ML072920186
| ML072920186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/2007 |
| From: | D'Antonio J NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| D'Antonio J | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML062050204 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354/07-301 | |
| Download: ML072920186 (32) | |
Text
E
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Hope Creek Scenario No.:
Op-Test No.: NRC2007 Examiners: J. DAntonio T. Fish B. Haagensen Initial Conditions: 95% power.
Turnover: Raise reactor power to 100% per Load Dispatcher request.
Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
Malf.
Event Type*
No.
NIA WN (ROISRO)
MSOSA I (SRO)
CDlOA C (RO/SRO)
PCO7A C (All)
ED16 PCO7B M (All)
EG12 DG08B DG02A DG02C DG02D HPOI C (RO/PRO)
HPO6M RC02 RC05 Event Raise power to 100% with recirculation flow PT-N076A MSL Pressure Fails Upscale (TS)
A CRD Pump Trip OBE Earthquake w/ 10A403 Bus Fault 8, Lockout (TS)
Aftershock w/ LOP, Main Generator Lockout, 6 EDG Start Failure (recoverable), A & D EDG fail resulting in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Buses HPCl & RCIC auto start failure (RCIC recoverable)
I APPENDIX D, Page 38 of 39
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Ip-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 1
- vent
Description:
Raise Power to 100% with Recirculation Flow Time Position SRO RO Lead Examiner Applicant's Actions or Behavior Briefs crew for the power maneuver to be executed IAW 10-0006 and Reactor Engineering Instructions.
Directs RO/BOP to raise power to 100% with Recirculation flow IAW 10-0006.
B RO refers to HC.OP-SO.BB-0002 regarding MG set critical vibration and flow instability points.
t RO - raises reactor power by increasing Recirc Flow per IOP-0006 at a rate not to exceed 1 %/minute.
B RO slowly turns the Recirc pump Master Speed Control potentiometer in the clockwise direction.
RO monitors the following for proper operation:
> Recirc speed increases P Recirc loop flow increases
> Reactor power increases When power has been raised approximately 3%, then contact the simulator booth operator to trigger EVENT 2 (ET-1).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
PT-N076A MSL Pressure Fails Upscale (TS)
Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew recognizes A NSSSS instrument failure by:
P OHA C8-A5 NSSSS INBD ISLN SYS OUT OF SVCE P Amber NSSSS CH A TRIP UNIT IN CAL OR GROSS FAIL light B CRlDS D2633 MSIV INBD SYS OUT OF SVCE CH A Reference ARP C8-A5 & takes action:
P Notifies CRS to ensure compliance with Tech Spec 3/4.3.2.
P Refers to ARP sheet for Digital Alarm Point D2633.
P Checks back panel 10C609 and identifies B21-N676A Steamline Pressure is failed upscale with a Gross Fail Trip in. Examiner cue: if the trip unit does not indicate as noted, then cue the candidate the trip unit is tripped with the Gross Fail Trip light lit.
9 Communicates findings to the CRS.
Identifies Technical Specification Requirements:
P Refers to Tech Spec LCO 3.3.2 & Table 3.3.2-1.
9 Determines that LCO 3.3.2 Action b.1.c applies to place the channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Contact Simulator Booth Operator to trigger EVENT 3 (ET-2).
~
~~~~
~-
~
~~
~
~
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 3
- vent
Description:
A CRD Pump Trir,
_E Time 3=
Position RO/BOP SRO SRO RO Applicants Actions or Behavior a
Crew recognizes A CRD Pump trip:
P OHA C6-F2 CRD SYSTEM TROUBLE b CRlDS 02244 CRD WATER PUMP A MOTOR E Flashing STOP light for AP207 P Flashing OVLD/PWR FAIL light for AP207 E C6-C3 CRD HYDR UNIT TEMP HI will alarm within a few minutes.
Refers to AB.IC-0001 CONTROL ROD; however, there are no actions to take at this time.
References ARP C6-F2 & takes action:
P Notifies CRS to refer to Tech Spec 3.1.3.5 for applicability.
Examiner note: Only applies if CRD accumulator trouble alarm comes in due to low accumulator pressure. This should not occur unless the operator does not start the CRD pump in a timely manner.
s Refers to ARP AR.ZZ-0011 sheet for D2244 CRD WATER PUMP A MOTOR TRlPflROUBLE AP207.
P Dispatches NE0 to inspect AP207. Simulator Booth Operator note: Wait a couple of minutes and report back that the motor is very hot to the touch and that it smells like something may have burnt inside the motor.
E Notifies the CRS that the A CRD pump is unavailable for start, and requests permission to place 8 CRD Pump in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1.
Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
A CRD Pump TriD Time -
Position SRO RO Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs the RO to place 6 CRD Pump in service using ARP AR.ZZ-0011 C6-F2 for CRlDS Point D2244.
Places B CRD Pump in service using ARP AR.ZZ-0011 C6-F2 for CRlDS Point D2244 Cause 1 :
P PLACE DRIVE WTR FLOW controller in MANUAL AND SET to 0.
P START B CRD Pump AND RESTORE system flow to 63 gpm.
P ADJUST HV-F003 to restore system pressure to normal, IF necessary.
P RETURN DRIVE WTR FLOW controller to AUTO.
Reports to the CRS that the B CRD Pump is in service.
Contact Simulator Booth Operator to trigger EVENT 4 (ET-3).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
OBE Earthquake wllOA403 Bus Fault & Lockout (TS)
Booth Operator RO/BOP Crew recognizes Seismic Event by:
Announce to the crew you feel ground motion then it stops AND, trigger EVENT 4 (ET-3), OR play earthquake sound for 10 seconds.
SRO P OHA C6-C4 SEISMIC MON PNL (3673
> CRlDS 03977 SEISMIC TROUBLE ALARM TRBL P Response Spectrum Analyzer indications on 1 OC650C Examiner note: identification may be delayed due to dealing with the immediate effects of losing the 10A403 Bus.
RO/BOP Recognizes loss of 1 OA403 Bus:
SRO P OHA E3-E2 4.16 SYS INCOMING BKR MALF P OHA E3-E2 4.16 FDR TO USS XFMER BKR MALF 9 Loss of voltage indication on 10A403 Bus 3 Flashing TRIP lights on associated supply breakers P Various solid OVLD/PWR FAIL lights on C channel equipment RO SRO Enters the following procedures:
Verifies reactor is stable by checking power, pressure, and level.
P AB.MISC-001 ACTS OF NATURE for seismic event.
P AB.=-0172 LOSS OF 4.16KV BUS 10A403 C Channel (priority)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 lp-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 3
!vent
Description:
OBE Earthquake wl 1 OA403 Bus Fault & Lockout (TS)
Position SRO BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior B
Recognizes C SACS pump trip & incomplete TACS swap from A to B SACS Loop:
3 OHA AI-64 SACSTTACS LOOP PRESS L O OHA A I -C5 SACSTTACS AUTO ISOLATION OHA Al-D5 SACSRACS ISLN SIGNAL RECEIVED P
Reports condition to CRS Identifies failure of HV-2522/2496C to close due to loss of power Examiner note: I f operator action is not taken to complete the TACS Loop swap within about 1 minute, then an unrecoverable loss of TACS will occur requiring a scram due to rising BOP equipment temperatures. It is anticipated that the operators will fail to prevent a complete loss of TACS. This is NOT a critical task.
CRS enters AB.COOL-0002 SAFETYRURBINE AUXILIARIES COOLING SYSTEM and implements Condition B:
> CRS directs ensuring TACS swaps to B Loop SACS IAW with either AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 10 OR ABCOOL-0002 Condition B Ensures TACS swaps to 6 Loop SACS IAW with either:
> AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment IO, OR
> AB.COOL-0002 Condition B
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
OBE Earthquake w/ 10A403 Bus Fault & Lockout (TS)
IF TACS Loop swap was successful, THEN the CRS will continue performing actions in AB.=-01 72 LOSS OF 4.16KV BUS 1 OA403 C.
9 The CRS identifies the need to enter Tech Spec LCO 3.8.2.1 Action A due to the loss of channel C battery charging capability. Restore within 2 hrs or be in Hot Shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
9 Lead Examiner Cue: Only allow a couple of minutes to see if the CRS will make the Tech Spec call and then instruct the Simulator Booth Operator to proceed to EVENT 5 (ET-4). The CRS will most likely be dealing with other immediate plant priorities, so it may take too much time to wait. In this event, ask a follow-up question after the scenario to have the CRS make the Tech Spec call for the loss of the bus.
IF TAGS Loop swap was NOT successful, THEN:
9 The CRS determines that there is a complete and sustained loss of TACS and implements Retainment Override I in 9 Directs RO to reduce reactor recirculation pumps to minimum speed.
9 Directs RO to lock the Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
I AB.COOL-002.
> Examiner Note: At the end of the scenario, ask the CRS a follow-up question regarding the Tech Spec call for the loss of the 10A403 4KV bus.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 4
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Description:
OBE Earthquake w/ 10A403 Bus Fault & Lockout (TS)
Position RO SRO RO Lead Examiner Applicant's Actions or Behavior The RO performs the following:
b Reduces reactor recirculation pump flow to minimum
> Performs Scram actions IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 1 N Reports Scram actions complete
> Identifies entry into EO.ZZ-0101 RPV CONTROL due to reactor level less than t12.5 inches.
m Enters EO.ZZ-0101 and directs the RO as follows:
9 Restore level to between +12.5 and +54 inches with feedwater.
b Stabilize pressure between 900 and 1000 psig using bypass valves.
Stabilizes reactor level and pressure as follows:
b Places feedwater in Startup Level Control IAW AB.ZZ-0001 4 AND restores level to between +I25 and +54 inches with feedwater.
N Stabilizes pressure between 900 and 1000 psig using bypass valves IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 15.
When the RO reports scram actions complete and that reactor level and pressure are stable, or when the Lead Examiner directs, THEN instruct the Simulator Booth Operator to Eontinue to EVENT 5 (ET-4).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout, B EDG Start Failure (recoverable). A &
D EDG Fail resultinq in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Applicants Actions or Behavior Announce to the crew you feel ground motion then it stops AND, trigger EVENT 5 (ET-4), OR play earthquake sound for 10 seconds.
Crew identifies a total loss of AC power (Station Blackout) by:
P Observing multiple electrical alarms on alarm panel E3. The group of alarms forms a distinctive U pattern.
9 All AC electrical busses show no voltage 9 ALL EDGs fail to start.
9 Major loads including condensate and circ water are lost.
P NSSSS isolation / MSlV closure.
e Enters or re-enters the following procedures:
P ABZZ-0135 STATION BLACKOUT b EO.ZZ-0101 RPV CONTROL when RPV level drops below
+12.5 inches OR pressure rises above 1037 psig Reports lowering reactor level & rising reactor pressure due to the loss of feedwater & loss of bypass valves.
Reports re-entry conditions to EO.ZZ-0101 RPV CONTROL when RPV level drops below +12.5 inches OR pressure rises above 1037 psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout, 6 EDG Start Failure (recoverable). A &
D EDG Fail resultina in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Position BOP SRO RO Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies that all EDGs failed to start.
Attempts immediate operator actions to start the A, B, & D EDG from the control room IAW step 3.1 of AB.ZZ-0135. Examiner Note: the operator should not attempt to start C EDG since there is a known bus lockout.
Reports that EDG start from the control room was unsuccessful.
Directs:
i BOP to perform subsequent operator actions IAW AB.ZZ-0135 STATION BLACKOUT P RO to maintain OR restore RPV level between +12.5 and
+54 inches using HPCl & RClC P RO to stabilize pressure between 900 and 1000 psig using SRVs Sequentially cycles SRVs to stabilize pressure between 900 and 1000 psig.
IF RPV level drops below -38 inches, THEN the RO recognizes that HPCl & RClC failed to automatically start. Examiner Note:
Refer to EVENT 6 for HPCl & RClC component malfunctions.
IF the RO attempts a manual HPCl & RClC start, THEN:....... Examiner Note: Refer to EVENT 6 for HPCl&
RClC component malfunctions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 lp-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Ivent
Description:
Aftershock wl LOP Blackout, 6 EDG Start Failure (recoverable). A &
D EDG Fail resultinq in unrecoverable loss of 1 OA401 & 1 OA404 Busses
_p Time -
Position ROIBOPI SRO SRO BOP Booth Operator Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes entry conditions to EO.22-0102 when Torus water temperature reaches 95°F or when Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig (DW cooling lost).
Enters E0.U-0102 when Torus water temperature reaches 95°F or when Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig and monitors parameters as well as Curve SPT-P for Heat Capacity Temperature limit. Examiner Note: there are no actions to take other than monitor parameters since all containment cooling systems do not have power.
Dispatches operator to the EDG Remote Control Panels to investigate the start failure.
Directs NE0 to attempt to start EDGs from the Remote or Local Control Panel.
When directed to attempt to start the EDGs locally, then report back that local I remote start attempts failed. Nothing happened when you tried to start the engines. Report that B EDG may have blown control power fuses and that you are troubleshooting with maintenance. State that you may be able to use C EDG fuses in B EDG. Tell the operator that A EDG has a broken starting air line and the air tanks are empty, and D EDG seems to have lost DC control power, but you cannot find the cause. Tell the operator that you will report back shortly with a status report on 6 EDG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-DQ 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout, " B EDG Start Failure (recoverable), " A &
D EDG Fail resultincl in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Position SRO SRO RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Once RPV level & pressure are stable, then the CRS briefs the crew as follows:
Communicates plant status including electrical system status, injection sources & pressure control method.
Identifies EDG recovery as a high priority to regain low pressure injection capability, containment cooling, and battery charging.
Assigns the BOP or RO to coordinate with maintenance and field operators to drive diesel recovery.
Assigns BOP or RO for level and pressure control responsibility.
Discusses the need to begin a controlled cooldown.
Discusses the need to continue with the subsequent operator actions in the AB.ZZ-0135 STATION BLACKOUT procedure and assigns the BOP or RO primary responsibility for those tasks. Tasks include calling out attachments for alternative room cooling and DC load shed.
Discusses need to contact the Load Dispatcher to get an ETA for offsite power restoration.
Solicits feedback and then ends the brief.
Directs the RO to initiate a cooldown between 90 and 100°F/hr.
Examiner Note: AB.ZZ-0135 calls for 1OO"Whr cooldown &
EO.ZZ-O1O1 calls for less than 9O"FIhr.
Initiates a cooldown as directed by the CRS using SRVs and or RClC as needed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout, B EDG Start Failure [recoverable), A &
D EDG Fail resultinq in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Position SROIBOP Lead Examiner Booth Operator BOP SRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Ensures that the Grid System Operator is contacted to determine the ETA for offsite power restoration and to communicate that a blackout is in progress at the station and that an emergency is in progress. Booth Operator: If contacted, then report that there is extensive grid damage and that the best ETA for offsite power is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Calls out to have the RClC high area temperature isolation bypassed using AB.ZZ-0135 step 4.5.1 1. Examiner Note: this action is directed in two procedures: EO-ZZ-0101 RPV CONTROL and AB.=-0135 STATION BLACKOUT.
When ready, then contact the Simulator Booth Operator to have him contact the operator performing AB.ZZ-0135 actions to permit 6 EDG recovery.
Contact the operator performing AB.ZZ-0135 and inform him that 6 EDG is ready for start from the control room. If asked, then tell the operator that you found a blown fuse and you replaced it with a fuse from C EDG.
Notifies the CRS that 6 EDG is ready for start.
Directs operator to start and load the B EDG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout. 6 EDG Start Failure (recoverable). A &
D EDG Fail resultina in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Applicants Actions or Behavior Starts the B EDG from the control room panel AND closes the output breaker to energize 1OA402 bus.
CRITICAL TASK Energize 10A402 B train 4KV Bus.
Reports that the B EDG is powering 10A402 bus.
Directs BOP/RO to place 6 RHR train of Torus Cooling in service.
Places 6 RHR Torus Cooling in service IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Page 2 of 2.
CRITICAL TASK: B RHR Torus Cooling placed in service IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 3 Page 2 of 2.
The scenario may be terminated at this point. Remember to ask the SRO a follow-up question to have the SRO determine the Tech Spec call for initial loss of the 10A403 4KV bus (EVENT 4). In addition, have the SRO perform the Admin JPM to make the EAL declaration for this scenario.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5
- vent
Description:
HPCl & RClC Auto Start Failure lRClC Recoverable)
Position RO CRITICAL TASK Applicants Actions or Behavior D
IF RPV level drops below -38 inches, THEN the operator:
9 Recognizes that HPCl & RClC failed to automatically start P Reports the condition to the CRS P Continues to diagnose as follows:
For HPCI, the operator:
9 Attempts a manual start by ARMING, then PRESSING the HPCl MAN INlT PB P
Recognizes that HPCl will not start P
Reports condition to CRS D
For RCIC, the operator:
Attempts a manual start by ARMING, then PRESSING the RClC MAN INIT PB (IAW ABZZ-0001 Attachment 6 page 1 of 6, RCIC Injection). Examiner note: record time when RClC started Recognizes that that the RClC automatic flow controller FIC-R600 has failed as evidenced by speed oscillations (turbine speed will cycle up and down at low speed below the minimum required speed of 2150 RPM).
Places the FIC-R600 in manual control.
Manually raises turbine speed to greater than 2150 RPM AND continues to raise speed as needed to obtain pump discharge pressure greater than reactor pressure to establish RPV injection flow. Examiner note: record time that operator raises speed above 2150 RPM Restores and/or maintains RPV level between +12.5 and +54 inches OR if RClC capacity is too low to reach the normal level band with the existing decay heat, then the operator requests a lower band to control in.
Reports to the CRS that RClC is injecting with the flow controller in manual.
CRITICAL TASK Inject using RClC BEFORE -161 inches.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
HPCl & RCIC Auto Start Failure (RCIC Recoverable)
Time Position
-+-
Booth Operator 1
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Dispatches an operator to investigate HPCl malfunction.
Wait a couple of minutes and report back that there is an oil line break on HPCl and that there is oil on the floor. The oil has not reached the floor drain.
Reports to the CRS that HPCl has an oil line break.
Ensures that maintenance is dispatched to attempt to recover HPCI.
Examiner Note: Return to continue in EVENT 5
Amendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Hope Creek Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: NRC2007 Examiners: J. DAntonio Operators:
P O )
T. Fish (RO)
- 6. Haagensen (BOP)
Initial Conditions: Startup is in progress with the unit at about 19% power just after Main Generator Synchronization.
Turnover: Raise power by withdrawing control rods IAW 10-3 and RE guidance Event 1 Malf.
1 EventType. I Event No.
No.
1 N/A WN (RO/SRO) Raise power by withdrawing control rods 2
NM21A I (ROISRO)
A APRM fails upscale after 1 rod is withdrawn 3
CD23 C (RO/SRO)
Stuck control rod 4
FW29A I (SRO) 5 MS04A C (All) 6 Multiple I/O M (All) 7 CUIIA C (All)
(TS)
MS04D Overrides DFCS LT-N004A fails upscale (TS)
Steam Leak in steam tunnel Hydraulic ATWS when operators attempt to scram due to rising steam tunnel temperatures Failure of RWCU to isolate on manual SLC initiation CUI 1 B 8
MS19D C (All)
Failure of D Steam Line to auto isolate MS20D
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor APPENDIX D, Page 38 of 39
Event 1: Withdraw Control Rods Crew continues planned Startup activities IAW 10-003 beginning at step 5.4.13 to raise power and prepare for inerting. WITHDRAW the last 4 control rods in the group beginning at Step 433 of the Reactor Engineering Pull Sheet.
CRS directs withdrawing control rods beginning at Step 433 of the Reactor Engineering Pull Sheet.
Examiner Cue: If the requests Reactor Engineering approval for continuous withdraw, then cue the operator that continuous withdraw is permissible.
After the 1 control rod is fully withdrawn, THEN TRIGGER ET-2.
RO withdraws control rod 10-43 from position 12 to 48. The RO monitors control rod position and NI response during the withdraw.
RO monitors Reactor power, pressure, and level and ensure plant conditions are stable.
Ensures no scram setpoints have been exceeded.
Crew recognizes RPS % scram by:
3 OHA C3-A2 REACTOR SCRAM TRIP LOGIC A l MONITORING SYSTEM
= RPS Trip Logic A1 NORMAURESET status lights extinguished Pilot Scram Valve Solenoid LOGIC A NORMAL status lights for all four groups extinguished.
3 OHA C5-A1 NEUTRON Page 1 of 13
0 Crew recognizes A APRM Upscale by:
=. OHA C3-C4 APRM SYS A UPSCALE TRIP/INOP
=. C3-D4 APRM UPSCALE 3 APRM A UPSC TR OR 3 APRM A UPSC ALARM INOP status light status light
=. APRM A indicating 125% on 10C650 and CRIDS RO observes normal indications on the other APRMs and reports that A APRM has failed upscale.
RO refers to AR.ZZ-0009 alarm response procedure for OHA C3-C4 and the associated digital alarm point response procedure for D2441.
RO informs the CRS to ensure compliance with Tech Spec 3.3.1.
Specifications 3.3.1 for RPS Instrumentation AND 3.3.6 for Rod Block Instrumentation.
SRO determines that the A APRM can be bypassed and only a tracking LCO is needed since the minimum number of APRMs per trip system remain operable for both the RPS & Rod Block functions.
SRO directs the RO to bypass the A APRM.
RO places APRM RPS TRIP CHANNEL A(6) MONITOR BYPASS joystick in A APRM position.
SRO reviews Technical Page 2 of 13
RO resets the A channel 1/2 scram.
RO resets alarms as applicable.
RO reports that the A APRM is bypassed and that the ?h scram is reset.
SRO contacts I&C OR Work Control to initiate corrective action to repair the A APRM.
SRO directs the RO to continue with control rod withdraw at Step 434 of the Reactor Engineering Pull Sheet.
RO pulls the next two control rods from position 12 to position 48 (Steps 434 & 435). The RO monitors control rod position and NI response during rod withdraws.
RO selects control rod 10-19 and attempts to withdraw the rod.
RO recognizes stuck rod by:
= Various rod position indications NI response RO informs CRS of stuck rod CRS implements AB.IC-0001:
RO raises drive water d/p in approximately 50 psid increments and attempts to withdraw rod.
Condition I Page 3 of 13
Booth Operator: Permit rod WHEN rod withdrawal is Rod may double notch.
movement after 2nd pressure raise.
>300 psid, attempted with drive water d/p THEN Crew recognizes rod motion on 4 Rod Display, RWM, or CRIDS.
Examiner Cue: IF the control RO restores drive water d/p to rod double notches, THEN normal band.
the operator may ask for RE recommendation. Cue the operator to continue to withdraw to position 48.
RO withdraws 10-1 9 to position
- 48.
RO reports that the rod group withdraw is complete.
Crew recognizes N004A failure by:
3 OHA B1-F5 FEEDWATER 3 OHA B3-Fl DFCS 2/3 LOGIC SENSOR FAIL ALARMRRBL status light REACTOR LVL 8 SENSOR FAILURE HIABS IOBAD HIDEV LI-R608A indication on 1 OC650C.
RO validates current RPV level with redundant instruments.
3 3 CRIDS D5272 NB/C DFCS HIGH LVL TRIP A 3 DFCS REACTOR LEVEL A
> DFCS REACTOR LEVEL A 3 DFCS REACTOR LEVEL A As RBEO, REPORT there are Crew dispatches RBEO to no visible problems at the A Instrument rack.
inspect the A Instrument rack.
Page 4 of 13
at the discretion of the Lead 0
IF dispatched to check the status of Steam Tunnel Unit
- Coolers, THEN REPORT both Steam Tunnel Unit Coolers are in service.
IF dispatched to check the status of HD-9395NB.
0 0
THEN REPORT they are both CLOSED.
When RX Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN, THEN Trigger ET-10.
0 Crew contacts Maintenance to troubleshoot.
CRS recognizes that the following Tech Spec applies:
=. FeedwatedMain Turbine Trip System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.9 Crew recognizes rising temperature in the Steam Tunnel by:
=. CRlDS A2541 "ST TUNNEL a CRlDS D3171/3712 "STM 10-VH216 INLET AIR (116")
TUNNEL RM 4316 TEMP HI" (1 40")
AREA LEAK TEMP HI" (145")
IN ALARM" (150")
TUNNEL RM 4316 ISLN DMPR NOPEN (150")
=. ConditionA CRS briefs the crew regarding the Retainment Override and when a scram is required.
=. OHA D3-A3 "MN STMIRWCU 3 OHA El-Fl "COMPUTER PT
=. CRlDS D363313635 "STM WHEN the Crew determines Steam Tunnel temperature cannot be maintained below 145
- degrees, THEN CRS directs locking the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
RO locks the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN and performs scram actions IAW AB.22-0001 Att. 1.
Page 5 of 13
Event 6: ATWS e
The failure to scram is already inserted. I e
CRITICAL TASK e
e e
e e
e e
Crew recognizes Scram Condition and Reactor Power Above 4% EOP entry condition:
= APRM indications Absence of rod motion
= All RPS channels still RESET
=. Rod position indications RO performs scram actions IAW CRS implements EOP-101 A.
PO stabilizes and maintains RPV level as directed by CRS.
CRS directs:
AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 1.
Initiating SLC Verifying RWCU Isolates RO/PO initiate SLC.
Crew initiates SLC before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110 degrees.
Crew recognizes RWCU failure to isolate bv:
HV-FOOlIF004 OPEN indication on 10C651C and 1 OC650D RWCU pump running indication on 1 OC651 C RWCU flow indication on CRlDS page 61 and 232 RO/PO isolate RWCU and inform CRS of failure to automatically isolate.
CRS directs:
Verifying Recirc runback to minimum a Tripping reactor recirc pumps RO/PO:
=, Verify Recirc runback to minimum Trip reactor recirc pumps Page 6 of 13
CRITICAL TASK CRS directs closing MSlVs and drains.
RO closes MSlVs and drains.
IF directed, THEN RO/PO control pressure with SRVs IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 13.
IF MSlVs are NOT isolated prior to steam tunnel temperature reaching 1 60°,
THEN Crew recognizes failure of Main Steam Line to isolate by:
3 OHA C8-C4 NSSSS ISLN SIG - STM TNL TEMP HI 3 OHA C8-A1/2/3/4 NSSSS MSlV LOGIC INITIATED
=. Amber NSSSS MSIV TRIP LOGIC TRIPPED status lights MSlV indication on 1 OC651 C Lowering Reactor Pressure IF MSlVs are NOT isolated prior to steam tunnel temperature exceeding 1 60°,
THEN_ Crew recognizes uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS by:
=, MSlV position indication
=, Various Reactor Pressure indications 3 OHA C8-B3 NSSSS ISLN SIG - MN STM PRESSURE L O
- CREW isolates steam line break andprevents an uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS conditions by closing MSIVs before Main Steam tunnel temperature has been above 160 degF for more than 5 minutes.
Page 7 of 13 The D steam line MSlVs will fail to automatically close.
ALL lines can be isolated by the Crew.
RECORD time (if any) between 160 degF and all MSlVs are closed:
TIME:
CRITICAL TASK Booth Operator:
REFER to the appropriate EOP and SUPPORT Crew requests for EOPs IAW with the following. Validated execution time delays are built-in.
DO NOT input EOP-320 at this time.
ABZZ-0001 Att. 13.
CRS directs performance of the following EOPs:
EO.ZZ-0320 Defeating ARI and RPS Interlocks 3 EO.ZZ-0322 Core Spray Injection Valve Override
- EO.ZZ-0311 Bypassing Primary Containment Instrument Gas Isolation Interlocks EO.ZZ-0319 Restoring Instrument Air in an Emergency CRS directs terminating and preventing injection to the RPV with the exception of:
3 SLC 3 CRD RClC RO/PO terminate and prevent injection from HPCI, RHR and feedwaterlcondensate IAW
=) Att 16 for 10C650 Att. 17 for 10C651 CRS directs maintaining RPV water level between -50 and
-185 with:
3 Feedwater IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 14 AB.ZZ-0001:
3 - HPCI IAW EOP-322 RClC IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 6 This Critical Task is not applicable if RPV level never reaches -129.
See justification for failure criteria.
The timing, order, and priority of the EOP performance may vary.
Should NOT call out Bypassing MSlV Isolation Interlocks due to known steam line leak.
EO.ZZ-0301 Typically, the lower end of the level band is set above -1 29.
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CRITICAL TASK RO/PO control level as directed by CRS with:
3 Feedwater IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 14 3
= HPCl IAW EOP-322 RClC IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 6 Crew lowers RPVlevel to -50: and ensures adequate core cooling by maintaining or restoring RPV level above -185 without Emergency Depressurizing.
CRS directs bypassing the RWM and commencing manual rod insertion.
RO/PO bypass RWM and insert control rods IAW RE-AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 1.
Crew recognizes Supp Pool Temp Above 95°F EOP entry condition by:
OHA C8-F1 SUPPR POOL TEMP HIGH Flashing 95 degree status light on 1 OC650C RM11 9AX833/834 alarm Various Suppression Pool temperature indicators CRS directs placing RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling.
RO/PO place RHR in Supp Pool Cooling IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 3.
RO/PO align SACS to support second RHR Hx IAW SO.EG-0001 Section 5.9.
Depending on resource management, this may not occur until the reactor is shutdown under all conditions without boron.
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Booth Operator:
WHEN the Crew has established level control, AND at the discretion of the Lead Examiner, THEN SUPPORT Crew requests for EOP-320.
Booth Operator:
WHEN the Crew has reset RPS AND inserts the next
- scram, THEN allow full rod insertion by deleting malfunction RPO1.
CAUTION: the rods WILL insert as soon as malfunction RPO1 is deleted.
Booth Operator:
SDV may be accelerated for time compression purposes.
CRITICAL TASK IF Suppression Pool temperature is > I 10 degrees, AND Reactor power is >4%,
AND SRVs are open or cycling, THEN Crew terminates and prevents injection to the RPV with the exception of SLC, CRD, and RCIC, Reactor power is c4%,
OR RPV level reaches -129, OR SRVs remain closed.
IF RPV level reaches -1 29, THEN Crew terminates and prevents injection from Core Spray.
WHEN EOP-320 Section 5.1 and 5.2 are complete, THEN the Crew implements EOP-320 Section 5.3 and reset RPS.
WHEN OHA C6-E4 clears, THEN the Crew initiates a manual scram IAW EOP-320 Section 5.3.
Crew fully inserts all control rods by any combination of:
Manual insertion Ordering EOP-0320 Crew recognizes the reactor is shutdown by:
a RWM Confirm Shutdown a CRlDS Rod positions RO verifies reactor shutdown status and informs CRS.
3 SPDS ALL RODS IN Page 10 of 13
WHEN the reactor is shutdown Should secure SLC under all conditions, W C R S exits EOP-1O1A and enters EOP-101.
pumps prior to exiting EOP-1OlA unless they are being used for level control.
at the discretion of Page 11 of 13
NRC Scenario 2
- 1.
- CREW isolates steam line break andprevents an uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS conditions by closing MSZVs before Main Steam tunnel temperature has been above 160 degF for more than 5 minutes.
WA 239001 Main and Reheat Steam System A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Main and Reheat Steam System; and (b) based on those predictions, use. procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:
A2.07 Main steam area high temperature or differential temperature high RO 3.8 SRO 3.9 WA 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EA2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EA2.06 Reactor Pressure RO 4.0 SRO 4.1 Given the current ATWS conditions of this scenario, preventing uncontrolled depressurization is as important as isolating the steam leak. The failure of the Main Steam lines to automatically isolate represents a containment bypass event at a time when the fuel is being challenged by an ATWS event.
Operator action is required to isolate the Main Steam lines. Although EOP-IOIA mitigation strategy allows bypassing the -129 isolation, this is only to account for intentional lowering of RPV level to below
-129. No procedure, including EOP-IOlA, supports leaving the MSIVs open with a leak that has exceeded isolation setpoints. This is philosophy is most clearly demonstrated by the procedure that bypasses the -129 isolations, EO.=-0301, whose prerequisites require: There is no indication of gross fuel element failure or steam line break. Successful completion of this critical task is demonstrated by closing the MSIVs before main steam tunnel temperature has been above the isolation setpoint for more than five minutes.
2
WA 218ooO Automatic Depressurization System A4 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room:
A4.04 ADS inhibit RO 4.1 SRO 4.1 WA 295031 Reactor Low Water Level EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL:
EA.06 Automatic depressurization RO 4.4 SRO 4.4 Given the current ATWS conditions of this scenario, preventing ADS automatic operation and potential uncontrolled reactor level flood up prevents a significant transient and subsequent positive reactivity addition to the reactor. EOPs direct this action under the current conditions. This critical task is only applicable if RPV water level goes below -129. Failure to satisfactorily complete the task is demonstrated by an automatic ACTUATION of ADS such that the ADS SRVs open and reduce reactor pressure by more than 300 psig.
Page 12 of 13
3
- Crew initiates SLC before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110 degrees.
WA 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EA1.04 SBLC RO 4.5 SRO 4.5 EA2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EAZ.04 Suppression Pool Temperature RO 4.0 SRO 4.1 Both RPS and AFU failed to insert any control rods. The closure of MSlVs will result in rejection of all heat to containment. EOP-1OlA requires initiation of SLC for ATWS events with power 9%.
The Boron Initiation Injection Temperature for the post scram power level in this scenario power is 110°F. Both AP208 and BP208 SLC pump fail to auto start. Crew action is required to commence SLC injection before the BIIT is reached.
4
- Crew lowers RPV level to -50: and ensures adequate core cooling by maintaining or restoring RPV level above -185 without Emergency Depressurizing.
IUA 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EA2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EA2.02 Reactor water level RO 4.1 SRO 4.2 Lowering level RPV level during an ATWS with reactor power >4% is a key strategy for controlling reactor power.
Maintaining adequate Core cooling under ATWS conditions is accomplished by maintaininghestoring level above
-185. HPCI and RCIC are capable of maintaining level under the current conditions. An Emergency Depressurization is not wmanted and would result in a large injection of cold water and the potential displacement of boron from the core.
5
- Crew fully inserts all control rods by any combination of:
Manual insertion Ordering EOP-0320 IUA 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EAI. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EA1.O1 Reactor Protection System RO 4.6 SRO 4.6 EA1.07 RMCS RO 3.9 SRO 4.0 Manually inserting all control rods, or directing HC.OP-EO.=-0320, provides the only methods for control rod insertion and substantial negative reactivity addition. It is critical for the crew to implement one of these methods to insert control rods and shut the reactor down. Failure to initiate these actions may leave the reactor subcritical due only to boron, and any event that displaces the boron would result in a significant power transient and challenge to the fuel. Additionally, with the MSIVs closed, any heat generated must be rejected to containment, which is not designed for sustained heat rejection from a reactor at power.
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