Text

Technical Specification Bases, Revisions 23 and 24
	ML052560098
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	09/08/2005
From:	Vanderheyden G; Constellation Energy Group
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML052560098 (71)
	v • d • e

George Vanderheyden 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Vice President Lusby, Maryland 20657 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 410.495.4455 Constellation Generation Group, LLC 410.495.3500 Fax I Constellation Energy September 8, 2005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. I & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Technical Specification Bases. Revisions 23 and 24 Enclosed for your use is one copy of the Calvert Cliffs Technical Specifications Bases, Revisions 23 and

24. These revisions were performed under the Technical Specification Bases Control Program (Technical Specification 5.5.14). This program states, "Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71 (e)."

The Lists of Effective pages are included. Please replace the appropriate pages of your copies of the Technical Specification Bases with these enclosed pages.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. L. Larragoite at (410) 495-4922.

Very y ur, GV/BJD/bjd

Enclosures:

Technical Specification Bases, Revision 23 Technical Specification Bases, Revision 24 cc: P. D. Milano, NRC (Without Enclosures)

S. J. Collins, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR Resident Inspector, NRC 00

PAGE REPLACEMENT INSTRUCTIONS Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification Bases - Revision 23 Remove and Discard Insert List of Effective Pages LEP-1 through LEP-5 LEP-1 through LEP-5 List of Revisions LOR-1 LOR-1 Technical Specification Bases Pages iii and iv iii and iv B 3.4.12-3 through B 3.4.12-6 B 3.4.12-3 through B 3.4.12-6 B 3.5.5-3 through B 3.5.5-5 B 3.5.5-3 through B 3.5.5-5 B 3.7.1-1 through B 3.7.1-4 B 3.7.1-1 through B 3.7.1-4 B 3.7.16-1 and B 3.7.16-2 B 3.7.16-1 and B 3.7.16-2 B 3.7.17-1 and B 3.7.17-2

February 25, 2005 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES LEP-1 Rev. 23 B 3.1.1-7 Rev. 2 B 3.1.8-5 Rev. 2 LEP-2 Rev. 23 B 3.1.2-1 Rev. 2 B.3.2.1-1 Rev. 2 LEP-3 Rev. 23 B 3.1.2-2 Rev. 2 B 3.2.1-2 Rev. 14 LEP-4, Rev. .23 B 3.1.2-3 Rev. 2 B'3.2.1-3 'Rev. 14 LEP-5 Rev. 23 B 3.1.2-4 Rev. 2 B 3.2.1-4 'Rev. 14 LOR-1,, Rev. .23 B 3.1.2-5 Rev. 2 7 B 3.2.1-5 Rev. 14 Rev. 2 B 3.1.2-6 'Rev. 3 B 3.2.1-6 -'Rev. 14 ii Rev. .2 B 3.1.3-1 Rev. 2 B 3.2.1-7 Rev. 14 iii Rev; 23 B 3.1.3-2 'Rev. 2 B'3.2.2-1 'Rev. 2 iv Rev. .23 B 3.1.3-3 'Rev. 2 B 3.2.2-2 'Rev. 8 B 2.1.1-1 Rev. .2 B 3.1.3-4 Rev. 2 B13.2.2-3 -Rev..14 B 2.1.1-2 Rev. 2 B 3.1.3-5 Rev. 2 B 3.2.2-4 -Rev'. 12 B 2.1.1-3 Rev. 2 B 3.1.4-1 Rev. 2 B.3.2.2-5 Rev. 12 B 2.1.1-4 Rev. 2 B 3.1.4-2 Rev. 2 B.3.2.2-6 Rev. 12 B 2.1.2-1 Rev. .2 B 3.1.4-3 Rev. 2 Bi3.2.3-1 Rev. 2 B 2.1.2-2 Rev. 2 B 3.1.4-4 ;Rev. 2 B:3.2.3-2 'Rev. 8 B 2.1.2-3 Rev. 2 B 3.1.4-5 Rev. 2 B'3.2.3-3 -Rev. 14 B 2.1.2-4 Rev. -2 B 3.1.4-6 Rev. 2 B 3.2.3-4 Rev. 12 B 3.0-1 Rev. .2 B 3.1.4-7 Rev. 2 B 3.2.3-5 Rev'. 12 B 3.0-2 Rev. 2 B 3.1.4-8 Rev. 2 B-3.2.4-1 Rev. 2 B 3.0-3 Rev. 2 B 3.1.4-9 Rev.' 2 B 3.2A4-2 Rev. 8 B 3.0-4. Rev. 2 B 3.1.4-10 Rev. 2. B 3.2.4-3 Rev. 14 B 3.0 Rev. 13 B 3.1.5-1 Rev. 2 B 3.2.4-4 Rev. 8 B 3.0-6 Rev. 13 B 3.1.5-2 Rev. 2 B 3.2.4-5 'Rev. 8 B 3.0-7 Rev. 13 B 3.1.5-3 Rev. 2 B 3.2.5-1 tRev. 2 B 3.0-8,; Rev.- 2 B 3.1.5-4 Rev. 2 B 3.2.5-2 Rev. 11 B 3.0-9 Rev. 2 B 3.1.5.5 Rev.- 2 B 3.2.5-3 Rev. 14 B 3.0-10 Rev. 2 B 3.1.6-1 .Rev. 2 B 3.2.5-4 Rev. 11 B 3.0-11 Rev. 2 B 3.1.6-2 Rev.- 2 . B 3.2.5-5 Rev. 11 B 3.0-12 Rev. 2 B 3.1;6-3 Rev.' 2 B 3.2.5-6 Rev. 11 B 3.0-13 Rev. 2 B 3.1:6-4 Rev. 2 B 3.3.1-1 Rev. -2 B 3.0-14 Rev. 2 B 3.1.6-5 Rev.' 2 B 3.3.1-2 Rev. .2 B 3.0-15 Rev. 13 B 3.1.6-6 Rev." 2 r B 3.3.1-3 ,Rev. 2 B 3.0-16 Rev. 13,, B 3.1.6-7 Rev., 2

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF REVISIONS AND ISSUE DATES Rev. Date Issued Date to NRC 0 May 4, 1998 1 August 28, 1998 October 30, 1998 2 August 28, 1998 October 30, 1998 3 October 28, 1998 October 30, 1998 4 March 16, 1999 October 18, 1999 5 October 18, 1999 October 18, 1999 6 April 14, 2000 October 24, 2000 7 May 18, 2000 October 24, 2000 8 June 29, 2000 October 24, 2000 9 October 24, 2000 October 24, 2000 10 February 1, 2001 November 13, 2001 11 March 22, 2001 November 13, 2001 12 November 13, 2001 November 13, 2001 13 September 5, 2002 December 19, 2002 14 May 14, 2003 October 21, 2003 15 January 9, 2004 November 3, 2004 16 March 31, 2004 November 3, 2004 17 April 16, 2004 November 3, 2004 18 May 5, 2004 November 3, 2004 19 June 4, 2004 November 3, 2004 20 July 1, 2004 November 3, 2004 21 August 11, 2004 November 3, 2004 22 October 13, 2004 November 3, 2004 23 February 25, 2005 Il LOR-1 Rev. 23

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.6.5 . Containment Air Temperature.. .............. B 3.6.5-1 B 3.6.6 - Containment Spray and Cooling Systems........... B 3.6.6-1 B 3.6.7 Deleted B 3.6.8 Iodine Removal System,(IRS)..................... B 3.6.8-1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS......

PLAN SYTEM.................................... B 3.7.1-1 B 3.7.1 - Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) .;.......... B 3.7.1-1 B 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) .............. B 3.7.2-1 B 3.7.3 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System......' B 3.7.3-1 B 3.7.4 Condensate Storage Tank (CST). B 3.7.4-1 B 3.7.5 Component Cooling (CC) System.................... B 3.7.5-1 B 3.7.6 Service Water (SRW) System....................... B 3.7.6-1 B 3.7.7 Saltwater (SW) System............... B 3.7.7-1 B 3.7.8 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) ...................................... B 3.7.8-1 B 3.7.9 Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS) ...................................... B 3.7.9-1 B 3.7.10 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Filtration System (PREFS) ............ B 3.7.10-1 B 3.7.11 Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System (SFPEVS) ..................................... B 3.7.11-1 B 3.7.12 Penetration Room Exhaust Ventilation System (PREVS) ..................................... B 3.7.12-1 B 3.7.13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Water Level ................ B 3.7.13-1 B 3.7.14 Secondary Specific Activity...................... B 3.7.14-1 B 3.7.15 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs).......... B 3.7.15-1 B 3.7.16 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration........ B 3.7.16-1 B 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage.................... B 3.7.17-1 I B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .................... ; B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating ............................ B 3.8.1-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources-Shutdown ............................ B 3.8.2-1 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil.................... B 3.8.3-1 B 3.8.4 DC Sources-Operating ............................ B 3.8.4-1 B 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown ............................. B 3.8.5-1 B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters................... B 3.8.6-1 B 3.8.7 Inverters-Operating .............................. B 3.8.7-1 B 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown ............................... B 3.8.8-1 B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating .................. B 3.8.9-1 B 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown ................... B 3.8.10-1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 . . Revision 23

-,___I_ L TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS................................. B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.1 Boron Concentration.............................. B 3.9.1-1 B 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation......................... B 3.9.2-1 B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations......................... B 3.9.3-1 B 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level ............- B 3.9.4-1 B 3.9.5 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level .............................. B 3.9.5-1 B 3.9.6 Refueling Pool Water Level....................... B 3.9.6-1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 iv Revision 23

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES this point :the event is terminated and the operator manually closes the PORV. -

RCS Vent Requirements.

Once the RCS is depressurized, a vent-exposed to the containment atmosphere will maintain-'the RCS at containment ambient pressure in an-RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving requirements of the transient do not exceed the capabilities of 'the'vent. Thus, the vent path must be

-capable of'relieving the'flow resulting from the limiting LTOP mass or-heatinput transient, and maintaining pressure below the P/T limits. The required vent capacity may be provided by one or more-vent paths.

If the vent path is > 8 square inches (e.g., removing the pressurizer manway) the RCS can not be pressurized above the P/T limits, and the LTOP System is not required. A vent path of greater than or equal to 8 square inches also exists during the RCS vacuum fill process when the > 8 square inch vent is temporarily'covered with a passive gravity-activated plate that does.not obstruct the required flow path when RCS vacuum is lost.

APPLICABLE Safety analyses (Reference 3) demonstrate that the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES vessel is adequately protected against exceeding the Reference 1, Appendix G, P/T limits during shutdown. In MODEs 1 and 2, and MODE 3 with allROCS cold leg temperatures

>'365 0F (Unit :1); > 301kF (Unit, 2), the RCPB is sufficiently above the nil-ductility temperature that the pressurizer safety valves prevent brittlefracture. At 3650 F (Unit 1),

301OF (Unit 2) and below, overpressure prevention falls to the:OPERABLE PORVs-and administrative controls or to a depressurizedRCS and a sufficient-sized RCS vent. Each of these means has-a limited overpressure relief capability.

Each time the P/T limit curves are revised, the LTOP System

'will'be re-evaluated 'to 'ensure its' functional requirements can still be satisfied'-using'the PORV method or the depressurized and vented RCS condition.

Reference 3 contains the acceptance limits that satisfy the LTOP requirements. ,Any change to the RCS must be evaluated B -3.4.12-3 Revision 23 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS &2 1 & 2 B -3'4.`12-3 Revision 23

aU14-LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES against these analyses to determine the impact of the change on the LTOP acceptance limits.

Transients that are capable of overpressurizing the RCS are categorized as either mass or heat input transients, examples of which follow:

Mass Input Type Transients

a. Inadvertent HPSI pump start;

b. Inadvertent HPSI and charging pump start; or

c. Charging/letdown flow mismatch.

Heat Input Type Transients

a. Inadvertent actuation of pressurizer heaters;

b. Loss of SDC; or

c. Reactor coolant pump startup with temperature asymmetry within the RCS or between the RCS and SGs.

The following are required during the LTOP MODEs to ensure that mass and heat input transients do not occur which either of the LTOP overpressure protection means cannot handle:

a. Rendering all but one HPSI pump incapable of injection and blocking automatic initiation from the remaining HPSI pump;

b. When HPSI suction is aligned to the RWT, the HPSI pump shall be in manual control and either:

1) HPSI flow is limited to

210 gpm, or

2) an RCS vent > 2.6 square inches is established;

c. Rendering HPSI motor operated valves (MOVs) only capable of manually aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS;

d. Running only one charging pump when injecting via HPSI (charging pump requirements are controlled administratively); and

e. Maintaining a pressure bubble with level < 170 inches.

The Reference 3 analyses demonstrate that either one PORV or the RCS vent and pressurizer steam volume can maintain RCS I 2 B 3.4.12-4 Revision 23 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS I &

& 2 B 3.4.12-4 Revision 23

LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES pressure below limits when only one HPSI:*pump is actuated and the HPSI pump's flow is-throttled. If HPSI pump flow is

.not throttled during addition of-mass to the RCS through on

HPSI loop MOV, then two PORVs or an RCS vent 2 2.6 square inches are capable of maintaining RCS pressure below limits.

Thus, the LCO allows'only one HPSI pump OPERABLE with flow throttled, orwith an`RCS vent 2 2.6 square inches during the' LTOP MODEs.

'Also to limit pressure overshoot over the PORV setpoint; the remaining HPSI and two charging pumpslare rendered incapable of injection, and the'RCPs are'disabled during water solid operation.

Heatup and cooldown analyses established the temperature of LTOP Applicability at;3650F (Unit 1)",and 3010 F (Unit 2) and below, based on'Standard Review Plan 'criteria. Above this temperature, the RCPB is sufficiently above the nil-ductility temperature and the pressurizer safety valves provide the reactor vessel pressure protection against brittle fracture. The vessel materials were assumed to have a fluence level equal to 4.49 x 10'9 n/cm2 (Unit 1),

4.0 x 1019 n/cm2 (Unit 2).

The consequences of a LOCA in LTOP conform to Reference 1,

- Appendix K and 10 CFR 50.46, requirements, by having SITs operable in MODE 3 and one HPSI pump available for manual

- actuation. ,

PORV Performance

-The'fracture mechanics analyses show that'the vessel is protected when the PORVs'are set to openrvat or below the curves'in Fig~ure 3.4.12-1 and are applicable when the SDC System is not in operation. The setpoint is derived by modeling th'performance of the LTOP System, assuming the limiting case-of loss' of SDC and one charging pump injecting into the RCS during water solid operation. These analyses consider pressure overshoot beyond the PORV opening setpoints,resulting fr6 msignal-processing and valve stroke times. The PORV setpoints below thederived limit ensure the Reference 1, Appendix G limits will be met. When the SDC System is in operation, the PORV'lift'setting must be Revision 23 CALVERT'CLIFFS - UNITS 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS & 22 1 & B 3.4.12-5 B 3.4".12-5 Revision 23

-I_L I11 LTOP System B 3.4.12 BASES

< 429 psia (Unit 1), < 443 psia (Unit 2). This ensures that the PORV lift setting is low enough to mitigate overpressure transients when SDC is in operation, since RCS temperature measurement is not accurate in this condition.

The PORV setpoints will be re-evaluated for compliance when the revised P/T limits conflict with the LTOP analysis limits. The P/T limits are periodically modified as the reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to embrittlement caused by neutron irradiation. Revised P/T limits are determined using neutron fluence projections and the results of examinations of the reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens. The Bases for LCO 3.4.3 discuss these examinations.

The PORVs are considered active components. Thus, the failure of one PORV represents the worst case, single active failure.

RCS Vent Performance With the RCS depressurized, analyses shows a vent size of j 1.3 square inches is capable of mitigating the limiting allowed LTOP overpressure transient provided a pressurizer steam volume exists, two of the three HPSI pumps are disabled and the remaining HPSI pump's flow is throttled.

In that event, this size vent maintains RCS pressure less than the maximum RCS pressure on the P/T limit curve. A 2.6 square inch vent is required to allow for single failures of other equipment, such as HPSI throttle valves.

An 8 square inch vent is sufficient to preclude RCS overpressure events. Therefore, when an 8 square inch vent is established, LTOP System requirements are not necessary to maintain RCS pressure within limits.

The RCS vent size will also be re-evaluated for compliance each time the P/T limit curves are revised based on the results of the vessel material surveillance.

The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.

LTOP System satisfies 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) (ii), Criterion 2.

Revision 23 CALVERT CLIFFS CALVERT -

UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS & 2 1 & 2 B 3.4.12-6 B 3.4.12-6 Revision 23

TSP B 3.5.5 BASES after a large break LOCA. .The minimum required volume is,

.. the volume of TSP that will achieve a sump solution pH of

'2 7.0 when taking into considerationthe maximum possible

.:sump water.volume, :and-the minimum possible pH. The amount of TSP needed in the Containment Building-is based on the mass of TSP required to achieve the desired pH. However, a required volume is specified, rather than mass, since it.is not feasible to weigh the entire amount of TSP in -

-. ' Containment.. The minimum required volume is based on the manufactured-density of TSP-.dodecahydrate. Since TSP can

.:have.a tendency to agglomerate from:high humidity in the

Containment Building,-theldensity may increase and the volume decrease during normal plant operation. Due to possible agglomeration and increase in density, estimating the minimum volume of TSP in.Containment is conservative 4w;m+trcr rbrhnin aMin-inlmu nirrln WY I L,1:. I %;jU._ L. L, C S- I cv II Vr CL IlI II IIIL aul III I kcq;u II cu L;

APPLICABILITY In MODEs 1, 2, 3, and 4, the RCS is at elevated temperature I

.. and pressure, providing an energy potential for a LOCA. The potential for.a LOCA.results ina need for the ability to control the pH of the recirculated coolant.

In MODEs 5 and 6, the potential for a LOCA is reduced or non-existent due to the reduced pressure and temperature limitations of these MODEs, and TSP is not required.

ACTIONS. . ...

If it is discovered that the TSP in'the Containment Building I sump is not within limits, action must be taken to restore

--the TSP to within limits. - During plant operation the containment sump is not accessible and corrections may not be possible.

The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is allowed for restoring the TSP within limits, where possible, because 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is the same time'allowed-for restoration of.'other ECCS components.

B.1 and B.2

'Ifthe TSP cannot-be restored within limits within the

. Completion Time of Required Action A.1,Mthe plant must be

- - brought to a MODE.in-which the LCO does-not apply. To achieve-this status, the plant must be.brought to at least CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B.-3.5.5-3 .. Revision 2

-lIm, TSP B 3.5.5 BASES j

MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.5.1 REQUIREMENTS Periodic determination of the volume of TSP in Containment must be performed due to the possibility of leaking valves and components in the Containment Building that could cause dissolution of the TSP during normal operation. A Frequency of 24 months is required to determine visually that a minimum of 289.3 cubic feet is contained in the TSP baskets.

This requirement ensures that there is an adequate volume of TSP to adjust the pH of the post-LOCA sump solution to a value 2 7.0.

The periodic verification is required every 24 months, since access to the TSP baskets is only feasible during outages, and normal fuel cycles are scheduled for 24 months. 1 Operating experience has shown this SR Frequency acceptable, due to the margin in the volume of TSP placed in the Containment Building.

SR 3.5.5.2 Testing must be performed to ensure the solubility and buffering ability of the TSP after exposure to the containment environment. A representative sample of 3.43 +/- 0.05 grams of TSP, from one of the baskets in Containment is submerged in 1.0 +/- 0.01 liters of water at a boron concentration of 3106 +/- 50 ppm, and at the standard temperature of 120 +/- 51F. Within four hours without agitation, the solution is decanted and mixed, the temperature adjusted to 77 + 20F, and the pH measured. The solution pH should be 2 6.0. The representative sample weight is based on the minimum required TSP weight of 14,371 ibm, which at manufactured density corresponds to the minimum volume of 289.3 cubic feet, and maximum possible post-LOCA sump volume of 4,503,500 lbm, normalized to buffer a 1.0 +/- 0.01 liter sample. The boron concentration of the test water is representative of the maximum possible boron IL CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.5.5-4 Revision 23

TSP B 3.5.5 BASES concentration corresponding to the maximum possible post-LOCA sump volume. Agitation of the test solution is prohibited, since an adequate standard for the agitation intensity cannot be specified. A test time of four hours would 'allow time for the dissolved TSP to naturally diffuse through the sample solution. A test time of less than four hours is more conservative than a test time of longer than four hours because the longer time could permit additional TSP to dissolve, if excess TSP was available. In the post-LOCA containment sump, rapid mixing would occur, significantly decreasing the actual amount of time before the required pH is achieved. This would ensure compliance with the Standard Review Plan requirement of a pH 2 7.0 by the onset of recirculation after a LOCA.

REFERENCES None

&2 B 3.5.5-5 Revision 23 CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 B 3.5.5-5 Revision 23

MSSVs B 3.7.1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS K.) B 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)

BASES -

BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the MSSVs is to provide overpressure protection for-the.secondary system.- The MSSVs also provide

. protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant

. pressure;boundary by providing a heat.sink for the removal of energy from theiReactor Coolant Systerm(RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the condenser and Circulating.Water System, -is-not available.

Eight MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside the Containment Structure, upstream of.,the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), as described in.Reference 1,

,Chapter 10. The MSSV rated capacity passes the full steam

..- !flow at 102% RATED THERMAL POWER (100%,.--2% for instrument error) withthe valves full open. This'jreets the requirements of Reference 2,.Section III, Article NC-7000, Class 2 Components. The MSSV designincludes staggered setpoints, according toTable'3.7.1-1 inthe accompanying Limiting Condition for .Operation (LCO),.so that only the number of valves needed will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chattering, because of insufficient steam pressure to'fully open all valves,

,following a turbine reactor trip. TheMSSVs have "R" size orifices.

-APPL-ICABLE - ---The-design-basi-s-for--the -MSSVs -comes--from--Reference-2,---.----

SAFETY ANALYSESi Section III,,Article NC-7000, Class,2 Components; their

.:purpose isrto limit;,secondary-system'pressure to < 110% of design pressure when passing 100% of design steam flow.

This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated

-,operational occurrence or-accidentconsidered Reference 1, Chapter.14. ,-, .. -

The events that challenge the MSSV relieving capacity, and

-thus:RCS pressure,.are-those characterized as decreased heat removal events; and are presented in Reference 1, Section.14.5., Of these,the full power, loss of load event

! is the limiting anticipated operational occurrence. A loss of load isolates the turbine and condenser, and terminates

normal feedwater flow:to'.the steam.generators. Before delivery of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) to the steam CAVET:LFF - UNITS 1 & 2

-UNT 1& 37.-1Rviio_

CALVERT'.CLIFFS B 3.7.1-1 : Revision.2

- - - ~ -I ME-~

MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES generators, RCS pressure reaches peak pressure. The peak pressure is < 110% of the design pressure of 2500 psig, but high enough to actuate the pressurizer safety valves.

Although the Power Level-High Trip is'not credited in the loss of load safety analysis, reducing the Power Level-High Trip setpoint ensures the Thermal Power limit supported by the safety analysis is met.

The MSSVs satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3.

LCO This LCO requires all MSSVs to be OPERABLE in compliance with Reference 2,Section III, Article NC-7000, Class 2 Components, even though this is not a requirement of the Design Basis Accident (DBA) analysis. This is because operation with less than the full number of MSSVs requires limitations on allowable THERMAL POWER (to meet Reference 2,Section III, Article NC-7000, Class 2 Components requirements), and adjustment to the Reactor Protective System trip setpoints to meet the transient analysis limits.

These limitations are according to those shown in Table 3.7.1-1, Required Action A.2, and Required Action A.3 in the accompanying LCO.

The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced.

The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. An MSSV is considered inoperable if it fails to open upon demand.

The lift settings, according to Table 3.7.1-2 in the accompanying LCO, correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

A Note is added to Table 3.7.1-2, stating that lift settings for a given steam line are also acceptable, if any two valves lift between 935 and 1005 psig, any two other valves lift between 935 and 1035 psig, and the four remaining valves lift between 935 and 1050 psig. Thus, the MSSVs still perform that design basis function properly. II CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B.3.7.1-2 Revision 23

MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES This LCO provides assurance thatthe MSSVs-will perform their designed safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the reactor coolant pressureboundary.-

APPLICABILITY In MODEs 1, 2, and 3, a minimum of five MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE, according to Table 3.7.1-1 in the accompanying LCO, which is limiting and bounds all'lower MODES.-

-InMODEs 4 and 5, there are no' credible transients requiring the MSSVs. .

The'steam generators are-not normally used for heat removal in MODES 5 and 6,sand thus'cannot-beoverpressurized; there is no requirement for theMSSVsto be OPERABLE in these MODEs.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note, indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.-'

,,A.1 and A.2

An alternative to restoring the inoperable MSSV(s) to OPERABLE status is to reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets Code requirements for the power level., The number of inoperable:MSSVs will determine the necessary level'of reduction in secondary'system steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced reactor trip settings of the power level-high'channels. The setpoints in Table 3.7.1-1-have'been verified by transient analyses.

The operator should limit the maximum steady state power level to some value slightly below this setpoint to avoid an inadvertent 'overpower trip.

The four-hour Completion Time for Required Action'A.1 is a reasonable-'time"period to reduce"*power level and is based on the low probability of"an event'occurring during this period wouldrequire activation'of the.MSSVs. An additional

'-,that

'32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months is allowed in'Requir:ed'Action'A.2 to reduce the

-setpoints. 'The-Completion'Time of 36,hours for Required

' Action'A.2 is based on a'reasonable' time to correct the MSSV

_:.~- Aeviln y -_-

ULIFb Stee CbXVEK me~-A & _

i _&

Ad *---- i UALVLKI - -r1I UNilb Z b 3.7.1-3 -Kevision 23

LU_

MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES inoperability, the time required to perform the power reduction, operating experience in resetting all channels of a protective function, and on the low probability of the occurrence of a transient that could result in steam generator overpressure during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in the associated Completion Time, or if one or more steam generators have less than five MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance Requirement (SR) verifies the OPERABILITY Ji of the MSSVs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoints in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

Reference 2,Section XI, Article IWV-3500, requires that safety and relief valve tests be performed in accordance with Reference 3. According to Reference 3, the following tests are required for MSSVs:

a. Visual examination;

b. Seat tightness determination;

c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting);

d. Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria; and

e. Verification of the balancing device integrity on balanced valves.

The ANSI/American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Standard requires that all valves be tested every five years, and a minimum of 20% of the valves be tested every 24 months. The ASME Code specifies the activities, as found lift acceptance range, and frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7.1-2 defines the lift Revision 13 CALVERT CLIFFS CALVERT -

I &

UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS & 2 2 B 3.7.1-4 B 3.7.1-4 -Revision 13

SFP Boron Concentration B 3.7.16 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.16 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration BASES BACKGROUND Fuel assemblies are'stored in the spent fuel racks in I accordance'with criteria based on'10 CFR 50.68. If credit is taken for soluble boron, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage'racks loaded with fuel 'of'the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must'not exceed 0.95, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level, if,flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical), at a.95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water. In addition', the maximum nominal U-235Ienrichment of the fresh.fuel assemblies is limited to 5.0 weight' percent.

APPLICABLE The criticality analysess were done such that the criteria of I SAFETY ANALYSES 10 CFR 50.68 are met. Boron dilution events are credible, postulated accidents, when credit for soluble boron is taken. The minimum SFP boron concentration in this Technical Specification supports the initial boron concentration assumption-in the dilution calculations.

For other non-dilution accident scenarios, the double I contingency principle of ANSI N 16.1-1975.requires'two unlikely, independent concurrent 'ev6nts to produce a criticality accident and-thus allows,credit for the nominal soluble boron concentration, as 'defined in LCO 3.7.16. I The concentration of'dissolved boron in the SFPs satisfies I Criterion 2 of 10 CFR -50.36(c) (2)(ii). -

LCO The specified concentration of dissolved boron in the SFP preserves the assumptions used in the analyses of the potential accident scenarios described above. This concentration of dissolved boron is the minimum required concentration for fuel assembly storage and movement within the SFPs. I APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever fuel assemblies are stored 'inthe SFPs.

CALVRT1 LIFS 2 -UNIT 3..16- Reisin 2 ,

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3;~7.16-1 Revision 23 1

I-ULM SFP Boron Concentration B 3.7.16 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 The Required Actions are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

When the concentration of boron in the SFPs is less than required, immediate action must be taken to preclude an accident from happening or to mitigate the consequences of an accident in progress. This is most efficiently achieved by immediately suspending the movement of fuel assemblies.

This does not preclude the movement of fuel assemblies to a safe position. In addition, action must be immediately initiated to restore boron concentration to within limits.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.16.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the concentration of boron in the SFPs I is within the required limit. As long as this SR is met, the analyzed incidents are fully addressed. The 7 day Frequency is appropriate because no major replenishment of pool water is expected to take place over a short period of time.

REFERENCES None CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.16-2 Revision 23 l

SFP Storage B 3.7.17 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage BASES BACKGROUND This Technical Specification applies .to the Unit 2 SFP only.

The spent fuel storage facility was originally designed to store either new (non-irradiated) nuclear fuel assemblies or burned (irradiated) fuel assemblies in a vertical configuration underwater, assuming credit 'for Boraflex poison sheets but assuming no credit for'soluble boron or burnup. The spent fuel storage cells are installed in parallel rows with center-to-center spa'ciing of 10 3/32 inches and with Boraflex sheets between adjacent assemblies. This spacing was sufficient to maintain keff

0.95 for spent fuel of enrichments up'to 4.52 wt% for standard fuel design and up to 4.30't% for Value Added Pellet (VAP) fuel design.

The burnup and enrichment requirem'ents of LCO 3.7.17(a) ensures that the'multiplication factor-(kff) for the rack in the SFP isless than the 10 CFR 50.68 regulatory limit with the VAP fuel design, ranging in'enrichment from 2.0 to 5.0 wt%, with burnup credit, with partial credit for soluble boron, but without Boraflex credit. The soluble boron credit will be limited to 350 ppm including all biases and uncertainties. For fuel assemblies which do not satisfy the burnup and enrichment requirements of LCO 3.7.17(a), the fuel assemblies may'be stored in the Unit'2 SFP if surrounded on all four adjacent faces by' empty rack cells or othe&_non-reactive materials'per"LCO 3.7.17(b).

APPLICABLE The Unit 2 spent fuel storage facility is:designed to SAFETY ANALYSES conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 by use of adequate spacing, soluble boron credit, and burnup credit.

The SFP storage satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c) (2)(ii).

LCO The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the Unit 2 SFP are in accordance with Figure 3.7.17-1 and ensure that the Unit 2 SFP meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68. The restrictions are consistent with the criticality safety analysis performed for the Unit 2 SFP. Fuel assemblies not meting the criteria of Figure 3.7.17-1 may be

,, fret . f1 yr verr ,glyrs e9 I, O i1 t - -asw, I URLVtK1 L-Lirt3 - U11i I 4 Da f. / ./ -1 . Revisi on 23 I

SFP Storage B 3.7.17 BASES stored in the Unit 2 SFP in a checkboard pattern in accordance with LCO 3.7.17(b).

APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the Unit 2 SFP.

ACTIONS A.1 Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, in either case, inability to move fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in Unit 2 SFP is not in accordance with Figure 3.7.17-1 or LCO 3.7.17(b), immediate action must be taken to make the necessary fuel assembly movement(s) to bring the fuel assembly configuration into compliance with Figure 3.7.17-1 or LCO 3.7.17(b).

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.17.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies by administrative means that the initial enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Figure 3.7.17-1 for LCO 3.7.17(a). This Surveillance Requirement does not address fuel assemblies stored in the Unit 2 SFP in accordance with LCO 3.7.17(b). This will ensure compliance with Specification 4.3.1.1.

REFERENCES None 1111, Revision 23 UNIT 2 B 3.7.17-2 B ,

CLIFFS - UNIT CALVERT CLIFFS -

2 3.7.17-2 Revision 23

I 1.

PAGE REPLACEMENT INSTRUCTIONS Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification Bases - Revision 24 Remove and Discard Insert List of Effective Pages LEP-1 through LEP-5 LEP-1 through LEP-5 List of Revisions LOR-1 LOR-1 Technical Specification Bases Pages B 3.1.5-3 and B 3.1.5-4 B 3.1.5-3 and B 3.1.5-4 B 3.3.10-13 through B 3.3.10-19 B 3.3.10-13 through B 3.3.10-16 B 3.6.1-5 B 3.6.1-5 B 3.7.5-1 through B 3.7.5-4 B 3.7.5-1 through B 3.7.5-4 B 3.8.1-5 through B 3.8.1-33 B 3.8.1-5 through B 3.8.1-32

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- p B 3.6.2-2 Rev. 2 B 3.7.2-1 Rev. 14 B 3.7.9-4 Rev. 11 B 3.6.2-3 Rev. 2 B 3.7.2-2 Rev. 14 B 3.7.10-1 Rev. 9 B 3.6.2-4 Rev. 2 B 3.7.2-3 Rev. 14 B 3.7.10-2 Rev. 2 B 3.6.2-5 Rev. 2 B 3.7.2-4 Rev. 14 B 3.7.10-3 Rev. 2 B 3.6.2-6 Rev. 2 B 3.7.2-5 Rev. 14 B 3.7.11-1 Rev. 15 B 3.6.2-7 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-1 Rev. 2 B 3.7.11-2 Rev. 15 B 3.6.2-8 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-2 Rev. 2 B 3.7.11-3 Rev. 15 B 3.6.3-1 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-3 Rev. 12 B 3.7.11-4 Rev. 15 B 3.6.3-2 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-4 Rev. 12 B 3.7.12-1 Rev. 2 B 3.6.3-3 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-5 Rev. 12 B 3.7.12-2 Rev. 2 B 3.6.3-4 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-6 Rev. 12 B 3.7.12-3 Rev. 2 B 3.6.3-5 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-7 Rev. 12 B 3.7.12-4 Rev. 2 B 3.6.3-6 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-8 Rev. 13 B 3.7.13-1 Rev. 8 B 3.6.3-7 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-9 Rev. 13 B 3.7.13-2 Rev. 8 B 3.6.3-8 Rev. 2 B 3.7.3-10 Rev. 12 B 3.7.13-3 Rev. 8 B 3.6.3-9 Rev. 2 B 3.7.4-1 Rev. 2 B 3.7.14-1 Rev. 2 B 3.6.3-10 Rev. 2 B 3.7.4-2 Rev. 8 B 3.7.14-2 Rev. 2 B 3.6.4-1 Rev. 2 B 3.7.4-3 Rev. 2 B 3.7.14-3 Rev. 2 B 3.6.4-2 Rev. 2 B 3.7.4-4 Rev. 2 B 3.7.15-1 Rev. 2 B 3.6.4-3 Rev. 2 B 3.7.5-1 Rev. 24 B 3.7.15-2 Rev. 13 B 3.6.5-1 Rev. 2 B 3.7.5-2 Rev. 24 B 3.7.15-3 Rev. 14 B 3.6.5-2 Rev. 2 B 3.7.5-3 Rev. 24 B 3.7.15-4 Rev. 2 B 3.6.5-3 Rev. 3 B 3.7.5-4 Rev. 2 B 3.7.16-1 Rev. 23 B 3.6.6-1 Rev. 2 B 3.7.5-5 Rev. 2 B 3.7.16-2 Rev. 23 B 3.6.6-2 Rev. 2 B 3.7.6-1 Rev. 5 B 3.7.17-1 Rev. 23 B 3.6.6-3 Rev. 15 B 3.7.6-2 Rev. 2 B 3.7.17-2 Rev. 23 B 3.6.6-4 Rev. 15 B 3.7.6-3 Rev. 5 B 3.8.1-1 Rev. 5 B 3.6.6-5 Rev. 2 B 3.7.6-4 Rev. 5 B 3.8.1-2 Rev. 12 B 3.6.6-6 Rev. 2 B 3.7.6-5 Rev. 5 B 3.8.1-3 Rev. 2 B 3.6.6-7 Rev. 2 B 3.7.7-1 Rev. 5 B 3.8.1-4 Rev. 10 B 3.6.6-8 Rev. 2 B 3.7.7-2 Rev. 12 B 3.8.1-5 Rev. 24 B 3.6.6-9 Rev. 18 B 3.7.7-3 Rev. 2 B 3.8.1-6 Rev. 24 B 3.6.6-10 Rev. 18 B 3.7.7-4 Rev. 12 B 3.8.1-7 Rev. 24 B 3.6.7 Deleted B 3.7.8-1 Rev. 8 B 3.8.1-8 Rev. 24 B 3.6.8-1 Rev. 2 B 3.7.8-2 Rev. 11 B 3.8.1-9 Rev. 24 B 3.6.8-2 Rev. 2 B 3.7.8-3 Rev. 11 B 3.8.1-10 Rev. 24 B 3.6.8-3 Rev. 2 B 3.7.8-4 Rev. 11 B 3.8.1-11 Rev. 24 B 3.6.8-4 Rev. 2 B 3.7.8-5 Rev. 11 B 3.8.1-12 Rev. 24 B 3.7.1-1 Rev. 2 B 3.7.8-6 Rev. 11 B 3.8.1-13 Rev. 24 B 3.7.1-2 Rev. 23 B 3.7.8-7 Rev. 11 B 3.8.1-14 Rev. 24 B 3.7.1-3 Rev. 23 B 3.7.9-1 Rev. 2 B 3.8.1-15 Rev. 24 B 3.7.1-4 Rev. 13 B 3.7.9-2 Rev. 13 B 3.8.1-16 Rev. 24 B 3.7.1-5 Rev. 13 B 3.7.9-3 Rev. 11 B 3.8.1-17 Rev. 24 LEP -4 Rev. 24

August 4, 2005 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES B 3.8.1-18 Rev. 24 B 3.8.5-4 Rev. 2 B 3.9.3-5 Rev. 13 B 3.8.1-19 Rev. 24 B 3.8.6-1 Rev. 2 B 3.9.3-6 Rev. 13 B 3.8.1-20 Rev. 24 B 3.8.6-2 Rev. 2 B 3.9.3-7 Rev. 13 B 3.8.1-21 Rev. 24 B 3.8.6-3 Rev. 2 B 3.9.4-1 Rev. 2 B 3.8.1-22 Rev. 24 B 3.8.6-4 Rev. 2 B 3.9.4-2 Rev. 19 B 3.8.1-23 Rev. 24 B 3.8.6-5 Rev. 2 B 3.9.4-3 Rev. 19 B 3.8.1-24 Rev. 24 B 3.8.6-6 Rev. 2 B 3.9.4-4 Rev. 22 B 3.8.1-25 Rev. 24 B 3.8.6-7 Rev. 2 B 3.9.4-5 Rev. 22 B 3.8.1-26 Rev. 24 B 3.8.7-1 Rev. 2 B 3.9.5-1 Rev. 2 B 3.8.1-27 Rev. 24 B 3.8.7-2 Rev. 2 B 3.9.5-2 Rev. 14 B 3.8.1-28 Rev. 24 B 3.8.7-3 Rev. 2 B 3.9.5-3 Rev. 19 B 3.8.1-29 Rev. 24 B 3.8.7-4 Rev. 2 B 3.9.5-4 Rev. 22 B 3.8.1-30 Rev. 24 B 3.8.8-1 Rev. 2 B 3.9.5-5 Rev. 22 B 3.8.1-31 Rev. 24 B 3.8.8-2 Rev. 19 B 3.9.5-6 Rev. 22 B 3.8.1-32 Rev. 24 B 3.8.8-3 Rev. 19 B 3.9.6-1 Rev. 2 B 3.8.2-1 Rev. 2 B 3.8.8-4 Rev. 19 B 3.9.6-2 Rev. 2 B 3.8.2-2 Rev. 2 B 3.8.9-1 Rev. 5 B 3.9.6-3 Rev. 2 B 3.8.2-3 Rev. 10 B 3.8.9-2 Rev. 2 B 3.8.2-4 Rev. 5 B 3.8.9-3 Rev. 2 B 3.8.2-5 Rev. 19 B 3.8.9-4 Rev. 2 B 3.8.2-6 Rev. 19 B 3.8.9-5 Rev. 2 B 3.8.2-7 Rev. 19 B 3.8.9-6 Rev. 2 B 3.8.3-1 Rev. 2 B 3.8.9-7 Rev. 2 B 3.8.3-2 Rev. 2 B 3.8.9-8 Rev. 2 B 3.8.3-3 Rev. 2 B 3.8.9-9 Rev. 2 B 3.8.3-4 Rev. 2 B 3.8.9-10 Rev. 2 B 3.8.3-5 Rev. 2 B 3.8.10-1 Rev. 5 B 3.8.3-6 Rev. 2 B 3.8.10-2 Rev. 5 B 3.8.3-7 Rev. 2 B 3.8.10-3 Rev. 19 B 3.8.3-8 Rev. 3 B 3.8.10-4 Rev. 19 B 3.8.3-9 Rev. 2 B 3.8.10-5 Rev. 19 B 3.8.4-1 Rev. 2 B 3.8.10-6 Rev. 19 B 3.8.4-2 Rev. 2 B 3.9.1-1 Rev. 11 B 3.8.4-3 Rev. 2 B 3.9.1-2 Rev. 13 B 3.8.4-4 Rev. 2 B 3.9.1-3 Rev. 10 B 3.8.4-5 Rev. 2 B 3.9.1-4 Rev. 10 B 3.8.4-6 Rev. 2 B 3.9.2-1 Rev. 2 B 3.8.4-7 Rev. 2 B 3.9.2-2 Rev. 19 B 3.8.4-8 Rev. 2 B 3.9.2-3 Rev. 19 B 3.8.4-9 Rev. 2 B 3.9.3-1 Rev. 13 B 3.8.5-1 Rev. 2 B 3.9.3-2 Rev. 13 B 3.8.5-2 Rev. 2 B 3.9.3-3 Rev. 13 B 3.8.5-3 Rev. 2 B 3.9.3-4 Rev. 13 LEP-5 Rev. 24

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES LIST OF REVISIONS AND ISSUE DATES Rev. Date Issued Date to NRC 0 May 4, 1998 1 August 28, 1998 October 30, 1998 2 August 28, 1998 October 30, 1998 3 October 28, 1998 October 30, 1998 4 March 16, 1999 October 18, 1999 5 October 18, 1999 October 18, 1999 6 April 14, 2000 October 24, 2000 7 May 18, 2000 October 24, 2000 8 June 29, 2000 October 24, 2000 9 October 24, 2000 October 24, 2000 10 February 1, 2001 November 13, 2001 11 March 22, 2001 November 13, 2001 12 November 13, 2001 November 13, 2001 13 September 5, 2002 December 19, 2002 14 May 14, 2003 October 21, 2003 15 January 9, 2004 November 3, 2004 16 March 31, 2004 November 3, 2004 17 April 16, 2004 November 3, 2004 18 May 5, 2004 November 3, 2004 19 June 4, 2004 November 3, 2004 20 July 1, 2004 November 3, 2004 21 August 11, 2004 November 3, 2004 22 October 13, 2004 November 3, 2004 23 February 25, 2005 24 August 4, 2005 LOR- 1 Rev. 24

Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.5 BASES As such, the shutdown CEA insertion limits affect safety analyses involving core reactivity, ejected CEA worth, and SDM (Reference 1, Section 14.1.2).

The shutdown CEA insertion limits satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c) (2)(ii), Criterion 2.

LCO The shutdown CEAs must be within their insertion limits any time the reactor is critical or approaching criticality.

This ensures that a sufficient amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor and maintain the required SDM following a reactor trip.

APPLICABILITY The shutdown CEAs must be within their insertion limits, with the reactor in MODEs 1 and 2. The Applicability in MODE 2 begins anytime any regulating CEA is not fully inserted. This ensures that a sufficient amount of negative reactivity is available to shut down the reactor and maintain the required SDM following a reactor trip. In MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6, the shutdown CEAs are fully inserted in the core and contribute to the SDM. Refer to LCO 3.1.1 for SDM requirements in MODEs 3, 4, and 5.' Limiting Condition for Operation 3.9.1 ensures adequate SDM in MODE 6.

This LCO has been modified by a Note indicating the LCO requirement is suspended during SR 3.1.4.4. This SR verifies the freedom-of the CEAs to move, and requires the shutdown CEAs to move below the LCO limits, which would normally violate the LCO.

ACTIONS A.1 When one shutdown CEA is withdrawn > 121.5 inches and

< 129 inches,the accumulated times the shutdown CEAs have I been withdrawn within this range must be verified. The Completion Time for'this'action'is once within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and I 24'hours thereafter.' Operation is allowed for 7 consecutive days and a total of 14 days per 365 days. The peaking factors may not be outside required limits when one shutdown CEA is misaligned; therefore, continued operation is I allowed. Since the power distribution limits are being maintained via the LCOs of Technical Specification Section 3.2, any out-of-limit peaking factor conditions will I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 B 3.1.5-3 Revision 2

Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits B 3.1.5 BASES require entry into the Actions of the appropriate Section 3.2 LCO(s). The limits on consecutive days and total days in this condition reflect that the core may be approaching the acceptable limits placed on operation with flux patterns outside those assumed in the long-term burnup assumptions. Therefore, operation in this condition cannot continue and the CEA is required to be restored per Action B. The accumulated times are required to be verified once within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to determine which accumulated time limit is more limiting. The periodic Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after the initial completion within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is adequate to ensure that the accumulated time limits are not exceeded.

B.1 Prior to entering this condition, the shutdown CEAs were fully withdrawn or all but one shutdown CEA was withdrawn

> 129 inches. If one shutdown CEA is withdrawn

> 121.5 inches and < 129 inches for > 7 days per occurrence or > 14 days per 365 days, or one shutdown CEA withdrawn

< 121.5 inches, or two or more shutdown CEAs withdrawn

< 129 inches, the out-of-limit CEAs must be restored to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . The Completion Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months reflects that the power distribution limits may be outside required limits and that the core may be approaching the acceptable limits placed on operation within flux patterns outside those assumed in the long-term burnup assumptions.

The CEA(s) must be restored to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

The 2-hour total Completion Time allows the operator adequate time to adjust the CEA(s) in an orderly manner.

C.1 When Required Action A.1 or B.1 cannot be met or completed within the required Completion Time, a controlled shutdown should be commenced. The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, for reaching MODE 3 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

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PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES A.1 When one or more Functions have one required indication channel that is inoperable, the required inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30-day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channel (or in the case of a Function that has only one required channel, other non-Reference 3 indication channels to monitor the Function), the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.

B.1 This Required Action specifies initiation of actions in accordance with Specification 5.6.7, which requires a written report to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and identifies proposed restorative Required Actions. This Required Action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown requirement, given the likelihood of plant conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation. Also, alternative Required Actions such as grab sampling or diverse indications are identified before a loss of functional capability condition occurs.

C.1 When one or more Functions'have two required indication channels inoperable (i.e., two channels inoperable in the same Function), .one channel in the Function should be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the Revision 19 UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS -

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__ _ - HH, PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES PAM Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur.

D.1 This Required Action directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.10-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function-dependent.

Each time Required Action C.1 is not met and the associated Completion Time has expired, Condition D is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

E.1 and E.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C are not met, and Table 3.3.10-1 directs entry into Condition E, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirements of this LCO do not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 Alternate means of monitoring containment area radiation have been developed and tested. These alternate means may be temporarily installed if the normal PAM channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allotted time. The HJTC-based reactor vessel water level instrumentation is one of three components of the inadequate core cooling instrumentation. The SMM instrumentation and CETs could be used to monitor inadequate core cooling. If these alternate means are used, the Required Action is not to shut down the plant, but rather to follow the directions of Specification 5.6.7. The report provided to the NRC should discuss the alternate means used, describe the degree to which the alternate means are equivalent to the installed PAM channels, justify the areas in which they are not Revision 24 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS -

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UNITS 1 2 B 3.3.10-14 B 3.3. 10-14 Revision 24

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES equivalent, and provide a schedule for restoring the normal PAM channels.

SURVEILLANCE A Note at the beginning of the SRs specifies that the REQUIREMENTS following SRs apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.10-1.

SR 3.3.10.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one indication channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that indication channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Sign'ificant deviations between the two indication channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one'of the channels or of something more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a qualitative assessment of the indication channel that considers indication channel uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.

If the channels are within the criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. If the channels are normally off-scale;during times when surveillance testing is required, the CHANNEL CHECK will only verify that they are off-scale in the same direction. Off-scale low current loop channels are verified to be reading at the bottom of the range'and not failed down-scale.

The Frequency of 31 days is based upon plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one indication channel of a given Function in any 31 day interval is a rare event. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel during normal operational use of the displays associated with this LCO's required channels.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-15 Revision 24

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES SR 3.3.10.2 Deleted.

SR 3.3.10.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 24 months or approximately every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a check of the indication channel including the sensor. The SR verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the CIV position indication channels will consist of verification that the position indication changes from not-closed to closed when the valve is exercised to the isolation position as required by Technical Specification 5.5.8, Inservice Testing Program. The position switch is the sensor for the CIV position indication channels. A Note allows exclusion of neutron detectors, CETs, and reactor vessel level (HJTC) from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience and consistency with the typical industry refueling cycle and is justified by an 24 month calibration interval for the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift.

REFERENCES 1. Letter from Mr. R. E. Denton (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated June 6, 1995, "License Amendment Request; Extension of Instrument Surveillance Intervals"

2. Letter from Mr. J. A. Tiernan (BGE) to NRC Document Control Desk, dated August 9, 1988, "Regulatory Guide 1.97 Review Update"

3. Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident (Errata Published July 1981), December 1975

4. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Requirements for Emergency Response Capabilities (Generic Letter 82-33),

December 17, 1982

5. UFSAR, Chapter 7, "Instrumentation and Control" Revision 24 CALVERT CLIFFS CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1&

UNITS 1 & 2 2 B 3.3.10-16 B 3.3.10-16 Revision 24

Containment B 3.6.1 BASES REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors" Option B, "Performance-Based Requirements"

2. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

3. American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1992 Edition through the 1992 Addenda,Section XI, Subsection IWL, "Requirements for Class CC Concrete Components of Light-Water Cooled Power Plants" as modified and amended by 10 CFR 50.55a CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1-5 Revision 24

CC System B 3.7.5 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.5 Component Cooling (CC) System BASES BACKGROUND The CC System provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety-related components p..

-during a DBA or transient. During normal operation, the CC System alsoprovides this function for various nonessential

.components. The CC System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the-Saltwater (SW) System, and thus to the-environment..

The CC System consists of.two redundant loops that are always -cross-connected.- A loop consists-of one of three

-redundant pumps, one of-two redundant CC heat exchangers along with a common.head tank, associated.-valves, piping, instrumentation, and controls. The third pump, which is an installed-spare, can be powered from either electrical

. train....The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming single active failure, is consistent with the assumptions made.in the accident analysis.

During normal operation one loop typically provides cooling water with a maximum CC heat exchanger outlet temperature of 950 F (a range of 700 F-950 F is acceptable during normal operating conditions) with.-the redundant loop components in standby. If needed, the redundant loop components can be aligned to supplement the in service loop. While operating on SDC with one loop, the CC heat exchanger outlet temperature may rise tola-maximum temperature of 120 0 F.

. Following'a loss.-of coolant accident'(LOCA) while

,:... ' recirculating water.fromthe containment'sump, the CC heat

-- - -: exchangers areldesignedito-provide a-maximum outlet cooling water temperature of:1200F provided'one of the following component alignment combinations is met-(assumes CC to containment and evaporators is isolated): a) 1 CC pump, 2'CC'heat exchangers, and 2 SDC-heat6exchangers; b) 1 CC pumps, 1 CC heat exchanger, 1 SDC heat exchangers; and c) 2 CC pumps" 2 CC heat-exchangers, .1SDC heat exchangers.

-In.the event.of a passive failure of-the common portions of the-CC loop during a LOCA, the'entire -system would be lost.

-The unit can-still be-maintained in a safe condition since LFS CAVR NT B 3.7.- - eiin2 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B -3.7.5-1 Revision 24

CC System B 3.7.5 BASES 1I the containment coolers would be utilized in lieu of the spray pumps/shutdown heat exchangers to cool the Containment Structure (Reference 1, Section 9.5.5).

Additional information on the design and operation of the system, along with a list of the components served, is presented in Reference 1, Section 9.5.2.1. The principal safety-related function of the CC System is the removal of decay heat from the reactor via the SOC System heat exchanger. This may utilize the SDC heat exchanger, during a normal or post accident cooldown and shutdown, or the Containment Spray System during the recirculation phase following a LOCA.

APPLICABLE The design basis of the CC System is for it to support a SAFETY ANALYSES 100% capacity Containment Cooling System (containment spray, containment coolers, or a combination) removing core decay heat 36 minutes after a design basis LOCA. This prevents the containment sump fluid from increasing in temperature during the recirculation phase following a LOCA, and provides a gradual reduction in the temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the RCS by the safety injection pumps.

The CC System is designed to perform its function with a single failure of any active component, assuming a loss of offsite power.

The CC System also functions to cool the unit from SDC entry conditions (TCold < 300 0F) to TCold < 1400 F during normal operations. The time required to cool from 300 0 F to 140'F is a function of the number of CC and SDC loops operating.

One CC loop is sufficient to remove decay heat during subsequent operations with TCOld < 140 0F. This assumes that a maximum inlet SW temperature occurs simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the system.

The CC System satisfies 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3.

LCO The CC loops are redundant of each other to the degree that each has separate controls and power supplies and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one CC loop is required to provide the minimum Revision 24 UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS -

1&&2 2 B 3.7.5-2 B 3.7.5-2 Revision 24

CC System B 3.7.5 BASES heat removal capability assumed in the safety analysis for the systems to which it supplies cooling water. To ensure this requirement is met, two CC loops must be OPERABLE. At least one CC loop will operate assuming the worst single active failure occurs coincident with-the loss of offsite power. Additionally, the'containment 'cooling function will also operate assuming the worst case passive failure post-recirculation actuation signal (RAS).

A CC loop is considered OPERABLE when the following:

a. The associated pump and common head tank are OPERABLE; and

b. The associated piping,'valves, heat exchanger and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety-related function are OPERABLE.

The isolation of CC from other components or systems not required for safety may render those components or systems inoperable, but-does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CC System.

APPLICABILITY In MODEs 1, 2, 3, and 4,_ the CC System is a normally operating system that must be prepared to perform its post accident safety-functions, primarily RCS heat removal by cooling the SDC heat exchanger.

In MODEs 5 and 6, the OPERABILITY requirements of the CC System are determined by the systems it supports.

ACTIONS A.1 Required Action A.1,is modified by'a Note indicating the requirement of entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, for SDC made inoperable by CC. This is'an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for, these components.

-With one CC loop-inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CC loop is adequate to perform the heat removal function. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE loop, r(Al 1IDT (l TMCC _ IITTC ,I A W11LYCLnI %1L.AI i - U11X IJ 11 2.

U 9 L.

1 7 1U.J./ i-2

-J 0 -D'-)ic 9A

rX;; v a Iu11 ILt

fil l"L CC System B 3.7.5 BASES and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 If the CC loop cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the CC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for CC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in their correct position.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the CC components or systems may render those components inoperable but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CC System.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

SR 3.7.5.2 This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CC valves on an actual or simulated safety injection actuation signal CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.5-4 Revision 2

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES The AC sources in one train must be-separate and independent (to the extent possible) of the AC sources in the other train. For the DGs, separation and independence are complete.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS) are shared systems with one train of each system connected to an onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem from each unit. Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1.c requires one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the other unit's onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to supply power to the CREVS and CRETS to be OPERABLE and one DG from the other unit capable of supplying power to the CREVS and CRETS to be OPERABLE. The qualified circuit in LCO 3.8.1.c must be separate and independent'(to the extent possible) of the qualified circuit which provides power to the other train of the CREVS and CRETS. These requirements, in conjunction with the requirements for the unit AC electrical power sources in LCO 3.8.1.a and LCO 3.8.1.b, ensure that power is available to two trains of the CREVS and CRETS.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODEs 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits, are not exceeded as a result of AQOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided and Containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions, are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The AC power requirements for MODEs 5'and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2.

ACTIONS A.1 To ensure a highly-reliable power source remains with the one required LCO'3.8.1.a offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining required offsite circuits-on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies-"perform," a failure of Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-5 Revision 24

-_ _film I AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition D and/or G, as applicable, for the two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

A.2 Required Action A.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required features.

These features are powered from the redundant AC electrical power train(s). Single train systems may not be included.

The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. The train has no offsite power supplying its loads; and

b. A required feature on another train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition A (one required LCO 3.8.1.a offsite circuit inoperable) a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

The Completion Time must be started if it is discovered that there is no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class lE Electrical Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features (or both) that are associated with the other train that has offsite power. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuits and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to Train A and Train B of the Revision 24 CALVERT CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS &2 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-6 B 3.8.1-6 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature.

Additionally, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

A.3 Consistent with Reference 6, operation may continue in Condition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the unit safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time-allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or LCO 3.8.1.b.' If Condition A is entered while,'for instance, an LCO 3.8.1.b DG is inoperable, and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . This could lead to a total of 17 days, since initial failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or LCO 3.8.1.b, to restore the offsite circuit.

At this time, a LCO 3.8.1.b DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (for a total of 20 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of LCOs 3.8.1.a and 3.8.1.b. The 17 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified 'condition after discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or LCO 3.8.1.b. 'This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the B 3.8.1-7 Revision 24 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNITS 1 & 2 1& 2 B 3.8.1-7 Revision 24

__-zmL AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 17 day Completion Time means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that LCO 3.8.1.a or LCO 3.8.1.b was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.

B.1 The 14 day Completion Time for Required Action B.5 is based on the OPERABILITY of both opposite-unit DGs and the availability of the OC DG. The OC DG is available to power the inoperable DG bus loads in the event of a station blackout or loss-of-offsite power. It is required to administratively verify both opposite-unit DGs OPERABLE and the OC DG available within one hour and to continue this action once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months thereafter until restoration of the required DG is accomplished. This verification provides assurance that both opposite-unit DGs and the OC DG are capable of supplying the onsite Class lE AC Electrical Power Distribution System.

B.2 To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with an inoperable LCO 3.8.1.b DG, it is necessary to verify the availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform,"

a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met.

However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

B.3 Required Action B.3 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a LCO 3.8.1.b DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are Revision 24 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS -

1 &

UNITS 1 &2 2 B 3.8.1-8 B 3.8.1-8 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES designed with redundant safety-related trains. Single train systems are not included. Redundant required feature failures consist'of inoperable feature's with a train, redundant'to the' train that has"an inoperable LCO 3.8.1.b DG.

The Completion Time f6r Required Action B.3 is intended to allow-the operator time to'valuate and repair any discovered 'inop'erabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception tothe normal "ftime zero" for

-beginning the'allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. An inoperable LCO-3.8.1.b DG exists; and

b. A required feature on another train is inoperable.

If at any-time during the existence of'this Condition (one LCO 3.-8.1.b DG inoperable) a required feature subsequently

'becomeslinoperable,'this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering one required LCO 3.8.1.b DG inoperable coincident with one'or'more inoperablefrequired support or

supported features (or'both) that are' associated with the OPERABLE DGs, results'in starting'the'Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently, is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

In thisCondition,Jthe remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protectionfor the-required feature's function may have been-lost; however, function has not been lost. -The four hour-Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart;to the inoperable

. ,required feature. :Additionally, the four hour Completion

.,Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC-sources, -areasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B-3;8.1-9 ' . - Revision 24

_____ __ JmL AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES B.4.1 and B.4.2 Required Action B.4.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s), SR 3.8.1.3 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition E and/or I of LCO 3.8.1, as applicable, would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists and Required Action B.4.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.3 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of the DG(s).

In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.4.1 or B.4.2, the corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months constraint imposed while in Condition B.

Consistent with Reference 7, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

These Conditions (B.4.1 and B.4.2) do not address the availability of the OC DG.

B.5 Operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed 14 days.

Planned entry into this Required Action requires that a risk assessment be performed in accordance with a configuration risk management program (Reference 11). This ensures that a proceduralized probabilistic risk assessment-informed process is in place that assesses the overall impact of plant maintenance on plant risk prior to entering this Required Action for planned activities.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8. 1-10 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs, available OC DG,

,and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E:Distribution System. The 14 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time

- '*for repairs, and the low probability'of a'DBA occurring

-during this'period. -

'In'addition to utilizing Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power

, Plant's processes for evaluating risk, Reference 11, Calvert Cliffs will administratively limit DG OOS time to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for elective maintenance unless the following actions are completed:

a. Weather conditions will be evaluated prior to entering the extended DG Completion Time for elective maintenance.' Anextended DG Completion Time will not

be entered for elective maintenance purposes if official weather forecasts are predicting severe conditions (tornado or thunderstorm warnings).

b. The condition of the offsite power supply will be evaluated'prior to-entering' th extended DG Completion Time.

c. No elective maintenance will be performed in the switchyard, on the 4 kV Distribution-System, or on the 13 kV Distribution System. -

' d. No maintenanhce or testing that affects the reliability

' of the train associated with'the operable DG on the affected unit w ill be scheduled -during the extended DG

'Completion Time. If any testing or maintenance activities, which affects' the train reliability must be performed while' the' extfended DG:Completion Time is in

'I~)~ '-'efeci ,i 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) evaluation will be

- 'performed. '

-,..- - e. Elective maintenance will not be-performed on the

-aalternate AC pwer-source (OC DG). Personnel will be

,.,;made aware of the dedication of the alternate AC source to the affected Unit..

f. 'Planned maintenance"'will not 'be performed on the

-; Auxiliary Feedwater'System.

B 3.8.1-11 Revision 24 UNITS 1 & 2 1 &

CALVERTJ CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT.CLIFFS -

2 B i3;.8. 1 11 S ~-~- Revision 24

_ _ - 2 I_ L.S AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES

g. The system dispatcher (System Operations and Maintenance Department) will be contacted prior to removing the DG from service and after it has been returned to service.

h. The operations crews will be briefed concerning the Unit activities, including compensatory measures established and the importance of promptly starting and aligning the alternate AC source (OC DG).

i. The on-shift operations crew will discuss and review the appropriate normal and emergency operating procedures prior to or shortly after assuming the watch for the first time after having scheduled days off while the extended DG Completion Time is in effect.

j. The condition of the grid will be evaluated prior to entering the extended DG 3.8.1 Condition B Completion Time for elective maintenance. An extended DG Completion Time will not be entered to perform elective maintenance when grid stress conditions are considered "High" per plant procedures. This will include conditions such as expected extreme summer temperatures and/or high demand.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.5 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or LCO 3.8.1.b. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an LCO 3.8.1.a offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have not been met for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . This could lead to a total of 17 days, since initial failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or LCO 3.8.1.b, to restore the DG. At this time, a LCO 3.8.1.a offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DG restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (for a total of 20 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of LCO 3.8.1.a and LCO 3.8.1.b. The 17 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or LCO 3.8.1.b. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 14 day and 17 day Completion Times means that both B 3.8.1-12 Revision 24 1&

UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS & 2 2 B 3.8.1-12 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES Completion-Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

As in Required Action B.3, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that LCO 3.8.1.a or LCO 3.8.1.b was initially not met, instead of at the time'Condition B was entered.

C.1.1 and C.1.2 In Condition C with an opposite-unit DG inoperable and/or the OC DG unavailable, the remaining OPERABLE unit-specific DG and required qualified circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class lE Distribution System.

Consistent with Reference 6, operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

D.1 Pursuant to LCO 3.0.'6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC source's to it,were inoperable resulting in de-energiization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition D is entered with no AC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, must be immediately-entered. Thisrallows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of theaLCO 3.8.1.c offsite circuit and DG without 'regard to whether a train is de-energized. Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a'de-'energized train.

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with the one required LCO3.8.1.c offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify -the OPERABILITY'of the remaining required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. 'However, if a second required CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.,8.1-13 Revision 24

_IUML AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition A and/or G, as applicable, for the two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

D.2 Required Action D.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function for the CREVS or CRETS. The Completion Time for Required Action D.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. The train has no offsite power supplying its loads; and

b. A train of CREVS or CRETS on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of Condition D (one required LCO 3.8.1.c offsite circuit inoperable) a train of CREVS or CRETS becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System coincident with one train of CREVS or CRETS that is associated with the other train that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuits and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to Train A and Train B of the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable CREVS or CRETS.

Additionally, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-14 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during'this period.

D.3 Consistent with the time provided in ACTION A, operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With one required LCO 3.8.1.c offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the unit'safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuits and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class lE Distribution System.

If the LCO 3.8.1.c required offsite circuit cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the CREVS and CRETS associated with the offsite circuit must be declared inoperable. The ACTIONS associated with the CREVS and CRETS will ensure the appropriate actions are taken. The'72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

E.1 The 14 day Completion Time for Required Action E.5 is based on the OPERABILITY of the other three safety-related DGs and the availabilityof the OC DG.' The OC DG is available to power the inoperable DG bus loads in the-event of a station blackout or loss-of-offsite power. It is required to administratively verify the three safety-related DGs OPERABLE and the OC DG available within one hour and to continue this action once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months thereafter until restoration of the required DG is accomplished. This verification provides assurance that'the three safety-related DGs and the OC DG are capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System.

E.2 Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it, were inoperable Revision 24 UNITS 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS

&2 I & 2 B .3.8.1-15 B .3.8.1-15 Revision 24

_ IIIUZL AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition E is entered with no AC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9 must be immediately entered. This allows Condition E to provide requirements for the loss of the LCO 3.8.1.c offsite circuit and DG without regard to whether a train is de-energized. Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with the one required LCO 3.8.1.c DG inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequency basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.

E.3 Required Action E.3 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period the LCO 3.8.1.c DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function for the CREVS or CRETS. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. An inoperable LCO 3.8.1.c DG exists; and

b. A train of CREVS or CRETS on the other train is inoperable.

If at any time during the existence of this Condition (the LCO 3.8.1.c DG inoperable) a train of CREVS or CRETS becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering the LCO 3.8.1.c DG inoperable coincident with one train of CREVS or CRETS that is associated with the one CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-16 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES LCO 3.8.1.b DG results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently, is acceptable because it-minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class lE Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the CREVS or CRETS may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The

'four hour Completion Time also takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining CREVS and CRETS train, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

E.4.1 and E.4.2 Required Action E.4.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s), SR 3.8.1.3 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition B and/or I of LCO 3.8.1, as applicable, would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause'failure no longer exists and Required Action E.4.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.3 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of the DG(s).

In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either'E.4.1 or E.4.2, the corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months constraint imposed while in Condition'E.

- Consistent with Reference 6, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months s-is reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

Revision 24

- UNITS 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1&&2 2 B 3.8.1-17 B 3.8.1-17 Revision 24

flL AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES These Conditions (E.4.1 and E.4.2) do not address the availability of the OC DG.

E.5 Consistent with the time provided in ACTION B, operation may continue in Condition E for a period that should not exceed 14 days. In Condition E, the remaining OPERABLE DGs, available OC DG, and offsite power circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the Class 1E Distribution System.

If the LCO 3.8.1.c DG cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days the CREVS and CRETS associated with this DG must be declared inoperable. The Actions associated with the CREVS and CRETS will ensure the appropriate Actions are taken.

The 14 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

F.1.1 and F.1.2 In Condition F, with an additional safety-related DG inoperable or the OC DG unavailable, the remaining OPERABLE DG and required qualified circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class lE Distribution System.

Consistent with Reference 6, operation may continue in Condition F for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

F.1.3 If the LCO 3.8.1.c DG cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months the CREVS and CRETS associated with this DG must be declared inoperable. The Required Actions associated with the CREVS and CRETS will ensure that the appropriate actions are taken.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable Revision 24 UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS -

& 2 1& 2 B 3.8.1-18 B 3.8.1-18 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES -- -

time for repairs, and-the low probability-of a DBA occurring during this period. -

G.1 and G.2 Condition G is ehtered when'both offsite 'circuits required by LCO 3.8.1.a are inoperable, or when-the offsite circuit required by LCO 3.'8.1.c and one offsite circuit required by LCO 3.8.1.a areconcurrently inoperable, if the LCO 3.8.1.a offsite circuit is credited with providing power to the

- -. ' 'CREVS and CRETS.- .

Required Action G.1 is intendedto' provide assurance that an

event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to.12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from that-allowed for one

- -train without offsite power, (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the -reduction to 12-hours is that Reference 6 allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for two required-offsite' circuits inoperable, based'upon the assumption that

'two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is appropriate.. These features-are powered from redundant AC safety trains. Single train features are not included in the list.' ' '

The Completion Time for Required Action'G.1 is intended to allow the 'operator time to'evaluate and repair any

' ' discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to'the normal 'Itime zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

a. Two required offsite circuits are inoperable; and

b. A-required Ifeature is inoperable."

' If at any time'during the existence of Condition G

- (e.g.-, two required LCO 3.8.1.a offsite circuits inoperable) and i required feature becomes1iroierable 'this Completion Time begins-to! Ie tracked. "

CALVERT- CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8'.-1-19 - - : Revision 24

____ - iimL AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES Consistent with Reference 6, operation may continue in Condition G for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation could correspond to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and

b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With two of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a loss of coolant accident, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

Consistent with Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sources two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , unrestricted operation may continue. If only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , power operation continues in accordance with Condition A or D, as applicable.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-20 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES H.1 and H.2.

Pursuant to' LCO3.O.'6,'the'Distribution System ACTIONS would not be enter'ed eveif all'AC sou'rces'to'it were inoperable resulting in 'de-energization. Therefore',' the Required Actions of'Condition'Hare'modified by'a Note to indicate that when Condition'H is-entered with no AC source to any

'train, the Conditions -and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9,

- must-be immediately 'entered.' This 'allows Condition H to provide requirements for the loss -of'one'required LCO 3.8.1.a offsite circuit and one LCO 3.8.1.b DG without

regard to'whether'-a'train isde-energized. Limiting

'Condition for Operation'3.8.9 provides'the appropriate restrictions for'ade-energized train.

Consistent with Reference 6, operation may continue in Condition H for a period that should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

In Condition H,. individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition G (loss of two required offsite circuits).

This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

-With two LCO 3.8.1.b DGs, inoperable, there are no remaining

-;standby-AC sources to provide power to most of the ESF

.systems. With one LCO-3.8.1.c:DG inoperable and the LCO 3.8.1.b DG that-provides-power to the-CREVS and CRETS

-inoperable, there arefno remaining-standby AC sources to the

-'---CREVS and CRETS.'- Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite -

electrical ,power, insufficient standby AC-isources-are available to power the-minimum required-ESF functions..-

Since the offsite electrical power systemis the only source

- of AC power for this level of degradation,"the risk LIFF NITS11. I Reisin 2 I &2 CALVRT -

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS &2 B3.,8.1-21 ! . , -

t-'Revision 24

II1IfI AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES associated with continued operation for a short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted.

The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

Consistent with Reference 6, with both LCO 3.8.1.b DGs inoperable, or with the LCO 3.8.1.b DG that provides power to the CREVS and CRETS and the LCO 3.8.1.c DG inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

J.1 and J.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions A, B.2, B.3, B.4.1, B.4.2, B.5, C, E.2, E.3, E.4.1, E.4.2, E.5, F, G, H, or I are not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within six hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

K.1 Condition K corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in LCO 3.8.1.a and LCO 3.8.1.b AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with Reference 1, GDC 18. Periodic component tests are CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-22 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES supplemented by extensive functional, tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are consistent with the recommendations of Reference 3, or Reference 4, and

.Reference 8.

When the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable. The minimum transient output voltage of 3740 V is 90% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value allows for voltage drop to the terminals of 4000 V motors whose minimum operating voltage is specified as 90% or 3600 V. The specified maximum output voltage of 4400 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors. It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V is no more'than the maximum rated operating 'voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively.

These values are equal to ÷1- 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are the recommendations given in Reference 3.

The SRs are modified bya Note which states that SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.15 are'applicable'to LCO 3.8.1.a and LCO 3.8.1.b AC Sources. The Note also states that SR 3.8.1.16 is applicable to LCO 3.8.1.c AC sources. This Note clarifies that not all of the SRs are applicable to all the components described in the LCO.

SR 3.8.1.1 and SR 3.8.1.2 These SRs assure-proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply tothe onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power.

The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred powersource, and that appropriate independence of offsite'circuits is maintained.

The Frequency of once within one hour after substitution for a 500 kV circuit and every eight hours thereafter, for SR 3.8.1.1 was established to ensure that the breaker alignment for the:SMECO circuit (which does not have Control Room indication) is in its correct position although breaker position is unlikely to change. The seven day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is adequate since the 500 kV circuit breaker CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-23 Revision 24

-~~ . IIIf AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the Control Room.

Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.1 is modified by a Note which states that this SR is only required when SMECO is being credited for an offsite source. This SR will prevent unnecessary testing on an uncredited circuit.

SR 3.8.1.3 and SR 3.8.1.9 These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs are modified by a Note (Note 2 for SR 3.8.1.3) to indicate that all DG starts for these surveillance tests may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading by an engine prelube period.

For the purposes of SR 3.8.1.9 testing, the DGs are required to start from standby conditions only for SR 3.8.1.9.

Standby conditions for a DG mean the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

In order to reduce stress and mechanical wear on diesel engines, the DG manufacturers recommend a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. This is the intent of Note 3, which is only applicable when such modified start procedures are recommended by the manufacturer.

Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.9 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds.

The minimum voltage and frequency stated in the SR are those necessary to ensure the DG can accept DBA loading while maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency levels. The Revision 24 CALVERT CLIFFS CLIFFS - UNITS 1&

UNITS 1 & 2 2 B 3.8.1-24 B 3.8.1-24 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES 10 second start requirement supports the assumptions of the design basis loss of coolant accident analysis in -

Reference 2, Chapter 14.

Since SR 3.8.1.9 requires a 10 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.3, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.3.

The 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.3 is consistent with Reference 4 and Reference 3. The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.9 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Reference 7. This Frequency provides adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

SR 3.8.1.4 This SR verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing with the offsite electrical system and accepting loads greater than or equal to 4000 kW for No. 1A DG and greater than or equal to 90% of the continuous duty rating for the remaining DGs. The 90% minimum load limit is consistent with Reference 3 and is acceptable because testing of these DGs at post-accident load values is performed by SR 3.8.1.11. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG'is'normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation. The 31-day Frequency for this SR is consistent with Reference 3.

This SR is modified-by four Notes.' Note 1 indicates that the diesel engine runs for this surveillance test may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 2 states that momentary transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 3 indicates that this surveillance test.shall be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to prevent routinely paralleling multiple DGs and to minimize-the potential for CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-25 Revision 24

ltJ!!I AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES effects from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance.

SR 3.8.1.5 This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level required by the SR is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of one hour of DG operation at full load plus 10%.

The 31-day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided, and unit operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.6 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling.

In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The SR Frequencies are consistent with Reference 8. This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR provided the accumulated water is removed during the performance of this surveillance test.

SR 3.8.1.7 This SR demonstrates that one fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8. 1-26 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES tank to',its associated day tank.,(This is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This SR provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump-is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE.

The Frequency for this SR is 31 days. The 31-day Frequency corresponds to the design of the fuel transfer system. The design of-fuel transfer systems is such that pumps will operate automatically or must be started manually in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following DG testing. In such a case, a 31-day Frequency is appropriate.

SR 3.8.1.8 Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer (this SR verifies steps 1 through 5). The sequencing logic controls the permissive and closing signals to breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance:ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load, and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. The UFSAR provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

The Frequency of-31'days is consistent with DG monthly testing and is sufficient to ensure the load sequencer operation as required.

SR 3.8.1.9 See SR 3.8.1.3.

-SR 3.8.1.10 Transfer of each'4.16 kV ESF bus-power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the'OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The

&2 B 3.8.1-27 Revision 24 CALVERT CALVERT CLIFFS -

UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 B 3.8.1-27 Revision 24

!T!I AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES 24 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.1.11 This SR provides verification that the DG can be operated at a load greater than predicted accident loads for at least 60 minutes once per 24 months. Operation at the greater than calculated accident loads will clearly demonstrate the ability of the DGs to perform their safety function. In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a DG load greater than or equal to calculated accident load and using a power factor < 0.85.

This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience. In addition, the post-accident load for No. 1A DG is significantly lower than the continuous rating of No. 1A DG. To ensure No. 1A DG performance is not degraded, routine monitoring of engine parameters should be performed during the performance of this SR for No. 1A DG (Reference 9).

This SR is modified by a Note which states that momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit will not invalidate the test. The 24 month Frequency is adequate to ensure DG OPERABILITY and it is consistent with the refueling interval.

SR 3.8.1.12 Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This SR demonstrates the DG load response characteristics. This SR is accomplished by tripping the DG Revision 24 UNITS 1 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS -

1&& 2 2 B 3.8.1-28 B 3.8.1-28 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES output breaker with the DG carrying' igreater than or equal to its associated .single largest post-accident load while

'paralleled to '6ffsite power. " "

Consistent with'References 10,' 3, and 4,'the load rejection test is acceptable if'the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference betweensynch'ronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15%-above synchronous speed,

'whichever is lower. ; sp The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the Reference 2, Chapter 8. i; - - i SR 3.8.1.13 This SR demonstrates that DG non-critical protective

-'functions are bypassed on a required'actuation signal. This SR is accomplished by verifying the bypass contact changes to-the correct state which prevents actuation of the non-critical function. The non-critical protective functions are consistent with References 3'and 4, and Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)-387 and are listed in'Reference 2, Chapter 8.: Verifying the non-critical trips 'are bypasse dwill ensure DG operation during a required actuation. The non-critical trips are bypassed during'DBAs'and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. A failure'"of the electronic'governor results in the diesel generator operating in hydraulic mode. This alarm provides the-operator withsufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems'that'are not',immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG. ' '

I.

'The 24 month Frequency' is based 6nengineering judgment, taking into consideration unit conditions required to perform the surveillance'test', and -isintended to be consistent with expected'fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown'-that thes'e components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded'to'be acceptable-from a reliability standpoint.-' This Frequency'is consistent'with Reference 2, Chapter 8.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B-3.,8;1-29 .:Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SR 3.8.1.14 This SR ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the surveillance test.

SR 3.8.1.15 In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This SR demonstrates the DG operation during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF (i.e., safety injection) actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

It is not necessary to energize loads which are dependent on temperature to load (i.e., heat tracing, switchgear HVAC compressor, computer room HVAC compressor). Also, it is acceptable to transfer the instrument AC bus to the non tested train to maintain safe operation of the plant during testing. Loads (both permanent and auto connect) < 15 kW do not require loading onto the diesel since these are insignificant loads for the DG.

Permanently- and auto-connected loads to the emergency diesel generators are defined as follows:

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-30 Revision 24

AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES Permanently-Connected-Load - Equipment that is not shed by an undervoltage or safety injection :actuation signal and is normally operating, i.e.,,loads :thatare manually started, selected, or process signal controlled are not considered

-,permanently-connected loads.

-.Auto-Connected Loads --Emergency equipment required for mitigating the events described inUFSAR Chapter 14 that are energized by loss-of-coolant incident sequencer actions after step zero and within the first minute of emergency

-- diesel generator operation after the initiation of an undervoltage signal.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the surveillance test and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 24.months., -,

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize mechanical wear and stress on the DGs during testing. 'For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be

.started from standby conditions, that is,with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs.

SR'3.8.1.16 This SR lists the SRs that'are' applicable to the LCO 3.8.1.c (SRs 3.8.1.1, 3.8.1.2, 3.8.1.3, 3.8.1.5, 3.8.1.6, and 3.8.1.7).: Perfo6rman ce of any SR for the LCO 3.8.1.c will satisfy both' Unit 1 and Unit -2 requirements for those SRs.

Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.4, 3.8.1.8, 3.8.1.9, 3.8.1.10, 3.8.1.11, 3.8.1.12, 3.8.1.13, 3.8.1.14, and

.3.8.1.15, are not required to be performed for the LCO 3.8.1.c. - Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.10 is not required because this SR verifies manual transfer of AC power sources from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite"circuit, but only one qualified offsite circuit is necessary for the LCOA3.8.`1.c. Surveillance Requirements'3.8.1.4,.-3.8.1.11-, and 3.1.8.12 are not required because' they'are tfests that deal with loads.

Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.8 verifies the interval between sequenced loads. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.14

& 22 B 3.8.1-31 Revision 24 UNITS 11 &

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS B -3.8.1-31 . Revision 24

II1IN AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES verifies the proper sequencing with offsite power.

Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.9 verifies that the DG starts within 10 seconds. These SRs are not required because they do not support the function of the LCO 3.8.1.c to provide power to the CREVS and CRETS. Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.13 and 3.8.1.15 are not required to be performed because these SRs verify the emergency loads are actuated on an ESFAS signal for the Unit in which the test is being performed. The LCO 3.8.1.c DG will not start on an ESFAS signal for this Unit.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants"

2. UFSAR

3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3, "Selection, Design, Qualification, and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Units Used as Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," July 1993

4. Safety Guide 9, Revision 0, March 1971

5. NRC Safety Evaluation for Amendment Nos. 19 and 5 for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2, dated January 14, 1977

6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Revision 0, "Availability of Electric Power Sources," December 1974

7. Generic Letter 84-15, Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability, July 2, 1984

8. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Revision 1, "Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," October 1979

9. Letter from Mr. D. G. McDonald, Jr. (NRC) to Mr. C. H. Cruse (BGE), dated April 2, 1996, Issuance of Amendments for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (TAC No. M94030) and Unit 2 (TAC No. M94031)

10. IEEE Standard 308-1991, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

11. NO-1-117, Integrated Risk Management Revision 24 CLIFFS - UNITS CALVERT CLIFFS -

1&

UNITS 1 & 2 2 B 3.8.1-32 B 3.8.1-32 Revision 24

ML052560098

Text

SUBJECT:

Enclosures:

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