ML102870148
ML102870148 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Vogtle |
Issue date: | 04/12/2010 |
From: | NRC/RGN-II |
To: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
References | |
50-424/10-301, 50-425/10-301 | |
Download: ML102870148 (225) | |
Text
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 76. 003AG2.1.30 001/1 /2/DROP ROD-LCL CONTROL/C/A-4.0/B-VOGTLE 09/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
- Unit at 100% power for last 10 weeks
- All rods out at 228 steps Current conditions:
- ROD AT BOTTOM alarm is alarming
- Control Bank D rod H-8 rod bottom LED lit
- Tave is lowering
- QPTR & AFD remain within limits Which of the following choices identifies the correct procedure entry and actions to take?
A. Enter AOP 18003-C, Section A, Dropped Rods in Mode 1.
Do not exceed 75% thermal power during rod recovery, rod pulls are limited to 3 step increments. Reset the Bank Overlap Unit to restore the RIL alarm to operable status.
B. Enter AOP 18003-C, Section C, Misaligned Rods in Model.
Do not exceed 65% thermal power during rod recovery, rod pulls are limited to 3 step increments. Reset the Bank Overlap Unit to restore the RIL alarm to operable status.
C Enter AOP 18003-C, Section A, Dropped Rods in Mode 1.
Do not exceed 75% thermal power during rod recovery, the 3 step rod pull limit may be suspended for this condition. Reset the P/A converter to restore the RIL alarm to operable status.
D. Enter AOP 18003-C, Section C, Misaligned Rods in Mode 1.
Do not exceed 65% thermal power during rod recovery, the 3 step rod pull limit may be suspended for this condition. Reset the P/A converter to restore the RIL alarm to operable status.
K/A 003 Dropped Control Rod 159
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM G2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS This question requires correct diagnosis of plant indications to determine correct procedures to enter and then the appropriate mitigative actions to take which are not immediate actions.
Question meets 1 OCFR55.43(b) criteria item #5 Assessment of facility conditions and selection of procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions making this an SRO only question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible since section A is the correct section and power is required to be maintained < 75% during the dropped rod recovery. The 3 step rod pull increments are normally required and the RIL alarm is INOP when rod recovery is begun.
B. Incorrect. Plausible since power is required to be reduced to < 65% prior to rod recovery, rod pull increments are normally limited to 3 steps, and the RIL alarm is INOP when rod revovery is begun.
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect. Plausible since power is required to be reduced to < 65% prior to rod recovery, the 3 step rod pull is suspended for this condition, and the RIL alarm is INOP for the reason listed.
REFERENCES
- 1. AOP 18003-C, Rod Control System Malfunction.
VEGP learning objectives:
- 1. LO-LP-60303-04:
Describe the effects of failing to reset the P/A converter (Bank Demand Position Display) following a dropped rod retrieval.
- 2. LO-LP-60303-07:
Describe why reactor power must be less than 65% or 10% below most limited power distribution restriction prior to dropped rod retrieval.
- 3. LO-LP-60303-1 5:
Describe the effects of failing to reset the P/A converter (Bank Demand Position Display) following a misaligned rod recovery.
160
HL15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 4. LO-LP-60303-1 8:
Given conditions and/or indications, determine the required AOP to enter (including subsections, as applicable).
161
- 1. 003AG2.4.35 001 Vo TLE Initial conditions:
- Unit at 100% power for last 10 weeks All rods out at 228 steps Current conditions:
- Rod at bottom alarm is alarming
- Control Bank D rod H-8 rod bottom LED lit
- Tave is lowering
- QPTR & AFD remain within limits Which of the following choices identifies the correct procedure entry and actions to take?
A. Enter AOP 18003-C, Section A, Dropped Rods in Mode 1.
Do not exceed 75% thermal power during rod recovery, rod pulls are limited to 3 step increments. Reset the Bank Overlap Unit to restore the RIL alarm to operable status.
B. Enter AOP 18003-C, Section C, Misaligned Rods in Mode 1.
Do not exceed 65% thermal power during rod recovery, rod pulls are limited to 3 step increments. Reset the Bank Overlap Unit to restore the RIL alarm to operable status.
C Enter AOP 18003-C, Section A, Dropped Rods in Mode 1.
Do not exceed 75% thermal power during rod recovery, the 3 step rod pull limit may be suspended for this condition. Reset the P/A converter to restore the RIL alarm to operable status.
D. Enter AOP 18003-C, Section C, Misaligned Rods in Mode 1.
Do not exceed 65% thermal power during rod recovery, the 3 step rod pull limit may be suspended for this condition. Reset the P/A converter to restore the RIL alarm to operable status.
Page: 1 10/6/2009
Approval Procedure No.
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18003 - C NUCLEAR OPERATIONS Revision No.
Date 23 Page No.
Unit COON 1 of 27 Abnormal Operating Procedures ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION PURPOSE PRB REVIEW REQUIRED This procedure provides instructions for malfunctions of the Rod Control System resulting in uncontrolled rod motion, dropped or misaligned rods.
SYMPTOMS SECTION A, DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1
- ALB1O-E5 ROD AT BOTTOM
- ALB1O-F2 POWER RANGE HI NEUTRON FLX PATE ALERT
- ALB1O-C2 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION
- Rod bottom LED on digital rod position indication.
- Tavg dropping.
SECTION B, UNCONTROLLED CONTINUOUS ROD RODS IN ALL MODES
- Rod motion with invalid demand from the Automatic Rod Control System.
- Failure of rods to stop moving when the Rod Motion Switch is released.
SECTION C, MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1
- ALB1O-C2 POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION
- ALB1O-D2 POWER RANGE UP DET HI FLX DEV
- ALB1OE2 POWER RANGE LWR DET HI FLX DEV
- Failure of ALB1O-C4 ROD BANK LO LIMIT or ALB1O-D4 ROD BANK LO-LO LIMIT to reset during rod withdrawal.
- Misaligned rod.
- Quadrant power tilt ratio calculation exceeds 1.02.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 2 of 27 Sheet 1 of 1 SYMPTOMS (CONTD)
SECTION D, DROPPED OR MISALIGNED RODS IN MODES 2 THROUGH 5
- Unexpected ALB1O-E5 ROD AT BOTTOM
- Unexpected ALB1O-F5 TWO
- Unexpected ALB1O-D6 ROD DEV
- Unexpected Rod bottom LED on digital rod position indication.
- Misaligned rod.
- Lowering flux and negative SUR on source or intermediate range nuclear instruments.
MAJOR ACTIONS
- Respond to Uncontrolled Continuous Rod Motion.
- Respond to Dropped Rods in Mode 1.
- Respond to Misaligned Rods in Mode 1.
- Respond to Dropped or Misaligned Rods in Modes 2 through 5.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 3 of 27 Sheet 1 of 1 CONTINUOUS ACTIONS Step Actions SECTION A, DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1
] A5 - Maintain Tavg at program.
A6 - Maintain power distribution when at or above 50% power.
[ 1 A12 - Maintain power level during recovery.
[ I A13 - Maintain Tavg within 3°F of Tref during recovery.
SECTION B, UNCONTROLLED CONTINUOUS ROD MOTION I B5 - Maintain power distribution when at or above 50% power.
SECTION C, MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 I C6 - Maintain Tavg at program.
[ I C7 - Maintain power distribution when at or above 50% power.
[ I C13 - Maintain power level during realignment.
{ I C14 - Maintain Tavg within 3°F of Tref during realignment.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 4 of 27 A DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED c:IA1. Stop any turbine loading changes.
A2. Check the following: A2. Perform the following:
Ela. DRPI - AVAILABLE Eli) Trip the Reactor.
EJb. Only one Rod dropped by El2) Go to 19000-C, E-0 observing DRPI. REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
ElA3. Initiate TS 3.1.4.
ElA4. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.
- AS. Maintain Tavg at program by performing the following as appropriate:
El. Adjust turbine load.
El. Dilute or borate.
El. Use manual Rod control.
- A6. Maintain power distribution when greater than or equal to 50% power:
Ela. AFD - WITHIN PLUS OR a. Reduce power until one MINUS 5 OF TARGET of the following are met:
El AFD within plus or minus 5% of target.
- OR El Reactor power less than 50%.
Elb. QPTR - LESS THAN OR Elb. Initiate TS 3.2.4.
EQUAL TO 1.02
PROCEOURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 5 of 27 A DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED A7. Perform the following:
E1a. Initiate action to determine cause and repair Rod Control malfunction.
LJb. With Maintenances concurrence disconnect lift coil for the dropped rod.
LJA8. Record the following in the Unit Control Log:
- Time of Rod drop.
- Dropped Rod number.
- Initial power level.
o Affected group step counter position.
LIA9. Reduce Thermal Power to less than 75 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> from time of Rod drop. (TS 3.1.4)
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 6 of 27 A DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED AlO. Check if Rod retrieval should be initiated:
EJa. Time of dropped Rod EJa. Shut down the unit. Go known. to 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).
EJb. Direct cause of dropped b. Perform the following:
Rod known and corrective actions taken. Eli) Consult Reactor Engineering and Operations Management.
- 2) Do not continue until one of the following is satisfied:
El IF recovery plan developed to retrieve dropped rod, THEN continue with Step A10.c.
- OR -
El IF decision made to shut down the unit, THEN go to 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).
- c. Dropped Rod withdrawal EJc. Shut down the unit. Go will be initiated within to 12004-C, POWER the following time OPERATION (MODE 1).
limits:
El Within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> - for cycle burnup less than 10,000 MWD/MTU.
- OR -
El Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> - for cycle burnup greater than or equal to 10,000 MWD/MTU.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 7 of 27 A DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED All. Prior to initiating Rod retrieval, reduce Thermal Power to the most limiting of the following:
LI 65% (10% below TS 3.1.4 restriction)
-OR-LI 10% below most limiting power distribution restriction:
- AFD
- Al2. Maintain power level during recovery:
LI Less than 75%.
- OR -
LI Less than power distribution restrictions:
AFD
- QPTR LJ*Al3. Maintain Tavg within 3°F of Tref during recovery.
LIA14. Position the ROD B1\NK SELECTOR SWITCH to the affected bank.
LIA15. Reset the affected group step counter to zero.
0A16. Reconnect dropped Rod lift coil.
LIA17. Disconnect all lift coils in the affected bank except for the dropped Rod.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 8 of 27 A DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED QA18. Check Rod being realigned - EJA18. Go to Step A20.
GROUP 1 CONTROL OR SHUTDOWN BANK ROD A19. Initiate 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS:
fle Rod Insertion Limit Monitor (if control bank)
El. Rod Position Deviation Monitor EIA2O. Check Unit operation at or Limit dropped Rod withdrawal above 75% for at least 72 to 3 steps per hour.
cumulative hours in a 7 day period.
LJA21. Record the affected banks group step counter positions in the Unit Control Log.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 9 of 27 A DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE:
- ALB1O-B06 ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE will illuminate when withdrawal of dropped Rod is initiated (unless Shutdown Bank C, D, or E Rod)
- Per 10000-C, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, the 3 step rod withrawal limitation may be suspended during abnormal conditions.
E1A22. Withdraw the Rod in Bank A22. IF the Rod fails to move, Select to the affected THEN:
banks current position.
Lia. Connect lift coils opened in Step A17.
Lib. Reset the step counter to value recorded in Step A21.
Elc. Continue applicable action items of TS 3.1.4.
Lid. Reset Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm using 1HS-40039 ROD CONTROL ALARM RESET.
Lie. Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in MAN.
Lif. Return to Step AlO.
L1A23. Record the following in the Unit Control Log:
- Recovery completion time.
- Affected Bank position.
E1A24. Connect the lift coils opened in Step Al7.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 10 of 27 A DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED L1A25. Reset Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm using 1HS-40039 ROD CONTROL ALARM RESET.
LJA26. Reset the MasterCycler using 13502, CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM.
A27. Check if P/A converter should be reset:
fla. Check recovered Rod - Lia. Go to Step A28.
CONTROL BANK ROD flb. Reset the P/A converter BANK POSITION DISPLAY to match the position recorded in Step A23 using 13502, CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM.
UNIT 1 CB-B71 UNIT 2 CB-B07 Lic. Discontinue 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS for Rod Insertion Limit Monitor.
NOTE: If possible, Maintenance should observe Rod exercise to determine required corrective actions.
L1A28. Exercise the affected bank LJA2S. the Rod drops again, using 14410, CONTROL ROD THEN return to Step Al.
OPERABILITY TEST.
0A29. Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in MAN or AUTO position, as desired.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 11 of 27 A DROPPED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED LA3O. Limit power ascension to 3%
per hour as detailed in Engineering procedure 87073-C, LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR FUEL OPERATION.
A31. Perform the following:
La. Notify Duty Engineer of Rod drop recovery.
Lb. Notify Duty Engineer that plant computer Rod position adjustment may be necessary.
Lc. Discontinue 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS for Rod Deviation Monitor when Rod demand position input to the IPC is reset.
LA32. Return to procedure and step in effect.
END OF SUB-PROCEDURE TEXT
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 12 of 27 B UNCONTROLLED CONTINUOUS ROD MOTION ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS Bi. Stop uncontrolled Rod motion by performing the following:
La. Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in MAN position.
Lb. Place the Rod Motion Switch in hold.
LB2. Check Rod motion - STOPPED B2. Perform the following:
La. Trip the Reactor.
Lb. IF in Modes 1, 2, or 3, THEN go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
- c. IF IN Modes 5 or 6, THEN perform the following:
Dl) Verify Reactor trip.
L12) Initiate repairs of Rod Control System.
E13) Return to procedure and step in effect.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS B3. Check the following alarms - B3. in Mode 1 or 2, EXTINGUISHED THEN perform the following:
Le ALB1O-C4 ROD BANK LO Li. Borate as necessary to LIMIT restore Rod height.
Lie ALB1O-D4 ROD BANK LO-LO LIMIT e Initiate the following:
Li. TS 3.1.5 LI. TS 3.1.6 LIB4. Restore Tavg to program by LIB4. Adjust RCS boron adjusting turbine load, concentration to restore Tavg to program.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 13 of 27 B UNCONTROLLED CONTINUOUS ROD MOTION ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- B5. Maintain power distribution when greater than or equal to 50% power:
Ela. AFD - WITHIN THE LIMITS Ela. Reduce power to less OF PTDB TAB 6.0 than 50% within 30 minutes. (TS 3.2.3)
Elb. QPTR - LESS THAN OR Lib. Initiate TS 3.2.4.
EQUAL TO 1.02 LJB6. Initiate repairs of Rod Control System.
EIB7. Return to procedure and step in effect.
END OF SUB-PROCEDURE TEXT
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 14 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED E:1C1. Stop any turbine loading changes.
EIC2. Check misaligned Rod - LIC2. Go to 13502, CONTROL ROD MISALIGNED BY GREATER THAN DRIVE AND POSITION 12 STEPS INDICATION SYSTEM C3. Check the following: LIC3. Shut down the unit. Go to 12004-C, POWER OPEPATION Lia. DRPI - AVAILABLE (MODE 1). (TS 3.1.4) flb. Only one Rod -
MISALIGNED BY GREATER THAN 12 STEPS LJC4. Initiate TS 3.1.4.
EC5. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.
- C6. Maintain Tavg at program by performing the following as appropriate:
0° Adjust turbine load.
0° Dilute or borate.
fle Use manual Rod control.
- C7. Maintain power distribution when greater than or equal to 50% power:
Ela. AFD - WITHIN PLUS OR a. Reduce power until one MINUS 5% OF TARGET of the following are met:
El AFD within plus or minus 5% of target.
- OR -
El Reactor power less than 50%.
fib. QPTR - LESS THAN OR fib. Initiate TS 3.2.4.
EQUAL TO 1.02
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 15 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS TN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED DC8. Initiate action to determine cause of and repair Rod control malfunction.
LIC9. Record the following in the JC9. exact time of Rod Unit Control Log: misalignment is NOT known, THEN use time of previous
- Time of Rod misalignment. Rod alignment verification performed in 14000,
- Misaligned Rod number. OPERATIONS SHIFTLY AND DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOGS as the
- Misaligned Rod position time of misalignment.
(DRPI) o Affected bank position (Demand and DRPI).
o Initial power level.
LIC1O. Reduce Thermal Power to less than 75% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> from time of Rod misalignment.
(TS 3.1.4)
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 16 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Cii. Check if Rod realignment should be initiated:
Ha. Direct cause of a. Perform the following:
misaligned Rod known and corrective actions have Eli) Consult Reactor been taken. Engineering and Operations Management.
- 2) Do not continue until one of the following is satisfied:
El recovery plan developed to realign rod, THEN continue with Step Bi1.c.
-OR El IF decision made to shut down the unit, THEN go to 12004-C, POWER OPERATI ON (MODE 1).
- b. Misaligned Rod Elb. Shut down the unit. Go withdrawal will be to 12004-C, POWER initiated within the OPERATION (MODE 1).
following time limits:
LI Within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> - for cycle burnup less than 10,000 MWD/MTU.
- OR -
El Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> - for cycle burnup greater than or equal to 10,000 MWD/MTU.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 17 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED C12. Prior to initiating Rod realignment, reduce Thermal Power to the most limiting of the following:
El 65% (10% below TS 3.1.4 restriction)
- OR -
El 10% below most limiting power distribution restriction:
AFD QPTR
- C13. Maintain power level during realignment:
El Less than 75%.
- OR -
El Less than power distribution restrictions:
o AFD o QPTR El*C14. Maintain Tavg within 3°F of Tref during realignment.
EIC15. Record the following in the Unit Control Log:
o Misaligned rod position (DRPI) o Affected bank position (Demand and DRPI).
ElC16. Position ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH to affected bank.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 18 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED LIC17. Determine if it is desirable LIC17. Go to Step C29 to position to position the Misaligned the Affected Bank to the Rod to Affected Bank Misaligned Rod.
position.
LJC18. Disconnect all lift coils in affected bank except for misaligned Rod.
LIC19. Check Rod being realigned - EIC19. Go to Step C2l.
GROUP 1 CONTROL OR SHUTDOWN BANK ROD C20. Initiate 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS:
L Rod Insertion Limit Monitor (if control bank)
El. Rod Position Deviation Monitor ElC21. Check Unit operation at or LIC21. Limit misaligned Rod above 75% for at least 72 withdrawal to 3 steps per cumulative hours in a 7 day hour.
period.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 19 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE:
- ALB1O-B06 ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE will illuminate when movement of misaligned Rod is initiated (unless Shutdown Bank C, ID, or E Rod).
- Per 10000-C, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, the 3 step rod withrawal limitation may be suspended during abnormal conditions.
E1C22. Withdraw or insert the C22. IE the misaligned Rod fails misaligned Rod in Bank to move, Select to align with THEN perform the following:
current bank DRPI position.
fla. Connect lift coils opened in Step C18.
Lib. Reset step counter(s) to value recorded in Step Cl5.
Lic. Notify I&C to determine cause of and repair Rod control malfunction.
- d. Determine if misaligned ROD is trippable:
Ell) IF rod control system malfunction is preventing rod motion, THEN misaligned rod is considered trippable.
E12) IF rod control system is properly demanding motion and no motion occurs, THEN misaligned rod is considered untrippable.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 20 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS TN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED (Step 22 continued from previous page) fle. misaligned Rod determined to be trippable, THEN go to Step C29 after repairs are complete.
- f. misaligned Rod determined to be untrippable, THEN:
- 01) Be in HOT STANDBY in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. (TS 3.1.4)
- 02) Go to 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).
0C23. Record the following in the Unit Control Log:
0 Recovery completion time.
- Affected Bank position.
0C24. Connect the lift coil(s) opened in Step C18.
L1C25. Reset Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm using 1HS-40039 ROD CONTROL ALARM RESET.
L1C26. Reset the Master Cycler using 13502, CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM.
0C27. Reset affected step counters to position recorded in Step C23.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 21 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED C28. Check if P/A converter should be reset:
fla. Check recovered Rod - Ela. Go to Step C38.
CONTROL BANK ROD Db. Reset the P/A converter BANK POSITION DISPLAY to match the position recorded in Step C23 using 13502, CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM.
UNIT 1 CB-B71 UNIT 2 CB-B07 EJc. Discontinue 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS for Rod Insertion Limit Monitor.
Lid. Go to Step C38.
E1C29. Reset Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm using 1HS-40039 ROD CONTROL ALARM RESET.
EJC3O. Reset the Master Cycler using 13502, CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM.
EIC31. Disconnect misaligned Rod lift coil.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 22 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION: Realigning, the affected bank to the misaligned rod must be done without violating the bank sequence, overlap, and insertion limits.
C32. Review the following:
Lie TS 3.1.5 Lie TS 3.1.6 L1C33. Withdraw or insert the affected bank in Manual Rod Control to the misaligned Rod DRPI position recorded in Step C15.
E1C34. Record the following in the Unit Control Log:
o Recovery completion time.
o Affected Bank position.
LiC35. Connect misaligned Rod lift coil.
0C36. Verify affected bank step counter readings are at the misaligned Rod DRPI position recorded in Step C15.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 23 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED C37. Check if Bank Overlap Unit should be reset:
Ela. Check if affected bank Ela. Go To Step C38.
position was less than All Rods Out position during the event.
Ob. Record control bank position in the Unit Control Log.
Elc. Reset the Bank Overlap Unit Counter using 13502, CONTROL ROD DRIVE AND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM.
UNIT 1 CB-B71 UNIT 2 CB-Bl4 NOTE: If possible, Maintenance should observe Rod exercise to determine required corrective actions.
ElC38. Exercise the affected bank EIC3S. IF the Rod misaligns again, using 14410, CONTROL ROD THEN return to Step Cl.
OPERABILITY TEST.
UC39. Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in MAN or AUTO, as desired.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003C 23 24 of 27 C MISALIGNED RODS IN MODE 1 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED C40. Perform the following:
Lia. Notify Duty Engineer of Rod drop recovery.
Lib. Notify Duty Engineer that plant computer Rod position adjustment may be necessary.
LJc. Discontinue 14915, SPECIAL CONDITIONS SURVEILLANCE LOGS for Rod Deviation Monitor when Rod demand position input to the IPC is reset.
LIC41. Return to procedure and step in effect.
END OF SUB-PROCEDURE TEXT
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C - 23 25 of 27 D DROPPED OR MISALIGNED RODS IN MODES 2 THROUGH 5 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Dl. Check if Reactor shutdown is required:
Ela. Check normal Reactor Ela. Go to Step D2.
startup using 12003-C, REACTOR STARTUP (MODE 3 TO MODE 2) - IN PROGRESS Elb. Check one or more rods - LJb. IF one or more Rods are DROPPED misaligned, THEN trip the Reactor and go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
- c. Perform one of the following:
El Go to 12005-C, REACTOR SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 2 TO MODE 3) and perform normal Reactor shutdown.
- OR -
El Trip the Reactor and go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 26 of 27 D DROPPED OR MISALIGNED RODS IN MODES 2 THROUGH 5 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED LID2. Check if physics testing in D2. Perform the following:
progress.
La. Trip the Reactor.
EIID. IF in Modes 1, 2, or 3, THEN go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
- c. IF in Modes 4 or 5, THEN perform the following:
Eli) Verify Reactor trip.
E12) Initiate repairs of Rod Control System.
E13) Go to the applicable UOP.
NOTE: Both the Reactivity Computer and Main Control Board Instruments should be observed for reactivity and startup rate indications.
LID3. Check reactivity - WITHIN 40 LID3. Go to Step D5.
PCM OF ZERO REACTIVITY OR ZERO SUR D4. Perform the following:
La. Stop dilution and borat ion.
Lb. Move Rods to maintain flux and reactivity in the range for physics testing.
Cc. Initiate repairs of Rod Control System.
Lid. Return to procedure in effect.
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 18003-C 23 27 of 27 D DROPPED OR MISALIGNED RODS IN MODES 2 THROUGH 5 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED E1D5. Check reactivity - MORE D5. Perform the following:
POSITIVE THAN +40 PCM OR SUSTAINED POSITIVE SUR Ea. Trip the reactor.
Lib. Go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
D6. Perform the following:
Ea. Stop dilution.
1b. Insert Rods and/or borate to return and maintain flux and reactivity in the range for physics testing.
Ejc. Initiate repairs of Rod Control System.
LJd. Return to procedure in effect.
END OF PROCEDURE TEXT
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 77. 003 G2 .4.41 001/2/1 /RCP-CLASSIFICATIONS/C/A-4 .6/NEW/HL- I 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
An RCP seal LOCA is in progress The OATC is unable to maintain PRZR level with normal charging SI is manually actuated 1 NAA de-energizes 30 seconds after the reactor trip All RCP breakers remain closed Current conditions:
19010-C, F-i Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant in progress CSFST monitoring is in progress:
- Core Cooling Orange due to low RVLIS Dynamic Range reading 40%
- CNMT Yellow due to radiation levels 800 mR/hr
- Inventory Yellow due to low PRZR level of 0%
RCS pressure is 1450 psig and slowly lowering with both CCPs and SIPs running.
REFERENCES PROVIDED The SS should...
A direct the OATC to open the breakers for RCPs 1 & 3 and then delcare an Alert emergency.
B. direct the OATC to open the breakers for all four RCPs and then declare a Site Area emergency.
C. direct the OATC to open the breakers for RCPs 1 & 3 and then delcare a Site Area emergency.
D. direct the OATC to open the breakers for all four RCPs and then declare an Alert emergency.
KIA 003 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS).
02.4.41 Knowledge of action level thresholds and classifications.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario with a small RCS LOCA in progress and a failure of the fast bus transfer mechanism for the bus powering 2 of the RCPs. The RCP 162
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM which drives the core cooling status tree to orange with incorrect data. Ultimately this affects the proper emergency classification since it appears that a second fission product barrier is potentially lost.
This question is appropriate for an SRO since it involves detailed diagnostic knowledge and correct use of EPIP classification procedures.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. EOP 19200-C requires opening RCP breakers for any RCP that is de-energized (RCP5 1 & 3 are powered from I NAA). The correct core cooling status tree challenge is yellow making the RCS barrier the only lost or potentially lost barrier.
This requires an Alert emergecy declaration due to the leakage being greater than the capacity of one charging pump in normal charging mode or RCS leak in progress with RCS subcooling < 24 F.
B. Incorrect. RCS pressure is above the RCP trip criteria of 1375 psig so the running RCPs (2 & 4) should. NOT be tripped. The incorrect core cooling status tree challenge of Orange results in a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier and a loss of the RCS barrier. This leads to an incorrect event classification of Site Area emergency.
C. Incorrect. EOP 19200-C requires opening RCP breakers for any RCP that is de-energized (RCP5 1 & 3 are powered from I NAA). If the student does not recognize the impact of the RCP breaker positions on the core cooling status tree then s/he would incorrectly diagnose a Site Area emergency due to potential loss of the fuel clad in addition to the loss of the RCS barrier.
D. Incorrect. RCS pressure is low but still above the RCP trip criteria of 1375 psig so the running RCPs (2 & 4) should NOT be tripped. The correct emergency classification for this event is an Alert emergency due to the loss of the RCS barrier.
REFERENCES 19010-C, E-l Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant page 25 19200-C, F-O Critical Safety Function Status Trees NOTES, and Core Cooling tree 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions Figures 1,2, and 4 (PROVIDED TO THE STUDENTS)
V-LO-TX-01101 Electrical Distribution Text page 17 V-LO-TX-16001 Primary Systems Text page 32 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-37002-9:
163
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM LO-LP-37003-9:
Explain how various combinations of RCPs running effect RVLIS indication.
LO-LP-401 01-10:
List the three fission product barriers that are part of the criteria for classifying an emergency.
LO-LP-40101-11:
Describe how the status of fission product.barrier integrity is obtained.
LO-LP-40 10 1-1 3:
Given an emergency scenario, and the procedure, classify the emergency (SRO only).
164
Approved By = Procedure Number RV J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19010-C 32 DateApproved E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY Page Number 3/24/09 25 of 25 COOLANT FOLDOUT PAGE
- 1. RCPTRIPCRITERIA Trip all RCPs if BOTH conditions listed below occur:
- 2. SI REINITIATION CRITERIA Operate ECCS pumps as necessary if EITHER condition listed below occurs.
- RCS subcooling LESS THAN 24°F [38°F ADVERSE].
- PRZR level CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 9% [37% ADVERSE].
Initiate ATTACHMENT A if it is necessary to re-establish CCP Cold Leg Injection.
- 3. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA Go to 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, if any SG pressure is lowering in an uncontrolled manner or has been completely depressurized, and has not been isolated.
- 4. E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA Go to 19030-C, E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, if any SG level rises in an uncontrolled manner or any SG has abnormal radiation.
- 5. COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION Go to 19013-C, ES-1.3 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, if RWST level lowers to less than 29%.
- 6. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION Switch to alternate CST by initiating 13610, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM when CST level lowers to less than 15%.
Printed October 14, 2009 at 10:54
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PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 19200-C 22 5 of 10 Sheet 1 of 1 F- 02 CORE COOLING GO TO 19221-C GO TO 19221-C I / *\ GOTO 19222.C GO TO 19222-C GO TO 19223-C GOTO f 19222C
Approved oy Proc%uure Number Rev J.D. Williams I Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 91001-C 32 Date Approved i Page Number 05/28/2009 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS I 10 of 108 REFERENCE USE 1.and3. y OR CORE COOLING (p.32)
CSFST RED N LOSS of CLAD 4
- 2. Coolant Activity Sample> 300 iCi!gm Equivalent I 1 31 (p.32) OR BARRIER
- 5. Containment Radiation Monitors RE-005/006 > 6.0 E+6 mr/hr (p.33) OR OR
- 1. and 4. OR Y
CORE COOLING (p.32)
POTENTIAL N
LOSS of
- 1. (p.32) CLAD HEAT SINK BARRIER CSFST RED N
- 7. Judgment: Judgment by the ED that the Fuel Clad Barrier is Lost or Potentially Lost. Consider conditions not addressed and inability to determine the status of the Fuel Clad Barrier (p.33)
FIGURE 1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY (Modes 1,2, 3and4 only)
Printed October 14, 2009 at 10:50
Approved by Protdüre Number Rev J.D. Williams Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 91001-C 32 Date Approved Page Number 05/28/2009 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS 11 of 108 REFERENCE USE
- 1. OR Y
HEAT SINK (p. 33)
POTENTIAL CSFST RED N LOSS of 4-
RCS INTEGRITY (p. 33)
BARRIER CSFST RED N
- 2. NON-Isolable RCS leak (including SG tube leakage) GREATER THAN the Capacity of One Charging Pump in the normal charging mode (p.34) OR
- 5. Unexplained level rise in any of the following: containment sump, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT),
Waste Holdup Tank (WHT) (p.34)
- 6. Judgment: Judgment by the ED that the RCS Barrier is Lost or Potentially Lost. Consider conditions not addressed and the inability to determine the status of the RCS Barrier (p. 34)
FIGURE 2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) INTEGRITY (Modes 1,2,3 and 4 only)
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4
A fast bus transfer scheme is utilized on the 13.8kv buses to shift the bus power supply from the UAT5 to the RATs if a Main Generator Trip occurs quickly enough to maintain voltage on the bus and prevent a Reactor Trip due to loss of RCPs. When the Main Generator Trips, the feeder breakers from the UATs to the 13.8kv buses trip open. As soon as the UAT feeder to the bus trips, and provided that the phase relationship between the voltage on the bus and incoming voltage from the RAT is within a preset tolerance, the RAT feeder to the bus will close. All of this occurs within about 0.1 seconds. If the phase relationship between the voltages is not within the preset tolerance, the fast bus transfer will not occur. However, the 13.8kv buses are also equipped with a residual voltage transfer that acts as a backup to the fast bus transfer.
The residual voltage transfer is also actuated by a Main Generator lockout relay. If a fast bus transfer does not occur following a Generator Trip, when the bus voltage decays to about 30 of normal, (as sensed by 2 DV relays per bus) the residual voltage transfer will close the bus feeder from the RAT. This occurs only if the feeder from the DAT has opened. There is no requirement for the voltages to be in phase in this case because by the time RAT feeder breaker re-energizes the bus, the existing bus voltage has decayed to essentially zero. The residual voltage transfer takes about 0.9 seconds to occur. The DV (under voltage) trips for the load feeder breakers have been defeated because many loads were tripping off prior to the residual bus transfer. Since the uv trips have now been defeated, if the bus is de-energized the handswitch indication for the loads on the dead bus will give false indication that the pump or motor is still energized. This is why when verifying a pump or other equipment is running that the operator must look at indications such as discharge pressure, flows, or voltages.
Loads supplied by the 13.8kv buses are fed through breakers that will trip automatically on instantaneous overcurrent or ground overcurrent to protect the switchgear and the motor loads. Reactor Coolant Pumps are supplied by two breakers in series to provide redundant interruption of power for the containment Electrical penetration over current protection.
The following starting duty cycle for the RCP should be observed:
- a. Only one RCP shall be started at any one time.
- b. Two successive starts are permitted, provided the motor is permitted to coast to a stop between starts.
- c. A third start may be made when the winding and core have cooled by running for a period of 20 minutes, or by standing idle for a period of 45 minutes.
The proper order for breaker operation to start a RCP is to place the RCP lE Control handswitch in START and then to place the RCP Non-1E Control handswitch in Start. The stopping order for the RCP involves placing its Non-1E Control handswitch in STOP and then PLACING its 1E Control handswitch in Stop. This process minimizes the power transferred across the lE breaker upon opening and closing thereby lowering the possibility of damage to the more expensive component.
During normal operation, transferring the 13.8kv bus from a UAT to a RAT or from a RAT to a UAT simply involves verifying incoming and bus voltages are approximately 13.8kv, placing the breaker synchronizing switch is on, and closing the associated incoming breaker. The alternate incoming breaker will immediately trip open.
°i v- LQ-T-° t
Revision 6.0
BEARING TEMPERATURE DETECTORS: One shoe of each bearing (upper thrust, lower thrust, upper radial, and lower radial) is provided with a temperature detector.
16.20 ANTI-REVERSE-ROTATION DEVICE The anti-reverse-rotation device used on the RCP motor is a simple ratchet and pawl arrangement requiring no lubrication and having no parts to wear during normal operation. The device prevents reverse rotation with 100 percent torque applied in that direction and with a maximum reverse movement of less than 5 degrees. At an approximate speed of 70 rpm the pawls drop and bounce across the ratchet plate.
At zero speed, one pawl will engage the ratchet plate, preventing rotation in the reverse direction. The pawl and associated parts are designed to support up to five times normal torque without exceeding safe working stresses. There are a number of such pawls spaced equally around the periphery, and any one can contain the reverse forces. The ratchet plate is normally stationary except when it absorbs shock. It is attached to its support with spring-return shock absorbers which prevent reverse shock from being transmitted to other motor parts. At startup, the pawls are kicked up by the ratchet notches, and they continue to bounce until the motor attains a speed of about 70 rpm. At this speed, the centrifugal force is sufficient to overcome the force of gravity and hold the pawls in the running position. While the motor is running at speed, there is no contact between the pawls and the ratchet plate.
16.21 FLYWHEEL It is important to reactor protection that the reactor coolant continues to flow for a short time after reactor trip. In order to provide this flow following loss of offsite electrical power, each reactor coolant pump is provided with a flywheel. Thus the rotating inertia of the pump, motor, and flywheel is employed during the coast down period to continue the reactor coolant flow. The pump/motor is designed for the safe shutdown earthquake at the site. Hence, it is concluded that the coast down capability of the pumps is maintained even under the most adverse case of loss of offsite electrical power coincident with the safe shutdown earthquake.
16.22 RCP BREAKERS Reactor coolant pumps are powered from 13.8 KV non-ESF busses through a non-class 1E Tie Breaker and a class 1 E motor breaker. RCP 1 and 3 are supplied from bus 1 NAA and RCP 2 and 4 are supplied from bus 1NAB. Only one RCP is started ata time to prevent over loading its associated 13.8 KV bus.
Both the non-class 1E and class 1E breaker are in series. The reactor coolant pump non-class 1E tie breakers (HS-0495B, 0496B, 0497B, 0498B) receive their control power from 125 VDC non-ESF busses.
In order to close these breakers the respective oil lift pump must be running and the oil lift pump discharge pressure must be at least (600 psig) as indicated by a blue light on the oil lift pump hand switch. These non-class 1 E tie breakers will automatically trip on: over voltage, instantaneous or time delay over current, 32 Revision 7.2 v
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 78. 007A2.03 001 /2/1/PRT-PZR OVERPRESSURE/C/A-3 .9!NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO!TNT/DS 19241-C, FR-P.l Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock is being implemented.
RCS WR pressure is 2335 psig RCS WR cold leg temperatures are 190 F and stable All RCPs are stopped PRZR level is 15%
The SS is at the step 23 of 19241-C which reads:
- a. Check any if ANY of the following conditions are satisfied:
RCS subcooling -
24 F to 34 F
[38 F to 48 F ADVERSE]
-OR PRZR level GREATER THAN 75%
[52% ADVERSE]
-OR RCS pressure LESS THAN 125 PSIG The SS should direct the OATC to depressurize the RCS to...
REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 125 psig with auxiliary spray.
B 125 psig with one train of COPS.
C. 34 F subcooling with auxiliary spray.
D. 34 F subcooling with one train of COPS.
K/A 007 Pressurizer Relief TanklQuench Tank System (PRTS)
A2.03 Ability to (a oredict the imDacts of the followinci malfunctions or 165
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations.
Overpressurization of the PZR.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a PTS scenario requiring the use of FR-P.1 to mitigate the condition. The scenario requires the student to determine which depressurization method should be used, and what the target for the depressurization is.
This question requires the student to assess the plant conditions and then prescribe a section of the procedure to mitigate this problem making this an SRO question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. 125 psig is the most restrictive criteria for this step in the procedure.
Auxiliary spray is a plausible choice since it is a possible branch in the procedure steps.
B. Correct. Since flow through the regenerative heat exchanger is isolated and the RCPs are stopped, the correct action by procedure is to use one train of COPS. 125 psig is the most restrictive criteria for depressurization.
C. Incorrect. 34 F subcooling is one of the possible depressurization criteria for this step of the procedure, but it is not the most restrictive for the plant conditions given.
Auxiliary spray is a plausible choice since it is a possible branch in the procedure steps.
D. Incorrect. 34 F subcooling is one of the possible depressurization criteria for this step of the procedure, but it is not the most restrictive for the plant conditions given.
Since flow through the regenerative heat exchanger is isolated and the RCP5 are stopped, the correct action by procedure is to use one train of COPS.
REFERENCES 19241-C, FR-Ri Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition steps 23 & 24 LO-HO-37071 -002 19241-C, FR-P.1 Imment Pressurized Thermal Shock pages 22 & 23 Steam Tables (PROVIDED TO STUDENTS)
VEGP learning objectives:
V-LO-LP-37071 -04:
State the actions for preventing or mitigating the severity of overcooling and 166
HL15R SRO NRC EXAM repressurizing transients.
V-LO-LP-37071 -06:
Using EOP 19241 as a guide, briefly describe how each step is accomplished.
167
Approved By Procedure Number J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19241-C 22 Date Approved Page Number FR-P.1 RESPONSE TO IMMINENT 7/11/08 PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION 17 of 34 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE The Upper Head region of the vessel may void during RCS depressurization if RCPs are NOT running. This will result in a rapidly rising PRZR level.
CAUTION RCS depressurization may result in RCP seal AP lowering to less than 200 psid. Shutdown of RCPs is required in this case.
- a. Check if ANY of the following _a. Go to Step 23.c.
conditions are satisfied:
RCS subcooling -
24°F to 34°F
[38°F to 48°F ADVERSE].
-OR PRZR level GREATER THAN 75%
[52% ADVERSE].
-OR RCS pressure LESS THAN 125 PSIG.
- b. GotoStep27.
Step 23 continued on next page Printed October 14, 2009 at 15:38
Approved By Procedure Number J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric GeneratingPlant 19241-C 22 Date Approved FR-P.1 RESPONSE TO IMMINENT Page Number 7/11/08 PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITION l8of 34 ACtION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- c. Check Normal PRZR Spray - __ c. IF letdown is in service, AVAILABLE. THEN go to Step 24.
IF letdown is NOT in service, THEN use one PRZR PORV by performing the following:
- 1) Arm one train of COPS and verify PRZR PORV Block Valve OPEN.
- 2) Open associated PRZR PORV.
_3) GotoStep25.
RCS can NOT be depressurized using any PRZR PORV, THEN go to Step 24 even though letdown is NOT in service.
- d. Open Normal PRZR Spray Valves.
- e. Go to Step 25.
- 24. Establish Auxiliary Spray by performing the following:
_a. Verify PRZR Heaters - OFF.
_b. Verify at least one CCP running.
Step 24 continued on next page Printed October 14, 2009 at 15:38
displace water into the PRZR, causing rapidly increasing PRZR level with the potential for water relief through the PRZR PORVs. The PRZR may fill with water within a few minutes. This note informs the operator of the potential for this condition, so that RCS depressurization can be stopped quickly to avoid a water solid PRZR.
STEPS: Depressurize RCS To Decrease RCS Subcooling Establish Auxiliary Spray by performing the following Check if any of the following conditions are satisfied Stop RCS depressurization PURPOSE: To decrease RCS pressure to the lowest pressure possible without losing subcooling BASIS:
The RCS pressure reduction is intended to decrease pressure stress on the vessel wall as much as possible. The RCS should be depressurized until RCS subcooling is between 24-34°F [38-48°F for adverse containment]. If a PORV is used and RCS subcooling decreases to less than 24°F [38°F for adverse containment] before a PORV is closed or isolated, the operator should allow adequate time for the PORV or its associated block valve to close (i.e., the time necessary for the valve to stroke) before manually operating ECCS pumps as necessary to restore subcooling per the previous continuous action step.
If normal PRZR spray is not available, and the RCS cannot be depressurized using any PRZR PORV, then the operator is instructed to use auxiliary spray. This preferred order of the means to depressurize the RCS takes into account that letdown has not been established yet to heat the auxiliary spray flow and minimize the thermal shock to the spray nozzle.
Once letdown has been established, using auxiliary spray for depressurization is preferred before using a PRZR PORV. If the operator is directed to return to this step after letdown has been established, and normal PRZR spray is not available, auxiliary spray should be used for depressurization.
A second criterion, in addition to subcooling, for stopping the pressure reduction is PRZR level greater than 75% [52% for adverse containment]. Limiting PRZR level ensures a substantial steam bubble which facilitates further pressure control.
A third criterion for stopping the pressure reduction is RCS pressure less than 125 psig. For certain postulated accidents, it is possible to start this step with a low RCS pressure (less than approximately 200 V Do-377/- o 22
psig) and greater than the required 10°F subcooling. It may be difficult to reduce RCS pressure any further per the RNO column. Since the intent of the step has been met, no further pressure reduction is necessary.
KNOWLEDGE:
RCS depressurization should be stopped when RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs is between 24°F
[38°F for adverse containment] and 34°F [48°F for adverse containment]
If subcooling decreases below the setpoint for reinitiating ECCS during the depressurization, the operator should take the appropriate actions such as closing the PORV or the block valve for a stuck open PORV, and wait to see if the actions are successful (i.e., allow adequate time for valves to stroke closed), before reinitiating ECCS. If the actions stop the depressurization and subcooling is restored, ECCS reinitiation is not necessary.
PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION:
34°F The sum of temperature and pressure measurement system errors, including allowances for normal channel accuracies, translated into temperature using saturation tables, plus 10°F.
48°F The sum of temperature and pressure measurement system errors, including allowances for normal channel accuracies and post accident transmitter errors, translated into temperature using saturation tables, plus 10°F.
75% PRZR level at the upper tap, including allowances for normal channel accuracy, minus 20% for operating margin.
52% PRZR level at the upper tap, including allowances for normal channel accuracy, post accident transmitter errors, and reference leg process errors, minus 20% for operating margin.
125 psig Saturation pressure for temperature Ti, including allowances for normal channel accuracy, plus 10 psi, not to exceed 200 psig.
STEP: Check PRZR Level GREATER THAN 19% [50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENTJ PURPOSE: To determine if PRZR level is above the heaters 23
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 79. 008AA2.28 OO1/1/1/PZR VAPOR ACC-SPDS/C/A 3.9/NEW/HL-15R NRC/SRO!TNT/DS Safety Injection has actuated from 100% power SS is implementing EOP 19010-C, E-l Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant SPDS indications for CSFSTs:
Subcriticality GREEN Core Cooling YELLOW due to RCS subcooling <24 F Heat Sink GREEN Integrity GREEN Containment YELLOW due to CNMT radiation > 750 mR/hr Inventory YELLOW due to PRZR level > 92%
PRZR level is 100%
RCS pressure is 1040 psig The SS is at the step 15 which reads:
- Pressure in all SGs -
STABLE OR RISING
A. return to an eariler step in 19010-C until RCS subcooling is > 24 F, then transition to 19011-C, SI Termination.
B. return to an eariler step in 19010-C until SG pressures stabilize then continue with 19010-C.
C continue with the next step in 19010-C, then start an RCS cooldown in 19012-C, ES-i .2 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
D. continue with the next step in 1901 0-C, then transition to 19011-C when RCS pressure starts increasing.
K/A 008 Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open) 168
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident.
Safety parameter display system indications.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a plausible scenario using the expected SPDS indications for a PRZR vapor Space accident due to a stuck open safety valve. The exam inee must properly interpret the CSFST challenges to determine that an RCS LOCA is in progress. Then s/he must be able to select the approppriate FOP strategy for step 15 of F-i and the appropriate FOP transition. The question requires detailed knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the FOPs that invovles a transition to an event specific sub-procedure making this an SRO level question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. The yellow condition on the core cooling CSFST is indicative of a primary LOCA. Returning to the earlier step in 19010-C would be applicable for a secondary LOCA. The choice is plausible since the return to the earlier step is in 19010-C and the PRZR level indication is a possible indication of RCS inventory after the faulted SG has completed blowing down.
B. Incorrect. The yellow condition on core cooling CSFST is indicative of a primary LOCA. Returning to the earlier step in 19010-C while waiting for SG pressures to stablize would be applicable for a secondary LOCA. The expected procedure flow path for a secondary LOCA would be a transition to 19011-C after SG pressures stabilized.
C. Correct. The yellow condition on core cooling indicates inadequate RCS subcooling.
The correct procedure flow path would be to continue with 19010-C and transition to FS-1.2 (19012-C) since RCS pressure is >300 psig. An RCS cooldown is performed in 19012-C to establish RCS subcooling.
D. Incorrect. The yellow condition on core cooling indicates inadequate RCS subcooling. A transition to 19011-C for SI termination is plausible since this is a continuous action from an eariler step in 19010-C. However, without adequate RCS subcooling, the transition criteria to 19011-C would not met.
REFERENCES 19010-C, F-i Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant steps 11, 15, 21 19200-C, F-O Critical Safety Function Status Trees core cooling V-LO-HO-37i 11-001 pages 25 & 26 VEGP learning objectives:
NO_QBJ TXOBJ LO-LP-371 11-01 State the physical bases for establishing equilibrium temperature and pressure in the RCS.
169
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM LO-LP-371 11-01 State the physical bases for establishing equilibrium temperature and pressure in the RCS.
LO-LP-371 11-02 State the effect of various size breaks on the Primary System with respect to temperatures and pressures.
NbOBJ 1XOBJ*
LO-LP-37111-05 State howa LOCA is initially detected. State how the proper procedure is entered.
NOOBJ TXOBJ LO-LP-371 11-08 Using EOP 19010 as a guide, briefly describe how each step is accomplished.
170
Approved By Procedure Number J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19010-C 32 Date Approved Page Number E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY
\3/24/09 COOLANT 9 of 25 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED reduced:
- a. RCS Subcooling GREATER-THAN 24°F [38°F ADVERSE].
- b. Secondary Heat Sink: b. GotoStepl2.
Total feed flow to intact SG(s) GREATER THAN 570 GPM.
-OR NR level in at least one intact SG GREATER THAN 10% [32%
ADVERSE].
- c. Go to Step 12.
RISING.
_d. PRZR level GREATER THAN
- d. Try to stabilize RCS pressure:
9% [37% ADVERSE].
. Use Normal PRZR Spray if Instrument Air to Containment available.
Go to Step 12.
_e. Go to 19011-C, ES-1.1 SI TERMINATION.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 12:35
rpprdBy Procedure Number R J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19010-C 32 Date Approved E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY Page Number 3/24/09 COOLANT 12 of 25 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ckRCSaSGpressures:15.ReturntoStep4.
. Pressure in all SGs -
STABLE OR RISING.
. RCS pressure STABLE OR LOWERING.
- 16. Check if DGs should be stopped:
_a. AC Emergency Busses - a. Try to restore offsite power ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE to AC Emergency Busses by POWER. initiating 13427A/B, 4160V AC AAO2/BAO3 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
_b. Reset SI, if necessary.
- c. Stop any unloaded DG and place in standby by initiating 13145, DIESEL GENERATORS.
- d. Check Stub Busses - d. Energize Stub Busses by ENERGIZED: performing the following as necessary:
. NBO1 NBO1 NB1O NB1O 1) Open breaker 1) Open breaker NBO1-01 NB1O-01
- 2) Close breaker 2) Close breaker AAO2-22 BAO3-18
- 3) Close breaker 3) Close breaker NBO1-01 NB1O-01 Printed October 13, 2009 at 12:35
Approved By Procedure Number R J. B. Staney Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19010-C 32 DateApproved Page Number E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY 3/24/09 COOLANT 16 of 25 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 21. In the event of a Design Basis Accident, the following apply concerning conservation of Ultimate Heat Sink inventory:
e IF a DBA LOCA coincident with a LOSP has occurred, THEN secure one train of NSCW within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the initiating event per 13150, NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER SYSTEM.
. H a DBA LOCA without an LOSP has occurred and normal NSCW makeup is lost, THEN secure one train of NSCW within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the loss of makeup capability per 13150, NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING ATER SYSTEM.
- 22. Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization is required:
_a. RCS pressure GREATER
- a. IF RHR Pump flow is greater THAN 300 PSIG. than 500 gpm, THEN go to Step 23.
_b. Go to 19012-C, ES-1.2 POST LOCA 000LDOWN AND DEPRESS U R IZAT ION.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 12:35
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 19200-C 22 5 of 10 Sheet 1 of 1 F- 0.2 CORE COOLiNG GO TO 19221.C GO TO 19221-C I GOTO 19222 C I 19222-C GO TO I 19223C
.\ >
GOTO F 19222 C (I
GO TO 19223-C 1
PURPOSE: To alert the operator that if RCS pressure should decrease in an uncontrolled manner to less than the shutoff head of the RHR pumps, they. must be manually restarted since the SI signal has been reset.
BASIS:
Except for relatively large LOCAs, the RCS pressure should remain greater than the shutoff head pressure of the RHR pumps until later in the recovery following a controlled cooldown and depressurization. To avoid damage to the RHR pumps, these pumps are stopped early in the recovery if RCS pressure is greater than their shutoff head. An automatic signal to restart these pumps may not be available if RCS pressure subsequently decreases uncontrollably to less than their shutoff head. In that case, manual action is required to restart these pumps.
PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION:
300 psig Shutoff head pressure of the RHR pumps, including allowances for normal channel accuracy and post accident transmitter errors.
STEP:
PURPOSE: To determine if the SI termination criteria should be rechecked BASIS:
Since procedure 19010-C is used to recover from both a LOCA and secondary side break, a second check on SG pressures is necessary in case there is a faulted SG h h as not fully depressurized at the time the SI termination criteria were checked. A check on RCS pressure is also necessary in case the SG pressures are stable and there is a faulted SG which is depressurizing at the time the SI termination there is a faulted SG which is still depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or if f the RCS pressure is increasing, the operator is directed to return to the step that checks RCP trip criteria, since the initial steps in 19010-C should be rechecked. Eventually, the faulted SG will blow down to atmospheric pressure and dry out, RCS pressure will stabilize or increase, and all SI termination criteria in 19010-C should be met. If the operator proceeds past this step in 19010-C with a depressurizing SG, he could be directed to 19012-C, ES-1.2 POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, and encounter more restrictive SI termination criteria than necessary.
25
KNOWLEDGE:
With a LOCA and no faulted SG the SG pressure could be decreasing slightly. This is considered a stable SG pressure. The concern addressed by this step is the presence of a secondary side break in which the faulted SG is still clepressurizing in an uncontrolled manner. If this is the case, the SI termination criteria may not be met at the time the check is encountered, and the operator should return to the RCP trip criteria step (4) in 19010-C and not proceed to 19012-C, ES-i .2 POST LOCA 000LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, until all SG pressures have been stabilized or are increasing and RCS pressure has stabilized or is decreasing.
Uncontrolled means not under the control of the operator, and incapable of being controlled by the operator using available equipment.
STEP: Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped PURPOSE: To stop emergency diesel generators if they have started and are running unloaded BASIS:
Diesels not be run extensively unless carrying load. Diesels should auto-start on an SI signal, but will not load if offsite power is available. If DGs are supplying the emergency busses, then stub busses are re energized to aid the recovery process.
If SI has not been previously reset and the diesel generators should be stopped, SI should be reset prior to stopping the diesels.
When the emergency diesels are stopped, they are placed in standby to be ready to start either manually or automatically.
PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION:
Additional equipment loaded on stub busses includes DG air compressors, PRZR backup heater groups A & B, Reactor Makeup Water pumps, CRDM fans, and Reactor Cavity cooling fans.
26
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 80. 01 0G2. 1.20001 /2/1/PZR PRESS-PROC STEPS/C/A-4.6/NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO!TNT/DS Given the following conditions:
19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture is being implemented Rapid RCS cooldown and depressurization have been completed The loop 1 PRZR spray valve is stuck open PRZR level is 76% and rapidly rising RCS pressure is 1150 psig and lowering The SS should direct the OATC to...
A. stop RCP 1 then stop RCP 4 if pressure continues to lower.
Operate ECCS pumps as necessary if RCS pressure continues to lower after stopping both RCPs. Then transition to 19133-C, ECA-3.3 SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control.
B stop RCP 4 then stop RCP 1 if pressure continues to lower.
Transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired if pressure continues to lower after stopping both RCPs.
C. stop RCP 4 then stop RCP 1 if pressure continues to lower.
Operate ECCS pumps as necessary if RCS pressure continues to lower after stopping both RCPs. Then transition to 19133-C, ECA-3.3 SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control.
D. stop RCP 1 then stop RCP 4 if pressure continues to lower.
Transition to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery Desired if pressure continues to lower after stopping both RCPs.
KIA 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)
G2.1 .20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario where rapid RCS cooldown and depressurization have iust been comoleted and the OATC is unable to shut one of the normal sorav 171
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM valves. This question evaluates the students ability to properly execute procedure steps related to the PRZR pressure control system and therefore matches the K/A.
This question also requires detailed knowledge of decision points in EOP E-3 steps 42
& 43 that involves a transition to emergency contingency procedure ECA- 3.1 which meets SRO question construction criteria.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. The procedural requirements are to stop RCP 4 first. Stopping RCP 1 is plausible since it provides spray flow for loop 1. The transition to ECA-3.3 (SGTR Without PRZR Pressure Control) is plausible due to the loss of the normal spray control function and the continued loss of RCS pressure.
B. Correct. RCP 4 is always the first RCP to be stopped if a spray valve fails open since it has been demonstrated to provide the majority of the spray flow to the normal spray valves. The transition to ECA-3.1 (SGTR With Reactor Coolant System LOCA:
Subcooled Recovery Desired) is required on the next EOP step if RCS pressure continues to lower.
C. Incorrect. RCP 4 is always the first RCP to be stopped if a spray valve fails open since it has been demonstrated to provide the majority of the spray flow to the normal spray valves. The transition to ECA-3.3 (SGTR Without PRZR Pressure Control) is plausible due to the loss of the normal spray control function and the continued loss of RCS pressure.
D. Incorrect. The procedural requirements are to stop RCP 4 first. Stopping RCP 1 is plausible since it provides spray flow for loop 1. The transition to ECA-3.1 (SGTR With Reactor Coolant System LOCA: Subcooled Recovery Desired) is required on the next EOP step if RCS pressure continues to lower.
REFERENCES 1 9030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture steps 42 and 43 V-LO-HO-3731 1-001 pages 51 & 52 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-3731 1-07:
Using EOP 19030 as a guide, briefly describe how each step is accomplished.
172
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19030-C 36.1 Date Approved Page Number E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE I 7/11/08 26of56 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 42. Term in ate RCS depressu rization:
- a. Verify Normal PRZR Spray N orni al S p ray valve ca n valve(s) CLOSED.
NOT be closed, THEN stop RCP 4.
IF PRZR pressure continues lowering uncontrollably, THEN stop RCP 1.
CLOSED.
- c. Block COPS.
- d. Check Auxiliary Spray - IN SERVICE.
- e. Stop Auxiliary Spray: _e. Isolate Auxiliary Spray line.
1). Open CHARGING TO LOOP ISO VALVE:
HV-81 46
-OR HV-81 47
- 2) Close PRZR AUX SPRAY VALVE:
HV-8 145 Phnted October 15, 2009 at 09:34
Approved By I Procedure Number J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19030-C 36.1 Date Approved Page Number E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 7/11/08 27 of 56 ACTION1EXG-TErDRSPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 43. kRCS pressure RlS -
43osePRzR:oRvBiockv:e.
THEN go to Step 44.
IF pressure continues to lower, THEN perform the following:
- a. Check the following conditions for indication of
. Valve status indications
. PORV discharge line temperature 00 -, -.
SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT:
SUB000LED RECOVERY CAUTION ECCS FLOW SHOULD BE TERMINATED when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfilling of the ruptured SGs.
- 44 Check if ECCS flow should be terminated:
- a. RCS Subcooling GREATER
- a. Go to 19131-C, ECA-3.1 THAN 24°F [38°F ADVERSE]. SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT:
SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Step 44 continued on next page Printed October 15, 2009 at 09:34
Terminate RCS depressurization PURPOSE: To determine if RCS depressurization criteria are satisfied BAS 5:
RCS depressurization will be stopped if any one of the following 3 basic criteria are met:
This is the target you are ideally shooting for. However leak size, ECCS injection flow rates, and RCS depressurization rates may result in you meeting one of the other 2 criteria.
- 2. Loss of RCS subcooling (24°F).
For multiple tube failures or reduced ECCS capacity for a smaller tube failure, it may be necessary to decrease RCS pressure below that of the ruptured steam generator pressure in order to restore pressurizer level. In that case backfill flow (secondary to primary leakage) will supplement ECCS flow to restore pressurizer level. If pressure continued to be reduced to saturation, voiding in the primary system may result in an unreliable pressurizer level indication and delay SI termination. To avoid this, depressurization of the RCS is terminated if minimum RCS subcooling is reached.
3 PRZR level is approaching the upper level tap (75%).
In some cases, pressurizer level may approach the upper tap (top of the indicating range) before RCS pressure is reduced to the ruptured steam generator pressure. This may be a symptom of a smaller tube failure, voiding in the upper head during natural circulation conditions, or injection of the SI accumulators. Depressurization of the RCS is terminated on high pressurizer level to prevent filling the pressurizer and loss of pressurizer pressure control. Following SI termination, pressurizer level decreases which further reduces RCS pressure to equilibrium with the ruptured steam generator. In some cases, such as a small tube failure, the pressurizer may be sufficiently full such that no depressurization of the RCS is necessary prior to SI termination.
STEP: Check RCS Pressure RISING -
51
PURPOSE: To detect excessive leakage from the pressurizer PORV and ensure isolation by closing its block valve BASIS:
The use of a pressurizer PORV results in a loss of reactor coolant. Since all safety injection pumps will be stopped in subsequent steps, this PORV must close properly to ensure that adequate coolant inventory can be maintained with only normal chrging capacity. Although SI reinitiation criteria are provided to ensure that adequate core cooling will be maintained, stopping all ECCS pumps with a loss of coolant through the PORV in excess of normal makeup capacity may result in unnecessary cycling of the ECCS pumps.
The mass flow rate through a leaking PORV will be approximately within the capacity of the normal reactor coolant makeup system if RCS pressure increases when the PORV is closed. Consequently, the operator is instructed to check that RCS pressure is increasing as additional verification that the SI pum s will not be needed to maintain coolant inynto ylf p ss oes not increase after the PORV and block valve are closed, excessive akage from the PORV is suspected. In that case, the operator is transferred to ECA-3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED, to stop ECCS pumps one at a time after it is demonstrated that the reduced ECCS capacity is sufficient to maintain_adequate coant inventory.
PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION:
This step is a redundant check on RCS pressure response to ensure minimal leakage from the pressurizer PORV since increasing RCS pressure is also a necessary condition for SI termination in E-3.
CAUTION: ECCS FLOW SHOULD BE TERMINATED when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfilling the ruptured SC(s).
PURPOSE: To alert the operator that primary-to-secondary leakage will continue until ECCS flow is terminated.
BASIS:
SI termination is necessary to control reactor coolant inventory and stop primary-to-secondary leakage. If ECCS flow is not terminated, leakage into the secondary will eventually fill the steam generator with water and lift the atmospheric relief valves. This could damage the relief valve and main steamline which would 52
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 81. 01 1EG2.4.1 1 001/1/1/LARGE LOCA-AOPS/ARPS/C/A 4.2/NEW/HL-15R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS The SS is implementing 19010-C, E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant CNMT pressure is 12 psig The event occurred 125 minutes ago Cold leg recirculation cooling was aligned 28 minutes ago RWST EMPTY level alarm has just actuated The SS is at the step in 19010-C to Check if CNMT spray should be stopped The SS should direct the OATC to reset CNMT spray and...
A. stop both CNMT spray pumps and close the pump discharge valves. This is done to prevent damaging the CNMT spray pumps and to isolate the CNMT spray penetrations.
B align both CNMT spray pumps for recirculation. This is done to scrub radioactive Iodine from the CNMT atmosphere.
C. stop both CNMT spray pumps and close the pump discharge valves. This is done because sufficent radioactive Iodine has been scrubbed from the CNMT atmosphere.
D. align both CNMT spray pumps for recirculation. This is done to continue lowering CNMT pressure below 3.8 psig while preventing damage to the CNMT spray pumps.
K/A 011 Large Break LOCA G241 I Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a plausible scenario where a large RCS LOCA has occurred.
The exam inee must diagnose that this is a primary LOCA from the conditions given and then correctly apply the actions of step 12 in 19010-C and step 16 of 19013-C. The correct answer is based on a transition back into 19013-C to place CNMT spray on recircu lation.
This is an SRO question since it involves detailed knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involves a transition to an event specific sub-procedure.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS 173
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM A. Incorrect. This would be the correct answer if 19010-C were being implemented for a large secondary LOCA.
B. Correct. An RCS LOCA is in progress. CNMT spray is aligned for recirculation when RWST level reaches 8% (Empty Level) per 19013-C. CNMT spray must operated in recirculation for 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for a primary LOCA before stopping the pumps.
C. Incorrect. This choice meets one of the 2 requirements for stopping CNMT spray on a primary LOCA.
D. Incorrect. This choice is correct on the alignment of the CNMT spray system, but is incorrect with respect to the CNMT pressure requirement. The RWST empty level requies stopping all ECCS pumps to prevent damage but the CNMT spray pumps should remain running.
REFERENCES 19010-C E-l Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant step 12 19013-C, ES-I .3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, steps 7, 16-18 V-LO-HO-371 11-001 page 23 VEGP learning objectives:
NO_OBJ TXOBJ LO-LP-371 11-08 Using EOP 19010 as a guide, briefly describe how each step is accomplished.
NO_OBJ TX_OBJ LO-LP-371 13-02 Using EOP 19013 as a guide, briefly describe how each step is accomplished.
174
Approved By Procedure Numb J B Stanley 19010-C 32 DatéApproved Page Number E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDA\
3/24/09 COOLANT 10 of 25 ACTION/EXPECTED NOT OBTAINED
- 12. Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:
- a. CS Pumps RUNNING.
- a. Go to Step 13.
oainmereESS _b. WHEN Containment pressure is less than 15 psig, THEN go to Step 12.c.
_Go to Step 13.
- c. Any Containment radiation levels c. Perform the following:
- INDICATE HIGH DUE TO PRIMARY LOCA: _1) Reset Containment Spray signal.
RE-002
_2) Stop Containment Spray RE-003 Pumps.
RE-005 3) Close CNMT SPRAY ISO VLV:
RE-006
. HV-9001A
- HV-9001B
-- Step 13.
- d. Operate CS Pumps: d. WHEN CS Pumps have operated for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Atleastl.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in AND in the recirculation mode for at least 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, THEN perform Step 12.c RNO. )
recirculation mode.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 12:51
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley e lectric Generating Pan 19013-C 28 Date Approved Page Number ES-i .3 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG 7/11/08 RECIRCULATION 5 of 19 ACTION/EXPECTED RESP ONSE NOT OBTAINED
_3. Initiate ATTACHMENT A to align ECCS Pumps to the Cold Leg Recirculation flowpath and continue with Step 4.
_4. Notify Health Physics that radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building will change when Cold Leg Recirculation is established.
_5. Make a page announcement to clear personnel from the Auxiliary Building prior to initiating Cold Leg Recirculation.
- 6. Initiate Continuous Actions Page.
(hSTIeveIGREATER 7. Stop any ECCS Pumps taking suction from the RWST.
- 8. Check if SI pumps should be stopped.
- a. RCS pressure GREATER
- a. IF RCS pressure rises to THAN 1625 PSIG. greater than 1625 psig, THEN stop SI Pumps.
Go To Step 9.
- b. Stop SI Pumps.
_9. Check ATTACHMENT A - _9. Do NOT continue with this COMPLETE. procedure until ATTACHMENT A has been COMPLETED.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 13:01
Approved By --
Procedure Number Rev J.B. Stanley 19013-C 28 Date Approved (ç.i .3 TRANSFER TO COLD LE 5 Page Number 7/11/08 RECIRCULATION 8 of 19 ACTI0N/EXPECTEDSPONSE 1ESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- b. At Shutdown Panel B:
. Place HS-0112F in local.
Verify LV-01 12E is closed.
- 15 Monitor RHR Pumps suction *15 IF CNMT Sump blockage is condition: suspected and at least one ECCS train appears to be RHR Pump Amps STABLE. unaffected, THEN:
IPC Points:
- a. Request guidance from the J9623 TSC.
J9624
- b. Establish more frequent
IPC Points:
IF suspected CNMT Sump F0626 blockage prevents maintaining F0627 at least one ECCS train in the
- Discharge Pressure - STABLE. recirculation mode, THEN goto 19113-C, ECA-1.3 IPC Points: RECIRCULATION SUMP BLOCKAGE.
P6310 P63 11 Check RWST level LES WHENRWSTlevellowersto
çUALTO8O. / less than 8%, N THENreturntoStepl6ofthis )
ocedure.
Go to procedure and step in effect.
PrInted October 13, 2009 at 12:52
Approved By Procedure Number J B Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19013-C 28 DateApproved Page Number ES-1.3 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG 7/11/08 RECIRCULATION 9of19 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTIONS
- The specified actions in Steps 17 through 19 should be promptly completed to avoid loss of CS Pump suction.
- Local observation of CS Pump suction and discharge pressure gauges should only be performed if radiation levels permit.
UNIT 1 (AB D75) UNIT 2 (AB D06)
- 17. Reset Containment Spray.
- 18. Align CS Pump A for recirculation:
- a. Open CS Pump A suction valves a. Locally open:
from Containment Emergency 1-HV-9003A (AB-C134)
Sump.
2-HV-9003A (AB-C124) e HV-9002A, CNMT SPRAY jf valves can NOT be PUMP A CNMT SUMP opened, SUCT IRC THEN stop CS Pump A.
- HV-9003A, CNMT SPRAY PUMPACNMTSUMP GotoStepl9.
SUCT ORC
- HV-9017A Step 18 continued on next page Printed October 13, 2009 at 13:00
L°°-7i oo\
9% PRZR level just in range, including allowances for normal channel accuracy and reference leg process errors.
37% PRZR level just in range, including allowances for normal channel accuracy, post accident transmitter errors (Adverse Containment Conditions), and reference leg process errors.
STEP: Check If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped PURPOSE: To stop containment spray pumps if running and no longer needed BASIS:
Spray pumps are automatically actuated on Hl-3 containment pressure. In 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, the operator verifies that the Containment Spray System is operating if it is required. buring a LOCA, the need for continued operation of the spray system is monitored by this step in 19010-C. After containment pressure is reduced and the spray pumps have operated for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (1 .5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in the recirculation mode) to ensure mixing of the TSP with the liquid and adequate time to absorb Iodine from the containment atmosphere the pumps can be stopped. If at any time the ontainment pressure increases above the HI-3 containment pressure setpoint, the ORANGE path of the Containment Status Tree sends the operator to FR-Z.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE which checks the need for containment spray and verifies that the spray system is operational if it is required.
KNOWLEDGE:
As part of the action to terminate containment spray, the operator closes the motor operated valve on the line when stopping the containment spray pump. This action will PLANT-SPECIFIC INFORMATION:
15 psig Pressure for resetting spray signal, minus allowances for normal channel accuracy.
STEP: IF offsite power is lost after SI reset, THEN restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:
RHR Pumps 23
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 82. 025AG2.4.31 001/1/1/LOSS OF RHR-ALARMS/MEM -4.1 /4.3/NEW/HL-15RNRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
A loss of RCS level during mid-loop operations occurred AOP 18019-C, Loss of Residual Heat Removal was implemented RHR pump lB has been stopped Current conditions:
Core exit TCs have been verified at 129 F and increasing RCS MIDLOOP LO LEVEL alarm is lit RCS level is currently 185 10 and lowering RCS cold and hot legs are intact (no openings)
The SS is at step Bi 1 which reads:
Bil. Check RCS level:
- a. LESS THAN 188 FEET
_b. LESS THAN 186 FEET The correct method to restore RCS level is to make up from the...
A. VCT through the normal charging path into an intact cold leg.
B. RWST through the normal charging path into an intact cold leg.
Cv RWST through the BIT with the normal charging path isolated.
D. RWST using an SI pump through the RCS cold legs.
175
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM K/A 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)
G2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario for a loss of RCS level while at mid loop conditions.
The examinee must correctly determine the proper method of RCS makeup per 18019-C Attachment D for the conditions given in the stem (10 level alarm and RCS level trends). This is an SRO question because the examinee must use detailed knowledge of when and how to implement Attachment D to AOP 18019-C.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Charging through the normal path into an intact cold leg is correct except the source is aligned to the VCT, and the crew is past this point in the AOP.
B. Incorrect. The flow path is plausible from other steps in the AOP with regards to the normal charging line as well as the RWST as the source of the makeup. The flowpath should be through the BIT at this point in the AOP.
C. Correct. Attachment D lists the CCPs from the RWST through the BIT as one of the two allowable flowpaths.
D. Incorrect. Everything is correct with respect to Attachment D other than the SIP flowpath, it should be through the RCS hot legs.
REFERENCES 18019-C, steps Bli and B12, Attachment D VEGP learning objectives:
NQOBJ TX_OBJ LO-LP-60315-04 Given the entire AOP, describe:
- a. Purpose of selected steps
- b. How and why the step is being performed
- c. Expected response of the plant/parameter(s) for the step 176
Approved By Procedure Nurnber C. R. Dedrickson VtbEIctriGTierfflngR1ajt 18019-C )26.2 Date Approved aeur (IOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOV) 4-1 8-200 7 22 of 69 B. LOSS OF RHMSDE OR 6 BELOW PRZR IR OR S_GfcI ZZLE DAMS INSTALLED 6
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
_1) Align CCPs for cold leg injection using ATTACHMENT D.
- 2) Start at least one CCP.
_c. GotoStepBl6.
Bil. Check RCS level:
_a. LESS THAN 188 FEET. _a. GotoStepBl6.
- b. LESS THAN 186 FEET. b. GotoStepBl4.
B12. Refill RCS:
- a. Align one of the following using ATTACHMENT D.
SIPs for hot leg injection.
-OR-CCPs for cold leg injection.
- b. Start at one or Step 12 continued on next page Printed October 13, 2009 at 13:11
IAoved By I Procedure Number
- 0. R. Dedrickson Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18019-C 26.2 Date Approved Page Number 4-18-2007 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 62 of 69 ATTACHMENT D Sheet 1 of 2 ECCS ALIGNMENTS SI Pumps for Hot Leg Injection:
- a. SIP suction valves OPEN
. HV-8806
. HV-8923A
. HV-8923B
- b. SIP miniflow valves - OPEN
. HV-8813
. HV-8814
. HV-8920
- c. HV-8835 CL INJ FROM SIS - CLOSED
- d. SIP Hot Leg Isolation valves - OPEN
. HV-8802A
. HV-8802B Printed October 13, 2009 at 13:14
Approved By Procedure Number C R Dedrickson Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18019-C 262 Date Approved Page Number 4-18-2007 LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 63of69 ATTACHMENTD Sheet 2 of 2 ECCS ALIGNMENTS CAUTION The NCP will NOT have miniflow when the CCP normal miniflow valves are closed.
2 orcoldLenjectkn(B ij LV-112D LV-112E
- b. VCT OUTLET ISOLATION valves - CLOSED
. LV-0112B LV-0112C
- HV-8508A
- HV-8508B
- d. CCP Normal Miniflow valves CLOSED
- HV-8110
- HV-8111A
- HV-8111B
- e. CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION valves CLOSED -
- HV-8105
- HV-8106
- HV-8801A
. HV-8801B END OF ATTACHMENT D Printed October 13, 2009 at 13:14
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 83. 026A2.03 001/2/1/C. SPRAY- ESF FAILURE/C/A-4.4/NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
An RCS LOCA has occurred 19010-C, F-i Lost of Reactor or Secondary Coolant has been implemented The OATC is monitoring CSFSTs Current conditions:
CNMT CSFST is Orange due to high containment pressure The OATC reports transition to 19251-C, FR-Z.l Response to High Containment Pressure is required Neither train of CNMT spray is operating RWST LO-LO LEVEL alarm is active Which one of the following choices describes the correct diagnosis and actions to take?
A. CNMT spray has failed to automatically actuate. Go to 19251-C and remain in that procedure until directed to return to procedure and step in effect.
B CNMT spray has failed to automatically actuate. Go to 19013-C, ES-i .3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation and place at least one train of of ECCS in the cold leg recirculation mode of operation prior to transitioning to 19251-C.
C. CNMT spray actuation is not required. Go to 19251-C and return to 19010-C after both trains of CNMT coolers (low speed) are verified in service and proper CIA and CVI are verified.
D. CNMT spray actuation is not required. Go to 19013-C, and place at least one train of ECCS in the cold leg recirculation mode of operation prior to transitioning to 19251-C.
K/A 026 Containment Spray System (CSS)
A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations.
Failure of ESF K/A MATCH ANALYSIS 177
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM The question presents a scenario where the student must diagnose the failure of CNMT Spray to automatically actuate based on the CNMT CSFST challenge.
Additionally the student is required to determine the appropriate procedure to use for the plant conditions given and prioritize the mitigative actions.
This question requires the student to assess plant conditions and then prescribe a prcoedure with which to proceed. This requires detailed knowledge of the CNMT CSFST and procedures 19251-C, and 19013-C which are an emergency contingency procedure and an event specific sub-procedure, respectively. These attributes meet the SRO question requirements evaluation tool.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. An orange path on CNMT due to high CNMT pressure means the CNMT Spray actuation setpoint has been reached. The required procedure transition in response to the orange condition is to go to 19251-C. However, with the RWST Lo-Lo Level alarm active, the ECCS system must first be placed in cold leg recirculation per the caution contained in procedure 19013-C and step 2 of procedure 19251-C.
B. Correct. An orange path on CNMT due to high CNMT pressure means the CNMT Spray actuation setpoint has been reached. The RWST Lo-Lo Level alarm directs implementation of 19013-C which contains a caution that the first 12 steps of the procedure must be completed to place at least one train of ECCS on cold leg recirculation prior to implmenting any FRPs.
C. Incorrect. CNMT pressure exceeds the CNMT Spray actuation setpoint. The actions listed in this choice for procedure 19251-C are all correct. The procedure also contains actions to align CNMT spray which has been omitted from this choice to make it consistent with the first part of this choice.
D. Incorrect. CNMT pressure exceeds the CNMT Spray actuation setpoint. The RWST Lo-Lo Level alarm directs implementation of 19013-C which contains a caution that the first 12 steps of the procedure must be completed to place at least one train of ECCS on cold leg recirculation prior to implmenting any FRPs.
REFERENCES 19200-C, F-O Critical Safety Function Status Trees F-0.5 Containment Tree 19251-C, FR-Z.l Response to High Containment Pressure Step 2 19013-C, ES-i .3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation page 4 NOTES 17006-1, Annunciator Response Procedure for ALBO6 on Panel 1A2 on MCB Window F06 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-1 5101-06:
178
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM List all actuation signals for containment spray, including the parameter, coincidence, and setpoint.
LO-LP-371 13-02:
Using FOP 19013 as a guide, briefly describe how each step is accomplished.
LO-LP-371 13-04:
State when cold leg recirculation lineup is performed.
LO-LP-371 13-05:
Given a NOTE or CAUTION statement from the FOP, state the bases for that NOTE or CAUTION statement.
179
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 19200-C 22 9 of 10 Sheet 1 of 1 F- 0.5 CONTAINMENT GO TO 19251-C I
/N GOTO
! 19251-C CONTAINMENT PRESSURE LESS THAN 21.5 P516
-+(;* c GO TO
-y
/ 19253-C
[CONTAINMENT NO RADIATION LESS THAN 750 MR/HR YES Ltzzzzzz(.) CSF SAT
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J.P Stanley _
gtIeEI-ectr-ic Generati-ng-PlaiiL, 19251-C 16 Date Approved
- Z.1 RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT Page Number 7/11/08 PRESSURE 3of 12 ACTION/EXPECTENRSPoNN0T OBTAINED
- 1. Initiate the following:
- Continuous Actions Page.
- 91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRU
- 2. Check RWST level GREATER _*2. Go to 19013-C, ES-i .3 TRANSFER THAN 29%. TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.
- 3. Check Containment Isolation 3. Actuate CIA.
Phase A ACTUATED:
- CIA MLB indication IF valves do NOT close, THEN close valves.
- 4. Check Containment Ventilation Isolation:
- a. Dampers and Valves - CLOSED: a. Perform the following:
_2) Start Piping Pen Units.
Printed October 15, 2009 at 13:08
Approved By I Tprocedure Number Rev gtIeEteCtr1C GeneratrrrgRJ I
J B Staney j19013.C 28 DateApproved T ES-1.3 TRANSFER TO COLD LEG\ J PaeNumber 7/11/08 1
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RECIRCULATION RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 4of 19 NOTES
_RGS-Co1dies and the completion of Stepj2.
- Steps 1 through 12 should be performed without delay.
- The RWST inventory between the RWST LO-LO and Empty alarms is sufficient for a minimum of approximately 11 minutes of ECCS injection flow assuming that the RHR pumps are isolated from the RWST or stopped within the first 6 minutes after the RWST LO-LO alarm is received.
CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:
o RHR Pumps
- SI Pumps
- Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units
- Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).
- ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CR1 is reset).
- 1. Verify SI Reset.
_2. CNMT Emergency Sump level - 2. IF CNMT Sump level indicators GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO Ll-764 and LI-765 are both less 13.5 INCHES: than 13.5 INCHES, THEN stop RHR Pumps A and B Ll-764 and goto 19111-C, ECA-1.1 Ll-765 LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION.
Printed October 15, 2009 at 13:06
Approved By Procedure Number C S Waldrup Vogtle Electric Generating Plant z 17006-1 32 Date Approved ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURES FOR ALB 06 ON PANEL 1A2 Page Number 7/11/08 ONMCB 57of59 WI DOW F04 ORIGIN SETPOINT RWST 1 -LT-0990 LO-LO LEVEL 1 -LT-0991 2/4 channels 1 -LT-0992 relay K161 1-LT-0993 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE
- 2. RWST in use for refueling.
rn leakage.
2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Safety Injection transfers from injection to recirculation mode on a 2 out of 4 LO-LO level logic, if the SI signal has not been reset.
3.0 NONE NOTE Actions for RWST LO-LO level during SI are governed by 1C,ES-1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.
4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 1. While in Modes 5 or 6 and the RCS or Reactor cavity filling operations are not in progress, dispatch personnel to locate and isolate the leak.
- 2. Makeup to the RWST, if necessary, per 13701-1, Boric Acid System.
5.0 COMPENSATORY OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE END OF SUB-PROCEDURE
REFERENCES:
1X4DB 121, PLS, 1X5DT0066, 1X6AUO1 -201, 1X6AVO1 -242, 1 X6AXO1 -334, 1 X6AXO1 -409 Printed October 15, 2009 at 13:18
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 84. 028AG2.4.20 OO1/1/2/PZR LVL MALF-NOTES/C/A-4.3/NEW/HL-1 5R NRC/SRO!TNT/DS Initial conditions:
PRZR level channel 459 failed low 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago LCO 3.3.1 condition M is applicable for the failed channel PRZR LVL CNTL SELECT switch is in the 461/460 position AOP 18001-C, Section D, is being implemented Current conditions:
I&C needs to perform an ACOT on PRZR level channel 461 The surveillance will be late in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> PRZR level channel 459 time to repair is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Reactor power is 15%
The correct action for the SS to take per cautions in AOP 18001-C is to...
A. bypass channel 459 using the BTI Panel AND trip channel 461 per Table Dl of AOP 18001-C.
B. Place the unit in mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to meet LCO 3.0.3 requirements.
Cs trip channel 459 per Table Dl of AOP 18001-C AND bypass channel 461 using the BTI Panel.
D. leave channel 459 as is AND reduce power to less than P7 (10%) prior to bypassing channel 461 using the BTI Panel.
180
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM KIA 028 Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction G2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a plausible scenario where the SS must properly apply a caution from AOP 18001-C, Section D, for a PRZR level malfunction. This question also involves the application of administrative procedures (technical specifications and system operating procedures) requirements in conjunction with the AOP meeting the SRO question requirements for procedures.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible since bypassing a failed channel is allowed per AOP 18001-C, however the caution in Table Dl requires bypassing the channel to be tested.
B. Incorrect. Plausible since LCO 3.0.3 would be applicable for 2 PRZR level channels out of service above 10% power.
C. Correct. These actions are in accordance with the cautions in Table Dl of AOP 18001-C.
D. Incorrect. Plausible because the normal practice is to leave the failed channel as is during its allowed out of service time per technical specifications to faciliate troubleshooting efforts. This is allowable per AOP 18001-C. Also plausible since the LCO is NOT applicable below 10% power and the Unit is at 15% power. The AOP does not address this option.
REFERENCES AOP 18001-C, Steps D12-D14 and Table Dl VEGP LCO 3.3.1 function 9 (PRZR hi level) condition M VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-39207-02:
Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
- a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.3 are exceeded.
- b. The required actions for all section 3.3 LCOs.
181
- (FAIUREOFPRZR LEVEL INSTRUMENTATI9)
ACTION/EXPE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- D1o Check PRZR level is maintained at *D10 Maintain PRZR level at program program by auto control. using manual control.
_D1 I. Notify l&C to initiate repairs.
_D12. Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI)
PANEL OPERATION, if desired.
D13. Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per TABLE Dl within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (TS 3.3.1)
_D14. Initiate the applicable actions of Technical Specification 3.3.1.
- Dl 5. Check repairs and surveillances - *D1 5. Perform the following:
COMPLETE.
_a. WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step D16.
- b. Return to procedure and step in effect.
D16. Perform the following:
_a. Return tripped bistables to NORMAL position.
- b. Return MASTER TEST switch to NORMAL position.
- c. Return LS-459D to the desired position. (CH459/460 normal position.)
Step 16 continued on next page Printed October 13, 2009 at 14:42
Approved By I Procedure Number JStanIey Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18001-C 32 Date Approved .1 Page Number SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION I
.5/14/09 26of42 Sheet 1 of 1 CAUTIONS
- Only one channel should be tripped.
- The bistable input is placed in the tripped state by positioning the selector switch on the specified test card to TEST.
- The bistable input identified by the switch number should agree with the location specified by CAB, CARD, and B/S before tripping a bistable input. If a discrepancy exists,_CAB-CARD-B/S should be used, not_switch number.
- Bypassing another channel for Surveillance Testing with a channel inoperable is permitted provided the inoperable channel is in the tripped condition and the channel
\. beiriq test ed is not bypassed fo r more th an 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
FRAME SSPS INPUT CAB /CARD B/S SWITCH Initial LT-459 Failure (Channel 1)
High Level Reactor Trip 1 8/47 1 LS-459A (
MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/73 7 (
LT-460 Failure (Channel 2)
High Level Reactor Trip 2 8/47 1 LS-460A (
MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/73 7 (
LT-461 Failure (Channel 3)
High Level Reactor Trip 3 8/44 1 LS-461A (
MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/73 7 (
END OF TABLE Dl Printed October 13, 2009 at 14:42
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 (page3ofg)
Reactor Trip System Instrumentation I APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE SETPOINT()
- 8. Pressurizer Pressure
- a. Low i(O 4 M SR 3.3.1.1 1950 psig (g) psig 1960 SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15
- b. High 1,2 4 E SR 3.3.1.1 2395 psig 2385 psig SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15
- 9. Pressurizer Water (1t) 3 M SR 3.3.1.1 93.9% 92%
Level High
- 10. Reactor Coolant Flow- Low
- a. Single Loop lQ) 3 per loop N SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15
- b. Two Loops iO) 3 per loop M SR 3.3.1.1 89.4% 90%
SR 3.3.1.7 SR 3.3.1.10 SR 3.3.1.15 (continued)
(0 Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.
(g) Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Pressurizer Pressure-Low are 10 seconds for lead and 1 second for lag.
(h) Above the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(I) Above the P-7 (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock and below the P-8 (Power Range Neutron Flux) interlock.
(n) A channel is OPERABLE with an actual Trip Setpoint value outside its calibration tolerance band provided the Trip Setpoint value is conservative with respect to its associated Allowable Value and the channel is readjusted to within the established calibration tolerance band of the Nominal Trip Setpoint. A Trip Setpoint may be set more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint as necessary in response to plant conditions.
Vogtle Units I and 2 3.3.1-16 Amendment No. 128 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 106 (Unit 2)
RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME (ecnninerablj, NOTES 1). For RCP bus undervoltage or
/ underfrequency instrument functions; the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing of other channels.
- 2. For other instrument functions; a channel may be bypassed for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
M.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> I OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-7.
78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> I N. One Reactor Coolant NOTE Flow-Low (single loop) A channel may be bypassed for up channel inoperable. to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing.
N.1 Place channel in trip. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> I OR N.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-8.
76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br /> I (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.1-5 Amendment No. 116 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 94 (Unit 2)
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 85. 034G2.4.20 001 /2!2/FH EQUIP-NOTES, ETC./C!A-4.3INEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT!DS Initial conditions:
Core off-load is in progress on Unit 2 The CNMT equipment hatch is open with a designated closure crew Both personnel airlock doors are open with a designated door operator Reactor cavity water level is 219 feet Current conditions:
A loss of all AC power occurs on Unit 2 A spent fuel assembly is fully withdrawn in the refueling machine The mast is over the CNMT upender The Fuel Handling Supervisor should suspend fuel movement and...
A direct manual operation of the refueling machine to place the fuel assembly in a safe location.
Direct closure of the containment equipment hatch and ONE of the personnel airlock doors to meet technical specification action requirements.
B. direct manual operation of the refueling machine to place the fuel assembly in a safe location.
Direct closure of the containment equipment hatch and BOTH of the personnel airlock doors to meet technical specification action requirements.
C. leave the fuel assembly in its current position. Operation of the refueling machine is not possible without AC power.
Direct closure of the containment equipment hatch and ONE of the personnel airlock doors to meet technical specification action requirements.
D. leave the fuel assembly in its current position. Operation of the refueling machine is not possible without AC power.
Direct closure of the containment equipment hatch and BOTH of the personnel airlock doors to meet technical specification action requirements.
K/A 034 Fuel Handlinq Equipment (FHES) 182
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM 02.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a loss of all AC power during a core off-load scenario. The student is required to apply the correct technical specification action requirements from cascading LCOs due to the loss of AC power. The student is also required to know that emergency manual operation of the refuleing machine is possible without AC power. This question requires knowledge of the operational implication of EOP warnings, cautions and notes for fuel handling equipment meeting the K/A topic.
The question is written at the SRO level because it requires the student to apply required actions of technical specifications and application of LCO 3.0.6 requirements.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. Per base LCO 3.8.10 Distribution Systems Shutdown, action A.1 requires suspending core alterations and action A.2 requires suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The definition of core alterations further states that suspension shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. LCO 3.8.10 action A2.5 requires declaring associated required residual heat removal subsystem(s) inoperable and not operation. Supported system LCO 3.9.5 action A.4 requires closure of all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
B. Incorrect. Per base LCO 3.8.10 Distribution Systems Shutdown, action A.1 requires suspending core alterations and action A.2 requires suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The definition of core alterations further states that suspension shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. LCO 3.8.10 action A2.5 requires declaring associated required residual heat removal subsystem(s) inoperable and not operation. Supported system LCO 3.9.5 action A.4 requires closure of all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. ONLY ONE personnel airlock door is required to be closed.
C. Incorrect. Manual operation of the refueling machine without AC power is possible using 93500-C making this choice incorrect. Leaving the fuel assembly in its current position is debatable. The actions listed for the containment hatch and personnel airlock doors are correct per technical specificaitions D. Incorrect. Manual operation of the refueling machine without AC power is possible using 93500-C making this choice incorrect. Leaving the fuel assembly in its current position is debatable. LCO 3.8.10 action A2.5 requires declaring associated required residual heat removal subsystem(s) inoperable and not operation. Supported system LCO 3.9.5 action A.4 requires closure of all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. ONLY ONE 183
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM REFERENCES VEGP Tech Specs Core Afteration definition LCO 3.0.2 LCO applicability Required actions LCO 3.0.6 LCO applicability Supported systems LCO 3.8.10 Distribution Systems Shutdown LCO 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.5 RHR & Coolant Circulation - High Water Level 93500-C Manual Operation of Fuel Handling Equipment, section 4.2.3 hoist failure VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-3921 2-02:
Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
- a. Whether any Tech Spec LCO5 of section 3.8 are exceeded.
- b. The required actions for all section 3.8 LCO5.
LO-LP-3921 3-02:
Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
- a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.9 are exceeded.
- b. The required actions for all section 3.9 LCO5.
184
Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)
CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.
CHANNEL OPERATIONAL A COT shall be the injection of a simulated or TEST (COT) actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify the OPERABILITY of required alarm, interlock, and trip functions. The COT shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the required alarm, interlock, and trip setpoints so that the setpoints are within the required ra CORE ALTERATION CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or other reactivity control components within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preckjde completion of movement of a component to a safe CORE OPERATING LIMITS The COLR is the unit specific document that REPORT (COLR) provides cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific parameter limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.6.5. Unit operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications.
DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 shall be that concentration of 1-131 (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of 1-131, 1-132, 1-133, 1-134, and 1-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in EPA Federal Guidance Report No. 11, Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion, EPA-52011-88-020, September 1988.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 1.1-2 Amendment No. 149 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 129 (Unit 2)
LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCD) APPLICABILITY LCD 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2 and LCD 3.0.8.
Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCD, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCD 3.0.5 and LCD 3.0.6.
If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required unless otherwise stated.
LCD 3.0.3 When an LCD is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:
- a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;
- b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and
- c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.
Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCD or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCD 3.0.3 is not required.
LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
LCD 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:
- a. When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; or (continued)
Vogtle Units I and 2 3.0-1 Amendment No. 141 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 121 (Unit 2)
LCD Applicability 3.0 3.0 LCD APPLICABILITY LCD 3.0.4 b. After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable (continued) systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications; or
- c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.
This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.
LCO 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.
LCD 3.0.6 When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCD not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the support system LCO ACTIONS are required to be entered. This is an exception to LCD 3.0.2 for the supported system. In this event, additional evaluations and limitations may be required in accordance with Specification 5.5.15, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP). If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.
When a support systems Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.0-2 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
Distribution Systems Shutdown 3.8.10 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS /SE 3.8.10 Distribution SystemsShutdown J.8.10Theneodion:fAZandACvitaIbuselectricaIPower distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6 ACT IONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, or AC vital bus supported required electrical power eature(s) inoperable.
distribution subsystems inoperable. OR A.2.1 uspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.
AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblie AND A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend Immediately operations involving positive reactivity additions.
AND (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.10-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Distribution Systems Shutdown 3.8.10 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.4 Initiate actions to restore Immediately required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status.
,Z A.2.5 Declare associated ImmediateI\
7 required residual heat
/ removal subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.10.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to 7 days required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems.
Vogtle Units I and 2 3.8.10-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Containment Penetrations 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS Pen etratio)
LCO 3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:
- a. The equipment hatch is capable of being closed and held in place by
- b. The emergency and personnel air locks are isolated by at least one air lock door, or if open, the emergency and personnel air locks are isolable by at least one air lock door with a designated individual available to close the open air lock door(s); and
- c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:
- 1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or
- 2. capable of being closed by at least two OPERABLE Containment Ventilation Isolation valves APPLICABILITY: / During CORE ALTERATIONS, tiring movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more containment A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately penetrations not in ALTERATIONS.
required status.
AND A.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.9.4-1 Amendment No. 115 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 93 (Unit 2)
RHR and Coolant Circulation High Water Level 3.9.5 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS ResidualHeatRemovalRHRandGoolantirculation-HighWaterLevel LCO 3.9.5 One RHR loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.
The required RHR loop may be removed from operation for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration.
APPLlCABILlTY6 with the water Ievel 23 ft above the top of reactor vessel flange.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME euirements RHR loop A.1 Suspend operations Immediately involving a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration.
AND A.2 Suspend loading Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the core.
AND A.3 Initiate action to satisfy Immediately RHR loop requirements.
AND (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.9.5-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
RHR and Coolant Circulation High Water Level 3.9.5 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.5.1 Verify one RHR loop is in operation and circulating 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> reactor coolant at a flow rate of 3000 gpm.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.9.5-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Approved By . Procedure Number Rev C. R. Dedrickson Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 93500-C 7 Date Approved Page Number 3/20/08 MANUAL OPERATION OF FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT 5 of 8 INITIALS 4.2 REFUELING MACHINE 4.2.1 Bridge Motor Failure 4.2.1.1 De-energize power to the motor by turning OFF breaker CB-D located in the back of the REM console on the right side.
4.2.1.2 Lift and secure deck plates to gain access to the drive line.
4.2.1.3 Manually release the drive motor brake.
4.2.1.4 Install the emergency handwheel on the speed reducer shaft.
4.2.1.5 Hand crank the handwheel, as required, to move the bridge in the desired direction.
4.2.1.6 Confirm position of the bridge by means of the bridge index marks.
4.2.2 Trolley Motor Failure 4.2.2.1 De-energize power to the motor by turning OFF breaker CB-D located in the back of the REM console on the right side.
4.2.2.2 Lift and secure deck plates to gain access to the drive line.
4.2.2.3 Manually release the trolley motor brake.
4.2.2.4 Install the emergency handwheel on the speed reducer shaft.
4.2.2.5 Hand crank the handwheel as required to move the trolley in the desired direction.
4.2.2.6 Confirm position of the trolle stMotorilurA6_
Do-energize power to the mOiby turning OFF breaker CB-D located in the back of the REM console on the right side.
Manually release the hoist motor brake using the release (T-handle) on the housing.
Install the emergency chain wheel (stored in trolley drive compartment) on the hoist winch shaft.
Printed October 16, 2009 at 13:55
Approved By Procedure Number C. R. Dedrickson Vogtle Electric Generating Plant _. 93500-C 7 Date Approved Page Number 3/20/08 MANUAL OPERATION OF FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT 6 of 8 INITIALS Operate the chain wheel up or down to move hoist as required.
Confirm position of the hoist by means of the Z-tape or other positive means (e.g.; underwater TV camera).
42.4 Solenoid Air Valve Failure 4.2.4.1 Each solenoid air valve is equipped with a manual operator to be used in the event of electrical failure. A small button located just below the solenoid on the valve body is depressed by using a small round pin approximately 1/8 inch diameter.
4.25 Fuel Gripper Cylinder Failure 4.2.5.1 Raise the mast to full up.
4.2.5.2 Locate the 2 eyebolts on the top of the gripper cylinder and attach cables to them.
4.2.5.3 Lower the fuel assembly to the desired location.
4.2.5.4 Select the gripper unlatch position on the gripper selector switch located on the control console OR, if necessary, manually operate the unlatch solenoid as in Step 4.3.4.1 above.
4.2.5.5 Apply upward force to the cables to unlatch the fuel assembly.
4.2.6 Auxiliary Hoist Motor Failure 4.2.6.1 De-energize power to the motor.
4.2.6.2 Pull out the brake release knob on the end of the motor.
4.2.6.3 Install the emergency handwheel on the motor extension shaft.
4.2.6.4 Hand crank the handwheel up or down to the desired location.
Pdnted October 16, 2009 at 13:55
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 86. 056AA2.73 001/1/1/LOSS OFFSITE PWR-HTR/C/A-3 .6/NEW/HL- 1 SR NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
The reactor is tripped following a loss of both RATs 1AAO2 is energized by DG-1A DG-1 B is running with its output breaker open The SAT is available AOP 18017-C, Section B for Loss of Grid is being implemented Current conditions:
The OATC reports he is able to energize only Group A of the PRZR backup heaters.
The correct actions to take for this conditon are to:
A Emergency trip DG-1 B and re-energizel BAO3 from the SAT.
All required groups of PRZR heaters are operable due to these actions.
B. Emergency trip DG-1 B and re-energize I BAO3 from the SAT.
All required PRZR heaters are still inoperable, enter LCO 3.0.3 and take the appropriate actions.
C. Manually close DG-1 B output breaker to re-energize 1 BAO3.
One required group of PRZR heaters is inoperable, but NO technical specification action is required.
D. Manually close DG-1 B output breaker to re-energize 1 BAO3.
All required groups of PRZR heaters are operable due to these actions.
KIA 056 Loss of Offsite Power AA2.73 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power.
PZR heater onloff.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS 185
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM The question presents a plausible scenario where a loss of off-site power has occurred.
One DG has failed to re-energize its associated bus. The exam inee is required to determine the correct AOP actions for this failure and to properly apply technical specifications, including LCO 3.0.6, making this anSRO question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. Tripping DG-l B is required per AOP 18017-C. Student must also recognize that required PRZR heaters are operable when their power supply is energized.
B. Incorrect. Tripping DG-1B is required per AOP 18017-C. Entering LCO 3.0.3 is correct for both required PRZR heaters being inoperable but both of the required 2 groups are operable.
C. Incorrect. Manually closing a DG output breaker is a plausible action because earlier revisons of plant procedures directed this action. PRZR heaters are operable when the bus is energized.
D. Incorrect. Manually closing a DG output breaker is a plausible action because earlier revisons of plant procedures directed this action. The second half of this question choice is correct.
REFERENCES AOP 18017-C, Steps B2 and B34.
VEGP Technical Specifications:
LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating (Action E)
LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating LCO 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.0.6 Supported Systems VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-60330-1 0 Given that a loss of grid has occurred from 100% power, describe the expected flow through the EOPs and AOP 18017-C.
LO-LP-39202-02 Demonstrate a working knowledge of the application of all Technical Specification definitions.
LO-LP-39202-03 186
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM time extensions.
LO-LP-39204-05 State the conditions when an action does not need to be completed.
LO-LP-3921 2-02 Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
- a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.8 are exceeded.
- b. The required actions for all section 3.8 LCOs.
187
Approved By t rdure$4mber Rev SA. Phillips Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18017-C) 7.3 DateApproved BNtyfciA[RID DISTURBANCES7 OFN 9/20/08 8of52 B. LOSS OF GRID ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
_B1. Implement 91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.
Check both emergency buses - -
ENERGIZED BY DIESEL GENERATORS:
- a. Both Class 1 E 41 60V busses a. Perform the following:
ENERGIZED.
- Emergency trip affected DG.
. Perform the following to re-energize affected 41 60V 1E bus:
From the SAT by initiating 13418-C, STANDBY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER
-OR-From the Diesel Generator by initiating 13145, DIESEL GENERATORS.
- b. Buses frequency AT 60HZ.
- b. Adjust frequency using DG speed control pushbuttons as necessary.
_c. Buses voltage BETWEEN
- _c. Adjust voltage using DG voltage 4025V AND 4330 V. control pushbuttons as necessary.
Step 2 continued on next page Printed October 13, 2009 at 13:27
Approved By Procedure Number Rev Vogtle Electric Generating Plant S. A. Phillips 18017-C 7.3 DateApproved Page Number ABNORMAL GRID DISTURBANCES/LOSS OF 9/20/08 GRID 21 of 52 B. LOSS OF GRID ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED B32. Transfer any de-energized NYS, NYRS, and NYR busses to alternate sources by initiating 13432, 1 20V AC NON 1E INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
B33. Check DRPI - ENERGIZED. _B33. Swap DRPI power supply using 13432, 12OVAC NON 1E INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
NORMAL ALTERNATE UNIT LOCATION SUPPLY SUPPLY 1 1NYC2 1BBC-20 1ABC-20 (CB-B66) 2 2NYC2 2BBC-20 2ABC-20 (CB-B1 2)
B34. Initiate applicable Technical Specification requirements:
_AC electrical power sources - LCO 3.8.1 or LCO 3.8.2.
AFWS - LCO 3.7.5.
RCS Specific Activity SR 3.4.16.2.
B35. Check expected diesel generator B35. Order fuel for the following:
operation time LESS THAN FOUR
. Emergency Diesel HOURS.
Generators
- Security Diesel Generator
- Diesel Fire Pumps B36. Check Offsite power - RESTORED. B36. Return to Step B35.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 13:28
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
- a. Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1 E AC Electrical Power Distribution System; and
- b. Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite Class 1 E power distribution subsystem(s).
Automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B ESF buses shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS LCO 3.O.4b is not applicable to DGs.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> circuit inoperable, required OPERABLE offsite circuit. AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-1 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2 Declare required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from with no offsite power discovery of no offsite available inoperable when power to one train its redundant required concurrent with feature(s) is inoperable. inoperability of redundant required feature(s)
AND A.3 Restore required offsite 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> circuit to OPERABLE status. AND 14 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)
C Vogtle Units I and 2 3.8.1-2 Amendment No.100 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
AC Sources Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One DG inoperable. B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 forthe 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> required offsite circuit(s).
AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND B.2 Verify SAT available. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND B.3 Declare required feature(s) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> from supported by the discovery of inoperable DG inoperable Condition B when its required concurrent with redundant feature(s) is inoperability of inoperable. redundant required feature(s)
AND B.4.1 Determine OPERABLE DG 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is not inoperable due to common cause failure.
OR B.4.2 Per-form SR 3.8.1.2 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE DG.
AND (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-3 Amendment Nc. 100 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
AC Sources Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) NOTE Required Action 8.5.1 is only applicable if the combined reliability of the enhanced black-start combustion turbine generators (CTG) and the black-start diesel generator is 95%. Otherwise, Required Action B.5.2 applies.
B.5.1 Verify an enhanced black- 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> start CTG is functional by verifying the CTG and the OR black-start diesel generator starts and Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> achieves steady state prior to entry into voltage and frequency. Condition B OR B.5.2 Start and run at least one 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> CTG while in Condition B.
OR Prior to entry into Condition B for preplan ned maintenance AND (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-4 Amendment No. 100 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.6 Restore DC to OPERABLE 14 days from status. discovery of failure to meet LCO C. Required Actions B.2, C.1 Restore DG to OPERABLE 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> B.5.1, or B.5.2 and status.
associated Completion Times not met.
D. Two required offsite D.1 Declare required feature(s) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from circuits inoperable, inoperable when its discovery of redundant feature(s) is Condition D inoperable, concurrent with inoperability of redundant required AND features D.2 Restore one required 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> offsite circuit to OPERABLE status 4 E. One required offsite NOTE
)
circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, AND Distribution Systems Operating, when Condition E is entered with no AC power source to one or more trains.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-5 Amendment No.100 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. (continued) E.1 Restore required offsite 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> circuit to OPERABLE status.
OR E.2 Restore DG to OPERABLE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> status.
F. Two DGs inoperable. F.1 Restore one DG to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
G. One automatic load G.1 Restore automatic load 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> sequencer inoperable, sequencer to OPERABLE status.
H. Required Action and H.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A, C, AND D, E, F, or G not met.
H.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> OR Required Action B.1, B.3, B.4.1, B.4.2, or B.6 and associated Completion Time not met.
Three or more required 1.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately AC sources inoperable.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.1-6 Amendment No. 100 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 78 Unit 2)
Pressurizer 3.4.9 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
Pressurizerwaerlev 92% and
- b. Two groups of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity of capable of being powered from an APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizer water level A.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> not within limit, reactor trip breakers open.
AND A.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> B. One required group of B.1 Restore required group of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> pressurizer heaters pressurizer heaters to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition B not AND met.
C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.9-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Pressurizer 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.1 Verify pressurizer water level is 92%. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.4.9.2 Verify capacity of each required group of 18 months pressurizer heaters is 150 kW.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.9-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES BACKGROUND Two groups of pressurizer heaters can be administratively (continued) loaded onto the non-Class 1 E emergency buses. The Class 1 E 4160-V breakers supplying the non-Class 1E buses are automatically opened upon a safety injection signal, but they can be closed under administrative procedure.
APPLICABLE In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the LCD requirement for a steam bubble SAFETY ANALYSES is reflected implicitly in the accident analyses. Safety analyses performed for lower MODES are not limiting. All analyses performed from a critical reactor condition assume the existence of a steam bubble and saturated conditions in the pressurizer. In making this assumption, the analyses neglect the small fraction of noncondensible gases normally present.
Safety analyses presented in the FSAR (Ref. 1) do not take credit for pressurizer heater operation; however, an implicit initial condition assumption of the safety analyses is that the RCS is operating at normal pressure.
The maximum pressurizer water level limit satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii). Although the heaters are not specifically used in accident analysis, the need to maintain subcooling in the long term during loss of offsite power, as indicated in NUREG-0737 (Ref. 2), is the reason for providing an LCO.
LCD The LCD requirement for the pressurizer to be OPERABLE with a water volume 1656 cubic feet, which is equivalent to 92%
(LI-0459A, LI-0460A, LI-0461A), ensures that a steam bubble exists.
Limiting the LCD maximum operating water level preserves the steam space for pressure control. The LCD has been established to ensure the capability to establish and maintain pressure control for steady state operation and to minimize the consequences of potential overpressure transients. Requiring the presence of a steam bubble is also consistent with analytical assumptions.
The LCD requires two groups of OPERABLE pressurizer heaters, each with a capacity 150 kW, capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. This means that the two of pressurizer heaters must ca of being his accomplished by administratively loading the two required (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.9-2 Rev. 2-10/01
Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES LCO groups of pressurizer heaters onto the non-Class I E emergency buses.
(continued) These non-Class I E emergency buses are in turn fed from the Class 1E 4160-V buses which can in turn be supplied from the emergency diesel generators or offsite power sources. The minimum heater capacity required is sufficient to maintain the RCS near normal operating pressure when accounting for heat losses through the pressurizer insulation. By maintaining the pressure near the operating conditions, a wide margin to subcooling can be obtained in the loops.
APPLICABILITY The need for pressure control is most pertinent when core heat can cause the greatest effect on RCS temperature, resulting in the greatest effect on pressurizer level and RCS pressure control. Thus, applicability has been designated for MODES 1 and 2. The applicability is also provided for MODE 3. The purpose is to prevent solid water RCS operation during heatup and cooldown to avoid rapid pressure rises caused by normal operational perturbation, such as reactor coolant pump startup.
In MODES 1, 2, and 3, there is the need to maintain the availability of pressurizer heaters, capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the initial conditions of these MODES give the greatest demand for maintaining the RCS in a hot pressurized condition with loop subcooling for an extended period. For MODE 4, 5, or 6, it is not necessary to control pressure (by heaters) to ensure loop subcooling for heat transfer when the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is in service, and therefore, the LCO is not applicable.
ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Pressurizer water level control malfunctions or other plant evolutions may result in a pressurizer water level above the nominal upper limit, even with the plant at steady state conditions. Normally the plant will trip in this event since the upper limit of this LCO is the same as the Pressurizer Water Level High Trip.
If the pressurizer water level is not within the limit, action must be taken to restore the plant to operation within the bounds of the safety analyses. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3, with the reactor trip breakers open, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This takes the unit out of the applicable MODES (continued)
Vogtle Units I and 2 B 3.4.9-3 Rev. 1-11/98
LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LCO APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.4 b. After performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable (continued) systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate; exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications; or
- c. When an allowance is stated in the individual value, parameter, or other Specification.
This Specification shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.
LCO 3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the OPERABILITY of other equipment. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing required to demonstrate OPERABILITY.
LCO 3.0.6 When a supported system LCO is not met solely due to a support system LCO not being met, the Conditions and Required Actions associated with this supported system are not required to be entered. Only the su ort system LCO ACTIONS are re uired to be entered. This is an exception to O 3.0.2 for the supported system. In , additional evaluations and limitations may be required in accordance with Specification 5.5.15, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP). If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.
supportsystemsRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemto be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.0-2 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 116 (Unit 2)
Distribution Systems Operating 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating LCO 3.8.9 The required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
The redundant emergency buses of 4160 V switchgear 112AA02 and 1/2BAO3 may be manually connected within the unit by tie breakers in order to allow transfer of preferred offsite power sources provided SR 3.8.1.1 is successfully performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to the interconnection. The interconnection shall be implemented without adversely impacting the ability to simultaneously sequence both trains of LOCA loads.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more AC A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> electrical power power distribution distribution subsystems subsystems to AND inoperable. OPERABLE status.
16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO B. One or more AC vital bus B.1 Restore AC vital bus 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> electrical power electrical power distribution subsystems distribution subsystems to AND inoperable. OPERABLE status.
16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.9-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Distribution Systems Operating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more DC C.1 Restore DC electrical 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> electrical power power distribution distribution subsystems subsystems to AND inoperable. OPERABLE status.
16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> E. Two or more electrical E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately power distribution subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to 7 days required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.9-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 87. 065AG2. 1.30001/1/1/LOSS OF AIR-LOCAL/C/A-4.O/NEW/HL-1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
Both units are at 100% power AOP 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air is being implemented for Unit 2 Current conditions:
Unit 2 instrument air header pressure is 90 psig and lowering The Turbine Building Operator (TBO) reports the unit 2 reciprocating air compressor is not fully loading The SS should direct the TBO to...
A. close the air compressor filter inlet valve (2-2401-U4-627).
Locally isolate the the instrument air supply to the turbine building when air pressue drops < 80 psig.
B. isolate instrument air to the controller (PY-19315A) and depress the water drain valve at the air inlet damper.
Locally isolate the the instrument air supply to the turbine building when air pressure drops < 70 psig.
C. isolate instrument air to the controller (PY-19315A) and depress the water drain valve at the air inlet damper.
Locally isolate the the instrument air supply to the turbine building when air pressure drops < 80 psig.
D close the air compressor filter inlet valve (2-2401 -U4-627), and Locally isolate the the instrument air supply to the turbine building when air pressure drops < 70 psig.
188
HL.15R SRO NRC EXAM K/A 065 Loss of Instrument Air G2.1 .30 Ability to locate and operate components including local controls.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a plausible scenario where local actions in AOP 18028-C for loss of instrument air (including attachment A) must be correctly applied. Attachment A is implemented if air pressure drops < 70 psig. The use of 18028-C Attachment A meets the SRO question requirements instructions.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. The actions listed for the first part of this choice are corect making this very plausible. Isolating the turbine building instrument air header is also an action contained in attachment A of the AOP.
B. Incorrect. The actions given for fully loading the air compressor are correct for a rotory air compressor. The action for isolating the turbine building instrument air header is correct per Attachment A.
C. Incorrect. The actions given for fully loading the air compressor are correct for a rotory air compressor. The action to locally isolate the trubine building instrument air header is plausible since this is an action perlormed in the attachment. 80 psig is the setpoint for separating the instrument air headers.
D. Correct. All actions listed are correct for the pressures given.
REFERENCES AOP 18028-C. Loss of Instrument Air steps 16, 19, 20, and A2 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-60321 -06:
Describe the operator actions required during normal full power operation when instrument air header pressure fails below 80 psig and/or below 70 psig.
189
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18028-C 25 Date Approved Page Number LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR 3/22/09 3 of 29 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED INITIAL ACTIONS
- 1. Check proper operation of all available air compressors on affected unit:
- a. All air compressors RUNNING. _a. Start all available air compressors on affected unit.
/ b. All air compressors PROPERLY
- b. Dispatch operator to fully load any air compressor not loading CNGZZZZZLOZ/ pr
,/1) Reciprocating close-4 h,letv:Ives:
UNIT 1(TB-A-T11) filt r 1-2401-U4-627 A-2401-U4-629 ,1 UNIT2( B-A-Tb)
-2401-U4-62 a) Isolate instrumentar to controllers PY-1 931 5A and/or PY-19314A using local air isolation valves.
b) Verify air pressure is bled off by depressing water drain pushbutton on Sullicon Controllers air inlet dampers.
Printed January 7, 2010 at 13:41
Approved By I iProcedure Number Rev J.StanIey VogtleElectric Generating Plant 18028-C 25 DateApproved Page Number LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED heckInstrumentAirheader*19.PerformthefolIowing:
pressure REMAINS GREATER THAN 70 PSIG. a. Trip the reactor.
- b. Initiate 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
- c. Go to ATTACHMENT A, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR IN MODE 3.
- 20. Check header pressure STABLE 20. IF leakage source can NOT be OR RISING. isolated, THEN restore/isolate UNAFFECTED unit Instrument Air as follows:
- a. Perform one of the following:
IF Unit 1 is selected for the swing compressor, THEN close 2-2401 -U4-51 0.
-OR-IF Unit 2 is selected for the swing compressor, THEN close 1-2401-U4-510.
- b. Verify swing compressor is running (TB-A-TC1 1).
_21. Check Instrument Air header _21. Go to Step 24.
pressure on P1-9361 GREATER THAN 100 PSIG.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 14:23
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B._Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18028-C 25 Date Approved Page Number LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR 3/22/09 14 of 29 ATTACHMENT A Sheet 1 of 8 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR IN MODE 3 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
_A1. Check Instrument Air supply header _A1. GotoStepA8.
pressure on P1-9361 LESS THAN 100 PSIG.
- A2 Check Instrument Air header *A2. Dispatch an operator to close Turbine Building instrument air UNIT 1: 1 -2420-U4-5 12 (TB-i -TEl 2) 2-2420-U4-5 12
_A3. Check SG ARVs MAINTAINING SG
- A3. Perform the following:
PRESSURE BETWEEN 1080 AND 1140 PSIG. _a. Verify SG atmospheric relief valves in AUTO:
SG 1: PIC-3000A SG2: PIC-3010A SG 3: PIC-3020A SG 4: PIC-3030A
_b. Verify controller setpoint potentiometers set at 7.5.
- A4 Maintain SG NR levels - BETWEEN 60% AND 70%.
HrEnted October 13, 2U09 at 14:23
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 88. 068AA2.03 001/1/2/CR EVAC-RCS TEMPS/C/A-4.2INEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
- The unit tripped from 100% power due to a control room fire
- AOP 18038-1 Operation from Remote Shutdown Panels was entered
- The CCPs and SI pumps were running when local control was established Current conditions:
- RCS Cold legs 1 4 temperatures 557 F
- RCS Hot legs 1 4 temperatures 559 F
- RCS Core exit temperatures 565 F
- WR RCS pressure 1900 psig and rising
- PRZR level is 5% and rising
-AFWflow-OGPM
The SS is at the step of AOP 18038-ito check if SI is actuated Which one of the following correctly describes the SI actuation status and follow up actions to take per 18038-1?
A. SI is actuated and SI termination criteria are met. Stop all but i CCP and both SI pumps.
B SI is actuated and SI termination criteria are NOT met. Both DGs should be locally emergency stopped if their busses are powered by the RATs.
C. SI is NOT actuated. RCS temperature should be raised by closing the MSIV5, BSIVs and SGBD valves by locally opening power supply breakers for these components.
D. SI is NOT actuated Locally raise charging flow using to fill the PRZR to 17%
before energizing the PRZR backup heaters to prevent damage.
K/A 068 Control Room Evacuation AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation.
T-hot, T-cold, and in-core temperatures.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS 190
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM a fire. The SS must use the remote S/D panel indications to determine if SI was actuated prior to taking local control, if SI termination criteria are met using core exit temperatures, and followup actions to take per the AOP. The question requires applying detailed knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points that involve transition to event specific steps.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. SI is actuated based on the COP and SI pumps status, however SI termination criteria (PRZR level and SG levels) are NOT met. The follow up actions are correct for meeting SI termination criteria.
B. Correct. SI is actuated based on the CCP and SI pumps status, however SI termination criteria (PRZR level and SG levels) are NOT met. The follow up actions are correct per AOP 18038-1 steps 35 and 37.
C. Incorrect. SI is actuated, however this choice is plausible because. PRZR pressure is
> 1870 psig for SI actuation and pumps could have spuriously started due to the control room fire. The followup action is correct per continuous action step 33.
D. Incorrect. SI is actuated, however this choice is plausible because PRZR pressure is
> 1870 psig for SI actuation and pumps could have spuriously started due to the control room fire. The follow up action is correct per continuous action step 39.
REFERENCES AOP 18038-1, Operation from Remote Shutdown Panels steps 33 through 39.
LO-PP-60327 slides 15-18, and 36.
VEOP learning objectives:
LO-PP-60327-02:
List the instruments and controls that are fire event qualified and how they are identified.
LO-PP-60327-07:
Describe the response of ECCS equipment to Safety Injection signal after the Local/Remote transfer switch has been taken to Local position.
LO-PP-60327-08:
State the expected response of the plant/parameter(s) for a given step in AOP 18038-1/2.
191
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM 192
Approved By . Procedure NumberV J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038-1 31 Date Approved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9I09 PANELS 26 of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Closing BSIVs by opening 1AD12-03 and 1BD12-03 will isolate RMW to VCT blender.
(3. CHECK RCS temperatur *33 temperature is less than STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO) 557°F and lowering, 557°F. THEN:
- a. Verify SGARVs are closed.
SGARV can NOT be closed, THEN control RCS temperature by initiating ATTACHMENT E.
-OR-Close SGARV by opening its breaker:
Brkrl7on lAY2Afor 1 -PV-3000 (AB-1 18)
Brkrl8on lAY2Afor 1-PV-3030 (AB-118)
Brkr lOon 1BYC1 for 1 -PV-301 0 (CB-B61)
Brkr 12 on 1BYC1 for 1 -PV-3020 (CB-B61)
- b. IF cooldown continues, THEN throttle total AFW flow to a minimum of 570 gpm, OR less if at least one SG level is above 10% NR.
°Step 33 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:29
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J B Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038-1 31 DateApproved gm OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9/09 PANELS 27 of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
. Breakers 8 and 3 on 1AD12 (CB-B52)
Breaker8on 1AD11 (CB-B52)
- Breakers 8 and 3 on 1BDI2 (CB-B47)
IF temperature greater than 557°F and rising, AND IF a control room fire, THEN control RCS temperature by performing the following:
Initiate ATTACHMENT G.
-OR UseSGARVs 1-PV-3010 and 1-PV-3020 by initiating ATTACHMENT E.
Step 33 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:29
[Approved By Procedure Number Rev Vogtle Electric Generating Plant J. B. Stanley 18038-1 31 DateApproved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9/09 PANELS 28 of 98 L
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temperature greater than 557°F and rising, AND IF NOT a control room fire, THEN control RCS temperature by performing the following:
Use SG ARVs on Shutdown Panel A or Shutdown Panel B.
-OR By initiating ATTACHMENT E.
NOTE If an SI actuation occurs, TSC consultation may be necessary after it is staffed.
Checksactu. Go to Step 39.
Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:28
Approved By Procedure Num6 J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038-1 DateApproved PageNumber OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9/09 PANELS 29 of 98 ACTIONLEXPETED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Check if ECCS flow should be ;35 Do not reduce ECCS flow.
reduced:
Consult TSC when it is staffed.
. RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING 0 PRZR level GREATER THAN 9%
. Secondary heat sink:
Total feed flow to SG5 -
GREATER THAN 570 gpm.
-OR WR level in at least one 5c3/)
EATER THAN 65%.
NOTE Train 8 is the preferred charging train for a Control Room fire when operating from Remote Shutdown Panels.
- 6. Reduce ECCS flow by stopping the following equipment:
. All but 1 CCP
. SI Pumps
. RHR Pumps Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:28
Approved By Procedure Number Rev Vogtle Electric Generating Plant J. B. Stanley 18038-1 Date Approved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN cz PANELS 30 of 98 J
ACTION!E ONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF preferred normal power is supplying Emergency 41 60V Busses, THEN stop emergency Diesel Generators using local emergency stop pushbuttons.
- 38. Check NCP stopped BREAKER 38. Perform the following:
1NAO5-08 TRIPPED (AB-A52).
_a. Turn 1 NAO5-08 control power breaker off.
_b. Trip INAO5-08.
Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:28
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J.StanIey Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038-1 DateApproved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9/09 PANELS 31 of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTIONS
- 1-LV-01 12B, 01 12C, 01 12D, 01 12E will NOT reposition on VCT low-low level after they have been transferred to the Shutdown Panels.
- PRZR Heaters will NOT cut off on low PRZR level after controls have been transferred to the Shutdown Panels.
- When operating from the Shutdown Panels, Train B is the preferable charging train.
- mp suctIon a. Align charging pump suction aligned to VCT: to RWST:
- Letdown in service At Shutdown Panel B:
(1-Fl-0132B on Shutdown Panel A).
- Open 1-LV-01 12E.
- 1-LV-0112B VCT OUTLET
- Close 1-LV-0112C.
ISOLATION on Shutdown Panel A OPEN.
- -OR-e 1-LV-0112C VCT OUTLET At Shutdown Panel A:
ISOLATION on Shutdown Panel B OPEN.
- Open 1-LV-0112D.
e 1-LV-01 12D RWST TO
- Close 1-LV-01 12B.
CCP-A&B SUCTION on Shutdown Panel A -
CLOSED.
- 1-LV-01 12E RWST TO CCP-A&B SUCTION on Shutdown Panel B -
CLOSED.
Step 39 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:33
Approved By Procedure Nurnber J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038.-i 31 DateApproved PageNumber OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9IO9 PANELS 32 of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- b. Open CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION valves:
- 1-HV-8105 (Shutdown Panel B)
- 1-HV-8106 (Shutdown Panel A)
- c. IF S actuated, THEN at discretion of Shift Supervisor, close BIT DISCH ISOLATION valves:
- 1-HV-8801A (Shutdown Panel A) o 1.-HV-.8801B (Shutdown Panel B)
- d. Start CCP B on Shutdown Panel d. Start additional CCP if B or CCP A on Shutdown Panel desired while waiting for A. local charging valve 1-FHC-0121 (AB-C113)to be manned.
_e. Stop NCP by locally tripping breaker 1 NAO5-08 (AB-A52).
Step 39 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:33
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038-1 31 DateApproved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS 33 of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTES
- At SS discretion, ATTACHMENT F may be used to establish Safety Grade Charging even if Instrument Air is available.
- COP motor starting limitations are two consecutive starts from ambient temperature, one start from operating temperature; subsequent start after 1 5 minutes running or 45 minutes standstill.
- f. Maintain PRZR level between f. Maintain PRZR level 50% and 70%: between 50% and 70%
using either of the following:
0 Throttle charging using 1-FHC-0121 (outside NCP With COP B running:
Room in AB-Ci 13).
- 1) Verify mini-flow path:
e Control seal injection flow 8 to 13 gpm per RCP by 1-HV-8110 throttling 1-1208-U6-136 and OOP-A&B closing 1-1 208-U6-1 34 (both COMMON in NCP valve gallery MINIFLOW open AB-Ol 12). (Shutdown Panel A).
-OR-
. 1-HV-8111B COP-B MINIFLOW open
- IF instrument air is NOT (Shutdown Panel available, B).
THEN maintain PRZR level between 50% and 70% by using ATTACHMENT F.
Step 39 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:33
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038-1 31 DateApproved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9/09 PANELS of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
_2) Isolate letdown by closing LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM 1-LV.460 AND LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV DOWNSTREAM 1 -LV-459 (Shutdown Panel A).
- 3) Close CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION 1-HV-8106 (Shutdown Panel A).
_4) Open 1-HV-8801B BIT DISCH ISOLATION (Shutdown Panel B).
- 5) Control PRZR level by:
Closing and opening 1 -HV-8801 B (Shutdown Panel B).
-OR-Stopping and starting CCP B.
Step 39 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:33
Approved By . . Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038-1 31 Date Approved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9/09 PANELS of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
_6) At Shift Supervisors discretion, establish control of seal injection flow by closing 1-1 208-U6-1 53 to isolate 1-FV-0121 (handwheel in NCP valve gallery AB-C1 12),
and throttle seal injection using 1-1 208-U6-1 51, (handwheel in CCP B valve gallery AB-Ci 19).
Flows can be monitored locally on 1-FI-0143B and 1-Fl-0142B (FHB-A10) or on Plant Computer.
-OR-With CCP A running:
- 1) Verify mini-flow path:
e 1-HV-8110 CCP-A&B COMMON MINIFLOW open (Shutdown Panel A).
- 1-HV-8111A COP-A MINIFLOW open (Shutdown Panel B).
Step 39 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:33
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18O381 31 DateApproved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN
( /9/o9 PANELS 36 of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 2) Isolate letdown by closing LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM 1-LV-460 AND LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV DOWNSTREAM 1-LV-459 (Shutdown PaneL A).
- 3) Close 1-HV-8105 CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION (Shutdown Panel B).
_4) Open 1-HV-8801A BIT DISCH ISOLATION (Shutdown Panel A).
- 5) Control PRZR level by:
Closing and opening 1 -HV-8801A (Shutdown Panel A).
-OR Stopping and starting CCP A.
Step 39 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:33
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18038-1 DateApproved Fage Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN 3/9/09 PANELS of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 6) At Shift Supervisors discretion, establish control of seal injection flow by closing 1-1 208-U6-1 53 to isolate 1-FV-0121 (handwheel in NCP valve gallery AB-C1 12) and throttle seal injection using 1-1 208-U6-1 52 (handwheel in CCP A valve gallery AB-Ci 14).
Flows can be monitored locally on 1-FI-0144B and 1-Fl-0145B (AB-A09) or on Plant Computer.
Step 39 continued on next page Printed October 7, 2009 at 14:33
Approved By Procedure Number Rev Vogtle. Electric Generating Plant J. B. Stanley 18038-1 31 De Approved Page Number OPERATION FROM REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANELS 38 of 98 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Power may need to be restored by closing breakers 1AD12-03 (CB-B52) and 1BDI2-03 (CB-B47) to establish safety grade letdown.
- g. U PRZR level can NOT be maintained less than 88%,
THEN open the following until PRZR level lowers to less than 70%:
- Train B head vent:
- 1-HV-8095B RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV e 1.-HV-8096B RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV
- 1-HV-0442B REACTOR HEAD VENT TO PRT
- Train A head vent:
- 1-HV-8095A RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV
. 1-HV-8096A RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV
Fire Qualfied Instruments a d Controls provided by the Ea 1 Sy
- RCS Loop 2 Wide Range Cold Leg Temperat.
- RCS Loop 3 Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature TI-433B
- RCS Wide Range Pressure P1-403
(
- ressurizer evel LI-460
- S/G #2 Wide Range Level LI-502
- S/G #3 Wide Range Level LI-503
- Head Vent Controller HV-442B
- Accumulator Vent Controller HV-943B List of instruments and controls that are provided by Eagle 21.
o- pp oD7
Other Fire Event Qua lfIed instruments that are NOTprovided by Eagle 21
truments.
The average Core Exit Thermocouples Quadrants 2&3 (unit 1) rage Core Exit Thermocouples of Quadrants 1 &4(unit 2)
This information is provided by the Display Processing Units (DPU) which are located outside the Main Control Room on level 2 of the Control Building. Due their location and the signals that they provide which are optically isolated, certifies it as Fire Event Qualified.
Fire Event Qualified Instruments
- Train B Extended Range Neutron Flux Lower Range Indication
- Train B Extended Range Neutron Flux Upper Range Indication Indication is provided by Channel Gamma Metrics System.
llth3ponet
/
response to the folloi
- Safety Injection Signal (S SP)
Safety Injection Pump Elementary Drawing 1 X3D-BD-DO 1 C During a LOSP Load Shed will alwa s occur in Local or Control Room f seencing on si or UV the trans fer itch must be mn the 36
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 89. 072A2.03 001 /2/2/ARM-BLOWN FUSES/C/A-2.9/NEW/HL-1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
RCS Tavg is 300 F RE-2565 has been taken out of service for maintenance The following rad monitors are delcared inoperable:
RE-2565A, Containment Particulate Monitor RE-2565B, Containment Iodine Monitor RE-2565C, Containment Gaseous Monitor Current conditions:
The DPM power supply fuse for RE-002, Containment Area Low Range Monitor, blows.
Which one of the following correctly describes the expected system response and corrective actions to take?
A CVI actuation occurred.
Enter actions of LCO 3.3.6 (CVI Instrumentation).
B. CVI actuation did NOT occur.
Enter an INFO ONLY LCO 3.6.3 (Containment Isolation Valves).
C. CVI actuation occurred.
Enter an INFO ONLY LCO 3.6.3 (Containment Isolation Valves).
D. CVI actuation did NOT occur.
Enter the actions of LCO 3.3.6 (CVI Instrumentation).
KIA 072 Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ARM system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations.
Blown nowr-sunnlv fLIsP 193
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM K/A MATCH ANALYSIS This question presents a scenario where a power supply fuse for RE-002 blows. The student must determine if this will result in CVI actuation and the appropriate technical specification actions to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences matching the K/A.
The question requires the student to determine the impact on operability of CVI instrumentation / valves and the correct required actions making this an SRO level question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. Loss of power to the Data Processing Module (DPM) for RE-002 will result in a high radiation CVI actuation. With the skid for RE-2565 out of service, all 3 associated detectors are inoperable. RE-2565A, B, and C count as only one channel.
When RE-002 fails due to the blown power supply fuse, only one CVI containment radiation channel is operable requiring entery into LCO 3.3.6 for CVI instrumentation.
B. Incorrect. CVI actuation will occur due to the loss of power to the DPM for RE-002.
Since LCO 3.6.3 is a cascaded technical specification from LCO 3.3.6 an INFO only LCO for 3.6.3 would be incorrect but plausible.
C. Incorrect. CVI actuation did occur as stated in the first part of this choice making this plausible. Since LCO 3.6.3 is a cascaded technical specification from LCO 3.3.6 an INFO only LCO for 3.6.3 would be incorrect but plausible.
D. Incorrect. CVI actuation will occur when the power supply to the DPM for RE-002 fails. The techncial specification action statements in the second half of this choice are correct making this a plausible choice.
REFERENCES
- 1. LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.
- 2. 18032-1, Loss of Vital 120 VAC Power section B.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-PP-321 01-03:
Describe how DPMs are affected by a loss of power and subsequently re-energized.
194
Approved By . Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 118032-1 27 Pageer LOSS OF 120V AC INSTRUMENT P0 LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL_1AY2A(A ACTION XPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTES
- Train A ESF se uencer will not operate followin loss o
- Loss of power to Panel 1AY2A will result in a Containment Ventilation Isolation.
- SG-1 and SG-4 ARVs will NOT operate from QMCB following loss of 1AY2A.
B1. Notify Chemistry that the following radiation monitors will be out of service and will need to be reset when power is restored:
, 1 RE-0002 (CVI) e IRE-0005 1 RE-2532A (FHBI) 1RE-2532B (FHBI) 1RE-12116 (CR1) 1RE-13119
_B2. Dispatch an operator to restore Panel lAY2Abyinftiating 13431, 12OVAC 1 E VITAL INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.
_B3. Refer to ATTACHMENT B to determine affected instrumentation.
B4. Refer to Technical Specifications and complete any applicable action statements.
Printed October 16, 2009 at 10:39
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J B Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18032-1 DateApproved Page Number LOSS OF 120V AC INSTRUMENT POWER 3/22/09 29 of 100 B. LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL 1AY2A (AB-118)
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
_*B5. Check power to IAY2A *B5. Perform the following:
RESTORED.
_a. WHEN power to IAY2A is restored, THEN perform Step B6.
- b. Return to procedure and step in effect.
B6. Restore equipment to normal by initiating 11886, RECOVERY FROM ESF ACTUATIONS.
B7. Return to procedure and step in effect.
END OF SUB-PROCEDURE TEXT Printed October 16, 2009 at 10:39
Approved By IProcedure Number Rev Vogtle Electric Generating Plant J. B. Staney 18032-1 27 Date Approved Page Number LOSS OF 120V AC INSTRUMENT POWER 3/22/09 30 of 100 ATTACHMENT B Sheet 1 of 1 TABLE 1 PANEL 1AY2A LOAD LIST BREAKER LOAD 03 SAFETY RELATED DISPLAY CONSOLE DRMS 04 DATA MODULE I RX0005 - CNMT AREA MONITOR MONITOR 06 DATA MODULE ARX-2532 - FUEL HANDLING BLDG HVAC MONITOR 07 DATA MODULE 1RX-12116 - CR AIR INTAKE MONITOR 08 SEQUENCER BOARD 1-1821-U3-001 09 BOP SAFETY ACTUATION CABINET 11CQESF 10 TRAIN A SYSTEM STATUS MONITORING PANEL 11 PREAMP1RT-005 12 DATA MODULE 1 RX-131 19- MAIN STEAMLINE MONITOR 13 DATA MODULE 1RX-1 3120- MAIN STEAMLINE MONITOR 14 DISPLAY PROCESSING UNIT (DPU-A) 15 REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT Al, CHANNEL I 16 REMOTE PROCESSING UNITA2, CHANNEL I 17 SERVO-AMP FOR ATM DUMP VALVE 1ATPY3000 18 SERVO-AMP FOR ATM DUMP VALVE 1ATPY3O3O 19 SPARE 20 SPARE 21 SPARE 22 SPARE 23 SPARE 24 SPARE END OF ATTACHMENT B Printed October 16, 2009 at 10:39
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation LCD 3.3.6 The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.
ACTIONS NOTE-Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Only one radiation A.1 Restore at least two channels 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> monitoring channel to OPERABLE status.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-1 Amendment No. 105 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 83 (Unit 2)
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. NOTE Enter applicable Immediately Only applicable in Conditions and Required MODE 1,2,3, or4. Actions of LCO 3.6.3, /
Containment Isolation Valves, for containment One or more Functions purge supply and exhaust with one or more manual isolation valves made or automatic actuation inoperable by isolation channels inoperable. instrumentation.
OR No radiation monitoring channels OPERABLE.
OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. NOTE C.1 Place and maintain Immediately Only applicable during containment purge and CORE ALTERATIONS or exhaust valves in closed movement of irradiated position.
fuel assemblies within containment. OR No radiation monitoring C.2 Enter applicable Immediately channels OPERABLE. Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.9.4, OR Containment Penetrations, for Required Action and containment purge supply associated Completion and exhaust isolation Time for Condition A not penetrations not in met. required status.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-3 Amendment No. 105 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 83 (Unit 2)
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE Refer to Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Function.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.2 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.6.3 Perform MASTER RELAY TEST. 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.6.4 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.6.5 Perform SLAVE RELAY TEST. 18 months SR 3.3.6.6 NOTE Verification of setpoint not required.
Perform TADOT. 18 months SR 3.3.6.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.6.8 Verify RESPONSE TIMES are within limits. 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-4 Amendment No. 145 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 125 (Unit 2)
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 Table 3.3.6-1 (page 1 of 1)
Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION SPECIFIED CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS TRIP SETPOINT CONDITIONS
- 1. Manual Initiation 1,2,3,4 2 SR 3.3.6.6 NA
- 2. Automatic Actuation Logic SR 3.3.6.2 NA and Actuation 1,2,3,4 2 SR 3.3.6.3 SR 3.3.6.5 SR 3.3.6.1 SR 3.3.6.4
,2,3,4,6(°) SR 3.3.6.7 SR 3.3.6.8 (b)
(RE-2565C)
(b)
- b. Particulate (RE-2565A)
(b)
- c. Iodine (RE-2565B) ci. Area Low Range 15 mr/h(c)
(RE-0002. RE 50x background(d)
- 4. Safety 1,2,3,4 Refer to LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation,Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.
(a) Containment ventilation radiation (RE-2565) is treated as one channel and is considered OPERABLE if the particulate (RE-2565A) and iodine monitors (RE-2565B) are OPERABLE or the noble gas monitor (RE-2565C) is OPERABLE.
(b) Setpoints will not exceed the limits of Specifications 5.5.4.h and 5.5.4.i of the Radioactive Effluent Controls Program.
(c) During CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
(d) During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.3.6-5 Amendment No. 105 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 83 (Unit 2)
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 90. 073A2.02 00 1/2/1/PROC RM-DECTR FAILS/C/A-3 .2/NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
Unit 1 is at 100% power CNMT pressure relief is in progress per 13125-1, Containment Purge System iRE-i 2442C, Plant Vent Effluent Radiogas Monitor (Low Range), is out of service Current conditions:
1 RE-i 2444C, Plant Vent Effluent Wide Range-Low Radiogas Monitor, fails low The SS should...
A direct the termination of the CNMT pressure relief and ensure periodic grab samples of the Plant Vent occur to comply with ODCM action requirements.
B. direct the termination of the CNMT pressure relief and enter LCO 3.0.3, be in mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
C. allow CNMT pressure relief to continue and verify 1 RE-2565C, Containment Vent Effluent Radiogas Monitor, remains operable and in service to monitor the release.
D. allow CNMT pressure relief to continue and ensure periodic grab samples of the Plant Vent occur to comply with ODCM action requirements.
K/A 073 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations.
Detector failure.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario with a containment pressure relief in progress when the remaining required plant vent radiogas monitor detector fails low The ODCM requires that periodic grab samples be taken on the plant vent and that containment purging operations be immediately terminated. This question addresses the effects of a detector failure and the correct procedures (ODCM) used to mitigate the failure.
This question is an SRO question because it involves application of required actions from the ODCM.
195
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. Action 48 of the ODCM requires immediate termination of containment purging operations. Action 47 of the ODCM requires periodic grab samples be taken while release via this pathway continue.
B. Incorrect. Action 48 of the ODCM requires immediate termination of containment purging operations. Even though both plant vent noble gas monitors are inoperable, the ODCM provides actions for this condition and LCO 3.0.3 entry is not required.
C. Incorrect. Action 47 of the ODCM allows continued effluent releases via the plant vent and RE-2565C is one of the required radiation monitors in the discharge path making this choice plausible.
D. Incorrect. Action 47 of the ODCM allows continued effluent releases via the plant vent as long as periodic grab samples are taken and analyzed. Continuation of effluent releases in conjunction with a compensitory action is allowed with all other ODCM action requirements except action 48 making this choice plausible.
REFERENCES ODCM Table 3-1 and action 47 & 48 13125-i, Containment Purge System section 4.4.1 Containment Pressure Relief, step 4.4.1.3 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-PP-291 01-12:
Describe the importance of RE-i 24420 and RE-i 2444C on Containment Mini-Purge.
196
r;eue Rev VogtJeçpjj..Gen.e.rating_Fa1ant%. iNur
)
DateApproved QQAINMENTPURGESYSTEM 35 INITIALS 4.4 NON PERIODIC OPERATION NOTE When monitoring and changing containment pressure during this procedure, computer point P-9871 OR 1-PI-1 0945 (QHVC) should be used. These are the only containment pressure instruments that will indicate a negative pressure.
(41ConnmenesseRf 4.4.1.1 IF the Unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4:
- a. Review Limitations 2.2.5c, 2.2.7, 2.2.8, and 2.2.10.
- b. Place additional containment cooling units in service if desired, to correct the high pressure condition.
4.4.1 .2 Notify Chemistry of the upcoming Mini-Purge operation or Pressure Relief operation:
Obtain the current approved Containment Gaseous Release Permit.
OR IF an updated permit is unavailable, request that Chemistry sample the containment atmosphere and prepare for the gaseous release.
Printed October 15. 2009 at 15:34
Approved By Procedure Number S.A. Phillips Vogt(e Eectric Generating Plant 13125-1 46.4 Date Approved Page Number 12/5/08 CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM 22 of 35 INITIALS 4.4.1.3 WHEN a current approved Containment Gaseous Release Permit is ob ned, perform the following:
- a. Verify at least two of the following radiation monitors are operable for CVI purposes (TS 3.3.6):
- 1-RE-2565A&B OR 1-RE-2565C
- 1-RE-002
- 1-RE-003
- b. Verify at least one of the following radiation monitors is rabiefOjMuroses:
CAUTION The pressure relief should NOT be initiated until the current approved Containment Gaseous Release Permit is obtained.
4.4.1.4 Verify that the release will be initiated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the sample collection date/time indicated on the Release Permit and prior to the Permit must be initiated before (Date/Time) indicated on 36022-C Data Sheet 1. The release must be terminated no later than the Release may not continue beyond (Date/Time) indicated on 36022-C Data Sheet 1.
Printed October 15, 2009 at 15:34
VEGP ODCM Table 3-i. Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation OPERABILITY Requirements Minimum Instrument Channels OPERABLE Applicability ACTION
- 1. GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM (Common)
- a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor, with Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release (ARE-0014) 1 During releasesa 45
- b. Effluent System Flowrate Measuring Device (AFT-0014) I During releasesa 46
- 2. Turbine Building Vent (Each Unit)
- a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor (RE-12839C) 1 During releasesa 47
- b. Iodine and Particulate Samplers (RE-i 2839A & B) 1 During releases 3 51
- c. Flowrate Monitor (FT-i 2839 or FIS12862)b I During releasesa 46
- d. Sampler Flowrate Monitor (FI-1321i) 1 During releasesa 46 3.
)
- a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor (RE-i2442CorRE-12444C) 1 Atalltimes 47,48 -
- b. Iodine Samp[erM5ThTRE-12442B or RE-i 2444B) 1 At all times 51
- c. Particulate Sampler/Monitor (RE-12442A or RE-12444A) 1 At all times 5i
- d. Flowrate Monitor (FT-i 2442 or 12835) i At all times 46
- e. Sampler Flowrate Monitor (FI-12442 or FI-i2444) 1 At all times 46
- 4. Radwaste Processing Facility Vent (Common)
- a. Particulate Monitor (ARE-i 6980) i During releases 3 51
- a. During releases means During radioactive releases via this pathway.
- b. During emergency filtration.
3-3 VER 25
VEGP ODCM Table 3-1 (contd). Notation for Table 3-1 ACTION Statements ACTION 45 With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, the contents of the tank(s) may be released to the environment for up to 14 days provided that prior to initiating the release:
- a. At least two independent samples of the tanks contents are analyzed, and
- b. At least two technically qualified members of the Facility Staff independently verify the discharge line valving, and verify the release rate calculations.
Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.
ACTION 46 With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided the flowrate is estimated at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 47 With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grab samples are taken at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and these samples are analyzed for radioactivity within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
C With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, immediately suspend containment purging of ACTION 49 (Not Used)
ACTION 50 (Not Used)
ACTION 51 With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via the affected pathway may continue provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment.
3-4 VER 25
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 92. G2. 1.35 001 /3/N/A/FHS RESPONSIBILITIES/MEM-3 .9/B-VOGTLE 09/HL-1 5R NRC/SRO!TNT/DS Which of the following correctly describes the Refueling SRO responsibilities per the VEGP Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)?
The Refueling SRO must observe and directly supervise all...
A. fuel shuffle activities inside the FHB. Approve FME zone 2 entries while refueling is in progress.
B. all core alteration activities. Approve FME zone 2 entries while refueling is in progress.
C. fuel shuffle activities inside the FHB. No other concurrent duties are allowed.
D core alteration activities. No other concurrent duties are allowed.
200
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM KIA G2.1 .35 Conduct of Operations.
Knowledge of the fuel handling responsiblities of SROs.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question requires the student to recall the specific duties and responsibilities of the Fuel Handling Supervisor in accordance with the Technical Requirements Manual matching the topic of the K/A.
This question is written for an SRO since it requires knowledge of the refueling floor SRO per the published guidance for SRO only questions.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible since this choice is for fuel handling activities in the FHB. The TR requires the SRO to directly observe core alterations which occurs in the CNMT building only. The refueling SRO can restrict FME zone 2 activities if desired, but entry does not require refueling SRO permission per the TRM.
B. Incorrect. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling is correct.
However, the SRO is not allowed to have any other duties during core alterations. The refueling SRO can restrict FME zone 2 activities if desired, but entry does not require refueling SRO permission per the TRM.
C. Incorrect. Plausible since the refueling SRO must directly observe refueling (core alterations). This choice is for fuel handling activities in the fuel handling building.
D. Correct. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
REFERENCES TR 15.1.1 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-PP-251 01-20:
Describe the restrictions placed on the Fuel Handling Supervisor per the Technical Requirement 15.1.1.
201
- 1. G2.1.35 001 Which of the following correctly describes the Refueling SRO responsibilities per the VEGP Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)?
A. Must observe and directly supervise all fuel shuffle activities inside the FHB.
Approves FME zone 2 entries while refueling is in progress.
B Must observe and directly supervise all core alteration activities. No other concurrent duties are allowed.
C. Must observe and directly supervise all core alteration activities. Approves FME zone 2 entries while refueling is in progress.
D. Must observe and directly supervise all fuel shuffle activities inside the FHB. No other concurrent duties are allowed.
Unit Staff TR 15.1 15.0 Administrative Controls TR 15.1 Unit Staff TR 15.1.1 All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation.
TR 15.1 .2 Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 15.1.2-1.
Vogtle Units I and 2 15.1 - 1 Rev. 0 Technical Requirement 12/26/96
HL-1 5R SRO NRC EXAM
- 93. G2. 1.4000 1/3/N/A/RE ADMIN REQUIREMENT/C/A-3 .9/NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
Core reload is in progress A once burned fuel assembly is in transent with the refueling machine Current conditions:
A shift in CNMT HVAC drastically increased the noise level SRNI count rate is inaudible on the refueling machine The Fuel HandIng Supervisor should...
A. verify that the control room can still hear the audible count rate. If the control room does not hear audible counts, then he should suspend all operations involving core alterations.
The FHS may direct that the assembly be placed into the reactor core.
B. assign a designee to monitor the audible count rate from containment. If the designee cannot hear an audible count rate then he should suspend all operations involving core alterations.
The FHS may direct that the assembly be placed into the reactor core.
C. verify that the control room can still hear the audible count rate. If the control room does not hear audible counts, then he should suspend all operations involving core alterations.
The FHS may direct that the assembly be placed in the containment upender.
D assign a designee to monitor the audible count rate from containment, If the designee cannot hear an audible count rate then he should suspend all operations involving core alterations.
The FHS may direct that the assembly be placed in the containment upender.
K/A G2.1 .40 Conduct of Operations.
Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.
202
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM KIA MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario where the Fuel Handling Supervisor can no longer hear the audible count rate in containment after a shift in HVAC causing an increase in noise levels. Ability to answer this question requires the knowledge of the administrative requirements in procedures 93300-C, Conduct of Refueling Operations and the Technical Requirements Manual TR 13.9.6 which mathces the K/A topic.
This question also requires specific knowledge of Fuel Handling Supervisor duties per 93300-C and the specific actions of TR 13.9.6 making this an SRO only question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. If the control room cannot hear the audible count rate you must also suspend core alterations making this choice plausible. The issue here is weather you need to hear it from containment. Also, placing fuel assembly in a safe location (the core) is not allowed since it would be adding positive reactivity.
B. Incorrect. Per 93300-C, step 4.2.12 in times of high noise levels in containment during CORE ALTERATIONS, the Fuel Handling Supervisor may assign a designee to monitor the Audible Count Rate. TR 13.9.6 requires suspension of core alterations and positive reactivity changes, which precludes placing the fuel assembly in the core as a safe location.
C. Incorrect. If the control room cannot hear the audible count rate you must also suspend core alterations making this choice plausible. The issue here is weather you need to hear it from containment. Also, placing fuel assembly in a safe location (the upender) is allowed since it would NOT be adding positive reactivity.
D. Correct. Per 93300-C, step 4.2.12 in times of high noise levels in containment during CORE ALTERATIONS, the Fuel Handling Supervisor may assign a designee to monitor the Audible Count Rate. TR 13.9.6 requires suspension of core alterations and positive reactivity changes, which precludes placing the fuel assembly in the core as a safe location.
REFERENCES 93300-C, Conduct of Refueling Operations step 4.2.12 TR 13.9.6 Source Range Monitor Audible Indication VEGP learning obiectives:
LO-PP-25101-24:
Describe the responsibilities that each of the following positions have during refueling operations:
203
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- b. Fuel Handling Supervisor
- c. Unit Shift Superintendent
- d. Reactor Operator
- e. Shift Superintendent
- f. Reactor Engineer LO-LP-3921 3-06:
Given the TRM, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
- a. Whether any TR of section 13.9 has been exceeded.
- b. The required actions for all section 13.9 TRs.
204
Source Range Monitor Audible Indication TR 13.9.6 13.9 Refueling Operations TR 13.9.6 Source Range Monitor Audible Indication TR 13.9.6 At least one source range moni containment and co CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Required source range A.1 NOTE monitor audible indicatio Makeup to the reactor inoperable or coolant system (RCS) is erating. allowed, provided the makeup source has been verified to be greater than the required refueling boron concentration (reference Technical Specifications Paragraph 3.9.1)
S uspenperations Immediately involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT SURVEILLANCES SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TRS 13.9.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> TRS 13.9.6.2 NOTE Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION 18 months Vogtle Units I and 2 13.9 - 10 Rev. 2 Technical Requirement 4/21/04
Approved By I Procedure Number W. F. Kitchens ç 9gt1e-EIettTGeeratIng PJant. 11 93300-C 21 .2 Page Number CONDUCT OF REFUELING OPERATIONS) 4.1.6 Ensurefiiw-4i+e4-.assenibiies that reactor have been properly processed and inspected and are available for loading prior to the beginning of the refueling.
4.1.7 May perform as second person who verifies correct manipulation of fuel assemblies and inserts.
4.2 FUEL HANDLING SUPERVISOR The qualifications, responsibilities, and authority of this individual are as follows:
4.2.1 The Fuel Handling Supervisor shall have a current Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) license or an SRO license limited to fuel handling.
4.2.2 The Fuel Handling Supervisor should be trained in proper fuel handling techniques at VEGP.
4.2.3 The Fuel Handling Supervisor should be familiar with the procedures listed in Step 5.7.
4.2.4 Ensures that approved procedures are adhered to by all refueling crew personnel.
4.2.5 Ensures that all required check-off and prerequisites are completed prior to commencing a specific fuel handling evolution.
4.2.6 Ensures that appropriate entries and sign-offs are made on the Fuel Handling Data Sheets.
4.2.7 Ensures Fuel Handling Data Sheet compliance in containment.
4.2.8 Contacts the Reactor Engineer for approval of any deviations from the approved Fuel Handling Data Sheets per 93641-C.
4.2.9 Keeps himself informed of the systems that affect fuel handling and ensures that all evolutions in progress are compatible with the refueling program.
4.2.10 May perform as second person who verifies correct manipulation of fuel assemblies and inserts.
4.2.11 The Fuel Handling Supervisor ensures that the Reactor Engineer is notified of all assemblies that are difficult to seat and of the observations made from the binocular visual inspection.
.2.12 In times of high noise levels in containment during CORE ALTERATIONS, the Fuel Handling Supervisor may assign a designee to monitor the Audible Count Printed October 23, 2009 at 13:04
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 94. G2.2. 19 002/3/N/A/MAINT WO REQUIRMENTS/C/A-3 .4/NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
Unit 2 is at 100% power The regulating transformer associated with 2AY1A is danger tagged for maintenance The transformer has been out of service for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Current conditions:
2AY1A is de-energized due to inverter 2AD1 Ii fault The time to repair the inverter is estimated at 2-4 days The expected return to service time for the transformer is 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> The SS should enter LCO due to this failure, and the SM should...
A 3.8.9 upgrade the work order for the regulated transformer to an emergency work order.
B. 3.0.3 upgrade the work order for the regulated transformer to an emergency work order.
C. 3.8.9 inform the work planners that the regulated transformer needs to be restored in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
D. 3.0.3 inform the work planners that the regulated transformer needs to be restored in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
K/A G2.2.19 Equipment Control.
Knowledge of maintenance work order requirements.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario where 2 train A I E motor control centers become inonerable. The student must determine the correct [CO action to aoolv and also s/he 205
HL-15R SRO NRCEXAM must determine the appropriate action related to these failures under the work order program 00350-C, Work Request Program which matches the K/A topic.
This question requires the knowledge of actions required by the Shift Manager, an SRO licensed shift position, under procedure 00350-C, and application of the correct LCO action meeting the requirements of an SRO only question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. LCO 3.8.9 condition B is entered, which requires vital bus 2AY1A to be re-energized in the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Once condition corrective action time is exceeded, condition D is entered, requiring the unit to bw placed in mode 3 in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Since bus 2AY1As associated regulation transformer is also danger tagged for maintenance, the SM will need to upgrade the work order to emergency work to respond to a shutdown LCO of< 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
B. Incorrect. Plausible since two 1 E electrical components that power vital busses are now out of service. Since these components both feed the same vital bus, LCO 3.0.3 enter is not required because a loss of safety function has not occurred making this choice incorrect.
C. Incorrect. 3.8.9 is the correct LCO to enter making this choice plausible. The student must realize the time left to re-energize the vital bus is less than 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. Not upgrading the work order for the regulating transformer would not meet procedure 00350-C step 2.8 requirements making this choice incorrect.
D. Incorrect. Plausible since two 1 E electrical components that power vital busses are now out of service. Since these components both feed the same vital bus, LCD 3.0.3 enter is not required because a loss of safety function has not occurred making this choice incorrect.
REFERENCES 00350-C, Work Request Program steps 2.8 and 3.11.1.1 LCO 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-63350-04:
Describe the requirements for emergency maintenance and when emergency maintenance can be performed.
LO-LP-3921 2-02:
Given a set of Tech SDecs and the bases. determine for a soecific set of olant 206
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
- a. Whether any Tech Spec LCOs of section 3.8 are exceeded.
- b. The required actions for all section 3.8 LCOs.
LO-LP-39202-03:
Demonstrate the application of logical connectors, completion times, and completion time extensions.
LO-LP-3921 7-10:
Given a set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode, determine if a loss of safety function exists.
207
Distribution Systems Operating 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating LCO 3.8.9 The required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
The redundant emergency buses of 4160 V switchgear 1!2AAO2 and 1/2BAO3 may be manually connected within the unit by tie breakers in order to allow transfer of preferred offsite power sources provided SR 3.8.1.1 is successfully performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to the interconnection. The interconnection shall be implemented without adversely impacting the ability to simultaneously sequence both trains of LOCA loads.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more AC A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> electrical power power distribution distribution subsystems subsystems to AND inoperable. OPERABLE status.
16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO One or more AC vital bus B.1 Restore AC vital bus 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> electrical power electrical power distribution subsystems distribution subs AND
çinoperaleoperable. OPERABLtatusBLE status.
16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of fai meet LCO zo (continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.9-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Distribution Systems Operating 3.8.9 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. OneormoreDC 0.1 Restore DC electrical 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> electrical power power distribution distribution subsystems subsystems to AND inoperable. OPERABLE status.
16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO Required Action and Be in MODE 3.
associated Completion Time not met.
D.2 Be in MODE 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> more electl E LCO3.O.3. diately power distribution subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function.
(
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.9.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to 7 days required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.8.9-2 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
Approved By . . Procedure Number Rev H. R. VAUGHT Vogtle Electnc Generating Plant 00350-C
, 41.0 Date Approved Page Number 07-01 -2009 WORK REQUEST PROGRAM 3 of 42 2.5 CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE Maintenance performed on the plant by personnel selected according to Procedure NMP-GM-010, Supplemental Personnel Control.
2.6 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE Work tasks performed on systems or components to resolve items identified through preventive or predictive maintenance, surveillance, inspections, and other methods.
2.7 DEDICATION The point in time after which a Commercial Grade Item is accepted for a safety-related application and deficiency reporting becomes the responsibility of P V 2.8 EMERGENCY MAINTENANCE Any immediate mandatory maintenance or repair activity that is necessary to maintain safe operation or shutdown capabilities or to respond to a shutdown
- L ss than or equal to 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. (1987214038) 2.9 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM COMPONENT Those plant components required by VEGP FSAR 9.5.1 to be operational in order to maintain the viability of the Fire Protection Program.
2.10 FUNCTIONAL TESTS A test , inspection or check which provides verification that a corrective or preventive maintenance activity corrected an original component deficiency, did not introduce a new deficiency, and provides a high degree of confidence that a subsequent return to service Operability Test, if required, can be performed satisfactorily. Performance of those steps necessary to determine that structures, systems, and components function in accordance with predetermined specifications. Functional tests may include: Surveillance tests, ISI tests, ASME Section XI requirements, and inspections in accordance with Procedure 29401-C, Maintenance Work Order Functional Tests. (1985205452)
(1985205455) (1985205456)
Printed October 23, 2009 at 13:59
Approved By Procedure Number Rev H. R. VAUGHT Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 00350-C 41.0 Page Number 07-01-2009 WORK REQUEST PROGRAM 3.11 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENTSHIFT SUPERVISION 3.11 .1 Shift Supervision ensures that the Maintenance Program is supported as follows:
3.11.1.1 Shift Manager (SM)
- a. Make determinations of emergency maintenance.
- b. Make notifications for reportable plant conditions.
3.11.1.2 ShiftSupervisor(SS)
- a. When contacted by the Work Week Coordinator, offers him a preliminary assessment of the following:
(1) Effect on plant operations or identified plant problems.
(2) Whether or not a clearance is needed.
(3) Whether or not an LCO should be applied.
(4) Post maintenance testing requirements.
- b. Provides authorization to start work.
- c. Determine the scope of troubleshooting activities and appropriate controls.
3.11.1 .3 Shift Support Supervisor (SSS)
The SSS may perform the actions identified for the SS in accordance with Procedure 10000-C, Conduct of Operations.
3.11.2 Off Shift Supervision ensure that the Maintenance Program is supported as follows:
3.11.2.1 Operations Superintendents should supply WO evaluation data to Work Week Coordinator on request.
3.11.2.2 Operations Department Representatives, while performing Ops reviews on work activities, may designate which activities will require a pre-job brief, especially an interdepartmental one. The work activities will then be flagged, and the information will then be made available to the shift crews via the Work Activity schedule.
Printed October 23, 2009 at 13:59
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 95. G2.2.3 5 001 /3/N/A/TECH SPEC MODES/C/A-4.5/NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
RCS Tave is 554 F TAVG/TREF DEVIATION alarm is lit The UO is recording RCS loop Taves every 15 minutes per 12003-C Reactor Startup The OATC has pulled control bank A rods to 50 steps Current conditions:
The OATC has pulled rods to 100 steps on control bank C The OATC is waiting for the count rate to stabilize while SUR decreases to 0 TAVG/TREF DEVIATION alarm is still lit The UO realizes his last set of RCS loop Tave readings were taken 45 minutes ago In accordance with Technical Specifications the SS should direct the...
A. OATC to insert the control bank rods within the next 15 minutes due to the requirement to declare LCO 3.4.2, RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality not met.
B. OATC to insert the control bank rods within the next 30 minutes due to the requirement to declare LCO 3.4.2, RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality not met.
Ct UO to immediately record all four RCS loop Taves and have the OATC continue to wait for count rate stabilization.
D. UO to immediately record all four RCS loop Taves and if any RCS loop Tave is less than 551 F have the OATC to pull rods to restore Tave in the next 30 minutes.
K/A G2.2.35 Equipment Control.
Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario for a reactor start up with the UO recording RCS loop Taves per SR 3.4.2.1 requirements. To answer this question correctly, the student must determine the correct mode and status of the reactor which matches the K/A for this question. The question requires detailed knowledge of the techncial specification for minimum temperature for criticality.
208
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM This question also involves the application of required actions and suveillance requirements lAW rules of application requirements of techncial specifications making this an SRO question per the SRO only question guidance document.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. This listed action is correct if the reactor were critical and RCS loop Taves have not been recorded in the next 30 minutes per SR 3.0.3. SR 3.4.2.1 is required to be perfromed every 30 minutes. The controlling procedure requires recording the temperatures every 15 minutes.
B. Incorrect. This action would be correct if Tave was in fact less than 551 F. The crew has 30 minutes to perform SR 3.4.2.1 prior to declaring LCO 3.4.2 not met.
C. Correct. Per SR 3.0.3: If it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk impact shall be managed.
D. Incorrect. The first part of this choice is the correct action to take. However, pulling rods and possibly taking the reactor critical to restore Tave greater than 551 F is incorrect. If the reactor is critical then LCO 3.4.2 would meet the mode applicability requirements and the listed action to shutdown the reactor within 30 minutes would apply.
REFERENCES Technical Specifications Generic SR SR 3.0.3 LCO 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality UOP 12003-C, Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2) step 4.2.5 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-61 201-15:
State the parameter and frequency recorded to meet the minimum temperature for criticality technical specification LO-LP-39208-02:
Given a set of Tech Specs and the bases, determine for a specific set of plant conditions, equipment availability, and operational mode:
- a. Whether any Tech Spec LCO5 of section 3.4 are exceeded.
- b. The required actions for all section 3.4 LCOs.
209
RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality 3.4.2 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 4 2 RCS Temperature for Cnticali 3.4.2Mmn1mumEhRcSIoopavege::mperature(Tavg)shaIIbe551oF.
APPLICABILITY: MODE with keff 1. 0.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION MLN TIME
( A. Tavg in one or more RCS Iops not within A.1 nMO.( 30 minute,)
it>
SURVEILLANCE Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.4.2-1 Amendment No. 96 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 74 (Unit 2)
SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 SRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for individual LCOs, unless otherwise stated in the SR.
Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be failure to meet the LCO. Failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet the LCO except as provided in SR 30.3. Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.
SR 3.0.2 The specified Frequency for each SR is met if the Surveillance is performed within 1 .25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the Frequency is met.
For Frequencies specified as once, the above interval extension does not apply.
If a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a once per..
basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.
Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.
SR 3.0.3 4f it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within its specified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to f the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater. This delay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance. A risk evaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk impact shall be managed.
If the Surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.
(continued)
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.0-4 Amendment No. 125 (Unit 1)
Amendment No. 103 (Unit 2)
SR Applicability 3.0 3.0 SR APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.3 When the Surveillance is performed within the delay period (continued) and the Surveillance is not met, the LCO must immediately be declared not met, and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.
SR 3.0.4 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO shall only be made when the LCOs Surveillances have been met within their specified Frequency, except as provided by SR 3.0.3. When an LCO is not met due to Surveillances not having been met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.
This provision shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 3.0-5 Amendment No. 137 (Unit 1)
Amendment No.116 (Unit 2)
NOTE Step 4.2.5 is not applicable if Tavg and Power recording is being performed lAW Step 4.2.4 4.2.5 Using Data Sheet 2, commence recording Tavg at 15-minute intervals and verify Tavg remains greater than or equal to 551 °F.
T 3.4.2) (1984300206, 1996232496) 4.2.6 Verify the CONTROL ROOM HI FLUX LEVEL AT SHUTDOWN alarm (HFASA) for both SR NI Channels are blocked. (TS 3.3.8 Note) (1996233053)
- a. SR Channel N31 blocked IV SR Channel N32 blocked IV
- b. Verify HFASA alarm status:
(1) SOURCE RNG HI FLUX LEVEL AT SHUTDOWN (ALBIOCO1) reset.
(2) SOURCE RNG HI SHUTDOWN FLUX ALARM BLOCKED (ALBIOBO1) illuminated.
4.2.7 Verify Rod Bank Selector Switch in MANUAL.
IV Printed October 26, 2009 at 11:08
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 96. 02.3.05 001/3/N/A/USE OF RAD MON SYS/C/A-2.9/NEW/HL-15RNRC/SRO/TNT/DS Given the following:
Reactor trip and SI on low PRZR pressure RCS pressure is now 23 psig CNMT pressure is now 23 psig CNMT radiation monitors RE-0051006 read 5.3 E+5 mR/hr Plant Vent Radiogas Effluent monitor RE-i 2444C has read 1.2 E+3 pCi/cc since the event initiation 10 minutes ago.
Determine the appropriate emergency classification based on the conditions listed above.
REFERENCES PROVIDED A General, PARs required on declaration message.
B. Site Area, PARs required on declaration message.
C. General, PARs NOT required on declaration message.
D. Site Area, PARs NOT required on declaration message.
K/A G2.3.05 Radiation Control.
Ability to use radiation monitoring systems.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS The question requires the student to properly interpret radiation monitor readings to determine the appropriate emergency classification per procedure 91001-C.
The question matches the use of the radaition monitoring systems to properly interpret data for an emergency classification.
This question is also written for an SRO since it requires knowledge of which radiation monitors are used for emergency classification and if protective action recommendations are required for an emergency declaration.
ANSWER / DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct. With the plant vent radiation monitor RE-i 2444 reading > 7.0 E+2 pCi/cc the general emergency threshold has been reached for both cold and hot conditions listed in the radiological effluents columns of figures 4 & 5 of 91001-C. The protective 210
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM 91002-C, Emegency Notifications.
- 8. Incorrect. Site Area emergency is plausible since the 15 minute duration specified for 12444 readings has not been exceeded while the RCS and CNMT barriers have both been lost per evaluations on figures 2, and 3 of 91001-C. Protective action recommendations are also plausible sInce a radiaactive release is occurring.
C. Incorrect. The emergency classification is correct based on the RE-i 2444 radiation monitor readings. Waiting for PARs based on dose assessment results is incorrect based on 91002-C, Checklist 2 notes.
D. Incorrect. Site Area emergency is plausible since the 15 minute duration specified for 12444 readings has not been exceeded while the RCS and CNMT barriers have both been lost per evaluations on figures 2, and 3 of 91001-C. Not issuing PARs for a Site Area emergency classification while waiting for does asessment is very plausible action. Procedures do not require any PARs on the initial declaration for a Site Area emergency.
REFERENCES 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions Figures 1 through 4. (PROVIDED TO THE STUDENTS) 91002-C. Emergency Notifications Checklist 2 page 1.
VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-401 01-13:
Given an emergency scenario, and the procedure, classify the emergency (SRO only).
LO-LP-401 01-36:
Summarize the evaluation and implementation of Protective Action Recommendations as specified in the EPIPs (NMP-EP-109). (SRO only) 211
Approved By Procedue Number Rev J.D. Williams Vogtle Electric Generating Plant . 91001-C 32 Date Approved I Page Number EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS 10 05/28/2009 I of 108 REFERENCE USE
- 1. and 3. OR Y
(p.32)
CORE COOLING CSFST RED N LOSS of OR CLAD
- 2. Coolant Activity Sample> 300 iCi/gm Equivalent I -131 (p.32)
BARRIER C
- 1. and 4. OR Y
(p.32)
CORE COOLING POTENTIAL CSFST 1c\ N LOSS of 4
- 1. (p.32) OR CLAD Y
HEAT SINK BARRIER CSFST RED N
- 7. Judgment: Judgment by the ED that the Fuel Clad Barrier is Lost or Potentially Lost. Consider conditions not addressed and inability to determine the status of the Fuel Clad Barrier (p.33)
FIGURE 1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY (Modes 1,2,3 and4 only)
Printed October 27, 2009 at 9:01
Approved By Proceaur Number Rev J.D. Williams Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 91001-C 32 Date Approved I I Page Number 05128/2009 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS I I 11 of 108 REFERENCE USE LeakinprogressANDROSSubcoolingisLessThan24°F OR ADVERSE] (p.
- 3. SGTR Resulting in an SI Actuation (p.34) OR LOSS of RCS 4.Containment Radiation Monitors RE-005!006 > 2.0 Ehr(p.34) OR BARRIER OR
- 1. OR Y
(p.33)
HEAT SINK POTENTIAL CSFST RED N LOSS of
RCS INTEGRITY (p. 33) BARRIER CSFST RED N
- 2. NON-Isolable RCS leak (including SG tube leakage) GREATER THAN the Capacity of One Charging Pump in the normal charging mode (p.34) OR
- 5. Unexplained level rise in any of the following: containment sump, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT),
Waste Holdup Tank (WHT) (p.34)
- 6. Judgment: Judgment by the ED that the RCS Barrier is Lost or Potentially Lost. Consider conditions not addressed and the inability to determine the status of the RCS Barrier (p. 34)
FIGURE 2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) INTEGRITY (Modes 1,2,3 and4 only)
Printed October 27, 2009 at 9:01
Approved By Procecluyé Number Rev J.D. Williams Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 91001-c 32 Date Approved i Page Number 05/2812009 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS I 12 of 108 REFERENCE USE
- 2. Rapid Unexplained Containment Pressure Decrease Following Initial Pressure Increase (p.35) OR LOSS
- 2. Intersystem LOCA indicated by Containment Pressure or Sump Level Response Not Consistent OR With a Loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant (p. 35) of
- 4. Primary-to-Secondary Leakage> 10 gpm AND a Non-Isolable Steam Release of Contaminated OR BARRIER Secondary Coolant is Occurring to the Environment (p. 36)
- 5. Containment Isolation Valve(s) or Damper(s) are NOT Closed Resulting in a Direct Pathway to the OR Environment After Containment Isolation is Required (p. 37)
Fay to the environment exists based on VALID RE-2562C, RE-i 2444C, OR RE-i 24420 Alarms. (p.37)
- 2. CTMT CSFST AND less than the following minimum operable equipment: -0 CNTMT four CTMT fan coolers AND one train of CTMT spray (p.35)
BARRIER
<62% (p.37)
- 2. Containment Pressure > 43 psig (p.35) OR
- 6. Containment Radiation Monitors RE-0051006 > 2.4 E+8 mr/hr (p.37) OR
- 8. Judgment: Judgment by the ED that the CNTMT Barrier is Lost or Potentially Lost. Consider conditions not addressed and inability to determine the status of the CTMT Barrier (p. 37)
FIGURE 3 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY (Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 only)
Printed October 27, 2009 at 9:01
EFFLUENTS BALD LEVELS
- . I I. I See Notes I and 2.
\aie 1: If dose assessment results ore uikbIe Ot iie tme of dedmnthn!, re c! sflcaum sbould be based on Threshold ending on any of the ffihlowing radiation 2 instead of ThrcthoLI Vtthe #1 IThth neessarm monitors that exceeds QR expected to exceed the hecLrxtons shmld nor be dekred a;niin results, the dose readiug shown for 15 minutes longer: nsnoir should be initiated / ccnpkted ifl ouler to deseniine
- 2R.1 5 39 15 10 rs/c
. 124 70x1&tCiJcc miiw,res bnt noLd declare the event as soon as is is
- RE43119 nru rA22 . x 10 uCi/ce detej mined that the release thoaaon has oj will lilrehi exceed 1, mmnises.
- 2. Dose assessment usinz actusi neieoio1o indicates doses greater than 1000 mR TEDE OR 5000 mR thyroid CDE at ORbev.onct the site boundar.
OR I. Field snrsey resuirs indicate closed window dose rates exceeding 1000 niRjhr expected to continue for more than. one hour: OR ana1ses of field surve samples indicate thyroid CtE of 5000 mR for one hour cf inhalation, at OR beyond the site boundary.
9,ao/-
FeE
Approved By I Procedure Number Rev J.D.Williams I Vo j
9 JE1 riG Genii1nP4aE[ Pi 91002-C 53 Date Approved I / EMERGENCY NOTIFICA Page Number 03103/2009 I I 10 of 23 Sheet I of 5 Reference Use CHECKLIST 2 EMERGENCY DIRECTOR INSTRUCTIONS FOR ENN FORM IMPLEMENTATION (1985304606) (1985304832) fliAL ACTIONS NOTES
- The ENN Communicator should establish communications with offsite authorities before the ED completes the message form.
- Emergency Recall activation will be performed by Control Room ENN Communicators only.
- A follow-up message containing pertinent radiological release information (including lines 14 through 16) should be started promptly after an initial notification that indicates a release is occurring or has been completed.
Direct the ENN Communicator to activate the Emergency Recall System and then establish communications and complete roll call in accordance with Checklist 4. (1985304621)
- 2. Complete or direct the completion of the Emergency Notification Form Checklist 2, except portions of items 1 (message #), items 2 (Notification time, date and authentication #), items 3 (Confirmation Phone #) and items 17 (notified by) which will be completed by the communicator.
- a. Complete items 1, 2 and 3 as appropriate.
- b. Item #4, select appropriate Emergency Classification, part ,
event description of
, or j complete the emergency that including the EAL# and provide a bases of supports the classification, that is, how the associated EAL threshold is exceeded per Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of procedure 91001-C.
NOTES
(
- PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDATIONS, are required for ALL General N.,rgency declarations. __----
- Refe ce ure NMP-EP-1 09 for PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDATIONS.
- c. Item #5, parts , , J, and should be completed as delineated in NMP-EP-109. If the recommended protective actions change after the initial general declaration is transmitted, a follow-up transmission is required to be initiated with in 15 minutes. (1985304591)
(1985304593) (1985304619) (1985304692) (1985304693)
Printed October 27, 2009 at 9:19
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 97. G2.4.27 001 /3/N/A/FIRE IN PLANT PROCS/C/A-3 .9/NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS A fire alarm is annunciated on the Fire Alarm Computer in the control room. After the UO acknowledges the alarm and announces the location of the detector, the SS/SM should...
A. dispatch a Responder with a portable radio to investigate, sound the Fire Alarm (Siren) and make an announcement over the PA system to assemble the fire brigade.
Immediately contact the Burke County Emergency Management Agency.
B. dispatch a Responder to investigate, sound the Fire Alarm (Warble) and make an announcement over the PA system to assemble the fire brigade.
Immediately contact the Burke County Emergency Management Agency only if the fire is within a vital area.
0 dispatch a Responder with a portable radio to investigate. If a fire is confirmed, sound the Fire Alarm (Siren) and make an announcement over the PA system to assemble the fire brigade.
Immediately contact the Burke County Emergency Management Agency.
D. dispatch a Responder to investigate. If a fire is confirmed, sound the Fire Alarm (Warble) and make an announcement over the PA system to assemble the fire brigade.
Immediately contact the Burke County Emergency Management Agency only if the fire is within a vital area.
212
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM K/A 02.4.27 Emergency Procedures I Plans.
Knowledge of fire in the plant procedures.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario where the student must correcctly identify the actions the SM/SS must take or direct upon receipt of a fire alarm matching the K/A topic.
This question is written for SROs since it focuses soley on the actions the SM/SS must either take or direct control room staff to perform in response to a fire alarm per procedure 92005-C, Fire Response Procedure.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Dispatching a responder with a portable radio is the correct action to take in response to a FAC fire alarm per 93005-C step 3.5.1. Sounding the fire alarm and making the PA announcement occur only after the fire is confirmed by the responder.
By procedure step 3.8.1 the Burke County EMA is immediately contacted.
B. Incorrect. The responder should be dispatched with a portable radio. Sounding the fire alarm and making the PA announcement occur only after the fire is confirmed by the responder. By procedure step 3.8.1 the Burke County EMA is immediately contacted for any fire.
C. Correct. Step 3.5.1 states that the applicable S M/SS should dispatch a responder to investigate. The note preceeding this step states that personnel dispatched should carry a portable radio for communication with the Control Room. Step 3.7.1 states that when the presence of a fire is confirmed the SM/SS shall direct Control Room personnel to sound the fire alarm (siren) on the plant PA system and make an announcement to assemble the fire brigade. Step 3.8.1 states immediate notification of Burke County Emergency Management Agency shall be performed by the Shift Supervisor or Shift Manager.
D. Incorrect. All actions of this choice are correct except for the fire alarm. The correct alarm to sound is the siren.
REFERENCES 92005-C, Fire Response Procedure steps 3.5.1, 3.7.1, and 3.8.1 VEGP learning obiectives:
LO.-TA-40008:
Assemble and Dispatch the Fire Brigade using 92005-C (SRO ONLY) 213
Approved By Procedure Number Rev P. M. Conley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 92005-C 27.1 Date Approved Page Number 5/7/2008 FIRE RESPONSE PROCEDURE 10 of 22 135 OPERATIONS PERSONNEL NOTES
- Personnel dispatched should carry a portable radio for communication with the Control Room.
- The SM/SS may elect not to dispatch a Responder if there is reliable information available confirming the presence of a fire.
Upon notification via phone report or receipt of an alarm in the Control Room or C&T, the applicable SM/SS should dispatch a Responder to investigate.
3.5.2 If notification was via C&T or Control Room alarm at the Fire Alarm Computer, the SS will dispatch a responder to:
- a. Proceed to the remote alarm panel or the affected zone to determine the location of the alarm and notify the Control Room to confirm the fire.
- b. If the alarm is in the protected area, the Responder will then proceed to the location of the activating device and inspect for and verify the presence of a fire and notify the Control Room to confirm the fire.
3.53 Notification VIA Phone
- a. If notification was via phone report, verification is not necessary.
- b. If verification is performed, the results of the inspection for the presence of fire shall immediately be communicated to the Control Room.
Printed October 26, 2009 at 12:25
Approved By I Procedure Number Rev P. M. Conley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 92005-C 27.1 Date Approved Page Number 5/7/2008 FIRE RESPONSE PROCEDURE 13 of 22 I
Reference Use 3.7 ANNOUNCEMENTS 3.7.1 Fire Alarm Announcement After Confirmation Sound the fire alarm (siren) over the Plant PA system
- b. Make the following announcement: El ATTENTION, ATTENTION. THIS IS A (DRILL / ACTUAL FIRE EMERGENCY). THERE IS A FIRE IN.. .(Specify exact location, such as unit number, building name, floor level and equipment affected.) FIRE TEAM RESPOND TO THE PRIMARY (or ALTERNATE) FIRE BRIGADE EQUIPMENT LOCKER (Alternate locker upon SM/SS direction, normally chosen only if conditions at the primary locker could be hazardous). NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL SHOULD LIMIT UNNECESSARY CALLS OR TRIPS TO THE CONTROL ROOM AND FIRE SCENE. THIS IS A (DRILL / ACTUAL FIRE EMERGENCY).
- c. Sound the siren each time and repeat the announcement two (2) more times.
3.7.2 Fire Alarm Announcement After Loss Stop
- a. When the loss stop benchmark has been received from the Fire Team Captain in the event of an actual fire, the SM/SS shall direct the Control Room personnel to make the following announcement:
ATTENTION IN THE PLANT, ATTENTION IN THE PLANT. THE FIRE IN. ..(Specify exact location, such as unit number, building name, floor level and equipment affected.) IS OUT.
- b. When the loss stop benchmark has been received from the Fire Team Captain in the event of a fire drill, the SM/SS shall direct the Control Room personnel to make the following announcement:
ATTENTION IN THE PLANT, ATTENTION IN THE PLANT. THE FIRE DRILL HAS BEEN TERMINATED.
Printed October 26, 2009 at 12:25
Approved By -. . Procedure Number Rev P. M. Conley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant _. 92005..C 27.1 Date Approved Page Number 5/7/2008 FIRE RESPONSE PROCEDURE 14 of 22 3.8 CONTROL ROOM ACTIONS AFTER FIRE CONFIRMATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT NOTE Having the Fire Team respond to a fire outside the protected area is a decision the S M/SS shall make. The condition of the plant, the location of the fire, and the availability of fixed suppression are a few items he should consider before sending the Fire Team outside the protected area.
3.8.1 Immediate notification of Burke County Emergency Management Agency shall be performed by the Shift Supervisor or Shift Manager as follows:
- a. Contact Burke County Emergency Management Agency (BCEMA) by dialing 911 on the Waynesboro line. El
- b. If there is a problem with this means of communication, contact BCEMA using SouthernLinc. The following numbers may be used on a SouthernLinc phone with the ability to call numbers outside of the Southern Company network: LI (1) Dispatch: Linc ID: 111 9103 (2) Director I Chief: Linc ID: 111 7493 (3) Assistant Chief: Linc ID: 111 9105 (4) Battalion Chief: Linc ID: 111 9101 (5) Spare: Linc ID 111 7554
- c. As a minimum, the following information should be given:
(1) Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (2) Location of the fire (3) Description of the fire (be specific as possible)
(4) Name of the Fire Team Captain or person in charge at the fire scene (5) Inform them VEGP Security personnel will meet them at the Main Gate to escort them to the fire location.
- d. Notify Security of BCEMA estimated time of arrival and request issuance of dosimetry to the offsite responders at the PESB if the fire is in an RCA or has the potential to involve radiological material. El Printed October 26, 2009 at 12:26
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 91. 079A2.Ol OO1/2/2/SA-X-CONN WI IAS/C/A-3.2/NEW/HL-15RNRC/SRO/TNT/DS AOP 18028-C Loss of Instrument Air is being implemented Instrument air pressure is 95 psig and lowering RCS Tave is 314 F The SS should direct the Turbine Building Operator to...
A. manually isolate the service air system when air pressure drops below 80 psig.
Service air should be restored locally in the turbine building by implementing SOP 13710-1, Service Air System when service air pressure at the PMEC is above 97 psig to prevent excessive lowering of the instrument air system pressure.
B. manually isolate the service air system when air pressure drops below 80 psig.
Service air should be restored by isolating control air to the Service Air Dryer and then resetting PV-9375 per Attachment B of AOP 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air in Modes 4, 5, and 6 to prevent excessive service air flow.
C verify automatic isolation of the service air system from the instrument air system at 80 psig.
Service air should be restored locally in the turbine building by implementing SOP 13710-1, Service Air System when service air pressure at the PMEC is above 97 psig to prevent excessive lowering of the instrument air system pressure.
D. verify automatic isolation of the service air system from the instrument air system at 80 psig.
Service air should be restored by isolating control air to the Service Air Dryer and then resetting PV-9375 per Attachment B of AOP 18028-C, Loss of Instrument Air in Modes 4, 5, and 6 to prevent excessive service air flow.
K/A 079 Station Air System (SAS)
A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operatons on the SAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations.
Crnss-connctinn with IAS 197
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM K/A MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a scenario that requires the isolation and the subsequent restoration of the service air cross-tie with the instrument air system following a loss of air meeting the required K/A.
This question is also written at the SRO level because it requires detailed knowledge of when to implement attachments including how to coodinate these items with prcedure steps. It also requires knowledge of coordination of normal and abnormal procedures.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. The service air header will automatically isolate at 80 psig. The resoration steps and the procedure to use are all correct actions to take.
B. Incorrect. The service air header will automatically isolate at 80 psig. Attachment B of AOP 18028-C is applicable for this event. However the action to restore service air are contained in SOP 1371 0-1 which is called out in the AOP.
C. Correct. 18028-C continuous action step 6 requires dispatching an operator to locally verify isolation of the service air header. The use of SOP 13710-1 and the conditions of use are all correct.
D. Incorrect. 18028-C continuous action step 6 requires dispatching an operator to locally verify isolation of the service air header. Attachment B of AOP 18028-C is applicable for this event. However the action to restore service air are contained in SOP 13710-1 which is called out in the AOP.
REFERENCES AOP 18028-C pages 4, 5, and 25 SOP 13710-1, page 19 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-021 10-08:
Show the flow path of air through the in-service and regenerating chambers of an on service air dryer.
LO-LP-021 10-15:
List the sequence of major events on a decreasing instrument air pressure condition.
Describe the method of recovering from low instrument air pressure.
LO-LP-60321 -06:
198
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM Describe the operator actions required during normal full power operation when instrument air header pressure fails below 80 psig and/or below 70 psig.
199
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J. B. Stanley Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 18028-C 25 Date Approved Page Number LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR 3/22/09 4 of 29 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION
%Qo NOT isolate control air to instrument or service air dryers as this will cause dryers to b1b\n continuously.
_2. Verify proper operation of Instrument 2. IF an Instrument Air Dryer is Air dryers. malfunctioning, THEN place in two chamber full flow mode by pushing in local pushbutton switch:
Dryer A HS-0746 Dryer B HS-0747
- 3. Verify proper operation of Service Air 3. IF a Service Air Dryer is dryers. malfunctioning, THEN perform one of the following:
Bypass Service Air dryer:
a) Open 2401-U4-551 Service Air Dryer Bypass.
b) Slowly close 240 1-U4-554 Service Air Dryer Outlet.
_c) Close 2401-U4-548 Service Air Dryer Inlet.
-OR-Place service air dryer in two chamber full flow mode by depressing local pushbutton switch HS-0745.
_4. Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.
Printed October 16, 2009 at 16:28
Approved By Procedure Number Rev Vogtle Electric Generating Plant J. B. Stanley 18028-C Date Approved Page Number LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR 3/22/09 5 of 29 AC11ON!EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Loss of Turbine Building instrument air will cause all extraction steam stop valves to close.
MFP miniflow valves and feedwater heater and drain tank hi-level dump valves will fail open.
- 5. Check Instrument Air header _5. Go to Step 1 7.
pressure LOWERING.
Check Instrument Air header _*6. Dispatch an operator to verify pressure REMAINS GREATER
- PV 9375 Service Air Header THAN 80 P51G. Isolation Valve is closed:
UNIT I (TB-A-TD11)
UNIT 2 (TB-A-TD1O)
- 7. Check UNIT 1 Service Air 7. Verify seals supplied with bottled AVAILABLE. nitrogen at greater than or equal to 50 psig:
Cask loading pit gates.
- Fuel transfer canal gates.
Printed October 16, 2009 at 16:28
Approved By Procedure Number Rev Vogtle Electric Generating Plant J. B. Stanley 1 8028-C 25 Date Approved Page Number LOSS OF 3/22/09 25 of 29 ATTACHMENT B heet 4of 7 LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR IN MODES 4, 5, OR 6 ACTION/EXPEC NSE E NOT OBTAINED
- B9 Check Instrument Air header *B9 Dispatch an operator to close pressure REMAINS GREATER
- Turbine Building Instrument Air THAN 70 PSIG. isolation valve:
UNIT 1: 1-2420-U4-512 (TB-1-TE12)
UNIT 2: 2-2420-U4-512 (TB-i -TEl 0)
Bi 0. Check main turbine turning gear BlO. Engage turning gear if necessary ENGAGED. by initiating 13800, MAIN TURBINE OPERATION.
Bi 1. Check cause for loss of Instrument Bi 1. Perform the following:
Air CORRECTED.
_a. Maintain stable RCS conditions until a source of instrument air is established.
- b. Return to Step Bi.
- 12. Restore air systems to normal by _B12. Return to Step Bi.
initiating the following:
- 13710, SERVICE AIR SYSTEM.
-AND-e 13711, INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM.
Hrinted October 16, 2089 at 16:28
Approved By Procedure Number Rev S. A. Phillips Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 13710-1 38.3 Date Approved Page Number SERVICE AIR SYSTEM 4.4.3.1 Verify the following valves are closed:
- SERVICE AIR AIR DRYER I BYPASS VLV 1-2401-U4-551.
NOTE Pressure Switch 1-PSL-9375 is located on Instrument Rack 15 (1-1 624-P5-R1 5) Turbine Building Level I near the Powdex Vessels.
t PMEC, When Service Air header pressure is greater than N 97 psig on 1-.PI-19380, reset Pressure Switch 1-PSL-9375 by) multaneously depressing both RESET switches.
Verify 1 -PV-937s.
CAUTION When repressurizing the Service Air header, the valve should be opened slowly to prevent reducing pressure to less than 100 psig.
4.4.3.4 Re-pressurize the Service Air header as follows:
- a. Slowly open SERVICE AIR AIR DRYER 1 BYPASS VLV 1-2401-U4-551.
- b. If desired, start up Service Air Dryer per Section 4.1.5.
Printed October 16, 2009 at 16:30
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 98. G2.4.3 9001 /3/N/A/RO E-PLAN DUTIES/C/A-3 .8/NEW/HL- 1 5R NRC!SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditions:
A large RCS LOCA has occurred An Alert emergency has been declared by the Shift Manager The Shift Manager should direct the unaffected units...
A. UO to complete a roll call and then a recall. Confirmation that the primary recall system functioned properly is confirmed by a page on the SMs pager that starts with 666.
Faxing of the notification form is required to be performed in parallel with the ENN notification to meet the initial notification time requirements.
B UO to complete a recall and then a roll call. Confirmation that the primary recall system functioned properly is confirmed by a page on the SMs pager that starts with 999.
Faxing of the notification form is performed in parallel with the ENN notification only if time permits to prevent exceeding the initial notification requirements.
C. SS to complete a roll call and then a recall. Confirmation that the primary recall system functioned properly is confirmed by a page on the SMs pager that starts with 666.
Faxing of the notification form is required to be performed in parallel with the ENN notification to meet the initial notification time requirements.
D. SS to complete a recall and then a roll call. Confirmation that the primary recall system functioned properly is confirmed by a page on the SMs pager that starts with 999.
Faxing of the notification form is performed in parallel with the ENN notification only if time permits to prevent exceeding the initial notification requirements.
K/A G2.4.39 Emergency Procedures I Plans.
Knowledge of ROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS 214
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM The question presents an emergency scenario where an Alert emergency has been declared due to a large RCS LOCA. The question requires the student to properly answer the duties of the ROs for emergency notification in procedure 91002-C, Emergency Notifications, checklist 4, Directions for ENN Communicators matching the K/A topic.
This question is written for an SRO due to the expected pager indications, who must perfrom the ENN notification, and what effect the FAXing of the ENN form has on initial notification time requirements.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. The unaffected units UO is the correct person to select, the correct order is to perfrom the recall first followed by the roll call. For a radiological emergency the SMs pager should display 999. 666 is displayed for a security emergency. Faxing of the ENN form is done in parallel. This is done as long as it does not jepordize the time limits via the voice notification circuit (ENN).
B. Correct. The unaffected unit UO is the person designated at the start of shift by the SM as ENN communicator. This person performs the duties listed in checklist 4 of 91002-C. They include completing a recall followed by aroll call. Verifiyng the SM receives 999 on his pager and faxing the ENN form if time permits.
C. Incorrect. The unaffected units SS is the individual designated at the start of shift to be t.he ENS communicator. The ENN communicator will complete recall followed by the roll call. 666 is displayed for a security emergency. Faxing the ENN form is done in parallel with notification via the voice circuits if time permits.
D. Incorrect. The unaffected units SS is the individual designated at the start of shift to be the ENS communicator. 999 is the correct display on the SMs pager and faxing the ENN form is done if time permits.
REFERENCES 00012-C, Shift Manning Requirements, step 4.2 and Data Sheet 1 91002-C, Emergency Notifications Checklist 4 Directions for ENN Communicators sheets 1 and 4 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-63500-04:
(SRO only) Given a list of duties and responsibilities, identify those that belong to the Shift Manager (SM).
LO-LP-401 01-15:
215
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM State the individual responsible for making emergency notifications.
LO-TA-40003:
Emergency Notifications using 91002-C 216
_ uegurne; Rev aey Vogtle Date Approved / _ Page Number 3/17/09 I\ISHIFT MANNING REQUIREMENTS
) 2 of 5 1.0 PU RP Os E This procedure consolidates and establishes the minimum shift manning as required by Technical Specifications, the Technical Requirements Manual, the Emergency Plan, and the FSAR. This procedure also prescribes the manner in which each department will provide records for shift manning.
2.0 DEFINITIONS None 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 DEPARTMENT MANAGERS/SUPERINTENDENTS Department Managers/Superintendents whose personnel are required to work shifts are responsible to ensure that their department provides at least the minimum required qualified personnel on each shift as outlined in Data Sheet 1.
3.2 TRAINING AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANAGER The Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager will supply each department head a list of all current Emergency Response Organization qualified personnel at least quarterly, listing the date when each qualification lapses.
Additionally, Training will maintain a database with this information. This data is available to personnel throughout the plant.
4.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 The Operations, Health Physics/Chemistry, Security, and Maintenance Departments shall ensure that for each shift the minimum staffing is maintained for positions required by Data Sheet 1.
4.2 At the beginnin of each shift, the Shift Mana er shall ensure Data Sheet 1 is completed. Any deviation from e manning requiremen s o ata Sheet 1 s a I be no e in the Comments section with the reason for the deviation(s). Typical or normal personnel filling the positions are listed below that position slot. Data Sheet 1 shall be filled out using the lists of qualified personnel. An Operations Superintendent, the Operations Manager, or the Duty Manager shall approve any deviation from Data Sheet 1 manning.
Printed October 26, 2009 at 14:36
Approved By I Procedure Number Rev Vogtle Electric Generating Plant J. B. Stanley Date Approved I 00012-C 1 7 Page Number SHIFT MANNING REQUIREMENTS 3/17/09 i 4 of 5 DATA SHEET I Sheet 1 of 2 Minimum Shift Manning (Either Unit in Mode 1-4)
Date: Shift (Day/Night):.
POSITION UNIT #1 COMMON UNIT #2 Shift Manager V-OPS-SS, V-ERO-CRO1, and Also assigned as Emergency Director V-ERO-CR1O Ss V-OPS-USS, V-ERO-CRQ2, AND Also assigned as ENS Communicator Also assigned as ENS Communicator V-ERO-CR1O OATC V-OPS-RO/BOP UO V-OPS-RO/BOP and V-ERO-CRO4 Also assigned as ENN Communicator Also assigned as ENN Communicator SO V-OPS-SO SOINPO SO/NPO STA (May be assigned other duties) (SM, or SSS or SS not assigned to FB V-OPS-STA or ENN Communicator)
Fire Team Captain V-FR-FIRE BRIGADE LEADER SSS, or SS C&T FBMember 1.
V-FP-FIRE BRIGADE SO(Also fulfills Common SO FSAR req)
FB Member 2.
V-FP-FIRE BRIGADE SO FB Member 3.
V-FP-FIRE BRIGADE SO FB Member 4.
V-FP-FIRE BRIGADE SO Security V-ERO-SEC or V-ERO-SECO2 Per Security Procedure 90101-C SAT Operator 5.
V-OPS-SO-OAO Assigned per procedure 1341 9-C SOINPO/SRO Wilson Operator 6.
V-OPS-WILSON BLKSTRT Assigned per procedure 13419-C SO/NPO Emergency Plan POSITION UNIT #1 COMMON UNIT #2 Emergency Shift Manager Dectr ENN UO Unaffected Unit UO Unaffected Unit Communicator RQCR04 nr V- Z_
SS Unaffected Unit SS Unaffected Unit
/ Communicator V-OPS-USS or V-OPS-STA Printed October 26, 2009 at 13:40
I Approved By J.D. Williams I Vogtle Electric Generating Plant A Procedure Number Rev 91002-C 53 Date Approved I EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS Page Number 03/0312009 I 18 of 23 Sheet I of 6 Reference Use
- Emergency Recall activation (Section I.) will be performed by Control Room ENN Communicators only.
- ERO personnel should be recalled only if an Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency has been declared or when directed by the Emergency Director.
- If the Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency involves an actual or credible imminent threat of attack on the plant by a hostile force, then activate the Security Emergency Scenario.
- There is a three to four minute delay between initiating the emergency recall and the callback to the control room from the recall system.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION RECALL (1985304614)
- 1. Operations personnel shall activate the Primary emergency recall system in accordance with posted system instructions. (Either NOUE or Alert/Site Area/General or Security Scenario as appropriate)
- 2. Operations personnel should verify the Primary emergency recall s stem is o via a callback to the cont b the emergency recall system. In addition, the Shift Managers beeper should activate and display rmined emergency pager message. The number displayed on the pager for an actual emergency will be three 9s (999) and a call-in number. The number displayed on the pager for a security emergency will be three 6s (666) and a call-in number.
- 3. If it has been determined that the Primary emergency recall system located at VEGP is not operable then Operations personnel shall activate the Back-up emergency recall system (Either NOUE or Alert/Site Area/General or Security Scenario as appropriate) in accordance with Back-up emergency recall posted system instructions. ENA
- 4. Operations personnel should verify the Back-up emergency recall system is operable via a callback to the control room by the emergency recall system. In addition, the Shift Managers beeper should activate and display a predetermined emergency pager message. The number displayed on the pager for all emergencies will be (800-475-9704). __J1 NA
- 5. Record date, time and name below after completing the Steps For Remote Activation as delineated within the posted system instructions
/ /
Date Time Name Printed October 26, 2009 at 14:16
Approved By Procedure Number Rev J.D. Williams Vogtle Electric Generating Plant m 91002-C 53 Page Number EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 03/03/2009 CHECKLIST 4 Sheet 4 of 6 DIRECTIONS FOR ENN COMMUNICATORS (CONTINUED)
NOTES
- Ensure items #1 (message #), items 2 (Notification time, date and authentication#),
items 3 (Confirmation Phone #) and items 17 (notified by) are completed by the communicator. The ENN Communicator should not wait for the ED to complete the notification form prior to completing the roll call.
- When reading item #5, Protective Action Recommendations, ensure parts J,
j, , and j are marked as applicable and read for all General emergency declarations.
- Ensure the ED has signed the Emergency Notification form pjjpr to transmission.
- its expected that the emergency facility which performs an initial notification will also complete the first follow-up notification for that initial notification. (e. g. the control room would complete message 1 and message 2 at minimum nor to transfer to the T
- Faxing of the Emergency Notification form should never cause the time requirements for voice notification to be missed.
TRANSMISSION OF NOTIFICATION MESSAGE
- 1. Transmit the notification form via vo e and facsimile in the following manner:
- a. If time permits, fax the notification form.
(1) Place a copy or one sheet of the triplicate form facedown in the transmit tray of the fax machine.
(2) Depress the appropriate one-touch speed dial button (Control Room use NOTIFY)
NOTE For notifications time purposes (either 15 or 60 minute notifications, once line 2 of the notification form (checklist 2) has been read the time requirement is considered to be met.
ad the notification form hecklist 2) starting at line 1, through line 13 then
- c. If performing a follow-up notification, read lines 1-17 Printed October 26, 2009 at 14:17
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM
- 99. WEO4EA2. 1 001/1/1 /LOCA OUTSIDE- PROCS/MEM-4.3/M-FARLEY 04/HL- 1 5R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS The crew is implementing EOP 19112-C, ECA-1.2 LOCA Outside Containment.
The COLD LEG INJECTION FROM SIS HV-8835 has been closed.
The SS determines the leak is now isolated.
The correct procedure transition is...
A. 19011-C, ES-1.1 SI Termination.
B 19010-C, E-l Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
C. 19111-C, ECA-l .1 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
D. 19012-C, ES-1.2 Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
217
HL15R SRO NRC EXAM K/A WEO4 LOCA Outside Containment EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment).
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
KIA MATCH ANALYSIS The question presents a plausible scenario where an RCS LOCA ouside CNMT has been isolated. The examinee must select the apprpriate recovey procedure. This question requires the use of a diagnostic step and decision point in an FOP that involves a transition to an event specific sub-procedure, making this an SRO question.
ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. Plausible since the LOCA is now isolated. The crew will eventually transition out of 19010-C to this procedure, but this choice is incorrect because it is not entered directly from 19112-C.
B. Correct. 19112-C specifies going to 19010-C for this condition.
C. Incorrect. Plausible since this is the expected transition from 19112-C if recirculation capability has been lost.
D. Incorrect. This is plausible since the RCS may be in saturated conditons with pressure above 300 psig. Those pararmaters would result in a transition to 19012-C from 19010-C, but NOT from 19112-C.
REFERENCES FOP 19112-C steps 3 and 4 Farley 2004 NRC exam question W/FO4EA2.1 001 VEGP learning objectives:
N/A 218
- 1. W/EO4EA2.1 001 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a Small Break Loss Of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) caused a plant trip and SI actuation.
- SI and Phase A Containment Isolation have actuated per design.
- The crew has implemented EEP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and EEP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
- A LOCA outside containment is indicated so the crew has transitioned to and is performing steps in ECP-1 .2, LOCA Outside Containment.
- The crew has just completed the step to isolate RCP seal injection.
The crew observes RCS Pressure is no longer dropping, and is now rising.
Which one of the following describes the required actions in accordance with ECP-1 .2 that must be taken at this point?
Ab Go to EEP-1, Loss Of Reactor Coolant Or Secondary Coolant.
B. Direct HP to perform radiation surveys in the auxiliary buildings.
C. Go to ESP-1 .2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
D. Immediately transition to ECP-1 .1, Loss Of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
Page: 1 9/30/2009
PROCEDURE NO. REVISION NO. PAGE NO.
VEGP 19112C 5 4 of 4 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
- 3. Try to identify and isolate SI Cold Leg injection break:
LI a. Close SI PMP-A TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821A.
LI b. Check RCS pressure LI b. Open SI PMP-A TO COLD LEG
LI Go to Step 3d.
LIc. Go to Step 3k.
Lid. Close SI PMP-B TO COLD LEG ISO VLV HV-8821B.
LI e. Check RCS pressure LI e. Open SI PMP-B TO COLD LEG
LI Go to Step 3g.
LI f. Go to Step 3k.
LI g. Close COLD LEG INJECTION FROM SIS NV-8835.
LI h. Check RCS pressure LI h. Open COLD LEG INJECTION
- RISING FROM SIS HV-8835.
LIGo to Step 4.
LIj. Go to Step LIk. Stop SI Pump in train with leak isolated.
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM 100. WE1OEA2.1 001/1/2/NAT CIRC WI VOIDS/C/A-3.9/M-HARRIS 08/HL-15R NRC/SRO/TNT/DS Initial conditons:
An RCS cooldown at 50 F/hr per 19002-C, ES-0.2 Natural Circulation 000ldown is in progress Current conditions:
PSMS train A DPU is inoperable RCS pressure is 1200 psig and lowering RCS cold leg temperatures are 450 F and lowering SG pressures are 435 psig and lowering PRZR level is 35% and rising The RCS temperature must be < 350 F in the next 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 30 minutes to comply with a technical specification action requirement.
The correct action to take for these condtions is to...
A. continue the cooldown at the present rate. Declare an Alert emergency due to the inability to cool down the RCS to < 350 F within the technical specification LCD action time limit.
B. repressurize the RCS within the limits of LCD 3.4.3 to collapse potential voids while increasing the cooldown rate to 70 F/hr to meet the technical specification time limit.
C transition to 19003-C, ES-0.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Void in Vessel (With RVLIS) and increase the cooldown rate to 70 F/hr to meet the technical specification time limit.
D. transition to 19004-C, ES-0.4 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Void in Vessel (Without RVLIS) and increase the cooldown rate to 70 F/hr to meet the technical specification time limit.
K/A WEIO Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel withlwithout RVLIS.
EA2.1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS).
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.
K/A MATCH ANALYSIS 219
HL-15R SRO NRC EXAM appropriate actions to comply with tech ncial specifications and the appropriate EOP transition.
This question is appropriate for an SRO since it involves detailed knowledge of a decision point in EOP 19002-C that involves a transition to 19003-C, an event specific sub-procedure ANSWER I DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect. This course of action is a procedurally plausible path and there is an option for declaring an NOUE for not completing technical specification action requirements within the time limit.
B. Incorrect. Repressurizing the RCS within the LCO 3.4.3 limits to collapse potential voids is a procedural option in 19002-C. 19002-C requires a transition to 19003-C with a cool down rate in excess of 50 F/hr.
C. Correct. Since RCS cooldown rate must exceed 50 F/hr to comply with technical specifications a transition to 19003-C is required.
D. Incorrect. Since RCS cooldown rate must exceed 50 F/hr to comply with technical specifications a transition to 19003-C is required. A transition to 19004-C would be appropriate if RVLIS was not functional. However, RVLIS is still fucntional even with one DPU out of service.
REFERENCES 19002-C, ES-0.2 Natural Circulation Cooldown steps 10, 18, 20, and 23 19003-C, ES-0.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown with Void in Vessel (With RVLIS) step 4 V-LO-PP-05101 Plant Safety Monitoring System slide 34 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementation Procedure Figure 4 EAL# SU2 VEGP learning objectives:
LO-LP-3701 2-15:
State the limitations on subcooling and cooldown rate associated with natural circulation cooldown. Include the bases for any variations.
220
- 1. ElO EA2.1 002 Given the following:
- A reactor trip has occurred due to a loss of offsite power.
- The operating crew is performing actions of EPP-005, Natural Circulation Coold own.
- N Train RVLIS is out of service.
T
- The crew has commenced RCS cooldown and depressurization.
- RCS pressure is 1780 psig and trending DOWN.
- RCS Tave is 448 °F and trending DOWN.
- All SG pressures are at 960 psig and trending DOWN slowly.
- Pressurizer level is 35% and trending UP slowly.
- Plant management determines that RCS cooldown rate MUST be performed at approximately 60 °F!hr due to secondary inventory concerns.
Which ONE of the following actions will be required in accordance with EPP-005?
A. Remain in EPP-005 and continue cooldown and depressurization.
B. Actuate safety injection and go to Path-i, entry point A.
C Transition to EPP-006, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void In Vessel (With RVLIS).
D. Remain in EPP-005, stop depressurization and re-establish required subcooling.
Page: 1 9/30/2009
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE FN1NOT OBTAINED
- b. As RCS cooldown is initiated, hold HS-0500A and HS-0500B in the BYPASS INTERLOCK position until RCS temperature is 0
- 10. Initiate RCS cooldown to cold shutdown:
ron concentration a. Return to Step 6.
greater than required boron concentration for xenon free cold ILegs-LSTHAN50Hr.
_c. Dump steam to Condenser using c. Use SG ARVs.
Steam Dumps.
- d. Maintain SG NR levels AT -
APPROXIMATELY 65%.
_e. Check RCS cooldown at 15 minute intervals.
Use 60°F/HR curve and RCS Cold Leg temperature.
_g. Perform other appropriate actions required to take the unit to cold shutdown by initiating 12006-C, RCS COOLDOWN TO COLD SHUTDOWN.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 14:51
Approved By Procedure Number Rev C. S. Waidrup Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19002-C Date Approved Page Number ES-0.2 NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN
- 2/27/09 10 of 22 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION SI actuation circuits will automatically unblock if PRZR pressure rises to greater than 2000 psig.
- 17. Block SI actuation:
o Low steamline pressure SI
- Low PRZR ressureSl
- 18 Maintain following RCS conditions:
o RCS pressure AT 1950 psig.
o PRZR level AT 25%.
- Cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs
- LESS THAN 50°F/Hr.
- RCS temperature and pressure -
WITHIN LIMITS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.4.3 (PTLR):
Use 60°F/HR curve and RCS Cold Leg temperature.
- 19 Monitor RCS cooldown:
e Core Exit TCs LOWERING.
e RCS WR Hot Leg temperatures -
LOWERING.
. RCS subcooling - RISING.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 14:51
Approved By Procedure Number Rev Vogtle Electric Generating Plant C. S. Waidrup 19002-C DateApproved Page Number ES-O.2 NATURAL CIRCULATION 000LDOWN 2/27/09 11 of 22 ACTIQNLEXEEQIED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF at any time it is determined th the desired cooldown rate may form a steam void in the reactor vessel, THEN go to 19003-C, ES-O.3 NATURAL CIRCULATION DOWN WITH IN VESSEL (WITH RVLIS
- 21. Initiate RCS depressurization:
- a. Verify CRDM Fans AT LEAST
- a. Maintain RCS subcooling -
TWO RUNNING. GREATER THAN 124°F.
Go to Step 21.c
- b. Maintain RCS subcooling -
GREATER THAN 74°F.
Go to Step 22.
- d. Depressurize RCS using Auxiliary Spray.
- 22. Continue RCS cooldown and depressurization:
- a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs LESS THAN 50°F/Hr.
- b. Maintain RCS subcooling - b. Stop depressurization.
GREATER THAN 74°F (124°F with less than two CRDM Fans Re-establish subcooling.
running).
Step 22 continued on next page Pdnted October 13, 2009 at 14:51
EAroved By I V Procedure Number Rev
- 0. S. Waidrup Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 19002-C 21 Date Approved Page Number ES-O.2 NATURAL CIRCULATION 000LDOWN 2/27/09 12 of 22 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
Use 60°F/HR curve and RCS Cold Leg temperature.
- 23. Check that steam void in Reactor 23. Repressurize RCS within limits f Vessel does NOT exist: Technical Specification LCO 3.4.
(PTLR) to collapse potential voids PRZR level NO UNEXPECTED system and continue cooldown.
LARGE VARIATIONS.
)
IF RCS depressurization must
- RVLIS Upper Range - GREATER continue, THAN 98%. THEN go to 19003-C, ES-0.3 NATURAL CIRCULATION COOL DOWN WITH VOID IN VESSEL WITH RVLIS).
- 24 Check if ECCS should be locked out:
- a. Check RCS WR pressure - LESS _a. WHEN RCS WR pressure is THAN 950 PSIG. less than 950 psig, THEN go to Step 25.
Go to Step 29.
Printed October 13, 2009 at 15:21
Approved By Procedure Number Re J.B. Stanley ogttricG!
Date Approved Page Number ES-O.3 NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDO 7/22/2008 WITH VOID IN VESSEL (WITH RVLIS)
ACTION/EXPTRESPONSE RESPONE_NOT OBTAINED CAUTION While in this procedure, do NOT exit to 19263-C, FR-I.3 RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL, to perform a head venting operation.
_1. Verify Steps 1 through 19 of 19002-C, Return to applicable step of ES-0.2 NATURAL CIRCULATION 19002-C, ES-0.2 NATURAL COOL DOWN COMPLETE.- CIRCULATION COOL DOWN.
_2. Initiate the Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.
- 3 IF SI actuation occurs during this procedure, THEN go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
AVAILABLE. _
. Go to 19004-C, ES-0.4 NATURAL CIRCULATION COOL DOWN WITH VOID IN VESSEL (WITHOUT RVLIS).
- 5 Try to restart an RCP:
- a. Close PRZR Spray Valve(s) for stopped RCP(s):
RCP 1: PIC-0455C RCP 4: PIC-0455B
- b. Establish conditions for starting b. GotoStep6.
an RCP using ATTACHMENT A.
Step 5 continued on next page Printed October 13, 2009 at 14:52
PSMS Abnormalities
- if a RPU/DPU is out of service or not functioning, the indicators and algorithms associated with that RPU/DPU will not I
I Each DPU calculates the RVLIS aigorithN for both trains of RVLIS.
LO *P 3L(
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