ML072920186
| ML072920186 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/2007 |
| From: | D'Antonio J NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| D'Antonio J | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML062050204 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354/07-301 | |
| Download: ML072920186 (32) | |
Text
E Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Hope Creek Scenario No.: Op-Test No.: NRC2007 Examiners: J. DAntonio T. Fish B. Haagensen Initial Conditions: 95% power.
Turnover: Raise reactor power to 100% per Load Dispatcher request.
-Event Malf. Event Type* Event No.
1 No.
NIA WN (ROISRO) Raise power to 100% with recirculation flow 2 MSOSA I (SRO) PT-N076A MSL Pressure Fails Upscale (TS) 3 CDlOA C (RO/SRO) A CRD Pump Trip 4 PCO7A C (All) OBE Earthquake w/ 10A403 Bus Fault 8, Lockout
- ED16 (TS) 5 PCO7B M (All) Aftershock w/ LOP, Main Generator Lockout, 6 EG12 EDG Start Failure (recoverable), A & D EDG fail resulting in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 DG08B Buses DG02A DG02C
- DG02D 6 HPOI C (RO/PRO) HPCl & RCIC auto start failure (RCIC recoverable)
HPO6M RC02
- RC05 I
APPENDIX D, Page 38 of 39
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Ip-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 1
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Description:
Raise Power to 100% with Recirculation Flow Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Briefs crew for the power maneuver to be executed IAW 10-0006 and Reactor Engineering Instructions.
Directs RO/BOP to raise power to 100% with Recirculation flow IAW 10-0006.
RO B RO refers to HC.OP-SO.BB-0002 regarding M G set critical vibration and flow instability points.
t RO - raises reactor power by increasing Recirc Flow per IOP-0006 at a rate not to exceed 1%/minute.
B RO slowly turns the Recirc pump Master Speed Control potentiometer in the clockwise direction.
RO monitors the following for proper operation:
> Recirc speed increases P Recirc loop flow increases
> Reactor power increases Lead When power has been raised approximately 3%, then contact Examiner the simulator booth operator to trigger EVENT 2 (ET-1).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
PT-N076A MSL Pressure Fails Upscale (TS)
Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew recognizes ANSSSS instrument failure by:
P OHA C8-A5 NSSSS INBD ISLN SYS OUT OF SVCE P Amber NSSSS CH A TRIP UNIT IN CAL OR GROSS FAIL light B CRlDS D2633 MSIV INBD SYS OUT OF SVCE CH A Reference ARP C8-A5 & takes action:
P Notifies CRS to ensure compliance with Tech Spec 3/4.3.2.
P Refers to ARP sheet for Digital Alarm Point D2633.
P Checks back panel 10C609 and identifies B21-N676A Steamline Pressure is failed upscale with a Gross Fail Trip in. Examiner cue: if the trip unit does not indicate as noted, then cue the candidate the trip unit is tripped with the Gross Fail Trip light lit.
9 Communicates findings to the CRS.
Identifies Technical Specification Requirements:
P Refers to Tech Spec LCO 3.3.2 & Table 3.3.2-1.
9 Determines that LCO 3.3.2 Action b.1 .c applies to place the channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Contact Simulator Booth Operator to trigger EVENT 3 (ET-2).
~ ~~~~ ~- ~ ~~ ~ ~
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 3
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Description:
A CRD Pump Trir,
_E Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3 = a RO/BOP Crew recognizes A CRD Pump trip:
SRO P OHA C6-F2 CRD SYSTEM TROUBLE b CRlDS 02244 CRD WATER PUMP A MOTOR E Flashing STOP light for AP207 P Flashing OVLD/PWR FAIL light for AP207 E C6-C3 CRD HYDR UNIT TEMP HI will alarm within a few minutes.
SRO Refers to AB.IC-0001 CONTROL ROD; however, there are no actions to take at this time.
RO References ARP C6-F2 & takes action:
P Notifies CRS to refer to Tech Spec 3.1.3.5 for applicability.
Examiner note: Only applies if CRD accumulator trouble alarm comes in due to low accumulator pressure. This should not occur unless the operator does not start the CRD pump in a timely manner.
s Refers to ARP AR.ZZ-0011 sheet for D2244 CRD WATER PUMP A MOTOR TRlPflROUBLE AP207.
P Dispatches NE0 to inspect AP207. Simulator Booth Operator note: Wait a couple of minutes and report back that the motor is very hot to the touch and that it smells like something may have burnt inside the motor.
E Notifies the CRS that the A CRD pump is unavailable for start, and requests permission to place 8 CRD Pump in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1. Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
A CRD Pump TriD Time Position SRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs the RO to place 6CRD Pump in service using ARP AR.ZZ-0011 C6-F2 for CRlDS Point D2244.
RO Places B CRD Pump in service using ARP AR.ZZ-0011 C6-F2 for CRlDS Point D2244 Cause 1:
P PLACE DRIVE WTR FLOW controller in MANUAL AND SET to 0.
P START B CRD Pump AND RESTORE system flow to 63 gpm.
P ADJUST HV-F003 to restore system pressure to normal, IF necessary.
P RETURN DRIVE WTR FLOW controller to AUTO.
Reports to the CRS that the B CRD Pump is in service.
Contact Simulator Booth Operator to trigger EVENT 4 (ET-3).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
OBE Earthquake wllOA403 Bus Fault & Lockout (TS)
Booth Announce to the crew you feel ground motion then it stops Operator AND, trigger EVENT 4 (ET-3), OR play earthquake sound for 10 seconds.
RO/BOP Crew recognizes Seismic Event by:
SRO P OHA C6-C4 SEISMIC MON PNL (3673
> CRlDS 03977 SEISMIC TROUBLE ALARM TRBL P Response Spectrum Analyzer indications on 1OC650C Examiner note: identification may be delayed due to dealing with the immediate effects of losing the 10A403 Bus.
RO/BOP Recognizes loss of 1 OA403 Bus:
SRO P OHA E3-E2 4.16 SYS INCOMING BKR MALF P OHA E3-E2 4.16 FDR TO USS XFMER BKR MALF 9 Loss of voltage indication on 10A403 Bus 3 Flashing TRIP lights on associated supply breakers P Various solid OVLD/PWR FAIL lights on C channel equipment RO Verifies reactor is stable by checking power, pressure, and level.
SRO Enters the following procedures:
P AB.MISC-001 ACTS OF NATURE for seismic event.
P AB.=-0172 LOSS OF 4.16KV BUS 10A403 C Channel (priority)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 lp-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 3
!vent
Description:
OBE Earthquake wl 1OA403 Bus Fault & Lockout (TS)
Position Applicants Actions or Behavior B Recognizes C SACS pump trip & incomplete TACS swap from A to B SACS Loop:
> OHA A I - 6 4 SACSTTACS LOOP PRESS L O 3 OHA A I -C5 SACSTTACS AUTO ISOLATION
> OHA Al-D5 SACSRACS ISLN SIGNAL RECEIVED
> Identifies failure of HV-2522/2496C to close due to loss of power P Reports condition to CRS Examiner note: I f operator action is not taken to complete the TACS Loop swap within about 1 minute, then an unrecoverable loss of TACS will occur requiring a scram due to rising BOP equipment temperatures. It is anticipated that the operators will fail to prevent a complete loss of TACS. This is NOT a critical task.
SRO CRS enters AB.COOL-0002 SAFETYRURBINE AUXILIARIES COOLING SYSTEM and implements Condition B:
> CRS directs ensuring TACS swaps to B Loop SACS IAW with either AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 10 OR ABCOOL-0002 Condition B BOP Ensures TACS swaps to 6Loop SACS IAW with either:
> AB.COOL-0002 Condition B
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
OBE Earthquake w/ 10A403 Bus Fault & Lockout (TS)
IF TACS Loop swap was successful, THEN the CRS will continue performing actions in AB.=-01 72 LOSS OF 4.16KV BUS 1OA403 C.
9 The CRS identifies the need to enter Tech Spec LCO 3.8.2.1 Action A due to the loss of channel C battery charging capability. Restore within 2 hrs or be in Hot Shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in Cold Shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
9 Lead Examiner Cue: Only allow a couple of minutes to see if the CRS will make the Tech Spec call and then instruct the Simulator Booth Operator to proceed to EVENT 5 (ET-4). The CRS will most likely be dealing with other immediate plant priorities, so it may take too much time to wait. In this event, ask a follow-up question after the scenario to have the CRS make the Tech Spec call for the loss of the bus.
I IF TAGS Loop swap was NOT successful, THEN:
9 The CRS determines that there is a complete and sustained loss of TACS and implements Retainment Override I in AB.COOL-002.
9 Directs RO to reduce reactor recirculation pumps to minimum speed.
9 Directs RO to lock the Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
> Examiner Note: At the end of the scenario, ask the CRS a follow-up question regarding the Tech Spec call for the loss of the 10A403 4KV bus.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 4
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Description:
OBE Earthquake w/ 10A403 Bus Fault & Lockout (TS)
Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO The RO performs the following:
b Reduces reactor recirculation pump flow to minimum
> Performs Scram actions IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 1 N Reports Scram actions complete
> Identifies entry into EO.ZZ-0101 RPV CONTROL due to reactor level less than t12.5 inches.
SRO m Enters EO.ZZ-0101 and directs the RO as follows:
9 Restore level to between +12.5 and +54 inches with feedwater.
b Stabilize pressure between 900 and 1000 psig using bypass valves.
RO Stabilizes reactor level and pressure as follows:
b Places feedwater in Startup Level Control IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 14 AND restores level to between +I25 and +54 inches with feedwater.
N Stabilizes pressure between 900 and 1000 psig using bypass valves IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 15.
Lead When the RO reports scram actions complete and that reactor Examiner level and pressure are stable, or when the Lead Examiner directs, THEN instruct the Simulator Booth Operator to Eontinue to EVENT 5 (ET-4).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout, B EDG Start Failure (recoverable). A &
D EDG Fail resultinq in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Applicants Actions or Behavior Announce to the crew you feel ground motion then it stops AND, trigger EVENT 5 (ET-4), OR play earthquake sound for 10 seconds.
Crew identifies a total loss of AC power (Station Blackout) by:
P Observing multiple electrical alarms on alarm panel E3. The group of alarms forms a distinctive U pattern.
9 All AC electrical busses show no voltage 9 ALL EDGs fail to start.
9 Major loads including condensate and circ water are lost.
P NSSSS isolation / MSlV closure.
e Enters or re-enters the following procedures:
P ABZZ-0135 STATION BLACKOUT b EO.ZZ-0101 RPV CONTROL when RPV level drops below
+12.5 inches OR pressure rises above 1037 psig Reports lowering reactor level & rising reactor pressure due to the loss of feedwater & loss of bypass valves.
Reports re-entry conditions to EO.ZZ-0101 RPV CONTROL when RPV level drops below +12.5 inches OR pressure rises above 1037 psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout, 6 EDG Start Failure (recoverable). A &
DEDG Fail resultina in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Identifies that all EDGs failed to start.
Attempts immediate operator actions to start the A, B, & D EDG from the control room IAW step 3.1 of AB.ZZ-0135. Examiner Note: the operator should not attempt to start C EDG since there is a known bus lockout.
Reports that EDG start from the control room was unsuccessful.
SRO Directs:
i BOP to perform subsequent operator actions IAW AB.ZZ-0135 STATION BLACKOUT P RO to maintain OR restore RPV level between +12.5 and
+54 inches using HPCl & RClC P RO to stabilize pressure between 900 and 1000 psig using SRVs RO Sequentially cycles SRVs to stabilize pressure between 900 and 1000 psig.
IF RPV level drops below -38 inches, THEN the RO recognizes that HPCl & RClC failed to automatically start. Examiner Note:
Refer to EVENT 6 for HPCl & RClC component malfunctions.
IF the RO attempts a manual HPCl & RClC start, THEN: .......Examiner Note: Refer to EVENT 6 for HPCl&
RClC component malfunctions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 lp-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Ivent
Description:
Aftershock w l LOP Blackout, 6 EDG Start Failure (recoverable). A &
DEDG Fail resultinq in unrecoverable loss of 1OA401 & 1OA404 Busses
_p Time Position ROIBOPI Applicants Actions or Behavior Recognizes entry conditions to EO.22-0102 when Torus water SRO temperature reaches 95°F or when Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig (DW cooling lost).
SRO Enters E0.U-0102 when Torus water temperature reaches 95°F or when Drywell pressure reaches 1.68 psig and monitors parameters as well as Curve SPT-P for Heat Capacity Temperature limit. Examiner Note: there are no actions to take other than monitor parameters since all containment cooling systems do not have power.
BOP Dispatches operator to the EDG Remote Control Panels to investigate the start failure.
Directs N E 0 to attempt to start EDGs from the Remote or Local Control Panel.
Booth When directed to attempt to start the EDGs locally, then report Operator back that local I remote start attempts failed. Nothing happened when you tried to start the engines. Report that B EDG may have blown control power fuses and that you are troubleshooting with maintenance. State that you may be able to use C EDG fuses in B EDG. Tell the operator that A EDG has a broken starting air line and the air tanks are empty, and D EDG seems to have lost DC control power, but you cannot find the cause. Tell the operator that you will report back shortly with a status report on 6 EDG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-DQ 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout, " B EDG Start Failure (recoverable), " A &
D EDG Fail resultincl in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Once RPV level & pressure are stable, then the CRS briefs the crew as follows:
Communicates plant status including electrical system status, injection sources & pressure control method.
Identifies EDG recovery as a high priority to regain low pressure injection capability, containment cooling, and battery charging.
Assigns the BOP or RO to coordinate with maintenance and field operators to drive diesel recovery.
Assigns BOP or RO for level and pressure control responsibility.
Discusses the need to begin a controlled cooldown.
Discusses the need to continue with the subsequent operator actions in the AB.ZZ-0135 STATION BLACKOUT procedure and assigns the BOP or RO primary responsibility for those tasks. Tasks include calling out attachments for alternative room cooling and DC load shed.
Discusses need to contact the Load Dispatcher to get an ETA for offsite power restoration.
Solicits feedback and then ends the brief.
SRO Directs the RO to initiate a cooldown between 90 and 100°F/hr.
Examiner Note: AB.ZZ-0135 calls for 1OO"Whr cooldown &
EO.ZZ-O1O1 calls for less than 9O"FIhr.
RO Initiates a cooldown as directed by the CRS using SRVs and or RClC as needed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout, B EDG Start Failure [recoverable), A &
D EDG Fail resultinq in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SROIBOP Ensures that the Grid System Operator is contacted to determine the ETA for offsite power restoration and to communicate that a blackout is in progress at the station and that an emergency is in progress. Booth Operator: If contacted, then report that there is extensive grid damage and that the best ETA for offsite power is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Calls out to have the RClC high area temperature isolation bypassed using AB.ZZ-0135 step 4.5.1 1. Examiner Note: this action is directed in two procedures: EO-ZZ-0101 RPV CONTROL and AB.=-0135 STATION BLACKOUT.
Lead When ready, then contact the Simulator Booth Operator to Examiner have him contact the operator performing AB.ZZ-0135 actions to permit 6 EDG recovery.
Booth Contact the operator performing AB.ZZ-0135 and inform him Operator that 6 EDG is ready for start from the control room. If asked, then tell the operator that you found a blown fuse and you replaced it with a fuse from C EDG.
BOP Notifies the CRS that 6 EDG is ready for start.
SRO Directs operator to start and load the B EDG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Aftershock w/ LOP Blackout. 6 EDG Start Failure (recoverable). A&
D EDG Fail resultina in unrecoverable loss of 10A401 & 10A404 Busses Applicants Actions or Behavior Starts the B EDG from the control room panel AND closes the output breaker to energize 1OA402 bus.
CRITICAL TASK Energize 10A402 B train 4KV Bus.
Reports that the B EDG is powering 10A402 bus.
Directs BOP/RO to place 6RHR train of Torus Cooling in service.
Places 6 RHR Torus Cooling in service IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 3 Page 2 of 2.
CRITICAL TASK: BRHR Torus Cooling placed in service IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Attachment 3 Page 2 of 2.
The scenario may be terminated at this point. Remember to ask the SRO a follow-up question to have the SRO determine the Tech Spec call for initial loss of the 10A403 4KV bus (EVENT 4). In addition, have the SRO perform the Admin JPM to make the EAL declaration for this scenario.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 3p-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5
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Description:
HPCl & RClC Auto Start Failure lRClC Recoverable)
Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO D IF RPV level drops below -38 inches, THEN the operator:
9 Recognizes that HPCl & RClC failed to automatically start P Reports the condition to the CRS P Continues to diagnose as follows:
For HPCI, the operator:
9 Attempts a manual start by ARMING, then PRESSING the HPCl MAN INlT PB P Recognizes that HPCl will not start P Reports condition to CRS CRITICAL TASK D For RCIC, the operator:
Attempts a manual start by ARMING, then PRESSING the RClC MAN INIT PB (IAW ABZZ-0001 Attachment 6 page 1 of 6, RCIC Injection). Examiner note: record time when RClC started Recognizes that that the RClC automatic flow controller FIC-R600 has failed as evidenced by speed oscillations (turbine speed will cycle up and down at low speed below the minimum required speed of 2150 RPM).
Places the FIC-R600 in manual control.
Manually raises turbine speed to greater than 2150 RPM AND continues to raise speed as needed to obtain pump discharge pressure greater than reactor pressure to establish RPV injection flow. Examiner note: record time that operator raises speed above 2150 RPM Restores and/or maintains RPV level between +12.5 and +54 inches OR if RClC capacity is too low to reach the normal level band with the existing decay heat, then the operator requests a lower band to control in.
Reports to the CRS that RClC is injecting with the flow controller in manual.
CRITICAL TASK Inject using RClC BEFORE -161 inches.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No. NRC2007 Scenario No. 1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
HPCl & RCIC Auto Start Failure (RCIC Recoverable)
-+-
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Dispatches an operator to investigate HPCl malfunction.
Booth Wait a couple of minutes and report back that there is an oil Operator line break on HPCl and that there is oil on the floor. The oil has not reached the floor drain.
Reports to the CRS that HPCl has an oil line break.
Ensures that maintenance is dispatched to attempt to recover HPCI.
1 Examiner Note: Return to continue in EVENT 5
Amendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Hope Creek Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: NRC2007 Examiners: J. DAntonio Operators: PO)
T. Fish (RO) 6.Haagensen (BOP)
Initial Conditions: Startup is in progress with the unit at about 19% power just after Main Generator Synchronization.
Turnover: Raise power by withdrawing control rods IAW 10-3 and RE guidance Event 1 Malf. 1 EventType. I Event No. No. ______
1 N/A WN (RO/SRO) Raise power by withdrawing control rods 2 NM21A I (ROISRO) A APRM fails upscale after 1 rod is withdrawn (TS) 3 CD23 C (RO/SRO) Stuck control rod 4 FW29A I (SRO) DFCS LT-N004A fails upscale (TS) 5 MS04A C (All) Steam Leak in steam tunnel MS04D 6 Multiple I/O M (All) Hydraulic ATWS when operators attempt to scram Overrides due to rising steam tunnel temperatures 7 CUIIA C (All) Failure of RWCU to isolate on manual SLC initiation CUI 1B 8 MS19D C (All) Failure of D Steam Line to auto isolate MS20D
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor APPENDIX D, Page 38 of 39
Event 1: Withdraw Control CRS directs withdrawing control Rods rods beginning at Step 433 of the Reactor Engineering Pull Sheet.
Crew continues planned Startup activities IAW 10-003 beginning at step 5.4.13 to raise power and prepare for inerting. WITHDRAW the last 4 control rods in the group beginning at Step 433 of the Reactor Engineering Pull Sheet.
Examiner Cue: If the RO withdraws control rod 10-43 requests Reactor from position 12 to 48. The RO Engineering approval for monitors control rod position and continuous withdraw, then NI response during the withdraw.
cue the operator that continuous withdraw is permissible.
RO monitors Reactor power, After the 1 control rod is fully pressure, and level and ensure withdrawn, THEN plant conditions are stable.
TRIGGER ET-2. Ensures no scram setpoints have been exceeded.
Crew recognizes RPS % scram by:
3 OHA C3-A2 REACTOR SCRAM TRIP LOGIC A l 3 OHA C5-A1 NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM
= RPS Trip Logic A1 NORMAURESET status lights extinguished Pilot Scram Valve Solenoid LOGIC A NORMAL status lights for all four groups extinguished.
Page 1 of 13
0 Crew recognizes A APRM Upscale by:
=. OHA C3-C4 APRM SYS A UPSCALE TRIP/INOP
=. C3-D4 APRM UPSCALE 3 APRM A UPSC TR OR INOP status light 3 APRM A UPSC ALARM status light
=. APRM A indicating 125% on 10C650 and CRIDS RO observes normal indications on the other APRMs and reports that A APRM has failed upscale.
RO refers to AR.ZZ-0009 alarm response procedure for OHA C3-C4 and the associated digital alarm point response procedure for D2441.
RO informs the CRS to ensure compliance with Tech Spec 3.3.1.
SRO reviews Technical Specifications 3.3.1 for RPS Instrumentation AND 3.3.6 for Rod Block Instrumentation.
SRO determines that the A APRM can be bypassed and only a tracking LCO is needed since the minimum number of APRMs per trip system remain operable for both the RPS & Rod Block functions.
SRO directs the RO to bypass the A APRM.
RO places APRM RPS TRIP CHANNEL A(6) MONITOR BYPASS joystick in A APRM position.
Page 2 of 13
RO resets the A channel 1/2 scram.
RO resets alarms as applicable.
RO reports that the A APRM is bypassed and that the ?hscram is reset.
SRO contacts I&C OR Work Control to initiate corrective action to repair the A APRM.
SRO directs the RO to continue with control rod withdraw at Step 434 of the Reactor Engineering Pull Sheet.
RO pulls the next two control rods from position 12 to position 48 (Steps 434 & 435). The RO monitors control rod position and NI response during rod withdraws.
RO selects control rod 10-19 and attempts to withdraw the rod.
RO recognizes stuck rod by:
= Various rod position indications NI response RO informs CRS of stuck rod CRS implements AB.IC-0001:
Condition I RO raises drive water d/p in approximately 50 psid increments and attempts to withdraw rod.
Page 3 of 13
Booth Operator: Permit rod WHEN rod withdrawal is Rod may double notch.
movement after 2nd pressure attempted with drive water d/p raise. >300 psid, THEN Crew recognizes rod motion on 4 Rod Display, RWM, or CRIDS.
Examiner Cue: IF the control RO restores drive water d/p to rod double notches, THEN normal band.
the operator may ask for RE recommendation. Cue the operator to continue to withdraw to position 48.
RO withdraws 10-19 to position 48.
RO reports that the rod group withdraw is complete.
Crew recognizes N004A failure by:
3 OHA B1-F5 FEEDWATER 2/3 LOGIC SENSOR FAIL 3 OHA B3-Fl DFCS ALARMRRBL 3 DFCS HIGH LVL TRIP A status light 3 CRIDS D5272 NB/C REACTOR LVL 8 SENSOR FAILURE 3 DFCS REACTOR LEVEL A HIABS
> DFCS REACTOR LEVEL A IOBAD 3 DFCS REACTOR LEVEL A HIDEV LI-R608A indication on 1OC650C.
RO validates current RPV level with redundant instruments.
As RBEO, REPORT there are Crew dispatches RBEO to no visible problems at the A inspect the AInstrument rack.
Instrument rack.
Page 4 of 13
Crew contacts Maintenance to troubleshoot.
CRS recognizes that the following Tech Spec applies:
=. FeedwatedMain Turbine Trip System Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.9 Crew recognizes rising temperature in the Steam Tunnel by:
=. CRlDS A2541 "ST TUNNEL 10-VH216 INLET A I R (116")
at the discretion of the Lead a CRlDS D3171/3712 "STM TUNNEL RM 4316 TEMP HI" (140")
=. OHA D3-A3 "MN STMIRWCU AREA LEAK TEMP HI" (145")
3 OHA E l - F l "COMPUTER PT IN ALARM" (150")
=. CRlDS D363313635 "STM TUNNEL RM 4316 ISLN DMPR NOPEN (150")
=. ConditionA IF dispatched to check the 0 CRS briefs the crew regarding status of Steam Tunnel Unit the Retainment Override and Coolers, when a scram is required.
THEN REPORT both Steam Tunnel Unit Coolers are in service.
IF dispatched to check the 0 WHEN the Crew determines status of HD-9395NB. Steam Tunnel temperature THEN REPORT they are both cannot be maintained below 145 CLOSED. degrees, THEN CRS directs locking the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
When RX Mode Switch is 0 RO locks the Mode Switch in placed in SHUTDOWN, THEN SHUTDOWN and performs Trigger ET-10. scram actions IAW AB.22-0001 Att. 1.
Page 5 of 13
Event 6: ATWS e Crew recognizes Scram I
The failure to scram is already Condition and Reactor Power inserted. Above 4% EOP entry condition:
= APRM indications Absence of rod motion
= All RPS channels still RESET
=. Rod position indications e RO performs scram actions IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 1.
e PO stabilizes and maintains RPV level as directed by CRS.
CRS directs:
Initiating SLC Verifying RWCU Isolates e RO/PO initiate SLC.
CRITICAL TASK
- Crew initiates SLC before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110 degrees.
e Crew recognizes RWCU failure to isolate bv:
HV-FOOlIF004 OPEN indication on 10C651C and 1OC650D RWCU pump running indication on 1OC651C RWCU flow indication on CRlDS page 61 and 232 e RO/PO isolate RWCU and inform CRS of failure to automatically isolate.
e CRS directs:
Verifying Recirc runback to minimum a Tripping reactor recirc pumps e RO/PO:
=, Verify Recirc runback to minimum Trip reactor recirc pumps Page 6 of 13
CRS directs closing MSlVs and drains.
RO closes MSlVs and drains.
IF directed, THEN RO/PO control pressure with SRVs IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 13.
IF MSlVs are NOT isolated prior The D steam line to steam tunnel temperature MSlVs will fail to reaching 160°, automatically close.
THEN Crew recognizes failure of -
ALL lines can be Main Steam Line to isolate by: isolated by the Crew.
3 OHA C8-C4 NSSSS ISLN SIG - STM TNL TEMP HI 3 OHA C8-A1/2/3/4 NSSSS MSlV LOGIC INITIATED
=. Amber NSSSS MSIV TRIP LOGIC TRIPPED status lights MSlV indication on 1OC651C Lowering Reactor Pressure IF MSlVs are NOT isolated prior to steam tunnel temperature exceeding 160°,
THEN_ Crew recognizes uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS by:
=, MSlV position indication
=, Various Reactor Pressure indications 3 OHA C8-B3 NSSSS ISLN SIG - MN STM PRESSURE LO CRITICAL TASK
- CREW isolates steam line break RECORD time (if any) andprevents an uncontrolled between 160 degF and depressurization during ATWS all MSlVs are closed:
conditions by closing MSIVs before TIME:
Main Steam tunnel temperature has been above 160 degF for more than 5 minutes.
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0 RO/PO inhibit ADS IAW ABZZ-0001 Att. 13.
CRITICAL TASK
- CREWprevents an uncontrolled This Critical Task is not depressurization during ATWS applicable if RPV level conditions by preventing ADS never reaches -129.
ACTUATION. See justification for failure criteria.
Booth Operator: CRS directs performance of the The timing, order, and REFER to the appropriate EOP following EOPs: priority of the EOP and SUPPORT Crew requests EO.ZZ-0320 Defeating ARI performance may vary.
for EOPs IAW with the and RPS Interlocks following. Validated execution 3 EO.ZZ-0322 Core Spray time delays are built-in. Injection Valve Override Should NOT call out EO.ZZ-0311 Bypassing EO.ZZ-0301 DO NOT input EOP-320 at Primary Containment Bypassing MSlV this time. Instrument Gas Isolation Isolation Interlocks due Interlocks to known steam line EO.ZZ-0319 Restoring leak.
Instrument Air in an Emergency CRS directs terminating and preventing injection to the RPV with the exception of:
3 SLC 3 CRD RClC RO/PO terminate and prevent injection from HPCI, RHR and feedwaterlcondensate IAW AB.ZZ-0001:
=) Att 16 for 10C650 Att. 17 for 10C651 CRS directs maintaining RPV Typically, the lower end water level between - 5 0 and of the level band is set
-185 with: above -1 29.
3 Feedwater IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 14 3 RClC IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 6 HPCI IAW EOP-322 Page 8 of 13
RO/PO control level as directed by CRS with:
3 Feedwater IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 14 3 RClC IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 6
= HPCl IAW EOP-322 CRITICAL TASK Crew lowers RPVlevel to -50: and ensures adequate core cooling by maintaining or restoring RPV level above -185 without Emergency Depressurizing.
CRS directs bypassing the RWM and commencing manual rod insertion.
RO/PO bypass RWM and insert control rods IAW RE-AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 1.
Crew recognizes Supp Pool Temp Above 95°F EOP entry condition by:
OHA C8-F1 SUPPR POOL TEMP H I G H Flashing 95 degree status light on 1OC650C RM11 9AX833/834 alarm Various Suppression Pool temperature indicators CRS directs placing RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling.
RO/PO place RHR in Supp Pool Cooling IAW AB.ZZ-0001 Att. 3.
RO/PO align SACS to support Depending on resource second RHR Hx IAW management, this may SO.EG-0001 Section 5.9. not occur until the reactor is shutdown under all conditions without boron.
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Booth Operator: -
IF Suppression Pool temperature WHEN the Crew has is > I 10 degrees, established level control, -
AND Reactor power is >4%,
AND at the discretion of the AND SRVs are open or cycling, Lead Examiner, THEN Crew terminates and THEN SUPPORT Crew prevents injection to the RPV requests for EOP-320. with the exception of SLC, CRD, and RCIC, Reactor power is c4%,
OR RPV level reaches -129, OR SRVs remain closed.
IF RPV level reaches -1 29, THEN Crew terminates and prevents injection from Core Spray.
Booth Operator: WHEN EOP-320 Section 5.1 and WHEN the Crew has reset 5.2 are complete, RPS AND inserts the next THEN the Crew implements scram, EOP-320 Section 5.3 and reset THEN allow full rod insertion by RPS.
deleting malfunction RPO1.
CAUTION: the rods WILL insert as soon as malfunction RPO1 is deleted.
Booth Operator: WHEN OHA C6-E4 clears, SDV may be accelerated for THEN the Crew initiates a time compression purposes. manual scram IAW EOP-320 Section 5.3.
CRITICAL TASK
- Crew fully inserts all control rods by any combination of:
Manual insertion Ordering EOP-0320 Crew recognizes the reactor is shutdown by:
3 SPDS ALL RODS IN a RWM Confirm Shutdown a CRlDS Rod positions RO verifies reactor shutdown status and informs CRS.
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WHEN the reactor is shutdown Should secure SLC under all conditions, pumps prior to exiting W C R S exits EOP-1O1A and EOP-1OlA unless they enters EOP-101. are being used for level control.
at the discretion of Page 11 of 13
NRC Scenario 2 1.
- CREW isolates steam line break andprevents an uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS conditions by closing MSZVs before Main Steam tunnel temperature has been above 160 degF for more than 5 minutes.
WA 239001 Main and Reheat Steam System A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Main and Reheat Steam System; and (b) based on those predictions, use. procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:
A2.07 Main steam area high temperature or differential temperature high RO 3.8 SRO 3.9 WA 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EA2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EA2.06 Reactor Pressure RO 4.0 SRO 4.1 Given the current ATWS conditions of this scenario, preventing uncontrolled depressurization is as important as isolating the steam leak. The failure of the Main Steam lines to automatically isolate represents a containment bypass event at a time when the fuel is being challenged by an ATWS event.
Operator action is required to isolate the Main Steam lines. Although EOP-IOIA mitigation strategy allows bypassing the -129 isolation, this is only to account for intentional lowering of RPV level to below
-129. No procedure, including EOP-IOlA, supports leaving the MSIVs open with a leak that has exceeded isolation setpoints. This is philosophy is most clearly demonstrated by the procedure that bypasses the -129 isolations, EO.=-0301, whose prerequisites require: There is no indication of gross fuel element failure or steam line break. Successful completion of this critical task is demonstrated by closing the MSIVs before main steam tunnel temperature has been above the isolation setpoint for more than five minutes.
2
WA 218ooO Automatic Depressurization System A4 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room:
A4.04 ADS inhibit RO 4.1 SRO 4.1 WA 295031 Reactor Low Water Level EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL:
EA.06 Automatic depressurization RO 4.4 SRO 4.4 Given the current ATWS conditions of this scenario, preventing ADS automatic operation and potential uncontrolled reactor level flood up prevents a significant transient and subsequent positive reactivity addition to the reactor. EOPs direct this action under the current conditions. This critical task is only applicable if RPV water level goes below -129. Failure to satisfactorily complete the task is demonstrated by an automatic ACTUATION of ADS such that the ADS SRVs open and reduce reactor pressure by more than 300 psig.
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3
- Crew initiates SLC before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110 degrees.
WA 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EA1.04 SBLC RO 4.5 SRO 4.5 EA2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EAZ.04 Suppression Pool Temperature RO 4.0 SRO 4.1 Both RPS and AFU failed to insert any control rods. The closure of MSlVs will result in rejection of all heat t o containment. EOP-1OlA requires initiation of SLC for ATWS events with power 9%. The Boron Initiation Injection Temperature for the post scram power level in this scenario power is 110°F. Both AP208 and BP208 SLC pump fail to auto start. Crew action is required t o commence SLC injection before the BIIT is reached.
4
- Crew lowers RPV level to -50: and ensures adequate core cooling by maintaining or restoring RPV level above -185 without Emergency Depressurizing.
IUA 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EA2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EA2.02 Reactor water level RO 4.1 SRO 4.2 Lowering level RPV level during an ATWS with reactor power >4% is a key strategy for controlling reactor power.
Maintaining adequate Core cooling under ATWS conditions is accomplished by maintaininghestoring level above
-185. HPCI and RCIC are capable of maintaining level under the current conditions. An Emergency Depressurization is not wmanted and would result in a large injection of cold water and the potential displacement of boron from the core.
5
- Crew fully inserts all control rods by any combination of:
Manual insertion Ordering EOP-0320 IUA 295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown EAI. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown:
EA1.O1 Reactor Protection System RO 4.6 SRO 4.6 EA1.07 RMCS RO 3.9 SRO 4.0 Manually inserting all control rods, or directing HC.OP-EO.=-0320, provides the only methods for control rod insertion and substantial negative reactivity addition. It is critical for the crew to implement one of these methods to insert control rods and shut the reactor down. Failure to initiate these actions may leave the reactor subcritical due only to boron, and any event that displaces the boron would result in a significant power transient and challenge to the fuel. Additionally, with the MSIVs closed, any heat generated must be rejected to containment, which is not designed for sustained heat rejection from a reactor at power.
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