ML072000374
ML072000374 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Indian Point |
Issue date: | 07/17/2007 |
From: | Leyse M - No Known Affiliation |
To: | Reyes L NRC/EDO |
Shared Package | |
ML072140837 | List: |
References | |
G20070508, TAC MD6074, TAC MD6075 | |
Download: ML072000374 (4) | |
Text
EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM: DUE: 08/15/07 EDO CONTROL: G20070508 DOC DT: 07/17/07 FINAL REPLY:
Mark Edward Leyse New York, New York TO:
Reyes, EDO FOR SIGNATURE OF ** GRN ** CRC NO:
Dyer, NRR DESC: ROUTING:
Indian Point, Units 2 & 3 Reyes Virgilio Kane Ash Ordaz cyr/Burns DATE: 07/18/07 Carpenter, OE Caputo, 01 ASSIGNED TO: CONTACT: Collins, RI Cyr, OGC NRR Dyer Mensah, NRR Jones, OGC SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
Ref. G20070273.
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July 17, 2007 Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coinmission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Dear Mr. Reyes:
I am writing to you because I believe the Petition Review Board ("PRB") has made a serious mistake by deciding not to accept my petition fbr an enforcement action, dated April 24, 2007 (available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML071150299), concerning Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 ("IP-2 and -3"). In a letter to me, dated May 31,, 2007, Jennifer Golder, Deputy Director (Acting), Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, states that "[tjhe PRB's final decision is that [my] petition does not meet the criteria for acceptance under 10 CPR 2.206 because [l].. .identified no facts to indicate that IP-2 or IP-3 is in violation or any NRC requirement, or that operation of IP-2 or IP-3 presents a safety hazard."
The PRB's claim that my petition "identified no facts to indicate that IP-2 or IP-3 is in violation of any NRC requirement" is incorrect. My petition clearly illustrates that recent emergency core cooling system ("ECCS") evaluation calculations for both IP-2 and -3 were conducted in violation of NRC requirement 10 C.F.R. § 50.46(a)(1)(i). 10 C.F.R. § 50.46(a)(1)(i) states: "ECCS cooling performance must be calculated... to provide a ssurance that the most severe postulated loss-of-coolant accidents are calculate." And, as any good faith reading ofrmy petition will reveal, I clearly illustrate that recent ECCS evaluation calculations done for both IP-2 and -3 (lid not calculate the most severe postulated loss-of-coolant accidents ("LOCAs") that could occur at both plants.
The ECCS evaluation calculations for lP-2 and -3, done in 20(4 and 2005, respectively, to qualify stretch power uprates were non-conservutive because those calculations did not model scenarios where one-cycle fuel would have heavily crudded and oxidized cladding or would have crud-induced corrosion failures (100% oxidation); i.e., cladding that would be significantly more degraded than the most degraded cladding conditions modeled in the ECCS evaluation calculations for both plants (see pages 2-6 and 39-40 of my petition). Furthermore, in my petition I discuss the fact that one-cycle fuel sheathed in heavily crudded and oxidized cladding has higher quantities of stored energy than the fcesh, beginning-of-lie -fuel modeled by the licensee of IP-2 and -3 in the ECCS evaluation calculations done to qualify the IP-2 and -3 stretch power uprates (see pages 2-3, 7-9, 14-15, 25-27, 31-32, and 38-39 of my petition).
Tn fact, as I state in the petition, the licensee of IP-2 and -3 claimed that the pre-accident oxidation and transient oxidation would "always be below 15%"iL at both 11'-2 and -3 in See NRC, letter to Fnturgy, "Indian Point Nuclear Generating. Unit No. 2 - Issuance of Amredment Re: 3.26 Percent Power Uprate," October 27, 2004, locatcd at: www.nrc.gov, t"/*d Nd2:80 L00E & "r * -999- : "ON X_ EDO -- G20070508
the event of LOCAs (see page 6 of my petition). I illustrate that this claim is non-conservative because it fails to consider operating conditions experienced at pressurized water reactors ("PWRs") in recent years: three PWRs in the United States (Three Mile Island Unit 1 (1995), Seabrook (1997), and Palo Verde Unit 2 (2000)) operated with cladding that had 100% local oxidation-oxidation had locally perforated cladding at those plants (see page 6 of my petition).
It is significant that the NRC is presently concerned that high humup fuel sheathed in heavily oxidized cladding may cause compliance problens with 10 C.I.R. § 50.46(b)
(see pages 35-38 of my petition). In fact, NRC Information Notice 98-29, has a guideline, stipulating that the "[tiotal oxidation [of cladding] includes both pre-accident oxidation and oxidation occurring during a LOCA," 2 that is being considered ibr regulation status for a ncw revised version of 10 C.F.R. § 50.46, due in 2009.' Therefore, it follows that the NRC should also be concerned about LOCA scenarios regarding one-cycle fucl with crud-induced corrosion lailures (100% oxidation), where cladding is substantially more degraded than high burnup cladding and where there is a substantially greater quantity of stored energy in the fuel than there is in high burnup fuel.
The iURB's claim that my petition "identified no facts to indicate that...operation of IP-2 or 11-3 presents a safety hazard" is also incorrect. My petition clearly documents facts that illustrate that IP-2 and -3 currently have power production levels that were qualified by non-conservative FCCS evaluation calculations; i.e., calculations that did not "provide assurance that the most severe postulated [LOCAs were] calculated" (see pages 2-12, 14-17, and 39-40 ormy petition). For this reason, current operations of IP-2 and -3 present a safety hazard because both plants now have the potential to operate in violation of' 10 C.,R. § 50.46(h).
Additionally, in her letter, Ms. Golder, states that "[tlhe PRB notes that a petition for rulemaking is an appropriate process to address (my] concerns, and further notes that [I]
have submitted such a petition (ADAMS Accession No. ML070871368, docket PIRM 84)." My rulemaking petition, presently under consideration, proposes that the NRC ensure that nuclear power plants do not operate with unsafe thicknesses of crud and oxide layers on cladding, set a maximum allowable hydrogen content in cladding, and amend Appendix K to Part 50-ECCS Evaluation Models to require that the steady-state temperature distribution and stored energy in the fuel at the onset of a postulated LOCA Electronic Reading Room, ADAMS Documents, Accession Number: M.L042960007, Enclosure 2, p. 18; see also NRC, letter to Entergy, "Indian Point Nuciear Generating Unit No. 3 -- Issuance of Amendment Re: 4.85 Percent Stretch Power Uprate and Relocation of Cycle-Specific Parameters," March 24, 2005, located at: www.nre.gov, Electronic Reading Room, ADAMS Documents, Accession Number: ML050600380, Enclosure 2, p. 16.
2 NRC, "NRC Information Notice 98-29: Predicted Increase in Fuel Rod Cladding Oxidation,"
August 3, 1998, located at: http://www.nrc.gov/rrading-rnrddoc)-collL.tions/gcn-comm/inro-notices/1998/in98029.html (accessed on 01/21/07).
See NRC, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Materials, Metallurgy, and Reactor Fuels Subcommittee Meeting Transcript, January 19, 2007, p. 245; set also NRC, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 539th Meeting Transcript, February 2, 2007, p. 10.
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be calculated by tactoring in the role that the thermal resistance of crud and/or oxide layers on cladding plays in increasing the stored energy in the fuel. Ti is good that the NRC is presently considering my petition tfr rulemaking; however, that should not excuse the PRB firom overlooking the fact that the licensee of IP-2 and -3 receritly conducted non-conservative ECCS evaluation calculations in violation of 10 C.F.R. §
,50.46(a)(1)(i).
To uphold its congressional mandate to protect the lives, property, and environment of the people of New York, the NRC must not allow the power production levels of IP-2 and -3 to be basedLon FCCS evaluation calculations that violate 10 C.F.iR. § 50.46(a)(1)(i). Tn the case of IP-2 and -3, located less than 40 miles north of New York City, this lack of ECCS evaluation model conservatism puts millions of people at risk. I respectilully request that you overrule the PRB's decision and order the PRB to consider the petition for an enforcement action that I submitted, dated April 24, 2007, concerning IP-2 and -3.
Sincerely, Mark Edward ILeyse P.O. Box 1314 New York, NY 10025 incl20054ocolumbia.edu 3
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