ML21075A105
| ML21075A105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/2021 |
| From: | Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Todd Fish Operations Branch I |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19353E011 | List: |
| References | |
| EPID L-2021-OLL-0001 | |
| Download: ML21075A105 (204) | |
Text
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 218000 K1.01 Importance Rating 4.0 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthephysical connections and/or cause- effect relationships between AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIzATION SYSTEM andthe following: RHR/LPCI: Plant-Specific Question: RO#1 Given:
= A small break LOCAexists ina RWCUpipe chase. ,
= Theleak hasnotbeen isolated.
= Therearenoother leaksfrom primary containment.
= HPCIisinjecting.
= RPVlevel is30inches above the topofactive fuel andcontinues tolower.
=
pressure Drywell isat.75psig andsteady. .
Which ofthe following describes whenADSinitiates toallow LPCIinjection into theRPV?
A. 105seconds after the first twoLPCI (RHR) pumpsstart
~
B. 105seconds ADSlogic after determines thatthere isa leak C. 405seconds ADSlogic after determines thatRPVlevel hasbeenless thanthe ADSsetpoint D. 105seconds RPVlevel after 1(-129 inches)isconfirmedwitha RPVlevel 3 (12.5 inches) signalin Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): IAWHC.OP-SO.SN-0001(Q) section 3.3.1(see attached)
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. The 105second timer isonly functionalifRPVlevel islowcoincident withhigh drywell pressure, A leak intheRWCUpipe chase isoutside ofcontainment anddoesnot affect drywellpressure the5 minute timer hastotime outfor leaksoutside thedrywell.
B: Incorrect- The105 second timer isonly functionalifRPVlevel islowcoincident withhigh drywell pressure, A leak intheRWCUpipe chase isoutside ofcontainment anddoesnot affect drywell pressurethe 5 minute timer hastotimeoutfor leaksoutside thedrywell.
C: 'Correct- TheADSdrywell bypass timerwill timeout at300seconds andinitiated depressurization. TAFis161" hence, the initial is-131" condition plus105second timer. The LPCI (RHR) pumpsw ill be running from theRPV level1 (-129inches) signal.
start D: Incorrect. The105second timer isonlyfunctional if RPVlevel islowcoincident withhigh dryweli pressure, A leak intheRWCUpipe chase isoutside ofcontainment anddoesnot affect drywell pressure the5 minute timerhas totimeoutfor leaks outside thedrywell.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SN-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
NUCLEAR PRESSURE RELIEF AND AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIzATION SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective:
Question Source: Bank# 30912 ~ '
Modified Bank# (Note changesorattachparent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 239002 K1.06 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthephysical connections and/or cause- effect relationships between RELIEF/SAFETY VALVESandthe following: Drywell instrument air/
drywell pneumatics: Plant-Specific Question: RO#2 Given:
Theplantisoperating at100%power.
Then:
A small leakdevelops ontheH-T210 pneumatic accumulator tankforthePSV-F013H SRV.
Whateffectwill haveonplant this operations?
A. Drywell pressure will risesteadily duetotheinleakage. Containment venting berequired will tomaintaindrywell pressure inthenormal band.
B. Thefrequency ofnitrogenmakeup tothedrywell will riseduetodrywell oxygen concentrations from rising theleak.
C. Thefrequency ofnitrogenmakeup tothedrywell rise will duetolowering drywell pressure from theaccumulator leakage.
D. TheAuto-Lead PCIGcompressor cycle will morefrequently.
There willbeNO significantnetchange indrywell pressure oroxygen concentration.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): SRVAccumulator ensures that theSRV's canbeopened andheld open following afailure ofthepneumatic supply, (PCIG), tothe ThePCIGsystem valve. takes suction onthe drywellatmosphere, which isprimarily nitrogen wheninerted; compresses thatgasandreturns it tothe drywell foruse bypneumatic valves (SRVs). Normal operationisonecompressor inAUTOLEAD modecyclingon and off between94-106 psig andthe othercompressor inAUTOmodecycling onand off between 85-106 psig.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect- Thenitrogen isina closed loop. TheN2leaked intothedrywell would bedrawn back into thePCIGsystem whenthecompressor cycles.There would benonetchange in drywell atmosphere.
B: Incorrect- TheSRVaccumulators arecharged N2from PClG. There would benooxygen introduced into thedrywellasa result oftheleak. Thestudent hastounderstand thepneumatic supply tothe SRVaccumulators.
C: incorrect- Thenitrogen isina closed loop. TheN2leaked intothe drywellwould.be drawn back into thePC1G system whenthe compressor cycles.There would benonetchange in drywell atmosphere.
D: Correct- PCIGcompressors normally take suction on the drywellatmosphere. PClGsupplies theSRVaccumulators. A leak onanaccumulator would resultisPCIGreceiver pressure lowering morequickly, which wouldresult inmorefrequent PCIGcompressorruns. The nitrogen; however, isina closed loop. Since theleakedN2 would bedrawn back into thePCIG system whenthecompressor cycles, therewould benonet change inthe drywell atmosphere.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.GS-0001(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
CONTAlNMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION HC.OP-SO.KL-0001(Q)
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENTGAS SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a system tha~tisphysically connected toorrequired for supportofthe Main SteamSystem, summarize the purpose ofthat interrelationship Question Source: Bank # 62165 ModifiedBank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New
-Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(8)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 203000 K2.01 Importance Rating 3.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofelectrical power supplies tothefollowing: Pumps- RHR/LPCI:
Injection Mode Question: RO#3 Given:
= Theplant wasoperating at100%power ina normal electrical line-up.
When:
a A high drywell pressure conditionof1.68 psigoccurs.
After30seconds,what will bethepower supply tothe RHRPumprunning
'C' inthe LPCI mode ofoperation?
A. Station Service Transformer 1BX501 via10A403 Switchgear B. 1CG400 diesel generator via 10A403 Switchgear C. 1CG400diesel generator via10B430 USS D. Station Service Transformer 1AX501 via10A403 Switchgear Proposed Answer: D
2021.NRC Written Examination Explanation (Optional):
4.16KVbuses 10A401 (Channel A)and10A403 (Channel C)arenormally powered from section 7 of the13.8KVring busviastation service transformer 1AX501This source (1AX501) isalso the alternate power supply for 10A402 (Channel B)and10A404 (ChannelD).
4.16KV buses 10A402 and 10A404 arenormally powered fromsection2ofthe13.8KV ring busvia station service transformer 1BX501 This source (1BX501)isalsothe power alternate supply for 10A401 and10A403.
Ifboth the normal andalternate sources tothe 4.16KV Class1Evitalbuses arelost (LOP), theEDGs will start torestore power totheir respective buses.
Each 4.16KV Class 1Evital bussupplies two 480VAC USSsvia stepdown transformers.
4.16KV Class Bus480VAC USS 10A401 10B410and 10B450 10A402 10B420 and10B460 10A403 (4.16KV) 10B430 and10B470 (480 VAC) 10A404 10B440 and10B480 Seeattached Table 1ofRHRpower supplies.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. 1BX501 isanalternate power supplytothe10A403 switchgear.Since the plant isin a normal electrical lineupandthere isnoLOP,the'C'RHRpumpispoweredfrom the 10A403 4.16KV Switchgear whichisnormally powered bythe1AX501 transformer.
B: Incorrect- Duetothe LOCAsignal fromhigh drywell pressurethe 1CG400 ('C' EDG) will be running but notloaded. Since there isno LOPsignal, the'C"RHRpumpwill bepowered fromthe10A403 4.16KV Switchgear which isnormally powered bythe1AX501 transformer.
C: incorrect- Since thereisnoLOPsignal, thepumpwill bepowered fromnormal ACDistribution lineup. Thenormal power supply forthe'C' RHRpumpisthe 4.16KV10A403 Switchgear. The 10B430 Unit Substation isa 'C' Channel 1Epower supplyforthe 480VACdistribution not the 4.16 KV D: Correct. Since thereisnoLOPsignal, thepumpwill bepowered fromnormal ACDistribution lineup. The'C' RHRpumpispowered from the10A403 4.16KV Switchgear whichisnormally powered bythe1AX501 transformer.
2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BC-0001(Q) Table1 (Attachif notpreviously provided)
RESIDUAL HEATREMOVAL SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants examination: none during Learning Objective: Concerning the1EACdistribution switchgear:
Given a listofelectrical loads (motor/unit "
choose arepowered which substations);
from the 1E4.16KV switchgear(s).
Question Source: Bank#
Modified Bank # (Note orattach changes parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 215003 K2.01 Importance Rating 2.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofelectrical power supplies tothe IRM following:
channels/detectors Question: RO#4 Given:
= Theplant isconducting astartupIAWHC.OP-lO.zz-0003,"Startup from Cold Shutdown toRated Power",
= TheReactor ModeSwitch isinSTARTUP/HOT STANDBY.
When:
= TheIRMSystem "A" UPSCALE/INOPERATIVE (C3-C2) alarmisreceived.
= RPSTrip System "A"isin(half-scram).
Which oneofthe following distribution panels' loss ofpower wouldbethecause ofthecurrent plantstatus?-
A. 1AD307, +24VDCPower Distribution B. 1AD417, 1E125VDCPower Distribution
~
C. 1AD318, Non-1E 125VDCPower Distribution D. 1AJ483, Non-1E 120VACPower Distribution Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): TheIRMvoltage pre-regulator receives+ 24VDCfrom plant DCdistribution (1AD307/1BD307) andprovides therequired regulated output(+20 VDC)'totheIRMchannel voltage regulator. Thevoltage regulator receives theoutput (+20VDC) from t hepre-regulator and generatesthe required operating voltages 15VDC) circuitry.Loss ofeitherthe
(+
+15VDC forinput or-15VDC tothehigh power voltage supplywill power cause supply anINOPtrip andtheIRMelectronic oftheaffected channels and a resultant half scram.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With the loss ofpower from the1AD307 +24VDCdistribution panel the"A" & "C" channel IRMswould losetheelectronic power circuitry andwould cause a lowvoltage onthe High Voltage Power Supply tothe IRMdrawers andbring inanINOPalarm which thenwould cause anRPStrip on the "A"channel (half-scram).
B: Incorrect- IRMsarenotpowered bya 1EVDCsource. The1E125VDCprovides control power to1Eloads. Thestudent has to decipher between a 1Esource versus a Non-1E sourceand also the proper DCdistribution125 VDC versus 24VDC.TheIRMsarepowered from24VDC 1AD307 ("A" & "C"channel IRMs) and 1BD307 ("B" & "D"channel IRMs).
C: Incorrect- IRMs arenot powered bya 125 VDC source.TheNon-1E 125VDCprovides control power tovarious Non-1E loads. Thestudent has todecipherbetween a 125VDCversus 24 VDCdistribution. TheIRMsarepowered from 24 VDC 1AD307 ("A" & "C" channel IRMs)and 1BD307 ("B" & "D"c hannel IRMs).
D: Incorrect. TheAPRMs,LPRMs(APRM slaves) and RBMs are powered from two120VAC UPS buses, 1AJ483 (thruEPAbreakers 1AN413 and1BN413) and 1BJ483 (thru EPAbreakers 1AN414 and1BN414). Thestudent hastorecognize thatthe PRNMs are AC powered andthe IRMsareDCpowered even though they arepart oftheNuclear Instrumentation System.
Technical Reference(s): E-0010 (Attach ifnot previously provided)
Single Line Meter andRelay Drawing 24VDCSystem Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Given a loss ofelectrical powertotheIRM Drives explain what response would be expected, IAWavailable ControlRoom Procedures.
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # -
262001 K3.01 Importance Rating 3.5 Knowledge K/AStatement: oftheeffect that a loss or malfunction ofthe A.C.
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION haveonfollowing:
will Major system loads Question: RO#5
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
= All Circulating Water pumps arerunningwith theirdischarge valves open.
full Then, power islost totheCirculating Water4.16 KVBus, 10A502.
= Ithas been sixty(60) seconds the since loss ofpower tothebus.
= NOoperator actionshave been performed onthe circulatingwater system.
Whatisthe presentCirculating Water systemconfiguration?
A. AP501andCP501 pumps arerunning BP501andDP501 pumps aretripped HV-2152A andHV-2152C Circ Water PumpDischarge Valves remain as-iswith NOposition indication HV-2152B andHV-2152D Circ WaterPumpDischarge Valves areinthe CLOSEDposition B. AP501andCP501pumps arerunning BP501 andDP501 pumpsaretripped Circ Water PumpDischarge Valves HV-2152A,B,C & D areintheOPENposition C. BP501 andDP501 pumps arerunning AP501andCP501 pumpsaretripped HV-2152B andHV-2152D CircWater PumpDischarge Valvesremain as-iswith NOposition indication HV-2152A andHV-2152C CircWater PumpDischarge Valves areinthe CLOSEDposition D. BP501andDP501pumpsarerunning AP501andCP501pumpsaretripped Circ Water PumpDischarge Valves HV-2152A,B,C & D areinthe OPEN position Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): HC.OP-SO.DA-0001, Section 3.3.8 Inthe event ofa BusPower Failure:
Inthe event of a 10A501 buspower failure,the "A" and"C"Pumps will trip withtheir respective valves closing within 30 seconds. Thedischarge valves for and"D"Pumpswill "B" fail asiswith lossofposition indication.
Inthe event ofa 10A502 buspower failure,the"B"and"D"Pumpswill trip withtherespective valves closing within 30 seconds. TheDischarge Valves for"A"and"C"Pumpswill remain aswith NOposition indication.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With the loss of the 10A502, the "B"and"D"Circ Pumpswill immediately and trip their associated discharge valves will stroke closewithin 30seconds. Since the"A" and"C" Circ pumps stillhave poweralong withtheir dischargevalves thepumps will continue torunthe valves will not move, howeverthey willlose indication.
position B: Incorrect- "A" and"C" pumps willbe running and the"B" and"D" pumpswillbetripped, however the"B" and"D" discharge valves will goclosedtoprevent the spinning trippedpumps backwards andrunning outthe"A" and"C" pumps.
C: incorrect- The10A502 powers the"B" and"D" pumps. They would trip immediately andthe respective discharge valves would goclosed.
D: Incorrect. The10A502 powers the"B"and"D"pumps. They wouldtrip immediately andthe respective discharge valves would goclosed.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.DA-0001 (Attach if notpreviously provided)
Circulating Water System Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Given a set ofconditions anda drawing of the controls, instrumentation,and/or alarms located intheMain ControlRoom, assess the status oftheCirculatingWater System byevaluation ofthecontrols, instrumentation, andalarms.
Question Source: Bank# 34417 Modified Bank # (Note changesorattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 262002 K3.02 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheeffectthata loss or malfunction oftheUNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) will onfollowing: Recirculation have pumpspeed: Plant-Specific Question: RO#6
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= The'A' Reactor Recirculation pumpisoperating at88%speed withallcells inservice.
= The'A' NXGController wasincontrol with the'B" NXGController available.
= The1AD131 VFD120VUPSwasoperating inNORMAL.
When:
= Dueto a manipulation error, the 480VAC supply tothe 1AD131 opened.
isinadvertently
= 'A'NXG Controller failure occurs.
= Automatic NXG Controller switchover to'B' NXGController occurs.
= (C1-D4 )REACTOR RECIRC A TROUBLE O HA isreceived Noother operator actions have been taken.
Whatisthe expected condition ofthe 'A'Recirculation pump/VFD followingtheNXGController Switchover?
A. Thepumpremains operating at 88% speed.
B. .
Thepumpisoperating atless than 88% speed.
C. Thepumpisoperating atgreater than88% speed.
. D. Thepumptrips.
Proposed Answer: B -
Explanation (Optional):Twodedicated 120VACUPSunits areprovided tosupplythe control powerfor the 480VACsupply VFD's. power istransformed intotwo120VACfeeds thatsupply theUPS.The redundant control power supplies ofthe VFD's arepowered byseparate 120VACsources, oncifrom eachUPS.The1A-D-131 UPSisthe normal supply tothe A components andthebackup supplytothe B components. The1B-D-131 UPSisthe normal supply tothe B components andthebackup supply to theA components. there If isa loss ofAC power, whenACinput power isrestored, the Inverter will automatically switch backtoACinput andtheUPSwill begin recharging thebatteries.
The'A'NXGcontroller isnormally incontrol with the 'B' instandby. If afaultoccursonthe 'A'NXG control controller, will swaptothe'B' NXGcontroller. Drive output will shutdown forapproximately 0.5seconds duringtheswap, which will result ina small decrease inpumpspeed. Themain Drive synchronizes tothenewlower pumpspeed a,nd initiates an Automatic Speed H old.
2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. Drive output will shutdown forapproximately 0.5 secondsduring theswap, which will result ina small decrease inpumpspeed.
B: Correct- When input power isrestored, theUPSwill automaticallyswapback toNORMAL. If a
fault occurs onthe'A' NXGcontroller, controlwill swaptothe'B' NXGcontroller.Drive output will shutdown for approximately 0.5 seconds during theswap,which result will ina small decrease inpumpspeed. Themain Drive synchronizes tothenewlower pump speed.
C: incorrect- TheUPS will automatically swapback toNORMAL uponrestoration ofinput power.
Themain Drive synchronizes tothenewlower pumpspeed.
D: incorrect. TheUPSwill only swap to BYPASSoperation duetoaninternal TheUPS fault.
would stillbeoperating andable to automatically transfer back toNORMAL wheninput power wasrestored. Driveoutput willshutdown forapproximately 0.5seconds during theswap, which will result inasmall decrease inpump speed. Themain synchronizes Drive tothe newlower pumpspeed.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.NQ-0003(Q) if (Attach previously not provided)
OPERATION OFREACTOR RECIRC VFDUNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES NOH01RECCON-16 Recirc. VFDLP Proposed Referenc.es tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Identify theresponse oftheReactor Recirculation VFDUPStothe following:
Loss ofNormal ACsupply Restoration ofNormal ACSupply Identify theresponse oftheVFDtoa Power Cell Bypass andNXGController failure. . . .
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattachparent)
New X v
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
Comments:
/
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO -
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 259002 K4.09 importance Rating 3.1 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofREACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM design feature(s) and/orinterlocks which providefor the following: Single element control Question: RO#7 Given:
a Theplantisconducting a startupIAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0003,"Startup from Cold Shutdown toRated Power".
= TheDigitalFeedwater ControlSystem isinSingle Element Control.
Whichofthefollowing describes whyRPVwater level isthesingle controllingparameter during lowpoweroperations?
A. Steam flow/Feed flow signals aremoreaccurate atlowpower.
B. RPVlevel changes are faster atlowpower than athigh power.
C. Steam flow/Feed flow signals areless accurateatlowpower D. Narrow Range Rosemount Level Detectors areinaccurate atlowpower.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Single element control isusedasthe controlling parameterduring lowpower operation andmeansthat vessel water level ismonitored asthe controllingparameter. Atlowpower operations: Vessel level changes areslower, Steam/feed flow signals areless accurate, thecontrol signal is developed bytaking themedian value ofthe three Narrow RangeRosemount Leveldetectors (PDT-N004 A, B &C)
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Steam flow/feed flow areparameters used bytheDFCS,however atlowpowers theses parameters arelessaccurate andtherefore theRPVwater level willbethecontrolling parameter.
B: Incorrect- ActualRPV level changesareslower atlower powers ascompared tohigher power level changes.
C: Correct- Steamflow/feed flow areparameters usedbytheDFCS,however atlowpowers theses parameters arelessaccurate andtherefore theRPVwater will level bethecontrolling parameter. TheFeedwater flow transmitters N002A/B- C32indicate theFeedwater flows tothe reactor vessel. Theassociated instrument loops arecalibrated for Power Operation (OPCON 1) andthus mayindicate inaccurate values inother conditions.
D: Incorrect. Narrow Range (0" to+60") isthe most accurate level indication normal during operations. It isreferencedtoinstrument zero and calibrated forsaturated steam-watermixture at1000 psig, 135FDrywell temperature, 75F Reactor Buildingtemperature. Provides level input totheMainControl Room,DFCS,ADS,RPS, and NS4 Technical Referen.ce(s): HC.OP-lO.zz-0003(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviouslyprovided)
STARTUP FROMCOLD SHUTDOWN TORATEDPOWER HC.OP-SO.AE-0001(Q)
FEEDWATER SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, describe thebasic control scheme for single element (startup) and threeelement (master), anddifferential pressure Feedwater controlmodes including process variables thatareused asinput signals for eachmode Question Source: Bank# 30946 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 205000 K4.05 Importance Rating 3.6 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofSHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE)design feature(s)and/orinterlocks which providefor the following:
Reactor cooldown rate Question: RO#8
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= TheplantisintheShutdown Cooling modeofoperation onthe'A'RHRloop.
= RHRShutdownCooling flow isnormal.
When:
= Thecrew recognizes that the cooldown rate isexcessive.
= TheCRS directs theRO/POtoreduce thecooldown rate.
Thecurrentvalvestatus/lineup for the 'A' RHRloop:
> BC-HV-F048A, RHRHX A SHELL SIDEBYPVLVis100%open.
> BC-HV-F003A, RHRHXA OUTLET VLVis80%open.
> BC-HV-F015A, RHRLOOP.RET TO RECIRC VLVis60%open.
/
Whichoneofthe following valve manipulations would reduce the cooldownrateIAWplant procedures?
A. Throttling CLOSED onthe BC-HV-F048A RHRHXSHELLSIDEBYPVLV.
B. Throttling OPENontheBC-HV-F003A RHR HX A OUTLET VLV.
C. Throttling OPENonthe BC-HV-F015A RHRLOOP RET TORECIRC VLV.
/ D. Throttling CLOSED onthe BC-HV-F003A RHRHXA OUTLET VLV.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-SO.BC-0002 Section5.2.40 Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Closing theF048A would send moreflow through the'A'RHRHXwhich would increasethe cooldown rate. Thestudent needstounderstand effects theoperational of manipulating the F048A andF003A andhowtheF048Abeing opened full requires theF003Ato beclosed todecrease cooldown rate.
B: Incorrect- With theF048A fully opened andthen theF003Afurther throttling openwould increase the cooldown rate. Moreflow through the'A'RHRHX.
C: Incorrect- F015Aisthrottled to maintain Shutdown Cooling flowatrequired flowrates. The F015A isnotthrottled for temperature control IAWprocedure.
D: Correct. Closing theF003A wouldreduce theflow through the'A'RHRHXwhich would decrease cooldown Thestudentneeds tounderstand theoperational rate. effects of manipulating theF048A andF003A andhow the FO48Abeing full opened the requires F003Ato beclosed todecrease cooldown rate.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BC-0002(Q) (Attachif provided) notpreviously Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given procedure HC.OP-SO.BC-0002, "Decay Heat Removal Operation",
explainthelisted prerequisites, precautions, and/or during limitations operation.
Question Source: Bank#
Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattachparent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(14)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 263000 K5.01 Importance Rating 2.6 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheoperational implications ofthe following concepts asthey apply toD.C.ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION: Hydrogen generation during battery charging.
Question: RO#9 Given:
a Theplantisoperating at100%power.
= HPCI250VDCbattery hasjust completed deep discharge rate surveillance testing.
= TheHPCIBattery charger hasbeenplaced inservice andischarging theassociated HPCIbattery bank.
Then:
a OHADiesel AreaHVACPanel 1EC483 E6-C2 isreceived.
= Thefield operator reportsa Iossofall Battery roomventilation.
= Theapplicable Abnormal procedure(s) is(are) entered.
Whichofthefollowing describes anoperational implication associated with theabove conditions ontheHPCI250VDCDistribution System?
A. Heat induced crackingofthebattery cells B. Buildup ofhazardous lead sulfate (PbSO4) dust onBattery Roomcomponents C. Explosive hydrogen-air mixture intheBattery Room D. Electrical fire causedwhenmoisture condenses across battery terminals Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0001 Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Thebattery roomtemperature will notbehigh enough tocausecracking. However, the student could seethis asa possible answer duetothe higherthannormal temperatures in the battery room. Theroomtemperature actually will comedownwithout ventilation. The battery rooms arekept between 740F and800F.Thebatteries areinoperableat<74aF.
B: Incorrect-As long asthe batteries areintact therewill benolead sulfate onthebatteries and certainly nodust will accumulate duetohigher temperatures.
C: Correct- During charging thebattery produces hydrogen whichcanbuild toexplosive conditions without ventilation. Eventhough this'wouldtake a long timefor anexplosive amount ofHydrogen tobuild up, the HVAC abnormal specifically directs monitoring bothtemperature andhydrogen concentration during each (see shift attached).
D: Incorrect. With thebattery cells intact, nomoisture willbuild up.Withnoventilationthestudent might think the humidity would rise in the room. A rise inhumidity wouldnotcause a spark across terminals. Thetemporary ventilation wouldcontrol batteryroomtemperature between 740F and80"F Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0001 if (Attachnotpreviously provided)
HVAC Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Given a setofplant conditions/malfunctions associated with battery ventilation, evaluatewhether a loss ofventilation toa battery roomcan result inequipment failure.
Question Source: Bank#
Modified Bank # (Notechangesorattach parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10) '
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 264000 K5.05 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheoperational implications ofthefollowing concepts asthey apply toEMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) :Paralleling A.C. power sources Question: RO#10 Given:
= HC.OP-ST.KJ-0003, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1CG400 OPERABILITY TEST MONTHLY isinprogress.
= ThePOispreparing tosynchronize "C"Emergency DieseiGenerator (EDG) toitsvital bus.
tosynchronizing, Prior the"C" EDGgovernor isplaced inthe mode, to ensure the EDG "C"
A. ISOCHRONOUS; exhibits proper loadsharingcharacteristics.
B. DROOP;exhibits properload sharing characteristics.
C. DROOP;vital busfrequency ismaintained.
D. ISOCHRONOUS; vital busfrequency ismaintained.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): ISOCHRONOUSMODEplaces the governor inisochronous (frequency governing). DROOP MODEplaces thegovernor indroop (load sharing). SPEEDDROOPcontrol:
permits load division andparallel operation ofunits whencontrolled bythemechanical governor.If thediesel generator isrunning intest output breaker is (paralleled tripped with open. This source) anoffsite whenanauto isdonetoprevent severe start power signalisreceived, andvoltage surges the when the governor isshifted toisochronous andthe voltage regulator isset for4160volts.After thebreaker istripped, it willreclose on the busif required tosupply power. This isthenormal standby lineupofthe EDG.
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. TheEDGnormal standby line uphasthegovernor controlintheIsochronous mode toprovide 4160KV/60 Hz..in the caseof anAuto Start (LOP/LOCA). However, thismodeof operation isused for frequency governing andnot for manual synchronizingofthe EDG.
B: Correct- TheEDGgovernor control will beswitched toDROOP fromISOCHRONOUS mode whenmanually synchronizing theEDG (seeattached). TheDROOP modeallows for load sharing with themechanical governor.
C: incorrect- Isochronous modeofoperation isused for frequency governing. TheDROOP mode allows for load sharing with the mechanical governor.
D: Incorrect. TheEDGgovernor control beswitched to DROOP from will ISOCHRONOUSmode whenmanually sharing with synchronizing themechanical the governor.
(see EDG attached). The DROOP modeallows forload Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-ST.KJ-0003 (Attach if notpreviously provided)
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1CG400 OPERABILITY TEST -
MONTHLY Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a labeled diagram/drawing of, or access to,theDiesel Generator controls located inthe main control room:
Explain theeffect ofeach control switch ontheemergency diesel generators.
Determine plant conditions orpermissive required forthe control switches to perform their intended function.
Question Source:Bank # 110708 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 212000 K6.04 Importance Rating 2.8 Knowledge K/AStatement: oftheeffect that a loss or malfunction ofthe will haveon following theREACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM :D.C. electrical distribution Question: RO#11
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
When:
= The power toboth RPSBackup Scram waslost.
valves Then:
= A fullactuation (de-energized) oftheRPSsystem occurs.
Thepower losttoboth RPS Backup Scramvalves wasthe (1)
A fullReactor Scram will (2) .
A. (1) 125VDCdistribution (2) NOToccur B. (1) 120VACdistribution (2) occur C. (1) 125VDCdistribution (2) occur D. (1) 120VACdistribution NOT (2) occur ProposedAnswer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):TheRPSBackup Scram valvesconsist oftwo1Epowered DCsolenoid operated, three-way, normally de-energized, pilot valves installed inseries. The1E125VDC distributions (1AD417/1BD417) supply thepower tothenormally de-energized Backup Scram valves.
Air at70 75 psigissupplied tothe scram air header viatheBackup Scram air header via the Backup scram valves (seeattached). TheBackup Scram Valves automatically energize tothe vent position in the event ofboth RPS channelsreceiving a tripsignal.TheBackup Scram valves willdepressurize the scram air header to vent air from the scram pilotvalves andscram dumpvalves toallow the controlrods toscram ona RPS trip signal. WhentheRPSsystem sends a trip signal tothe Backup Scram valves the valves will not be able tobeenergizeddueto theloss ofpower andreposition tovent the Scram Air header.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. TheBackup Scram valvesare powered fromthe1E125VDCdistribution systems (1AD417/1BD417). However, due tothe Backup Scram valves notrepositioning tovent the scramair header, theheader will stillbepressurized anda RPSreactor scramwill not haveoccurred. Thestudent will have todecipher if theRPSscram wassuccessful ornotbased onthe scramair header still being pressurized.
B: Incorrect- The120VAC distribution from RPS will power the normally energized scram valves (scram pilot distribution anddumpvalves).
systems TheBackup Scram valves arepowered andare normally de-energized. They from the1E125VDC will energize ona (1AD417/1BD417)
RPStrip signal.
C: Correct- TheBackup Scram valves arepowered from the 1E125 VDCdistribution systems (1AD417/1BD417). DuetotheBackup Scram valvesnot repositioning tovent thescram air header, theheader willstill bepressurized anda RPS reactor scramwill nothaveoccurred.
D: Incorrect. The120VAC distribution from RPSwill power thenormally energized.scram valves vent
(.scram thescramair pilotanddumpvalves).
header, theheader DuetotheBackup willstill Scram valves notrepositioning to bepressurized and a RPS reactor scramwill nothave occurred.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SB-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
REACTORPROTECTION SYSTEM OPERATION M-47-1 CRDHP&ID HC.OP-AB.zz-0001 Scram Hard Card Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions, evaluate the response ofRPStoanelectrical failure.
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6) '
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO '
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 211000 K6.03 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheeffect that a loss or malfunction ofthefollowing will have on the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM:A.C.power Question: RO#12 Given:
= A lossofoff-site power (LOP)hasoccurred.
= The"A"and"D"Diesel Generators did NOTstart.
= Allother systems respondedasdesigned.
ofthefollowing Which describes theStandby Liquid Control (SLC)systeminjection capabilities for conditions?
these A. SLCcaninject at.50%capacity until the"A"Diesel Generator isstarted.
B. SLCcaninject at100%capacity andboth valves squib canfire.
C. SLCcaninject at50%capacity andboth squibvalves canfire.
D. NOSLCinjection capability existsuntilatleastthe"A" or"D"Diesel Generator is started.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): 480V1EAC Distribution -
Power supplied tothebelow listed components originates from theEmergencyDiesel Generator Buses. "A" SLCpumpandsquib valve F004A,and isolation valve F006A supplied byMCC10B212 (EDG"A"), "B" SLCpumpandsquib valve F004B supplied by MCC 10B222 (EDG"B"), Isolationvalve F006Bsupplied byMCC10B242~(EDG"D"), SLC TankOperating Heater suppliedbyMCC10B252 (EDG"A") Non1Efrom 1ESLCTankMixing Heater supplied byMCC 10B282 (EDG"D") Non1Efrom 1E. Automatic ormanual initiation, SLCpumps both STARTandboth explosive valvesFIRE, developing a flowpath from thestorage tank tothe "A"core spray sparger inthereactor ve.ssel. Thesolution will pass through explosive valves F004A, a B,enter common header, flow through bothoutboard isolation stop check valves F006A, B,andthen into a
common header, terminating in'A' core spray header between thenozzle penetration andtheinboard manual isolationvalve F007A.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With the "B"EDG running andloaded (MCC10B222) the"B" SLCpumpwill berunning along with its squib valve and allowing flow firing through the-stop check valve totheCoreSpray header. The"A" SLCpumpandits squib valvewill nothave power until the"A" EDGisrestored.
B: Incorrect- The"A" EDGneeds toberestored andpower the10B242 MCC.
C: incorrect- Thesquib valvepower comes from the associated pumppower (breaker), therefore only the "B" SLCpumpandsquib valve will have power.
D: Incorrect. With the"B"EDGrunning andloaded (MCC10B222) the "B" SLCpumpwill be running along with itssquibvalve firing andallowing flow through the stop check valve tothe Core Spray header. Restoration of"A"EDGwill allow 100% capacity. Restoration of"D" EDGwill nothave aneffect onthe SLCinjection flowpath duetotheF006B stopcheck valve ina normal open(allow flow)standby condition.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0170 (Attach if not previously provided)
LOSSOF4.16KV BUS10A401 A CHANNEL HC.OP-AB.zz-0171 LOSSOF4.16KV BUS10A402 BCHANNEL Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during-examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory identify thepower supply 1EorNon-1E)
(i.e., toeach ofthe following:
Standby Liquid Control Pumps.
Standby Liquid Control System Squib ,
valves. '
Standby Liquid Control System Storage TankHeaters.
Question Source:Bank # 32602 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New ,
/
Question History: . .
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 271000 A1.05 Importance Rating 3.7 K/AStatement: Ability topredict and/or monitor changes inparameters associated with operating theREACTOR COREISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) including:
controls RCICturbine speed Question: RO#13 Given:
a TheReactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) inFullFlow isoperating Recirc Operation.
a TheRCICflow controllerisin"Autom.atic".
a RCICturbine speed is4500rpm.
Whichofthefollowing describes theresponse ofRCICturbine speed andsystem flow (after stabilize),
conditions iftheoperator momentarily throttlestheRCICPumpDischarge Test Return toCSTValve (BD-HV-F022) inthe"open" direction forthegivenconditions?
A. RCICturbine speedlowers System flow lowers B. RCICturbine speedlowers System flow isunchanged C. RCICturbine speedrises System flow isunchanged D. RCICturbine speedrises System flow rises Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): FlowController -
Theflow controller isa Bailey controlstation that allows the operator toselect either themanual orautomatic modeofoperation. MANUALInthis modethe operator sets desired RCICturbine speed. AUTOMATICInthe -
automaticmodeRCICturbine speed isautomatically adjusted tomaintain desired RCICpumpdischarge flow establishedbythe operator.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. In"Automatic" flow control, theRCICflow controller willreduce turbine speed tomaintain flow at thesetpoint.
B: Correct- WhenFO22is throttled open, system flow will rise. InAuto flowcontrol, controller will reduceturbine speedtomaintain flow atthesetpoint.
C: Incorrect- Throttling open onthe F022 will cause a riseinsystem flowandtheRCICflow controller will actuallylower the turbine speed tomaintain the system flow atthesetpoint.
D: Incorrect. System flowwill lower notrise when openingthe FO22. TheRCICflow controller will a'ctually lower theturbinespeed tomaintain the system flow atthe setpoint.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BD-0001(Q) (Attachifnot previously provided)
REACTOR COREISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain theeff'ect ofeachcontrol onthe RCICSystem.
Summarize plant conditions or permissives required for thecontrol switches toperform their intended function.
Question Source: Bank# .
35775 .
Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A.# 400000 A1.04 Importance Rating 2.8 K/AStatement: Abilitytopredict and/ormonitorchanges inparameters associated with operating theCCWScontrols Surge including: Tank Level Question: RO#14 f
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
= "A","B", and"C"SACSpumps areoperating.
= "D"SACSpumpisinAUTO.
Then:
= EG-LT-2508A, "A" Expansion Tanklevel fails transmitter providing a low-low-low level signal.
Which ofthe following describes the response oftheSACSsystem?
This low-low-low tank level ,
A. causes "A" and"C"SACS pump totrip, closesthe associated SACStoTACS supply andreturn isolation valves. Valve closureproduces a lowSACStoTACS flow from Loop"A" andsends a startsignal tothe "D" SACSpump. The"D" pumpstart signal opens andtheassociated theHx inlet valve, SACStoTACS supply andreturn valves.
B. sends a closesignal totheassociated TACS supply andreturn Isolation valves.
Valve closure produces a low SACSto TACS flow from Loop "A"This produces a "D" SACSpumpstart andsubsequentopen signal tothe associatedHxinlet valve andthe "B"SACSLoop SACStoTACS supply andreturn isolation valves.
C. causes "A" SACSpumptotrip. Thisproducesa low SACS toTACSflow from Loop "A"This produces a "D" SACSpumpstart and subsequent open signalto the "B"SACSLoopSACStoTACSsupply andreturnisolation valves.Loops are nowcross-connected.
D. sends anopensignal tothe"B"SACSLoopSACStoTACSsupply andreturn isolation valvesanda start signal tothe"D"SACSpump. Thepump start opens
-the associated HXinlet valve. Loops arenowcross-connected.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): TheSTACSwill automatically swapover tothe standby loop uponreaching a low-low-low level condition inthe associated SACSexpansion tank. SACS/TACS Supply isolation Valves(HV-2522A,B,C,D) AUTOCLOSEonLow-Low-Low level intheassociated SACSloop expansiontank (LSLLL-2508A,B,C,D). These valves AUTOOPEN whena lowflow condition exists intheopposite SACS loop(FSL-2544A,B,C,D) andthe control switch for therespective SACSpump isinAUTO.SACS/TACS Return Isolation Valves (HV-2496A, -
D)willAUTOCLOSEonLow-low-low level inthe associated SACS loop expansion tank(LSLLL-2508A,B,C,D). These valves AUTO will OPENwhena lowflow condition exists intheopposite SACSloop (FSL-2544A,B,C,D) andthe respective SACSpump control switchisintheAUTOposition. AnySACSpumpstart (manual or automatic) opens itsassociated Hxinlet valve (HV-2491A(B), HV-2494A (B)).
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. NoPumptrip on LO-LO-LO tank level,LowTACSIoop flowinthe opposite loop sends a signal toauto start the "D" pumpandall supply andreturn valve opening. The student hastounderstand that the "A" and"C" pumps willnot onthelowlowlowtank trip level but ona running loop low flow condition.
B: Correct- Low-low-Iow tank level closesthe associated loopvalves, causing a lowflow inthe operating TACSloop. LowTACSloopflow isinontheopposite loop.
Auto pumpstart andall supply andreturn valves opening will occur.
C: Incorrect-loops NoPumptrip will NOTbecross onLO-LO-LO connected tank level. Loop Lowflow condition duetotheclosure oftheassociated loop
(< 9,900 S
gpm).
ACS The toTACS valves.
D: Incorrect. The"D"pumpauto start comes from theopposite loop low flow condition notfrom the LOLOLOexpansion tank level signal. TheSACStoTACS valves also receivetheir open signal from theopposite loop lowflow condition. Theloops will NOTbecross connected duetotheclosure oftheassociated loop SACStoTACS valves.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.EG-0001(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
SAFETY ANDTURBINE AUXILIARIES COOLING WATER SYSTEMOPERATION HC.OP-AB.COOL-0002 SAFETY/TURBINE AUXILIARIES COOLING SYSTEM Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given aset ofconditions and/or a drawing ofaccess tothe controls, instrumentation and/or alarms located intheMain Control Room;assess the status ofthe SACSor itscomponents byevaluation ofthe '
controls/instrumentation/alarms.
Question Source: Bank# 34022 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis -
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 261000 A2.11 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement:
TREATMENT Ability (a) to predict SYSTEM;and(b) theimpacts of the following ontheSTANDBY GAS onthose based predictions, useprocedures tocorrect, control, ormitigate theconsequences ofthose abnormal conditions High oroperations:
containment pressure Question: RO#15
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
= RBVSandRBVEfans arerunning ina normal lineup.
= FRVS is ina normal standby configuration.
When: ,
= A high drywell pressure of1.68 psig occurs.
= RBVSand RBVE system isolates. m
= FRVSauto initiates.
Then:
= Twominutes laterthe operators complete therequired actionsforFRVSAutoInitiation Observation IAWHC.OP-SO.GU-0001, Recirculation Filtration, andVentilation System Operation.
HowmanyFRVSRecirculation FansandVent Fans will beinservice following theactions taken IAWHC.OP-SO.GU-0001, Filtration, Recirculation andVentilation System Operation?
FRVSRecirculation Fans FRVS Vent Fans A. 6 2 B. 4 1 C. 6 1 D. 4 2 Proposed Answer: B . .
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): FRVS Recirculation FansAV213through FV213inAUTOandFRVSVentFan inAUTO LEAD will automatically start under anyofthefollowing conditions:
High Drywell Pressure (1.68 psig).
LowRPV Water Level(Level 2, -
38").
Refueling Floor Exhaust Duct High Radiation (22x10-3micro Ci/cc).
Reactor Building Exhaust Air High Radiation (21x10-3micro Ci/cc).
There are2 FRVSVent Fans. OneinAuto Leadthe other inAuto. TheAutoLead will start onthe 1.68 psig signal while the FRVS Vent FaninAUTOwill automatically upon start failureofthe operating FRVSVent Fanotherwise the Auto Vent fan isinastandby condition notrunning.
So,anauto initiation oftheFPsVS system will have allsixRecirculation Fansrunning andtheAuto LeadVentFanrunning. Theoperators will then IAWplant procedures (HC.OPSO.GU-0001) secure the"E"and"F"Recirculation fans and place themina standby condition looking for a lowflow condition from theother fourRecirculation fansthat auto started. Post LOCAlineup for theFRVS system will havefour Recirculation Fans inservice with the oneAutoLead VentFaninservice.
A: Incorrect. All sixRecirculation fans will auto start onthe1.68 highdrywell pressure signal, however theoperators will secure twoRecirculation fans ("E" and"F"). There aretwoVent fans, however only theAutoLeadwill startonthe high drywell pressure signal. Theother Vent fan is ina standby conditiontostart ona failure ofthe Auto Lead Vent fan.
B: Correct- Four Recirculation fans will berunningafter theactions ofHC.OP-SO.GU-0001 are completed ("E" and "F"f ans are instandby for lowflow condition ontherunning Recirculation fans). The Auto Lead Vent F an willauto s tartand will continue to run withthe Auto Vent fan in a standby condition (the Auto V ent f an willNOT receivea start onthe 1.68 h ighdrywell pressure signal).
C: incorrect- All sixRecirculation fans will auto startonthe 1.68 highdrywell pressure signal, however the operators will secure twoRecirculation fans ("E" and"F") IAW HC.OP-SO.GU-0001.
D: Incorrect. FourRecirculation fans will berunning after theactions ofHC.OP-SO.GU-0001 are completed ("E" and"F" fans areinstandby for lowflow condition). TheAuto Vent fanwill NOT receive a start onthe1.68 high drywell pressure.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.GU-0001(Q) (Attach ifnot previously provided)
FILTRATION, RECIRCULATION AND VENTILATION SYSTEM OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Concerning theFiltration Recirculation Ventilation System (FRVS):
Distinguish between the automatic starts andstops associated with theFRVSVent andRecirc Fans.
Question Source:Bank #
ModifiedBank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New X
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO ExaminationOutline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A# 215005 A2.01 Importance Rating 2.7 K/AStatement:Ability (a) to predict theimpactsof the following onthe AVERAGE POWER RANGEMONITOR/LOCAL POWERRANGEMONITOR SYSTEM ;and(b) basedonthose useprocedures predictions, tocorrect,control, ormitigate the consequences ofthose abnormal conditionsoroperations:
Power supplydegraded Question: RO#16
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
= AllNeutronmonitoring systems areOPERABLE.
When: ,
= TheNeutron Monitoring Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) breakers 1AN413 AND 1BN413 from 1AD483 tripopen.
Thefollowing Abnormal procedures have beenentered:
= HC.OP-AB.IC-0003, Reactor Protection System
= HC.OP-AB,IC-0004, Neutron Monitoring
= HC.OP-AB.zz-0136,Loss of120 VACInverter
= Thecause ofthe trip isunknown atthis time.
(1)Whatisthecurrent status ofthePower Range NeutronMonitoring System?
(2)Whatadditional action isrequired IAWabnormal plantprocedures?
A. (1) "A"AND"C" APRM's areDE-ENERGIED; "A" AND"C" 2/4 voters areDE-ENERGlzED.
(2) Bypass "A"AND"C"APRMs.
B. (1) "A" AND"C" APRM's remain "A" energized;AND "C" 2/4 voters are ENERGIzED.
(2) Reset theEPAbreakers 1AN/BN413oncethe cause isknown.
C. (1) "A"AND"C" APRM's areDE-ENERGI.zED; "A" AND"C" 2/4 voters are ENERGIzED.
(2) Bypass "A" AND"C" APRMs.
D. (1) "A" AND"C" APRM's remain energized; "A"AND"C" 2/4 voters areDE-ENERGIzED.
(2) Reset the EPAbreakers 1AN/BN413oncethecause isknown.
Answer:
Proposed D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):TheAPRMs,LPRMs(APRM slaves) andRBMsarepowered from two120VAC UPS buses, 1AJ483(thru EPAbreakers 1AN413 and1BN413) and1BJ483 (thru EPAbreakers 1AN414 and1BN414). EachAPRM,LPRM,andRBMhave twoauctioneered power supplies fromtheir respective Quad LowVoltage Power Supply (QLVPS) providing +5VDC, a nd115VDC. A loss ofone 120VACbus will notresult ina loss ofpowertothePRNMinstruments. The2/4 Voter Modules are notpowered from QLVPS but directly,from their associated EPAbreakers. Voter Modules A & C are powered from1AJ483, Voter Modules B& D arepowered from 1BJ483. A lossofpower from oneofthe 120VAC UPS's will result intwo(2) voters tochange state, fail-safe andall their.indications OFF with nolights. This will result ina "half scram" as%ofRPSwill betripped. Theother two(2) voters will remain energized andthelogic isstill "any 2 outof4"APRMsontheremaining two
/ voters.
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. Duetothe fact that only oneofthe120VAC UPSpower supplies waslost (1AJ483),
the"A"& "C"APRMs(PRNMs) willstill havepower through 1BJ483 andtheauctioneered power supply fromtherespective QLVPS. However, the 2/4Voters Modules A & C supplied by the120VAC1AJ483 willbede-energized andtherefore a RPStrip onA1/A2 RPStrip logic (half scram). Since the APRMsaria still powered andindicatingthey DONOTneed tobebypassed.
B: Incorrect- The2/4Voters Modules A & C supplied bythe120VAC1AJ483 will bede-energized andtherefore a RPStrip onA1/A2RPStrip logic (halfscram). Thesource ofthe problem would have tobecorrected the EPA (Reset breakers) before resetting the RPS trip.
C: Incorrect- The"A" & "C" APRMs(PRNMs) willstillhave power through 1BJ483 andthe auctioneered power supply from therespective QLVPS. The 2/4 Voters Modules A &C supplied bythe120VAC1AJ483 will bede-energized andtherefore a RPS trip onA1/A2 RPStrip logic scram).
(half Since bypassed.
the APRMsarestill powered andindicating they DONOTneed tobe D: Correct. The"A" & "C" APRMs(PRNMs) still will have power from1BJ483 andthe auctioneered power supply from therespective QLVPS. The2/4Voters Modules A & C supplied bythe120VAC 1AJ483 will bede-energized andtherefore a RPStrip onA1/A2 RPStrip logic (halfscram). The sourceoftheproblem would have tobecorrected (Reset theEPAbreakers) before resetting the RPStrip.
Technical Reference(s):
PN1-C51-1080-0026, Sheet 6 (Attachifnot previously provided) 120VACPower Supply toPRNMs HC.OP-AB.IC-0003, RPS HC.OP-AB.IC-0004, Nis HC.OP-AB.zz-0136, Loss of120VAC Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, determine therodblocks and/or scrams initiated bythePRNM '
System.
Question Source: Bank# ,
Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New X Question History:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 223002 A3.02 Importance Rating 3.5 Ability K/AStatement: tomonitor automatic operations ofthePRIMARYCONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAMSUPPLYSHUT-OFF including: Valve closures Question: RO#17
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Drywell pressure isat1.3 psig
= Reactor water level isat-56inches
= Maincondenser pressure isat22inHgA
= Reactor pressure isat75psig Whichone of the following describes thesystem valves that areisolatedbased onexceeding isolations signals?
> BB-SV4310/SV4311- Reactor Recirculation Sample Line isolation valves.
> BG-HVF001/F004 -
RWCU isolation valves. '
> AB-HVF022/FO28 -
MSlVs.
> AB-HVF016/F019 -
MSL Drain isolationvalves.
> GB-HV9531Drywell-Chilled Water isolation valve.
A. Reactor Recirculation Sample Line isolation valves, Chilled Drywell Water Isolation valves, MSIVs ONLY B. RWCUisolation valves, MSIVs and MSLDrain isolation Drywell valves, Chilled Water isolation valves ONLY.
C. Reactor Recirculation Sample Lineisolation valves,MSIVs andMSLDrain isolation valves, RWCUisolation valves ONLY.
D. RWCUisolation valves, MSLDrain .isolation valves, DrywellChilled Water isolation ONLY.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached HC.OP-SO.SM-0001 Tables ofvalveisolations Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. RXSample valves close onRPVlevel(-38 inches). DrywellChilled Water valves close onDWpress (1.68 psig) or RPV level
(-129inches), MSlVsa nddrains are closedonlow vacuum (21.5 inHgA).
B: incorrect- Drywell Chilled Water valves onDWpress close (1.68 psig)orRPVlevel (-129 inches), RWCU isolated onRPVlevel (-38inches),MSlVs anddrains areclosed onlow vacuum (21.5 inHgA).
C: Correct- MSIVsand drains areclosed onlowvacuum (21.5 inHgA),RWCUisolated onRPV level (-38 inches), RX Sample valves closeonRPVlevel (-38 inches).
D: Incorre'ct. MSIVsanddrains are closed onlowvacuum (21.5 inHgA),RWCUisolated onRPV level (-38 129inches).
inches), Drywell Chilled Water valves close onDWpress (1.68psig) orRPVlevel(-
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q) if (Attachnot previously provided)
ISOLATION SYSTEMS OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Interpret andapply graphs charts, and tablescontained withinPrimary Containment.
Question Source: Bank# 35757 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 206000 A3.01 Importance Rating 3.6 K/AStatement: tomonitor Ability automatic operations oftheHIGHPRESSURECOOLANT INJECTION SYSTEMincluding: Turbine speed: BWR-2,3,4 Question: RO#18
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= HPCIhasinitiated from a valid HiDrywell Pressure signal psig of1.68
= RPVWater level isat35"
= Reactor pressure isat980psig Then:
= Theoperator observes thattheHPCIturbine control (FV-4879) valve isinthe throttled position AND that turbine speed islowering.
the Additionally, operator observes the following valvesgoing closed:
> FV-4880, HPCIturbine stopvalve
> HV-F006, HPCIpump discharge toCore Spray
> HV-8278, HPCIpumpdischarge toFeedwater
> HV-F012, HPCIminimum flow with Later, theHiDrywell Pressure signal still in,theoperator notices that HPCIturbinespeed is againrisingandHPCIrealigns forinjection without taking anyactions.
Whichofthe following couldhave caused thisHPCI response?
A. A mechanical overspeed HPCItrip B. Anautomatic reset ofa HPCIisolation C. An automatic swapoftheHPCIpumpsuctionsource D. A HPCIflow controller incorrectly set Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Uponreaching anoverspeed condition (approximately 5200rpm), hydraulic oil will be removed from theHPCIturbine stop valve allowing actuator, spring tension toclose it.This causes a loss ofsteam flow tothe turbine. Whenthe turbinehasslowed sufficiently, hydraulic oil will bere-applied tothestop valve actuator andtheHPCISystem will restart ifaninitiation signalis '
still present. A mechanical overspeed tripwillcause theturbine stopvalve (FV-4880) toclose. This causes thefollowing valvestoclose: HPCIpumpdisch,arge valvetoCore Spray (HV-F006) andHPCI pumpminimum flow valve (HV-F012). TheHV-8278 automatically will close upon receipt ofFV-4880 fully cIpsed. Theturbine control valves (FV-4879) will bythe bethrottled turbine governor control system tolimit overspeed. HPCI trips, isolations, and interlocks(see attached HC.OP-SO.BJ-0001).
Plausibility Just.ification:
A: Correct. Uponreaching anoverspeed condition (approximately5200rpm), hydraulic will oil be removed from theHPCI turbine stop valve allowing actuator, spring tension toclose it.
This causes a loss ofsteamflow totheturbine. Whentheturbine hasslowed sufficiently, hydraulic oil will bere-applied to thestop valve andtheHPCISystem actuator will if restart an initiation signal isstillpresent.
B: Incorrect-determine There thatthe isnoHPCIisolation signal present valves that (seeattached).
areisolating are duetoa mechanical Thestudent overspeed trip willhave nota to isolation.
C: Incorrect- BJ-HV-F042, PMPSUCTFROMSUPP CHB Auto closes onHPCIDiv1Isolation signal. Auto opens onCSTlowlevel ORSuppression Chamber high level. There isnochange inCSTorSuppression pool level. TheBJ-HV-F042 has nointerlockwith thegovernor control ortheother valves mentioned.
D: Incorrect. Placing HPCIFIC-R600 inMANresults inanopen loop control with the flow controller output becoming afixed speeddemandsignal tothe turbine governor. This will provide stable, constant turbine speed control,but requireoperator action will tomaintainthe desired vessel injectionflow rate.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BJ-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
HIGHPRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEMOPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: ForHPCISystem tripsandisolations:
Given plant conditions,determinethe sequence ofevents following ofa receipt HPCIturbine trip signal Question Source: Bank# 30478 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 300000 A4.01 Importance Rating 2.6 K/AStatement: tomanually Ability and/or monitor in operate the control Pressure room:
gauges- Instrument Air.
Question: RO#19
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= The10K107 Service Air compressor isrunning.
= Both the00F-104 and10F-104 Air Dryers arein-service.
= The00K107Service Air compressor isinstandby
= The 1AF-104 Air Dryer isinstandby.
= The 10K100 EmergencyInstrument AirCompressor isinstandby.
= The KAHV-7595, Service Air Supply Header Isolation Valve,isopen.
Then:
= Thefollowing annunciators arereceived:
> A2-A1, INST AIR HEADER A PRESSURE LO
> A2-A2, INSTAIRHEADER B PRESSURE LO
> A2-B1, COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM TROUBLE
> A2-B2, COMPRESSED AIR PANEL 00C188
= Current airpressures are:
> Service Air pressure is90psig.
> Instrument pressure air attheEmergency Instrument Air is82psig.
Receiver
> Instrument pressure air is77psig.
After oneminute with thesameair pressures above, Whatistheconfiguration oftheService andInstrument Air System?
A. The00K107 Service Air Compressor isrunning Instrument Air Dryer 1AF104 isin-service.
TheEmergency Instrument AirCompressor isrunning.
TheKAHV-7595 isopen.
B. The00K107 Service Air Compressor isinstandby notrunning Instrument Air Dryer 1AF104 isinstandby.
TheEmergency Instrument AirCompressor isrunning.
TheKAHV-7595 isclosed.
C. The00K107 Service AirCompressor isinstandby notrunning.
Instrument Air Dryer 1AF104 isin-service.
TheEmergency Instrument AirCompressor isinstandby notrunning.
TheKAHV-7595 isclosed.
D. The00K107 Service AirCompressor isrunning.
Instrument Air Dryer 1AF104 isinstandby.
TheEmergency Instrument AirCompressor isinstandby notrunning.
TheKAHV-7595 isopen.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Normal Service/Instrument AirSystem upwill line have theLEADair compressor in-service with theLAGcompressor instandbyalong with theEIACinstandby. With thetwo ofthe three Air Dryers in-servicethethird air dryer (1AF-104)will bein standby. Theservice airh eader isolationvalve (7595) willbenormally opened. Asthe airpressures lower there are specific setpointsfor the above equipment toAuto Start orisolate along withspecificairpressure gauge readings (see attached table).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. Withthe Service Air Pressure <92psig andthepre-lube timer timed out(the timer is set for 1minute),the standby air compressor 00K107 willauto start. With theinstrument Air Pressure 5 85psig,the standby Air Dryer 1AF-104 will gointo service. With the Emergency Instrument AirCompressor Receiver Pressure 5 85psig theEIAC will auto start. Forthe KAHV-7595 toisolate (close) the Instrument AirPressure hastoreach 5 70psig.
B: Incorrect-With theService Air Pressure <92psig andthe pre-lube timer timed out(the timer is set for 1minute), the standby aircompressor 00K107 willauto start. With the instrument Air Pressure 5 85psig, thestandby Air Dryer 1AF-104 will gointo service. FortheKAHV-7595 to isolate (close) theI nstrument Air Pressure has toreach 5 70 psig.
C: Incorrect With theService AirPressure<92 psig andthepre-lube timer timed out(the timer isset for 1minute), the standby air compressor00K107 will auto start.With theEmergency Instrument Air Compressor Receiver Pressure $ 85 psigthe EIACwill auto start.Forthe KAHV-7595 toisolate (close) theInstrument AirPressure hastoreach 5 70psig.
D: Incorrect. With theInstrument AirPressure 5 85psig, the standby Air Dryer 1AF-104 go will into service. With theEmergency Instrument AirCompressor Receiver Pressure 5 85psig the ElACwill autostart.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.COMP-0001(Q) (Attachif not previously provided)
INSTRUMENT AND/ORSERVICE AIR Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Given a list ofpossible trips, determine which arevalid compressor trips.
Summarize/identify the operationofthe emergency instrument aircompressor.
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examirfation Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 2150004A4.06 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: tomanually Ability operate and/or monitor inthecontrol room: Alarms andlights-Source RangeMonitor.
Question: RO#20 Given:
= Theplantisperforming control rod withdrawals with themode switch inSTARTUP.
When:
= The"RODOUTMOTIONBLOCK" overhead window illuminates.
= AllIRMrange switches areonrange 3 or4.
a "A"SRMhasfailed downscaleto1cpsandisbeing withdrawn.
a "A"SRM"DNSC" li'ght isilluminated. -
a "B"SRMisfully withdrawnandreading 95cps.
a "C"SRMispartially withdrawnandreading 98,000 cps.
a "D"SRMispartially withdrawnandreading 103,000 cps.
SRMisthecause Which oftherodblock?
A. "D"SRM B. "A"SRM C. "B" SRM D. "C"SRM Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):.SRM Upscale.rod.bjocis: SRMreading 10E5cpsorgreater. Bypasses: Joystick selected for the associated SRMchannel orRange8orgreater onassociated IRM's orReactor Mode Switch in RUN (Seeattached). SRMdownscale rodblock: Lessthan 3 cps.Bypasses: Joystick selected for the associated SRMchannel orassociated IRMrange positioned switches torange 3 orgreater or Reactor Mode Switch inRUN(See attached).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. "D"SRM isabove the RodBlock setpoint forcpsat> 10E5cps. Duetothe fact that the "A" SRMRodBlock isbypassed with the IRMsonrange 3 orgreater theonly SRMthat iscausing theRodBlock isthe"D" SRM.
B: Incorrect- With theIRMs on range 3and4the "A"SRMdownscale rodblock isbypassed. The student hastoknowthebypass interlocks forthe SRMs.
C: Incorrect"B" SRMisnot ata level that wouldeither beupscale ordownscale fora RodBlock.
Thedetector notfully inserted andcounts lessthan 100cpsisa RodBlock, however this rodblock isbypassed with theIRMsonrange 3or greater (See attached).
D: Incorrect."C" SRMisbelow theupscale setpoint and greater than100cpswith thedetector not fully inserted alongwith thebypass oftheIRMs on range 3 orgreater. '
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SE-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
Nuclear Instrumentation System Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, choose theparameter, setpoint,andbypass conditions foreach SRMsignal which willinitiatea rodblock and/or reactor scram.
Question Source: Bank# 30618 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE .
ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 209001 A4.11 Importance Rating 3.7 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor inthecontrol room: System flow Question: RO#21 A Caution/Step inHC.OP-SO.BE-0001, CoreSpray System Operation states that:
If ANDSEALED INIT INA (B, C,D) isonandCoreSpray autoinitiation has notoccurred,BOTH pumpsina loopmustbemanually started.
WHICHONE(1) Caution/Step?
ofthe following describes thebasis for this A. Both pumpmanual start pushbuttons mustbedepressed tostartthe associated diesel generator incase ofLoss ofoffsitePower. .
B. Both pumps mustbestarted tosati'sfy theinterlock foropening theOutboard Injection Valve.
C. Both pumpsmustbeoperating toprovide sufficient driving headtoopencheck valve HV-F006A(B).
D. Both pumpsmust berunning toprevent pumprunout Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): A Caution inHC.OP-SO.BE-0001, CoreSpray System Operation states thatif INITAND SEALED INA(B,C,D) isonandCore Spray auto initiation hasnotoccurred,BOTHpumps ina loop must be manually started. (See attached)
HC.OP-SO.BE-0001 -
3.0PrecautionandLimitations 3.1.3. ArmingAND pressing A(B) MANINIT PBwill start theassociatedCoreSpray PumpANDopen theOutboard Injection Valve (WHEN theIowReactor pressure issatisfied).
interlock Arming ANDpressing C(D) MAN INIT PB will start the associatedpump. m Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. TheEDG'sstart ontheCSinitiation logic notthepumpstart logic B: Incorrect- Theinjection valve needs to seeeither the"A"or"B" andthe< 461pressure logic permissive C: Incorrect- Whenpumpdischarge pressure is> RPVpressure the checkvalve will open= 380 psi.
D: Correct. Both pumpsmustberunning toprevent pump runout Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BE-0001(Q) notpreviously (Attach if provided)
Core Spray System Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Summarize/identify thesequence of events followingreceipt ofanautomatic or manual CoreSpray System initiation signal Question Source: Bank# 29633 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History: /
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 211000 2.1.30 Importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability to locate andoperate components, including local SLC controls-Question: RO#22 ..
Given:
Theplantisoperating at90%power.
= HC.'OP-IS.BH-0003, STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP AP208 INSERVICE TEST, tocheckflow rates during power operations istobe performed.
Howisthe ofthe firing squib valve(s)avoided, whenstartingthepump(s)forthis surveillance?
A. TheSLCsquib valve firingcircuitry from comesdirectly RRCSandis unaffected during this test.
B. Thesquib valve(s)mustbephysically removed from the system before running theSLCpump(s).
C. Thebreaker(s) fortheappropriate valve(s) squib must beopened prior torunning theSLCpump(s). -
D. Starting theStandby Liquid Control pumpwith thelocalcontrolswitch bypasses the squib firingcircuit.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Local START-STOP ofeach SLCpumpcanbeaffected from control local panel 10C011. Operation ofeither localswitch will STARTonly theassociatedpumpandwill notFIRE either of the squib valves, orcause a RWCUsystem isolation. requires Thesurveillance thelocal switches to be manipulated sothat the squib valves donotfire sodium andintroduce pentaborateinto thereactor.(see attached)." Primer circuits for the squib valves arepowered from a Class1EPower Supply which originates attheSLCA/Bpumpbreakers. Theactuationcircuitry ofthesquibvalves prevents the firingof the explosive charges whenpumpoperation isinitiated fromtheTESTswitches located onpanel 10C011 Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. AnRRCSsignal wouldautomatically start bothpumpsandfirethesquibvalves, however thesquib valve circuitry comesdirectly from the andisbypassed pumpbreaker when using the localpanel pumpcontrol switches.
B: Incorrect- Thesquib valves IAW the surveillance arenot removed duetothefact thatusing the local control switches willbypassthe firing circuitfor thesquib valves andstill thepumps.
start C: Incorrect- Thepower forthe squib valves come from the pumpbreaker associated andthe firing circuitry will bebypassed bythe manipulation ofthe localcontrol switch for theassociated pump.
D: Correct. Operating thelocal controlswitch forthe "A" SLCpumpwill bypassthe firing circuitry for the associated squib valve andtherefore the for start "A" pump will testingofthe of flowrate thepumpwithout firing thesquib valve andnotintroducing sodium pentaborateintothereactor.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-IS.BH-0003(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL PUMP AP208 INSERVICE TEST Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: (none)
Learning Objective: Frommemory, summarize/identify the locations from which theStandby Liquid Control System pumps maybemanually started/stopped andsummarize theeffect that operating thepumps from each locationwill haveonStandby Liquid Control System response.
Question Source: Bank# 72736 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattachparent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # C4.0U Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofCCWSdesign feature(s) andorinterlockswhich provide for the following: Automaticstart ofstandby pump Question: RO#23 Given:
a All servicewater pumpcontrolsareinAUTO.
a "A",
"C",and"D"SSWpumpsarerunning.
= The'B'PCISMANInitiation Pushbutton (10C651C)isarmed anddepressed.
the.response Select "B"and"D"Service Water pumps.
A. TheD SWpumpwill trip,andthen bothB andDSWpumps will start in approximately 55seconds.as bytheLOCASequencer.
controlled B. TheD SWpumpwill trip,andthen theBSWpumpwill only start immediately.
C. TheD SWpumpwill continue andtheB SWpumpwill running, start immediately.
D. TheDSWpumpwill continue andtheB SWpumpwill running, start in approximately 55seconds bythe ascontrolled LOCASequencer.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): EachPCISchannel canbemanually byARMING initiated respective (rotating collarfully clockwise) andDEPRESSING therespective CNTMT ISLN MANINITIATION pushbutton.
Manually tripping a "PCIS channel" will initiate theRBE/RFE functions associated withthat respective channel. TheService water systems receive a startsignalfrom: LOCALevel 1andLOCA Level 2/Reactor Building-Refuel Floor Exhaust Hi-Hi (see Radiation.attached table).
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. The "D" SSW pump willcontinue torunsince it wasalready running."B"channel PCISdoes notsend a trip signal tothe "D" SSWpump.PCIS also doesnotsend a signal to start theLOCAsequencer. The"D" SSWpumpwill receiveanAUTOstart from the"D"PCIS channel notthe"B" PCIS channel. Thestudent needstoknowthat thePCISsystem issingle channelized.
B: Incorrect There would beno trip signal tothe "D"SSWpump from the"B"PCISchannel. The "B"SSWpumpwould start immediately (see attached).
C: Correct Since thePCISsystem ischannelized the manual initiation ofthe"B" channelwould startthe "B" SSWpumpimmediately and since there isnoeffect onthe "D"SSWpumpthe pumpwould continue torunsince itwasalready running.
D: Incorrect. PCISdoesnot send asignal tostartthe LOCA sequencer. Themanual initiation of "B"PCISchannel will the"B" start SSWpumpimmediately withoutanytime delays(see attached).
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviouslyprovided)
ISOLATION SYSTEMS OPERATION Pr.oposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given anAutomatic orManual of Initiation thePrimary Containment IsolationSystem (PCIS), evaluate theeffect onthe individualsystem anddetermine the overallplant effect onplant operations Question Source: Bank# 30000 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE .-
ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO .
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 1 K/A # 259002 A4.01 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Ability tomanually operateand/or monitor in the control All room: individual component controllers inthemanual mode. ReactorWater LevelControl. '
Question: RO#24 Given:
= Theplantwasoperating at100%power.
When,avalidReactor Vessel DomePressure High signalisreceived:
= Thereactor failed toscram.
= APRMsareNOTDOWNSCALE. -
= FEEDWATER RUNBACK INITIATED ison.
= AII RFPcontroller three speedsindicate 2500RPMs.
= Allapplicableemergency operating procedures havebeen entered.
RFPspeed controllers arereducedtolimit feedwaterflow to0%
A. until reference APRMsaredownscale, then automatic oftheRFP control controllers isavailable.
B. for 30seconds, manual then controlofthe RFPcontrollers isavailable.
C. until reference APRMs aredownscale, then manual control oftheRFP controllers isavailable.
D. for 30seconds, then automatic controlofthe RFPcontrollersisavailable.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):TheRRCSrunback limits RFPTspeed to2500rpmif: 25seconds Reactor after pressure 21071 psig andAPRMpower isnotdownscale (below 4%) orisINOP. RFPcontrol is returned attheDFCScontroller inManual attheminimum setting after 30seconds asindicated by theMAN CONTROL AVAILlight on10C651B being illuminated.This runback lowers subcooling inlet which provides a negative reactivity effect(See attached).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect.The 'APRMs > 4%along with the 21071 psig reactor pressure willcausetheRFPT runback. The RFP speed controllers will have-MANUAL control after available 30seconds ofthe RRCSrunbackregardless ofwhat the APRMsarereading. Duetothefact thattheAPRMs caused the runback, the student will have todecipher ifthe APRMDownscales allows automatic control RFPsor not.
of the i B: Correct- RFPcontrol isreturned atthe DFCScontroller inManual attheminimum after setting 30seconds.
C: Incorrect- TheAPRMs> 4%along with the 21071 psig reactor pressurewill cause the RFPT runback. TheRFPspeed controllerswill have MANUAL control available after 30seconds ofthe RRCSrunback regardless ofwhat the APRMs arereading.
D: Incorrect. RFPcontrol isreturned attheDFCS controller inManual attheminimum setting after 30seconds. Thestudent could decipher that the controllers wouldbe,back inautomatic.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SA-0001(Q)
(Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
REDUNDANT REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION HC.OP-AR.zz-0013 Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, predict thesequence of events which occur withintheRedundant Reactivity Control System upon:
Automatic initiationinresponse toa high reactor vessel pressure conditionwith or without theAPRMpermissive.
Question Source: Bank# ,
Modified Bank # (Note changes orattachparent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKriowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7) ,
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination
.^
Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 262001 2.1.20 Importance Rating 4.6 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations:Ability procedure tointerpret andexecute A.C steps.- .
Electrical Distribution.
Question: RO#25
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
a A unit startup isinprogress.
= Themain generator isbeing synchronized IAWHC.OP-SO.MA-0001, tothegrid MAIN GENERATOR & EXCITER OPERATION & SWITCHING Section 5.2.
Thefollowing indications areobserved:
= Keylocked SYNC SCOPE switch ONposition.
isinthe
= TheSYNCH WINDOW lightisNOTilluminated.
= Sync Scope is rotating slowly intheClockwise direction.
a Generator and Grid voltages areset IAWtheSOP.
E M eac. 3 @ @ -
9" a 20 to to With the SYNCWINDOWlight NOTilluminated A. theSYNCCHECKOFFpushbutton mustbedepressed beforedepressing the (BS2-6) CLOSEpushbutton.
breaker BS6-5 B. themain generator exciter field breaker isopen.
C. theGenerator Voltage mustbelowered than toless thegridvoltage before depressing thebreaker BS6-5 CLOSE (BS2-6) pushbutton.
D. the52x60 Generator isopen.
Disconnect Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached section 5.2 ofthe HC.OP-SO.MA-0001, MAINGENERATOR &
EXCITER OPERATION & SWITCHING Synchronizing for andLoading theMain Generator.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. SYNCH CHECKOFF(momentary pb)De-energizes thesynchcheck relayand removes forsynch check relay input toenablebreakerclosure.Whenthe synch ~
the requirement check relay isnot functioning properly, this pbmustbedepressed whileclosing its associated andB allows main generator theoperator output tobypass breaker.
the synch IAWSection check relay (see 5.2 attached) andclose themain Steps 5.2.13.A generator breaker tosynchronize theunit to the grid.
B: Incorrect- For.the syncscope andvoltages toindicate that themachine isproperly synchronized the exciterfield breaker and52x60 mustboth beclosed.Theexciterfield -
breaker isclosed IAWstep 5.2.5. (See attached)
/
C: Incorrect- Generator voltage mustbe greater than gridvoltageIAWstep 5.2.11.(See attached).
D: Incorrect. ,The52x60 MainGeneratorDisconnect isclosedIAWStep5.4.15 (See attached) as a prerequisite toSection 5.2being performed.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.MA-0001 (Attachif previously not provided)
MAINGENERATOR & EXCITER t OPERATION &SWITCHING Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: UnitSynchronization Figureinstem Learning Objective: Given a labeled diagram/drawing of, or access to, the Main Power System controls/indication bezel:
Explain thefunction ofeachindicator.
Predict theconditions that willcausethe indicators tolight orextinguish.
Determine theeffect ofeach control switch ontheMain PowerSystem.
Explain theconditions orpermissives required for the control switches to perform their intended functions.
Question Source:Bank # 32750 Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattachparent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 261000 A1.03 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: Ability topredict and/or monitor changes inparameters associated with operating theSTANDBY GASTREATMENT SYSTEM controls including:Off-site release levels Question: RO#26 Given:
a Theplantisoperating at100%power.
a OHAE6-A5 RBEXHRADIATION ALARM/TRBL hasannunciated.
a ThePlant Operator that reports RBVentilation Exhaust isreading x 10-3 1.5 pCi/cc on allthreechannels.
Basedonthis, thePlant Operator IAWHC.OP-AB.CONT-0004, Radioactive Gaseous Release is required to A. manually placeFRVSinservice andmonitor Off Site Release Rates.
B. ensure reactor ventilation building isinservice andbuilding dPis> -0.30 inches water gauge.
C. ensure reactor ventilation building andFRVSstarted.
isisolated D. ensure reactorbuilding ventilation andFRVSstarted, isisolated if RBVentilation Exhaust reaches2.0 x 10-3 pCi/cc.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Air exhausted from thereactor building ismonitored for radiation, priorto passingthrough the secondary containment isolation dampers, bythree rad'monitors. If 2 out of3 monitors sense a radlevel of1x10-3 pCi/cc; then, the1Ebreakers for theRBVEandRBVSfans trip, the secondary containment supply andexhaust dampers close, FRVSstarts.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. The FRVS system will autostart onthe RBExhaust radiationlevel of2 1x10 -3 micro Ci/cc. on2 out of3channels. Thestudent will have tounderstand that the setpointis reached for hiradlevel start ofthe FRVSsystem. Manually theFRVSsystem starting isan option whenradlevelare rising, howevertheauto start setpoint hasbeenreached.
B: Incorrect- TheRBVSsystem will automatically isolate onthe RBExhaust radiation levelof2 1x10 -3micro Ci/cc.on2 outof 3 channels. If theRBVSsystem wasstillinservice then the procedure would guide the operator tomaintain secondary containment dP.
C: Correct T'he FRVSsystem will autostart andthe RBVSsystem will automatically isolate onthe RBExhaust radiation level ofa1x10 -3 micro Ci/cc. on2out of3channels. (See attached).
D: incorrect. Airexhausted from therefuel floor tothe RBVE system ismonitored for radiation, prior topassing through secondary containment isolation dampers, bythree radmonitors. If2 out of3 sense a radlevel of2x10-3 microci/cc the following occurs: the1Ebreakers fortheRBVE andRBVSfans trip,thesecondary containment supply and exhaust dampers close, FRVS starts. Theradlevels areat1.5 x 10-3pCi/cc ontheRBExhaust soall oftheautomatic actions abovewouldalready'have happened.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.CONT-0004(Q) (Attachif not previously provided)
RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS RELEASE HC.OP-SO.GU-0001(Q)
FRVSSystem Operation '
Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Obj~ective:Given plant conditionsandplant procedures, determine required actions of theretainment override(s) andsubsequent operator actions inaccordance with Radioactive Gaseous Release.
Question Source:Bank # 113146 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 256000 K1.07 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthephysical connections and/or cause- effect relationships between REACTOR CONDENSATE SYSTEM andthe following: SJAEcondenser.
Question: RO#27 Given:
= A plant startup isinprogress.
= Theoperators wereplacing the firstPCP(Primary Condensate Pump) in-service IAW HC.OP-SO.AD-0001, Condensate System Operations, the'A' PCP pump.
When:
ThePO(Plant Operator) noticedthat the PRICNDSPUMP'A' STARTENABLE status light wasNOTilluminated.
ofthefollowing Which would bethecause ofthe above condition?
A. HV-1680A, PCP'A' DISCHVLV 100%CLOSED.
B. PDV-1719, SJAE/SPE BYPASS VLV 90%OPEN.
C. Condenser level at9 inches for2 outof3 shells.
D. HV-1639A, PCP'A' SUCTVLV 100%OPEN.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): A (B, C)P102START-STOP pbcontrol andindication on10C651A. Asa permissive for a pumpSTART,theSTARTENABLElight mustbeilluminated, identifyingthe following conditions are Condenser satisfied: level greater than 6"for 2/3shells,HV-1639A (B, C) pumpsuction valve 100%OPEN,HV-1680A C)
(B, pump discharge valve 100% CLOSED, and SJAE/SPE Bypass valve PDV-1719 100%OPEN. SJAE/SPE Condenser Bypass Valve (PDV-1719) maintains a differential pressure across the SJAE/SPE condensers toprovidedesign flowthrough the tube side ofthe heat exchangers. PDV-1719 mustbe100%OPENtoenable STARTofthefirst primary condensate pump. This canonly beidentified bythepresence oftheSTARTENABLE status light(s) attheprimary condensate pumpcontrol bezel(s).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Thedischarge valve 100%closed isa permissive fortheSTARTENABLE ofthe PCP.
B: Correct- TheSJAE/SPE bypass valve willbenormally throttledtocontrolthed/p andtherefore flowacross theSJAEcondensers,however, for the first PCPgoing intoservice this valve hasto be1.00% opentoprovide thepermissive input into the STARTENABLEstatus light andalso provide aflowpath for thePCP.
C: Incorrect- Thecondenser levelhastobegreater than 6inches in2 ofthe3 shellsisalso a permissive fortheSTARTENABLE statuslight. .The student will have torealize that the level even though lowisstillabove theLowLowsetpoint.
D: Incorrect. Thesuction valve 100%open isa permissive for theSTARTENABLE ofthePCP.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.AD-0001(Q)(Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
CONDENSATE SYSTEM
^
OPERATION Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicantsduring examination: Pump controlsinstem Learning Objective: Concerning pumps:
theprimary Select the four condepsate conditions that, whensatisfied, illuminatethe Start Enable lightatthepumpcontrol bezel.
Concerning theSJAE/SPE bypass valve, explain the functionsoftheBYPASS ON andBYPASS OPENpushbuttons used to control theSJAE/SPE bypass valve Question Source: Bank#
Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattach parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO .
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 223001 K2.10 Importance Rating 2.7 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofelectrical power supplies tothe following:Drywell chillers: Plant-Specific Question: RO#28 Given:
a Theplantisoperating at100%power.
a TheAK111,BK111, andDK111 Turbine Building Chilled Water Units arein-service.
= Drywell parameters arereading normal.
Then:
= A loss ofpower transient occurs.
= Drywell pressureand temperature start torise.
= 'A'PrimaryCondensate Pumptrips.
= 'A'Secondary Condensate Pumptrips.
= OnlyoneTurbine Building Chiller remains running.
Which ofthefollowing loss ofpower caused this transient?
A. 10A101, 4.16KV Switchgear B. 10A120, 7.2KV Switchgear C. 10A102, 4.16KV Switchgear D. 10A110, 7.2KV Switchgear Proposed Answer: D '
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Power supplies (Turbine Building Chilled Water compresso,rs):1AK111 -
10A110*; 1BK111 -
10A120*;1CK11110A101; 1DK11110A110*
7.2KV toa step-down transformer to4.16KVfor theAK111andDK111chillers. Along withpowering theAK111andDK111, the10A110 switchgear powers also the'A' PCPand'A' SCP.(See attached).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. The 10A101 is thepower supply tothe CK111Since theChillersare 4.16KV power the student might select 4.16KV switchgear even though they shouldrealize the tripofthe PCP andSCPwhich are 7.2 KVpowered.
B: Incorrect- The10A120 powers theBK111 along with the 'B'PCPand'B' SCP.TheBK111 would betheremaining chiller running.
C: Incorrect- The10A102 does not power any ofthe chillers,however thestudent coulddecipher the BK111 andDK111because of the'B' channel status of10A102 andthe factthat itisatthe rightvoltage tosupply aTurbine Chilled Waterchiller.
D: Correct. The10A110 supplies boththe AK111 andDK111 witha 7.2KV transformer to4.16KV tosupply thechillers. The'A' PCPand'A' SCP also comeoff ofthe10A110 7.2KV switchgear.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.NA-0001(Q) (Attachif notpreviously provided) 7.2 KVSystem Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective:
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank# (Notechangesor attach parent)
New X Question History: . . .
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55C'ontent: 55.41(5)
Comments: -
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO '
Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # '243000K3.04 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe effect that a loss or malfunction oftheFUELHANDLING EQUIPMENT willhave onfollowing: Reactor manual control system: Plant-Specific Question: RO#29 Given:
= TheModeSwitch isinREFUEL.
= AllControlRodsarefull in.
= TheRefuel Platform isoverthe core.
= TheMain Fuel Hoist/Fuel Grapple isNOTloaded.
Then:
= TheRefuel Bridge System RodOutRelay (ROR) contact fails all indicatingrods are NOTfull in.
if Whatistheeffect, any, ontheReactor Manual Control System duetothis (RMCS) malfunction?
A. REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM INOP B. RODSELECTION BLOCK C. Noeffect onRMCS,but theMain Fuel Holst cannotbemoved D. ACTIVITY CONTROLS DISAGREE Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): The"one rodout" interlock required byTechSpec3.9.1 doesnotactually produce a rodblock. Instead, theinterlock isenforced bylogic within RMCSthat prevents the selection of asecond control rodfor movement with anyother rodnotfully inserted while inthe refuel mode. The main fuelhoist motion will beinhibited andthe Fuel Holst Interlock light will be illuminated when the following conditions exist. TheRodOutRelay (ROR) contact isopened indicating atleast onecontrol rodiswithdrawn inthereactor. ANDTherefueling platform isover the reactor vessel. i.e. (RS1 contact is open). Refueling RodBlocks: Fuel Grapple Loaded ANDRefuel Platform Over Reactor Cavity orRefuel Platform Over Reactor Cavity ANDReactor ModeSwitch in RWMdata (see STARTUP attached). Activity Control todetermine ifcontrol rod Cards movement is compare allowed control orshould rodselection beblocked.
data, plant Theyreceive status, and input from the Fuel bundle loadedon service platform,Hoist loaded orgrapple downorloaded, Refueling platform over core. TheReactor Controls SystemINOP, this informs theoperator that theRDCS(Rod Drive Control System) hasshutdown due toafault (Acknowledge andCommand signals disagree). No control rod motion ispossible. TheROR relay does not produce anINOPcondition.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. TheReactor Controls System INOP, this informs the operator that theRDCS(Rod Drive Control System) hasshutdown due to a fault(Acknowledge andCommand signals disagree). Nocontrol rodmotion ispossible. The RORrelay doesnotproduce anINOP condition. TheRDCSisstill available.
B: Correct- With theRORcontact failed openandindicating totheRMCSsystem that all rods are NOTfull in; a RODSELECTBLOCKwill beenforced.
C: Incorrect- Themain fuel hoistinterlock will bein, however the RMCS isaffected through the RODSELECT BLOCK(one-rod-out interlock).
~
D: Incorrect. With inputs fromtheRefuel System, the Activity Control Cards will process the information andwill either allow orblock rod motion, but only ifthey disagree. Inthis scenario there isnomention ofa malfunction ofthe signalsgoing totheRMCSActivity Control Cards.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.KE-0001(Q) (Attach ifnot previously provided)
Refuel Platform Operation HC.OP-ST.KE-0001(Q)
Refuel Interlock Functional Test Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, explain the interrelationships between theReactor System Manual Control andthe following:
Refueling System Source: Bank#
^
Question Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New X Question History:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 271000 K4.01 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofOFFGAS SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide forthefollowing: Dilutionofhydrogen gasconcentration Question: RO#30 WhichONEthefollowing statementscorrectly explains the consequences the if Off Gas Recombinercatalyst weretodeteriorateorbecome wet.
Thedesignrate of(dilution) recombinationofhydrogen andoxygen will <
A. remain thesame,however therewill bemoisture tothe carryover adsorber beds.
B. rise, because oftherise intemperature intheRecombiner vessel.
'lower, C. because thediatomic oxygen will notcomeincontact with theplatinum.
D. remain the same,however Recombiner vessel temperature will increase.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): TheOff GasRecombiners cause free H2andO2torecombine towater vapor.
This will coritrol the Hydrogen concentration intheoffgastrain. Therecombiners utilize a homogeneous platinum and palladium mixture asa catalyst. AstheO2,comes into contact with theplatinum causes it the diatomic O2 to separate making iteasier for itocombine with theH2andform water. Thepalladium acts toraise surface area and thereby help controltherecombination reaction. This isactuallyaform of combustion andgives off heat.Therecombiner temperature isexpected torise 135Fper 1%H2.If water coats theplatinum, splitting ofthediatomic O2cannot take place andrecombiner efficiency lowers. When the recombiner is suspectedofbeing wet(high moisture content), then the recombiner will bepurgedwith nitrogen IAWradwaste operating procedures.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. If thereisexcessive moisture intheoffgas flow, thiscould makeit tothe adsorber bedsdownstream ofthefeedgas recombiner. Theguard bedfor the adsorber beds would alarm onhid/p towarnofexcessive moisture onthe adsorber beds. However, duetothemoisture content, splitting ofthediatomic O2cannot take place andrecombiner efficiency lowers.
B: Incorrect- Therecombiner temperatureis expected torise 135Fper1%H2.However, dueto themoisture content,splitting ofthediatomic O2 cannot take place andrecombiner efficiency lowers.
C: Correct- If water coats theplatinum, ofthe splitting diatomic O2cannot take place and recombiner efficiency lowers.
D: incorrect. Therecombiner temperature isexpected torise 135F per 1%H2.If water the coats platinum, splitting ofthediatomic O2cannot take place andrecombiner efficiency lowers.
Technical Reference(s): HC.RW-OP.HA-0001(R) (Attachif not previously provided)
Gaseous Radwaste Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Explain/identify ofmoisture theeffect in theprocess gasstream onthefollowing components: Recombiner Question Source: Bank# 33172 ModifiedBank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(13)
Comments:
i
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek .
Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO -
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 230000 K5.04 Importance Rating 2.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe operational implications ofthefollowing concepts asthey apply toRHR/LPCI: TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOLSPRAY MODE:Evaporative cooling Question: RO#31 Given:
= A LOCAhasoccurred intheDrywell.
= AIIplant equipment functioned asdesigned.
= Theapplicable EOPshave beenentered.
= "A"RHRisplaced inTorus Cooling andSpray IAWHC.OP-AB.zz-0001, Transient Plant Conditions (Hard Card).
ofthefollowing Which describes thestatus ofTorus parameters?
SuppressionPool temperature andpressure arelowered by A. evaporative convective cooling, cooling, andheat rejection totheRHRHeat Exchanger.
B. evaporative cooling andheat rejection totheRHRHeat Exchanger ONLY.
C. convective coolingandheat rejection totheRHRHeat Exchanger ONLY.
D. heat rejection tothe RHRHeat Exchanger ONLY.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Suppression PoolCooling- RHRIoops A and/orB canbealigned tosupport Suppression Pool cooling. Pumpsuction isreceived from the Suppression Pool through F004A(B).
Pumpdischarge isdirected through theRHRHXvia the shell side inletHV-F047A(B) andHV-F024A(B) test returnto the Suppression Pool.
Suppression Chamber Spray- RHRloops A and/or B canbealigned tosupportSuppression Pool chamber spray.Pump suction isfrom Suppression Pool through HV-F004A(B) through RHRpumpA(B).
Discharge isdirectedthrough RHRHXandtoSuppression Pool airspacevia HV-F027A(B).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. Torus evaporative Sprayand Torus cooling cooling andconvective cooling flowpaths ofspray arealigned flow simultaneously andheat (see attached) totheRHRHxwill rejection so occur simultaneously.
B: Incorrect- Convective cooling will be a significant cooling mechanism along with Evaporative cooling andthe flow throughtheRHR heat exchanger (see attachedbases).
C: Incorrect- Evaporative cooling will contribute tothereductionofpressure andtemperature ofthe suppression chamber.
D: Incorrect. With both flowpaths (Spray andCooling) lined upthrough theRHRheat exchanger, the RHRheat exchanger willact asa heat sink,however, thesprayingofthe suppression chamber air space willprovide both evaporative andconvective cooling mechanism which will reduce pressure (condenses) andtemperature.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102-BASES(Attach if not previously provided)
HC.OP-AB.zz-0001 Att. 2 Transient Plant Conditions Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain thereasons for howplant/system parameters respond whenimplementing a givenAbnormal Operating Procedure.
Givenanystep oftheemergency operating procedure, determine the reasonfor performance ofthat step and/or predict expected system response to control manipulations Question Source: Bank# 32645 Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(14)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 216000 K6.01 importance Rating 3.1 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe effectthat a loss or malfunction ofthe following will have on the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION :A.C. electrical distribution Question: RO#32 HowwilltheNuclear Boiler Instrumentation system beaffected by the lossof the1BD481?
A. ECCSRosemount Trip Units willNOTprovide initiation/permissive signals and RPVlevel indications willfailupscale.
B. ECCSRosemount Trip Units will provide still initiation/permissive signals; however, RPVlevel indicationswillfail downscale.
C. ECCSRosemount Trip Units willNOTprovide initiation/permissive signals a.nd RPVlevel indications willfaildownscale.
D. ECCSRosemount Trip Units will provide still initiation/permissive signals; however, RPVlevel indicationswillfail upscale.
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional):
AD-DD481 supply Inverters 120VACpower totheinstruments utilized by ECCS.The1(A-D)D481 Inverters power theECCSAnalog Trip Units.Lossof1BD481 inverter causes theloss ofDIVII"B"Channel ECCS/RCIC Auto Trip UnitsandStart Relays -
ingeneral, Process Signal Transmitter failures affecting signals, initiation Min. FlowValves, pressure permissives, etc. Channels "B"and"F" affected along withIoss ofinstrument power affecting various systems.
Instrument will indications fail (see low attached).
Plausibility Justification:
2021NRCWritten Examination A: incorrect. TheECCStransmitters will losepower andtherefore theability toprovide initiation/permissive signals for ECCSsystems. TheIoss will oftheinverter cause theRPVlevel indications tofail downscale.
B: incorrect- TheECCStransmitters will losepower andtherefore theabilitytoprovide initiation/permissive signals for ECCSsystems.
C: Correct-The student will havetodetermine ifthe481inverter providespower totheECCS transmittersand from a control roomawareness ofindications theywillhave todetermine that theloss ofthe 481 inverter will cause thelevel indications tofail downscale.
D: Incorrect. TheECCS transmitters will losepower andtherefore theability toprovide initiation/permissive signals forECCS systems. Theloss oftheinverter willcause theRPVlevel indications tofail downscale.
TechnicalReference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0136(Q) if (Attachnotpreviously provided)
Loss of120VAC Inverter Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Objective: Given Learning a system that interrelates with the Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation System, evaluate theeffects onthat system due to loss oformalfunctions with theNuclear Boiler Instrumentation System and/or associated components.
QuestionSource: Bank #
Modified Bank# (Note changes or attach parent)
New X QuestionHistory:
QuestionCognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 202001 A1.13 Importance Rating 3.1 K/AStatement: topredict Ability monitorchanges inparameters associated and/or with operating theREC1RCULATION SYSTEMcontrolsincluding: Recirculation loop temperatures:
Plant-Specific Question: RO#33
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isinOPCON3.
= NOReactor Recirculation Pumpsarerunning.
= RWCU isin-service.
= RPV pressure isat985psig.
= "A" Recirculation LoopTemperature isat499F.
= "B" Recirculation Loop Temperatureisat483*F.
a RPVBottom HeadDrain Coolant Temperatureisat391F.
(Assume thereadings are takenwithin15minutesprior toattempting a p,ump start)
Whichoneofthefollowing describes whether starting the"A" and/or "B"Reactor Recirculation Pumpsispermitted?
START"A" RECIRC START"B"RECIRC A. YES NO B. YES YES l C. NO YES D. NO NO Proposed Answer: D
2021'NRC Written Examination ,
Explanation (Optional):Tostart anidle Reactor Recirculation Pumpthe following have tobesatisfied:
Within 15minutes prior tostarting pump, VERIFY temperature differential between Reactor coolant within idle loop ANDcoolant inpressurevessel is 50F.
5 Within 15 minutes prior tostarting pump, VERIFY temperature differential between Reactor coolant within dome AND bottom head drain is5 145*F.
RPVPressureis 985 psig (1000 psia) usingsteam tables the corresponding temperature is544.6*F for RxPressure Vessel Steam Space Coolant SaturationTemperature. D/Tfor.idle loop tosteamspace tempis"A" Pump=45.6*F and"B" Pump=61.6F. Limit is<500F. "B" PumpisUNSAT for "A" start.
PumpisSAT.
D/TSteam dome(steam space temp)tobottom headis544.6*F -
391*F
= 153.6*F. Limit is5 145*F.
Therefore, neither pumpmay bestarted. "B" Pumpisoutside D/Tlimit for start. "A" Pumpis within limits inloop toRPVtemp, however outside limits for steam dometobottom head. Both D/Ttempcriteria havetobemet.
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. "B" PumpisoutsideD/T limit for start. "A" Pumpis within limits inloop toRPV temp, however outside limitsforsteam dome tobottom head.BothD/Ttempcriteria havetobemet.
B: Incorrect- "B" Pumpisoutside D/Tlimit for start. "A" Pumpiswithin limits inloop toRPV temp, however outside limitsforsteam dome to bottom head.
C: Incorrect- "B" Pumpisoutside D/Tlimit for start. "A" Pump is within limits inloop toRPV temp, however outside limitsforsteam dometobottom head.
D: Correct. Seeabove calculations andexplanation.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BB-0002(Q) (Attach if not previously provided)
Reactor Recirculation Operations HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q)
SystemlPower Recirc Oscillations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants dunng examination: none Learning Objective: Given plantconditionsandplant procedures,determine required actions of ..
theretainmentoverride(s)andsubsequent operator actions inaccordance with the Recirculation System/Power Oscillations.
Question Source: Bank# '
68133 Bank Modified # (Notechanges orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO ExaminationOutline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 201003 A2.05 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement:
DRIVEMECHANISM Ability (a) to predict
- and(b) theimpactsof the following ontheCONTROL basedonthose predictions, RODAND control, useprocedures tocorrect, ormitigatetheconsequences ofthoseabnormal conditions oroperations
- Reactor Scram Question: RO#34
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= A reactor startup isinprogress.
= Reactor pressure isat900psig.
When:
= A reactor scram occurs.
= Thescram inletvalves fortwocontrol rodsfail toopen.
(1) Which ofthefollowing describe theeffect ofthis failure?
(2) Abnormal/emergency operating procedures areentereddueto .
A. (1)Thecontrol rods insertandtheir bluescram onthe lights full coredisplay illuminate.
(2) the full core reactor scram.
B. (1)Thecontrol rods insert and their bluescram lights onthe full coredisplay do NOTilluminate.
(2) the full core reactor scram.
C. (1)Thecontrol rods failtoinsertand their blue scram onthe lights full core display doNOTilluminate.
(2)theATWS.
D. (1)Thecontrol rods fails toinsert andtheirblue scram lightsonthefull core display illuminate.
(2)the ATWS.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Reactor pressure will inserttherod at900psig. Theblue lights areactuated by both scram inletandoutlet valves picking upthere limitswitches. Thecontrol rods are scram timetested at>800 psig andthe scram inletandoutlet blue lights onthe full core display (see areobserved attached surveillance). Pressure from thescram accumulators cannot drive therods duetotheScramInlet valves being closed. However, the Scram Outlet valves opening cause asignificant DPbetween the reactor andscram discharge volume (vented toatmosphere) toallow therods toscram. Sincethe two control rods will scram, there will bea full core reactor scram. With no. ATWScondition (Reactor shutdown under all conditions withoutBoron), the crew willenter EOP-101 orAB.zz-0000 forthe successful reactor scram.
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. Thescram inlet valves did notmove, therefore thelimit switches for theblue lightson thefull core display forthe two control rods will NOTilluminate.
B: Correct- Thescram inletvalves did not move, therefore the switches limit for theblue lights on the fullcore display forthe twocontrol rodswill NOTilluminate. Duetothe large DPacross the CRDMthe twocontrol rods willfully insert and the reactorwill beshutdown under all conditions without Boron. This isa full core reactor scram which would requireentry into AB.zz-0000 Reactor Scram orEOP-101 RPVControl. There isnoATWScondition.
C: Incorrect- Duetothe large DPacross the CRDM the twocontrol rods willfully insert andthe reactor will beshutdown under ali conditions without Boron. Thisisafull core reactor scram which would require entry into AB.zz-0000 Reactor Scram orEOP-101RPVControl. There is noATWScondition.
D: Incorrect. Thescram inlet valves did notmove, thereforethe limit switches for theblue lightson the fullcore display forthe twocontrol rods will NOTilluminate. This is afull core reactorscram which would require entry into AB.zz-0000 Reactor ScramorEOP-101 RPVControl. There is noATWScondition.
Technical Reference(s): HC.RE.ST-BF-0001 (Attachifnot previously provided)
Control RodScram Time HC.OP-AB.zz-0000 Reactor Scram Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none . .
Learning Objective: Given P&IDM-47-1, select the various riser isolation valves, scram pilot valve assemblies, scram valves, directional flow control valves, accumulators and instrumentation assemblies.
Question Source:Bank #
Modified Bank # 30889 (Added part (2)tomatch theK/A)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(2)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 219000 A3.01 Importance Rating 3.3 K/AStatement: Ability tomonitor automaticoperations oftheRHR/LPCI:
TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOLCOOLING MODEincluding: Valve operation.
Question: RO#35 Given:
= Theplant isoperating at89%power.
= "B"RHRPumpisrunning inSuppression Pool mode.
Cooling Then:
= A complete loss ofoffsitepoweroccurs.
= AllEmergency Diesel Generators have started automatically andaligned to their respectivebusses . .
oneofthefollowing Which describestheresponse ofthe "B"RHRTest BC-HV-F024B, Return Valve?
A. Receives a close immediately signal thebusisreenergized.
after B. Remains openuntilAUTOCLOSEOVERRIDE PBispressed.
C. Remains openuntilCLOSEPBispressed.
D. Receives a close 5 seconds signal after thebusisreenergized.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): HV-F024A(B) willautomatically CLOSEinresponse toa manual orautomatic LPCIinitiation signal inthe respective loop logic.Toreopen F024A(B) following the Auto the closure, following permissive/ operator actions arerequired: A LPCI signal initiation ispresent (in therespective loop logic)and LPCI injection valve for therespective loop (HV-F017A(B) is100%CLOSED.
Depressing the AUTO CLOVRDpushbutton on10C650 willthen enable the valve(s) tobeoperated as desired. The stem of the question hasnoreference toa LOCAc.ondition andtherefore theF024B will notisolate and can be CLOSED bythenormal CLOSEPB.The"B" RHRpump willstart immediately after the busisenergized bythe "B" EDG.
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. With a LPCI initiation the FO24B would isolate immediately after the buswas energized, however theLPCI initiation signal isnot present onlya LOP,therefore theFO24B will NOTisolate.
B: incorrect- With a LPCI initiation signal present andtheF017B, injection valve closed, the F024B canbeoperated with the AUTO CLOSE OVERRIDEPBpressed, however thereisno LPCIsignal present.
C: Correct- With noLPCI initiation signal present andthe factthatthevalve isanMOVthevalve willfail asisandwhenpower isrestored tothe bus, the valvecanbeoperated with thenormal CLOSEPB.
D: Incorrect. With noLPCI initiation signal theFO24B will NOT isolate. If theLPCIinitiation signal wasinthen the valve would close immediately afterpower was restored to thebus. Thestudent could decipher that there isa time delay duetothe pumphaving tostart firstthen the valve opening. There isa 5 second time delay onthe "C"and"D"RHR pumps starting offofnormal power.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BC-0001(Q) (Attach ifnot previously provided)
RHRSystem Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given aset ofconditions anda drawing of thecontrols, instrumentation and/or alarms located inthemain control room, assess the status oftheResidual Heat Removal System orits components by evaluation ofthe controls/instrumentation/alarms Question Source: Bank # 36238 Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO '
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 201006 A4.03 Importance Rating 3.0 K/AStatement: tomonitor Ability automatic operations oftheRODWORTH MINIMIzER SYSTEM (RWM) (PLANT SPECIFIC) including: Latched group indication Question: RO#36 Given:
a A startup isinprogress.
= TheRodWorth Minimizer(RWM) indicates STEP04.
= AllRodPull Listing -
RWMSTEP rods04 areattheir withdrawlimit -
position 08.
Whichstatementdescribes whentheRWMwill latch toSTEP05?
A. Whenacontrol rodinthenext RWMGroup (STEP isselected.
05)
B. Whena control rodinthenext RWMGroup (STEP 05) isselected andinserted onenotch.
C. TheRWMwill remain latched atSTEP04since theBanked Position Withdrawal Sequence Group isthe same.
D. Whena control rodinthe next RWMGroup (STEP isselected
- 05) andwithdrawn onenotch.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): EachRWMSTEPconsists of1ormoreControl Rodsthat aretobemoved within the specified notch limits. NOTE: RWMSTEPs arelisted asRWMGROUPS ontheRodPull Listings.The RWM will allow anyorder ofcontrol rodmovement within anRWMSTEP,but RWMSTEPs must bewithdrawn insequence. TheRWMdetermines the STEPb'y Current a process called"Latching" OncetheRWM "Latches" theCurrent STEP, iw till follow control rodmovements, andwill change the Current STEPwhen a StepBoundaryisreached andcrossed. Ata step boundary, ifa control rodis selected fromthe next STEP suchasduring ,a startup orshutdown andoncethecontrol rodis moved, theSTEPassociated with that control rodwill bedisplayed. Selection ofa controlrod which ifmoved could cause deviation fromthe sequence, will resultinINSERT andWITHDRAW Blocks.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Since therods are the sameinboth groups, theRWMwill notlatch uptoSTEP05 until seesa STEP05rod withdrawn atleast it onenotch.
B: incorrect- Since the rodsarethe same inboth groups,theRWMwill notlatch uptoSTEP05 until it seesa STEP-05 rodwithdrawn atleast onenotch.Inserting therodwill cause the RWM toremain latched atSTEP04.
C: Incorrect- TheRWMSTEPSarenot thesame asthe BPWSGroups.
D: Correct. TheRWMwill uptoSTEP05when it latch sees a STEP05rodwithdrawn atleast onenotch since all ofSTEP04havebeenwithdrawn totheirlimit, Technical Reference(s): if not provided)
HC.OP-SO.SF-0003(Q) (Attach previously RWMOperations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given asetofconditions, summarize the criteria used bytheRWMtoselect therod grouptobelatched.
Question Source: Bank# 36040 Modified Bank# ,
(Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7) '
Comments: ,
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group# 2 K/A # 204000 2.4.9 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures /Plan: Knowledge oflowpower /shutdown implications (e.g.,
inaccident loss ofcoolant accident or loss ofresidual heatremoval) mitigation RWCU.
strategies.
Question: RO#37
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Thereactor hasbeeninCOLDSHUTDOWN fortwo(2) days followingpower operations.
= Reactor vessel water levelis+30inches.
= Neither Reactor Recirculation Pumpisavailable.
When:
= A lossof Shutdown Cooling occurs.
= Theshutdown cooling suction valves haveisolated andcannot bere-opened.
= HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009, ShutdownCooling hasbeenentered.
Whichofthefollowing operator actions will aid inpreventing reactor vessel stratification thermal andprovide alternate decay heat removal?
A. Place RWCUSystem in service, maximizingRACStotheNRHXandbypass the regenerative heatexchanger if necessary.
B. LineuptheCondensate Transfer system through theCoreSpray line injectionto feed the vessel.
C. Start a second CRDpumpandmaximize CRD flow byopening thedrive water pressure controlvalve andadjusting both flow control valves.
D. Raise reactor vessel water level ONLYuntil the HIGH REACTOR LEVEL annunciator isreceived.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): RWCUbottom head drainsuction maximizes vessel circulation to prevent/minimize thermal stratification CRD (cold water). RWCU Heat E xchanger Bypass a diverts portion of, or all ofthe flow from going through the heat exchangers tothe return line tothe This reactor.
helps limit thermal stratification andcool downofthereactor vessel during periods ofno recirculation flow.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct.
Recirculation Persubsequent pumps action notavailable "F"
along with thenormal (see ofAB.RPV-0009 attached)
SDCflowpath with the Reactor duetotheisolation valves failed closed, RWCU isanalternate decay heat removal system andcanbelined upina timely manner along with the reduction invessel thermal stratification. TheRWCUpumps take suction off thebottom ofthe vessel andreturn through the feedwater lines.
B: Incorrect PerAB.RPV-0009, the Condensate Transfer system lined upthrough eitherCore Spray orRHRisalso aviable alternate decayheat removal ofthe core. However, thesuction temperature (CST) for theCondensate Transfer system ismuchcooler then the vessel bottom suction andtherefore would contribute to thermal stratification.
C: Incorrect- TheCRDpumps will provide increase flow through the core, however the temperature ofthesuction oftheCRDsystem (Condensate/ Hotwell Reject) will bemuchcooler then the vessel bottom suction andtherefore would contribute tothermal stratification.
D: Incorrect. PerAB.RPV-0009, raising RPVlevel when there is nocore circulation willprovide natural circulation (cooling) andalso helpwith reducingthermal stratification. However, thelevel needs toberaised to>--80inches and< 90inches (see attached). The HIGH REACTOR LEVELalarm isat+39inches.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009 (Attachif not previously provided)
Shutdown Cooling HC.OP-AB.zz-0001 Transient Plant Conditions Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain thereasons for howplant/system parameters respond whenimplementing Shutdown Cooling.
Question Source: Bank # 33592 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(2)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # ,
2 Group# 2 K/A # -
201002 K3.02 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheeffect that a loss or malfunction oftheREACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM have will onfollowing: Rodblock monitor: Plant-Specific 1 Question: RO#38 Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
a ReactorManual Control System (R'MCS) isinoperable.
Whichofthefollowing system(s), if anyarestill capable ofenforcing control rod motion block signals? '
A. APRMsONLY.
B. RBMandtheRWMONLY.
C. RBMONLY.
D. None.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): TheRMCSreceives inputs from theRWM,Refueling Bridge andHolst location load,Neutron Monitoring System, CRD,andtheReactor ModeSwitch andenforces a control rod block ifplant conditions warrant. TheAPRMinstruments provide processed th.e LPRM datat the o RBM instrument. The RBM system ispart ofthe PRNMsystem, specifically through the 2/4voters. Each2/4 Voter Logic Module provides theinterface between theRBMandtheReactor Manual Control System.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. AIIsystem generating rodblock signals provide permissives totheRMCSwhich either permits orblocks control rod motion. With therod block function ofRMCSinoperable, no rod block signals will be enforced. APRMswill still have toRPSandtheRBMfor input display andalarms.
B: Incorrect- APRMswill have input toRPSandthe still RBMfor display andalarms. TheRWM willbebypassed atthegivenpower. TheRBMinput from thePRNMsystem (2/4voters) will NOTbeprocessed atthe RMCS.
C: Incorrect- APRMswill still have inputto RPS and theRBMfor display andalarms. TheRWM willbebypassed atthe given power. Allsystem generating rodblock signals provide permissives tothe RMCSwhich eitherpermits orblocks control rodmotion.With therodblock function ofRMCSinoperable, norodblock signals willbeenforced.
D: Correct. All system generating rodblock signals provide permissives tothe RMCSwhich either permits orblocks control rodmotion. With therod block function ofRMCSinoperable, no rodblock signals will beenforced.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SF-0001(Q)(Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
RMCSOperation Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, explain the interrelationships between theReactor Manual Control System andthefollowing :
RodWorth Minimizer, Neutron Monitoring System, RodBlock Monitor System.
Question Source: Bank# 33441 Modified Bank# (Notechanges orattachparent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO '
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 295024 EK1.01 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe operationalimplications ofthe following concepts asthey apply toHIGHDRYWELL PRESSURE Drywell integrity: Plant-Specific Question: RO#39 TheDrywell Spray InitiationLimit(DWSIL) isdefined tobethehighest drywell temperature at which initiation ofdrywell sprays will not result inanevaporativecooling pressure drop tobelow the A. drywell-below-suppression pool differential pressure capability or thehigh drywell pressurescram setpoint.
B. drywell-below-suppression pool differential pressure capability g thesuppression chamber spray initiationpressure.
C. suppression poolbelow reactor building differential pressure g capability thehigh drywell pressurescram setpoint.
D. suppression poolbelow reactor building differential pressure g capability thesuppression chamber spray initiationpressure.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Thepurpose ofEOP-102 istomaintain primary containment integrity, and protect equipment intheprimary containment. Changes indrywell temperature candirectly effect changes in primary containment pressure. Prior tospraying the drywell, thedrywell temperature must bebelow curve DWT-P (see atwhich DWSIListhehighest drywelltemperature attached), which represents the initiation Drywell ofdrywell Spray sprays Initiatio'n will Limit notresult (DWSIL).
inan The evaporative cooling pressure drop tobelow thehigh drywell pressure scram 'setpoint. Thefinal pressure followingevaporative cooling islimited tothe scram setpoint toensure that the operator has time toterminate sprays before convective cooling reduces pressure below 0psig. This prevents developing and/or exceeding thenegative design pressure oftheprimary containment (-3 PSID drywell below suppression pool D/P) andensures theintegrity oftheprimary containment.
Suppression chamber sprayis the initial mitigationstrategy employed byEOP-102 inpreference to drywell spray asit doesnot affect electiical components in the drywell andit canbeused prior to reaching 9.5psig, which isthe Suppression ChamberSpray Initiation Pressure (SCSIP). Seeattached EOP-102 Drywell Pressure Leg.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct- TheDWSILis the highest drywell temperature atwhich initiation ofdrywell sprays will notresult inanevaporative cooling pressure drop tobelow thehigh drywell pressure scram setpoint. This prevents developing and/orexceeding the negative design pressure ofthe primary containment (-3 PSIDdrywell belowsuppression pool D/P) andensures the integrity oftheprimary containment.
B: Incorrect- Eventhough Suppression Chamber Spray will bethe initialmitigation strategy, The DWSIListhehighest drywell temperature atwhich initiation of drywell sprays will not result inan evaporative cooling pressure drop tobelow the thehigh drywell pressure scramsetpoint.
C: Incorrect- Suppression chamber sprays precludes airfromthe Reactor Building being drawn if the suppression chamber wasallowed togonegative. However,Drywell Sprays will preclude '
a pressure drop tobelow the primary containment D/Pof-3PSIDbetween drywell below suppression pool D: Incorrect. Eventhough Suppression Chamber Spray will bethe initialmitigation strategy, Drywell Sprays will preclude a pressure drop tobelow the primary containment D/P of -3PSID between .
drywell below suppression pool. . .
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102BASES (Attach ifnot previously provided)
EOP-102 BASES Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Define the term "Drywell Spray Initiation Limit" Question Source: Bank # 110262 Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295037 EK1.03 Importance Rating 4.2 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheoperational implications ofthe followingconcepts asthey apply toSCRAMCONDITION PRESENT ANDREACTOR POWER ABOVEAPRM DOWNSCALE ORUNKNOWN: Boron effects onreactor power (SBLC)
Question: RO#40 Given:
a A failure toscram hasoccurred.
a Thecrew istaking perHC.OP-EO.zz-0101A, actions ATWSRPVControl. ,
Currentplant conditions:
a RPVpressure isbeing maintained 800-1000 psigwithSRVs.
a RPVlevel isbeing maintained -100 to-50inches withreactorfeedpumps. ~
a 50%ofthe SLCTankcontents havebeeninjected into theRPV.
= Rodsarebeing insertedmanually.
= 3 rods at48will NOTmove.
ofthefollowing Which statements correctly describe the currentplant status?
A. Thereactor isshutdown andcooldown maynowcommence.
B. Thereactor isNOTshutdown but cooldown ispermitted because SLCis injecting.
C. Thereactor willNOTbeshutdown .until theCold ShutdownBoron Weighthas beeninjected.
D. SLCmaybesecured ifpressure ismaintained within current pressure band.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optionallnjection oftheCold Shutdown Boron Weight (CSBW) ofboron into theRPValso provides adequate assurance that thereactor isandwill remain shutdown. TheCSBWistheleast weight of soluble boron which, ifinjectedintotheRPVandmixed uniformly, will maintain thereactor shutdown under all conditions. CSBW hasbeeninjected intothe core whenthere is<1100 gallons left in theSLCtank. (See attached EOP-101A BASES).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Cooldown isnot permitted untilCold Shutdown Boron Weight (CSBW) isinjected or only onerod not at00.50%ofthe tank injected into theRPVwould equate tomorethan 2000 gallons remaining intheSLCtank. If anyamount ofboron less than theCSBWhasbeen injected into theRPV, thecore response reactivity from cooldown ina partially borated core is unpredictable andsubsequent EPGsteps maynotprescribe the correct actions for such conditions ifcriticalitywere tooccur.
B: Incorrect- CSBWmustbeinjected, whichis<1100 gallons remaining intheSLCtank. 50%of the tank injected intotheRPVwould equate tomore than 2000gallons remaining inthe SLC tank. Thecooldown ispermittedwhen CSBW isinjected orif iwtill remain shutdown without boron. Dueto3rods fulloutit take the injection of will CSBWfor thereactor toremain shutdown.
C: Correct- CSBWmustbeinjected, which is<1100 gallons remaining intheSLCtank because morethan onerod(3 rods stuck at48notshutdown under all conditions) will remain fullout.
Tanklevel isnormally between 4880gal (Hi ALARM) and 4640 gal (Lo ALARM). the 50% of tank injected intotheRPVwould equate tomorethan 2000 gallons remaining inthe SLCtank.
If anyamount ofboron lessthan theCSBWhasbeeninjected into theRPV,thecore reactivity response from cooldown ina partially borated core isunpredictable andsubsequent EPGsteps maynotprescribe thecorrect actions forsuch conditions ifcriticality were tooccur.
D: Incorrect. SBLCisnotpermitted tobesecured CSBWhas been injected orthereactor until will remain SDunder allconditions without boron. Dueto3rods full out it will take theinjection of CSBWfor thereactor toremain shutdown.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0101ABASES(Attach ifnot previously provided)
ATWSRPVControl Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given anystep oftheprocedure, explain thebasis forperformance ofthat step and/or evaluate theexpected system response tocontrol manipulations prescribed bythat step.
Question Source: Bank# 35685 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History: NRC2016 Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295030 EK1.03 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe operationalimplications ofthe concepts following asthey apply toLOWSUPPRESSION POOLWATERLEVEL: Heat capacity Question: RO#41 ONE(1)
Which ofthe following isthebases for the atwhich Suppression Pool level theprimary pressure containment allowable limits could beexceeded andsteam may notbeadequately condensed?
A. HPCIexhaust line becomes uncovered.
B. Ventheader dra'in linesbecome uncovered.
C. Downcomers become uncovered. . . .
D. .
Suppression PoolTechnicalSpecification minimum level water value.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examinat~ion Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-EO.zz-0102 BASES Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Ifsuppression pool level cannot bemaintained above 26inches,andadequate core cooling isassuredtheoperator isdirected tosecure HPCI. Operation oftheHPCIturbine withits exhaust unsubmerged will tend todirectly pressurize thesuppression chamber. Action is already taken atthe 38.5 inch level based ondowncomers becoming uncovered andloosing suppression capabilities oftheSuppression pool.
B: Incorrect- The threshold of55inches wasselected asthere isa 1%inch drainpipeattachedto thelowpoint ofeach ofthe eight vent pipes located inthe torus. These drainpipesopeninto the torus atanindicated level of50IN; this levelisbetween thelowlevel LCOandthe level at which thedowncomers become uncovered. It isprudent totake theanticipatory actionsto shutdown the reactor prior tothe uncovering of these drainpipes.
C: Correct- Suppression pool water level mustbemaintained above theelevation ofth.e W
suppression pool following to a
ensure primary that steam system break discharged will fromthedrywell beadequately into condensed.
the lf suppression pool water level cannotbe maintained above the specified minimum value,steam maynotbeadequately condensed and primary containment pressure couldexceed allowable limits.
D: incorrect. Whensuppression pool level lowers to below the TechnicalSpecificationlower limit, EOP-102 provides direction touseECCSandsafety-related service watersystems and alignments notnormally used tomaintainsuppression pool waterlevel ingeneralplant procedures.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102-BASES(Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
EOP-102 BASES Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given anystep oftheprocedure, determine thereason forperformance of that step and/or predict expected system response tocontrol manipulations prescribed bythat step.
Question Source: Bank# 2019NRCExam(#15)
Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History: 2019NRCExam Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295038 EK2.06 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheinterrelationsbetween HIGHOFF-SITE RELEASE RATE andthe Process following: liquidradiation monitoring system Question: RO#42
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= A discharge oftheRadwaste Floor Drain Sample Tankisinprogress totheDelaware River.
When:
= The Liquid Radwaste Discharge IsolationValve (HV-5377A) tothe CoolingTower Blowdown line automatically closes (isolates).
= TheRM-11 isinalarm.
(Assume NOoperator action)
Which condition below would cause this termination(isolation) whenthelisted was setpoint reached?
(1) LiquidRadwaste Effluent HIGH radiation (2) CoolingTower Blowdown dilution flow LOWflow (3) LiquidRadwaste Effluent sample flow rate HIGH (4) CoolingTower Blowdown RMSHIGH radiation (5) LiquidRadwaste Effluent HIGHdischarge flow A. (1)and(3) ONLY B. (2)and(5) ONLY C. (2), (3)and(4) ONLY D. (1), (2)and(5) ONLY Answer:
Proposed D
' ^
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Waste discharge fromtheliquid radwaste system shall besampled before discharge, shallbemonitored during discharge, andshall beautomatically terminated whenthe instantaneous radioactivity concentration would reach 10CFR20 limits for anunrestricted areaafter dilution. IAW HC.OP-AR.SP-0001 RM-11alarm response, isolation ofHV-5377A&B isduetoanyoneof the following:
High radiation(HIGH LEDonOSP-RI-4861)
High Disch Flow(setpoint determined byLiquid Effluent Permit )
LowDilution LowSample Flow Flow (setpoint determined byLiquid Effluent Permit )
Monitor Failure Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Lowsample flow rate wouldbeanisolation setpoint. Thehigh sample flowrate would besufficient fortheRMS toaccurately measure thedischarge radiation levels.
B: Incorrect- Theeffluent high radiation which is upstream ofthe cooling tower blowdown RMSwill isolate thedischarge before itcanreach the downstream RMS.Thecooling tower blowdown RMSisNOTanisolation signal tothe HV-5377A&B.
C: Incorrect- Thehigh,sample flow ratewould be sufficient for theRMStoaccurately measurethe discharge radiation levels. Theeffluent highradiation which isupstream ofthe cooling tower blowdown RMSwill isolatethe discharge before it can reachthe cooling tower blowdown RMS.
Thecooling tower blowdown RMSisNOTanisolation signal totheHV-5377A&B.
D: Correct. With lowdilution flow andhigh effluent discharge flow, the RMSwill notbeable to accurately sample thedischarge andalso dilutethe discharge sufficiently toreduce theradiation levelsofthedischarge andtherefore reach the setpoint ofhigh radiation ofthe discharge.Any oneofthese parameter/setpoints terminate will (isolate) the d ischarge.
t Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AR.SP-0001(Q) (Attach ifnot previously provided)
RM-11 Alarm Response Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Summarize/identify theconditions thatwill cause anAutomatic Isolation ofthe Radwaste Release Line (HV-5377A&B).
Question Source: Bank# 120363 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(13)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295003 AK2.02 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe interrelationsbetween PARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOF A.C. POWERandthe following: Emergency generators.
Question: RO#43 Given:
a Theplant isina normal ACelectrical line up.
= The10A403 bustrips duetoa BUSDIFFERENTIAL OVERCURRENT.
Whichofthe following describes howthis affects the "C"Emergency DieselGenerator andits breaker?
output A. Thediesel canbemanually started andtheoutput breaker mustbe manually closed. . .
B. Thediesel islocked out andthe output breakerislocked out.
C. Thediesel willautomatically startandthe output breaker mustbemanually closed.
D. Thediesel willautomatically startandtheoutput breaker will automatically close.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): TheEDGlockout circuitry iscomprised ofregular, backup, andtest lockouts.
When energized, the regular lockout relay willinitiate thefollowing actions: Trip andlockout theDiesel engine.Trip and lockoutthe Generator breaker. Enable Generator breaker failure protection.
Regular lockout relay (86R) actuation results from the following signals: Generator differential overcurrent, Bus differential overcurrent, Engine overspeed, andLowlube oil pressure Emergency stop PB.Loss of the 10A403 1ESwitchgear abnormal HC.OP-AB.zz-0172 will beentered along with othe'rvarious abnormal procedures for theaffected (see systems attached).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Withoutthe 86R reset (will notreset with theBUSDifferential condition still in),the EDGandits output breaker willNOTbeable tostart andclose eitherAutomatically ormanually.
Thestudent could decipher that the EDGisnotaffected onlythe10A403 switchgear (bus).
B: Correct-With the86Renergized the EDGwill belocked out along with theoutput breaker.The 10A403 buswill bede-energized and theappropriate affected systems abnormal procedureswill beentered.
C: Incorrect- TheEDGwill belocked outfrom the 86Renergizeddue tothe BUSD1FFERENTIAL.
Thestudent could decipher that theEDGisnot affected only the10A403 switchgear (bus).
D: Incorrect. Without the 86Rreset notresetwith the BUSDifferentialcondition (will in),
still the EDGandits output breaker willNOTbeable tostart and close Automatically. Thestudentcould decipher that theEDGisnotaffected only the10A403 switchgear (bus).
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.PB-0001(Q) 4.16 KV (Attach ifnot previously provided)
HC.OP-SO.KJ-0001(Q) EDG HC.OP-AB.zz-0172(Q) 10A403 Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicantsduring examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, summarize/identify the response ofthe4.16KV busses toeachof the followingconditions:
BusDifferentialOvercurrent Given plantconditions, determine the automatic actionswhich result from the following:
Diesel Generator regularorbackup lockout energized.
Question Source: Bank # 33973 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge !
10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 600000 AK2.03 Importance Rating 2.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheinterrelationsbetween PLANT FIREONSITEandthe following:Motors.
Question: RO#44
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
When :
= OHA A2-A5 FIREPROTPANEL10C671 isreceived.
= TheFire Computer screen shows a fire inroom4303.
= Controlboard walkdownreveals that 'D' RHRpumphasspuriously started.
= NOother control room OHAalarms have beenreceived.
= NOother equipment hasspuriously started.
= Theoperators havesecured the 'D'RHRpump.
Which oneofthe following action(s) is (are)requiredfor thiscondition IAWHC.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, FIRE-Spurious Operations?
A. Place the RHRpumpbreaker
'D' control switch ANDlockout inpull-to-lock the'D:
EDGbypressing both emergency stoppush buttons.
B. Place the RHRpumpbreakercontrol
'D' switch in puII-to-lock C. Place the'D' Core Spray and'D' RHRpump breaker control inpull-to-switches lock.
D. Place the'D' Core Spray and'D' RHRpumpbreaker control switches inpull-to-lock ANDlockout the'D' EDGbypressing both emergency stoppush buttons.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-AB.FIRE-0001 Condition E andAttachment2.Spurious Activation ofDChannel equipment.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Oncethepumpissecured topreventit from restarting becauseofthefiredamage thepump breaker hastobetaken toPTL, theprocedure would that require theassociated EDG locked out only if the'D' CoreSpray pumpspuriously started.
B: Correct- With the spurious start attributed tothefire damage theAB.FIRE-0001Condition E hasthe operators put the'D' RHRpumpbreaker into PTL.
C: Incorrect- IAWAB-Fire-0001 Conditiori E therequired actions only pertain totheequipment that spuriously roomaffected started. Even though the 'D'CoreSpray pumpisonthe pumpdidNOTstart, samechannel (same thepumpbreaker therefore attachment 2) the Core Spray doesnotneed tobein PTL D: Incorrect. IAWAB-Fire-0001 Condition E therequiredactions onlypertain totheequipment that spuriously started. TheCore Spray pump did NOTstart; the therefore, pumpbreaker does notneedtobeinPTL Inaddition, the'D' EDG will NOThave tobelockedout(seecondition E).
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.FIRE-0001(Q) (Attachif previously not provided)
FIRE- Spurious Operation Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, determine requiredactions of theretainment override(s)andsubsequent operator actions inaccordancewith the FireSpurious Operations.
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changesorattachparent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295004 AK3.02 Importance Rating 2.9 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe reasonsfor the following responses asthey apply to PARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOFD.C. POWER:Ground isolation/fault determination.
Question: RO#45 Whichofthefollowing correctlydescribestheindication ofa directnegative short toground on oneofthe 125VDCclass 1Epower supplies (10D410)?
A. A negative groundcurrent will beonly indicated onpanel 1AD417.
B. Both white lights onpanel 10D410 will bebrighter than normal.
C. A negative groundcurrent will beindicated onControl Roompanel 10C650D.
D. Both white onpanel lights 10D410 will bedimmer than normal.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Switchgear ground detection lights:Normally both lightsaredim.If a ground exists, one light will dimandtheother willbebrighter. Brightnessisdetermined bymagnitudeof ground. LOCAL/REMOTE ground detection ammeter selectorswitch.Located ontheassociated distribution panel. InLOCAL, indication ofa ground (positiveornegative) ontherespective switchgear/distribution panel will beprovided onthedistribution panel DCground detection ammeter. inREMOTE, indication ofa ground (positive ornegative) ontherespective switchgear/distribution panel will beprovided oncontrol roompanel 10C650D.
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. InREMOTE, indication ofa ground ornegative)
(positive ontherespective switchgear/distribution panel will beprovided oncontrolroompanel 10C650D.
B: Incorrect- Onelight will bedim and the other will bebrighterona ground (positive ornegative).
C: Correct- LOCAL/REMOTE ground detection ammeter selector switch.Locatedonthe associated distributionpanel. InREMOTE, indication ofa ground (positive ornegative) onthe respective switchgear/distribution panel will beprovided oncontrol roompanel 10C650D.
D: incorrect. Normally both lights aredim. If a ground exists,onelight dimandthe will other will be brighter.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0147(Q). (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
D.C. System Grounds Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain thereasons for howplant/system parameters respond whenimplementing, DCSystem Grounds, Abnormal Operating Procedure.
Given a setofplant conditions evaludite those conditions anddetermine if a D.C.
ground exists.
Question Source: Bank# X Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO . . .
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295001 AK3.03 Importance Rating 2.8 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthe reasons for the following responses asthey apply to PARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOF~FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION :Idle flow loop Question: RO#46 Given:
= Theplantisoperating at100%power.
When:
The"B"Reactor Recirculation Pumptrips duetoaVariable Frequency Drive (VFD)fault.
Immediately following thetransient,the plant stabilizeswiththefollowing parameters:
= ReactorPower isat50%rated.
= "B"Reactor RecirculationPumpistripped.
"A"Reactor RecirculationPumpspeed isat45%.
a JetPumpLoop "B" Flow (FI-R611B-B21) isat4 MIbm/lhr.
a JetPumpLoop"A"Flow (FI-R611A-B21) isat38.5MIbm/hr.
JetPumpFlow Recorder (FR-R613-B21) isat33.1MIbm/hr.
=
Whatisactual core flow (WT)?
A. 42.5 Mlbm/hr., becauseflow inthe idle isnegative loop (reverse)flow.
B. 35.1 Mlbm/hr., becauseflow intheidle isnegative loop (reverse)flow.
C. 35.1 MIbm/hr., becauseflow intheidle ispositive loop (forward)flow.
D. 42.5 Mlbm/hr., becauseflow intheidle loop ispositive (forward)flow.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): During single loop operations, the totalcore flow indication maybeincorrect.
This is due tothe subtraction network inthe core flowinstrument subtracting out flowfromthesecured loopwhen this flow maybeFORWARD FLOWnot reverseflow.Ifoperating loop recircdrive flow (loop flow) is<23,000 gpm[speed is<48%), theflow intheidle loop ispositive (forward) flow. Theidle loop jet pump flow andthe operating loop jet pumpflow should beadded toobtain actual core flow.
IFOperating Recirc Loop flow 5 23Kgpm. DETERMINE Actual CoreFlow byADDINGIdle LoopJet PumpFlow ANDOperating LoopJet PumpFlow. (FI-R611A-B21 andFl-R611B-B21)
IFOperatingRecirc Loopflow > 23Kgpm. THEN:DETERMINE Actual CoreFlow bySUBTRACTING 85%ofidle LoopJetPumpFlow FROM Operating loop JetPumpFlow
[FI-R611A(B.)-B21 -
(0.85xFI-R611B(A)-B21))
VERIFY proper function ofthe subtraction circuit bychecking that calculated core flow(step A6) isthe sameasTotal Jet PumpFlow (FR-R13-B21 OR A190).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Ifoperating loop recirc drive flow (loop flow)is<23,000 gpm[speed is<48%), the flow inthe idleloop ispositive (forward)flow. Theidle loop jet pumpflow andtheoperating loop jet pumpflow should beadded toobtainactual coreflow of42.5 Mlbm/hr.
B: Incorrect- IFOperating Recirc Loopflow > 23Kgpm. THEN: DETERMINE Actua'I CoreFlow by SUBTRACTING 85%ofIdle LoopJetPumpFlowFROM Operating loop JetPumpFlow
[FI-R611A (B)-B21 -
(0.85 x FI-R611B (A)-B21)) [38.5 (.85) 4)
- = 35.1 MIbm/hr.
Theoperating loop recircdrive flow (loop is<23,000gpm [speed is<48%),
flow) the flow inthe idle loopispositive (forward) flow. Theidle loopjetpumpflow and the operating loop jet pump flow should beadded toobtain actual core flowof42.5 MIbm/hr.
C: incorrect- Theidle loopjet pumpflow andthe operating loop jet pump flow should beadded to obtain actual coreflow.
D: Correct. Theoperating loop recirc drive flow(loop flow)is<23,000 gpm[speed is <48%), the flow intheidle loop ispositive (forward) flow. Theidle loop jet pumpflow andthe operating loop jetpumpflow should beadded.
toobtainactual core flow of42.5 Mlbm/hr. .
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q) (Attach if not previously provided)
Recirc System/Power Oscillations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Explain thereasons forhowplant/system parameters respond whenimplementing Recirculation System/Power Oscillations.
Question Source:Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis
2021NRCWritten Examina'tion Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 700000 AK3.02 Importance Rating 3.6 K/AStatement: Knowledge ofthereasons for the following responses asthey apply to GENERATOR VOLTAGE ANDELECTRIC GRIDDISTURBANCES: Actions contained in abnormal operating procedure for voltage andgrid disturbances.
Question: RO#47
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= TheReactor isat16%power.
= A plant startup isinprogress.
When:
= An SMD (Solar Magnetic Disturbance) AlertofK7occurs.
= ESOC Excess MVARSis inalarm.
= DCNeutral Ground Current isinalarm.
= HC.OP-AB.BOP-0004, Grid Disturbances, isentered.
Then:
= BX500MainPowerTransformer Oil Temperature exceedstheMaxPeak Setpoint.
Which. ofthe following action(s) is(are) required IAWHC.OP-AB.BOP-0004, GridDisturbance?
A. LOCKthe ModeSwitch inSHUTDOWN ONLYduetoexceeding Main Power Transformer Oli Temperature.
B. REDUCE Recirc. Pumpspeed tominimum, LOCKthe ModeSwitch in SHUTDOWN, andTRIPtheMain Turbine due toExcess MVARS inalarm.
C. REDUCE Recirc. Pumpspeed tominimum and LOCK the ModeSwitch in SHUTDOWN ONLYduetoExcess MVARSin alarm.
D. TRIPtheMain Turbine ONLYduetoexceeding Main Power Transformer Oil Temperature.
Answer:
Proposed D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-AB.BOP-0004 Condition C Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect.With Reactor power <18%andtheMaxpeak temperature setpoint reachedIAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C,Trip ofthe Main Turbine isthe only action needed.<18%locking the modeswitch inshutdown isNOTrequired atthispower level.Thereactorwill still beatpower.
B: incorrect- With Reactor power >18%andtheoil temperatureatMaxPeakSetpoint,then IAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C runrecirc tominimum, locktheM.S. inshutdownandthentripthe main turbine.
C: Incorrect- With Reactor power >18% andthe oil temperature atMaxPeakSetpoint,then IAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C run recirc tominimum, locktheM.S. inshutdownandthentrip the main turbine. With Reactor power <18% and theMaxpeak temperature reached setpoint IAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C,Tripof the MainTurbine isthe only action needed.
D: Correct. With Reactor power <18%and the Maxpeaktemperature setpoint reachedIAW AB.BOP-0004 Condition C,Trip oftheMain Turbine isrequired removing generator themain from thegrid andthemainpower transformers.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.BOP-0004(Q) (Attach notpreviously if provided)
Grid Disturbances Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, d.etermine required actionsof theretainment override(s) andsubsequent operator actions inaccordance withGrid Disturbances.
Quest.ion Source: Bank# .
Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments: ~
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295026 EA1.03 importance Rating 3.9 K/AStatement: Ability tooperate and/or monitorthe following asthey applytoSUPPRESSION POOLHIGHWATERTEMPERATURE: Temperature monitoring Question: RO#48 Given:
= Theplant isoperating at70%power.
= Coreisolation Reactor Cooling (RCIC) isoperating CSTtoCST mode ofoperation inthe IAWHC.OP-IS.BD-0001(Q) -
Reactor Core Cooling Isolation Pump OP203 Inservice Test.
= Suppression pool temperature is89F andrising.
Suppression Pool cooling isinservice HC.OP-EO.zz-0102, Primary Containment Control, will beentered ONLYif Suppression Pool Average WaterTemperature reaches andcontinues torise asmonitoredonpanel section (temperature recorder) .
A. 95F;10C650E CAS(TR-4967 A1/B1- Suppression Chamber Atmospheric Temperature)
B. 105F;10C650C PAM(TR-3881 A1/B1- Suppression PoolTemperature)
C. 105F;10C650E CAS(TR4967 A1/B1- Suppression Chamber Atmospheric Temperature)
D. 95F;10C650C PAM(TR-3881 A1/B1- Suppression PoolTemperature)
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):EOPs are entered whenever anentry condition issatisfied,unless theentry condition istheresult ofa planned maintenance activity orapproved procedure. Theplanned maintenance orapproved procedure fnust evaluate theimpact ofNOTperforming theEOPactions atthe entry condition setpoint. If suppression pool temperature isexceeded during theperformance oftesting for twospecific system testing procedures: HC.OP-IS.BJ-0001(Q) andHC.OP-IS.BD-0001(Q) andno other heat input to the suppression pool exists, then entry into EOP-102 isnotrequired. Specific guidance for EOP-102 entry ata suppression pool temperature of105"F under these conditions is provided inthese procedures. Thespecific TR recorders that theoperators usetodetermine the (see Average SuppressionPool temperature areonthe10C650C PAMsection attached and table) this isalso IAWtheDL-26Attachment 3m (see attached).
ofthe large volume,Suppression Duetothe variationsintemperatures ofthe Suppression pool because Pool Average Water Temperature needsto bemonitored.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. 95*F isthenormalEOP-102 entry temperature;however IAWT.S, EOPBases, and theIn-service procedure test (IS.BD-0001), 105*F andcontinuing torise isthe entryintoEOP-102with thegiven conditions. IAWthe DL-26 Attachment 3mfor Suppression Chamber Average Water temperature check, the TR3881 A1/B1 on10C650C PAMsection isused.
B: Correct-105*F andcontinuing torise istheentry into EOP-102with thegiven conditions.IAW the DL-26 Attachment 3mfor Suppression Chamber Average Water temperature check,theTR-3881 A1/B1 on10C650C PAMsection isused.
C: Incorrect- IAWthe DL-26 Attachment 3mfor Suppression Chamber Average Water temperature check, theTR-3881 A1/B1on10C650C PAMsection is used.
D: Incorrect. 95*F isthe normal EOP-102 entry temperature; however IAWT.S, EOPBases, and theIn-service test procedure (IS.BD-0001), 105*F andcontinuing to rise isthe entryintoEOP-102with thegiven conditions.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102BASES (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
HC.OP-IS.BD-0001- RCIC HC.OP-DL.zz-0026 Att.3m T.S. 3.6.2.1 Suppression Chamber Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions, recognize the five (5) entry conditions forthePrimary Containment Control Emergency Operating Procedure IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0102 Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # #13on2019 *(Modified tofittheK/Afor temperature monitoring instrumentation. Originalattached)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
2021NRCWritten Examination Comments:
Original Question (#13 on2019Exam)
Given:
= Theplantis operating at50%rated power.
= SuppressionPool cooling is inservice.
= High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) isoperating CSTtoCSTmodeofoperation inthe IAW HC.OP-IS.BJ-0001(Q) -
HPCI Main andBooster PumpSet 0P204 andOP217-In-service Test.
= Suppression pool temperature is88Fandrising.
Whatarethe requirements forentry into HC.OP-EO.zz-0102 Containment "Primary Control"?
ONLYwhenSuppression Pool temperature reaches andcontinues torise.
A. 90*F B. 100*F C. 105F D. 120F Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295023 AA1.07 Importance Rating 3.6 K/AStatement: tooperate Ability and/or monitorthe following asthey apply toREFUELING ACCIDENTS: Fuelpool cooling andcleanup system Question: RO#49 Given:
= Theplantisina refueling outage performing fuelmoves inthespentfuel pool.
= 'A'Fuel Pool Cooling (FPCC) pumpisinservice cooling thefuelpool.
= 'B'FPCCpumpisinstandby.
Then:
a A pipe break occurs, which results ina trip ofthe FPCCpumpanda significant
'A' loss of fuel poolinventory.
TheIMMEDIATE operator action IAWHC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q), FuelPool Cooling isto A. evacuate theRefuel Floor andreturn theirradiated assembly fuel tothe vessel orpool.
B. addwater tothe fuel from pool Condensate Suppression Transfer, Pool via RHR,Fire Water,orService Water.
C. place 'B'FPCCpumpinservice, andverify.actual fuelpool temperature remains bounded within projected heat-up curves.
D. check linerdrains tolocatetheleakage path.
2021NRCWritten Examination Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): Seeattached HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004, FuelPool Cooling forI.O.A and subsequent operator actions.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. Due tothe concerns ofALARA(radiation exposure)ofpersonnelontherefuelfloor, theIMMEDIATE action istoevacuate those personnel andreturn anyfuelbacktoitsoriginal position ineither the vessel orpool for shielding purposes. Theother actions areappropriateto help mitigate the issue; however they arenottheIMMEDIATE concern.
B: Incorrect-sources Subsequent operator action that forlowering canbeused to make uptotheskimmer fuel pool surgetank; (see level attached).
howeverthis These isnotthe areall IMMEDIATE concern.
C: Incorrect- This isa subsequent operator action inHC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q) forloss offuel pool heat removal capability.Thisaction would certainly take place;howeverthis isnot the IMMEDIATE concern.
D: Incorrect. This isasubsequent operatoraction inHC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q) for lossoffuel pool inventory. This isnotthe IMMEDIATE concern.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
Fuel Pool Cooling Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, recall the Immediate Operator Actions for a given Abnormal Operating Procedure.
Question Source: Bank .
- #50onNRC2016 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
New Question History: NRC2016 Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO ExaminationOutline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295025 EA1.05 Importance Rating 3.7 K/AStatement:Ability tooperate and/or monitorthe following asthey apply toHIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: RCIC Question: RO#50
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
When:
= A reactor scram occurred.
Tenminutesafter thescram:
= AnMSIVIsolation occurred.
= With the high reactor pressure condition,RCICisplaced inpressure control augmented bySRVs IAWHC.OP-AB.zz-0001, Transient Plant Conditions.
= With theRCICflow controller inAUTO,the plant operator (PO) observes RCICspeed oscillations.
Which ofthefollowing explains the RCIC speedoscillations?
A. Swings inRPVpressure areoccurring duetothemethods being used forpressure control. This causes theRCICspeed tochange asthecontroller maintains a constant flow.
B. Inpressure control, theRCICcontroller attempts tomaintaina constant speed,but CANNOTrespond fast enough tomaintainspeed astheRPVpressure changes.
C. Using RCICfor pressure controlisinherently less stable than using it forlevel control duetothelower pressure intheCSTcompared tothe RPV.Thegreater instabilityisseen asanincrease inoscillations.
D. Thecomparatively smallCSTvolume results inthe RCICsuction anddischarge points inthe CSTbeing close together,andathigh flow the turbulence causes oscillations.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): MANUALInthis-modethe operator sets desired RCICturbine speed. Placing RCICflow control inMAN results inanopenloop control with theflow controller output becoming a fixed speed demand. Although this willprovide stable, constant turbine speed, anoperator will haveto maintain desired vessel injection flow rate.
AUTOMATICIn the -
automatic modeRCICturbine speed isautomatically adjusted tomaintain desired RCICpump discharge flow established bythe operator. So,asthe steam pressure changes (SRV cycling) tothe RCIC system, the speed h as tochange tomaintain the discharge flow The operators would observe this operation of theRCICsystem witha high reactor pressure condition that wasbeing controlled byRCIC along with theSRVs.Theflow controllerwillnormally beinAUTO.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. Asthe SRVscycle the reactor pressure will change, changes this the steam pressure tooperate theRCICpump. Tomaintaintheconstant flow, thespeedmust change. This would bea normal condition andobservation bytheplant operator while monitoring theRCICsystem with the flow controller in AUTO.
B: Incorrect- InAUTOthe controller maintains flow andinmanual itmaintains speed. The candidate mayreverse themethods ofRCIC control.
C: Incorrect- Thecontroller isequally stable inthe pressure andlevel control modes. The ofinjecting candidate maybelieve that theoperation ofRCICin other thanits design function tothecore isless stable.
D: Incorrect. TheCSThasa relatively small volume compared to theSuppression Poolbut it doesnot result inoscillations. Theoperator mayaccept thatthe smaller flow volume results in suction/discharge interaction.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0001(Q) Transient(Attach ifnot previously provided)
Conditions HC.OP-SO.BD-0001(Q) RCIC Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a labeled diagram/drawing ofthe RCICSystem controls/indication bezel:,
Explain theeffect ofeach control onthe RCICSystem. Summarize plant conditions orpermissives required forthe control switches toperform their intended function.
Question Source:Bank # 119950 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO -
Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295006 AA2.04 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/or interpret the following asthey applytoSCRAM:
Reactor pressure Question: RO#51 Given:
a Theplant isoperating at100%power.
Then:
= 2ofthe3 DEHCSteamHeader Pressure transmitters (PT-1001A& PT-1001B) slowly driftUPSCALE.
WithNOoperator action, theplantwillscram a.s reactor pressure(1) ANDthe Components/Systems availableforreactor pressurecontrol following thescraminclude (2) .
A. (1) lowers (2) Bypass Valves,RCIC B. (1) lowers (2) SRVs,HPCI C. (1) rises (2) SRVs,HPCI D. (1) rises (2) Bypass Valves,RCIC Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Twoof the three DEHCpressure transmitters drifting upscale willcause the Turbine Control/Bypass valves toopenresulting inanUncontrolled Lowering ofRPVpressure. With theMode switch remaininginRUNandNOoperator action, asreactor pressure lowers to756psig, the MSIVs will close, the reactorwillscram (MSIVs 8%closed RPSsetpoint), andthebypass valves willbe unavailablefor pressure control. SRVs,RCICandHPCIwill beused for pressure control inthis situation.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. With the two DEHCpressure transmitters driftingUPSCALE, thehigh reactor pressure signal input toDEHCwill cause the Turbine Control andBypass Valves toopen. This will cause anactual uncontrolled lowering ofactual reactor pressure. With nooperator action, thereactor pressurewill reach the setpoint of756#for theMSlVs toisolate andthereactor scrams. With theMSIVs isolated, thebypass valves willnolonger control pressure.
B: Correct- With thetwoDEHC pressure transmitters drifting UPSCALE, thehigh reactor pressure signal input toDEHCwill cause the Turbine Control andBypass Valves toopen. This willcause anactual uncontrolled lowering of actual reactor pressure. With nooperator action, thereactor pressure will reachthesetpoint of756# fortheMSIVs toisolate andthe reactor scrams. Turbine Control andBypass valves willnolonger control reactor pressure. Reactor pressure will be controlled with SRVs,HPCI, andRCIC.
C: incorrect- Thestudent could interpret the transmitter failureasa high pressure condition, which will scram thereactor at1037#. Since reactor pressure actually lowers andwith no operator action, the reactor pressure willreach thesetpoint of756#for theMSIVs toisolate and thereactor scrams. Turbine Control andBypass valves will nolonger control reactor pressure.
Reactor pressure willbecontrolled with SRVs,HPCI, and RCIC.
D: Incorrect. Thestudent could interpret the transmitter failureas a high pressure condition, which will scram thereactor at1037#. Since reactor pressure actuallylowers andwith nooperator action, thereactor pressure willreach the setpoint of756# forthe MSIVs to isolateandthe reactor scrams. With the MSIVs isolated, the bypass valves willnolonger control pressure.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0005(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
Reactor Pressure Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andaccess to control roomreferences (EHC Logic simplified drawing), determine system response tothe following:
Loss ofpressure orspeed signal inputs.
Question Source: Bank # 151506 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO ~ '
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295005 AA2.03 Importance Rating 3.1 K/AStatement: Ability todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey apply toMAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP:Turbine valve position Question: RO#52 Given:
= Theplantisoperating at50%power.
= TheMain Turbine First Pressure Stage isat243psig.
When:
= A maingenerator loadreject occurs.
= Thecrew enters the applicableplant procedures.
ofthe Which following aretheimmediate responses ofthe Turbine Control Valves (TCVs),
Intercept Valves(IVs) andtheReactor Protection System (RPS-)?
A. TheTCVsandIVs Fast Close.
RPSwill trip.
B. TheTCVsandIVsFast Close.
RPSwill NOTtrip.
C. TheTCVsandIVs Throttle Close.
RPSwill trip.
D. TheTCVsandIVs Throttle Close.
RPSwill NOTtrip.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): If a power-to-load unbalance (PLU) (alsocalled a load reject) occurs:Theload signal is immediately settominimum (Digital EHC). Thecontrol valve andintercept valve acting fast solenoids are actuated. A direct turbine trip isgenerated. This isdone toprevent theturbine overspeed condition thatcould result from asudden loss ofsignificant generator load. With power>30%,
the reactor will scram, RPSwill trip with firststage pressure >98.1psig with a TCVfast closure.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With a power-to-load unbalance (PLU) condition,the fast actingsolenoids forBOTH the TCVsand IVs willactuatecausing a fast closure ofthe turbine valves. Also, throughthe digital EHCsystem this will bea direct turbine trip. With power >30%, this will bea reactor scram. RPSwill trip with first stage pressure >98.1 psigwith the TCVfast closure.
B: Incorrect- With a power-to-load unbalance (PLU) condition,thefast actingsolenoids forBOTH the TCVsandIVs will actuate causing a fast closure ofthe turbine valves. RPSWILLtrip dueto the TCVfast closure andpower level/first stage pressure.
C: Incorrect- With a normal turbine runback, the turbine valves would however, throttle, thePLU willinput.a minimum value (0) into the DEHC causing a direct turbine trip with ofthe activation fastacting solenoids for the TCVsandIVs.
D: Incorrect. With a normal turbine runback, the turbine valves would throttle, however,thePLU willinput a minimum value (0) into the DEHC causing a directturbine trip with activation ofthe fastacting solenoids for the TCVsandIVs. Withthe power level andfirststage RPS pressure, WILLtrip.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AR.zz-0014/0020 (Attach if notpreviously provided)
HC.OP-BOP-0002 Main Turbine HC.OP-SO.SB-0001 RPS Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Regarding a power-to-load unbalance signal:
Determine whenthepower-to-load unbalance circuit isenabled/disabled.
Choose theparameters monitored to initiate the signal.
Explain whythis signal isgenerated.
Question Source: Bank# 119986 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New . .
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination HopeCreek
- ~
Facility:
Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295019 AA2.01 Importance Rating 3.5 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/or interpret the following asthey apply toPARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOFINSTRUMENT AIR:Instrument air system pressure Question: RO#53 Given:
a Theplant isoperating at100%power.
When:
a A largeleak onthe Instrument Air header occurs.
a TheInstrument Airheader pressure islowering at10psig/minute.
Whenislocking theModeSwitch inShutdown required andwhy?
A. More than onecontrol rodDRIFTS duetoa LowAccumulator Pressure.
B. Onecontrol rodDRIFTS dueto.its Scram InletValve opening.
C. Morethan onecontrol rodDRIFTS duetotheir Scram Outlet Valves opening.
D. Onecontrol rodDRIFTS duetoa LowAccumulator Pressure.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Thescram inletandoutlet valves for each controlrodHCUarenormally held closed bythe scram air header pressure (70 psig) from t he instrument airsystem. Asthe instrumentair header lowers the scram airheader willlower which willcause thescram inlets andoutlets tofailopen which will cause the controlrods tostart todrift. Thelow accumulator pressure condition isanindication ofeither a low nitrogen gaspressure ontheaccumulator (possible leak attheaccumulator) without control rodmovement orif thecontrol rodisscrammed. Theaccumulator willdischarge ona scrammed control rod toassist the control rodtothe full inposition. With theloss ofairtheScram Inlet andOutlet valves will starttofail open allowing thecontrol rodtodrift. A rodcandrift without a loss ofair dueto other control rodmovement operations.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. IAWAB.IC-0001 multiple rods (not drifting scramming) requires theM.S. tobe locked inShutdown. However, the lowaccumulator pressure isanindication ofeither a local accumulator troubleora scrammed rod.
B: Incorrect- Withthe scram air header depleting due tothe instrument air header lowering, the ScramInlet andOutlet valves willfail open which will allow thecontrol rodtodrift close. The I.O.A for AB.IC-0001 hasmultiple rods drifting not just onebefore locking the modeswitch in Shutdown. A rodcandrift without a loss of air duetoother controlrodmovement operations.
C: Correct- With thescram air header depletingdue tothe instrument air header lowering, the Scram Inlet andOutlet valves willfail open which will allow the control rodtodrift close. IAW AB.IC-0001 multiple rods drifting (not scramming) requires the M.S. t obelocked inShutdown.
D: Incorrect. Thelowaccumulator pressure isanindication of either a local accumulator trouble or a scrammed rod.IAWAB.IC-0001 multiple rodsdrifting (not scramming) requires the M.S.tobe locked inShutdown.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.IC-0001(Q)(Attachif not previously provided)
Control Rod HC.OP-AR.zz-0011 Rod Drift/Accumulator Alarms Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Regarding HC.OP-AB.IC-0001(Q), Control Rod: Frommemory, state theimmediate operator actions.
Question Source: Bank# 118766 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295018 AK2.02 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheinterrelations between PARTIAL ORCOMPLETE LOSSOF COMPONENT COOLING WATERandthe following: Plant operations Question: RO#54
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
= "B","C",and"D" Station Service Water Pumpsarein-service.
= "A" Station Service Water Pumpisinstandby.
When:
= The"C" Station Service Water Pumptrips ona lowflow condition.
= The"A" Station ServiceWater Pumpauto starts.
= HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001, StationService Water isentered.
75seconds after thestart of the "A" Station Service Water Pump:
= The"A" Service Water loop flowhasrisen byapproximately 2,000 GPM.
Basedonthis, the"A" Station Service Water Pump A. flow isNOTresponding asdesigned. Recommend restartingthe"C"Station Service Water Pump.
B. flow isresponding asdesigned. Ensure fullpumpflow inapproximately85 moreseconds.
C. flow isNOTresponding asdesigned. Recommend securing thepumpto investigate thelowflow condition.
D. flow isresponding asdesigned. Ensure fullpumpflow inapproximately 25 moreseconds.
Proposed Answer: B ,
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Station Service Water PumpStart -
inAUTO,SSWPumpDischarge lf Valve Opens inthefollowing sequence:
Forty seconds after opensignal, valve opens to4%,valve should beopen to4%by43seconds (frominitial start).
Thirty seconds later thevalve opens to8%,valve should beopen to8%by75seconds initial (from start)
Thirty seconds later valveopens to100%, valve should beopen to100%by160seconds (from initial start)
TheService Water Pumps are rated for 16,500 gpm.TheService Water dischargevalves are28" motor operated butterfly valves.
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. With thedischarge valve open to8%(75 seconds) andwith approximately 2000gpm offlow added tothe loopflow (a fraction of the16,500 gpm), thepumpanddischarge valve operation would beresponding properly. Thecause ofthe "C"SSWpumpwould beknown, so theoretically thecrew could restart the "C" SSWpump, however there would benoprocedural guidance inthis situation.
B: Correct- With thedischarge valve open to 8%(75 seconds) andwith approximately 2000gpm offlow added operation would totheloop flow beresponding (a fraction properly of the 16,500 gpm), the and the operators would pumpanddischarge continuetomonitor valve for the discharge valve toindicate full open withfullflow inanother 85seconds.
C: Incorrect- With thedischarge valve opento8%(75seconds) andwith approximately 2000gpm offlow added operation would tothe loop beresponding (a
flow fraction properly.
ofthe16,500gpm), thepumpanddischarge Therecommendation tosecurethe pumpwould valve be correct, however thepumpanddischarge valve areresponding correctly with thegiven conditions. This isnot a lowflow condition.
D: Incorrect. With thedischarg'e valve open to8%(75 seconds), adding 25 seconds would bethe startofthedischarge valve opening to100%. Thevalve still hastotravel tofull open at160 seconds, sofull flowhasnotyet been established.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviously provided)
Station Service Water tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Proposed References Learning Objective: Recognize abnormal indications/alarms and/or procedural requirements for implementing Station Service Water.
Question Source: Bank # 110944 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295016 AA1.06 Importance Rating 4.0 K/AStatement:
Ability tooperate and/or monitorthe following asthey toCONTROL apply ROOMABANDONMENT: Reactor level water Question: RO#55
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
When:
= A Control Roomfire causes a Main Turbine Trip andMSIVclosure.
= The Control Roomhasbeenabandoned. -
= Control has been establishedIAWHC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002, ControlRoomEnvironment.
= HC.OP-lo.zz-0008, Shutdown from Outside the Control Roomhasbeen entered.
Currentplant conditions:
= A plant cooldown is inprogress.
= Preparations are being made toplace "B"RHRin(SDC) Shutdown Cooling.
= Current Reactor Coolant temperature isat350F.
= RCICisin-service andmaintaining ReactorWater Level.
= Indicated RPVwater levelisat 30" onWide Range levelinstrumentation.
AsRPVpressure islowered, which ofthefollowing actions willberequired lAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0008, Shutdown from Outside the Control Room tocontinue thecooldown oftheplant?
[Reference attached)
A. Maintain greater than +80" indicated on Shutdown Range.Place "B"RHRin SDCwhenReactor Coolant temperature islessthan 324F.
B. Maintain -38" to+54" indicated onWideRange with RCIC.Place "B"RHRin SDCimmediately.
C. Maintain greater than +80" indicated onShutdownRange. Place"B" RHRin SDCimmediately.
D. Maintain -38" to+54" indicated onWideRange with RCIC.Place "B"RHRin SDCwhenReactor Coolant temperature isless than 324F.
Proposed Answer: D . . .
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation att. 10for (Optional):
actual RPVlevel) 10-0008 step 5.2.2 andRPVpressure direction states; 800-1000 maintain psig,
-38"to+54"WideRange SDCinterlocks arenot cleared (see until temperature valve is< 324*Fwhich onceitis opened, butwill corresponds prevent with initial 80psig att valve (see opening 6)theinterlock untilthepressure will not close interlock the iscleared (82 psig). Either AB.HVAC-0002 or10-0008 hasthe crew place RCICin-servicetomaintain level and willalso reduce pressure (plantcooldown). With HPCIorRCICnotmaintaining levelandnorecirc pumps promote available, natural 10-0008 has circulation the crew raising tomaintain cooling.
RPVlevel to+80" TheAttachment Shutdown 10willgivethe (see Range att.10) operator to amore accurate actual RPVlevel. Attachment 6will allow the student todeterminewhat pressure theplantis atandth.e permissives forplacing "B" (<
RHRinSDC 82psig).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. With RCICin-service, IAW 10-0008theRPVlevel bandis-38" to+54"10-0008
~
does reference +80" for naturalcirculation if nothing else isavailable.RCICisproviding level andpressure control along with a cooldown oftheplant.
B: incorrect-greater than With thereactor theSDCvalves coolant temperature interlock at350F (see of82 psig, therefore "B" 6)theRPVpressure att.
RHRcannot beplaced isstill inSDC untiltheRPVpressure islowered below 82psig which corresponds to324F(80 psig).
C: Incorrect- With RCICin-service, IAWI0-0008 the RPV levelband is-38" to+54". 10-0008 does reference +80" for natural circulation ifnothingelse isavailable. "B" RHRcannot beplaced inSDCuntil theRPVpressure islowered below 82psig which corresponds to324F(80 psig).
D: Correct. With RCICin-service, IAWI0-0008 the RPVlevelband is-38" to+54",With the reactor valves coolant interlock temperature of82psig, at 350F therefore (see "B"
att.
RHRcannot R PV 6)the pressure isstill greater beplacedin SDC until thantheSDC theRPVpressure islowered below 82psig which corresponds to324*F (80 psig).
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002 Control Room(Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
Environment HC.OP-IO.zz-0008 Shutdown from Outside the Control Room Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants dunng examination: HC.OP-IO.zz-0008 Att. 6/Att. 10 Learning Objective: Interpret charts, graphs andtables contained within the SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THECONTROL ROOM Integrated Operating Procedure to maintain plant operations within specified limits.
Question Source: Bank# 31125 Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295031 EK2.12 Importance Rating 4.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheinterrelationsbetween REACTOR LOWWATERLEVELand the following: Primarycontainment isolation system/NS4.
Question: RO#56 Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
= ReactorEngineering isrunningaTIPtrace.
When:
= A reactorscram occurs.
= Thereactor operator that reports reactor waterlevelreached -50" Currentplant conditions:
= Level hasrecovered andisbeing maintained between+12.5" to+54"
= Thereactor engineer reportsthatthe TIPs failed toretract.
= ThereisNOevidence ofcontainment leakage.
IAWHC.OP-AB.CONT-0002, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT, thenext if any, action, willbe A. noaction requiredsince TlPSdoesnotreceive anisolationsignal until
-129" B. toFIREthe shear valveatthe oftheSM/CRS.
discretion C. tomanually theTIPs retract andensure theTIPvalve closes.
D. noactiori requiredsince reactor water hasbeen level toabove restored +12.5".
2021NRCWritten Examination Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): TIPsystem response toa Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System containment isolation signal: Lowreactor vessel level (-38 inches, LEVEL2), orHigh drywell pressure (1.68 psig),
orActuation oftheNSSSSChannel A manual isolation switch.AllTIPdetectors notinthe"in-shield" position willautomatically bewithdrawn. AllTIPball valveswillautomatically close oncetheir respective detectors have reached the "in-shield" position..Seeattached actionsofHC.OP-AB.CONT-0002 Primary Containment and the NS4 isolations IAWHC.OP-SO.SM-0001, Isolation System Operations.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. TIPs RPV level isolation is at-38" Onthe scram the level reached -50", this would cause anNS4isolationsignal, andtherefore TIPswould retract andisolate. Thestudent would have toknowwhatlevel the system isolates.Level 1(-129")isalso a primary containment level isolation (see setpointattached SM-0001 table for the TIPs system).
B: Incorrect- Shear valves whenfired, a chisel-type plunger (guillotine)isdriven into theTIPguide tube with enough forcetoshear thedrive/signal cable andseal thereactor endofthe guide tube.
This isaction isnecessary whenthe TlP cannot bemanually isolated andisthe sourceofthe (no leak evidence ofleakage) (See attached subsequent action F ofAB.CONT-0002).
C: Correct- With the-50" level initial after thescram, the TIPsshould have retracted andisolated.
IAWthe1.O.A ofAB.CONT-0002 andsubsequentaction G,the TIPs needtobemanually retracted which will isolate the system.
D: Incorrect. TheLevel 2 (-38") will seal infor the NS4system toallow the TIPs toisolate immediately. Eventhough level wasrecovered from-50"toa normal level bandof+12.5" to54" the isolation thatdidnot occur hastobemanually isolated.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002 Primary (Attach if not previously provided)
Containment HC.OP-SO.SM-0001 Isolation Systems Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory explain theresponse ofthe TIPSystem following the receipt ofan isolation signal from theNuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System.
Question Source: Bank # 110478 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295021 AA2.02 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/orinterpret the following asthey apply toLOSSOF SHUTDOWN COOLING :RHR/shutdown cooling system flow Question: RO#57 Given:
= A reactor cooldown isbeingperformed.
= AIIvalveshavebeenaligned for placing 'B'RHRinto Shutdown Cooling.
T=0:
= The'B'RHRpumpisstarted.
= Theoperator opens BC-HV-F015B, RHRLOOPBRETTORECIRC.
BC-HV-F015B lights indicate thevalve isstroking open.
T=30seconds:
= ThePlant Operator that reports the'B' RHRloop flow isindicating 1200 gpm.
Continuing tooperate inthis condition will cause .
A. lowering ofRPVlevel B. overheating RHRpump ofthe'B' C. lowering ofsuppression pool level D. tripping ofthe'B' RHRpumponovercurrent Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Theminimum flow valve isnormally open whentheRHRSystem isinstandby.
The valve will automatically close whenthepumpisrunning for>4seconds ANDRHRpumpflow exceeds 1270 GPM.If system flow iowers below 1250 GPMfor tenseconds ormore(with thepump breaker closed) the minimum flow valve willopen. Theminimum flow valve sends flow tothe suppression pool. Exiting theRHRHX,flow isreturned tothe RPVvia return valve HV-F015A (B)and testable check HV-F050A (B). Flow enters theRxRecirc Loop A (B)discharge piping where itreenters the vessel through the jet pumps.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With1200 gpm flow indication, the minimum flowvalve (F007) willbeopen and therefore returning flow back to thesuppression pool. This system alignment would drain the RPVtothe suppression pool. Theforced circulation isnotmaking it through the core (establishing proper SDC flow) andAB.RPV-0009 would beentered for aloss ofshutdown cooling.
B: Incorrect- With theminimum flow valve opened, the RHRpump will not overheat. Thestudent might interpret the noflow asthecondition for overheating the pump.If the pumpisoverheating itwould have tobesecured andAB.RPV-0009 would beentered fora loss ofshutdown cooling.
C: Incorrect- Theminimum flow valve (F007) will beopen andtherefore returning flow back tothe suppression pool. This system alignment would drain the RPVtothe suppression pool. The suppression pool level would berising not lowering. With the suction from the suppression pool RHRpumpwould NPSHwitha actual lowering suppression the have a reduced pooland therefore a potential securing ofthepump. AB.RPV-0009 would beentered for a loss of shutdown cooling.
D: Incorrect. With the ampsrising the student might interpreta high current condition and therefore atrip ofthe "B"RHRpumpatthe breaker duetoovercurrent. AB.RPV-0009 would be entered for a loss ofshutdown cooling.
Technical Reference(s): (Attach ifnot previously provided)
Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a set ofconditions anda drawing of the controls, instrumentation and/or alarms located inthemaincontrol room, assess the statusoftheResidual Heat Removal System.
Question Source: Bank# 34143 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(3)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295028 2.4.18 Importance Rating 3.3 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures /Plan: Knowledge ofthe specific bases for EOPs.
High Drywell Temperature Question: RO#58 Which ofthefollowing describes the negative impact ofDrywelltemperature inexcess of340F?
A. All RPVwater level instrumentation isinvalidated.
B. Emergency depressurization capabilities ADScould with become impaired.
C. Theoperation andeffectiveness ofdrywellsprays will beadversely affected.
D. Containmerit venting berequired will to'get within thesafe area oftheDrywell Spray InitiationLimit Curve.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): EOP-102 (see Bases attached): Ifdrywell temperature cannot becontrolled by operation ofallavailable drywell cooling, direction isprovided torun back therecirculation pumps to minimum speed, initiatea manual scram. This isperformed inanticipation ofshuttingdownthereactor recirculation pumps asthe motors arenot qualified forcontinuous operation ina spray environment; drywell sprayis required before both themaximum temperature atwhich ADSisqualified (UFSAR Table 5.26) andthe drywell design temperature (UFSAR Table 1.3-4) limits arereached at340"F.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Inaccurate level indication mayoccur whendrywell temperature exceeds the saturation temperature for the existingRPVpressure. Butthis isnotthebases for thehigh drywelltemperature of340*F.
B: Correct- 340Fisthe maximum drywell temperature atwhich ADSisqualified tooperate.
C: incorrect- Sprays aremoreeffective with highertemperaturesduetotheincreased evaporative cooling.
D: Incorrect. TheDSIL Curve permitsSpray for a widerange ofpressures withDrywell temperature above 340F.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102-BASES (Attach ifnot previously provided)
Primary Containment Control Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective:
Question Source:Bank # 34099 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295008 AK1.03 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheoperational implications ofthe following asthey concepts apply toHIGHREACTOR WATERLEVEL:Feedflow/steam flow mismatch Question: RO#59
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
a All3 RFPT's areinmanual speedcontrol.
= RPVlevel @35inches.
ispresently Feedwater pump flows:
> 'A' 3.2 Mlbm/hr
> 'B'3.6 Mlbm/hr
> 'C' 3.5Mlbm/hr Main Steam flows:
> 'A' 2.6Mlbm/hr
> 'B' 2.5Mlbm/hr
> 'C' 2.6Mlbm/hr
> 'D' 2.4Mlbm/hr Based onthese RFPTspeeddemand mustbeadjusted conditions, anRPV toprevent IAWHC.OP-AB.RPV-0004, Reactor Level Control.
A. highlevelalarm B. lowlevel scram reactor C. highlevelmain trip turbine D. lowlevelalarm Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Total FeedFlow is10.3 Mlbm/hr. TotalSteam flow is10.1 Mlbm/hr. This mismatch will result ina rising RPVwater level. RPVspeed demand mustlower toprevent theLevel 7alarm. The Level 7 high levelalarm will occur if noaction istaken. IAWHC.OP-RPV-0004, Reactor Level Control, theoperatorswould have manual controlcontrollinglevel between Level 4 andLevel 7 (see attached I.O.A of AB.RPV-0004). These t wolevelalarms preclude the RPS setpoint of+12.5" (Level 3 Reactor Scram) and+54" (Level 8)MainTurbine Trip.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With the mismatch between Total FeedFlow andTotal Steam Flow at.2Mlbm/hr for feedwater flow,the RPV water level would start torise. Theoperators have manual control of feedwater, therefore the speed demand onthe RFPTs would belowered tocompensate forthe RPVlevel rising. IAW AB.RPV-0004 the operators would maintain level between Level4 (low level alarm) andLevel7 (high levelalarm).
B: incorrect- With themismatch between Total FeedFlow andTotal Steam Flow at.2Mlbm/hr for feedwater flow, theRPVwaterlevel would start torise. TheRFPTswould belowered to compensate for theRPVlevel rising. IAW AB.RPV-0004 the operators would maintainlevel between Level 4 (low level alarm) and Level 7 (high alarm).
level C: Incorrect- IAWAB.RPV-0004 the operators would maintain level between Level 4 (low level alarm) and Level 7 (highlevel alarm). The operators would p revent thel rising evel toa Main Turbine Trip setpoint.
D: Incorrect. With the mismatch between TotalFeedFlow and Total Steam Flow at.2Mlbm/hr for feedwater flow, theRPVwater level would start torise. The RFPTs would belowered to compensate for theRPVlevel rising.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.RPV-0004 (Attach if notpreviously provided)
Reactor Level Control Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given a set ofconditions andadrawing of thecontrols, instrumentation and/or alarms located intheMain Control Room, identifythestatus oftheFeedwater Control System Question Source: Bank# 35529 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments: . . .
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295022 AK2.04 Importance Rating 2.5 K/AStatement: Knowledge oftheinterrelations between LOSSOFCRDPUMPSandthe following: Reactorwater level Question: RO#60 Given:
= A plant startup isinprogress IAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0003, Startup from Cold Shutdown to RatedPower.
ReactorPower isonrange 4oftheIRMsandslowly rising.
= ReactorLevel isat+ 36inches andstable.
= ReactorPressure isat0 psigandstable.
Temperature Reactor isat180Fandstable.
TheplantisNOTatthe pointofadding heat (POAH). .
When:
The'A'Control RodDrive Pump(CRD) trips.
a Thestandby, 'B' CRDPumptrips onthe attemptedstartbytheReactor Operator(RO).
= Rodmovement Control hasbeen suspended.
Reactor waterlevel will andthe operators will haveto A. rise; increase theRWCUblowdown flowrate tothe Main Condenser.
B. lower; increase theFeedwater tothevessel.
flowrate C. rise; reduce theFeedwater flowrate tothevessel.
D. lower; reduce theRWCUblowdown flowrate totheMain Condenser.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):RWCUblowdown operations isnormally balanced toreject the makeup rate from CRD. Withoutthe CRDpumprunning, RWCUisrejecting atapproximately the samerate. RPV levelwill lower. TheCRDpumps willprovide a continuous make-up rateduetothelowpower andthe plant being below the POAH.Oncetheplant reaches thePOAHandstarts togenerate steam,the steam generation will begreater than theCRDpumpmakeup rate. Atthispoint inI0-0003, thecrewis toplace theFeedwater systemin-service feeding the vessel toprovide the necessary make-up dueto the steam generation. . .
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. With the reactor recirc pumps in-service (initialheatup andpressurization ofthe RPV), thepumpswould beadding heat tothe vessel inventory, however the RWCUblowdown flowrate would exceed any heat expansionbythe reactor recirc. pumps. Level willlowerdueto RWCUblowdown flowrate and the lossofthe CRDsystem.
B: Incorrect- Level will lower due to RWCU blowdown flowrate andtheloss ofthe CRDsystem.
Theplant isbelow thePOAH,so the Feedwater system would notbefeeding thevessel atthis time. If the student doesnot recognize thesignificance oftheplant being below thePOAH,they might select theFeedwater systemfeeding the vessel.
C: Incorrect- With thereactor recirc pumps in-service (initial heatup andpressurization ofthe RPV), thepumps would beadding heat tothe vessel inventory, however theRWCUblowdown flowrate would exceed anyheat expansion bythe reactor recirc. pumps. Ifthe studentdoesnot recognize thesignificance oftheplant being below the POAH, they might select theFeedwater system feeding thevessel.
D: Correct. Level will lower duetoRWCUblowdown flowrate and the loss oftheCRDsystem.
Theplant isbelow thePOAH,sotheCRDsystem will provide vessel inventory and theRWCU blowdown flowrate willcontrol theCRDmake-up rate andtherefore RPVlevel.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-lO.zz-0003 (Attachif not previously provided)
S/Ufrom Cold S/D HC.OP-SO.BG-0001 RWCU Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Frommemory, determine whya method of reactor water levelcontrol mustbe available prior toplacing theCRDH System in-service including thepreferred method oflevel control.
Question Source: Bank# 36244 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE .
ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO ExaminationOutline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295009 AA2.01 Rating 4.2 Importance K/AStatement: todetermine Ability and/or interpret the following asthey toLOW apply REACTOR WATERLEVEL: Reactor water level Question: RO#61
2021 NRCWritten Examination Given:
Reactor Power isat94%power.
= Allthree Reactor Feedpumps areinAuto.
> Narrow Range"A" (PDT-N004A) = 36inches.
> Narrow Range "B" (PDT-N004B) = 35inches.
> Narrow Range "C"(PDT-N004C) = 34inches Then:
A large leak develops inthe "A".Steam flowdetectorpressure diaphragm causing a
gross failalarm onthe instrument.
> OHAB3-F1 "DFCS ALARM/TRBL" alarmisin.
> CRIDSdisplay D5921- "DFCSTrouble" alarm isin.
Inresponsetothese conditions, the Digital Feed Control System will andRPVlevel
.(.1.).
willA -
A. (1) remain inthree element (2) willremain constant B. (1) transfer tosingle element (2) remain constant C. (1) remain inthree element (2) willraise slowly duetothelower total steam flow input totheMaster Controller D. (1) transfer tosingle element (2) rapidly rise due to feed flow steamflow mismatchresponse Proposed Answer: B
2021 NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional HC.OP-SO.AE-0001 2.3.21. -
TheMaster Level Controller will automatically switch from single elementtothree element levelcontrol at> 31.4% total steam flow after a 1minute timedelay ANDwillswitch from three element tosingle elementlevel control instantaneously at< 27.8% total steam Seeattached.
flow.
HC.OP-AR.zz-0007 -
D5921DFCSTrouble RFPTs element control. On a loss ofanySteam Flow signal,
. Additionally, the Operator Display screen(s) will display digitally the faileddetector(s).Seeattached.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. With theloss of the steam flow signal andwiththe givenalarms, theDigital Feedwater System will transfer from 3-element to element single control withnochange in reactor water level duetoNarrow Range detectorsmatched toMaster controlleroftheDigital Feedwater System..
B: Correct- Transfer tosingle element, there willbenolevel perturbation based onNarrow Range detectors matched toMaster controller.
C: Incorrect-. With the loss ofthe steam flow signal andwith thegiven alarms, theDigital Feedwater System will transfer from 3-elementto single element control D: Incorrect- There will benolevel perturbation basedon Narrow Rangedetectors matchedto Master controller.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.AE-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
Feedwater System Operations HC.OP-AR.zz-0007 (B3-F1, D5921) ' -
Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: norie Learning Objective:Frommemory, describe the response of theFWLCsystem if.a system transmitter '
weretofail.
Question Sour.ce: Bank# 124703 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
- Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295034 EA1.04 Importance Rating 4.1 K/AStatement: Ability tooperate and/ormonitorthe following asthey apply toSECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGHRADIATION: SBGT/FRVS: Plant-Specific Question: RO#62
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isoperating at100%power.
= AnI&CPCIS(Primary Containment System)
Isolation isinprogress.
surveillance When:
= The control roomreceives a High Reactor andRefuel Building FloorRadiation isolation signal. . .
= Reactor Building Ventilation Supply (RBVS) andReactorBuilding Ventilation Exhaust (RBVE) fans trip.
= All automatic actions occur for secondary ventilation.
containment
= TheI&Csurveillance wassecured.
= ThePCIShigh radiation isolationsignals werereset.
WHATactions arerequiredto restore theReactor Ventilation Building Supply(RBVS)and Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust (RBVE) fans?
The (1) breakers for both Reactor andExhaust BuildingSupply fansmustbe manually closed, then the fans willberestarted from the (2)
A. (1) 1-E (2) local controls(10C382)
B. (1) 1-E (2) control main room(MCR)
C. (1) Non1-E (2) main controlroom(MCR)
D. (1) Non1-E (2) local controls(10C382)
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):TheRBVSfan units aresupplied power thru1Eandnon-1E breakers.lf circuit any of thefollowing conditions occur, the1Ebreaker willtrip,causing thenon-1E totrip onunder voltage. (The Non-1E breaker opens/closes tostop/start the fan. Thebreakers arein series.).
-38"Rx LVL, 1.68 psig Drywell Pressure, Reactor buildingventilation exhaust Highradiation 1x10-3 mCi/cc, Refuel floor ventilation exhaust Highradiation 2x10-3 mCi/cc.
TheClass 1-Ebreakers are located inthe respective 1-EUnit channel SubStation TheNon switchgears 1-Ebreaker isthe breaker actuatedfor routine equipment operation via STOP/START normal. control switches atthe local panel 10C382. Toreclose the1Ebreaker, allinitiating signals mustbeclear andPCISreset; then, the breaker must bemanually reclosed atthe 480V1Eunit Indication substation.
of1Ebreaker position isprovided on10C650E(Main Control Room).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With theHighradiation signalsin, theRBVS/RBVE fans will (1E trip breaker thenthe Non-1E breaker). With P CIS reset, the1Ebreakers will haveto beclosedmanually (locally).
Then, the fans willbestartedat the localpanel 10C382 toplace theRBVSina normal line up.
B: Incorrect- With PCISreset, the1E breakers will have tobeclosed manually(locally).
The RBVSsystem isoperated locally atthe 10C382 panel. Indication of1Ebreaker is position provided on10C650E (Main Control Room).
C: incorrect TheNon-1E breaker opens/closes to stop/start the fan.The1Ebreaker will trip onthe high radiation signal from PCIS. TheRBVSsystem isoperated locally atthe10C382 panel.
D: incorrect. TheNon-1E breaker opens/closes tostop/start thefan. The1Ebreaker will trip on thehigh radiation signal from PCIS.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q) (Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
Isolation System Operation HC.OP-SO.GR-0001(Q) RBVS Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plant conditions associated with the Reactor Building VentilationExhaust (RBVE) andSupply (RBVS) system:
Summarize/identify theautomatic trips of the electric supply.
Question Source: Bank# 115987 Modified Bank# attached)
(Original New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295032 EA2.01 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Ability todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey toHIGH apply SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREATEMPERATURE :Areatemperature Question: RO#63
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant wasoperating at50%power.
When:
= A fire wasreported intheHPCIPumproom.
Current plant conditions:
= Thesmoke and heathasspread totheRCICPumproomasaresult offirefighting efforts.
= HPCIandRCIC have isolated duetohigh temperatures.
= Temperatures inboth the HPCIPumproom andRCICPumproomareat275*F.
= Firefighting efforts have been hampered duetopreviouslytagged fire suppression systems.
TABLE 1 Column1 Column2 AreaDescription & RoomNumber MaxNormal MaxSafeOp OpTemp Temp CRDPumpRoom(4202) 115*F 140*F HPCI(4111) 115*F 250F CoreSpray PumpRoomsA(4118) & C(4116) 115F 140F RHRPumpRoomsA(4113) & C(4114) 115*F 140*F SACSA & C (4309) 115*F 140F RCICPumpRoom(4110) 115*F 250F Corespray PumpRoomsB(4104) & D(4105) 115F 140*F RHRPumpRoomsB(4109) & D(4107) 115*F 140F SACSB & D (4307) 115*F 140*F RWCUPipe Chase(4402) 160*F 350*F Which ofthe following actions isrequired IAWEmergency Operating Procedures?
[Reference attached) . . . -
A. Manually scram thereactor andemergency depressurize.
B. Bypass High RoomTemperature isolations RCICandrestore for tostandby lineup.
C. Shutdown thereactor andcommence a normal cooldown.
D. Runback reactor recirculation andmanually the scram reactor.
ProposedAnswer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optionai): Seeattached flowchart ofHC.OP-EO.zz-0103/4. Student will determine from Table 1 that theHPCIandRCICPumprooms areattheMaxSafe Oplevel which willlead themtothe fact thatthe reactor will havetobeshutdown with a normal cooldown (IO.zz-0004). Butduetothe fact that there is NO reactor coolant discharge inprogress, the student willhave todetermine where togo downtheRBLeg ofEOP-103 (attached). There isnorequirement for a manual scram oremergency depressurizationof the reactor. . .
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. A reactor coolant system isnotdischarging into theReactor Building, IAWEOP-103step RB-15 (seeattached). Emergency d epressurization is notr equired.
B: Incorrect- Thebypassing oftheRCICorHPCIhigh temperature isolations isdriven bya Station Blackout condition IAWHC.OP-AB.zz-0135 Attachment 10.There isnoSBOinprogress, therefore norequirement tobypass theRCIChigh temperature isolation andplace it instandby.
Duetothe factthat the isnot in theRCICpumproom',
fire the student might choose tohave RCICavailable andtherefore select the bypassing ofthe high temperature isolations.
C: Correct- A reactor coolant system isnot discharging into theReactor Building andtheMax Safe Operating Limit in2 areas (Table 1) has been exceeded. ThereforeIAW RB-15, RB-21, andRB-22, thereactor isrequired tobeshutdown witha normal cooldown (10.22-0004).
D: Incorrect. A reactor coolant system isnotdischarging into theReactor Building, IAWEOP-103step (see RB-15 attached). A manual reactor scram is notrequired.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0103/4 .(Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
RXBldg andRADRelease Control Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: Table 1ofEOP-103 in stem ofquestion and the Reactor Building Control Leg attached Learning Objective: Given anystep intheprocedure, describe thereason for performance ofthat step and/or expected system response to control manipulations prescribed bythe step.
Question Source: Bank # 66819 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
2021 NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType': RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295020 2.1.31 Importance Rating 4.6 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, andtodetermine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup. Inadvertent Containment Isolation.
Question: RO#64 t
Given:
a Theplant wasoperating at75%power.
a AnI&Csurveillance wasinprogress.
When:
a Anerroneous lossofmain condenser vacuum signalcauses aninadvertent isolation of allMain SteamIsolation Valves (MSIVs).
a Alloperator actions forareactor scram have beencompleted.
Current plant conditions:
a Theloss ofmain condenser vacuum signal hasbeen cleared.
a Maincondenser vacuum indicationsareatnormal vacuum levels.
Whichofthefollowing would beREQUIRED toreset the NSSSS(NS4) MSIVisolation logic?
A. TheMSlVcontrol switches must bein"Close".
B. TheTurbine StopValves mustbeclosed.
C. TheReactor ModeSwitch mustbein"Shutdown".
D. .
TheMain Condenser LowVacuum Bypass Switches.
mustbein "Bypass" .
A A Proposed Answer:
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):TheMSlVs will isolate ona low vacuum signal of21.5"Hg.Abs (seeattached SM-0001).To reset theMSlVisolation logic,main condenser vacuum needs tobebelow of thesetpoint 21.5"Hg.Abs andtheMSIVcontrol roomswitches have tobeinthe "CLOSE" (see positionattached section of SM-0001).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With main condenser vacuum below the isolation setpoint of21.5"HGAduetothe erroneous loss ofvacuum isolation signal cleared, toRESET theMSIVlogic theMSIVvalve switches on10C651 will have tobeinthe "CLOSE" position.
B: incorrect-Withthe scram actionscompleted, themain turbine willbetrippedandtherefore the TSVswill beclosed. However, duetothe fact that the loss ofmain condenser vacuum signal is cleared, the MainCondenser LowVacuum Bypass Switches areNOTneeded. FortheBypass Switches tocomplete the bypass ofa 21.5"HGA vacuum condition, theTSVshave tobe<90%
open. If a bypass wasneeded, then the TSVsbeing closed would berequired.
C: Incorrect- ReactorModeSwitch not inrunbypasses the <8%closed RPSsetpointforMSlVs.
Themodeswitch canbeinanyposition except "Run", therefore theMSlVisolationlogicdoesnot have toseethe ModeSwitch in"Shutdown" specifically.
D: Incorrect. Lowmain condenser vacuum of 21.5"HGA canbebypassed via4 keylockswitches at10C609, 10C611(NS4 Panels)when turbine stop valves are s 90% OPEN (mainturbine tripped). Since theerroneous lossofvacuum signal is cleared, there isnoneedfor thebypass switches tobein"Bypass",
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.SM-0001(Q)(Attach if provided) notpreviously IsolationSystem Operation Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given ofNSSSSisolation a list signals, explain theplant conditions and/or operator actions necessary for automatic and/or manual bypass ofthe isolation signal. - '
Question Source: Bank # 33823 ModifiedBank# (Note changes orattachparent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(6)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO '
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 500000 EK2.03 Importance Rating 3.3 K/AStatement:
Knowledge oftheinterrelationsbetween HIGHCONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS andthe following:
Containment Atmosphere Control System Question: RO#65
=
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
a A large break LOCAhasoccurred intheDrywell a MultipleEquipment failures have occurred.
a Drywell Pressure is16psig andrising.
a RPV level haslowered tobelow topofactive fuel(TAF) andcontinuestolower.
a The H2/O2 Analyzersmust beplaced inserviceduetothe potentially highHydrogen and Oxygen concentrations inprimary containment.
Which ofthefollowing describes?
(1)ALLsample locations monitored bytheH2/O2 Analyzers AND (2)Whether anycontainment isolation signals totheassociated ContainmentIsolation Valves (CIVs) can be overridden to ensure a of vailabilitythe H2/O2 A nalyzers A. (1) Theupper drywell and the torusONLY (2) ALL CIVs C AN be overridden andopened B. (1) Theupper drywell andthetorus ONLY (2) ALLCIVsCANNOT beoverridden and remain isolated C. (1) Theupper drywell, lower drywell andthe torus (2) ALLCIVs C ANNOT b e overriddenandremain isolated D. (1) Theupper drywell, lower drywellandthetorus (2) ALLCIVs CANbeoverridden andopened Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Eachpackage (H202 analyzer) takes samples from threedifferent locations; High -
Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression Chamber AirSpace.
Each ofthe 3 sample suction linesandtheonereturn lineisprovided with 2 MOVfor containment isolation. Containment Isolation Valves (16 Total) automatically close upon: High DRYWELL pressure
(+1.68 psig),Reactor WaterLevel 2 (-38 inches), Reactor Building Vent Exhaust high-high Radiation (1 x 10-3 mci/cc). All 16 containment isolation valves associated with HOAShaveidentical control bezels:
OPEN,CLSD, OVLD/PWR FAIL, andOVERRIDDEN. TheCIVscanbeindividually opened afterthe associated isolation override P.B. isdepressed at(10C650E). (See attached figures the of controls andthe H2/O2 drawing)
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Eachpackage (H202 analyzer) takes samples from three different locations; High -
Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression Chamber Air Space.
Duetothegiven conditions all the CIVs would isolateoneither theDrywell pressure orRPV level. Therefore, they would allhave tobeoverridden tobypass the automatic isolation.
B: incorrect- Eachpackage (H202 analyzer) takes samples from three different locations; High -
Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression Chamber Air Space.
TheClVshavethe capabilities ofbeing overridden onthecontainment isolation signals from drywell high pressure andRPVlowlevel. The H2/O2 analyzers can beplaced in-service to monitor thehigh Hydrogen andOxygen concentrations inthe primary containment.
C: Incorrect- Eachpackage (H202 analyzer) takes samples from three different locations; High Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression Chamber Air Space.
ALLtheCIVsfor theses sample points would beable tobe lined upfor sampling.
D: Correct. Eachpackage (H202 analyzer) takes samples fromthree different locations; High -
Drywell headregion, Low Drywell cylindrical region, Suppression Chamber Air Space.
TheCiVscanbeindividually opened after theassociated isolation override P.B. is depressed at(10C650E)
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.GS-0002(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
H2/O2 Analyzer Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examinati'on: .none Leaming Objective: Select the three parameters, including setpoints, which will automatically isolate the HOASandpredict therequired operator action to:Reset the isolation signal andrestore theHOAStoservice.
Manually override theisolation signal and restore the HOAStoservice.
Question Source: Bank# 120390 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.1.7 importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability to evaluate plant performance andmake operational judgements based onoperating characteristics, reactor behavior, andinstrument interpretation.
Question: RO#66 Given:
a TheplantisinOperational Condition 4,preparing forplant startup.
a 'B'RHRLoopisinShutdown Cooling inaccordance with HC.OP-SO.BC-0002, Decay HeatRemoval Operations.
When:
a TheReactor Operator (RO)reports Total CoreFlow haslowered significantly.
= RPVlevel isslowly andiscurrently rising at+85inches.
a ReactorHeadVent temperaturereadings are rising.
also Which ofthefollowing isthe ofthe cause given plant conditions?
A. RHRPump'B' RHRloop test return MOVvalve BC-HV-FO24B isopen.
B. RHRPump'B' MinFlow valve BC-HV-F007B isopen.
C. RHRPump'B' Suppression Pool Spray Header isolation valve BC-HV-F027B is open.
D. Reactor Pump'B' Recirculation Discharge valve BB-HV-F031B isopen.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached Precautions andLimitations ofHC.OP-SO.BC-0002, Decay Heat Removal Operations.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Opening this valvewhile inshutdown cooling would cause a lowering ofRPVlevel.
BC-HV-F024A(B), RHRLOOPTESTRETMOVwill drain theReactor Vessel tothe Suppression Pool ifopened inShutdown Cooling (Precaution 3.1.1).
B: Incorrect- Opening theF007valve while inshutdown cooling would cause a lowering ofRPV level. BC-HV-F007A(B), RHRPUMPA(B) MINFLOWMOVwill drain the Reactor Vessel tothe Suppression Poolif opened inShutdownCooling, duetoflow below thelow-flow setpoint precluding automaticvalve closure. Toprevent this from occurring, the BC-HV-F007A (B)is CLOSED andtagged while inShutdown Cooling (Precaution 3.1.3).
C: Incorrect- Opening this valve while in shutdown cooling would cause a lowering ofRPVlevel.
BC-HV-F027A (B), RHRLOOPA (B) SUPP POOLSPRAYHDRISLN,MOV will drain the Reactor Vessel tothe Suppression Pool if opened while the associated'RHR Pumpisin Shutdown Cooling. Toprevent this from occurring, theBC-HV-F027A(B) isCLOSED andtagged while inShutdown Cooling (Precaution3.1.2).
D: Correct. Byopening BB-HV-F031B whileinshutdown cooling onthe'B' RHRloop, acore bypass isinitiated, which causes headvent temperatures toincrease. Thecooled shutdown cooling flow isnotreturned tothe vessel via the jet pumps (causeoftotal core flow lowering), but insteadis sent through the'B' recirc pumpduetoitsdischarge valve being open. This a creates bypass loop where hot reactor water isremoved from the vessel, but thecooled water isnot returned directly tothe vessel, thereby causing heatup and swell (cause ofrising level)
(Limitations 3.2.4 and3.2.5).
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-SO.BC-0002 (Attach if not previously provided)
Decay Heat Removal Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given plantconditions involving a Loss of Shutdown Cooling, summarize required actions tomitigate thecondition.
Question Source: Bank # 30780 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History: NRC2016 Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(7)
Comments: .
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level 'RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.1.32 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Conduct ofOperations: Ability toexplain andapply all system limits and precautions.
Question: RO#67 Given:
= A reactor cooldown isinprogress IAWHC.OP-lO.zz-0004, Shutdown from Rated Power toCold Shutdown.
= Both reactor recirculation pumps areinservice.
a Preparations arebeing madetoplace the'B'RHRsystem into shutdown cooling.
the During transition from normal Reactor System Recirculation operations toestablishing ShutdownCooling flow with the RHRpump,
'B' ofthefollowing Which isthepreferred Reactor Pumplineup?
Recirculation A. Both Reactor Recirculation Pumpsareinservice.
B. ONLY'A' Reactor Recirculation Pumpisinservice.
C. Both Reactor Recirculation Pumpsaresecured.
D. ONLY'B' Reactor Recirculation Pumpisinservice.
Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached Precautions andLimitations Shutdown ofHC.OP-IO.zz-0004, fromRated Power toCold Shutdown along with the Cautionfor minimizes thetimeatwhichthereisno forced flow through the core from eitherthe Reactor RecirculationSystemorthe RHRSystem. The Reactor Recirc Pump associated with theRHRLoop tobeplaced inShutdownCoolingmustbesecured with its discharge valve shut. Thedischarge valve ofanyReactor Pumpwhich Recirculation isNOTin operation shouldremain.closed throughout Shutdown Cooling operations.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. The 'B' Recirc pumpmustbesecured priortoplacingthe
'B' RHRpump inservice andthe loop intoSDC. TheReactor Recirc Pumpassociated theRHRLoop with tobeplacedin Shutdown Cooling must besecured with discharge its valveshut.
B: Correct- During transitionfrom normal Reactor RecirculationSystemoperations to establishment ofShutdownCooling, only the AP201Reactor Pumpmaybeleft Recirc in operation until theBP202(only) RHR Pumpisoperating andthen satisfactorily, onlyuntil the required BRHRLoopflow ofapproximately 10,000 gpmis attached achieved.(See 10-0004).
C: Incorrect- Minimizes thetime atwhich there isnoforced flow throughthecorefromeither the Reactor Recirculation System ortheRHR System. TheAP201Reactor Pumpmaybeleft Recirc inoperation until theBP202(only) RHRPump isoperating satisfactorily.
D: incorrect. TheReactor Recirc Pumpassociatedwith theRHRLoop tobeplacedinShutdown Cooling mustbesecured with its discharge valveshut.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-IO.zz-0004(Q) (Attach if not provided) previously S/Dfrom rated Power toCold S/D Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Analyze plantconditions andparameters todetermine ifplant operationisin accordance with theSHUTDOWN FROM RATEDPOWER TOCOLDSHUTDOWN Integrated Operating Procedure, supporting System OperatingProcedures andTechnical Specifications.
Question Source: Bank# 36162 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(5)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.2.12 importance Rating '3.7 K/AStatement: Equipment Control: Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
Question: RO#68 Given:
a for Preparation plant Startup isinprogress IAWHC.OP-lO.zz-0002, Preparationfor Startup.
Plant
= TheCRDsystem hasjustbeenplaced inservice.
OncetheCRDsystem isinservice, thecrewisrequired toexercise toensure proper rodmotiontosatisfy surveillance requirements forplant start up.
A. atnormal pressureONLYfor those controlrodswhich hadmaintenance performed onthem B. allcontrol rods atnormal pressure ONLY C. allcontrol rods atbothelevated ANDnormal pressure D. atboth elevated ANDnormal pressure ONLYfor those controlrods which historically have hadoperational problems Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): With preparation for plantstartup, theCRDsystem will beplaced intoa normal system lineup toallow therequired control rodexercising surveillance prior toreactor andto criticality satisfy Tech Spec surveillance requirements. Seeattached sections ofHC.OP-IO.zz-0002 andthe surveillance requirements (purpose) ofHC.OP-ST.BF-0001.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. There arerequirements for retestinganycontrol rods thathavehadmaintenance performed on them; however, this requirement for operability pertains toevery control rod.
B: Incorrect- Tosatisfy therequirements for prestart uptocriticality, all controlrodswill have tobe exercised atbothnormal andelelevated pressures IAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0002.
C: Correct- IAWHC.OP-lO.zz-0002 andTechSpec requirements all controlrodswill beexercised toboth normal andelevated pressures along with the surveillance required check.
coupling The control rods areexercised IAW HC.OP-ST.BF-0001.
D: incorrect. Tosatisfy the requirements forprestart uptocriticality, allcontrolrods willhave tobe exercised.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-IO.zz-0002(Q) (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
Preparation for Plant S/U HC.OP-ST.BF-0001(Q)
Control RodDrive Exercise Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Analyze plant conditionsandparameters todetermine if plant operation isin accordance with thePREPARATION FOR PLANTSTARTUP Integrated Operating Procedure, supporting System Operating Procedures andTechnical Specifications. ,
Question Source: Bank# 33038 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattachparent)
New Question History:
I Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10) l Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.2.15 importance Rating 3.9 K/AStatement: Equipment Control: todetermine theexpectedplant Ability configuration using design andconfiguration control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups,tag-outs, etc.
Question: RO#69 IAWOP-AA-108-101, CONTROL OFEQUIPMENT ANDSYSTEM STATUS:
Component AnAbnormal PositionSheet (ACPS) isrequiredtobefilled out if (1) - . .
eSOMS(WorkClearance Module) isupdated bytheNCO (2). . .
A. (1) aligning equipment outside ofroutineoperations.
(2) at the end of eachshift.
B. (1) a change incomponent positionisperformed per anapproved maintenance activity.
(2) atthe endofeachshift.
C. (1) aligning equipment outside ofroutineoperations.
(2) once d aily.
D. (1) a change incomponent positionisperformed per anapproved maintenance activity.
(2) oncedaily.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Situations will occur whenit isdesired toreposition a component andno approved documentation exists. TheACPS(Abnormal Component Position Sheet) approved wilibethe configuration control method. There aresomelimitations, however tousing anACPS,for an example approved maintenance activity that controlsthe component position. Attheendofeach theNCO shift shall update the ACPS (See attached OP-AA-108-101).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With no formal document tocontrol the component configuration anACPS
.(position),
will bethecontrolling document. Duetotheimportance ofconfiguration control from oneshift to thenext, the going NCO will off update the eSOMs(Work Clearance Module) andthe ACPSwill befiled awaywith no changes (See attached section onupdating the ACPS).
B: Incorrect- An approvedmaintenance activity that controlscomponent position isoneofthe limitations ofusing aACPSdocument (See attached sectiononthe ACPSLimitations).
C: Incorrect- Duetothe importance of configuration controlfrom oneshift toithenext, off the going NCOwill update the eSOMs(Work Clearance Module) andthe ACPSwill away befiled with nochanges (See attac'hedsection on updating the ACPS).
D: Incorrect. Anapproved maintenance activity that controls component position isoneofthe limitations ofusing aACPSdocument. Duetothe importance ofconfiguration control fromone shift tothe next, theoff going NCOwill update the eSOMs (Work Clearance Module).
Technical Reference(s): OP-AA-108-101 (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
CONTROL OFEQUIPMENT AND SYSTEM STATUS Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: FrommemoryState theresponsibilities of thefollowing personnel with regardto Component Configuration Control:
All personnel CRS Duty Operator[NCO/NEO Building Watch)
Question Source: Bank# 111253 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO '
Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.3.7 Importance Rating 3.5 K/AStatement: Radiation Control: Abilitytocomply with radiation workpermit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions.
Question: RO#70 Given:
= A RWCUsystem valve independent verification isbeing completed inthe field.
When:
= Theon-duty NCOdiscovers thattwovalves onthe verification list arein the "A" RWCU pumproom(High Radiation Area).
= Theshiftradiation protectiontechnician andtheindependent verifier reviewed the Radiation WorkPermit (RWP) survey for the"A" RWCUpumproom.
= Thegeneral area doserate atthevalves is110mRem/hr.
= Thejobisestimated totake sixminutes.
Whatistheestimated cumulative dosetheverifierwillreceive andisthe"Hands On" independent verificationrequired IAWOP-AA-108-101-1002, Component Configuration Control?
A. 18mRem;independent verification isrequired.
B. 11mRem;independent isNOTrequired.
verification C. 11mRem;independent verification isrequired.
D. 18mRem;independent isNOTrequired.
verification Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Dose rate calculation-[6 minutes/ 60,then0.1 hrx 110mRem/hr = 11mRem)
Calculation of110mRem/hr/ 6 minutes = 18.3mRem,estimate 18mRem, if thecandidate did not carry theunits correctly. IAWOP-AA-108-101-1002 Attachment 5 (see attached) GeneralRulesfor '
Verification, If significant cumulative radiationexposure (10mRem) would bereceivedbytheperson performing the Independent Verification orbypersons assisting theperformance oftheIndependent Verification. "Hands On"IndependentVerification isNOTrequired.
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. With a calculation of110/6 (carrying thewrong units),the student would get18 mRem.Thestudent would have toknow the General Rule of>10mRem forthe"Hands On" independent verification NOTrequired.
B: Correct- With a calculation of0.1 x 110,thestudent would get11mRem.This calculation is correct andthe fact that it is >10mRem, the "Hands On"independent isNOT verification required. ,
C: Incorrect- Thecalculation of11mRem accumulative dose iscorrect, howevertheindependent verification isNOTrequired duetothe dose being >10mRem. Thestudent wouldhave toknow the General Rule of>10mRem forthe"Hands On"independent verification NOTrequired.
D: Incorrect. With a calculation of110/6 (carrying thewrongunits), the student would get18 mRem.With thetotal >10mRem, thestudentcould pickthis distractorascorrect.
Technical Reference(s): OP-AA-108-101-1002 (Attach if notpreviously provided)
Component Configuration Control Attachment 5 (1.5and1.5.1)
Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Describe what theworker is acknowledging whensigning a RWPprior touse.
Question .
Source: Bank # .
NRC2019 Q#72(New)
Modified Bank# (Note changes orattachparent)
New Question History: NRC2019 Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments: ;
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.3.13 importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Radiation Control: Knowledge of Radiological Safety Procedures pertaining to licensed operatorduties,such asresponse toradiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuelhandling responsibilities,access tolocked highradiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
Question: RO#71 Which ofthefollowing isthe required actionifa Locked High Areakey islost Radiation bythe responsible whochecked individual it outfrom theRadiation Protection Department?
Theindividual immediately shall notify A. Security andestablish positive controiofaccess tothe area.
B. theRadiation Protection Manager andverify the area lockedafterchecking for unauthorized personnel.
C. the Manager, Shift re-iock the areaandhave Radiation check Protection for exposures in excessofthoseexpected.
D. Shift Protection Radiation Technician andRadiation Protection Supervisor andcontrol allaccess tothearea.
I 1
l Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached section ofRP-AA-463, High Radiation Area KeyControls Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Security isplausible duetothe fact thatthesecurity watchisalwaysonduty inall sections oftheplant. Positive control ofaccess tothe area isa responsibility ofthekeyholder IAWRP-AA-463.
B: inc'orrect-This would betheresponsibility oftheShift RadPro TechnicianandSupervisor after the keyholder has informed them ofthe lostkey. IAWRP-AA-463, theShiftRadProTech would normally verify the LHRA islocked once the operator returned thekey.
C: Incorrect- Thekeyholder would have toimmediately contact theShiftRadProTechandRad ProSupervisor before contacting the Shift Manager. TheShift Manager wouldensure that the RadProdepartment completed theproperinvestigation andalso hadtheLHRAre-locked.
D: Correct. IAWRP-AA463, responsibilities ofthekeyholder includes controlling access tothe area andif thekeyislost toimmediately inform the SRPTandRPS.
Technical Reference(s): RP-AA-463 (Attach if provided) notpreviously High Radiation AreaKey Controls Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: State the responsibilities ofthefollowing personnel forissuance ofkeys toLocked High Radiation Areas:
KeyHolder SM Shift Radiation Protection Technician (SRPT) IAW RP-AA-463, High Radiation i Area KeyControls Question Source: Bank# 30961 Modified Bank # (Notechanges orattachparent)
New Question History: NRC2016 Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO . .
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.4.35 Importance Rating 3.8 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge oflocal auxiliary tasks operator during emergency andtheresultant operationaleffects.
Question: RO#72
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant wasat100%power.
When:
= A Loss ofOffsite Power occurred.
= The 'A' EDG failed toautomatically start. -
= Operators were unable tostart the 'A'EDGfrom theControl Room.
= HC.OP-AB.zz-0135, Station Blackout/Loss ofOffsite Power/Emergency Diesel Generator Malfunction isbeing implemented.
Which ofthe following sets ofactions accurately describes howtostart ANDload the'A' EDG under these conditions IAW HC.OP-AB.zz-0135?
Local andRemote EDGPanels:
1A-C-421: Local Engine ControlPanel (102' elev.)
1A-C-422: Remote Generator ControlPanel (130' elev.)
1A-C-423: Remote Engine Control Panel(130' elev.)
After verifyingthat theREADY FORAUTOSTART isON,Panel 1A-C-423, then A. PLACEEMERGENCY TAKE-OVER Switch in EMERG position onPanel 1A-C-422,PLACEthe REMOTE ENGINE CONTROL inSTARTon1A-C-423, and then 'A' EDGoutput breaker will auto-close.
B. Press theDIESEL ENGREMOTEpushbutton EDGon10C651(MCR) for the 'A' andensure REMOTE lightison10C651, PLACELOCAL ENGINE CONTROL Switch on1A-C-421 inSTART,andthen the'A' EDGoutput breaker willbe closed from theMain Control Room.
C. PLACEEMERGENCY TAKE-OVER Switch inEMERGposition on Panel 1A-C-422,PLACEREMOTE ENGINE CONTROL inSTARTatPanel1-A-C423, and then the 'A'EDGoutput breaker will beclosed atPanel 1-A-C-422.
D. PLACEthe REM/LOC/MAINT 'CONTROL SELECTswitch on1A-C-421in REMOTE, Place LOCALENGINE CONTROL Switch on1A-C-421 inSTART, andthen the'A'EDGoutput breaker will beclosed fromtheMainControl Room.
Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Placing theEmergency Takeover switch inEMERG enables thelocal start.
Theauto-closure circuit forthe EDGoutput breaker alsoremains enabled. WhentheEDGfrequency andvoltage satisfy theDiesel Ready forLoadpermissive (>95% Frequency andVoltage), thebreaker canbeclosed manually. InREMOTE onthe REM/LOC/MAINT switch atthe1A-C-421 panel, diesel control isestablished eitherinthecontrol roomorattheremote enginelgenerator control panels (422 and423).IAW AB-135 Subsequent action B,if theEDGdoesnotstart andload from theMain Control allows Room,then a local start for either anEDG start from isrequires local attheRemote panels orremote Panels panels. This particular (see 422and423 attached).
scenario isfor AB-135 a
remote panel start; however there are for distractors panel local start. Inanycase (remote panel orlocal start)the EDG output breaker will beclosed from t heremote panel (422).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Placing theEmergency Takeover switch inEMERG enables th'e local start.
However, placing theEMERGENCY TAKE-OVER switch on1A-C-422 inEMERG defeats the automatic closure oftheEDGoutput breaker. It hastobemanually closed frompanel 1A-C-422.
B: Incorrect- Selecting REMOTE the'A' EDG engine on10C651E for does NOTenable the LOCALENGINE CONTROL switch on1A-C-421. It doesenable control atthe Remote panels 1A-C-422 and423.
C: Correct- Placing theEmergency Takeover swithin EMERG enables thelocal start ofthe EDG from theremote panels (422 and423). WhentheEDG frequency andvoltage satisfy theDiesel Ready for Loadpermissive (>95% Frequency andVoltage), thebreaker canbeclosed manually.
D: Incorrect. InREMOTE onthe REM/LOC/MAINT switch atthe 1A-C-421 panel, dieselcontrolis established either inthecontrol roomorattheremote engine/generator control panels (422 and423).
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.zz-0135(Q) (Attach if not previously provided)
Station Blackout/Loss ofOffsite Power/EDG Malfunction HC.OP-AR.KJ-0001 1A-C-423 Panel Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: none Learning Objective: Discuss the operational impilcationsofthe abnormal indications/alarmsforsystem operating parameters relatedtoStation Blackout/Loss OfOffsite Power Diesel Generator Malfunction,Abnormal Operating Procedure.
Question Source: Bank# 62474 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis ;
10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10) i
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.4.28 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge toa security ofprocedures relating event.
Question: RO#73
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= There wasanUnusual Event declared duetoafire inthe AuxiliaryBuildingcaused by anexplosion.
= TheSite Protection isresponding tothefire.
= The Security Department isresponding totheSecurity Event.
= It isdetermined that thereisanon-going security atHopeCreek.
threat IAWEmergency Preparedness procedures relating totheSecurity Event, Theactivation ofthe Operations Support Center (OSC) (1)
AllONSITE personnel will (2)
A. (1) isrequired (2) report toAssembly/Accountability Stations B. (1) isNOTrequired (2) take cover andShelter-in-Place C. (1) isNOTrequired (2) report toAssembly/AccountabilityStations D. (1) isrequired (2) take cover andShelter-in-Place Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): TheOperations Support Center (OSC)will beactivated if theUEclassification wastheresult ofa Security event.Otherwise, OSCactivationisoptionalat a UEclassification.
Assemblyisrequired atanAlert andoptional ata UE.Accountability isimplemented atanAlert or higher level.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Theactivation ofthe OSCisrequired duetotheSecurity Event. WiththeSecurity Event on-going, thereporting toanAssembly/Accountability Station would notbeprudent with thepossible terrorist activities inprogress.
still B: incorrect- Normally during anUnusual Event it would classification, beatthe discretion ofthe Emergency Coordinator toactivate theOSC(optional). However, duetothe Security Event the OSCactivation would berequired. Duetotheshift personnel manning theOSC,theOSC personnel would manthe OSCandshelter-in-place.
C: Incorrect- Normally during anUnusual Event classification, it would beatthediscretion ofthe Emergency Coordinator toactivate theOSC(optional). However, duetotheSecurity Event the OSCactivation would berequired. With theSecurity Eventon-going, thereportingtoan Assembly/Accountability Station would not beprudent withthepossible terrorist activities still in progress.
D: Correct. Theactivation oftheOSCisrequired duetotheSecurity Event. AII ONSITE personnel will security "Take Cover andShelter-in-Place" (see attachedemergency procedure relating to the event).
2021NRCWritten Examination Technical Reference(s): NC.EP-EP.22-0102(Q) '(Attach if not provided) previously Emergency Coordinator Response Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: List thefour emergency and classifications what happens during theclassification including:
= Facilitiesactivated
- Facilities staffed Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # orattach changes (Note parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.2.42 Importance Rating 3.9 K/AStatement: Equipment Control: Ability torecognize system parametersthat areentry-level conditions forTechnicalSpecifications.
Question: RO#74 Given:
= Theplantisoperating at100%power.
= Delaware River isat82F andrising temperature slowly.
= HC.OP-DL.zz-0026 Attachment3h,Plant Systems (River Water Temperature) is implemented.
Noadditional Technical Specification actions arerequired untilRiver WaterTemperature reaches A. 83.1*F B. 84.1*F C. 85.1*F D. 88.1*F Proposed Answer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Seeattached procedures, HC.OP-SO.EA-0001, HC.OP-DL.zz-0026,andT.S.
3.7.1.3 Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. With river temperature > 82F,the Attachment 3hisimplemented. Once temperature is>84*F, then theSOPsection for elevated river temperature isimplemented, but onlyafter river temperature exceeds 85F.This isalso the entry for condition 3.7.1.3 T.S.
Ultimate Heat sinkspecification. At84.5F, thecrew would tomonitor continue temperature river for >85*F. IAW T.S.3.7.1.3 at88Fall SSWS,SACS,EDGsandSACScross ties not cross connected would allow continued power operations.
B: Incorrect Oncetemperature is>84*F, thenthe SOPsection for river elevated temperature is implemented, butonly after rivertemperature exceeds 85*F.
C: Correct-With rivertemperature >85*F, the crew would enter 3.7.1.3 T.S. andimplement the actions IAWSSWSOPsection for elevated river temperature would which require opening the yard dumpvalves toestablish an alternate dischargepath for SSWsystem the D: Incorrect. IAWT.S. 3.7.1.3 at88F all SSWS, SACS,EDGsandSACScross ties notcross connected would allow continued power operations.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-DL.zz-00026(Q) Att. 3h if (Attach notpreviously provided)
HC.OP-SO.EA-0001(Q) Sect. 5.9 T.S. 3.7.1.3 Ultimate Heat Sink Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given specific plant operating conditions which require operator actions within 1hourFromMemory select thecorrect Technical Specification action(s) for the following:
T.S3.7.1.3 Ultimate HeatSink Question Source: Bank # j Modified Bank # changes (Note orattachparent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10) ;
I i
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: RO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group#
K/A # 2.3.14 Importance Rating 3.4 K/AStatement: Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiation orcontainment hazards that may arise duringnormal,abnormal, oremergency conditions oractivities.
Question: RO#75 IAWHC.OP-EO.zz-0318, Containment Venting:
Withhighradioactivity conditions inprimary containment, venting the primary containment via either theSuppression Chamber 2"or24"Exhaust lines wouldbethepreferred vent paths.
However,whatistheconcern forusingeither ofthese vent paths?
A. High radiation conditions inthereactor building.
B. Unmonitored radioactive release. . .
C. Releasing ofradioactivitywithout the scrubbing effect.
D. Inability toreduce pressure toprevent containment damage.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):If the containment atmosphere isbelieved tobecontaminated, ventlineups should beselected soastominimize theamount ofradioactivity released while achieving still the objective ofthe venting requirement. Thesuppression pool isthepreferred containment primary vent path under accident conditions. Venting from t hes uppression chamber is preferred, generally, obtain to thebenefits of suppression pool scrubbing. However, the vent path passes ductwork through that contains Back Draft Dampers andBlow-out Panels causing elevated radiological conditionsinthe Reactor Building.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. Using the preferred ventpath through thesuppression chamber forscrubbingandthen through theReactor Building, this will cause elevated radiological inthe conditions personnel spaces ofthe Reactor Building. Goodengineering radiation protection controlswill have tobein place.
B: incorrect- Thevent path isscrubbed bythe suppression pool, treatedbyFRVSandmonitored prior tobeing released.
C: Incorrect- Byutilizing the vent paththrough the suppression chamber or24"Exhaust (2" line seeattached), the scrubbing effectwillhelp reduce the release. '
radioactive D: Incorrect. Venting thecontainment isstill accomplished through thepreferredventpathof either suppression chamber exhaust line,however there is anadded benefit through the suppression chamber for scrubbing (reducing theradioactivity ofthe release).
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0318(Q) (Attach if notpreviouslyprovided)
Containment Venting Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Explain thebasis/reason for all prerequisites, precautions, andlimitations ofeachofthe 300series Emergency Operating .
Procedures. . .
Question Source: Bank # 113307 Modified Bank# (Note changesorattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.41(10)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295026EA2.01 Importance Rating 4.2 Ability K/AStatement: todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey apply to SUPPRESSION POOLHIGHWATERTEMPERATURE: Suppression pool temperature water Question: SRO#76
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
a Theplant wasoperating at75%power.
When:
a One reliefvalve stuck openandcould not beclosed.
a The reactor hasbeen manually shut down.
Current plant conditions:
a Suppression pool temperature isat96Fandslowly rising.
a Suppression Pool level isat79inches andslowly rising.
= Drywell pressureis at 1.1psig andstable.
Drywell temperature is at 100F andstable.
Whatactions IAWemergency operating procedures isrequired?
I. Place allavailable Drywell Cooling inservice.
II. Place allavailable Suppression Pool Cooling in service.
III.Initiate Suppression Chamber Sprays.
IV. Reject water from the suppression pool through 'B' RHR toRadwasteasnecessary.
A. II & IVONLY B. I, & IVONLY C. II, Ill, & IVONLY D. I, II,& III ONLY Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached EOP-102 legs for suppression pool parameters. If isdetermined it that suppression pool temperature bemaintained cannot below 95F using normal methods, subsequent instructions provide guidance oncontrolling suppression pool temperature using allavailable suppression poolcooling. When suppression pool level rises above the Technical Specificationupper limit, EOP-102 provides direction touseECCSand/oralignments not normally used tomaintain suppression pool water level ingeneral plant procedures. 'B' RHRtoRadwaste isused inaneffortto maintain primary containment initsnormal configuration andtoprevent level from rising tothepoint where themoresevere actions ofreactor scram, termination ofdrywell sprays, termination ofexternal injection sources, and emergency RPVdepressurization will berequired.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. Seeattached SP/T-3. With Suppression Pool temperature >95*F andrising, the action IAWEOP-102 istoplace all available SuppressionPool Cooling inservice. Seeattached SP/L-12.With Suppression Pool level High >78.5 inches andrising, the action IAWEOP-102 isto lower theSuppression Poollevel using 'B' RHRtoRadwaste lineup.
B: Incorrect- Maximizing drywell cooling would have been directed from theHC.OP-AB.CONT-0001for theelevated drywell pressure, however due tothe plant shutdown andthecurrent primary containment parameters, drywell cooling is notordered from the EOPsspecifically EOP-102.Drywell pressure iscurrently stable.
C: Incorrect-exceeds Suppression 9.5psig, Chamber andarenotrequired Sprays arenot atthis time.
directed untilsuppression chamber pressure J D: Incorrect. Seeattached SP/T-3, SP/L-12, DW/T-2, and DW/P-2. Suppression Chamber Sprays arenot directed untilsuppression chamber pressure exceeds 9.5psig, andarenotrequired at this time Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-EO.zz-0102-FC (Attach if not previously provided)
Primary Containment Control HC.OP-AB.CONT-0001 Drywell Pressure Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Given anystep ofthe procedure, determine thereason for performance of -
that step and/or predictexpected system response tocontroi manipulations prescribed bythat step Question Source: Bank # 152245 1 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
~
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
Comments:
i
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # , 295016 AA2.03 Importance Rating 4.4 K/AStatement: Ability todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey apply toCONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT :Reactor pressure Question: SRO#77
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Thecontrol room wasevacuated.
= Thereactor isshutdown.
= Alternate Shutdown Cooling from theRemote (RSP)
Panel Shutdown following a Lossof Offsite Power isbeing performed.
= AII RSP controlsare functional.
theapproach toCold During Shutdown, IAWHC.OP-IO.zz-0008, ShutdownFromOutside the Control Room, Reactor If Pressuredoes NOT stabilize 160psig below theSuppression above SRVs Pool, (1) canbeopened as required from RSPcontrols.
their If thecooldown rate exceeds 90F/hr., then thecrew direct LPCIinjection toreduce theRPV into UNTILReactor Pressure lowers to within (2) psig ofSuppression Chamber Pressure.
A. A andE (1)
(2)100 B. (1)F,H,andM (2)50 C. A andE (1)
(2)50 D. (1)F,H,andM (2)100 Proposed Answer: B
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional): Seeattached 10-0008 Att. 11 Thefollowing SRV's canbeoperated from the remote shutdown panel (10C399): F013F (non-ADS),F013H B transfer (LLS SRV,nonADS),and inEMERGENCY, F013M theF,H& M SRV's (non-ADS)If the RSP-10C399 Channel switch isplaced become inoperable from themain control room. TheA andE SRV's have AUTO-OPEN key,lock.
switches inthe lower relay roomonpanel 10C631, (Div.
4 Relay Vertical Panel). Controlling reactor pressure with the given conditions, SRVswill beused asrequired. inthecase ofoperating SRVsfrom theRSPlocal controls, -only theF,H,orMSRVscanbeoperated. A andESRVsareavailable through a keylock switch, however their controls areatthelower relay panel 10C631. Ifthe cooldown rate isbeing exceeded(90F/hr) with theabove conditions,IAW10-0008 Att.11,thedirection toreduce LPCI injection until Reactor Pressure lowers towithin 50psig ofSuppression Chamber Pressure orthe cooldown decreases below100F /hr. isthemitigation strategy atthis point.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. A andE SRVsare available through a keylock switch, howeve'r theircontrols areat thelower relay panel' 10C63110-0008 gives the option tousethe A andE SRVs,however the stemofthe question asks forthe controls atthe RSP.Whenexceeding the cooldown rate,the direction toreduce LPCI injection until Reactor Pressurelowers towithin 50psig ofSuppression Chamber Pressure orthe cooldown decreases below100F/hr. isthemitigation strategy atthis point.
B: Correct- F013F (non-ADS), F013H(LLS SRV, non ADS), andF013M(non-ADS) canbe operated from theremote shutdown panel (10C399). When exceeding the cooldown rate,the direction toreduce LPCI injection until Reactor Pressure lowers to within 50psig of Suppression Chamber Pressure orthe cooldown decreases below 100F/hr. isthemitigation strategy atthis point.
C: incorrect A andESRVsareavailable through a keylock switch, however theircontrols areat the lower relay panel 10C631. 10-0008 givesthe option tousethe A and E SRVs,however the stem ofthe question asks forthe controls attheRSP.
D: Incorrect. Whenexceeding thecooldown thedirection rate, toreduce LPCI injection until Reactor Pressure lowers towithin 50psig ofSuppression Chamber Pressure or the cooldown decreases below100F/hr. isthemitigation strategy atthis point.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-IO.zz-0008(Q) (Attach ifnot previouslyprovided)
Shutdown FromOutside Control Room Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective: Analyze plant conditions andparameters todetermine ifplant operation isin .
accordance with theSHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THECONTROL ROOM Integrated Operating Procedure, supporting System Operating Procedures andTechnical Specifications.
Question Source: Bank# 125070 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New i Question History:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 -
ExamType: SRO '
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295037 EA2.07 Importance Rating 4.2 K/AStatement: Ability todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey applytoSCRAM CONDITION PRESENT ANDREACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWNContainment
- conditions/isolations Question
- SRO#78
~
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
a While operating at60%reactor power, scram a reactor onlowreactor waterlevel occurs.
= Thereactor fails toscram.
a All control rods remain attheir pre-trip conditions.
T=30minutes after the transient: . . .
= SLCtank level isat2600 gallons.
a Rxpoweris <4%.
= RPVpressure is at900psig.
a RPVlevel wasintentionally lowered andmaintained within -50inches to-120inches.
a Suppression poollevel is at79inches andsteady.
a Suppression pooltemperature isat1550F andslowly lowering.
a Drywell pressure isat4.5 psig andsteady.
a Main condenser vacuum is at 6 inches Hgabs andslowlydegrading.
= NOindications ofafuel failure or steam line breakexist.
Which ofthe following action(s) is(are) required IAWemergency operating procedures?
A. Lower reactor pressure tostaybelow the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit Curve.
B. Emergency depressurize thereactor.
C. Bypass interlocks as.required andmaintainthe MSIVs open.
D. Depressurize the reactor andmaintain cooldownrate below 90*F/hr.
Answer:
Proposed C i
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):Under failure-to-scramconditions, certainisolations maybedefeated toprevent closure of theMSIVs andpermit continued useofthe main condenser asa heat sink. Ifthemain steam lineswere allowed toclose, theenergy addition tothe containmentwould likelyinc'rease andtheHeat Capacity Temperature Limit couldbereached ina relativelyshort time. Defeating the main steam line isolations may thus bea principal contributortosuccessful mitigation ofa failure-to-scram event.
Defeating thelow level isolations anticipates the possible levelreduction andprevents unnecessaryloss ofthe main condenser. Seeattached EOP-101A FC. .
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. The combination ofRPVpressure andSuppression pool temperature for HCTLdo not challenge theAction required area ofHCTL.Seeattached HCTLcurve.
B: Incorrect- RPVwaterlevel can bemaintainedabove185inches, emergency depressurization isnotrequired. Seeattached LP-18.
C: Correct- Isolations maybedefeated topreventclosure oftheMSlVs andpermit continueduse ofthemain condenser asa heatsink. LowRPVwater level isolations are defeated since subsequent steps maylower RPVwater level tobelow the lowRPVwater level MSIVisolation setpoint. Seeattached LP-8 andRC/P-17.
D: Incorrect. Cooldown isnotpermitted untilthe Cold Shutdown Boron weight hasbeen added.
(1100 gallons inthe SLCtank). SeeattachedRC/P-19.
Technical Reference(s): (Attach if not previously provided)
Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: 'none Learning Objective: Given anystep oftheprocedure, explain thebasis forperformance ofthat step and/orevaluate the expected system response tocontrolmanipulations prescribed bythatstep.
Question Source: Bank # 33931 Modified Bank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
Comments: . .
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 295021 2.2.40 Importance Rating 4.7 K/AStatement:
Equipment Control:Ability toapply Technical Specifications for Loss a system-ofShutdownCooling (RHR).
Question: SRO#79
2021NRCWritten Examination.
Given:
= Theplant isshutdown.
= Detensioning oftheReactor Headisinprogress.
= 'A' RHRisinshutdown cooling.
= 'B' RHRisinstandby.
= Reactor coolanttemperature isat135Fandsteady.
= RHR flow is at10,000 gpm.
= ThePlant Operator (PO) determines thatthe 'A' RHRHeat Exchanger hasfaileddueto leakage into theStation Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS).
= ThePOremoves 'A' RHRLoopfrom service andisolates the'A' RHRHeat Exchanger.
With theabove plant conditions and (1) RPVlevel asdefined inTechnical Specifications, theCRSdetermines that. - (2) - . . - .
A. (1) low (2)atleast oneshutdowncooling modeloop ofthe residual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE with oneRHRpumpandoneheat exchangerin operation.
B. (1)high (2) shutdown two modeloopsof the cooling residual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE andatleast one loop is inoperation with oneRHR pumpandoneheat exchangerOPERABLE ineachloop.
C., (1)high (2)atleast oneshutdown cooling modeloop oftheresidual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE with oneRHRpump and oneheat exchanger inoperation.
D. (1)low (2)twoshutdown modeloops cooling oftheresidual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE andatleast oneloop isinoperation with one RHR pumpandoneheat exchangerOPERABLE ineachloop.
Proposed Answer: D
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):With a lossofSDConthe'A' RHRloop andthe'A' RHRheat exchanger isolated duetothe leak,the 'A' RHRloop ofSDCisINOPERABLE. Thecurrent status ofthe plantwith RPV level <22feet 2inches above the top ofthe reactor pressure vessel flange (low level)and heat lossesto ambient arenot sufficient tomaintain OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5,theCRSwould have to determine that T.S. 3.9.11.2is applicable which would require twoshutdown coolingmodeloops ofthe residual heat removal (RHR) system OPERABLE andatleast oneloop isinoperation with oneRHR pumpandoneheat exchanger OPERABLE ineach loop. This isthe entry conditions for T.S.3.9.11.2.
Theentry conditions for T.S. 3.9.11.1 with thehigh level asdefined as>22feet 2inches above the top ofthereactor pressure vessel flange andheat losses toambient arenotsufficient tomaintain OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5would beatleast oneshutdown cooling modeloop oftheresidual heat removal (RHR) system SHALL be OPERABLE with one RHR pump and one heatexchanger OPERABLE. (See attached entry conditions andapplicability's for T.S. 3.9.11.1 High Level and3.9.11.2 LowLevel).
Plausibility Justification:
A: incorrect. Asdefined inT.S. 3.9.11, <22feet 2 inches above thetopofthereactor pressure vessel flange isapplicable toT.S. 3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVELspecification. Theentry condition forT.S3.9.11.2 istwoshutdown coolingmodeloops oftheresidual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE and atleast oneloop isinoperation with oneRHRpump andoneheat exchanger OPERABLEin each loop.Thestudent willhave todetermine either T.S. 3.9.11.1 HIGHWATERLEVEL orT.S. 3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVELandthen theentry condition foreach TechSpec.
B: Incorrect- T.S. 3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVELisapplicable for thegiven conditions.
Detensioning ofthehead isOPCON 5,however the RPV levelis <22feet 2 inches above the top ofthereactor pressure vessel flange (the refuel cavityabove ofthe vessel head hasnotbeen filledyet).
C: Incorrect- T.S.3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVELisapplicable for the given conditions.
Detensioning oftheheadisOPCON 5,however the RPVlevel is <22 feet2 inches above the top ofthe reactor pressure vessel flange (the refuel cavityabove ofthevessel headhasnot been filledyet). Theentry condition for T.S3.9.11.2 istwoshutdown cooling mode loopsof the residual heat removal (RHR) system SHALLbeOPERABLE andatleast one loopisinoperation with oneRHRpumpandoneheat exchanger OPERABLE ineach loop.
D: Correct. T.S.3.9.11.2 LOWWATERLEVELisapplicable for thegiven conditions. The entry condition forT.S3.9.11.2 istwoshutdown cooling modeloops ofthe residual heatremoval (RHR) system SHALLb.e OPERABLE andatleast oneloop isinoperation with oneRHR pump andoneheat exchanger OPERABLE ineach loop.
Technical Reference(s): T.S. 3.9.11.1 and3.9.11.2 (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
Refueling Operations Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: none Learning Objective:Assess Residual Heat Removal System operability anddetermine required actions associated withResidual Heat Removal System inoperability.
Question Source: Bank #
Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New X Question History:
2021NRCWritten Examination HopeCreek Facility:
Vendor: GE ,
ExamDate: 2021 ExamType:SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # E950h Importance Rating 4.0 K/A.Statement: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Ability toverifysystem alarmsetpointsand operate controls identified inthealarm response manual. Partial orComplete LossofForced Core FlowCirculation Question: SRO#80
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
When:
= Reactor flow andpower begantotrend downward.
a RPT breakers CN205andDN205aretripped open.
(1)Whatistherequired action IAWHC.OP-AB.RPV-0003, Recirculation System abnormal?
(2)Based onthe above conditions andIAW10CFR50.72, what istheearliest reporting requirement, if any?
A. (1) locktheReactor Mode Switch inthe Shutdown position.
(2) eighthours.
B. (1) check power-to-flowrelationship for 'A'Reactor Recirculation Pumpinsingle loopoperation.
(2) NOTreportable.
C. (1) check power-to-flow relationship for 'B'Reactor Recirculation Pumpinsingle loopoperation.
(2) NOTreportable.
D. (1) locktheReactor ModeSwitch inthe Shutdown position.
(2) fourhours.
ProposedAnswer: D Explanation (Optional): TheRPTbreakers functiontointerrupt power from therecirc Variable Frequency unit Drive tothereactor recircpumps, thus providing a rapid cessation ofcore flow andsubsequent rise incore voidingtoreduce reactorpower. Eachrecirc pumpissupplied power through twobreakers arrangedinseries. "A"Recirc Pump: RPTBreakers AN205& CN205, "B"Recirc Pump: RPTBreakers BN205& DN205. With CN205andDN205tripped, both "A" and"B"reactor recirculation pumpsare tripped, there therefore, arenorecirc pumps running with thereactor critical.
Theimmediate operator IAWHC.OP.AB.RPV-0003 actions A 4-hour 0003). report isrequired istoLockTheModeSwitch for anevent involving a critical scram unless (see inShutdown attached it resultedfrom RPV-andwas ofa pre-planned part sequence. Manual RPSactuation inanticipation ofreceiving anautomatic RPS isreportable actuation (RAL 11.3.2).
2021NRCWritten Examination Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. An8 hour reportiscorrect for anyother actuation (forexample jPCIS andECCS).
Due tothe manual RPSactuation, thisisreportable totheNRCwithin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> IAWRAL11.3.2.
B: incorrect- DuetotheRPTbreaker arranged inseries the'A'Recirc pumpRPTbreakers are AN205 and CN205. With the tripofthe CN205 the'A' Recirc pumpwill betripped, alongwiththe
'B' Recirc pump duetothe D.N205 breaker trip.Therefore;IAWAB.RPV-0003 immediate operator actions is toLock the ModeSwitch inShutdown (RPS trip).Thestudent willhaveto determine the RPT arrangement andunderstand thatthe plant isnotinsingle loop operation and the I.O.A will have to betaken.Dueto themanual RPSactuation, thisisreportable totheNRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> IAW RAL 11.3.2.
C: Incorrect- Duetothe RPT breaker arrangedin series the'B' Recirc pumpRPTbreakers are BN205andDN205. Withthe trip oftheDN205the'B' Recirc pumpwill betripped, alongwiththe
'A' Recirc pumpduetotheCN205 breaker trip. Therefore;IAWAB.RPV-0'003 immediate operator actions istoLock the Mode Switch in Shutdown (RPS trip).Thestudent willhaveto determine theRPTarrangement and understand thattheplant isnot insingle loop operation and the I.O.A will have tobetaken. Dueto the manual RPSactuation, this isreportable totheNRC within 4hours IAWRAL11.3.2.
D: Correct. Theimmediate operator actions IAW HC.OP.AB.RPV-0003 istoLockTheMode Switch inShutdown. Duetothe manual RPSactuation, this isreportabletotheNRCwithin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> IAWRAL11.3.2.
Technical Reference(s): RAL11.3.2 System Actuation (Attach if notpreviously provided)
HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003 Recirculation HC.OP-SO.BB-0002 Recirc. Ops.
Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants duringexamination: EALs andRALs without the attachments Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, determine requiredactions of theretainment override(s) andsubsequent =
operatoractions inaccordance with the Recirculation System/Power Oscillations.
Question Source: Bank#
ModifiedBank# (Note changes orattach parent)
New X Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Memory orKnowledge 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
Comments:
I 2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination OutlineCross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 2950182.4.4 Importance Rating 4.7 K/AStatement: Emergency Procedure/Plan:Ability torecognize abnormal indications for system operating that are parameters entry conditions level for emergencyland abnormal operating procedures:Partial orTotal LossofCCW Question: SRO#81
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant isat100%rated power.
Then:
= The plant experiences a grassing event.
= HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001, "StationService Water" hasbeenentered.
= All actions toclear theSSWSStrainer pressure HiHidifferential alarm havefailed.
= 'A' SSWS Strainer dPis 6 psid.
= The'A' SSW Pump is inservice at3500gpmontheloop supplying TACS.
= SSWTemperature is53F.
'A'SSWSStrainer operationis considered (1) Additional
. actions include(2)
[Reference attached)
A. (1) inoperable (2) placing thestandby SSW pump in service.
B. (1) degraded (2) ensuring thestandby SSWpump isinManual.
C. inoperable (1) ensuring (2) thestandby SSWpumpisinManual.
D. (1) degraded (2) placing thestandby SSWpumpinservice.
Answer: B Proposed
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):With thegiven parameters for SSW,the student will have todetermine thatthe entry condition into subsequent actionC ofAB.COOL-0001 isapplicable (see attached). With strainer SSW dPabove 5 psid,the attachment 4 graph willhave tobeused todetermine theoperability ofthe 'A' traveling screen. Placingthe standby SSWpumpinthe "A"SSWloop inMANUAL isalso required IAW subsequent action C of AB.COOL-0001 toprevent a possible automatic start ofthe standby pumpfrom a low flowcondition intheassociated loop. Normal alignment would haveoneSSWpumpinservice per loop ofSSWandthe standby pumps inAUTO. . . .
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. With the given SSWparameters offlow andtemperature, thepoint onthegraph of attachment 4,places the 'A' SSWstrainer inthe acceptable region for operations. However, the
'A' SSWtraveling screen isconsidered degraded. Duetoa potential lowflow condition inthe associated loop the standby SSW pump will beplaced inMANUAL. Thestudent will have to both determine from thegraph theoperability ofthe strainerandthe factthat the standby pump could auto start duetothe conditions onthe "A" SSWloop.
B: Correct- Thepoint onthegraphof attachment 4,places the SSWstrainer
'A' intheacceptable region for operations. However, IAW the instruction ofattachment 4,the 'A' SSWstrainer is considered degraded. With the histrainer dPontheloop ofSSWsupplying TACSanda potential ofa lowflow automatic start (condition C) thestandby pumpisplaced inMANUAL.
C: Incorrect- With the'A' SSWpumpthe only pump inservice, the standby pumpwill beplaced in MANUAL. Thepoint onthegraph ofattachment4, places the'A' SSWstrainer intheacceptable region for operations (degraded).
D: incorrect. With the 'A'SSWpumptheonly pumpinservice, thestandby pumpwill beplaced in MANUAL toprevent theauto start onassociated looplowflow condition.
Technical Reference(s): HC.OP-AB.COOL-0001 Station(Attach if not previously provided)
Service Water Condition C andAttachment 4 Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: ,HC.OP-AB.COOL-
'0001 Attachment 4 Learning Objective: Given plant conditions andplant procedures, determine required actions of theretainment override(s) andsubsequent operator actions inaccordance with Station Service Water.
Question Source: Bank# 73176 Modified Bank # (Modified stem with SSWflow and temperature tochange theanswer from degradeb '
to inoperable)
New Question History: #78onNRC2018 Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
Comments:
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 1 K/A # 600000AA2.03 Importance Rating 3.2 K/AStatement: todetermine Ability andinterpret the following toPLANTFIRE astheyapply ONSITE: Firealarm Question: SRO#82
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant hasjust started upafter a refueling outage.
When:
alarm for the Service/RadwasteBuilding ontheMCRfire hasalarmed computer.
~
= A fire
= A fire has brokenout intheRadwaste Trash Compacter Area.
= All applicable procedures havebeen entered.
Current plant conditions:
= TheFire Brigade has beenfighting the firefor 18minutes.
= Levels ofairbornecontamination havebeenrising Building.
intheRadwaste
= South Plant Vent Radiation effluent levels are9.12 E+2uCi/sec NG.
= NOsafety systems have been affected bythe fire time.
atthis With theabove conditions, declare an A. Unusual Event fora plant fire.
B. Unusual Event fora radiological release.
C. Alert for a plant fire.
D. Alert for a radiological release.
Proposed Answer: A
2021NRCWritten Examination i
Explanation (Optional):HU4.1UNUSUAL EVENT:This EALaddresses the mag~nitude andextent of FIRES that maybeindicative ofapotential degradation ofthelevel ofsafety ofthejplant. TheTable H-1 (seeattached EAL) Fire Areas includethose plant structures identified asSeismic Category I.Upon receipt, operators will takeprompt actionstoconfirm the ofaninitial validity fire alarm, or indication, report. For EAL HU4.1 the intent ofthe15-minute duration istosize theFIRE and'to discriminate against small FIRES that arereadily extinguished. With theduration ofthe firefighting efforts at18 minutes andinan area onTable H-1,theCRSwould declare (see anU.EIAWHU4.1 attached). The radiation Escalation levelsofthe.SPV doNOTexceed oftheU.E due tothefire would therequirement occur if the firehadaffected atrain (RUh.1 ofanU.EorAlert orRA1.1).
ofaiSafety System (SA8.1). Thestudentswill beprovided the EALandRALswithout attachments. Thestudent will haveto determine both theextent of the fire(Radwaste is onthe Table H-1) andtheoffsite' release oftheSPV.
Plausibility Justification:
A: Correct. With thefire(alarm) in theRadwaste area (Table H-1) andfirefighting effortshave been inprogress forgreater than 15minutes, the CRSwould declare anUnusual Event with HU4.1 duetothe fire.TheSPV release isbelow the setpoint foreither thej U.EorAlert foroffsite release.
B: incorrect- Thegiven value fortheSPV effluent levelisbelow thethreshold for declaring anU.E foroffsiterelease (RU1.1).
C: incorrect- With the fire (alarm)intheRadwaste area (Table H-1)andfirefighting effortshave beeninprogress forgreater than15minutes,the CRS woulddeclare anUnusual Event with HU4.1 duetothe fire.Escalation oftheU.Edueto the firewould occur ift'hefire hadaffected a train ofa Safety System (SA8.1).
i D: Incorrect. Thegiven value for theSPVeffluent levelisbelow thethreshold for declaring anU.E for offsite release (RU1.1) and thereforenot f ora nAlertlevel (RA1.1).
Technical Reference(s): EALHU4.1, SA8.1, RU1.1, & RA1.1 (Attach if not previously provided)
Fire andOffsite Release Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: EALs andRALs without the attachments Learning Objective: ECG/E-Plan/Fire & Medical Questions:
Knowledge ofthe reasons for thefollowing responses asthey apply tothe implementation ofsite emergency plan.
Question Source: Bank # 35661 Modified Bank # (Note changes orattach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis I
10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
Comments: !
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 295015 AA2.01 Importance Rating 4.3 K/AStatement:
Ability todetermine and/or interpret the following asthey apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM:Reactor power Question: SRO#83
2021NRCWritten Examination Given:
= Theplant wasoperating at100%power.
When:
a A Main SteamLine breakoccurred inthe Steam TunnelcausinganMSIVisolation anda reactor scram.
Current plant conditions:
= All control rods did NOTinsert.
HC.OP-EO.zz-0101A, ATWS-RPV Control wasentered.
= All SCRAMHardCard actions are completed.
= Reactor Power isat5% and slowlylowering.
Suppression Pool isat115"Fandslowly rising.
Temperature SRVsarecycling.
RPVlevel wasintentionally lowered to -129inches andisnowbeing maintained between -129 inches and-185inches.
a Secondary Containment isbeingmaintained.
= Secondary Containment area temperatures andradiation monitorsarestable.
= Drywell Pressure isat1.8 psig andslowly rising.
= Reactor Coolant Sample Activity is250pCi/gm Dose equivalent 1-131.
Whatdescribes the classification level forthis eventandthe cause oftheclassification?
A. Alert duetotheMainSteamLine Break.
B. Site AreaEmergency duetoHigh Drywell Pressure.
C. Alert duetotheFailure toScram.
D. Site AreaEmergency duetoHigh RCSlodine Concentration.
ProposedAnswer: C
2021NRCWritten Examination Explanation (Optional):SA6.1ALERT--
Anautomatic ormanual scram failstoshut downthe reactor as indicated byreactorpower >4%.This EALaddresses afailure oftheRPStoinitiate orcomplete an automatic ormanual reactor scram that results ina reactor shutdown, and subsequent operator manual actions taken (Hard Card actions ofinitiating ARI) atthereactor controlconsoles toshutdown thereactor arealso unsuccessful. If the failure toshut downthereactor isprolonged enough tocause a challenge toRPVwaterlevel orRCSheat removal safety functions, the emergency classification level will escalate toa SITEAREAEMERGENCY via (see EALSS6. attached EALsfor FailuretoScram). Thestudent will have todetermine from the current reactor power andHard Card actionsthat they areinanALERTdue tofailure toScram. The student will have toreference the ECGbarrier table torealize that theMain Steam pressure Line Break hasbeen isolated (no classificationduetomain notanSAEandthe steam line break). Thehigh drywell willbea 5-point ALERT dose equivalent iodine isbelow the threshold for declaration (See attached barrier tables).
Plausibility Justification:
A: Incorrect. Duetothe MSIVs isolating the mainsteam line break outside ofprimary containment would beisolated; therefore there would benodeclaration onthe main steam line break. IAW thebarrier table (RB3.L), iftheMSlVdid not isolate than a declaration for a5-point ALERTwould becorrect.
B: Incorrect- With secondary containment maintained andrad monitors andarea temps stable, the break would not cause anSAEtobedeclared. Barrier Table would give only 5 points ALERT (RB2.L).
C: Correct- An automatic ormanual scram fails toshut down the reactor asindicated byreactor power >4%andsubsequent operator manual actions taken (Hard Cardactions ofinitiating ARI) atthereactor control consoles toshutdown thereactor arealso unsuccessful Thendeclare anALERT(SA6.1).
D: Inc^orrect. TheRCSiodine did not reach thelimit specified inFissionProduct Barrier Table (FB3.L).
Technical Reference(s): EALS6-RPSFailure (Attach ifnotpreviously provided)
Fission Product Barrier Table Proposed References tobeprovided toapplicants during examination: EALsandRALs without the attachments Learning 'Objective:ECG/E-Plan/Fire & Medical Questions:
Knowledge ofthereasons for the following responses asthey apply tothe implementation ofsite emergency plan.
Question Source: Bank # 119580 Modified Bank # (Note change,sor attach parent)
New Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension orAnalysis 10CFRPart 55Content: 55.43(5)
2021NRCWritten Examination Facility: HopeCreek Vendor: GE ExamDate: 2021 ExamType: SRO -
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group# 2 K/A # 2950122.1.25 Importance Rating 4.2 K/AStatement: ConductofOperations: Abilitytointerpret reference such materials,asgraphs, curves, tables, High etc.- Drywell temperature Question: SRO#84
.