IR 05000354/2011003
| ML112160723 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/2011 |
| From: | Arthur Burritt Reactor Projects Branch 3 |
| To: | Joyce T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| Burritt A RGN-I/DRP/PB3/610-337-5069 | |
| References | |
| IR-11-003 | |
| Download: ML112160723 (30) | |
Text
August 4, 2011
SUBJECT:
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/201 1 003
Dear Mr. Joyce:
June 30, 2011
SUBJECT:
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/201 1 003
Dear Mr. Joyce:
On June 30,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed. an inspection at the Hope Creek Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results discussed on July 13, ZOl1, with Mr. Lewis and other members of your staff'
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified'
ln accordance with Title 10 of the code of Federal Regulations (cFR) 2'399 of the NRC's
"Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically foi public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the FuOti.ty Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS)' ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qovlreadinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room)'
Sincerely, Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No: 50-354 License No: NPF-57
Enclosure:
InspectionReport05000354/2011003 MAttachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I==
50-354 NPF-57 05000354/201 1 003 PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)
Hope Creek Generating Station P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 April 1,2011through June 30, 2011 A. Patel, Acting Senior Resident Inspector B. Smith, Acting Senior Resident lnspector J. Hawkins, Acting Resident lnspector L. Kern, Project Engineer A. Turilin, Project Engineer J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist B. Yip, Security Specialist S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Engineer G. Meyer, Senior Reactor Engineer Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
lR 0500035 412011003; 0410112011 - 061301201 1 ; Hope Creek Generating Station; Routine
Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covers a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and announced inspections by a regional radiation specialist and reactor engineers. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
No findings were identified.
.1
REPORT DETAILS
Summarv of Plant Status The Hope Creek Generating Station operated at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period with the following exception. On May 2Q,2011, operators reduced power to 76 percent for planned maintenance on feedwater heating and to perform a control rod pattern adjustment. The unit was restored to full power on May 22,2011.
1. REACTOR SAFEW
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions Inspection Scope The inspectors completed one readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed PSEG's seasonal readiness procedures and reviews associated with hot weather conditions, The inspectors reviewed system health reports and walked down systems that could be subject to increased heat conditions during the summer months. The inspectors focused on the readiness of the station service water system, the circulating water system, and the emergency diesel generators. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Findinos No findings were identified.
Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power Svstem Inspection Scope The inspectors completed one inspection sample to evaluate the readiness of PSEG's offsite and alternate AC power systems for adverse weather. Inspectors verified that plant features and procedures for operation and continued availabitity of offsite and alternate AC power systems during adverse weather were appropriate. The inspectors reviewed station procedures affecting these areas and communications protocols with the transmission system operator to verify that the appropriate information could be exchanged when issues arose that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors also reviewed the material condition of offsite AC power systems and onsite alternate AC power systems and performed a walkdown of the switchyard. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Findinos No findings were identified, a.
b.
.2 a.
b.
==1R04 Equipment Alionment (71111,04 - 4 samples) Partial Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors completed four partialwalkdown inspection samples. The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns for the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was unavailable.
The inspectors completed walkdowns to determine whether there were discrepancies in the system's alignment that could impact the function of the system, and therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down system components, and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation, The inspectors also verified that PSEG had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP). The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
. A, C, and D emergency diesel generators (EDGs) with B EDG out-of-service on April 19 o A and C service water (SW) pumps and traveling water screens with B SW pump out-of-service on May 17
. A control rod drive (CRD) pump with B CRD pump out-of-service on May 23 o Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) A room cooler with RCIC B room cooler out-of-service on June 6 b.
Findinos No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Fire Protection - Tours Inspection Scope The inspectors completed six quarterly fire protection inspection samples. The inspectors performed tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with PSEG's administrative procedures; fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use; that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition; and that compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEG's fire plan. The areas toured are listed below with their associated pre-fire plan designator. The documents reviewed are listed in the
.
o FRH-1 1-413, C Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
.
FRH-1 1-412, D RHR a.
. FRH-11-414, A Core Spray (CS)o FRH-11-411, B CS
.
FRH-1 1-414, C CS e FRH-1 1-411, D CS b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111,06 - 1 sample) Underqround Bunkers/Manholes Subiect to Floodinq a.
==
Inspection Scope The inspectors completed one flood protection measure inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed selected risk-important plant design features and PSEG procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal flooding events. Specifically, the inspectors focused on condition of safety-related cables located in underground manholes. The inspectors examined the conditions of the SW cables in manhole vaults MH103 and MH105. The inspectors reviewed PSEG's manhole inspection and any pumping of water found in the manholes and verified that PSEG followed their corrective actions for an operability evaluation associated with the cables.
The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
==1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample;71111.07T - 3 samples)
==
.1 Annual Heat Sink Performance
a.
lnspection Scope The inspectors selected the A EDG lube oil heat exchanger (HX) cooled by safety auxiliary cooling system (SACS) for review. The inspectors verified that bio-fouling programs existed and were managed in accordance with PSEG procedures and commitments to Generic Letter 89-13, "Seryice Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," and that HX performance data demonstrated satisfactory performance. The inspectors walked down the A EDG lube oil HX while it was in operation and reviewed the maintenance history to identify potential degraded conditions or gaps in the preventative maintenance program. The inspectors also reviewed notifications in the CAP to verify that PSEG was identifying EDG lube oil HX problems at the appropriate threshold and that corrective actions addressed the identified problems and were effective. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
.2 Triennial Heat Sink Performance
Inspection Scope Based on the plant specific risk assessment and previous inspections, the inspectors selected the following heat sink samples:
o 1B SACS HX o 1B reactor auxiliary cooling system (RACS) HX o Ultimate heat sink (B loop of SW system to Delaware River)
The Hope Creek probabilistic risk assessment showed the risk importance of SW (ultimate heat sink), SACS (cooling of safety-related components), and RACS (cooling of emergency instrument air compressor). Both SACS and RACS are closed loop cooling systems with HXs cooled by SW. The risk assessment also showed the risk importance of associated operator actions for manually starting a SW pump, isolating a SW pipe rupture in the RACS room, and controlling SACS heat loads.
The inspectors reviewed the selected SACS, RACS, and SW system material condition, maintenance, and testing to ensure that PSEG maintained the risk-significant components consistent with licensing requirements and design assumptions. ln addition, the inspectors reviewed the associated operational, abnormal, and emergency procedures to verify a congruent, accurate approach to achieving system cooling objectives.
The inspectors walked down the applicable cooling components in the B SW intake bay, B SACS room, RACS room, and emergency instrument air compressor area of the turbine building. Also, the inspectors inspected remote controls (pump breakers and remote shutdown panel) associated with operator actions, The inspectors reviewed records of completed HX and buried piping inspections, intake bay silt surveys, preventive maintenance activities, and functional tests to confirm that ongoing activities maintained cooling functional capabilities. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Proqram
Requalification Activities Review bv Resident Staff
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample. The inspectors observed a licensed operator annual requalification simulator scenario (SG-676) on May, 3,2011, to assess operator performance and training effectiveness. The scenario involved a seismic event coincident with a loss of coolant accident and loss of an inverter. The inspectors assessed simulator fidelity and observed the simulator instructors' critique of operator performance. The inspectors also b.
1R12 observed control room activities with emphasis on simulator identified areas for
improvement. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Findinos No findings were identified.
Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed three maintenance effectiveness inspection samples. For the equipment performance issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated items such as:
appropriate work practices; identifying and addressing common cause failures; scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the Maintenance Rule; characterizing reliability issues for performance; trending key parameters for condition monitoring; charging unavailability for performance; classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(aX1) or (aX2); and appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (aX1).
The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b.
. 50.65(a)(3) evaluation from February 2009 to August 2010
. EDGs Findinqs No findings were identified.
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emerqent Work Control (71111.13 - 6 samples)
==1R13 a.
lnspection Scope==
The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment samples for planned and emergent work control. The inspectors reviewed on-line risk management evaluations through direct observation and document reviews for the following six plant configurations:
. B EDG and cable spreading room cardox system out-of-service during week of April 18 e Reactor Manual Control System out-of-service for emergent maintenance during week of May 2
. C SW pump and C RHR room cooler out-of-service during week of May 9
.
B SW pump and 10K107 instrument air compressor out-of-service during week of May 16 r Salem gas turbine and D SW pump out-of-service during week of May 23 r Yellow risk status during maximum emergency generation alert on May 31 The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs for these configurations to verify that concurrent planned and emergent I
maintenance and test activities did not adversely affect the plant risk already incurred with these configurations. PSEG's risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walkdowns. The inspectors also used PSEG's on-line risk monitor (Equipment Out-of-Service workstation)to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations. Finally, the inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R15 Operabilitv Evaluations
a.
lnspection Scope The inspectors completed six operability evaluation inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for the degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with the following systems:
r Control rod 22-07 failed transponder card
==1R18 r H SRV main seat leakage r B RHR HX degraded grating r A SW pump seal excessive leak off
.==
Degraded equipment hatch flood barrier seal between SACS rooms r Degraded D SW pump B phase cable The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified. The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to verify the adequacy of PSEG's operability determinations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screening. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 2 samples)
Tem porarv Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications described below, The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the temporary modifications.
The inspectors verified the post-modification testing was adequate to ensure the SSCs would function properly. The 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation associated with the temporary modifications were also reviewed.. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
o Temporary modification 11-007, De-rate B EDG Lube Oil Keep Warm Heater 8E406.
This modification reduced the heat output of the B EDG lube oil heater due to a higher than normal lube oil temperatures. The modification eliminated the need for operators to manually control lube oil temperature by locally cycling the heater breaker.
o Temporary modification 11-008, Remove Internals of Check Valve EPV-016, B Spray Wash Booster Pump Check Valve. The modification involved removing the internals of the B spray wash check valve due to the identification of a broken check valve disc connection. Adequate parts were not available for the station to repair the check valve. The temporary modification specified manual cross-tie valve, EPV-020, between the B and D spray wash systems to be maintained in the closed position.
b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testinq
a, lnspection Scope The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance items listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability following completion of maintenance. The inspectors reviewed applicable test procedures to verify that they tested all safety functions potentially affected by the associated maintenance activities. The inspectors verified that for each potentially affected safety function the acceptance criteria stated in the procedure was consistent with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and other design documentation. The inspectors witnessed completion of the testing or reviewed the completed test results to confirm acceptance criteria were met and verified satisfactory restoration of all safety functions affected by the maintenance activities. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
. 24Y battery charger AD-304 after battery discharge on April 1
. B EDG output breaker replacement on April 19 r A SW pump gasket replacement on May 10 r B SW strainer breaker thermal overload replacement on May 19 o B CRD pump seal leak off pipe replacement on May 24
. A SW makeup valve Bailey card replacement on June 1
. A and C CS pump normal and emergency power start delay timing relay replacement on June 3 b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testinq
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed eight surveillance testing (ST) inspection samples. The inspectors witnessed performance of and/or reviewed test data for the risk-significant STs listed below to verify that the SSCs tested satisfied Technical Specifications, UFSAR, and procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness, and were consistent with design documentation; that test instrumentation had current calibrations and the correct range and accuracy for the application; and that tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied. Upon ST completion, the inspectors confirmed that equipment was returned to the status specified to perform its safety function. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
. A EDG monthly surveillance test on April 4
. High pressure coolant injection in-service test on April12
. C SACS pump in-service test on April 13 r A control room emergency filtration system surveillance test on April 13
. Containment isolation valve, l GSHV-5050A & 5052A, leak rate test on May 9
. Reactor coolant system leakage determination on May 12 o A standby liquid control surveillance test on June 2
. D EDG monthly surveillance test on June 23 following a scheduled maintenance window b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
lEPO Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)a.
lnspection Scope The inspectors completed one drill evaluation inspection sample, The inspectors observed emergency plan response actions at the technical support center during a force on force emergency preparedness drill on June 8, 2011. The inspectors verified that emergency classification declarations and notifications were completed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72,10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and the Hope Creek emergency plan implementing procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Gornerstone: Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71 124.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed several locations where PSEG monitors potentially contaminated material leaving the radiological controlled area and inspected the methods used for control, survey, and release from these areas. The inspectors verified that the radiation monitoring instrumentation had appropriate sensitivity for the type(s) of radiation present.
The inspectors reviewed PSEG's criteria for the survey and release of potentially contaminated material. The inspectors verified that there was guidance on how to respond to an alarm that indicated the presence of licensed radioactive material.
The inspectors reviewed PSEG's procedures and records to verify that the radiation detection instrumentation was used at its typical sensitivity level based on appropriate counting parameters.
The inspectors selected sealed sources from PSEG's inventory records that presented the greatest radiological risk and verified that sources are accounted for and had been verified to be intact.
Risk-Siqnificant Hiqh Radiation Area (HRA) and Verv Hioh Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and VHRAs. The inspectors verified that any changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection.
The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become VHMs during certain plant operations. The inspectors verified that PSEG controls for all VHRAs, and areas with the potential to become a VHRA, ensured unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the area.
Radiation Protection Technician Proficiencv The inspectors observed the performance of the radiation protection technician with respect to radiation protection work requirements. The inspectors determined that technicians were aware of the radiological conditions in their workplace, the radiation work permit controls/limits were in place, and that their performance was consistent with their training and qualifications with respect to the radiological hazards and work activities.
The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found the cause of the event to be radiation protection technician error. The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause. The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems.
b.
Findinos No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04\\
a.
lnspection Scope Specials Dosimetric Situations Declared Preonant Workers The inspeciors vErifled that PSEG informed workers, as appropriate, of the risks of radiation exposuie to the embryo/fetus, the regulatory aspects of declaring a pregnancy, and the specific process to be used for (voluntarily) declaring a pregnancy.
The inspectors selected individuals who had declared their pregnancy during the current assessment period and verified that PSEG's radiological monitoring program for declared pregnant woikers was technically adequate to assess the dose to the embryo/fetus. The insfectors reviewed the exposure results and monitoring controls employed by PSEG and with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR Part20.
ffre inspectors rwie.weO eSEG's methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist. The inspectors verified that PSEG had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented.
The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period. The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed consistently with PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards' Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE)spectorsreviewedSDEdoseaSseSsmentsforadequacy.Theinspectorsevaluated pSEG's method for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles.
Neutron Dose Assessment
ilnspectorsevatuateopSEG'sneutrondosimetryprogram,includingdosimetertype(s)and/or survey instrumentation.
The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that
- (a) dosimetry and/or instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra,
- (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose and/or dose rate measurement, and
- (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated. The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation had been accounted for in the calibration. The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events, as applicable.
For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section, the inspectors determined how pSEG assigned dose of record for total effective dose equivalent, SDE, and lens dose equivalent.
Problem ldentification and Resolution
@itproblemsassociatedwithoccupationaldoseaSSeSsmentwere being identified by PSEG at an appropriate threshold and were properly addressed for resolution in their CAP. In addition, the inspectors verified the appropriateness of the corrective actions for the problems documented by PSEG involving occupational dose assessment.
b.
Findinos No findings were identified.
2RSs Radiation Mo.nitorino Instrumentation (7 1124.05)
a. Inspection Scope
Walkdowns and Observations The inspectors selected portable survey instruments in use or available for issuance. The inspectors checked calibration and source check stickers for currency and assessed instrument material condition and operability.
The inspectors observed PSEG staff perform source checks for various types of portable survey instruments. The inspectors determined that high-range instruments were source checked on all appropriate scales.
Whole Bodv Counter (WBC)
The inspectors reviewed the methods and sources used to perform WBC functional checks before daily use of the instrument. The inspectors determined that check sources were appropriate and align with the plant's isotopic mix. The inspectors reviewed WBC calibration reports completed since the last inspection to verify that calibration sources were representative of the plant source term and that appropriate calibration phantoms were used.
Portable Survev lnstruments. Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs), Electronic Dosimetrv, and Continuous Air Monitors The inspectors reviewed calibration documentation for at least one of each type of instrument.
For portable survey instruments and ARMs, the inspectors reviewed detector measurement geometry and calibration methods and had PSEG demonstrate use of its instrument calibrator.
The inspectors selected portable survey instruments that did not meet acceptance criteria during calibration or source checks and verified that PSEG had taken appropriate corrective action for instruments found significantly out of calibration.
The inspectors verified that PSEG had evaluated the possible consequences of instrument use since the last successful calibration or source check.
Instrument Calibrator
The inspectors reviewed the current output values for PSEG's portable survey and ARM instrument calibrator units. The inspectors verified that PSEG periodically measured calibrator output over the range of the instruments used through measurements by ion cham ber/electrom eter.
The inspectors verified that the measuring devices had been calibrated by a facility using National Institute of Sciences and Technology traceable sources and that correction factors for these measuring devices were properly applied by PSEG in its output verification.
Calibration and Check Sources
The inspectors reviewed PSEG's 10 CFR Part 61, "Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste", source term to determine if the calibration sources used were representative of the types and energies of radiation encountered in the plant.
Problem ldentification and Resolution The inspectors verified that problems associated with radiation monitoring instrumentation were being identified by PSEG at an appropriate threshold and were properly addressed for resolution in their CAP.
b.
Findinqs No findings were identified,
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Performance Indicator (Pl) Verification (71151-2 samples)
4. 40A1
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed PSEG's program for gathering, evaluating and reporting information for the Pls listed below. The inspectors used the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, to assess the accuracy of PSEG's collection and reporting of Pl data. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
o Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage
. RCS Activity The inspectors reviewed the data reported for these Pls for the period April 1,201Q, through March 31,2011. The records reviewed included Pl data summary reports, licensee event reports, surveillance testing data, chemistry data, and operator narrative logs. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the Pls and discussed the results with the personnel responsible for data collection and evaluation.
b.
Findinqs No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem ldentification and Resolution (71152 - 1 annual sample; 1 trend sample)
.1 Routine Review of ltems Entered into the CAP
a. Inspection Scope
As specified by lP 71152, "ldentification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEG's CAP. This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending management review committee meetings.
b.
a.
.2 Findinos
No findings were identified.
Annual Sample: Operator Workarounds lnspection Scope The inspectors performed a cumulative review of PSEG's identified operator workaround conditions. The inspectors reviewed PSEG's list of operator workarounds, operator burdens and concerns, temporary modifications, and operability determinations to assess the potential for these issues to impact the operators' ability to properly respond to plant transients or postulated accident conditions. The inspectors also reviewed operator logs and control room instrument panels to evaluate potential impacts on operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures. Finally, the inspectors toured the plant and control room to identify potential operator workaround conditions not previously identified by PSEG. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Findinos and Observations No findings were identified.
The inspectors determined that PSEG appropriately identified conditions that impacted operators' ability to respond to plant transients or postulated accident conditions and entered them into the CAP and that Operations personnel reviewed the cumulative impact of operator burdens, concerns, and workarounds on a periodic basis.
Semi-Annual Review to ldentifv Trends: Self-Assessments lnspection Scope The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues to identify trends that might indicate the existence of more significant safety i$sues, as specified by lP 71152, "ldentification and Resolution of Problems." The inspectors reviewed repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by PSEG outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, system health reports, status reports, operator logs, and other issue/concern lists. The inspectors also reviewed the PSEG CAP database for the prior year to assess notifications written in various subject areas to evaluate whether safety issues or adverse trends were apparent.
The inspectors focused on potential trends in specific problem areas identified in the selected self-assessments. The inspectors reviewed PSEG's evaluation of deficiencies identified by their self-assessments, including related extent of condition assessments.
This review was evaluated against PSEG's CAP guidelines and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B to determine whether potential adverse trends were properly identified and evaluated.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Findinqs and Observations No findings were identified.
b.
.3 a.
b.
40A5 The inspectors evaluated PSEG's problem identification and resolution performance by comparing the results of selected PSEG's self-assessments to station performance in the selected areas over the past year. In particular, the inspectors reviewed equipment and personnel performance to determine whether repeat or similar performance weaknesses existed in the areas that were self-assessed by PSEG. While no significant adverse trends were identified, the inspectors noted that PSEG identified several instances where some minor items had not been entered into the CAP and additional instances where corrective actions were either not completed or were not timely. The inspectors confirmed that PSEG responded appropriately, and these items were entered into the CAP for evaluation and resolution.
Other Activities (Closed) NRC Temporarv Instruction 2515/183. "Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damaqe Event" The inspectors assessed the activities and actions taken by PSEG to assess its readiness to respond to an event similar to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant fuel damage event. This included
- (1) an assessment of PSEG's capability to mitigate conditions that may result from beyond design basis events, with a particular emphasis on strategies related to the spent fuel pool, as specified by NRC Security Order Section 8.5.b issued February 25, 2002, as committed to in severe accident management guidelines, and as specified by 10 CFR 50,54(hh);
- (2) an assessment of PSEG's capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions, as specified by 10 CFR 50.63 and station design bases;
- (3) an assessment of PSEG's capability to mitigate internal and externalflooding events, as specified by station design bases; and
- (4) an assessment of the thoroughness of the walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events, which were performed by PSEG to identify any potential loss of function of this equipment during seismic events possible for the site.
Inspection Report 05000354/201 1009 (ML111300180) documented detailed results of this inspection activity.
(Closed) NRC Temporarv Instruction 2515/184. "Availabilitv and Readiness Inspection of
',
On May 13, 2011, the inspectors completed a review of PSEG's severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), implemented as a voluntary industry initiative in the 1990's, to determine
- (1) whether the SAMGs were available and updated,
- (2) whether PSEG had procedures and processes in place to control and update its SAMGS,
The results of this review were provided to the NRC task force chartered by the Executive Director for Operations to conduct a near-term evaluation of the need for agency actions following the Fukushima Daiichifuel damage event in Japan. Plant-specific results for Hope Creek Generating Station were provided in an Attachment to a memorandum to the Chief, Reactor Inspection Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, dated May 27, 201 1 (MLl 1 1470361).
.1.2
Meetings, including Exit On July 13,2011, the inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. D. Lewis and other members of his staff. The inspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary. No proprietary information was identified, ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
PSEG Personnel
- E. Carr, Operations Director
- E. Casulli, Shift Operations Superintendent
- K. Chambliss, Work Management Director
- P. Duca, Senior Engineer, Regulatory Assurance
- D. Boyle, Shift Manager
- D. Bush, System Engineer
- T. Carucci, FIN Team Leader
- L. Davis, System Engineer
- M. Gaffney, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- L. Gorecki, System Engineer
- C. Johnson, Senior Engineer
- F. Jones, System Engineer
- K. Knaide, Engineering Director
- W. Kopchick, Plant Engineering Manager
- D. Lewis, Hope Creek Plant Manager
G. Lichty Technical Specialist
- F. Mooney, Maintenance Director
- J. Perry, Hope Creek Site Vice President
- S. Peterkin, Radiation Protection Support Superintendent
- M. Resser, Fire Protection Engineer
- A. Shabazian, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
- G. Siefert, Design Engineer
- H. Trimble, Radiation Protection Manager
- L. Wagner, Salem Plant Manager
- A. Whatley, System Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
NONE