure:lnspectionReportNo'0500044312011004 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500044312011004; 0710112011-09/3012011; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine

Integrated Report; Fire Protection; Operability Evaluations.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident and regional specialist inspectors. One Green finding was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (lMC) 0609,

,,significance Determination process" (SDP). The cross cutting aspects for the findings were detLrmined using IMC 0310, "Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas." Findings for which the SDp does not apply may be Gieen, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is describeO in tlUnEG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Mitigating SYstems

(TS)

Green.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification

{l tathat requires that written procedures be established and implemented, including administrative procedures that define authorities and responsibilities for safe operation.

-pecifically, NextEra identified a degraded condition in the fire protection system on July 15, performance as 2011, Out iiO not properly or thoroughly evaluate the fire protection system required by NextEra proiedure gN-nn-ZOg-1001 . As corrective action, NextEra completed an fire protection system performance under certain operability"evaluation that identified degraded prevent operatingLconditions for which NextEra implemented administrative controls that would the degraded Performance.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because a reasonable doubt of operability fire existed untilfurther engineering evaluations were completed to demonstrate adequate Systems system performanc" ,id"r oeJign basis conditions. The finding affected the Mitigating objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond "orn"rrione to initiating events in order to prevent core damage. The issue was evaluated using Appendix F was determined to be of very of IMC 0669, "significance Determination Process" (SDP), and low safety signifiiance (Green) because the finding had minimal impact on fire system performance. te finding had a cross cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, p.1(c), becausl NextEra personnel did not adequately implement the operability fire system performance was thoroughly evaluated for determination process to ensure that actions were completed' (Section 1 R15)operability to assure timely and appropriate corrective

Other Findings

inspectors'

A violation of iery low safety significance identified by NextEra was reviewed by the corrective Corrective actions taken or ptaineO by NextEra have been entered into NextEra's corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4oA7 action program. This violation and of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summarv of Plant Status Seabrook Station operated at full power during the period'

1. REACTORSAFETY

Gornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111'01 - 2 samples)

.1 External Floodino

a. Inspection ScoPe inspection of the During the period August 15-23, 2Q11, the inspectors performe.d an reviewed the external flood proteciron measuies for Seabrook Station. The inspectors depicted the Updated finat'safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Chapter 2.4'2.2,.which safety-related equipment, to identify design flood levets anO protection'areas containing general areas that may be affected by external flooding. fhe inspectors conducted a building, and the site walkdown of the fuel stoiage building, thelssential switchgear erected flood emergency Jieset generator (EbG) building to ensure that NextEra also protection r"urr15, in accordance with design specifications. The inspectors severe weather to reviewed operating procedures for mitigating-external flooding during protect against determine if NextE]ri planned or established adequate measures to section of this inspection report external flooding events. Documents reviewed for each are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified'

.2 Readiness for lmpendino Adverse Weather Conditions

a. lnspection ScoPe readiness to During the period August 24-27,2011, inspectors reviewed NextEra's protect rist< signiiicani systems during the period Yl"l. Hurricane lrene was projected to prepare-d-and responded to impact the site area. The inspectors-verified that NextEra the severe weather conditions in accordance with procedure OS1200'03, "Severe for problems Weather Conditions." The inspectors also reviewed corrective actions downs of plant areas identified durinj the inspection. The inspection included walk systems including the including the n6rmal and emergency Ai etgglqt distribution supplemental emergency power supplies (SEPS), the service water and screen wash systems, and emergency feedwater systems' verified the The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR regarding design features' and The inspectors adequacy of the station procedures for ievere weather protection'..

weather preparation and reviewed pr"uioust-iO"ntitl"O deficiencies related to extreme action verified that the issues were appropriately dispositioned through the corrective program.

b. Findinos No findings were identified'

1R04 Equipment Aliqnment

.1 Partial Svstem Walkdowns

a. Inspection ScoPe The inspectors The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the systems listed below.

to the reactor safety selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative applicable cornerstones at ihe time they were inspected. Tl're inspectors review-ed operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, and the

-activities impact oT ongoing worX Jn redundant trains of equipment in order to identify safety conditions tn-at cJutO have impacted system performance of their intended of accessible portions of the functions. The inspectors also performed fieid walkdowns were aligned correctly and systems to verify system components and support equipment components and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the deficiencies' observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there wgre .Lo NextEra staff had properly identified equipment The inspectors als6 reviewed whether action program for resolution with the issues and entered them into the corrective appropriate significance characterization' o B emergency diesel generator (EDG) during inspection and test of the A EDG on August 15,2011

.

B train emergency feedwater (EFW) system during inoperability of the A EFW sYstem on August 25,2011 o B EDG during inoperability of the A EDG on September 19 and 20,2011 b.

Findinqs No findings were identified'

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Resident lnspector Quarterlv Walkdowns

a.

Inspection ScoPe material The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the verified that condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors with NextEra controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance protection and suppression administrative procedures. The inspectors veriiied that fire i1 the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire equipment was available for use as specified also verified that barriers were maintained in good maierial condition. The inspectors for out of service, degraded' or station personnel implemented compensatory measures with procedures' inoperable tire protection equipmeni, as applicable, in accordance

.

Primary Auxiliary Building (-)26' elevation on August 8,2011

.

Primary Auxiliary Building (-)6' elevation on August 8,2011 b. Findinqs performance is No findings were identified. An issue related to fire protection system discussed in Section 1R15 below.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111'06 - 1 sample)

.1 lnternal Floodinq Review

a.

Inspection ScoPe protect the control The inspectors reviewed the flood protection measures designed to from-building-cabie spreading room 50 ft elevation and other safety-related equipment evaluation for the effects of internalflioding. The inspectors reviewed NextEra's flooding and flood response procedures' The the selected areas, the design basis documents inspectors performed a walkdown of the selected areas to verify that as-found The equipment and conditions were consistent with the design basis documents.

equipment credited in inspectors reviewed the condition of seals, level alarms and other the flood analYsis.

b.

Findinos No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111'07 - 1 sample)

a.

Inspection ScoPe jacket water heat The inspectors reviewed the 201 1 testing of the B diesel generator fulfill its design function. The exchanger E4zBto verify that the heat exchanger could inspectors reviewed theimal performance monitoring trending data for heat exchanger Program"' The temperatures and fouling factors, and ES1850.017,;SW Heat Exchanger to evaluate the inspectors interviewed chemistry personnel and the system engineer process used to monitor tne rreit exchanger and commitments in Generic Letter 89-13'

,'service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment." The inspectors verify that issues conducted system walkdowns and reviewed condition reports to associated with the heat exchanger were identified and corrected' b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R1 1 Licensed operator Requalification Proqram (71111

.1 1Q

- 1 sample)a. lnspection ScoPe The inspectors reviewed operator implementation of the abnormal and emergency operating procedures on August 9,2011. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simJator iraining, which included a reactor shutdown with loss The inspectors of cooling and the iailure of select components to operate as required' actions, including the use of abnormal and verified .orpi"iion of risk significant operator the effectiveness of emergency operating proceJures. The inspectors assessed and degrading plant communications, im[lementation of actions in response to alarms supervisor' The conditions, and t'he oversight and direction provided by the control room made by inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification by the shift the shift manager and the techhical specification action statements entered the ability of the crew and technical adviir. Additionally, the inspectors assessed training staff to identify and document crew performance problems' b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 1 sample)

a.

Inspection ScoPe of The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness reviewed maintenance activities on SSC performance and reliability. The inspectors program documents, maintenance work orders, system health reports, corrective action NextEra was identifying and and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that properly evaluating performance problems within.the scope of the maintenance rule' For properly scoped into the each sampte seledted, the inspectors verified that the SSC was the (aX2)maintenance rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that performance criteria established by NextEra staff was reasonable.

As applicable, for of goals and corrective SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy the inspectors ensured that NextEra actions to return these SSCs to 1i1121. Additionally, that occurred within and staff was iolntitying and addressing common cause failures across maintenance rule system boundaries'

.

Cooling water system with focus on emergency diesel generator heat exchanger Performance and fouling.

b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

I

1R13 (71111.13 - 5 samPles)

a. Inspection ScoPe The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the performed maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra tfre appropriate 6sk asslssments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors significance relative to the reactor safety selecied these activities based on potential risk cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra personnel performed'risk assessments as required by 19 CFR 50'65(aX4) and that the Work' assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent plant ine inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results plant conditions of the assessment with the station's probabilistic risk analyst to verify were consistent with the 1sk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical systems, when specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety afplicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

.

A emergency diesel generator routine surveillance during emergent adverse grid conditions on July 11,2011 (CR166821 1)o planned maintenance for the emergency feedwater and enclosure air handling systems resulting in orange risk combinations on August 23-25' 2011 (wo 01382686)

I Planned maintenance for the A emergency diesel generator, emergency feedwater on and reserve auxiliary transformer that resulted in the orange risk combinations september 19-20, 2b1 1 (WO 40077891 and 01 207794)o planned maintenance for the emergency feedwater and 345 KV offsite power line 21-22' 2011 369 supplying that result the in oraige risk combinations on September (WO 40073287 and 01186862)

. planned maintenance affecting the 345 kV offsite power line 369 and the 480 V unit substation 61 power supply on September 26-28,2011 (WO 01197008)b. Findinos No findings were identified.

1R15 Operabilitv Determinations and Functionalitv Assessments (71111.15 - 4 samples)

a.

lnspection ScoPe or non-The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded conforming conditions:

o generators caused AR166g013, reduced cooling water flow to the emergency diesel generator jacket cooling water heat by marine fouling in the emergency diesel exchangers service water supply on July 9,2011 o AR1671288, high plant area temperatures caused by extreme environmental ambient temperatures on July 21,2011

.

AR1676974, removal of the pressure reducing valves from the fire protection system fire hose reels on August 22,2011

.

AR166 2416, pressurizer code safety valve (1-RC-V1 1 7) seat leakage on June 20, 2011 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was property justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognired increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design iriteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and UFSAR to NextEra's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable.

Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by NextEra. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

b. Findinqs Inadequate operabilitv Determination - AR 1668219, 1676974 lntroduction. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specfbatlo. (TS) 6.7.1.a that requires that written procedures be established and implemented, inciuding administrative procedures, as described in Regulatory Guide 1.i3, that define authorities and responsibilities for safe operation. Specifically, NextEra identified nonconforming and degraded conditions in the fire protection system on July 1 5, 2011 , (AR1668219), but did not properly evaluate fire protection system funttional performance as required by NextEra procedure EN-AA-203-1001 (AR1676e74).

Description.

The Seabrook fire protection (FP) system is described in UFSAR Section g5l Jhe UFSAR Appendix A Fire Hazards Analysis, UFSAR Appendix R Fire protection of Safe Sh'utdown Capability, and in the technical requirements manual (TRM). The FP water supply system was designed to provide sufficient flow for a period of two hours to the largest sian-dpipe/sprinkler header serving a safety related area (i.e.,

an emergency diesel generator) concurrent with operation of 2 fire hose stations flowing at 500 gfm t5ectionsF.3.E.O(b) and F.3.E.2(e)]. Service water booster pump, SW-p374, fiovides a backup water.supply to standpipes in Category I Buildings in the event that a seismic event damages the main fire protection water supply.

On July 11, 2011, NextEra issued AR1668219 to document two instances of past changes made to the fire protection system that were not adequately documented and/or evalulted. Design change ggDCRolC removed pressure reducing valves and vent/drain valves from standpipes lnat supply station hose reels, but failed to evaluate the impact of higher fire hose flows on the fire system performance y1!er design conditions' Further, th6 Seabrook fire fighters (Fire Brigade) had obtained higher capacity nozzles for use at the hose stations, Out OiO not identify these changes to Engineering and did not evaluate the impact of these changes on FP system performance. Specifically, the changes were not evaluated for the implct on the performance of service water booster pump SW-p374, the fire water stoiage tank capacity, and the performance of the main fire pumps to provide design flows.

Shift The deficiencies described in AR1668219 were presented to the Operation SM concluded Manager on July 15,2011, to provide an operability assessment' The flow margin that there was "no operabliity impact because there would be increased the relative to the original design". Actions were assigned to Engineering to evaluate into the design basis.

Upon review current configuraiions and incorporate the changes that the of the AR1668219 on August 11 , 2011 , the NRC inspectors determined there was no impact operability assessment taiteO sufficient technical basis to conclude the impact of the on rp .yrt"r performance. Although NextEra adequately assessed did not changei relative to the increased flow at the hose stations, the assessment to the rest of the consider how the increased flows at the hose reels would impact flows did not FP system, or other potential impacts on the fire water supply' The assessment consider whether the fire system could provide adequate flow at required Pressure for a period of two hours assuming concurrent operation of 2 ftre hose stations with the in operation' iargest demand standpipe/spirinkler headerserving a safety related area proced ure EN-AA-203- 1 00 1, "operability Determ inations/Functional Assessments,"

provides requirements for evaluation of nonconforming and degraded conditions and performed for systems requires in Section 2.0.2thatfunctional assessments (FAs) be jn fire unt .orponents (SSCs) that perform specified functions the TRM. The Seabrook requirements (TR) 7, 8,9, 10, 11 and 12' f rotection system is described in technical ine proceOure further requires in Section 4.2.2.8 that the Shift Manager evaluate the Oegr;OeO SSC per EN-AA-203-1001, Section 4.5, Functionality Assessments,(FA)'on the Seition 4.5.1 requires that, if an SSC is determined to remain operable based shall assign a responsible group Shift Manager's assessment, the Shift Manager per (engineering) to complete a iunctional assesiment that is to be documented determined that the nttJ"nr"ni{i, Grid"nce for Completion of FA. The inspectors protection evaluations NextEra performed on July 15,2011, for the indentified fire required by NextEra system deficiencies diO not perform th-e functionality assessment procedure EN-AA-203-1 001' After the NRC concerns regarding the July 1 5,2011, fire protection operability issued AR 1676974 assessment were discussed with NextEra on August 1 1 , NextEra with EN-that requested Engineering complete a functionality assessment accordance in system AA-203-1001 to assess th6 impact of the FP system changes on FP performance.

on August Based on the results of a functionality assessment subsequently completed.

protection system remained functional when 22,2011, NextEra concluded that the fire design basis condition' ptant insiatled equipment was used to respond to the FP system capacity replacement However, concerns were identified regarding the use of the higher evaluation for ntozzlesin place of the originally installed plJnt equipment' Engineering's flows that the replacement nozzles d'etermined that ihe nozzles caused higher system would adversely impact the fire tank capacity in a design basis fire' Specifically' the tne 2 hours assumed in the licensing basis main fire tanks would be drained sooner thah under design basis conditions.

under certain Further, NextEra identified concerns with potential run-out of P374 basis fire' conditions if NextEra used that pump to respond to a beyond design have sufficient Sfecifically, tfre enjineering evaluaiion determined thatP374 did not that would be used when offsite fire capacity to supportihe two 2.S incn hoses/nozzles design bases fire' fighters (Town of Seabrook) respond to the site during a beyond of the main fire water pumps may be NextEra also identified a concern that the capacity the FP system during a exceeded if two 2.5 inch hoses lnozzles were connected to determined that the beyond design bases fire response using offsite personnel' NextEra long as the system capacity use of higher capaciiy equipment would-be acceptable as and FP system parameters were controlled was considered by thL station fire brigade within the limits established by plant procedures.

NextEra documented the fire system (OD/FA 11-0007), and conditions/limitations in the st-aiion log on August 22,2011 member of initiated a

,,read and-si!n,, training ptan to infirm all operator and fire brigade using a hydraulics the limitations. NextEr"a plans further analyses of the FP system model to better impacts of using higher 1ow equipment' The inspectors administrative controls to assure the functionality of the FP "u"irut"'tne reviewed the licensee's system and determined they were adequate' procedure EN-AA-Analygis. The inspectors determined that not properly implementing was a performance deficiency' 203-1001 for gre Oeg;OLJ tonOition discussed above based on a comparison This performance OJiicl"ncy was considered more than minor g.L of Appendix E of IMC 0612' Specifically' the performance with Examples 3.j deficiency was more "nOthan minor because a reasonable doubt of operability existed until adequate performance further engineering evaluations were completed to demonstrate As such, the finding affected of the fire protection-syitem under design'basis conditions.

availability, reliability and the Mitigating Systems cornerstone obj6ctive to ensure the order to prevent core damage' capability of systemi that respond to initiating events in Process" (SDP),

The issue was evalult"o uri'ig lMc 0609, "slgnificance Determination Specifically, when evaluated and was determined to be of very low safety significance.

(failure to.properly review under IMC 0009, nppendix f, the performahceleficiency system hydraulic perf.ormance)undocumented/unevaluated changes that impact FP low degradation rating is affects the,,Fixed Fire protection system caiegory." A a design basis safe shutdown assigned since the reduction in suppression flow iatefor rated value for the largest fire was expected to be less than i 0% below the design hose stream' This issue did not hydraulic demand, in"trOing an allowance for manual screens to Green with no further affect the likelihood that a fire might occur. The finding in the area of problem identification and analysis. The finding had across cutting aspect personnel did not thoroughly resolution, correctivJ u"tion program, belause NextEra including prope.r-lv classifying' evaluate problems such that resolutions address causes, prioritizing anO evatuating affected systems for operability (P'1(c))' Specifically' NextEra system considering the did not adequatety evaluite the opeiability of the fireprotection did NextEra ' ensure unevaluated system changes identified on Juty 11.2011,.nor completed in a timely manner' corrective actions to supp5rt functionality were and Programs' requires

Enforcement.

Technical specification 6.7.1'a, Procedures administrative procedures written procedures be established and implemented, including and responsibilities for as described in negu-talor' CuiOe 1.33, that define authorities responsibirities and requirements safe operation. prJceoure eu-RR-203-1001 defines of continued plant for completing functionality assessments to establish the acceptability to the above' NextEra did not operation when SSCs are found to be degraded' Contra.ry for completing adhere to the NextEra Procedure EN-AA-203-1001 requirements when the fire protection :y.stefn was identified as potential functionality degraded on"rr"rirents iott and document a July ls, Specificatty, trtextEra did not complete

-203^10A1 Section 4'5 after the shift functionality assessment in accordance with EN-AA This on July 15' 2011' manager made the call that the system remained functional that resulted in the delayed identification, assessment and correction of a condition Because the finding is of impacted fire system performance under certain conditions' action program very low safety significance and was entered into NextEra's corrective (CR1O7O97+1, tnii violation is being treale{ ?? -T.ryCV, consistent with Section 2'3'2'a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (N-cv 05000443 I 2011004'01, Inadequate FunctionalityAssessmentforFireProtectionSystem)'

1R18 Plant Modifications

.1 TemPorarv Modifications

a. Inspection ScoPe Chilled Air The inspectors reviewed the modification to the B Train Control Building affected the functions of system per EC273g06 to determine whether the modifications engineering change systems that are important to safety. The inspectors reviewed the field walkdowns of documentation anO post-modification testing iesults, and conducted through work the modification. The inspector reviewed iriplementation of the changes the temporary modification did not package WO 4010g30S. The inspector verified.that performance capability of the Control degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and Building Chilled Air (CBA) system' b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testinq (71111'19 - 7 samples)

a.

Inspection ScoPe activities listed The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance belowtoverifythatproceduresandtestactivitiesensuredsystemoperabilityand procedure to verify that the functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test by the procedure tested ihe safety functions that may have been affected "t"qu"t"f' procedure was consistent with maintenanc" ,.tiuity, that the acceptance criteria in the basis documents, and that the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design The inspectors also the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved' that the test results adequately witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions' o and calibrations per Service water pump 41A motor breaker electrical inspections WO 400677A7 andWO 01210426 on August 18' 2011 r and inspections per Supplemental emergency power system (SEPS) maintenance WO 40068106 on August 25,2Q11 per WO

.

Component cooling water system thermal barrier pump maintenance 01 1891 42 on SePtember 7 ,2011 isolation valve o component cooling water system t!er1a.l iarrier heat exchanger 7,2011 CC-V1095 maintenance pei WOO1ZO2l45 on September on september 21' o A emergency diesel generator maintenance per wo 401 11423 2011

.

building air handling fan EAH-F318 power supply maintenance per WOs 40074302 and 01 197008 on September 27,2011

.

Service water pump p41D discharge isolation valve maintenance per WO 40113004 and 01 172578 on SePtember 30, 2011 b. Findinos No findings were identified'

1R22 Surveillance Testinq (71111-22 - 5 samples)

a. Inspection ScoPe reviewed test data of The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or technical selected risk-significant S'SCs to assess whether test results satisfied procedure requirements' The inspectors specificationt, il't" UFSAR, and NextEra demonstrated operational verified tnat tesiacceptance criteria were clear, tests instrumentation had readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test tests were performed current calibrations and the ,"ng" and aicuracy for the application, test completion' the as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied' Upon equipment was capable of inspectors considered whether the test results supported that following performing t6eiequlred safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests:

o 2 Year oX1416.05, service water cooling Tower Pumps Quarterly and ComPrehensive Test on JulY 15,2011 o 25,2011 lX 16g0.931, SSPS Train A Mode 1 Actuation Logic Test on Aug_ust

.

cs0910.01, Primary system sampling at cP-1664 on August 23,2011 o oX1 401.02., RCS L-eak Rate calculations in August 22-26,2!11 _

.

EX1g03.003, Reactor containment Type B and c Leakage Rate Tests on August 9, 2011 b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

Gornerstone: Emergency Preparedness lEPO Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 2 samples)

.1 Emerqencv Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection ScoPe drill on The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine NextEra emergency in the classification, September 14,2011 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies activities' The notification, and protective action i"com*endation development drill 1 1-03 to evaluate the inspectors oOr"r"J portions of emergency preparedness performance of the emergency organization and the adequacy of NextEra's

'."rpoit" post-drill critique. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the to determine whether the technical supbort center and emergency operations.facility recommendations were event classiiication, notifications, and protective action the station drill performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended by NextEra staff in order critique to .orp"i" inipector observations with those identified staff was properly to evaluate NextEra's critique and to verify whether the NextEra action program' identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2 Traininq Observations

a.

InsPection ScoPe during licensed operator The inspectors observed a drillfrom the control room simulator emergency p.lan requalification training on August 8,2011, which required implementaiion Oy an-operati-on, NextEra planned for this evolution to be evaluated "i"*. indicator data regarding drill-and exercise in"tuo"d in performance activities performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification "no critique for the performed ov tne tr"*. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution note any weaknesses and scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to evaluators noted the deficiencie, in tn" crew's performance and ensure that NextEra program' same issues and entered them into the corrective action b.

Findinqs No findings were identified'

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2RSO1 (71124.01)a. Inspection ScoPe following During the period september 12-15, 2011, the inspector conducted the radiological activities to verify that NextEra was evaluating, monitoring, and controlling calibration facility, a high radiation area (HRA)'hazards for work performed in the on-site in 10 CFR lmptementation oi these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained Part 2O,technical specifications, and the NextEra procedures' Radioloqical Hazards Control and Work Coveraqe The licensee uses a dedicated on-site facility for calibrating radiation monitoring The instruments. Housed in the facility is a Shepherd Model 81 beam irradiator.

mCi, 12 Ci' and 400 Ci irradiator contains four

(4) Cs-13i sources, having 12mCi, 24Q activities.

pre-operational The inspector observed the technician implement access controls and checks ior using the irradiator. These controls included:

o Obtaining two keys, one to enter the locked, stand-alone, facility area, (located away from the onsite in the protecied area, in a dedicated, locked fenced has two main buildings) and another to operate the irradiator. The facility separated the remote operating area and the area where the source is located. tfre"L".,

OuitOing is classified, and posted, as a "radiological controlled area," thereby requirlng the associated radiation work permit (RWf) .

administrative controlsl dosimetry, entry through a turnstile, and frisking for contamination prior to exiting the building' o lmplementing tire HRA contiols for entering the facility. These included being on the correct R=Wp, having the required dosimetry (alarming and and filling thermoluminescent doslmeter 1tt-O1;, obtaining a pre-entry briefing' out the necessary PaPerwork.

.

Performing daily iand prior to use) safety checks on the irradiator' These checks included:

o Ensure the tower assembly cover is locked closed o Verify that the air compressor is operating properly o Verify that the irradiator operating light is lit when a source is exposed is exposed o Ensure that the yellow alert lightis lit when the 12 Ci source o Ensure that the ied high teveitigfrt is lit when the 400 Ci source is exPosed (in the o Ensure that the source operating light, outside the chamber door separate,operatingroom)illuminateswl.gnanysourceisexposed and o Verity inat tire tZ iCi rorr"" drops back into its shielded container photoelectric beam is broken, located at the un ulrrr sounds when the entrancetotheSourceroom,byanobjectpassingthroughit oVerifythatindividualsfriskbeforeexitingthebuilding

.

and maintenance Additionally, the inspector verified that semi-annual safety by procedure HD0955'19' entitled "Use checks have been performeJ as required Condition Reports of the rvrooer ai SnLpn"rd Beam lrradiator"-and reviewed relatedtoirradiatoroperation/maintenanceissues.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified'

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2RSO7 a. Inspection ScoPe inspector conducted the following During the period september 12-15,2011, the activities to verify tnai Nextera imptemlnted the if n4p consistent with the technical (oDcM) to validate that specification, uno the off-site dose calculation manual of Appendix I to 10 cFR radioactive effluent releases met the design objectives Part 50.

one sample relative to this inspection This inspection activity represents completion of procedure,completingtheassociatedbienniaIrequirement.

Radiological Environmental The inspector reviewed the 2009 and 2010 Annual Use Census Report and associated operating Reports and the 2010 Annual Land monitoring programs were implemented census analysis to verify that the "nuiront"ntal as required bY the ODCM' Theinspectorwalkeddownfour(ofeight)air.samp.lingstations(Nos'AP-02'AP-03'AP-(No' WS-01 and WS-51)' two 04 and AP-09), two (of three) ,""*ui"i sampling stations (of two) tisn sampting stationi (FH-03 anO fH-se), one (of one) milk station (Nos' TM-oi' zz (ot 27) on-site monitorins 15), one (of seven) vegetation t-Taiin! ;9q"1 !T91 scj' sP-1 sD-2' sD-3' sD-s' sw-s' sw-wells (Nos. BD-1, BD-2,BD 3, BDj: Bb-6, TW-3 SW-1', SW-2', and sw-3)' two (of 6, SW-10, BU-10, su-11, BU-11, ilV-1;ilv-2' 14.(of 69) TLD monitoring stations three) off-site wells (Nos. wcj3 ano wc-t4) and (Nos. TL-1,11--2, ii-+, TL-5, TL-6,it-l,t-b'T!-9' it-tz'tL-13' TL-14'7L-15' TL-16' was conducted as described in the and TL-32). The inspector oetermineo that sampling the sampling equipment oDcM ano retaieo pio""outes. r6e inspector evaluated material conditions and calibration recoibs, when applicable' The inspector confirmed that the air sampling locations *"r"ln having hign XO and D/Q.wind sectors' and

"*"t the TLDs were tocJted in areas with the highest potentialfor public radiation exposure' technician collect and prepare for As part of the walk down, the inspector observed the samples' and analysis pu.ti"ur"te/iodine filter samples, milk, vegetation and water "i, environmental sampling was representative of the release pathways' as verified that and sample submittalfor analysis specified in the ODCM, and that tui..,fting techniques were in accordance with procedures' records for eight air samplers and The inspector reviewed the calibration/maintenance was currently calibrated' verified that the air flow calibration equipment Based on direct observation and review of records, the inspector verified that the meteorological instrumentation was operable, calibrated, and maintained in accordance with the guidance contained in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) section 2.3.3.3,$eabrook Station Technical Requirement22 - Meteorological Instrumentation, NRC Regulatory Guides 1.23 Rev. 0 and Regulatory Guide 1.97 Rev. 3, and the associated NexiEra procedures. The inspector verified that the meteorological data readout and recording instruments in the control room and at the tower were operable for wind direction, wind speed, air temperature, and delta temperature. The inspector confirmed that redundani instrumentation was available and that the annualized recovery rate for meteorological data was greater than 90 percent.

The inspector reviewed condition reports and Nuclear Oversight field observation reports and audits relevant to the REMP requirements, to evaluate the threshold for which issues are entered into the corrective action program, the adequacy of subsequent evaluations, and the effectiveness of the resolution. The inspector also reviewed monthly radiological effluents technical specification (RETS)/ODCM effluent-occurrence reportsto evalulte the adequacy and timeliness of performance indicator information.

The inspector reviewed the quarterly results of NextEra's inter-laboratory comparison program to verify the accuracy of NextEra's environmental air filter, charcoal cartridge, wat6r, biota, and milk sample analyses. Additionally, the inspector reviewed the annual

'NlexEra's quality assurance audit of vendor providing environmental analytical services.

The inspector reviewed changes made by NextEra to the ODCM as a result of changes to the land use census or sampler station modifications since the last inspection. The (or inspector also reviewed technicaljustifications for any change in sampling location frequency) and verified NextEra performed the reviews required to ensure that the changes diO not affect its ability to monitor the radiological condition of the environment.

The inspector confirmed that NextEra is implementing an onsite groundwater sampling and monitoring program sufficient to detect leakage from plant systems, structures and components. lnduled in this review was an evaluation of potential leakage from the Liquid storm drain system, spent fuel leak detection, plant drainage system and Waste Drain and associated leak detection methods.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance lndicator verification (8 samples)

.1 Barrier lnteqritv Cornerstone

a. Inspection ScoPe The inspectors reviewed NextEra's data for the Barrier integrity cornerstone performance indicators (Pl) listed below to verify the accuracy of the information the third reported to the NRC forihe period covering the fourth quarter of 20]_0 through quarter 2011. pl definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment lndicator Guideline,'iRevision 5, were used to verify the basis for each (LERs), operating reported element. The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports logs, procedures, and interviewed applicable personnel to verify the accuracy and

'The completeness of ihe reported data.

inspectors also reviewed the accuracy of the number of critical hours reported.

.

RCS Leakage o RCS Activity b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2 a.

Inspection ScoPe performance index Pls The inspectors reviewed NextEra data for the Mitigating systems for the period listed below to verify the accuracy of the information reported to theNRC Pl definitions and covering the fourth quarter of ZOiO through the third quarter 2011.

guidance contained in NEI gg-02, "Regulatory Assessment lndicator Guideline,"

The Revision 5, were used to verify the baiis for reporting each data element' logs, procedures' and inspectors reviewed licensee event reports (LERs), operating of the interviewed applicable personnel to verify the accuracy and completeness reported data for the following Pls'

.

High Pressure Injection System MSPI

.

EmergencY AC SYstem MSPI o Heat Removal SYstem MSPI o Residual Heat Removal System MSPI o Cooling Water SYstem MSPI b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.3 RETS/ODCM Radioloqical Effluent Occurrences

a. Inspection ScoPe 2010 The inspector reviewed relevant effluent release reports for the period August through August 2011, for issues related to the RETS/ODCM radiological effluent o""uri"nc"6 performance indicator as specified in NEI 99-02. The NEI criteria for release reporting data related to this performance indicator includes radiological effluent mrem/qtr organ dose for liquid occurrences that exceed 1.5 mrem/qtr whole body or 5.0 and 7'5 mrads/qtr for effluents; Smrads/qtr gamma air dose, 10 mrad/qir beta air dose, organ dose for gaseous effluents.

b.

Findinos No findings were identified.

4c.A2 ldentification and Resolution of Problems (71152 - 2samples)

.1 a.

Inspection ScoPe the As required by lnspection procedu re 71152, "Problem ldentification and Resolution,"

and plant inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities entered issues into the corrective action program at status reviews to verify that NextEra and an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, to assist with the identification of identified and addressed'aiverse trends. In order performance issues for follow-up, the repetitive equipment failures and specific human action inspectors pe*ormed a daily screening of items entered into the corrective program and periodically atiended condition report screening meetings' b.

Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2 a.

Inspection ScoPe The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the existing operator workarounds, control room operator burdens, existing operator aids, disabled alarms, and open main procedure operator actions, and deficiencies to identify impacts on emergency operating The any impact on mitigating systems performance or iniitiating event frequency' inspectors evaluated w[etirer station personnel had identified, assessed, and reviewed

'seabrook operator workarounJt specified in procedure OP-AA-108, "Oversight and "t

Control of OPerator Burdens'"

resolving main The inspectors reviewed NextEra's process for identifying, prioritizing and also reviewed control room distractions to minimize operator burdens. The inspectors of the the system used to track these issues and recent NextEra self assessments progi"t. The inspectors toured the control room and discussed current operator workarounds with operators to ensure the items were being addressed on a schedule consistent with their relative safety significance.

b. Findinqs and Observations did not No findings were identified. The inspectors determined that the issues reviewed adversel/affect the capability of the operators to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures. The inspectors also determined that NextEra entered operator threshold workarounds and burdens into the corrective action program at an appropriate and planned or implemented corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.

.3 Inspection Scope

to The inspectors reviewed the identification, evaluation, and corrective actions related and to NextEra's discovery of degradation in SFP material that affected SFP reactivity conditions changes NextEra made to-tne analytical methods it used to analyze reactivity-initiated as a result of a fleet self-in tfrJSfp. NextEra's actions for these issues were assessment documented in AR 222265.

b. Assessment and Observations performance No findings were identified. The inspectors' assessment of NextEra relative td identification, evaluation and corrective actions for this issue are discussed below. No immediate criticality safety issues were identified based on the conservative less than that assumptions used in the design analysis and actual degradation observed assumed in the analYses.

Effectiveness of Problem ldentification ntrolforthestorageofspentfuelthatwas.consistent with the design of record and that fuel was configured in the spent fuel and "n"lyr"r new fuel vaults in configuration consistent with the established controls.

The a rack design for administrative controlsirvere based on analytical methods to assure

< 0.95 without credit criticality control that limits the effective muitiplication factor, k"n, to threshold for soluble boron. NextEra has generated condition reports at a conservative action to assure that rack degradation 6onditions were addressed by the corrective program. ln response-to a fleet self-assessment, NextEra identified the need to update fuel storage and took actions to revise the Seabrook license and design bases for spent g.1-22io better reflect the analytical methods used to address UFSAR g.1 and Figure boral and boraflex degradation, and the administrative controls on fuel placement' Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of lssues .

.

degradation mechanisms' NextEra evaluated operating at other facilities to identify the potential for further rack

"*p"ri"n""s degradation at Sea-brook. NextEra used contracted specialists to monitor rack analyses bounded the deiradation and to analyze rack reactivity to assure the criticality to account for actual condition in the pool. NextEra developed analytical strategies to the license and further degradation. In response to the fleet self-assessment related and design baiis for spent fuel storage, NextEra considered the extent of condition no other issues involving a determined there the sFp issue was unique and that were nonconservative technical specification or licensing basis.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions ctive actions for monitoring degradation - -

under the Boral Monitoring mechanisms in spent fuel racks. NextEra actions continued pool' The results reported in the frogrur to trend the boral conditions in the spent fuel remain bounded by the June 2011 Boral Monitoring Report show that boral conditions response to a fleet self-assessment, aisumption used in the criiicality analysis. In to revise UFSAR 9'1 and Figure NextEra issued UFSAR Change Request uFcR 10-026 g.1-22to better reflect the analytical methods used to address boral and boraflex to support a new Jegradation; and,

(ii) NextEra initiateO a criticality analysis in 2011 license amendment request' timely actions to assure However, prior to the initiatives in 2010, NextEra had not taken Although NextEra made tne iicensing basis remained current wiin tne design basis- prior to been revised toine SFP design basis in 1998, the UFSAR had not the analytical UFCR 10-026 to address-the new administrative controls or reflect "n"ng",

neutron absorbtion.

similarly, the fuel placement assumptions used related to boraflex design basis issued as curves in TS 3.9. 1 3 in effect on september 30, 2011 , reflects the the changes made to Amendment 6 in 1gg1 . TS 3.g.13 had not been updated to reflect to rack degradation, and is the design basis analysis made in 1998 and 2oo2 due NextEra initiated actions to nonconservative withiespect to those analyses. Although taken NextEra should have revise the sFp ticensinjbasis via LARs 01--12 and 04-05, a Letter 98-10 to address more timely action p"p i'n" guidance in NRC Administrative this issue by a license nonconservative Technical-Specification. NextEra is addressing in late 2Q11.

The inspectors determined that amendment requesipianneo'ror submittal was not for the SFP degradation the failure to update in" UfSRn and TS to account had discussed above' NextEra more than minor performance deficiency because, as fuel rack condition did not initiated administrative controls that ensured that the spent was performance deficiency violate technical specification requirements and as such the more significant if left not a precursor to a significant event, would not become a reactor safety cornerstone objective' uncorrected and O'O n6t adversely affect (71153 - 2 samPle)40A3 for

.1 (closed) LER 05000443/201 1-001 , Noncompliance with Technical specification

Leakage detection Instruments a determination per Licensee Event Report 2011-Ol dated May 20, 201 1 reported prohibited by 10 cFR b0.73(aX2)iilte) tn"t Seabrook had operated in a condition in March 2011 that the containment Technical Speciticatioi'r. fiStl. NextEra deteimined the seismic requirements and backup gaseous radiation monitor RM-6548 did not meet pressure boundary leakage thus was not qualified for monitoring reactor coolant system occasions prior to the per TS limiting conOition for operati6n (LCO) 3'6'!'-1t.-On. several discovery of the o"n"iln"y, NextEra relied on RM-6548 to satisfy the TS 9-6,1 1 of service' RM-6548 was requirements while the primary r1{i{ion monitor was out instaled as plant d"tid;h;nge 89DCR046 on February 2, 1990' The radiation monitor readouts did not have signal design lacked tutt slls"mic quaification because RM-654-8 operational basis isolators to assure the indications remained functionalfollowing RM-6548 readouts were earthquakes. ln the Configuration installed per 89DCR046, common to the susceptible to failures within other monitors or faults on the data loop on May 1,2011, to upgrade fM-monitor. Design change EC271B7 0 was implemented qualified RM-23 654g by instaliing etecirical signal isolation devices and a seismically indicator to control room panel RM-CP-180A' The inspectors reviewed the accuracy-SO.Za.of the LER.and verified compliance with the reportability requirements in 10 CFR This issue was a violation of Seabrook detection TS LCO 3.4.6.1. The violation was caused by the failure to provide a leakage basis seismic event' monitor.upubt" of performing its function following an operating of NRC The failure to compiy with thJTS requirements con_stitutes a violation This LER is requirements that is'discussed further in Section 4OA7 of this report.

closed.

.2 The inspectors provided site coverage during one.adverse weather event'

The from Hurricane inspectors reviewed NextEra's actiois to protect risk significant systems the status of plant lrene on nugust Z7-29,2011 . The inspeciion included a review of and walk safety and electrical systems, monitoring of site environmental conditions responded to the severe downs of plant areas. The inspectors verified that NextEra "severe weather weather conditions in accordance with procedure os1200'03, the Conditions." The inspectors reviewed site conditions and hazards against significant impact on emergency plan criteria for classifying events. The storm had no problems identified the ptant or site. The inspectors revi6wed corrective actions for Era's extent of condition review for these during the inipection and examined Next issues.

4OA5 OtherActivities (60855'1 -

1 sample)

.1 a.

Inspection ScoPe The inspectors reviewed routine operations and monitoring of the ISFSI' The inspectors performed independent dose walked down the ISFSI to evaluate its material condition, temperatures were rate measurements of the storage modules, and confirmed module plant equipment operator logs within the required limits. The iispectors als_oreviewed Radiological for ISFSI surveillances and environmental (lSFSl) dosimetry records' against 10 CFR Parl20,ISFSI Technical control activities for the ISFSI were evaluated Specifications, and NextEra's procedures' b.

Findinqs No findings were identified' 4OAO Meetinqs. lncludinq Exit third quarter integrated On Octobe r 10,2ei1, the inspectors presented the results of the inspectors also inspections to Mr. P. Freeman and seabrook station staff. The by inspectors confirmed with NextEra that no proprietary information was reviewed during the course of the inspection' 4C.A7 Licensee-ldentified Violations NextEra The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by Enforcement and is a violition of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Policy for being dispositioned as a NCV.

TS LCO 3.4.6.1, "RCS Leakage Detection Systems," requires three leakage detection systems be operable, including a containment sump level monitoring system' a containment atmosphere partilulate radiation monitoring system a1d a containment plant operation for up atmosphere gaseous radiation monitoring system. The TS allow plant to thirty Oays-witn one leakage detection system inoperable, and requires a Contrary shutdown in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> if more than one leakage detection system is inoperable.

greater than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> on October 5, 2010, to the above, Seabrook operated for particulate and December 15,2010, January 4, 2011 and March 10, 2011, with both gaseous radiation monitors inoperable. On each occasion, RM6548 was credited for RCS teafage detection for more than 6 but less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The finding affected the system Initiating Erients cornerstone in that a system used to identify reactor coolant The leakage right not have been functionaifollowing a operational basis earthquake' backup gas monitor remained functional but lac*ed full qualification, as described in Section +Ong above. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) per function and did not IMC 0609 because the issue did iot result in a total loss of safety functions would contribute to both a transient initiator and the likelihood that mitigating entered into be unavailable. Since the issue is of very low safety significance and was the corrective action program as AR 1633042, the issue is considered a licensee-NRC identified, non-cited viola-tion (NCV) consistentwith Section2'3.2'a of the Enforcement PolicY.

ATTACHMENTS:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

B. Brown, Supervisor, Civil Engineering

V. Brown, Senior Licensing AnalYst

K. Browne, Plant General Manager

J. Esteves, Plant Engineering

P. Freeman, Site Vice President

P. Gurney, Reactor Engineering Supervisor

M. Collins, Manager, Design Engineering

L. Hansen, Plant Engineering

P. HarveY, REMP Manager

N. Levesque, Plant Engineering

A. Merrill, Reactor Engineer

M. Nadeau, System Engineer, Control Building Air Handling

M. O'Keefe, Licensing Manager

D. Perkins, Radiological Engineer

K. Randall, Reactor Engineer

D. Robinson, ChemistrY Manager

M. Scannel, Radiological Engineer

G. Sessler, Plant Engineering

R. Thurlow, Health Physics Supervisor - NU

J. Walsh, Nuclear Steam Supply System, Supervisor

T. Waechter, Assistant Operations Manager

B. Woodland, Plant Engineering Supervisor

UPDATED

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND

Opened/Closed

05000443 12011004-01 NCV Inadequate Functionality Assessment for Fire Protection SYstem

Closed

05000443/201 1 001 LER Noncompliance with Technical Specification for Leakage Detection lnstruments (Section 4OA3'1 )