ML063180375

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Proposed Written Exam for the Kewaunee Retake Examination - August 2006
ML063180375
Person / Time
Site: Kewaunee Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 11/07/2006
From:
NRC/RGN-III
To:
References
Download: ML063180375 (137)


Text

  • QNUM 001
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036002A201
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power

- R-11 and R-12, Containment Particulate and Gaseous Radiation Monitors values are increasing.

- A-RC-36D, Reactor Coolant Leak, is being implemented.

- Letdown is isolated.

- Charging flow is 80 gpm.

- Pressurizer level is 45% and constant.

- VCT Makeup is operating normally.

- VCT level is 10% and decreasing.

What operator action should be taken?

a. Align RWST suction to the Charging Pumps and start a rapid power reduction per A-O-03, Rapid Power Reduction.
b. Start a normal power reduction due to RCS leakage exceeding TS limits.
c. Restore at least 40 gpm Letdown flow due to potential for thermal shock on charging line connection to RCS.
d. Trip the reactor and go to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE A-RC-36D, step 4.1 A-CVC-35C, step 2 Contingency Action HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, if RWST is aligned a reactor trip is necessary B. Incorrect, not a normal situation C. Incorrect, this applies to a normal situation.

D. Correct

  • QNUM 002
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 031003A408
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- RXCP seal injection is normal.

- Annunciator 47014-J, RXCP THERM BARRIER TEMP HI alarms, followed shortly by annunciator 47021-I, RXCP CC FLOW LOW.

- Reactor Coolant Pump indications are as follows:

RXCP A TEMP RXCP B TEMP Outlet(TI-612)= 95°F Outlet(TI-608)= 95°F Therm Barrier(TI-614)=95°F Therm Barrier(TI-610)=170°F

- CC Surge Tank level has also increased slightly.

What is the consequence of these indications?

a. CC-612B, RXCP B Component Cooling Return Isol, has failed closed.

Trip RXCP B within 2 minutes.

b. CCW supply piping to RXCP B has failed.

Trip RXCP B within 2 minutes.

c. CC-610B, RXCP B Thermal Barr Comp Cooling Return, has gone to its failed position.

Maintain seal injection flow of 6 to13 gpm to RXCP B.

d. Thermal Barrier HX on RXCP B has ruptured.

Maintain seal injection flow of 6 to13 gpm to RXCP B.

  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE A-CC-31, step 14 A-RC-36C, step 8 HIGHER NEW

Justification:

A. Incorrect, would not cause a high Thermal Barrier temperature as long as normal seal injection is maintained.

B. Incorrect, would cause a lowering level of CC surge tank C. Incorrect, CC-610B failure position is open.

D. Correct, In-leakage raises surge tank level and thermal barrier temperature, high flow cause CC-610B to close and Low flow alarm.

  • QNUM 003
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 049003AK309
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 60% power.

- Control Rod G-11 (Control Bank D ) disconnects and drops to zero steps.

- The plant is stabilized with Control Bank D position at 140 steps.

- A-CRD-49, Abnormal Rod Control System Operations is implemented.

- The fault that caused the dropped rod is corrected.

- Realignment of Rod G-11 is in progress per A-CRD-49, Attachment A.

- Control Bank D step counter malfunctions during the realignment and is indicating 25 steps lower than actual rod position.

Assuming the step counter problem is NOT detected, what other indications will show that Rod G-11 is realigned with Control Bank D?

a. IRPI indication, and annunciator TLA-1, Rod Supervision Alarm, clears.
b. IRPI indication, and annunciator 47032-M, Lower Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio High, clears.
c. IRPI indication, and annunciator 47032-J, Power Range Negative Rate Channel Alert, clears.
d. IRPI indication, and annunciator 47041-P, Rod Bottom Rod Drop, clears.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE A-CRD-49, step 7 ARP 47032-M HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, Control Bank D position must be manually updated in PPCS before TLA-1 will clear B. Correct, indications of abnormal quadrant power distribution will clear when rod is realigned

C. Incorrect, Negative Rate channel alert must be manually reset on channel drawer.

D. Incorrect, Rod Bottom Rod Drop clearing only shows that G-11 is above 20 steps.

  • QNUM 004
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036003K502 Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A Bus 1 and Bus 2 Lockout occurs.

- The plant responds as designed.

What is the response of RCS parameters over the period from the point just prior to the trip to TEN minutes following the trip?

a. RCS cold leg temperature decreases and then increases.
b. RCS Hot leg temperature decreases and then stabilizes.
c. Core Delta T decreases and then increases.
d. Subcooling decreases and then increases.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE PT08S Thermal Hydraulics, Determination of Natural Circulation Flow HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, cold leg temperature will increase due to decreased heat removal in SG and then decrease as natural circulation is established B. Incorrect, hot leg temperature will decrease but then it will increase as core delta T increases to establish thermal driving head.

C. Correct, Core Delta T initially decreases as power changes from 100% value to that of just decay heat generation, but then increases as natural circulation driving head is developed.

D. Incorrect, subcooling will initially increase as core sensible heat is removed and then remain essentially stable or decrease as the core delta T increases.

  • QNUM 005
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 035004 2.1.28
  • QUESTION In the case of a fuel defect, what component is designed specifically to remove Cesium from the coolant?
a. Mixed Bed Demineralizer.
b. Cation Bed Demineralizer.
c. Deborating Bed Demineralizer.
d. Reactor Coolant Filter.
  • ANSWER b.

Cognitive Level: 1 F K/A: 004 2.1.28 - Chemical and Volume Control System: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls.

OBJ: RO2-05-LP035.002 - Describe the Chemical and Volume Control System to include the following in the description: Function/purpose, design basis, operating characteristics, and physical location as appropriate for the following major components: Ion Exchangers

  • REFERENCE System Description 35, 3.2.14 USAR Section 9.2, page 9.2-13 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, Mixed Bed Demins have H-OH resin.

B. Correct, Cesium removal and LIthium removal are the function of Cation bed C. Incorrect, Removal of boron is this bed's function.

D. Incorrect, Rx Coolant filter will remove resin fines and particulates

  • QNUM 006
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 035004K123 Given the following:

- The plant is in Hot Shutdown.

- A failure of VCT level channels LI-112 and LI-141 has occurred.

- Charging pump suction supply automatically transferred to the RWST.

- Repairs have been made to the VCT level channels.

- VCT level is 13%.

- While performing re-alignment of the Charging System to normal, the NCO inadvertently positions the control switch for CVC-301, RWST Supply to Charging Pumps, to CLOSE, before opening CVC-1, VCT Supply to Charging Pumps.

What will occur?

a. CVC-301 will close, causing all Charging Pumps to trip on low suction pressure.

b, CVC-301 will NOT close until CVC-1, VCT Supply to Charging Pumps, is open.

c. CVC-301 will close, causing isolation of the suction for the Charging Pumps.
d. CVC-301 will NOT close until VCT level is greater than 17%.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE E-2023 OPERXK-100-36 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, CVC-301 will close but there is no low suction pressure trip.

B. Incorrect, there is no interlock that prevents closing CVC-301.

C. Correct, there is no interlock that prevents closing CVC-301, the consequence is no suction source to the charging pumps.

D Incorrect, there is no interlock to prevent closure, both VCT level channels less than 5%

will open CVC-301.

  • QNUM 007
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 034005K5.09
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is being cooled down to Cold Shutdown.

- Reactor Coolant System has been borated to the Cold Shutdown Boron Concentration

- RCS pressure is 400 psig.

- RCS temperature is 350°F.

- N-RHR-34, Residual Heat Removal System, is in progress to startup RHR for cooldown.

What actions are taken to prevent the possibility of low boron concentration fluid in the RHR system diluting the RCS?

a. RHR fluid is replaced by RCS fluid during RHR System warmup.
b. RHR system is recirculated to the RWST prior to initiating flow to the RCS.
c. RHR boron concentration is verified by sampling prior to initiating flow to the RCS.
d. RHR system takes a suction from the RWST prior to RHR System warmup.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE N-RHR-34, steps 4.1.4 - 4.1.14 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Correct, system warmup requires taking suction from RCS and letting down to CVCS which equalizes boron concentration by replacing the water volume in the RHR piping.

B. Incorrect, RHR Pump surveillance testing recirculates system with suction aligned to RWST C. Incorrect, this sounds plausible but is not required.

D. Incorrect, Suction from RWST is the at power lineup or if operating RHR in split-train mode, but it is isolated for cooldown alignment.

  • QNUM 008
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 033006K602
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Annunciator 47024-B, ACCUMULATOR A LEVEL HIGH/LOW alarms.

- Accumulator A level is 25%.

- A-SI-33, Abnormal Safety Injection Accumulator Level and Pressure, is implemented.

- SI Pump A is started to fill Accumulator A per A-SI-33.

- SI-101A/ CV-31247, SI Pump Makeup to Accumulator A is opened.

- A Design Basis LOCA occurs.

What is the postulated effect of these conditions on ECCS operation?

a. SI Pump A becomes gas bound from the filling operation and fails.
b. Cold leg injection flow is decreased due to the filling operation.
c. Accumulator A does NOT inject because it is isolated during the filling operation.

d, SI Pump A reaches runout conditions.

  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE A-SI-33, step 4.3.5.h Technical Specifications, bases for TS 3.3.b.5 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, this is an issue associated with accumulator fill lines but concern is addressed by procedure.

B. Incorrect, RCS pressure will rapidly lower below Accumulator pressure, resulting in injection to Cold Leg, and higher than expected flow will occur. Plausible if candidate thinks that SI-11A is closed.

C. Incorrect, The accumulator remains aligned to the Cold Leg. Plausible if candidate thinks that SI-20A is closed.

D. Correct, 1-hour LCO time comes from this postulated situation.

  • QNUM 009
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036007A301
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- An inadvertent Containment Isolation signal is actuated.

- Pressurizer Relief Tank level starts slowly increasing.

What valve is the source of in-leakage to the PRT?

a. PR-2A, Przr PORV.
b. LD-5, Letdown Line Relief Valve.
c. SI-312, RHR to RX Vessel Relief Valve.
d. CVC-261, Seal Water Return Relief Valve.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE E-1638 E-2001 OPERXK-100-10 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, this relieves to the PRT but is not affected by the CI signal.

B. Incorrect, This relieves to the PRT but CI closes Letdown Orifice Isolation valves so line will not be under high pressure in this condition.

C. Incorrect, this relieves to PRT but is not in service and not affected by CI signal in this condition.

D. Correct, seal return line is isolated by CI signal and RCP #1 seal leakoff flow will pressurize this line, lifting this relief valve.

  • QNUM 010
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA EPE007EA204 Given the following:

- The plant was operating at 100% power.

- Safety Injection has initiated due to High Containment Pressure.

- The reactor did NOT trip.

- Initial operator actions to trip the reactor were unsuccessful.

- FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, Immediate Operator Action steps have been completed.

Conditions are as follows:

- Reactor power is 3% and decreasing slowly.

- Pressurizer level is 8% and decreasing slowly.

- Pressurizer pressure is 2180 psig and decreasing slowly.

- RCS Tavg is 543°F and decreasing slowly.

- The main turbine is tripped.

- AFW Pumps are running.

What is the NEXT required operator action for these conditions?

a. Verify all dilution flow paths isolated.
b. Close MSIVs to stop RCS cooldown.
c. Start Charging Pumps and establish emergency boration flow.
d. Open PRZR PORVs and Block Valves to establish SI flow greater than 100 gpm.
  • ANSWER d.

Cognitive Level: 3 SPK

  • REFERENCE FR-S.1, step 4.

BKG FR-S.1, step 4 HIGHER NEW Justification:

The given conditions indicate that Safety Injection is actuated and hence the SI Pumps would be running, and the Charging Pumps would not be running. The Charging Pumps would not be started until SI is reset, which is not directed at this point.

A. Incorrect, this a later subsequent action, a much higher priority is to add negative reactivity with boration.

B. Incorrect, this is a later subsequent action that applies to an uncontrolled cooldown situation.

C. Incorrect, this action would be taken if SI Pumps were not running, but with them running boration is more easily accomplished.

D. Correct, RCS pressure is above the SI Pump shutoff head and boration will be started simply by lowering RCS pressure with PRZR PORVs.

  • QNUM 011
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036008A207
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power

- CC-302, Letdown Cont Outl Temp Controller, valve goes to its FAIL position.

What is the result of this malfunction and what action should be taken?

a. RCS temperature will begin to lower until LD-27, VCT/Holdup Tank Divert Valve, is placed to the Holdup Tank position.
b. RCS boron concentration will begin to lower until LD-14 is placed to the V.C.

Tank position.

c. LD-14, LD Demin High Temp Divert Valve, will automatically realign to V.C. Tank position and must be verified in this position until letdown temperature is restored below 140°F.
d. LD-27, VCT/Holdup Tank Divert Valve, will automatically realign to Holdup Tank position and must be verified in this position until VCT temperature is restored below 130°F.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE E-2026 A-CC-31 step 6 Contingency Action 4.a)

A-RC-36F, step 4.4 N-CVC-35B, CAUTION step 4.1.2.4 HIGHER NEW Justification:

CC-302 FAIL position is open to its limit stop. This will result in increased cooling flow through the Letdown Hx. As the letdown is cooled, the coolant will give up boron to the mixed bed demineralizer, resulting in deboration of the letdown. As the flow is returned from the VCT to the RCS, a dilution will result. Taking LD-14 to V.C. Tank position will bypass the demineralizers.

A. Incorrect, This would assume CC-302 fails closed, and letdown temperature increases.

The demins would release boron to the hotter letdown fluid and when returned to the RCS the boration would cause Tavg to begin to lower. Positioning of LD-27 would stop the event, but would also result in auto makeup to the VCT to maintain level. Procedural direction is to isolate letdown and establish excess letdown.

B. Correct, This will stop the removal of boron by the Demins.

C. Incorrect, LD-14 does have automatic action and will change position if letdown temperature exceeds 140°F. Annunciator response (47044-K) provides this direction.

Actual temperature will lower.

D. Incorrect, CC temperature of 120° F requires this action; however, LD-27 does not have this automatic action. It will reposition no a high VCT level. Annunciator response (47041-L) provides this direction for the temperature.

  • QNUM 012
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036008AK201
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant was operating at 100% power.

- A reactor trip occurred.

- Safety injection is actuated.

- The cause of the reactor trip and safety injection has NOT been determined.

What indication would confirm that a Pressurizer PORV is stuck partially open?

a. Containment humidity and pressure increasing.
b. Pressurizer Relief Tank pressure and level increasing.
c. Indication of flow on PR-3A PRZR Safety Valve Flow Monitor.
d. Pressurizer pressure and level decreasing.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE System Description 36, Rev. 4, 3.6.6 & 3.6.8, page 33 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, leaking PORV discharges to PRT, not Containment.

B. Correct.

C. Incorrect, acoustic monitor will alarm for Safety Valve flow.

D. Incorrect, Level and pressure both decreasing indicates RCS leak from somewhere other than top of Pressurizer

  • QNUM 013
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 031008K401
  • QUESTION Which of the following conditions/signals will DIRECTLY cause the automatic start of the standby Component Cooling Pump?
a. Loss of Off-Site Power.
b. High-High Containment Pressure.
c. Low Discharge Header Pressure.
d. Trip of the operating CC Pump.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE E-2045 MEMORY BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, pump would be started by ESF load sequencer when power was restored to Bus.

B. Incorrect, a start signal for ICS pumps only C. Correct, less than 35 psig on common discharge header is start signal.

D. Incorrect, not a direct start signal.

  • QNUM 014
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036009EK203 The most notable difference in the design basis accident plant response between a Large Break LOCA (LBLOCA) and a Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA) is...
a. Only the SBLOCA clears the loop seal.
b. Only the LBLOCA results in core uncovery.
c. Only the SBLOCA needs added heat removal capacity from the S/Gs.
d. Only the SBLOCA results in peak clad temperatures greater than1200°F.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE BKG E-1, page 6 - 13 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, both LBLOCA and certain size SBLOCAs can uncover core.

B. Incorrect, both LBLOCA and certain size SBLOCAs clear loop seal.

C. Correct, energy removal from break flow/SI flow will not remove core decay heat so S/Gs are necessary D. Incorrect, peak clad temperature not expected to exceed 1200° F on SBLOCA

  • QNUM 015
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036010K303
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 57% power during a plant startup to 100% power.

Which event would result in an auto start of both motor-driven AFW pumps when the pumps are in AUTO? (Assume no operator action)

a. Both Startup Steam Dumps fail open.
b. Main Feedwater Pump A breaker opens.
c. Controlling SG A steam flow channel fails low.
d. Controlling Pressurizer pressure channel fails high.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE ARP 47041-C E-2038 HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, will cause a Tavg decrease and rods will withdraw to compensate B. Incorrect, 2 MFPs were running at this power level, so tripping of MFP A would not result in an AFW Pump start signal (both MFPs tripped).

C. Incorrect, SG A level is expected to lower but the control system is level dominant.

Therefore, level will stabilize at a value lower than normal program level.

D. Correct, spray valves open, pressure decreases to trip reactor and actuate SI with no operator action.

  • QNUM 016
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036011A102
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- An RCS leak inside containment is occurring.

- A-RC-36D, Reactor Coolant Leak, is implemented.

- Conditions are as follows:

- Charging flow is 44 gpm.

- Letdown flow is 40 gpm.

- RXCP seal injection flow is 8 gpm per pump.

- RXCP seal leakoff flow is 2.5 gpm per pump.

- Pressurizer level is 41% and has decreased 2% in the last 5 minutes.

Using the provided OPERATOR AID 02-21, what is the approximate RCS leak rate?

a. 20 gpm.
b. 25 gpm.
c. 30 gpm.
d. 35 gpm.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE A-RC-36D, step 4.1.6 AO # 02-21, HIGHER BANK Provided

Reference:

Operator Aid 02-21, Pressurizer Level Conversion Justification: Charging flow of 44 gpm and seal injection flow of 16 gpm = 60 gpm in-flow.

Letdown flow of 40 gpm plus 5 gpm of seal leakoff flow =45 gpm outflow. Charging /letdown flow mismatch = 15 gpm. PRZ level 43% =1955.2 gals, level 41%= 1878.4 gals. (1955.2

-1878.4) = 76.8 gals/ 5 minutes = 15.36 gpm.

C. Correct, pressurizer level change indicates 15 gpm leakage lost, and charging/letdown flow balance is +15 gpm.

  • QNUM 017
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA LBLOCA011EK3.14
  • QUESTION What is the reason for tripping the RXCPs at the onset of a Large Break LOCA?
a. Remove RXCP heat input to RCS.
b. Prevent RXCP degradation and/or damage.
c. Prevent a longer and deeper core uncovery.
d. RXCP flow could reduce effectiveness of ECCS injection.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE A-RC-36C, step 3 Contingency Action d.

System Description 36, 3.5.3, page 23 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, RCS loops would be voided by the LOCA and RXCP heat input would be minimal.

B. Correct, operating RCP without #1 seal DP and in steam environment will endanger pump.

C. Incorrect, Blowdown phase unaffected by RCPs for LBLOCA, but is true statement for SBLOCA.

D. Incorrect, SI injection is downstream of RXCPs with flow directed to vessel downcomer via the cold legs.

  • QNUM 018
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 005012A206
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A total loss of main feedwater occurs.

- A reactor trip signal is generated, but the Reactor Trip Breakers fail to open.

- A Rod Control Urgent Failure prevents rod motion.

- Auxiliary Feedwater System is operating per design.

- Operators have been dispatched to locally open the Reactor Trip Breakers.

What actions should be taken to mitigate this transient?

a. Align maximum Auxiliary Feedwater flow to ONE Steam Generator to preserve a heat sink for RCS heat removal.
b. Reduce turbine load slowly to avoid a rapid RCS temperature and pressure increase causing a lifting of Pressurizer Safety Valves.
c. Trip the main turbine to preserve the water inventory in the Steam Generators.
d. Open the Pressurizer PORVs immediately to avoid an RCS overpressurization as the Pressurizer goes water solid.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE BKG FR-S.1, step 2 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, stopping power generation and preserving SG inventory are more effective strategies.

B. Incorrect, want to preserve SG water inventory C. Correct, this preserves SG water inventory as long as possible.

D. Incorrect, RCS pressure increase is a function of SG inventory loss, not mitigated by Pressurizer PORVs.

  • QNUM 019
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 055013A302
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A Reactor Trip has occurred.

- Safety Injection has actuated.

- The crew is implementing E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, step 5 Verify Feedwater Isolation when it is discovered that both the RED and GREEN Position Indicating Lights for FW-12B, Feedwater to Steam Generator B Isolation Valve are NOT lit on Mechanical Control Console A.

What action is taken at this time to verify that Feedwater Isolation is complete?

a. Dispatch operator to locally close FW-12B.
b. Check FW-12B status light DIM on SI Ready Status Panel.
c. Check FW-12B status light BRIGHT on CI Active Status Panel.
d. Check FW-12B status light BRIGHT on SI Active Status Panel.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE System Description 55, 3.9 page 15 WPS-ESF6 (0808)

FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, local operator action is not directed by E-0 at this point. E-0 Step 16 directs checking of SI Active Status Panel lights-LIT.

B. Incorrect, No Light for FW-12B on this panel. Plausible since some valves related to SI alignment are on panel.

C. Incorrect, No light for FW-12B on this panel.

D. Correct, procedure requires verifying FW-12B closed and SI Active Status Panel light would be BRIGHT if valve was closed. DNOS 0302, Control Board Monitoring directs use of all direct and alternative indications for status monitoring.

  • QNUM 020
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 055013K601
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- PT-947, Containment Pressure Channel IV (Yellow) has failed high.

- NO operator action concerning this channel has been taken yet.

Of the remaining Containment Pressure Channels, ( a.) is the MINIMUM number of additional channels that have to trip to cause Safety Injection Actuation, AND ( b.) is the MINIMUM number of additional channels that have to trip to cause Containment Spray Actuation.

( a.) ( b.)

a. One One
b. One Two
c. Two One
d. Two Two
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE E-1604 E-1635 Containment Pressure XK-100-559 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, 2 of 3 logic for SI, 1 of 2 pairs 3 of 3 times for Spray B. Correct C. Incorrect, PT-947 is one of the 2 channels required for SI actuation D. Incorrect, PT-947 is one of the 2 channels required for SI actuation

  • QNUM 021
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036015/017AA105
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- The shaft of Reactor Coolant Pump B breaks, resulting in a complete separation of the RXCP impeller from the shaft.

What would be the result of this failure on plant operation?

a. Overcurrent trip of RXCP B breaker, resulting in a reactor trip.
b. Main Steam Header B low pressure, resulting in Safety Injection.
c. RCS Loop B low flow, resulting in a reactor trip.
d. OTDT High, resulting in a reactor trip.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE RO4-05-LP006, page 8.

Technical Specification Bases, Reactor Coolant Flow HIGHER MODIFIED Justification:

A. Incorrect, shaft break would result in decreased amps.

B. Incorrect, loop transit time would delay response until after Rx trip.

C. Correct, would cause Reactor Trip D. Incorrect, loop transit time would delay response until after Rx trip.

  • QNUM 022
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 048015K601
  • QUESTION What condition is a possible response to the failure of ONE Nuclear Instrumentation System fission chamber?
a. Erroneous indication for a power range channel.
b. Erroneous indication for both intermediate range channels.
c. Erroneous indication for a source range channel and an intermediate range channel.
d. Erroneous indication for an intermediate range channel and a power range channel.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE System Description 48, 3.1.3 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, power range does not use fission detectors, but an Ion Chamber B. Incorrect, Each IR channel uses a fission chamber of its associated SR channel.

C. Correct, one fission chamber outputs to both a SR and IR channel D. Incorrect, Power range does not use a fission chambers output, it has its own uncompensated ion chamber.

  • QNUM 023
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 046017K101
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Annunciator 47024-K, PPCS/SPDS ABNORMAL, is lit.

- Plant Computer Group has determined that PPCS has failed.

- A-CP-46, Abnormal Plant Process Computer System, is implemented.

- NIS Power Range Channel N-42 fails.

What is the effect of the PPCS failure on verification of core power distribution with a failed Power Range Channel?

a. Core Exit T/C Tilt monitoring is lost, power must be reduced to less than 85%.
b. Plant operation may continue, no additional monitoring is necessary.
c. Plant operation may continue if 4 CETs per quadrant are verified on ICC Monitoring System.
d. Plant operation may continue if quadrant power distribution is verified with an in-core flux map.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE A-CP-46, Attachment C, C.6 A-NI-48, Step 2 Contingency Action a.

HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, CETs can be verified/monitored on ICCMS B. Incorrect, additional verification/monitoring of quadrant power distribution is required with PR out of service.

C. Correct, Proper actions per A-NI-48 Attachment A.

D. Incorrect, in-core flux monitoring is required for validation of rod positions in rod misalignment/ IRPI problem situations.

  • QNUM 024
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 018022K302
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Containment pressure is 0.4 psig and stable.

- A containment cooling malfunction has caused containment temperature to increase from 100°F to 160°F.

What is the effect of the increase in containment temperature on the pressurizer level as indicated by the pressurizer level control channels?

a. Indicated level will be HIGHER than actual level because the reference leg fluid density decreases.
b. Indicated level will be LOWER than actual level because the reference leg fluid density decreases.
c. Indicated level will be HIGHER than actual level because the elevated containment temperature causes evaporation of water from the reference leg.
d. Indicated level will be LOWER than actual level because of the elevated containment temperature causes evaporation of water from the reference leg.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE Steam Tables HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Correct, increasing temp makes reference level fluid less dense.

B. Incorrect, opposite of what would happen.

C. Incorrect, reference leg returns to pressurizer vapor space, the rise in temperature will not result in significant evaporation back to Przr.

D. Incorrect, reference leg returns to pressurizer vapor space, the rise in temperature will not result in significant evaporation back to Przr.

  • QNUM 025
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 035024A 2.4.45
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- Core Burnup is 9000 MWD/MTU.

- RCS boron concentration is 740 PPM.

- The Reactivity Placard for BORATE reads "1 PPM 2.7 gallons boron/ppm."

Which of the following conditions will require the LARGEST emergency boration (most gallons of boric acid)? (Reactor Data Manual Figures RD-6.6 and RD-6.7 provided)

a. Plant at Hot Shutdown, RCS Tavg is 545°F and decreasing, Annunciator 47061-B, S/G A SF>FF, is lit.
b. Reactor is critical at 10e4 CPS, Control Bank C is at 65 steps, Annunciator 47042-R, Control Bank Low Low Limit, is lit.
c. Reactor is tripped, and Control Rod G-3 Rod Bottom Light is dark and its associated IRPI indicator is NOT indicating.
d. Reactor is tripped, and Annunciator 47101-J, Bus 62 Lockout, is lit.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE E-CVC-35, step 4.4 RD-6.6 RF-6.7 HIGHER NEW Provided

Reference:

Reactor Data Manual figures RD-6.6 and RD-6.7.

Justification: Each situation has a boration specified. Uncontrolled cooldown has the highest boron concentration - 1635 ppm. Going from 740 ppm to 1635 ppm ( delta of 895 ppm ) times 2.7 gals BA per ppm = 2416.5 gallons.

A. Correct, procedure calls for borating to 1% Cold Shutdown concentration. RD-6.7 shows 1635 ppm for 9000 MWD/MTU.

B. Incorrect, below RIL on startup requires a 300 gallon boration C. Incorrect, requirement is for 360 gallon boration for each rod NOT fully inserted.

D. Incorrect, loss of all IRPIs requires a boration to Hot Shutdown boron concentration, which from RD-6.6 is 980 ppm, requiring a 648 gallon boration (980-740=240 ppm x 2.7=648 ).

  • QNUM 026
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 034025AK101
  • QUESTION Given the following:

The following timeline applies following a 300 day continuous run:

- 11/01/03, 1000 Reactor Shutdown; Cooldown initiated for a maintenance outage.

- 11/04/03, 1300 Entered Cold Shutdown.

- 11/18/03, 0130 Operating RHR pump tripped and the standby pump could NOT be started.

- 11/18/03, 0200 CETs read 212°F.

- Przr level is 40% and rising slowly.

Using A-RHR-34, ATTACHMENT A, what is the MINIMUM makeup required for this condition?

a. 19 gpm.
b. 22 gpm.
c. 25 gpm.
d. 44 gpm.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE A-RHR-34, Attachment A HIGHER BANK Provided

Reference:

A-RHR-34, ATTACHMENT A Justification: Time after shutdown must be calculated properly at 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />.

A. Incorrect, 19 gpm is flow shown on graph, for 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> S/D.

B. Correct, this is the flow from graph for 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> after S/D.

C. Incorrect, 25 gpm is flow shown on graph for 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> after S/D.

D. Incorrect, this is 2 times the graph value and would be used for refill.

  • QNUM 027
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 023026K404
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A Design Basis LOCA occurs.

- A Loss of Offsite Power occurs.

- Diesel Generator B fails to start.

- Safety Injection and Containment Spray are actuated.

- Containment Spray Pump A is started by the ESF Load Sequencer.

What other actions occur to establish Containment Spray?

a. CI-1001A Caustic Additive to CNTMT Spray opens, ICS-5A Containment Spray Pump Discharge opens, spray is discharged through 2 spray rings.
b. CI-1001A & CI-1001B Caustic Additive to CNTMT Spray open, ICS-5A Containment Spray Pump Discharge open, spray is discharged through 4 spray rings.
c. CI-1001A & CI-1001B Caustic Additive to CNTMT Spray opens, ICS-5A &

ICS-6A Containment Spray Pump Discharge open, spray is discharged through 2 spray rings.

d. ICS-2A ICS Pump Suction opens, CI-1001A & CI-1001B Caustic Additive to CNTMT Spray open, ICS-5A & ICS-6A Containment Spray Pump Discharge opens, spray is discharged through 4 spray rings.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE FR-Z.1, step 3.b System Description 23, Rev. 5, sections1.5, 3.1 & 3.6 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, redundant valves CI-1001B and ICS-6A also receive open signal.

B. Incorrect, ICS-6A also opens, each ICS header has 2 spray rings

C. Correct .

D. Incorrect, ICS-2A is normally open and does not receive open signal, each ICS header has 2 spray rings.

  • QNUM 028
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036027AK301
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- Group C Pressurizer Heaters are out-of-service.

- A heatup of the RCS is in progress.

- RCS temperature is currently at 450°F.

- Pressurizer pressure is 700 psig and increasing.

- Group A and Group B backup heaters are energized.

- Pressurizer spray valves are approximately 10% open.

- A failure of all Pressurizer Heaters occurs.

What actions are required regarding the Pressurizer Spray Valves and the RCS heatup?

a. Spray valves may remain throttled if Pressurizer level is raised to maintain pressure. RCS heatup must be stopped as pressure cannot be raised.
b. Spray valves may remain throttled. RCS heatup may continue because pressure will continue to rise with the heatup.

c Spray valves must be closed. RCS heatup must be stopped because pressure will decrease due to spray bypass flow and heat loss to ambient.

d. Spray valves must be closed. RCS heatup can continue because pressure will continue to rise with the heatup.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE N-RC-36C, 4.2.3 7 4.2.2 System Description 36, 2.0. 3.6.2, 3.6.3 & 3.7.1 HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, raising level will add cold water, causing pressure to fall.

B. Incorrect, continued spray will cause pressure to fall.

C. Correct, heat losses and bypass flow will cause pressure decrease as stated.

D. Incorrect, bypass flow and heat losses will cause pressure to fall.

  • QNUM 029
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 035029EA205
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The crew is responding to an ATWS.

- FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS has been entered.

- The reactor is tripped and all control rods are inserted.

- The NCO has started aligning boration flow path per FR-S.1, step 6.

- The NCO has taken the control switch for CVC-440, Emergency Boration Valve to OPEN.

- CVC-440 position indication is a GREEN light.

What is the NEXT action required per FR-S.1?

a. Verify CVC-11 Charging Line Isolation Valve is open, fully open CVC-7 Charging Control Chg Line, and establish maximum available charging flow.
b. Open CVC-403, Boric Acid to Blender, and open CVC-408, BA Blender to Charging Pumps.
c. Emergency boration is no longer required, and the control switch for CVC-440 should be taken back to CLOSE.
d. Open CVC-301, RWST Supply to Charging Pumps, and close CVC-1, VCT Supply to Charging Pumps.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE FR-S.1, step 6 BKG FR-S.1 step 6 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, this action has been performed in previous step.

B. Correct, per FR-S.1, step 6.b.2)

C. Incorrect, Red Path (FRP) procedure must be completed.

D. Incorrect, boration from BA Tanks is preferred source, and this action is taken as

directed in Contingency Action step only if none of the flowpaths from BATs can be established.

  • QNUM 030
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 032AK302
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A loss of all AC power has occurred.

- The TSC DG failed to start.

- ECA-0.0, Loss of all AC Power actions are in progress.

- Steam Generators are being depressurized to 300 psig using the SG PORVs.

- Steam Generator pressure is 475 psig.

- RCS Cold Leg temperature is 465° F.

- Both channels of Source Range Startup Rate indicate +0.2 dpm.

- The STA monitoring the CSF Status Trees notifies the crew of a YELLOW path for SUBCRITICALITY due to Intermediate Range Startup Rate.

What action should be taken?

a. Begin an emergency boration.
b. Stop the SG depressurization and allow the RCS to heatup.
c. Immediately transition to FR-S.2, Response to Loss of Core Shutdown.
d. Continue the SG depressurization to 300 psig.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE ECA-0.0, steps 31 & 32 BKG ECA-0.0, step 32 HIGHER BANK Justification:

Step 31 directs depressurization of SG to 300 psig. Once the depressurization is initiated AND SG pressures are above 300 psig, the Contingency Action directs, "Continue with step 32..."

Step 32 checks the Intermediate and Source Range NIS startup rates. If a positive SUR is indicated, then the Contingency Action is to control PORVS to allow RCS heatup.

A. Incorrect, emergency boration not possible without AC power B. Correct, contingency action of ECA-0.0 step 32 - Check Reactor subcritical

C. Incorrect, first note in ECA-0.0 states that CSFs should be monitored for information only, FRPs should not be implemented.

D. Incorrect, a return to power would pose bigger problem than loss of RCS inventory through RCP seals.

  • QNUM 031
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 05A035K401
  • QUESTION The controller output which automatically positions the Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (FW-7A & B) to maintain programmed level uses steam generator narrow range water level AND which of the following?
a. Turbine impulse pressure.
b. Steam flow and feedwater flow.
c. Steam Flow, feedwater flow, and Turbine impulse pressure.
d. The setpoint established by the operator on the control station.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE XK-100-554 System Description 05A, 3.13.5 MEMORY BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, Turbine impulse pressure is not used in SG level control, but was used to generate program level setpoint at one time.

B. Correct, These signals create the steam flow feed flow mismatch signal portion of the controller output signal.

C. Incorrect, Turbine impulse pressure is not used in SG level control, but was used to generate program level setpoint at one time.

D. Incorrect, This would be true for the Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass valves.

  • QNUM 032
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 053036AK101
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- Refueling operations are in progress.

- Reactor cavity water level is decreasing.

- E-FH-53B, Loss of Reactor Cavity Inventory During Fuel Movement, is implemented.

- Containment radiation levels are slowly increasing.

Which of the following is the LEAST desirable location for an irradiated fuel assembly if the Containment must be evacuated?

a. Any available location on the lower core support plate.
b. Transfer system sump.
c. Manipulator crane mast.
d. RCC change fixture.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE E-FH-53B, Attachment A, A.2 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, This is one of the stated contingency action locations.

B. Incorrect, one of the stated contingency action locations C. Correct, E-FH-53B note before step A.3 states that leaving assembly in RCC change fixture is less hazardous than leaving it suspended in manipulator crane mast D. Incorrect, See above.

  • QNUM 033
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA EPE038EA104
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A Steam Generator Tube Rupture has occurred.

- E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, actions are in progress.

- Step 22, Depressurize RCS to Minimize Break Flow and Refill Pressurizer, is being performed.

- The Pressurizer Spray Valves have just been closed.

- Plant conditions are as follows:

- Pressurizer level is 8%.

- Pressurizer pressure is 950 psig.

- Ruptured SG pressure is 955 psig.

- Ruptured SG level is 77%

- Subcooling is 38°F.

What parameter changes would confirm that the Pressurizer Spray Valves are closed?

a. Pressurizer level increasing.
b. SI flow increasing.
c. Ruptured SG level decreasing.
d. Pressurizer pressure increasing.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE BKG E-3, step 22 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, SI flow will refill the Pressurizer even if spray valve is open.

B. Incorrect, SI flow increasing indicates that RCS pressure is still falling C. Incorrect, ruptured SG level will start increasing again as RCS repressurizes until SI flow is terminated.

D. Correct, pressure increasing provides indication that Sprays are closed.

  • QNUM 034
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 05B039K303
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- AFW Pump B is INOPERABLE.

- Main Steamline rupture occurs on Steam Generator A inside Containment.

- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, is performed to isolate SG A.

- Steam Generator A pressure is 25 psig.

- Steam Generator B pressure is 750 psig.

- AFW Header A flow is 0 gpm.

- AFW Header B flow is 280 gpm.

- AFW Pump A discharge pressure is 1600 psig.

- T/D AFW pump discharge pressure is 950 psig.

What operator action is required FIRST for these conditions?

a. Throttle AFW-2B, AFWP Flow Control, to maintain T/D AFW Pump discharge pressure greater than 1000 psig.
b. Place T/D AFW Pump Low Disch Press Trip Bypass Switch to BYPASS.
c. Throttle AFW-2C, T/D AFW Pump Discharge, to maintain T/D AFW Pump discharge pressure greater than 1000 psig.
d. Stop T/D AFW Pump, feed SG B through AFW-10A and AFW-10B, AFW Train A/B Crossover Valves, with AFW Pump A.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE A-FW-05B, steps 11 Contingency Action g. & 12 Contingency Action 1.c E-0, step 14 Contingency Action 1.c.

FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, AFW-2B is not in the flow path from T/D AFW Pump B. Incorrect, this action would be done if throttling of AFW-2C reduced flow below minimum

or discharge pressure could not be maintained.

C. Correct, action directed in AOP and EOPs D. Incorrect, trying to use AFW Pump A would start flow to Faulted SG.

  • QNUM 035
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 011045K301
  • QUESTION Which of the following signals will close the extraction check control valve BS-100, Bleed Steam Supply to FW Heaters 15A and 15B?
a. Turbine Trip.
b. High Level in the Heater Drain Tank.
c. High level in 15A or B Feedwater Heater.
d. Positive Differential Pressure between HD Tank and a 15 Feedwater Heater.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE E-1612 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Correct B. Incorrect, HDT high level causes HD-621, HDT Dump to Condenser to open.

C. Incorrect, 15A or 15B high level causes respective BS Stop Check Valve BS-102A or BS-102B to close along with HD-11A1 or HD-11B1, Reheater Drain Tank Drain to 15A/B FW Heater and the Steam supply MOVs BS-101A and MS-101B D. Incorrect, differential pressure between HDT and 15A/B FW Htr is not measured.

Measured only for HDT and 14A/B FW Heaters.

  • QNUM 036
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 006054AK101
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Containment humidity has increased off-scale HIGH.

- Containment pressure is 0.6 psig and increasing slowly.

- Power range NIs indicate 100% Rx power and stable.

- Steam flow from both S/Gs is steady at 100% power value.

- FW-7B, S/G B Main Feedwater Regulating Valve is full open and S/G B level is slowly lowering.

- Feedwater flow and level is normal for S/G A.

- A manual reactor trip and safety injection is then initiated.

- Following the trip, both MSIVs are closed.

- S/G B pressure is observed to be lowering while S/G A pressure is stable.

Which of the following describes the probable location of the leak ?

a. Steam piping between S/G B and the containment penetration.
b. S/G B feedwater line between the FW inlet check valve and the S/G.
c. S/G B feedwater line between the containment penetration and the FW inlet check valve.
d. Steam piping between the containment penetration and the S/G B Main Steam Isolation Valve.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE BKG E-2 HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, steam break would cause power increase.

B. Correct C. Incorrect, this leak would be isolated by check valve and FW Isolation Valve after the

trip.

D. Incorrect, would not release energy into containment.

  • QNUM 037
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA E00055E 2.4.20
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A loss of all AC power has occurred.

- At step 31 of ECA-0.0, the SG PORVs are opened to lower SG pressures to 300 psig.

- While this is in progress, the following annunciators are noted to alarm:

- 47021-A, SI TRAIN A ACTUATED

- 47021-B, SI TRAIN B ACTUATED

- 47021-C, CI TRAIN A ACTUATED

- 47021-D, CI TRAIN B ACTUATED What operator response should be taken in response to this condition?

a. Verify ALL ESF equipment control switches are in PULLOUT to prevent automatic starting.
b. Position BOTH Safety Injection Train A and Train B Block /Unblock switches to BLK to block the SI signal from starting any ESF equipment when power is restored.
c. Depress BOTH Safety Injection Train A and Train B Reset pushbuttons to allow manual loading of equipment on an ESF bus when power is restored.
d. Verify BOTH Bus 5 and Bus 6 Voltage Restoring Mode Selector switches are in MAN to prevent automatic loading of DGs onto the Buses.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE ECA-0.0, CAUTION 1, step 7 and NOTE, step 33.

FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, Not all ESF equipment is placed in PULLOUT. A Service Water Pump is left available for auto staring to provide DG cooling.

B. Incorrect, These switches are used to block the low Przr SI and Low Steamline SI

signals at the permissive (during normal cooldown). It will not prevent auto starting of equipment if an SI signal has been actuated.

C. Correct.

D. Incorrect, These switches are used when preparing to manully start and load a DG onto its associated bus, as directed in A-DGM-10A/B. These switches will not prevent auto loading of equipment once a bus is energized.

  • QNUM 038
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 039056A 2.1.14
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is at 100% power.

- A lightning strike in the substation causes a loss of off-site power.

- Security reports a fire in the Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer.

- Both Emergency Diesel Generators are running.

- Bus 5 and Bus 6 are energized.

What action is required?

a. Isolate Service Water to Turbine Building.
b. Perform plant announcement of fire and sound plant emergency alarm.
c. Dispatch electricians to Substation to restore Substation vital power.
d. Vent hydrogen from the Main Generator and purge with CO2.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE E-FP-08, step 4.1.1 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, required if we had a total loss of AC power B. Correct, any plant fire requires this notification.

C. Incorrect, this sounds like a plausible subsequent action after the loss of off-site power; however, Substation has batteries for backup power.

D. Incorrect, loss of BOP Buses would cause loss of normal seal oil pumps but battery BRE supplies air-side seal oil backup pump.

  • QNUM 039
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 038057AA101
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A loss of Instrument Bus 2 (White), BRB-113, has occurred.

- A-EDC-38, Abnormal DC Supply and Distribution System, is implemented.

- Electricians report that Instrument Bus 2 Inverter, BRB-111 has failed but it can be bypassed.

- Electricians are directed to energize Instrument Bus 2 from the alternate source using the Manual Bypass Switch.

Which of the following conditions is NOT an indication that Instrument Bus 2 is energized?

a. ICCMS Train B indications return.
b. Individual Rod Position Indication (IRPI) lights come on.
c. Protection Status Panel 44908 White Channel status light, Pressurizer >2000 psig, comes on.
d. NIS Channel 2 Rack is re-energized.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE A-ELV-40, NOTE step 3.2.1.

A-EDC-38, Attachment B Various GMPs to support above FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, this is a load powered from Instrument Bus 2.

B. Correct, IRPI lights are powered from Bus 62 powered panel, not an Instrument bus.

C. Incorrect, the Safeguards Status lights for Channel 2 are powered from Instrument Bus 2.

D. Incorrect, this is a Bus 2 load.

  • QNUM 040
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 05A059K4.16
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 60% power.

What will cause a trip of Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) A?

a. Feedwater header suction pressure decreases to 190 psig.
b. MFP A lube oil pressure decreases to 4 psig.
c. MFP A seal water flow decreases to 6 gpm to inboard and outboard seals.
d. Condenser hotwell level decreases to 17%.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE System Description 5A, 3.2 E-1624 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, low suction pressure trip is <180 psig for 2 minutes.

B. Correct, lube oil pressure <6 psig will trip pump.

C. Incorrect, Low seal flow is a Start Permissive only.

D. Incorrect, Condensate Pump B will trip at 14% hotwell level which would trip MFP A.

  • QNUM 041
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 045061AK201
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Annunciator 47012-B, Radiation Indication Alert, alarms.

- Annunciator 47011-B, Radiation Indication High, alarms.

- The alarming channel is on the Area Radiation Monitoring Panel.

What is the effect of the high radiation condition?

a. High radiation on R-2, Containment Area Monitor, causes Containment Evacuation Alarm to sound.
b. High radiation on R-4, Charging Pump Room Monitor, causes a flashing Red light and alarm horn on the Waste Disposal Control Panel.
c. High radiation on R-1, Control Room Area Monitor, causes the Control Room Post-Accident Recirc Fans to start.
d. High radiation on R-5, Fuel Handling Area Monitor, cause a flashing Red light and a local alarm horn on the R-5 local monitor.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE E-3745 A-RM-45, 3.1 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, R-2 does not cause any auto actions, CR would manually sound alarm after evaluation of conditions.

B. Incorrect, R-4 is local display only at entrance to Charging Pump Room.

C. Incorrect, R-1 does not cause any auto actions, R-23 CR Vent monitor would cause this actuation.

D. Correct, all area monitors just have local horn and alarm light.

  • QNUM 042
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 05B061 2.4.45
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A steamline rupture occurs on Steam Generator A.

- Reactor trip and safety injection are actuated.

- All Safeguards equipment operates per design.

- Steam Generator A is isolated per E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

- RCS temperature is 460° F and increasing.

- RCS pressure is 1500 psig and increasing.

- Steam Generator A level is 0% wide range.

- Steam Generator B level is 25% wide range and increasing.

With each of the following annunciators lit, which annunciator should be addressed FIRST?

a. 47062-M, AFW Pump B Abnormal.
b. 47063-L, Aux Feedwater Discharge XOVR Closed.

c, 47064-I, Steam Gen A Pressure Low.

d. 47062-N, T/D AFW Pump Abnormal.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE DNOS - 0301 Individual Annunciator Response Sheets HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Correct, should not have any alarms on AFW Pump B from conditions stated.

B. Incorrect, alarm is in because AFW-10A was closed per E-2 C. Incorrect, SG pressure is low because A is faulted SG D. Incorrect, alarm is in because T/D AFW Pump was placed in PULLOUT per E-0.

  • QNUM 043
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 05B061K101
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is at 15% power

- S/G B level channel LT-473 has been removed from service per A-MI-87, Bistable Tripping for Failed Reactor Protection of Safeguards Inst.

If S/G B level channel LT-471 fails high, what would be the status of feed for both S/Gs?

a. Both S/Gs are being fed from the motor-driven AFW Pumps only.
b. Both S/Gs are being fed from the turbine-driven AFW Pump only.
c. S/G A is being fed from motor-driven AFW Pump A. S/G B has NO feed flow.
d. S/G A feed remains normal. S/G B feed flow lowers due to throttling of its Main Feedwater Flow Control valve.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE 47064-E System Description 05B, 3.3 E-1602 E-1624 HIGHER BANK Justification: LT-473 OOS has Bistables tripped. Failure of LT-471 gives a 2/3 High-High level on SG B causing a SG B Feedwater Isolation which trips both MFW pumps. Both MFW pumps tripped causes a start of the Motor-driven AFW pumps, which then start feeding both SGs.

A. Correct, see justification statement.

B. Incorrect, no start signal to turbine-driven AFW pump.

C. Incorrect, normal lineup results in AFW feeding both SGs D. Incorrect, because MFW pumps get tripped by 2/3 High-High level on SG B.

  • QNUM 044
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 002062A 2.1.32
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant was operating at 100% power.

- Low service water header pressure has started all FOUR Service Water pumps.

- SW-3A and SW-3B, Service Water Header Isolation Valves have closed.

- A-SW-02, Abnormal Service Water System Operation was implemented.

- A leak was diagnosed in the Turbine Building Header and it was isolated.

- Conditions now are as follows:

- Service Water Pumps 1A1 and 1B2 are currently running.

- SW-3A and SW-3B are open.

- SW-4A and SW-4B, SW header to Turb Bldg Header, are closed.

- Service Water header A and B pressures are 106 psig.

What action is necessary?

a. Manually backwash traveling water screens.
b. Stop ONE Service Water Pump.
c. Manually backwash SW Pump strainers.
d. Depress Turb Bldg SW ESF Isol Reset pushbutton.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE A-SW-02, step 28 N-SW-02, 4.2.2 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, Not a specified action and not indicative of high discharge pressure but low suction (and discharge) pressure.

B. Incorrect, This action would not affect the low flow condition, but may lower header pressure. Procedural Note dictates that one SW Pump should remain running in each

Train.

C. Correct.

D. Incorrect, this action would be taken if aTurbine Building SW header isolation alert was in, but is not appropriate for the condition shown.

  • QNUM 045
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 039062K201
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- All equipment is in its normal alignment.

- A RAT lockout occurs due to a Sudden Pressure fault.

- Later in the shift, RXCP A trips due to overcurrent.

- All equipment operates per design.

What is the status of the 4160V system ONE minute after the trip of the RXCP?

a. 4160V Bus 5 is energized from its emergency diesel generator.
b. 4160V Bus 2 is energized from the MAT.
c. 4160V Bus 6 is de-energized.
d. 4160V Bus 1 is de-energized.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE N-O-02, 4.37.2 A-EHV-39, 3.1.1 and 3.1.3.b HIGHER BANK Justification: RAT Lockout causes loss of Bus 6 and start of DG B. RXCP A trip causes a reactor trip, followed by a turbine trip. Turbine trip causes loss of main Generator and Main Auxiliary Transformer. MAT loss causes busses 1,2,3,4 to lose power because backup from RAT is not available.

A. Incorrect, MAT is not available.

B. Incorrect, Bus 5 is normally powered from TAT C. Incorrect, Bus 6 would be powered by B Emergency diesel generator D. Correct, see justification statement.

  • QNUM 046
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 038063A3.01
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- An internal fault causes a loss of Battery BRB-101 and associated DC distribution panels.

What will be the control room indication of this loss of DC?

a. Annunciator 47101-B BRB-102 DC VOLTAGE LOW.

Loss of Red and Green valve position indicating lights for SI-9B, Safety Injection to Reactor Vessel.

b. Reactor Trip Breaker A Green light ON.

Charging Pump A speed goes to minimum.

c. Annunciator 47034-C SFGRD A OR B CONTROL POWER FAILURE.

Loss of Red and Green breaker position indicating lights for Safety Injection Pump B.

d. Zero volts indicated on BRB-102 DC Bus Voltage indicator.

Loss of Red and Green valve position indicating lights for MS-102, T/D AFW Pump Main Steam Isol.

  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE E-233 E-EDC-38B, 2.1 and APPENDIX A HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, Annunciator would be received, but SI-9B light power is from MCC-62B Ext.

B. Incorrect, Reactor Trip breakers would open, but Charging Pump A controller is Train A.

C. Correct, Train B provides DC power to B Safeguards Equipment controls and SI Pump B breaker.

D. Incorrect, Voltage indication is correct, but MS-102 is a Train A component.

  • QNUM 047
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 010064 2.1.33
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Annunciator 47091-C, DIESEL GENERATOR A ABNORMAL, is received.

- The NAO is dispatched to D/G A and reports the following conditions:

- The diesel is NOT running.

- Jacket Water temperature is 75°F.

- Starting Air pressure is 210 psig.

- Lube Oil temperature is 82°F.

- SW-301A, Service Water from D/G A Heat Exchanger, has failed open.

What action is required?

a. Turn off the Jacket Water heater and write a MWR
b. Declare D/G A inoperable, restore operability within 7 days.
c. Start D/G A startup air compressor and restore starting air pressure to 240 psig.
d. Manually close SW-301A and write a MWR.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE N-DGM-10A, FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, action is required if jacket water temperature is higher B. Correct, lube oil temperature is below minimum for engine operation.

C. Incorrect, air pressure is within limits.

D. Incorrect, no procedural direction provided and this would result in DG being inoperable.

  • QNUM 048
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 010064K202
  • QUESTION With the plant in its 100% power normal alignment, what is the power pathway to the Diesel Generator B Fuel Oil Priming Pump?
a. Bus 5 - Bus 52 - MCC 52A
b. BRB-108 - BRB-102 - BRB-104
c. Bus 6 - Bus 62 - MCC 62A
d. BRA-108 - BRA-102 - BRA-104
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE E-233 DC Electrical Cross-Reference, BRB-104 ckt 10 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, D/G B is associated only with Bus 6 and Bus 62 B. Correct, Fuel Oil Priming Pump is DC, powered through the Engine control panel which is supplied from Battery Charger B through BRB-104.

C. Incorrect, This is fuel oil transfer pump power supply.

D. Incorrect, D/G B is associated with B Train DC only.

  • QNUM 049
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 01065AK308
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant has experienced a complete and sustained loss of Instrument Air.

- The reactor has been tripped.

- E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, has been implemented.

- E-AS-01, Loss of Instrument Air, has been implemented.

What is the reason a cooldown of the RCS may be necessary while experiencing a loss of Instrument Air?

a. To reduce RCS pressure before the Pressurizer PORV backup air accumulators are exhausted.
b. To reduce RCS temperature before the Condensate Storage Tanks are emptied.
c. To prevent the Pressurizer from going full due to seal injection flow.
d. To reduce RCS temperature before the Steam Generator PORV N2 backup supply is exhausted.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE E-AS-01, 4.7 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, sufficient capacity for 5 cycles of each PORV and PORV operation is expected to be minimal during post-trip operation B. Incorrect, contents of hotwell can be used as CST makeup.

C. Correct, Note before step 4.7 of E-AS-01 states "it may be necessary to cool down RCS to prevent overfilling pressurizer due to seal injection flow."

D. Incorrect, SG PORVs have a 4-hr N2 backup supply and can be operated locally in manual.

  • QNUM 050
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 032A068A402
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Two Circulating Water Pumps are in operation.

- Discharge of Waste Condensate Tanks is in progress per N-LWP-32A-3.

- Circulating Water Pump 1B trips on overcurrent.

What action is required in regards to the liquid waste discharge in progress?

a. Notify NAO to stop release due to the change in dilution flow.
b. Notify NAO that release was automatically terminated by trip of CW pump.
c. NO action is necessary as R-18, Liquid Waste Monitor will automatically terminate release if discharge limits are exceeded.
d. Notify Chemistry that dilution flow has changed and additional sampling of the release is required.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE E-CW-04, step 4 Contingency Action HIGHER MODIFIED Justification:

A. Correct, action is specified in E-CW-04, change of number of running CW Pumps.

B. Incorrect, makes statement about interlock that does not exist.

C. Incorrect, R-18 setpoint is used in calculated dilution flow, so a change in dilution flow could result in exceeding discharge limits D. Incorrect, Chemistry is notified that discharge is terminated and that a new discharge permit is required.

  • QNUM 051
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 032B071 2.1.32
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN.

- Preparations for filling and venting the RCS are in progress.

In the Gaseous Waste System, what conditions must be established to receive gas from the PRT during the RCS fill and vent?

a. Gas decay tank selected for cover gas aligned to fill.
b. Gas decay tank with Oxygen concentration less than 2% aligned for fill.
c. Waste Gas Analyzer must be in operation.
d. Gas decay tank with Hydrogen concentration less than 2% aligned for fill.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE N-GWP-32B, 2.6 MEMORY NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, not a stated limitation, precaution 2.6 is applicable for tank receiving gas from RCS fill & vent.

B. Incorrect, gas being collected will likely have oxygen in it.

C. Incorrect, not a stated limitation as manual sampling can be done.

D. Correct, precaution 2.6 for receiving gas from RCS fill & vent that may contain oxygen.

  • QNUM 052
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 045073A1.01
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- RCS activity level is normal.

- A 10 gpm tube leak occurs in S/G B.

Which process radiation monitors will indicate the release of activity from S/G B to the environment?

a. R-33 Steam Line B , R-15 Air Ejector Exhaust, R-14 Aux Bldg Vent Exhaust, R-36 Aux Bldg Vent Stack.
b. R-34 Steam Line B, R-43 S/G B N-16 monitor, R-15 Air Ejector Exhaust, R-35 Aux Bldg Vent Stack.
d. R-33 Steam Line B, R-43 S/G B N-16 monitor, R-15 Air Ejector Exhaust, R-13 Aux Bldg Vent Exhaust.
d. R-34 Steam Line B, R-15 Air Ejector Exhaust, R-19 S/G Blowdown Liquid, R-13 Aux Bldg Vent Exhaust.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE E-O-14, 2.5, 2.6 & 2.8 A-RC-36D, 2.8 E-2021 OPERM-212 OPERM-601 HIGHER NEW Justification:

R-33 is S/G B steamline LO-Range monitor, R-43 is S/G B N-16 monitor would detect leakage.

R-15, Air Ejector monitor, and R-13, AB Exhaust monitor, are in the Condenser off-gas flowpath A. Incorrect, R-36 is a HI-Range monitor.

B. Incorrect, R-34 is a HI-Range monitor.

C. Correct D. Incorrect, R-34 is a HI-Range monitor

  • QNUM 053
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 002075K2.03
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- The TSC Diesel Generator is INOPERABLE.

- A Loss of All AC Power occurs.

- Efforts to manually and locally start Diesel Generator A and B are unsuccessful.

- ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, is in progress.

- A Safety Injection signal has actuated and been reset.

- Repairs have been made to Diesel Generator B.

- Diesel Generator B is started and Bus 6 is energized.

What is the first load to be placed on Bus 6?

a. Safety Injection Pump B.
b. Charging Pump B.
c. Service Water Pump 1B1.
d. Containment Fan Coil Unit 1C.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE ECA-0.0, CAUTION 2 step 7 BKG ECA-0.0, CAUTION 2 step 7 HIGHER MODIFIED Justification:

A. Incorrect, SI Pump may not be necessary B. Incorrect, Charging pump is lower priority than SW pump.

C. Correct, SW pump is necessary for DG cooling D. Incorrect, SW pump is highest priority

  • QNUM 054
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 02076A1.02
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A Service Water leak occurs on the supply line to Auxiliary Building Fan Coil Unit 1B.

- A-SW-02, Abnormal Service Water System Operation is implemented.

- SW-10B, Aux Bldg SW Header B Isolation, is closed to isolate the leak.

- The NCO reports that CC Heat Exchanger outlet temperature, computer point T0621A, is 105°F and increasing.

What action is required for these conditions?

a. Start the standby CC Pump.
b. Open SW-1300A, Comp Cooling Heat Exchanger A outlet.
c. Trip the reactor, and stop the Reactor Coolant Pumps.
d. Position LD-14, LD Demin High Temp Divert Valve, to VC TK position.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE A-SW-02, step16 Contingency Action a.

HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, operating 2 CC Pumps will not lower or stabilize system temperature B. Correct, This is the Contingency Action of step 4.11 with CC HX outlet temperature greater than or equal to 105° F C. Incorrect, this action is required with CC HX outlet temperature greater than 120° F.

D. Incorrect, this action would be taken for CC temp decreasing.

  • QNUM 055
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 001078A401
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- IA-101, Instrument Air to Containment Isol, inadvertently closes due to a failure.

- The GREEN indicating light bulb for IA-101 position indication is burned out, so the CLOSED position is NOT indicated.

What will alert the operator to this failure?

a. Charging flow decreases to ZERO due to CVC-11 failing closed.
b. Reactor Trip on Low Pressurizer Pressure.
c. Annunciator 47051-I, STATION AND INSTR AIR SYSTEM FAULT.
d. Low pressure is indicated on PI-4150103, Rx Bldg Header Pressure indicator.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE E-AS-01, step 4.1 M-213-6 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, Initially the valve will remain open as the IA header to the valve has an air accumulator to maintain the valve open, and charging flow will continue through bypass around CVC-11.

B. Incorrect, spray valves fail closed and letdown isolates so pressure will increase.

C. Incorrect, pressure switch for alarm is upstream of IA-101.

D. Correct, Rx Bldg header pressure indication taps off downstream of IA-101.

  • QNUM 056
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 001078K102
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Station and Instrument Air Compressor G is OOS.

- Air Compressor F is in service.

- Air Compressor F trips on high HP air temperature.

- Instrument Air header pressure decreases to 92 psig due to minor system leaks.

What is the status of the Instrument Air system for these conditions?

a. Compressors A, B, and C are running and loaded.

SA-200 and SA-400 (Station Air Header 1A and 1B Isolations) are partially closed.

b. Compressors B and C are running and loaded, and compressor A is running and unloaded.

SA-200 and SA-400 (Station Air Header 1A and 1B Isolations) are partially closed.

c. Compressors A, B, and C are running and loaded.

SA-200 and SA-400 (Station Air Header 1A and 1B Isolations) are fully open.

d. Compressors B and C are running and loaded, and compressor A is running and unloaded.

SA-200 and SA-400 (Station Air Header 1A and 1B Isolations) are fully closed.

  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE A-AS-01, 3.1.4 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Correct, Compressors A, B, C start at 105, load at 100, 98, and 96, SA-200/400 start closed at 95 but not fully closed until 90.

B. Incorrect, All 3 compressors should be loaded.

C. Incorrect, SA-200/400 should be partially closed..

D. Incorrect, SA-200/400 not fully closed until 90 psig.

  • QNUM 057
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 008086K503
  • QUESTION Fire hose stations in the plant where high voltage electrical hazards exist are provided with
a. fixed fog nozzles
b. adjustable spray/straight stream nozzles
c. straight stream nozzles
d. adjustable spray nozzles
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE Fire Protection Plan, Section 11.4.5, page 26.

FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Correct, stated in Fire Protection Plan.

B. Incorrect, this type of nozzle not used.

C. Incorrect, this type of nozzle not used.

D. Incorrect, this type of nozzle not used.

  • QNUM 058
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 018103A1.01
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A small instrument air leak inside Containment causes a slow rise in Containment pressure.

- Containment pressure is currently 1.7 psig.

In order to ensure adequate margin to Containment design pressure is maintained, what is the appropriate action to reduce Containment pressure?

a. All Containment Fan Coil Units should be started or verified running.
b. One Containment vacuum breaker should be opened after obtaining a discharge permit.
c. The Containment should be vented using the Post-LOCA 2 inch vent lines.
d. The Containment should be vented using the 36 inch RBV valves.
  • ANSWER c.

A. Incorrect, CFCUs will not reduce pressure from air leak B. Incorrect, this will not allow flow from containment to annulus, but from annulus to containment C. Correct, this is the path directed in N-RBV-18B D. Incorrect, 36" RBV valves are not allowed open with Rx critical without NRC permission.

  • QNUM 059
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.1.10
  • QUESTION Which of the following operator monitored parameters ensure the safety analysis assumptions for Shutdown Margin, Ejected Rod Worth, and Power Distribution Peaking Factors are maintained? (Note: A list of abbreviations used in the answer selections is provided below.)

QPTR - Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio DNBR - Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio AFD - Axial Flux Difference CHF - Critical Heat Flux

a. QPTR, DNBR, AFD, and Rod Insertion Limits.
b. Rod Misalignment Limitations, CHF, AFD, QPTR.
c. Rod Insertion Limits, AFD, QPTR, Rod Misalignment Limitations.
d. RCS Pressure, Rod Insertion Limits, Critical Boron Concentration, CHF.
  • ANSWER c.

COLR, 2.8 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, DNBR is not an operator monitored parameter.

B. Incorrect, Critical Heat Flux is not an operator monitored parameter.

C. Correct, maintaining these parameters within limits provides assurance that power distribution limits are met. Monthly incore flux maps directly measure core power distribution.

D. Incorrect, RCS pressure is a DNB parameter, critical boron concentration has no effect on the limits, CHF is not operator monitored.

  • QNUM 060
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.1.29
  • QUESTION Which of the following is NOT an approved method of performing second verification for a valve?
a. Observing an operator while he/she positions a throttled valve.
b. Locally manipulating a closed valve in the open direction only enough to verify valve stem movement AND then reclosing it.
c. Observing in the Control Room that the GREEN light indication is lit and the RED light indication extinguishes when the control switch is placed in CLOSE position for an air operated valve located in Containment.

d, Observing discharge pressure indication decrease AND discharge header flow indication increase for an inaccessible discharge isolation motor-operated valve with the Control Room control switch in OPEN position.

  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE GNP-03.30.06B, Step 6.1.3.8 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, this is the method used for throttle valves.

B. Correct, not an approved method.

C. Incorrect, use of remote position is allowed.

D. Incorrect, use of change in system parameters is allowed.

  • QNUM 061
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.2.13
  • QUESTION When clearing a tagout for the manual isolation valves for Charging Pump C, which of the following requirements is applicable?
a. Cards cleared should be turned over to the requester.
b. The individual removing the tagout must be a qualified Auxiliary Operator.
c. The Shift Manager must review the sequence of restoration requirements for the tagout.
d. All cards used in the Aux Building RCA must be thrown out at the RPO.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE NAD-03.03, 3.20 & 3.12 GNP-03.03.02, 6.6.2.g FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, tags are returned to Work Control Center.

B. Correct, Charging is a system under the responsibility of the Auxiliary Operator C. Incorrect, the Unit Supervisor/ Work Control Supervisor reviews this.

D. Incorrect, tags should be returned to Work Control Center.

  • QNUM 062
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 192 2.2.2
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is being started up after a mid-cycle outage.

- The Reactor is critical below the point of adding heat.

- RCS Tavg is at the no-load value.

- RCS boron is 850 PPM.

- Control Bank D position is 170 steps.

- MSIVs are closed

- The NCO withdraws control rods 12 steps.

- Startup rate is 0.2 DPM.

- No further operator action is taken.

When the point of adding heat is reached, what is the plant response?

a. Tavg will increase adding negative reactivity and driving the reactor sub-critical unless rods are withdrawn further.
b. Tavg, reactor power, and pressurizer pressure and level will increase until the SG PORVs open and stabilize reactor power at a higher level.
c. Tavg, reactor power, pressurizer pressure and level will increase until the reactor trips at 10% power.
d. Tavg, reactor power, pressurizer pressure and level will increase until condenser steam dumps open and stabilize reactor power at a higher level.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE PR08S, Reactor Operational Physics, Intermediate Range Operations, pages 28-29 HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, negative reactivity from temperature will balance positive reactivity and reactor will stabilize at higher power level.

B. Correct

C. Incorrect, this implies there is no reactivity feedback from temperature increase.

D. Incorrect, condenser steam dumps are not available, MSIVs closed.

  • QNUM 063
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.2.22
  • QUESTION The following plant conditions exist:

- REFUELING OPERATIONS are in progress involving fuel movement within the core.

- Both S/G levels are at 100% WR.

- The running RHR Pump A trips and locks out.

- Fuel movement is halted.

- RHR Pump B is started and aligned for shutdown cooling operation within a few minutes.

How are the REFUELING OPERATIONS affected?

a. Fuel movement CANNOT be resumed.

With the reactor vessel head removed, the S/Gs are NOT considered an OPERABLE heat sink.

b. Fuel movement CANNOT be resumed.

Both RHR pumps are required to be OPERABLE.

c. Fuel Movement may resume.

Either S/G meets the heat sink requirements for decay heat removal.

d. Fuel movement may resume.

Only one RHR pump is required to be operable.

  • ANSWER d.

A. Incorrect, The SGs are not required for a heat sink in this condition.

B. Incorrect, TS 3.8.a.4 only requires one RHR pump.

C. Incorrect, SGs are not required as a heat sink in this condition.

D. Correct, one RHR pump satisfies refueling requirements and one RHR pump with Rx cavity flooded satisfies heat sink requirements.

  • QNUM 064
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.3.1
  • QUESTION A valve located in Containment has the following radiation level readings:

- Bottom of valve: 2500 mR on contact, 1200 mR/hr @ 30 cm.

- Top of valve (bonnet area) - 100 mR/hr on contact and 48 mR/hr @ 30 cm.

This valve is located in the general area of Containment and NO enclosure exists. What are the required radiological postings ?

a. The valve should be roped off and posted as a "High Radiation Area" with a flashing light.
b. The valve should be roped off and posted as a "High Radiation Area" without a flashing light.
c. No posting is required as long as Containment is posted as "High Radiation Area."
d. Containment should be posted as a "Very High Radiation Area."
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE HP-01.019, Step 6.11.1 & 6.11.3 FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Correct, this falls under the Locked High Radiation Area in an place that is not and cannot be enclosed.

B. Incorrect, the flashing warning light is a requirement.

C. Incorrect, Containment general area is not a high radiation area.

D. Incorrect, the dose rate for that posting would be > 500 Rads/hr at 1 meter.

  • QNUM 065
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 032A 2.3.11
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A discharge of Waste Condensate Tank A is in progress .

- R-18, Waste Discharge Liquid Monitor fails off-scale high.

- R-18 is taken out-of-service.

What action is NOT necessary to continue the release?

a. Establish TWO independent locations for grab sampling during the release.
b. Analyze at least TWO independent samples from the Waste Condensate Tank A.
c. Perform independent verifications of the discharge lineup by at least TWO technically qualified staff members.
d. Perform independent verifications of the release rate calculations by at least TWO technically qualified staff members.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE Off-site Dose Calculation Manual, Rev. 9, Spec 3.1,Table 3.1.

FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

Per item 1.a Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line (R-18) not OPERABLE: Action 1 is required Action 1 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases may continue provided that prior to initiating a release:

At least two independent samples are analyzed in accordance with Surveillance Requirement 4.3.1.1 and At least two technically qualified members of the Facility Staff independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge line valving; Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway A. Correct, this is not a requirement but could be considered since grab samples are

required.

B. Incorrect, Included in ACTION 1.a C. Incorrect, Included in ACTION 1.b D. Incorrect, Included in ACTION 1.b

  • QNUM 066
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA E00 2.4.21
  • QUESTION The following plant conditions exist:

- Reactor trip and Safety Injection actuated 20 minutes ago.

- The trip caused by a steam line break on Main Steam Header from S/G A.

- S/G A Yarway level reads 10%.

- S/G B Yarway level reads 55%.

- RCS cold leg temperature indicates 265°F.

- Intermediate Range SUR indicates negative 0.1 decades per minute.

- SI flow indicates 400 gpm.

- AFW flow is 250 gpm total.

- Containment pressure reads 27 psig.

- Transition from E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, is in progress.

What is the next procedure to be performed?

a. E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
b. FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
c. FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.
d. FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE UG-0, 6.14 F-0.4 Critical Safety Function Status Tree - Integrity.

HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, This is the procedure to be used only if no Red or Orange paths were present.

B. Incorrect, Heat Sink is only a Yellow path and not required to be entered. Also higher priority condition exists.

C. Correct, Integrity is Red path due to cooldown >100°F in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and Cold Leg temperature <274°F

D. Incorrect, Containment is only an Orange path plus it is a lower priority than integrity.

  • QNUM 067
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA E00 2.4.4
  • QUESTION Which of the following conditions would prompt a transition out of ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation, while performing step 11, Align train B RHR pump for recirculation?
a. Power is lost to buses 5 and 6.
b. SI-350B, CNTMT Sump B Supply to RHR Pump B, CANNOT be opened.
c. The STA reports that a RED path exists on the Core Cooling Status Tree.
d. SI Pump B is NOT available AND RCS pressure is above the shutoff head for the RHR pumps.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE ECA-0.0, ES-1.3 HIGHER BANK Justification:

This is an evaluation of procedure entry conditions.

A. Correct, actions of ES-1.3 cannot be performed without power so transition to ECA-0.0 is appropriate.

B. Incorrect, this requires the other train to be aligned for recirc while continuing in ES-1.3.

C. Incorrect, first caution of ES-1.3 states that it takes precedence over implementation of FRGs.

D. Incorrect, this requires aligning the other train for recirc in ES-1.3.

  • QNUM 068
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 034 2.4.9
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is in REFUELING SHUTDOWN 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> after a normal shutdown.

- RCS draining per N-RC-36E, Draining the Reactor Coolant System is in progress and currently at a Hold Point.

- RCS pressure is stable at containment pressure.

- Pressurizer level is stable at 30% Cold Cal.

- RCS temperature is 140°F and increasing.

- Train A RHR is in operation.

- RHR-8A, RHR Flow Control Hx A Outl, is throttled 20% open.

- RHR Pump A discharge pressure is fluctuating between 25 and 100 psig.

- RHR flow is fluctuating from 1600 to 2000 gpm.

- RHR Pump A motor current is fluctuating.

- Component Cooling flow to the RHR system is normal.

What operator action(s) should be taken to correct these conditions?

a. Increase RHR flow to greater than 2000 gpm.
b. Stop RHR Pump A and establish an alternate method of decay heat removal.
c. Energize the Pressurizer heaters to raise RCS pressure to greater than 200 psig.
d. Align Train B RHR for cooling and start RHR Pump B. Once the RHR Pump B is running, stop RHR Pump A.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE A-RHR-34 N-RHR-34, 2.6 HIGHER MODIFIED Justification:

A. Incorrect, Direction is to maintain flow between 1600-2000 gpm. N-RHR-34 has limitation that individual RHR flow rate shall not exceed 2000 gpm.

B. Correct, With an RHR pump operating, and temperature NOT stable or decreasing, the direction is to establish an alternate heat removal method (Charging Pumps & use of a Przr PORV)

C. Incorrect, This would not affect RCS temperature, but is directed in the event RCS level or pressure was decreasing D. Incorrect, The standby RHR Pump would only be started in the event an RHR Pump was NOT already operating. It is NOT warranted to start the second pump with the first pump running.

  • QNUM 069
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA W/E03 2.1.27
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant was operating at 100% power.

- Reactor Trip and Safety Injection occurred due to a Small Break LOCA.

- All Safeguards equipment is operating normally.

- The crew has transitioned to ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

- ES-1.2 directs starting two Charging Pumps and establishing maximum charging flow.

What is the purpose for operating the Charging Pumps?

a. To provide seal cooling for the RXCPs.
b. To provide sufficient makeup so that SI Pumps can be stopped.
c. To provide Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray for RCS pressure control.
d. To provide additional makeup to restore Pressurizer level.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE BKG ES-1.2, HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, seal cooling should be provided by CCW, if that was lost then seal injection is isolated at this step B. Correct, SI flow will be replaced by charging flow later in procedure.

C. Incorrect, auxiliary spray is not desirable due to thermal shock considerations D. Incorrect, starting charging pump will not raise Pressurizer level due to equilibrium established between RCS leakage and injection flow for a small break LOCA.

  • QNUM 070
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 05BW/E05EK2.1
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant was at 100% power when a reactor trip and Safety Injection occurred.

- The crew has transitioned to FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

- While attempting to restore AFW, the following conditions are noted:

- Bus 5 is deenergized.

- The Turbine Driven AFW Pump is tripped and a large amount of oil is leaking from the governor.

- 47062-M, AFW PUMP B ABNORMAL is in alarm.

- SG A pressure is 75 psig and lowering.

- SG B pressure is 700 psig and slowly lowering.

- CST A and B levels read 92% each.

- AFW alignment is normal for post-trip conditions.

- The operator then takes AFW-2B, AFWP B Flow Control Valve, to the closed position.

What sequence of actions is required to start AFW Pump B based on the above conditions?

a. Take AFW Pump B control switch to STOP and then to START.
b. Reset breaker 1-604 timed overcurrent relays, and take AFW Pump B control switch to START.
c. Locally place the AFW Pump B Disch Press Trip Bypass Switch to BYPASS, and take AFW Pump B control switch to START.
d. Locally place the AFW Pump B Low Suction Press Trip Bypass Switch to BYPASS, and take AFW Pump B control switch to STOP and then START.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE ARP 47062-M, COMMENTS A-FW-05B, step 10.d & e Contingency Actions

FR-H.1, step 2.c E-1602 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Correct B. Incorrect, Annunciator 47062-M would not alarm until AFW-2B was moved from the open position, and annunciator 47093-L, BUS 6 FEEDER BKR OVERLOAD, would be in alarm.

C. Incorrect, Closing AFW-2B will allow the pump discharge header pressure to rise and remain above the trip setpoint, and this trip is delayed 5 seconds. Also, the control switch must be taken to STOP to reset the trip.

D. Incorrect, With the given conditions, there is no reason for the suction pressure trips to be active. The pump will start and run without taking the local action.

  • QNUM 071
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA E00 W/E10EA2.2
  • QUESTION A natural circulation cooldown is being conducted per ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void In Vessel.

While performing Step 3, Continue RCS Cooldown and Initiate Depressurization, the procedure places limitations on RCS subcooling, cooldown rate in the RCS cold legs, and temperature vs.

pressure limitations of RD-11.1.

Which of the following RCS parameter combinations meet the requirements of this step?

(RD-11.1.1, 11.1.2 and 11.1.3 provided)

Cooldown Rate (°F/hour) Temperature (°F) Pressure (psig)

a. 110 300 800
b. 60 275 1600
c. 30 520 1300
d. 10 450 500
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE ES-0.3, step 3.c RD-11.1.3, Rev. 12/20/04 HIGHER BANK Provided

Reference:

RD-11.1.1, Kewaunee RCS Composite Pressure/Temperature Limitations RD-11.1.2, Kewaunee Reactor Coolant System Heatup and Cooldown Limitations RD-11.1.3, Kewaunee RCS Composite Pressure/Temperature Limitations Justification:

A. Incorrect, procedure limits cooldown rate to no more than 100° F/hr.

B. Incorrect, pressure/temp is to the left of 300° F subcooled line in unacceptable region.

C. Correct, C/D rate is acceptable, Press/temp within limits, and subcooling is >50° F.

D. Incorrect, press/temp is below the 30°F Subcooling Limit.

  • QNUM 072
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 036 W/E11EK1.2
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant tripped from 100% power due to a LOCA and Loss of Off-site Power.

- Diesel Generator B failed to start.

- E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, has been implemented and the crew is performing step 17 - Evaluate Plant Status.

The plant status is as follows:

- RCS pressure is 700 psig and decreasing slowly.

- Steam Generator pressure is 900 psig and stable.

- RWST level is 47% and decreasing slowly.

- Residual Heat Removal Pump A tripped on overcurrent.

- Containment pressure peaked at 25 psig and is decreasing slowly.

- Containment radiation is 12 R/hr and stable.

- All other equipment is operating normally.

What procedure should be implemented by the crew?

a. FR-Z.3, Response to High Containment Radiation Level.
b. ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
c. ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation.
d. ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE E-1, step 17 a BKG E-1, step 17 HIGHER MODIFIED Justification:

A. Incorrect, FR-Z.3 is a yellow path procedure so it has lowest priority.

B. Correct, both RHR pumps unavailable means that recirculation cannot be established and this procedure is appropriate, E-1 step 17a Contingency Action.

C. Incorrect, RWST level above transition level of 37%

D. Incorrect, conditions for transition not evaluated until next procedure step.

  • QNUM 073
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 05B W/E12EK1.1
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant was operating at 100% power.

- Reactor Trip has occurred.

- Safety Injection has occurred.

- Both SGs are depressurizing uncontrollably.

- ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators, is implemented.

- SI has been reset.

- RCS pressure is 200 psig.

- ECA-2.1 directs isolation of the Safety Injection Accumulators.

What is the purpose of isolating the SI Accumulators?

a. Prevent Integrity CSF challenge from the SI Accumulator cold leg injection flow.
b. To allow a reduction in RCS pressure to establish RHR flow.
c. Prevent nitrogen injection into RCS after the discharge of the Accumulator liquid contents.
d. Prevent gas binding of the SI Pumps by accumulator nitrogen coming out of solution.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE BKG ECA-2.1, step 35 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, cooldown from SGs is the main problem.

B. Incorrect, this sounds plausible but is not a procedure priority at this point C. Correct, preventing accumulator nitrogen injection will ensure that gas accumulations will not impair core cooling.

D. Incorrect, gas binding of SI pumps is a concern during operation but is not the reason

for this step performance.

  • QNUM 074
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 05AW/E13EK2.1
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant experienced a spurious Reactor Trip from 100% power.

- FW-7A, SG A Main Feedwater Flow Control Valve, failed open and is mechanically stuck.

- All other equipment and systems functioned as designed.

Under these conditions, which of the following will prevent an overpressurization of Steam Generator A?

a. Condenser Steam Dump actuation.
b. SG A Safety Valves relieving at set pressure.
c. Feedwater Isolation actuation.
d. SD-3A, SG A PORV relieving at set pressure.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE BKG FR-H.2, 2.0 E-1625 HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, Steam Dump to condenser will close with Tavg decrease.

B. Incorrect, Won't reach set pressure due to FW addition cooling effect until isolation occurs C. Correct, Closes FW Isolation Valves on high-high OR if SI is actuated due to the cooldown, terminating the FW addition D. Incorrect, Won't reach set pressure due to FW addition cooling effect until isolation occurs.

  • QNUM 075
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 078 W/E16EA1.2
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant was operating at 100% power.

- A LOCA inside containment has occurred.

- E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant is in progress.

- Containment pressure is 2.5 psig.

- Containment Spray Pumps have been stopped.

- Containment radiation is 13 R/hr.

- Decision is made to transition to FR-Z.3, Response to Containment High Radiation Level.

What action should be taken to address the high containment radiation?

a. Verify RHR is supplying containment spray to reduce containment pressure to atmospheric.
b. Start Containment Spray Pumps to provide Iodine scrubbing of containment atmosphere.
c. Start Post-LOCA Hydrogen Control System to dilute containment airborne radioactivity.
d. Start Containment Fancoil Units to provide some filtration of containment particulate radioactivity.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE FR-Z.3, HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, with pressure below 4 psig further spray is not necessary B. Incorrect, spray does not reduce the radiation level significantly and unnecessarily depletes RWST C. Incorrect, this is only used for hydrogen control only.

D. Correct, this action will provide some filtration.

  • QNUM 076
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 034005A202
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is in COLF SHUTDOWN with RHR Pump A in operation.

- RCS is solid at 390 psig.

- RCS temperature is 180°F and stable.

- RHR-1A, RCS Loop A Supply to RHR Pumps inadvertently closes and will NOT re-open.

What is the impact of the closure of RHR-1A, and what actions are necessary in response?

a. RCS temperature will increase due to loss of cooling.

Start RHR Pump B.

b. Technical Specification 3.1.a.2.B, Decay Heat Removal Capability is NOT satisfied.

Restore inoperable RHR Train within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

c. RCS pressure control is lost.

Stop the running Charging Pumps.

d. Technical Specification 3.1.b.4, Overpressure Protection for Low Temperature Operation is NOT satisfied.

Verify RHR-1B and RHR-2B open and lock off their breakers.

  • ANSWER d.

A. Incorrect, RHR cooling is maintained.

B. Incorrect, LCO action time is incorrect, TS says to immediately restore.

C. Incorrect, RCS pressure control and CVCS letdown flow are not affected.

D. Correct, LTOP requirement as stated in TS and N-RHR-34.

  • QNUM 077
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119006 2.4.30
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is at 100% power.

- At 0830, Diesel Generator B is INOPERABLE due to governor repairs.

- At 0900, Bkr 15204, Bus 52 Supply to MCC-52E trips.

- Actions are initiated to investigate Bkr 15204 trip.

- Diesel Generator B is restored to OPERABLE status at 0930.

Determine the reportability requirements for this event at the current time.

(EPIP-AD-02, GNP 11.08.04 Table 1, and MCC-52E loads provided).

a. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> notification per 50.72 (a)(1)(i) declaration of UNUSUAL EVENT from Chart F.
b. 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification per 50.72 (b)(2)(i) due to initiation of TS required shutdown.
c. 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification per 50.72(b)(3)(ii), event or condition that results in a serious degradation of plant safety.
d. A report is NOT required since the condition is addressed in Technical Specifications and NO action time was exceeded.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE GNP-11.08.04 Table 1 EPIP-AD -02. Charts HIGHER NEW Provided

Reference:

GNP-11.08.04 table 1 EPIP-AD-02 Charts MCC Book pages for MCC-52E Justification: MCC-52E is power supply to ICS Pump A discharge valves ICS-5A &6A, Diesel Generator B inoperability cascades to ICS Pump B, so both trains of ICS are inoperable.

A. Incorrect, event is not a declarable Emergency B. Incorrect, TS 3.0.c is entered, a TS required shutdown is required to be initiated within 1

hour; however, DG is restored within this time.

C. Correct, per GNP-11.08.04 Table 1 D. Incorrect, though condition was restored before TS 3.0.c action was required, it is reportable.

  • QNUM 078
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 049014A202
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A 138KV Transmission line failure causes a Turbine load reduction.

- Bus 6 Lockout also occurs.

- Plant conditions following the transient are:

- Reactor power is 97%.

- Control Bank D position is 198 steps.

- Control Rod Bank Selector is in MANUAL.

What actions are required?

(Figure RD 4.1 and Technical Specifications pages 3.10-5 and 3.10-6 provided )

a. Restore Control Rods above LOW-LOW insertion limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
b. Verify position of control rods using incore moveable detectors within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
c. Trip the reactor and emergency borate 360 gallons for each non-indicating control rod.
d. Restore inoperable IRPI indications within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or reduce power to less than 50%.
  • ANSWER b.

HIGHER NEW Provided

Reference:

Reactor Data Manual figure RD 4.1 insertion limits Technical Specifications Pages TS 3.10-5 and 3.10-6 Justification: Loss of BUS 6 removes power to all IRPI indications.

A. Incorrect, LOW-LOW Limit Annunciator in due to the loss of power, rods are above insertion limit.

B. Correct, rods moved 28 steps so this action required by TS 3.10.f.3.A.

C. Incorrect, a past procedural action but no longer required.

D. Incorrect, not a requirement of procedure or TS

  • QNUM 079
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 035022AA202
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power with all parameters at normal expected values.

- Charging Pump B is Out of Service.

- 480V Bus 1-52 is lost.

- Letdown flow is isolated.

- RXCP A Bearing Water temperature is 200°F and stable.

- RXCP A #1 Seal Leakoff temperature is 185°F and stable.

- RXCP B Bearing Water temperature is 205°F and stable.

- RXCP B #1 Seal Leakoff temperature is 195°F and stable.

What procedure or specification will be the FIRST that requires a plant shutdown or reactor trip?

a. Technical Specification 3.2, Chemical and Volume Control System.
b. A-RC-36C, Abnormal RXCP Operation.
c. Technical Specification 3.7, Auxiliary Electrical System.
d. Annunciator Response Procedure 47043-F, PRESSURIZER LEVEL LOW.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE ARP 47043-F Operator Aid 02-21 HIGHER NEW Provided

Reference:

NOTE: While OA# 02-21 is not specifically provided here, nor required for determining solution, it was provided for in the RO portion of the exam and evaluation has determined its availability here does not affect the status of the question.

Justification:

This condition results in a loss of all Charging Pumps. No makeup is available to the RCS but RXCP Seal leakoff flow of approximately 5 gpm will result in RCS inventory loss, lowering Przr

level. ARP directs tripping the reactor if Prz level cannot be maintained greater than 5%

A. Incorrect, Safety Injection Pumps and flow path will satisfy this LCO.

B. Incorrect, Loss of seal injection can be sustained for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> without shutting down the RXCPs provided temperatures are within limits (225°F and 235°F, respectively)

C. Incorrect, LCO time for Bus 1-52 OOS is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> D. Correct, Pressurizer will empty in 5-6 hours and pressurizer heaters will be lost requiring SI actuation.

  • QNUM 080
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 031026 2.2.25
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have occurred.

- A LOCA has occurred.

- RHR Pump A has failed.

- ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation is being implemented.

- CC-400B, Component Cooling to RHR HX B will NOT open.

- Efforts are in progress to locally open CC-400B.

- It is estimated that repair of CC-400B will take 90 minutes.

What is the impact of these conditions upon establishing Containment Sump Recirculation and upon removal of Core Decay Heat?

a. Containment Sump Recirculation can be established without CCW.

Core decay heat is transferred to the Containment and will be removed by Containment Fan Coil Units.

b. Containment Sump Recirculation can be established without CCW.

Transition to Core Cooling FRGs to provide Core Cooling.

c. Containment Sump Recirculation can NOT be established without CCW.

Place RHR in service per A-RHR-34B, Residual Heat Removal Split-Train Mode to provide Core Cooling.

d. Containment Sump Recirculation can NOT be established without CCW.

Transition to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation to provide Core Cooling.

  • ANSWER a.

Justification: USAR 9.3 states that no cooling from RHR would be required during recirculation because containment fancoil unit capability using service water exceeds decay heat generation.

A. Correct, TS 3.3.d bases and USAR 9.3 B. Incorrect, Decay heat should be removed by fancoil units so no transition is required.

C. Incorrect, RHR operation in Split-train Mode is an option for other situations but not applicable here.

D. Incorrect, IPEOP does not specify any other contigency action

  • QNUM 081
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 018029 2.4.45
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is in Intermediate Shutdown.

- RCS Tavg is 240°F.

- At 1230, R-21, Containment Vent Monitor, failed high.

- Prior to removing R-21 from service, both Containment Vent Isolation Reset pushbuttons were depressed.

- Annunciator 47051-B, CNTMT VENT ISOL HIGH RADIATION DISABLED, is currently in alarm.

- The Containment Vent is scheduled to be restarted at 1300.

How do the current plant conditions affect the planned restoration of Containment Vent?

a. The Containment Vent may be started if R-11, Containment Particulate Monitor, or R-12, Containment Gas Monitor, is verified OPERABLE prior to initiation of the vent.
b. The Containment Vent may be started using the 2" Post-LOCA lines, if R-13 and R-14, Aux Bldg Vent Exhaust Vent Monitors are OPERABLE.
c. The Containment Vent may NOT be initiated with Annunciator 47051-B in alarm.
d. The Containment Vent may NOT be initiated until two technically qualified personnel have performed independent verification of the release rate calculations and the discharge valve lineup.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE N-RBV-18B, CAUTION step 4.1 ARP 47051-B FUNDAMENTAL BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, Vent could be started with R-21 OOS, but not with alarm in.

B. Incorrect, Caution about alarm also applies to this operation.

C. Correct, per N-RBV-18B Step 4.1 CAUTION D. Incorrect, This action required if R-13 and R-14 OOS.

  • QNUM 082
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 053034A102
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is in REFUELING Mode.

- A spent fuel assembly is in the Manipulator Crane in transit to the Upender.

- Annunciator 47033-43, TLA-18 RHR SYSTEM MONITOR ABNORMAL alarms.

- Refueling Water Level WR on PPCS is 66% and decreasing.

- Decreasing water level in the Refueling Cavity is observed.

- R-2, Containment Area Monitor and Manipulator Crane Radiation Monitor are reading normal.

What are the appropriate actions to be taken by the Refueling SRO?

a. Direct Containment Refueling Operator to lower assembly into transfer sump and unlatch.

Verify Containment Integrity is set.

b. Direct Containment Refueling Operator to lower assembly to any available location in core and do NOT unlatch.

Direct SFP Refueling operator to close Fuel Transfer System Gate Valve.

c. Direct Containment and SFP Refueling Operators to stop all fuel movement.

Evacuate ALL personnel from Containment.

d. Direct Containment Refueling Operator to lower assembly in RCC Change Fixture and unlatch.

Direct SFP Refueling Operator to close Fuel Transfer System Gate Valve.

  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE E-FH-53B, HIGHER MODIFIED Justification:

A. Incorrect, assembly will stay latched in Manipulator B. Correct, per E-FH-53B with low radiation levels

C. Incorrect, action would only be taken if Manipulator Crane Radiation Monitor was alarming.

D. Incorrect, assembly will stay latched in Manipulator Crane.

  • QNUM 083
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 006038EA208
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A SGTR has occurred.

- Actions of E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture are in progress.

- Both Circ Water Pumps tripped on Forebay low-low level and will NOT restart.

- Operators have identified and isolated ruptured S/G A.

- Preparations are being made to initiate RCS cooldown to establish desired subcooling.

What operator action is required to cooldown the RCS?

a. Dump steam at maximum rate from S/G B using its PORV.
b. Direct an operator to locally fully open all Atmospheric Steam Dump valves.
c. Dump steam at maximum rate from both S/G A and S/G B using their PORVs.
d. Momentarily place the Main Steam Dump Control Mode Selector to RESET, and then dump steam at maximum rate from S/G B to the condenser.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE E-3, Rev. Y, Step 10 BKG E-3, Rev. E, Step 10 HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Correct, Per E-3 Step 10 Contingency Action.

B. Incorrect, manual control of PORV is preferable to local operation.

C. Incorrect, Dumping steam from ruptured SG is not allowed if other options exist.

D. Incorrect, Steam Dump to condenser is interlocked off with CW Pump breakers open.

  • QNUM 084
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA E02040A 2.1.32
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant tripped from 100% power at 0336 due to an unisolable steam leak from Steam Generator B.

- Safety Injection has actuated.

- Steam Generator B is isolated per E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

The time is now 0406 and the following plant conditions exist:

- RCS Cold Leg temperature is 298°F and stable.

- RCS pressure is 1450 psig and increasing.

- Pressurizer level is 88% and increasing.

- Source Range SUR is ZERO.

What condition requires IMMEDIATE crew action to mitigate?

a. Loss of Core Shutdown due to RCS cooldown.
b. Thermal Shock to the Reactor Vessel wall due to RCS cooldown.
c. Pressurizer overfill and challenge to the Pressurizer PORVs due to continued SI flow.
d. Steam Generator Tube Primary-to-Secondary differential pressure limit exceeded due to continued SI flow.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE N-O-01, 2.3.5 BKG FR-P.1, 2. pages 3-5 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, consequence of a Design Basis Steam Leak but not this event B. Correct , most severe challenge from conditions given.

C. Incorrect, potential challenge but not the most serious under these conditions.

D. Incorrect, SG tube DP limit is not exceeded from the conditions given.

  • QNUM 085
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 038058AA202
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- ONLY the following annunciators are in alarm:

- 47104-A, BATTERY CHARGER A TROUBLE

- 47101-A, BRA-102 DC VOLTAGE LOW What actions are required?

a. Go to E-EDC-38A, Loss of Train A DC Power.
b. Verify reactor trip, go to E-0.
c. Verify BRA-102 voltage greater than 105 VDC per A-EDC-38.
d. Cross-connect BRA-102 and BRB-102 per A-EDC-38.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE A-EDC-38, step 4.1.2 MEMORY NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, procedure is implemented on loss of bus B. Incorrect, no Reactor Trip from conditions stated C. Correct, battery is still operable with voltage greater than 105 VDC D. Incorrect, not allowed during operation.

  • QNUM 086
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 005059A2.04
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant was operating at 100% power.

- A total Loss of Feedwater occurred.

- The reactor was tripped.

- All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps failed to start.

- FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink was implemented.

- RCS Bleed and Feed was initiated.

- Pressurizer PORV PR-2B failed to open.

- RCS Wide Range Hot Leg temperatures and Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures are INCREASING.

- Both Steam Generator Wide Range levels indicate 0%.

- Repairs have made Feedwater Pump A available.

- SI is reset.

What mitigation strategy is required?

a. Reset FW Isolation, Open FW Isolation Valves, Fast start Main FW Pump A, Open FW-10A and B, SG A and B Main Feedwater Bypass Flow Control Valve to establish 60 to 100 gpm feed flow.
b. Open FW isolation Valves, Fast start Main FW Pump A, Open FW-10A or FW-10B, SG A or B Main Feedwater Bypass Flow Control Valve to establish maximum feed flow to both SGs.
c. Open FW Isolation Valves, Fast start Main FW Pump A, Open FW-10A and B, SG A and B Main Feedwater Bypass Flow Control Valves to establish 60 to 100 gpm feed flow.
d. Reset FW Isolation, Open FW Isolation Valves,

Fast start Main FW Pump A, Open FW-10A or B, SG A or B Main Feedwater Bypass Flow Control Valve to establish maximum feed flow.

  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE FR-H.1, step 26 HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, maximum feed flow is required with temperatures increasing Opening the valves to BOTH SGs with hot dry condition is not directed B. Incorrect, FW Isolation signal must be reset.

C. Incorrect, FW Isolation signal must be reset, maximum feed flow required. Opening the valves to BOTH SGs with hot dry condition is not directed D. Correct, correct manipulations and maximum flow due to temperatures increasing.

  • QNUM 087
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 039062 2.4.49
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- All electrical buses are in their normal at-power alignment.

- The following annunciators have actuated:

- 47082-E, RAT LOCKOUT

- 47091-K, BUS 6 VOLTAGE LOW

- The BOP Operator reports:

- Bus 6 voltage is ZERO

- Bus 6 white power available lights are OFF.

What are the Immediate Operator Actions directed to be performed?

a. Position Bkr 1-611 43 Switch to MAN, position Bkr 1-611 Sync Switch to ON, close Brk 1-611, TAT to Bus 6.
b. Start Diesel Generator B.
c. Close Bkr 1-510 Bus 5&6 Tie, close Bkr 1-602 Bus 5&6 Tie.
d. Position Bkr 1-610 43 Switch to MAN, position Bkr 1-610 Sync Switch to ON, close Brk 1-610, MAT to Bus 6.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE A-EHV-39, 3.1.1 & 3.2.1.a FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, not an Immediate Operator Action, interlocks are designed to prevent closure of breakers for both Buses onto TAT at the same time.

B. Correct action, verify Diesel Generator B restores power to Bus 6 C. Incorrect, not allowed during power operation.

D. Incorrect, not an Immediate Operator Action, a possible subsequent action.

  • QNUM 088
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 008067AA208
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A fire in the Safeguards Bus 51,52 Switchgear area is reported.

- E-FP-08, Emergency Operating Procedure-Fire is implemented.

What references will provide the information to determine what systems and components are affected by the fire, and to shutdown ventilation systems for the affected areas to prevent the spread of fire or smoke?

a. E-0-07, fire in Dedicated Fire Zone.
b. Fire Protection Program Plan
c. Fire area strategies Book
d. E-FP-08 Appendix D - Potential local actions for fire in any Dedicated Zone.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE KPS Fire Plan, 10.3 E-FP-08, 4.13 NAD 02.10, 5.6.5 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, this procedure would be used if control of plant equipment from the Control Room was affected.

B. Incorrect, The FP Program plan simply describe the program, responsibilities, and the implementing documents used.

C. Correct, per E-FP-08 and Fire Protection Program Plan.

D. Incorrect, this Appendix provides direction for placing equipment in a safe mode, when control may be affected.

  • QNUM 089
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 56103A202
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Annunciator 47013-H, RXCP A Oil Level High/Low comes on.

- A-RC-36C, Abnormal RXCP Operation, has been implemented.

- A containment entry is necessary to locally determine RXCP A oil level.

Which of the following is NOT a requirement for performing the containment entry?

a. Confined Space Entry requirements are met.
b. Containment pressure is less than 2 psig.
c. An approved Radiation Work Permit.
d. A minimum of TWO persons to make the entry.
  • ANSWER b.
  • REFERENCE N-CCI-56, 2.4 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, containment during power operation is a confined space.

B. Correct, entry with containment pressurized is allowed with additional restrictions.

C. Incorrect, An RWP is required for containment entry.

D. Incorrect, this is a procedural requirement.

  • QNUM 090
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.1.13
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- A Steam Generator tube leak occurs.

- E-O-14, Steam Generator Tube Leak is implemented.

- UNUSUAL EVENT is declared and the Emergency Response Organization is activated.

Under these conditions, what individual is allowed access to the Control Room without restriction?

a. Crew Training Liaison.
b. Work Week Coordinator.
c. Support Person (CR).
d. Radiation Protection Manager.
  • ANSWER c.

A. Incorrect, not in GNP B. Incorrect, has frequent business in Control Room, but not in GNP C. Correct, assigned Emergency Plan position.

D. Incorrect, not in GNP.

  • QNUM 091
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.1.25
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is operating at 100% power.

- Annunciator 47015-L, RXCP B STANDPIPE HIGH/LOW has alarmed.

- NCO has determined that Standpipe level is HIGH.

- Reactor Coolant Pump B #1 Seal Leakoff is 2.8 gpm.

- Auxiliary Operator reports that RCDT level increased from 20% to 34% in ONE hour.

- Auxiliary Operator reports that RCDT level normally increases 3% over 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

What is the required course of action? (Operator Aid 89-6 provided.)

a. Total Seal Leakoff flow is greater than 8 GPM, perform immediate shutdown of RXCP B.
b. #2 Seal Leakoff flow is greater than 8 gpm, perform immediate shutdown of RXCP B.
c. #2 Seal Leakoff flow is greater than 1.1 gpm, stop RXCP B within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
d. #2 Seal leakoff flow is greater than 0.5 gpm, continue RXCP B operation while monitoring pump and seal indications.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE A-RC-36C, Operator Aid 89-6 HIGHER NEW Provided

Reference:

Operator Aid 89-6 Justification:

A. Incorrect, action would be required if RCDT inleakage was incorrectly determined and added to existing #1 Seal Leakoff flow.

B. Incorrect, this action would be required if RCDT inleakage was incorrectly determined C. Incorrect, action would be required if RCDT inleakage was incorrectly determined.

D. Correct answer, RCDT level change of 20% to 34% is 48 gallons which yields flow of 0.8 GPM. A-RC-36C, Attachment B step 5 directs monitoring of pump while continuing to operate.

  • QNUM 092
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.2.19
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A safety-related component is in an OPERABLE But Degraded condition.

- The repair of the component is scheduled for the next refueling outage.

- Concerns have been raised about a failure of the component prior to the scheduled repair.

What conditions must be satisfied to allow a voluntary entry into the Limiting Conditions for Operations to perform corrective maintenance?

a. Probabilistic Risk Assessment results in Core Damage Frequency = 8.68 E -5, 10CFR 50.59 evaluation.
b. Probabilistic Risk Assessment results in Core Damage Frequency = 2.1 E-3, all spare parts physically verified available.
c. Probabilistic Risk Assessment results in Core Damage Frequency = 2.1 E-3, Plant Manager approval.
d. Probabilistic Risk Assessment results in Core Damage Frequency = 8.68 E-5, planned work time does not exceed 50% of LCO time.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE NAD 08.02, 4.2.1, 4.2.2.1 & 4.2.3.1 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, 50.59 evaluation not required.

B. Incorrect, PRA Core Damage Frequency exceeds criteria.

C. Incorrect, PRA Core Damage Frequency exceeds criteria.

D. Correct, both statements satisfy NAD 08.02 Section 4.2.

  • QNUM 093
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 192 2.2.34
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A Reactor Startup is being performed.

- Estimated Critical Position for the startup is Control Bank D at 100 steps.

The RCCA Spider for Rod F-6 (Control Bank B) fails, resulting in Rod F-6 remaining fully inserted while its drive shaft is being withdrawn.

What will be the indication to the crew of this failure?

a. Annunciator 47041-P, ROD BOTTOM ROD DROP, alarms when Control Bank B position is greater than 35 steps.
b. Source range Channels N-31 and N-32 show asymmetric count rate during startup.
c. Eight-fold data predicts criticality at a higher rod position than ECP.
d. Annunciator 47033-24, TLA-9 CORE EXIT T/C TILTS alarms.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE N-CRD-49B, 4.2.6, 4.2.7 & 4.2.28.b RD 5.5.2 (example)

HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, a Rod Position Indication is directly related to impedance in sensing coils related to drive shaft position.

B. Incorrect, a rod on bottom might lead to asymetric response if close to Source Range Detector. Rod on bottom is in center location.

C. Correct, reactivity effect of rod on bottom will affect eight-fold data and Critical position.

D. Incorrect, rod on bottom at power would most likely cause this alarm. Not feasible without core heat generation.

  • QNUM 094
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.3.4
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- LOCA outside of Containment has occurred.

- GENERAL EMERGENCY has been declared.

- The Emergency Response Organization has not yet been staffed.

- It has been determined that the release path can be isolated in the RHR A Heat Exchanger Room.

- Radiation Protection has measured the general area dose rate at 20 REM/HR in the RHR Heat Exchanger Room.

Using Emergency Exposure Limits, what is the MAXIMUM stay time for an operator entering the area to isolate the leak?

a. 15 minutes.
b. 45 minutes.
c. 75 minutes.
d. 90 minutes.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE EP-AD-11, 5.1.4 & Table 5.1b HIGHER BANK Justification:

A. Incorrect, this would be the time limit based on the normal TEDE limit B. Incorrect, this would be time limit based on normal limit for lense of the eye exposure C. Correct, 25 REM TEDE to protect large populations by stopping release D. Incorrect, this would be time limit based the limit for lense of the eye to protect valuable property.

  • QNUM 095
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 018 2.3.9
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant is in REFUELING SHUTDOWN.

- Irradiated fuel movement is in progress.

- Containment Purge is in service

- Annunciator 47013-A, RAD MONITOR SAMPLING FLOW HIGH/LOW is alarming.

- R11/12, Containment Particulate/Gas Monitor, Sample Pump has stopped and will NOT restart.

What action is required?

a. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation Train A has occurred.
b. Restore R11/12 Sample flow to normal within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or stop the Containment Purge.
c. Verify R21 is operating and aligned to sample Containment.
d. Immediately suspend fuel movement.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE N-RM-45, steps 9.a & 110.a A-RM-45, steps 12.a and 13.a Contingency Actions ODCM, Table 3.2, 1.b HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, this would be a correct action if R11/12 failed or had High Radiation.

B. Incorrect, not stated anywhere.

C. Correct, R21 satisfies ODCM.

D. Incorrect, there is a requirement for R-12 on the daily refueling checklist but no requirement stated for failure.

  • QNUM 096
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA 119 2.4.38
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A GENERAL EMERGENCY has been declared due to a LOCA and ECCS failure.

- You are the acting Emergency Director.

- ARTO Met Data is unavailable.

- PPCS Meteorological Data from Group Output Nine is as follows:

- PRI TWR-60M WND SPD 12 mph

- PRI TWR-60M WND DIR FRM 307 Deg

- PRI TWR-10M WND SPD 10 mph

- PRI TWR-10M WND DIR FRM 303 Deg

- PRI TWR DELTA -5 deg Based on the conditions, what Initial Protective Action Recommendations should be made?

(EP-AD-19 and EPIPF AD-07-01, NARS Form provided.)

a. Evacuate ALL sectors out to 5 miles, shelter downwind sectors EFGH from 5 miles out to 10 miles.
b. Evacuate ALL sectors out to 5 miles, shelter downwind sectors FGH from 5 miles out to 10 miles.
c. Evacuate ALL sectors out to 2 miles, evacuate downwind sectors EFGH out to 5 miles, shelter downwind sectors EFGH from 5 miles out to 10 miles.
d. Evacuate ALL sectors out to 2 miles, evacuate downwind sectors FGH out to 5 miles, shelter downwind sectors FGH from 5 miles out to 10 miles.
  • ANSWER c.

Provided

Reference:

EP-AD-19, NARS FORM EPIPF-AD-07-01 Justification:

A. Incorrect, this would be a correct recommendation for Adverse Meteorology.

B. Incorrect, downwind sectors are based on 60M wind direction, rather than 10M, recommendation is also for Adverse meteorology.

C. Correct, per EPIPF AD-07-01, Box 8 & 9 directions D. Incorrect, downwind sectors based on 60M wind direction rather than 10M.

  • QNUM 097
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA E01W/E04 2.4.48
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A reactor trip and Safety Injection occurred.

- The crew has implemented ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment.

- The crew has closed the first of four valves, SI-302A, RHR Pump A Injection to Reactor Vessel.

- RCS pressure is 1150 psig and decreasing.

What is the correct action to be taken for these conditions?

a. Leave SI-302A closed and transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
b. Re-open SI-302A and transition to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.
c. Leave SI-302A closed and transition to ES-0.0, Rediagnosis.
d. Re-open SI-302A and continue in ECA-1.2 LOCA Outside Containment.
  • ANSWER d.
  • REFERENCE ECA-1.2, step 2 & 3 Contingency Actions a.

HIGHER NEW Justification: The action of closing SI-302A did not yield indications of leak isolation so isolation of other paths is attempted.

A. Incorrect, this would be correct if RCS Pressure increased B. Incorrect, additional leakage paths remain to be checked.

C. Incorrect, additional leakage paths remain to be checked.

D. Correct, as the remaining paths are checked in ECA-1.2

  • QNUM 098
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA FR-C W/E06 2.1.2
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- A Loss of All AC Power occurred.

- ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power has been implemented.

- At step18, while performing actions to prepare to tie Bus 52 to Bus 46, Maintenance reports DG B is ready for starting.

- Diesel Generator B has been manually started.

- Bus 6 has been energized.

The NCO reports Core Exit Thermocouples are reading 725°F and increasing. The NCO requests that Safety Injection Pump B be started to restore Core Cooling.

What is the proper action?

a. Wait until it is directed in FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling.
b. Direct the start Safety Injection Pump B.
c. Wait until it is directed by ECA-0.2, Loss of All AC Power Recovery with SI Required.
d. Direct manual initiation of Safety Injection, and verify Safety Injection Pump B starts.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE ECA-0.0, NOTE 1 step 1, step 36, & step 40 (transition)

ECA-0.2, NOTE step 1 & step 5 FUNDAMENTAL NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, implementation of FR-C.2 is not appropriate.

B. Incorrect, violation of procedure usage rules C. Correct, would be directed by ECA-0.2 D. Incorrect, this could be a QRF directed operation if ECA-0.0 was not the controlling

procedure.

  • QNUM 099
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA E-0 W/E10 2.4.4
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant tripped from 100% power due to a loss of Bus 1 and 2.

- Natural Circulation Cooldown is in progress per ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown.

- RCS pressure is 1500 PSIG and decreasing slowly.

- RCS cooldown rate of 25° F/hr has been established.

- Unexpected large variations in Pressurizer level are occurring between 35% and 25%.

- RVLIS RXCP OFF indication is 90%.

- Circumstances require that the cooldown and depressurization continue.

What action is required?

a. Increase RCS cooldown rate to collapse the steam voids and continue in ES-0.2.
b. Manually initiate Safety Injection and go to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
c. Transition to ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel.
d. Increase charging flow to increase RVLIS RXCP OFF indication, and continue in ES-0.2.
  • ANSWER c.
  • REFERENCE ES-0.2, step 15 Contingency Action HIGHER NEW Justification:

A. Incorrect, cooldown rate is at maximum rate allowed, as stated in conditions B. Incorrect, conditions do NOT require SI initiation.

C. Correct , per ES0.2 Step 15 Contingency Actions D. Incorrect, action would cause repressurization, which from stated conditions is not allowed.

  • QNUM 100
  • HNUM
  • ANUM
  • QCHANGED TRUE
  • ACHANGED TRUE
  • QDATE 2006/08/07
  • FAC 305
  • RTYP PWR-WEC2
  • EXLEVEL RO/SRO
  • EXMNR
  • QVAL 1.00
  • SEC
  • SUBSORT
  • KA FR-Z W/E14EA2.1
  • QUESTION Given the following:

- The plant experienced a LOCA at 0949.

- At 1034, the following plant conditions exist:

- Source Range Count Rate is 20,000 cps.

- Source Range SUR is negative.

- Containment pressure is 48 psig.

- RCS Cold Leg temperature reads Loop A at 312°F & Loop B at 298°F.

- Highest Core Exit Thermocouple reads 734°F.

- Steam Generator Narrow Range levels read SG A at 12% & SG B at 8%.

- Total Auxiliary Feedwater flow is 245 gpm.

- RCS pressure is 380 psig.

What procedure should be implemented?

a. FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure.
b. FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock.
c. FR-H.1 Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.
d. FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling.
  • ANSWER a.
  • REFERENCE F-0.5 HIGHER MODIFIED Justification:

A. Correct, only Red Path B. Incorrect, Orange Path on Integrity is not highest CSF challenge C. Incorrect, AFW flow and SG levels satisfy CSF for Heat Sink.

D. Incorrect, Orange Path on Core Cooling is not highest CSF challenge.