ML051570322
| ML051570322 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/2005 |
| From: | Godley R Constellation Energy Group |
| To: | Todd Fish Operations Branch I |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| Download: ML051570322 (131) | |
Text
NRC EXAM Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No.: NRC-01 Op-Test No.: NRC-01 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Simulator IC-20
- 1. 96% Power Rod Line >loo% (103%)
Turnover:
- 1. Raise Suppression Pool water level to 200 feet using CSH Pump per N2-OP-33 Event Malf. No. Event No.
1 I
I 2 RR08B 3 FW03A RR31 RR30
\--
4 FW35 5
Switch P628-B22C-S4A-A N2-SOP-34 Stuck Open SRV 6 TU02 9% M (ALL) and Condenser air in-leakage results in a slight drop in vacuum.
MCOI Because of the rising turbine vibration, the crew will insert a 15%, manual reactor scram and trip the main turbine.
Ramp N2-ARP-0 1 Time 3 N2-SOP-9 minutes N2-EOP-RPV Page 1 of 8 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal Final Submittal Thursday, April 21, 2005
NRC EXAM Loss of main condenser vacuum. The degrading vibration causes 100% event a main condenser vacuum leak that degrades rapidly once the reactor is scrammed and results in automatic closure of MSIVs.
The loss of the main condenser as a heat sink requires manual operation of SRVs for pressure control and contributes to challenging the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit. Rising Suppression Pool temperature requires entry into N2-EOP-PC.
N2-EOP-PC Incomplete Scram. When the crew scrams the reactor control rods fail to insert due to hydraulic lock. Reactor power will lower to about 18% to 23% by APRM indication. The crew will be able to manually insert control rods using RMCS. Additional manual scrams will be successful in inserting control rods.
N2-EOP-C5 N2-EOP-6 Attachment 14 9 The crew will be required to respond to a failure of RRCS to initiate and WCS to isolate when SLC is manually initiated.
10 FWOIB FWOIC 1 capability after terminate and prevent injection is performed. The crew will be required to perform RPV Blowdown when RPV water level cannot be maintained above MSCWL. The use of Alternate Injection systems such as low pressure ECCS systems is then required to maintain adequate core cooling.
EOP-C2 11 Emeraencv 2.2.2 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES ACTUAL (PER SCENARIO: SEE SECTION D.5.d) ATTRIBUTES
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 Events 2.3.4.5.8.9
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Events 9,lO
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Event 4 SOP-6, Event 5 SOP-34
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1 Event 6 (and 7 only counted once)
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2)
Event 8 EOP-C5. Event 10 EOP-CZ
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 4 CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:
CT-1.0 Close ADS valve prior t o SPT reaching 110°F CT-2.0 Avoid exceeding HCTL CT-3.0 Restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches)
CT-4.0 Fully insert control rods Page 2 of 8 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal Final Submittal Thursday, April 21,2005
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 48 RECIRC FLOW UNIT FAILURE/FEEDPUMP TRIP WITH PARTIAL RUNBACWTURBINE HIGH VIBRATION/FAILURE TO SCRAM PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/10/05 VALIDATED R. Lanae, B. Moore, M. Smith DATE 2/16/05 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE Y/LI/Q~
OPE RAT1ONS MANAGER CON FIGURATION 6 NA Exam Securitv DATE CONTROL NA Exam Securitv DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Initial Power Level: 96%, above the 100% Rod Line The scenario begins at 96% reactor power. The crew will add water to the Suppression Pool using the High Pressure Core Spray System (CSH) per normal operating procedure N2-0P-33, High Pressure Core Spray. While water is being added to the Suppression Pool, Recirc Flow Unit input to APRM/RBM fails downscale resulting in APRM high power scram signals inputted into the Power Range Monitoring System logic modules. The crew will bypass the affected instrument per normal operating procedure and annunciator response procedures.
The crew experiences a Reactor Feedwater pump trip and partial automatic Recirc Flow Control Valve (FCV) Runback. The partial runback occurs due to a trip RCS FCV hydraulic power units. The result is slowly lowering reactor water level due to failure of reactor power to be automatically reduced to within the capacity of the single remaining operating Feedwater pump.
Reactor water level will slowly approach the automatic scram low water level of 159 inches.
The crew will manually insert CRAM rods to reduce power approximately 10% to within the capacity of the single remaining operating Feedwater pump (65%). This action will return reactor water level to the normal band of 178 to 187 inches.
After the plant is stable, the total Steam flow signal to Feedwater Level Control operates erratically resulting in water level transient. The crew will take manual contol of Feedwater to stabilize level. Manual level control will be required for the remainder of the scenario.
An inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV valve occurs. The crew will take actions required by procedures to close the valve before a manual scram is required at Suppression Pool water temperature of 110°F.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
When the ADS/SRV is closed, Main Turbine vibration begins to rise. The crew will manually scram the reactor and trip the Main Turbine when procedure limits of 12 mils are exceeded, since there are no automatic turbine trips associated with turbine vibration. When the reactor is scrammed all control rods will fail to fully insert resulting in reactor power level of approximately 18% to 23% by APRM indication. When MSlVs close on low vacuum, heat will be added to the containment during SRVs operation for pressure control. The transient is complicated by loss of the remaining operating Feedwater pump and the inability to maintain water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches). The crew will perform an RPV Blowdown to lower RPV pressure which allows the use of RHS via Shutdown Cooling line. This is the last remaining preferred injection system. If, in the SROs judgment, additional injection sources are required to restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCRWL, Alternate Injection systems can now be lined up to restore and maintain level above -39 inches. The crew will execute Alternate Control Rod Insertion procedures to fully insert the stuck control rods, such that the reactor will remain shutdown.
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C5,C2. SOP-6, 29,101 D, 21 and 9.
EOP-6 Attachment 14 EAL Classification: SAE 2.2.2 Any RPS scram setpoint has been exceeded AND automatic and manual scrams fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown conditions without boron AND EITHER Power >4% OR Suppression Pool temperature > I 10°F Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is restored and maintained in normal level band 160 to 200 inches and all control rods are fully inserted.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent. Reduce power to 96% with RCS flow.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments I . Malfunctions:
- a. RD17 LOAD COMPOSITE 003 RD17 at 23% power QUEUED
- b. RP12A RRCS Failure (Div I) QUEUED
- c. RP12B RRCS Failure (Div 11) QUEUED
- d. CU08 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Fail, TRUE QUEUED
- e. RR08B RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale B F3
- f. FW03A Feedwater Pump Trip PIA, TRUE F4
- i. FW35 Steam Flow Input Fails to FW Control, TRUE F5 RELATIVES USED TO CAUSE ERRATIC OPERATION
- j. TU02 Main Turbine Vibration High F6 Value 9; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes
- k. MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage F6 Value 15; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes I. MCOl Main Condenser Air lnleakage ET02 Value 100; Ramp Time 5:OO minutes
- m. FWOIA Condensate Pump Trip PIA, TRUE ET02 TUA 8:OO minutes for all 3 FWOls
- n. FWOIB Condensate Pump Trip P I B, TRUE ET02
- 0. FWOIC Condensate Pump Trip PIC, TI UE ET02
- r. RP02 RPS Failure to Scram Automatic, TRUE F9 TUA 1 :30 minutes NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
- 2. Remotes:
- b. MSOGA Defeat Level IMSlV Isolation, DEFEATED F7 TUA 1:30 minutes
- c. MSOGB Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED F7 TUA 1:30 minutes
- d. MSO6C Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED F7 TUA 1:30 minutes
- e. MSO6D Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED F7 TUA 1:30 minutes
- 3. Overrides:
- a. None
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. None D. Support Documentation
- 1. Working copy of N2-OP-33, H.3.0 for use by crew OR plastic sleeve procedure sections to facilitate placekeeping. An already place-kept copy of F . l .O is to be made and provided with turnover sheet, since the scenario assumes this section has already been completed.
E. Miscellaneous
- 1. Red rod line sign posted
- 2. Reduce power to 96% with RCS flow.
- 3. At APRM #2 Voter Module ensure Memory reset. At APRM Module, select Trip Status and Reset Memory, to ensure no pre-existing trip lights are in on both the voter module and the APRM.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
- 4. EVENT TRIGGERS/COMPOSITES
- a. ET02 Mode Switch in Shutdown (Event Trigger 8) Initiates increase in MCOl magnitude to 100% AND all three Condensate Pump trip FWOI malfunctions with Ramp Time of 8:OO minutes after Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN for reactor scram.
- b. ET03 RClC Turbine Speed >72% in auto (Event Trigger 49) Initiates malfunction RC02 RClC Isolation following RClC start after 1:30 minutes.
- c. Malfunction Composite 003 RD17 @ 23%. Establishes RD17A at 04, RD17B at 06. The remaining RD17 are at 46 and 48. This results in post ATWS APRM indication of 23% and minimal mismatch with actual thermal power, which can be caused by APRM Gain Adjustments.
- d. Remote Composite 001 RHS SDC A and B Pipes Full. Sets RH55A and RH55B to 100% from default value of 0%. This minimizes observed drop in RPV water level when injecting with SDC lines through RHS*MOV40A and B. Level drop occurs partially because of modeling within RHS piping that assumes SDC pipes are not full.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: I N CD DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 96% 0 Loadline = >loo%
0 None PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Raise Suppression Pool Water level to 200 feet using CSH pump per N2-OP-33.
Establish CSH pump flow rate of 5500 to 6000 gpm. N2-OP-33 F . l .O Standby Condition Status Checks are comdete.
0 Holding power at 96% while Reactor Engineering verifies process computer Thermal power calculation PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
Scenario ID#
NSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given the plant at power and inadvertent opening of an ADS/SRV valve, the crew will close the SRV to preclude a manual scram if Suppression Pool temperature reaches 11O°F, per N2-SOP-34 CT-2.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram and RPV Blowdown required, the crew will avoid exceeding HCTL by a combination of terminating and preventing injection, injecting boron and operating Suppression Pool Cooling per N2-EOP-C5.
CT-3.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram and the RPV has been blown down per EOP-C2, the crew will resume injection when RPV pressure lowers below the MSCP, to restore and maintain RPV water level between the MSCWL and 202.3 inches.
CT-4.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram the crew will fully insert all control rods using alternate methods per N2-EOP-6 Attachment 14 B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.o Given the plant with direction to raise Suppression Pool water level, the crew will lineup High pressure Core Spray and raise level to 200 feet per N2-OP-33.
PO-2.0 Given downscale failure of a Recirc Flow Unit, the crew will bypass APRM 2 per applicable Annunciator Response Procedures and N2-OP-92.
PO-3.0 Given the reactor plant operating at full power when a Feedwater pump trip and failure of RCS to completely runback, the crew will perform a Rapid Power Reduction, insert cram rods to lower power NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
and stabilize the plant before a low level scram occurs per N2-SOP-6, SOP-29 and SOP-I01D PO-4.0 Given the plant operating at power and misoperation of FWLC system due to failed steam flow input signal, the crew will take manual control of FWLC and stabilize level per N2-SOP-6 PO-5.0 Given the plant operating at power with an inadvertent opening of an ADSlSRV the crew will close the valve before Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110°F to preclude a manual scram requirement, per N2-SOP-34.
PO-6.0 Given the plant operating at power with high Main Turbine Vibration, the crew will initiate a manual scram and manual turbine trip when vibration exceed 12 mils per applicable Annunciator Response Procedures and N2-SOP-21.
PO-7.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram, the crew will establish control rod insertion in accordance with EOP-6, Attachment 14.
PO-8.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power 4% or above and reactor water level 100 inches or above, the crew will terminate and prevent injection with the exception of SLS, CRD and RCIC.
PO-9.0 Given a failure of WCS to isolate when SLS is injected, the crew will manually close WCS containment isolation valves from P602.
PO-I 0.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with loss of Feedwater the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown and inject with alternate ATWS injection systems to restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCRWL per EOPs.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0 R ACT1ONS 3ew 0 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 SRO Suppression Pool Fill Utilizing CSH Pump Directs Suppression Pool fill per PO-I .o N2-OP-33, H.3.0 Enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 (as directed from N2-OP-33) Condition B and initates Required Actions B . l Verify by administrative means RClC System is OPERABLE when RClC is required to be 0PERABLE. (Completion Time is Immediately)
AND B.2 Restore HPCS System to OPERABLE status.
(Completion Time is 14 days)
BOP RO Verify Subsection F . l .O, Standby Condition Status Checks is complete. (Actual performance is NOT required because completion was provided in Shift Turnover in formation .)
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify SM has declared CSH System inoperable.
CAUTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE CSH PUMP TO OPERATE IN A RUNOUT FLOW CONDITION OF > 7175 GPM OR PUMP DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.
MINIMIZE AMOUNT OF TIME CSH IS OPERATING ON MINIMUM FLOW OR PUMP DAMAGE MAY OCCUR.
Start CSH*PI, HPCS PUMP I .
After the CSH pump is started, Suppression Verify open CSH*MOV105, Pool Level (SPL) will rise from initial level of MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.
199.8 feet. It will take about 3 minutes to raise Monitor CST AND Suppression SPL to 200 feet. Pool Levels.
Raise rate of transferring water from CST to Suppression Pool (5500 to 6000 gpm) by performing the following:
Throttle open CSH*MOVI 11, TEST RETURN TO SUPPRESSION POOL.
WHEN CSH System Flow is
> 634 gpm, verify closed CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.
NRC Scenario 1 -1 1- March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPE RAT0 R ACT1ONS WHEN desired Suppression Pool Level is reached, close CSH*MOVI 11, TEST RETURN TO SUPPRESSION POOL.
WHEN HPCS SYSTEM FLOW is less than 634 GPM, verify open CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.
Stop CSH*PI, HPCS PUMP 1.
Verify closed CSH*MOV105, MINIMUM FLOW BYPASS VLV.
Notify SM that 2CSH*MOV111 is closed AND operability concern per DER 2-98-0557 no longer exist.
Restore CST Level, as required, per N2-OP-4.
EVENT 2 Recirc Flow Unit B Failed Downscale PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F3 key:
ATC RO RR08B, RR Flow Unit Failure Downscale B Identifies and reports annunciators F3) to SRO Implements ARP actions 2/4 MDL 1-4 have received one of the two (Significant ARP 603202 603217)
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS required trips. An additional trip from any These are 603202 actions unbypassed A PRM will cause a reactor 3 Determine by Red UPSC/INOP SCRAM. light on 2CEC*PNL603 which APRM Channel has alarmed.
Rod withdrawal block. (APRM 2 is the affected instrument)
The following annunciators alarm: IF a SCRAM has occurred, THEN 603202 APRM TRIP SYSTEM enter N2-SOP-101C, Reactor UPSCALWINOPERAB LE Scram. (No scram occurs) 603208 APRM TRIP SYSTEM UPSCALE IF NO SCRAM has occurred, 603217 FLOW REFERENCE OFF NORMAL 6032 18 OPRM TRIP ENABLED THEN perform the following:
603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK Check the other APRM channels to verify that NO At P603 Rod Select Matrix Right Side SCRAM should have APRM 2 Amber UPSC ALARM lit occurred.
APRM 2 Red UPSC TRIP OR INOP lit IF a SCRAM should have OPRM 2 White TRIP ENABLED lit occurred, THEN enter the FL 0 W White CAMPA R lit Emergency 0perat ing Process Computer points alarm consistent with Procedures. (Scram conditions. RDSBCl2, NMPUC08, should not have occurred)
NMPBC47, NMPBC33, NMPBC22, NMPBCI 7, IF NO SCRAM should NMP2C121, NMP2C108 have occurred, THEN perform the following:
IF required, THEN lower At P608 backpanel, A PRM 2 Display includes Reactor Power per N2-FL 0 W 0.0% (pre-failure value is 95.5% flow) OP-I 01 D or N2-SOP-2/4 MOL 2 Module (and 1,3,4 modules) 101D. (Not required indicate APRM 2 HIGH/INOP TRIP red LED lit because instrument failure is the cause)
NRC Scenario 1 -13 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Refer to Technical Specifications for actions. (Inform SRO to Other FLOW indicafions on APRM 1,3,4 perform) chassis reads about 95.5%. Bypass the affected APRM per N2-OP-92.
Role Play: (See later Scenario If asked report all other Voter Module steps for bypassing the indications are consistent with Voter module 2 APRM) indications. Reset the memory on the following per N2-OP-92, Section F.8.0:
2/4 MDL 1 2/4 MDL 2 2/4 MDL 3 2/4 MDL 4 Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm.
Note ATC RO/BOP RO ARP actions for 603202 and 603217 will likely These are 603217 actions be performed concurrently or 603217 actions Determine which channel is in may be performed before 603202 actions. alarm and whether UPSC or COMPAR amber light(s) are illuminated on 2CEC*PNL603.
COMPAR (generated by RBM)
At 2CEC*PNL608 determine NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTO R ACT1ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS which flow channel is high/low by comparison of flow indicat ions .
IF desired, THEN bypass the affected APRM per N2-OP-92.
ATC RO/BOP RO Failed Flow Unit is bypassed by bypassing Bypass APRM 2with Bypassing APRM 2 Joystick per N2-OP-92 H.2.
After A PRM 2 is bypassed all annunciators APRM channel bypass can be and P603 indications return to pre-transient performed by placing the APRM conditions. BYPASS joystick to the APRM channel to be bypassed. This action will also bypass the associated Recirculation Flow circuitry and OPRM. Only 1 APRM channel may be bypassed.
The actions in this section are performed at 2CEC*PNL603 unless otherwise noted.
CAUTION Bypass joysticks can become electrically misaligned after numerous bending motions due to "Metal Creep". Any bypass function should NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS be verified by channel BYPASS lights to ensure that only the intended channel is bypassed.
Verify NO other APRM in bypass for the instrument to be bypassed.
Place the APRM BYPASS joystick to the bypass position 2.
IF APRM 2 was bypassed, THEN verify the following:
APRM 2 BYPASS light is lit on 2CEC*PNL603.
BYP is displayed in inverse video in the header for APRM 2 (2 - 4) Chassis at H13-P608.
Blue BYPASSED LED is lit for APRM 1 (2 - 4) on EACH 2/4 MDL at HI3-P608.
Report APRM 2 bypassed to SRO EVENT 2 SRO Actions SRO Directs APRM 2 bypassed Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Enters Tech Spec 3.3.1 . I RPS Function 2 APRMs. No action is required since only 1 APRM NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS channel is inoperable.
Refer to TRM 3.3.2 Control Rod Block Instrumentation Function 4.
0 2 channels are required for the function, which is to initiate a rod block. With 1 channel inoperable, 3 channels are still operable. No other action is required.
Conducts post event brief EVENT 3 Feedwater Pump A trip with partial RCS FCV runback PO-3.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate SRO malfunction by depressing F4key: Directs entry into:
N2-SOP-6 Feedwater Failures FW03A Feedwater Pump Trip PIA, TRUE N2-SOP-29 Sudden Reduction RR31 HPU B PMP Number 2 Failure, TRUE In Core Flow TUA 2 seconds N2-SOPIOID Rapid Power RR30 HPU B PMP Number I Failure, TRUE Reduction TUA 2 seconds; TRA I O seconds Directs Cram Rod insertion (SOP-29 and SOP-101D action)
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS The following annunciators alarm: 0 When conditions stabilize, enters 851509 REACTOR FEED PUMPlA/lB/IC AUTO TRIP Tech Spec 3.4.1 Condition B 851519 REAC FEED PMP I A / I B / I C MOTOR ELEC Required Action to Declare the FAULT 602210 FCV A PART CLOSURE RFP TRIP recirculation loop with lower flow to 602222 FCV B PART CLOSURE RFP TRIP be not in operation. With 602102 RECIRC FCV B HYDRAULICS INOPERABLE Completion time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. With 602104 RECIRC FCV B BACK UP HYDR INOPERABLE both recirculation loops operating 602106 RECIRC FCV B MOTION INHIBIT but the flows not matched, the 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGHILOW At P603 flows must be matched within 2 RPV water level slowly lowers and reaches itslowest hours. If matched flows are not values of about I70 inches after about 4 minutes (Low restored, the recirculation loop with Level scram setpoint is 159.3 inches). The operating lower flow must be declared not in Feedwater pump flow is pegged high. Power reduction operation, as required by is necessary to restore Feedwater pump flow to acceptable value. Required Action B.1. This Required Action does not require tripping the recirculation pump in the lowest flow loop when the mismatch between total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than the required limits. Now the one loop part of the LCO statement applies. Those action (single loop) are required to be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
APRM power lowers to about 75% and Total Core Flow is reduced to about 74 Mlbm/hr. A successful runback would result in power level of about 65%,
which is within the capacity of one Feedwater pump.
FWS-LVIOB goes to 100% open NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS At P851 ATC RO Feedwater Pump B amps rise to about 530 (max) Reports Feedwater Pump A trip and flow rises to top scale 24,000 gpm and RPV water level low alarms At P602 Monitors reactor power, pressure RCS FCV A goes to minimum (correct response) and water level RCS FCV B goes to about 70% (incorrect Enters N2-SOP-6 response due to HPU trips) Places LVIOA in MAN and full Loop Flow A about 20 Mlbm/hr closes Loop Flow B about 55 Mlbm/hr (Flow Mismatch Tech Spec entry is required)
When directed, inserts Cram Rods using Continuous Insert button for rapid Power reduction When control rods are inserted, reactor power will lower. Inserting the first 4 cram rods results in lowering power from 75% to about 63%. As power is lowered to single Feedwater pump capacity, RPV water level will rise and return to within the normal level band of I78 inches to 187 inches and Feedwater Pump B .
F WS-LV I OB throttles closed to flow return pump flow and amps to normal values.
SRO/BOP RO/ATC RO Note 0 Enter and implement the flowchart Crew initiates N2-SOP-29 flowchart decision actions per N2-SOP-29 blocks by answering YES/NO questions. Is a Recirc pump in service?
YES Is core flow to left of natural circ line? NO Core flow AND Power within NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Scram Region? NO 0 Core flow AND power within Note Exit Region? NO CRAM rod insertion will likely be directed from 0 Reduce rodline below 100% by N2-SOP-101D, Rapid Power Reduction. Also, inserting CRAM rods. (Also with operation above the 100% rod line, the being inserted to lower crew will insert CRAM rods. It is expected that power for SOP-IOID actions the ATC RO will insert the first four cram rods by A TC RO) to position 00 using P603 CONTINUOUS 0 > 3 OPRMs operable? YES INSERT pushbutton. (EVENT 2 Reactivity 0 Plant in Heightened Awareness Manipulation for ATC RO) Zone? NO 0 Recover per Attachment 2. Note Reactor Power will lower and Rod Line will be that actual recovery action to reduced below 100% rod line reset the motion inhibit cannot be performed until repairs are completed on HPUs)
CONSOLE OPERATOR If directed to remove Condensate Demineralizers from service due to the power reduction, manually enter REMOTES, as required to establish the directed number of in-service de mine raIizers:
FWO1A-H , CON DENSATE DEMlNERALIZER, OFF Plant should now be stabilized at about 60- SRO 65% power. The crew will make notifications Conducts post event brief and Plant Management will be consulted to establish coordination and overall direction as NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
to how recovery will be implemented.
SRO should address RCS Flow Mismatch RCS FCV motion inhibit requires repairs of HPUs 0 Electric Fault trip of Feedwater Pump A 0 Bypassed APRM 2 due to failed Flow Unit EVENT 4 Steam Flow Signal Failure PO40 ATC RO CONSOLE OPERATOR Identifies and reports misoperation When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate of FWLC to SRO malfunction and relatives by depressing F5 Enters N2-SOP-6 key: Places FWS-HICIOIOB (LVIOB) controller OR Master FWLC FW35 Steam Flow Input Fails to FW, TRUE controller to MANUAL Steam flow signal operation becomes erratic. Stabilizes RPV water level Feedwater flow and RPV water level becomes between 160 to 200 inches (178 to unstable. 187 inches normal band) 603139 RPV WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW 603307 RWM ROD BLOCK SRO CONSOLE OPERATOR Directs entry into N2-SOP-6 for After FWLC is placed in MANUAL, manually misoperation of FWLC activate malfunction: Conducts post event brief FW35 Steam Flow Input Fails to FW, TRUE Notifies Operations and Plant This will keep the failed signal inputted into Management FWLC. Contacts WEC SRO for assistance NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT10NS and work planning EVENT 5 Inadvertent opening of ADS/SRV PSVl21 PO-5.0 This event should proceed while the crew is discussing placing FWLC to single element in response to the previous event.
CONSOLE OPERATOR SRO When directed by Lead Evaluator, manually Directs entry into N2-SOP-34 enter over ride: Declares PSV121 ADS valve P628 SWITCH Page 2 of 3 P628-B22C-S4A- inoperable.
A; P628 ADS Valve PSV121, OPEN Refers to Tech Specs 3.5.1. With one ADS valve inoperable no The following annunciators alarm: actions is required. Currently the 601537 ADS VALVESlSAFETY VALVES LEAKING minimum number of REQUIRED 601 548 SAFETYIRELIEF VALVE OPEN ADS valves is still met with one 601553 ADS ACC TANK 32/33/34 PRESSURE LOW valve inoperable.
851506 CONDENSATE TRANSFER PUMP 1NlB Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.1.7.2 and AUTO START 851507 CNST XFER PMP DISCH HEADER recognizes requirement to perform PRESSURE LOW N2-OSP-ISC-M@002 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
May direct one loop of RHS placed At P601 MSS"PSVl21 red light lit and DIV I in Suppression Pool Cooling.
MSS*PSVl21 OPEN white postage stamp lit IF RHS is placed in indicating valve is open. Suppression Pool Cooling, NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS At P603, MWe drop is observed as turbine declares RHS inoperable for control valve closes slightly. LPCl mode and enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 CONDITION A Suppression Pool temperature rises and REQUIRED ACTION A.l with 7 approaches 90 F. day COMPLETION TIME.
IF Suppression Pool Temperature exceeds 90°F, enters EOP-PC.
Notifies Operations and Plant Management.
Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning.
Conducts post event brief.
EVENT 5 BOP RO Actions BOP RO Reports annunciators Enters and executes N2-SOP-34 Identify which SRV is open. (PSV121)
Place the keylock switch for PSV21 to the OFF position.
Did the SRV close? NO (Detail 1)
Use one or more of following indications to verify SRV status:
SPDS Computer ERF Computer Points MSSZCI 11; MSSZCl28 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Reactor Power Change Generator Output Change Steam FlowIFeed Flow Mismatch Accoustic Monitor Reduce power to approximately 85%
per N2-SOP-101D.(NIA, currently below 85% power)
IF Average Suppression Pool temperature is approaching 110°F.. . . . .
THEN Scram the reactor per N2-SOP-101C and continue here.
Proceeds to back panel P628 with fuse pullers and protective safety equipment (PPE). Using Detail 2, remove the fuses for the affected SRV in the following order until the SRV closes:
- 1. C Solenoid fuse
- 2. A Solenoid fuse (CT-1.O)
PSV121 remains open after pulling F79 and 0 For 2MSS*PSV121 C Solenoid F80. At P601 position indicating (red and P628 Strip K F79 and F80 pulled green) lights for PSV121 are now deenergized.
0 For 2MSS*PSV121 A Solenoid PSV 121 closes when F9A and FlOA are P628 Strip F9A and FlOA p ulled. (CT-1.O)
Did SRV close? NO for C solenoid but YES when A solenoid fuses are pulled.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Generator MWe rises and ERF Computer Detail 1 Points indicate SRV is closed. Use one or more of following indications to verify SRV status:
SPDS Computer ERF Computer Points MSSZCI 1 1 ; MSSZCl28 Reactor Power Change Generator Output Change 0 Steam FlowlFeed Flow Mismatch Accoustic Monitor Exits SOP-34 and informs SRO SRV is closed.
If directed starts RHS in Suppression Pool Cooling.
EVENT 5 ATC RO Actions ATC RO Monitors parameters to assist in determining SRV position.
Monitors and control RPV water level in directed band in manual.
EVENT 6 Rising Main Turbine Vibration with minor Main Condenser Air In-leakage PO-6.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR c
When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key:
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TU02 Main Turbine Vibration High (F6)
Value 9; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes MCOI Main Condenser Air lnleakage (F6)
Value 15; Ramp Time 3:OO minutes Main Turbine vibration and Offgas Train flow SRO rise. May direct further power reduction After about 1:30 minutes Turbine vibration by Cram rod insertion reaches 7 mils and the following annunciators When vibration or vacuum limits alarm: are exceeded, directs reactor 851 140 TURBINE GENERATOR VIBRATION scram and turbine trip.
HIGH Notifies Operations and Plant 851306 OFFGAS SYSTEM TROUBLE Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief BOP RO Reports and implements annunciator 851 129 actions by monitoring for condition that require further actions:
May initiate Process Computer Group Point 14 to monitor turbine vibration on CRT display.
IF any Bearing Vibration is 10 mils for 15 minutes. Trip OR verify Main Turbine Tripped in NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS accordance with N2-SOP-21, Turbine Trip.
After about 3 minutes Turbine vibration IF any Bearing Vibration is 12 reaches 12 mils requiring a manual reactor mils, verify Main Turbine Trip in scram and turbine trip. The following accordance with N2-SOP-21.
annunciators alarm:
Refer to N2-0P-21 Section 851 129 TURBINE GENERATOR VlSRATlON H.l.O, Operation With High HIGH-HI GH Vibration in Alarm or High Vibration Trip Disabled.
IF any Bearing Vibration is >9 mils with >3 mils/minute rate of change THEN trip OR verify Main Turbine Tripped in accordance with N2-SOP-21, Turbine Trip.
IF Bearing Vibration is projected to exceed 30 mils following a Turbine Trip THEN break condenser vacuum in accordance with N2-OP-21, Subsection H.1.4.
0 WHEN any vibration limit is exceeded or when directed, enters N2-SOP-21 and implements flowchart actions 0 Has Tubine tripped? NO 0 Power >25%? YES SCRAM the reactor per N2-NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SOP-101C. (ATC RO to perform action).
0 Manually trip Turbine using TRIP pushbuttons. (BOP RO to perform action).
0 Did the Turbine trip using TRIP pushbuttons? YES 0 Verify MSV/ CV/ ClVs closed AND TBVs open to control pressure.
0 Verify the following:
House loads transfer Megawatts are -0 R230, R925 open 41 M, 41 E open MDS1/233N open EVENT 6 ATC RO actions ATC RO Monitors reactor power, level and pressure If directed, implements N2-SOP-9 actions for lowering condenser vacuum If directed, lowers power per N2-SOP-101 D to stabilize vacuum. (Since already operating at reduced power, a further power reduction is not likely to be directed).
NRC Scenario I March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify proper operation of:
SJAE per N2-OP-9 Off-gas per N2-OP-42 Circ Water per N2-OP-1OA Reactor Power >25/0? YES Tthe crew is directed to manually scram and IF Condenser vacuum is trip the turbine on either of two parameters approaching 22.1 inches Hg .....
during this event. The crew must take these THEN ....
actions based on high turbine vibration 0 Scram the reactor per
(> 12mils) or lo wering condenser vacuum (prior N2-SOP-101 C to 22. I inch Hg, automatic turbine trip Trip the turbine per N2-setpoint. SOP21 EVENT 7 and 8 PO-7.0 and 8.0 Manual Reactor Scram and ATWS SRO Directs Mode Switch placed in The following preset malfunction become Shutdown active: Repeats back scram report RDI 7 COMPOSITE 003 QUEUED Enters EOP-RPV on low RPV RPIZA RRCS Failure (Div I) QUEUED water level (4% and level above 100 inches directs terminating and prevent injection at P603 except boron, CRD and RClC to standard NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTR UCTO R ACT1ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERAT0 R ACT10NS level band of 50 to 80 inches with Feedwater system.
When SPT reaches 1 IO F terminate and 0 Directs terminating and prevent injection a second time is required. preventing injection at P601.
0 Per override L-5, IF power is NOTE >4% AND level > -14 inches When using Fuel Zone Instruments, the value (TAF) AND an SRV is open of -14 inches (TAF) and -39 inches (MSCRWL) AND SPT >11O°F, directs is corrected for RPV pressure using Fig. Z injection terminated and curves. Typically at 800 -1000 psig, -14 inches prevents again UNlTlL either
= -55 inches AND -39 inches = -70 inches. 17 APRM are dnsc OR Therefore a level band between -14 and -39 is RPV Level reaches TAF directed as -55 to -70 inches when corrected (about -55 inches corrected per using Fig. Z Fig Z) 0 Records Fuel Zone Level Directs injection using only Detail G systems to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL As the SRO directs initial EOP-C5 actions and Directs from EOP-C5 PRESSURE the ROs perform those actions, the following Actions conditions should be achieved, before conditions further degrade (loss of Condensate RPV pressure stabilized below Booster Pumps occurs eight minutes after the 1052 psig with EHC (Bypass Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown: Valves) and SRVs. Standard pressure band 800 to 1000 psig NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Level stabilized and controlled 50 to 80 inches with F W and RCIC. Other injection sources When MSlV close, standard have been "terminated and prevented" from pressure band 800 to 1000 psig injecting except boron, CRD and RCIC. with SRVs Pressure stabilized and controlled 800 to 1000 Restore pneumatics to the psig with BPVs and SRVs. SRVs only after Drywell MSlV closure.
Both loops of SLS are injecting at 86 gpm. As WAIT until Cold Shutdown Suppression Pool water temperature rises, boron weight is injected (SLS RHS is placed in Suppression Pool Cooling tank level below 1450 gallons).
lin eup.
Directs from EOP-C5 POWER Actions Mode switch in Shutdown Initiate RRCS (EOP-6 Att 13)
Reduce Recirc to minimum With power >4%, trip the RCS Pumps When pressure and level are under control, directs control rod insertion per EOP-6 Attachment 14 BEFORE SPT reaches 1IOOF, directs SLS boron injection WAIT until boron injection is no longer required before terminating SLS injection.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 7 WHEN SPT reaches 90°F enters EOP-PC Directs both loops of RHS placed in Suppression Pool Cooling EVENT and ATC RO Actions as ATC RO directed. PO-8.0 7 Places Mode Switch in Shutdown 0 Provides scram report, including APRMs are not downcale and all rods are not fully inserted 0 Initiates RRCS by arming and depressing manual initiation pushbuttons per EOP-6 Att 13 0 Terminates and prevents P603 injection by placing FW control in manual and fully closing LVlOs 0 When level drops below 100 inches, establishes RPV injection by reopening LVlOs to maintain level in directed band (50 to 80 inches).
EVENT 7 and 8 BOP RO Actions as BOP RO directed. Inhibits ADS using 2 keylock switches Places HPCS pump control switch in PTL If directed, bypasses MSIV low level isolations per EOP-6 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONSOLE OPERATOR Attachment 10 IF requested to bypass MSlV low level Manually operates SRV to maintain isolations per EOP-6 Attachment 10, pressure in directed band (800 to immediatelv activate remote timer by 1000 psig) depressing F7 key THEN WAIT until the 1:30 Restores pneumatics (at P851) to minute TUA timer times out and report the Drywell by using keylocks to jumpers are installed override and reopen IAS*SOVI66 and 184.
MSOGA Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, Restores pneumatics (at P601) to DEFEATED, TUA 1 :30 minutes Drywell by using keylocks to MSOGB Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, override and reopen IAS*SOVI 64 DEFEATED, TUA 1:30 minutes and 165.
MSOGC Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED, TUA 1:30 minutes MSOGD Defeat Level 1 MSlV Isolation, DEFEATED, TUA 1:30 minutes I
Terminates and prevents Div I ECCS injection at P601 by performing:
Arm and depress Div I ECCS manual initiation pushbutton.
Override closed CSL Injection MOV (amber light stays on).
Place CSL pump in PTL.
0 Override closed RHS A Injection MOV (amber light stays on).
1:00 minute after RClC starts, ET03 actives Terminates and prevents Div II malfunction RC02 RClC FAILURE - ECCS injection at P601 by ISOLATION OF RCIC, TRUE perform ing:
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Arm and depress Div II ECCS manual initiation pushbutton.
Override closed RHS C Injection MOV (amber light stays on).
Override closed RHS B Injection MOV (amber light stays on).
When RClC isolates, reports RClC isolation to SRO EVENT 9 WCS Isolation Failure PO-9.0 Injects SLS boron injection using keylock switches CU08 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Fail, SLS*MOVl A and 1B open TRUE malfunction becomes effective SLS*Pl A and 1B start Explosive Valves fire WCS*MOVl02 and 112 isolation valves fail to Pump pressure and flow rise close when SLS switches are placed in ON. SLS tank level begins to lower When P602 control switches are used, the Identifies failure of WCS isolation WCS isolation MOVs will close.
Manually closes WCS isolation valves MOVl02 and 112 at P602 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTO R ACT10NS/
PLANT RESPONSE . OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 10 Trip of all Condensate Pumps PO-10.0 Eight minutes after the Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown, ET02 automatically activates the following malfunctions:
FWOIA Condensate Pump Trip P I A ATC RO FWOl B Condensate Pump Trip P I B Reports loss of all Condensate, FWOlC Condensate Pump Trip P I C Booster and Feedwater Pumps Reports lowering RPV water level Closes FWS-LVIOs for tripped Feedwater Pumps Lineup systems as directed All three Condensate Pumps trip. Feedwater pump suction pressure drops. feedwater Acknowledges loss of Feedwater pumps automatically trip on low suction Directs RHS injection through pressure. Shutdown Cooling per EOP-6 Attachment 30. (Requires RPV water level falls below MSCRWL and installation of jumpers to defeat cannot be restored until additional systems are RHS Shutdown Cooling interlocks lined up for injection. As RPV water level AND RPV pressure reduced below drops, core voiding results in lowering reactor 350 psig) power and pressure. Per L-10 Conditional Step, determines RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above MSCRWL with Detail G Preferred NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Systems AND EOP-C2 has not been entered yet.. . . . . EXITS C5 Level and Pressure legs AND ENTERS EOP-C2 to perform an RPV Blowdown Executes EOP-C2 as follows:
Determines reactor will NOT stay shutdown without boron (Step 2)
Determines SPL is above 192 feet (Step 3)
Directs terminate and prevent all RPV injection except boron, CRD and RClC (Step 4)
Directs all 7 ADS valves open (Step 5 )
When all 7 ADS valves are reported open, continues in C2 to WAIT blocks (Step 16 then
- 17) AND ENTERS (RETURN TO ) EOP-C5 at 10 RETURNS TO EOP-CS at 10 Determines 2 or more SRVs are open (L-12)
WAITS until RPV pressure drops below value in Table J (below 165 psig with 7 SRVs open; L-13)
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Directs injection using only Detail G systems slowly start injecting to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL (RHS through Shutdown Cooling per EOP-6 Attachment 30 should now be established; L - I4)
Determines capability of RHS to restore and maintain level above MSCRWL (L-15)
SRO may decide that RHS alone will not restore water level above MSCRWL and direct Alternate ATWS System Injection from Detail H systems (L-16 and L - I 7)
Likely to direct injection with HPCS, LPCS or RHS LPCl Returns to EOP-C5 at 9, since level was intentionally lowered prior to entering EOP-C2 Restores and maintains water level between MSCRWL and level recorded in step L-9 number 4 using Detail G and its OK to use Detail H systems NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT I O BOP RO Actions, when directed BOP RO Performs RPV Injection Via Shutdown Cooling Return per EOP-6 Attachment 30 Injection via RHS B (A)
Verify closed the following valves:
RHS*MOVI 5B (A), OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY RHS*MOV8B (A), HEAT EXCHANGER 1B (A) INLET BYPASS VLV (WHEN possible)
RHS*MOV33B (A), OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY RHS*FV38B (A), RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING RHS*MOV24B (A), LPCl B (A)
INJECTION VLV RHS*MOV40B (A), SDC B RETURN RHS*MOV104, RHR B TO REACTORHEADSPRAY CONSOLE OPERATOR Defeat Group 5 isolation interlocks When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to for 2RHS*MOV40B as follows defeat Group 5 isolation interlocks for (Figure 30-2):
2RHS*MOV40A or B per EOP-6 Attachment (2 CEC *PNL622)(NOT actually 30, immediately activate remote timer by performed) depressing FIO key THEN WAIT until the 2:OO 0 Lift AND tape the lead on minute TUA timer times out and report the terminal point BB-62 NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
\.-
jumpers are installed and leads are lifted. Install EOP Jumper #9 on terminal points BB-41 AND RH08 Group 5 Isolation Failure SDC MOVs, BB-60 TRUE F10) Verify RHS*Pl B (A), PMP 1B (A) is running.
NOTE 0 Verify open SWP*MOV90B (A),
HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE Per EOP-C5 Step L-13 and L-14, injection is WTR INLET VLV.
NOT allowable until RPV pressure drops below WAIT UNTIL reactor pressure 165 psig with 7 SRVs open. The crew SHALL has been reduced to less than NOT establish injection when RPV pressure 350 drops below 350 psig. This would violate the Throttle open RHS*MOV40B EOP step and Critical Task. (A), SDC B (A) RETURN to a maximum of 7450 gpm on E12-603B (A), RHR B (A) TOTAL FLOW meter to control RPV water level Throttle open SWP*MOV33B (A), HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV CONSOLE OPERATOR THROTTLE to establish When requested by BOP ROlATC RO to place approximately 7400 gpm on radiation monitor SWP*RE23B (A) in service (if E12-R602B (A), SVCE WTR not already in service), manually activate TO RHR B (A) HX FLOW meter remotes, then report RE23B (A) is in service:
NOTE: USE REMOTES FOR RE 23A IF 0 Request Rad Monitor APPROPRIATE : SWP*RE23B (A) placed in service NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RM02 SWP23B Rad Detector Online/Offline, EOP-6 Attachment 30 is ON cornplete Confirms P601 system injection to RM03 SWP23B Process Monitor Sample RPV is terminated and prevented Pump, ON Opens all 7 ADS valves by arming and depressing ADS MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons on P601 Reports 7 ADS valves are open Reports when RPV pressure drops below Table J value of 165 psig with 7 SRVs open Injects with systems to restore and maintain RPV water level in directed band (CT-3.0)
RHS Via Shutdown Cooling HPCS 0 LPCS 0 LPCl CONTINGENCY: IF ALL (including Fuel Zone) water level instruments are downscale, the Crew will enter EOP-C4, RPV Flooding temporarily. When RPV water level starts to rise (level can now be determined, EOP-C4 is exited (step 1 override) and EOP-C5 re-entered at 6 and EOP-C2 re-entered at 25.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Alternate Control Rod Insertion ATC RO Using EOP-6 Attachment 14 Appropriate sections to be performed are Flowchart determines appropriate 3.3 Additional Manual Scram Initiation sections (3.3 and 3.5) to be 3.5 Manual Control Rod Insertion (Driving rods performed.
with RDS). These sections are performed Performs section 3.3 concurrently. Reset ARI by directing fuses pulled CONSOLE OPERATOR per 3.3.1 WHEN requested to reset ARI per EOP-6 Attachment 14, immediately activate remote timer by depressing F8 key THEN WAIT until the 1:30 minute TUA timer times out and report the fuses are pulled L
RP14A RRCS ARI FailurelDefeated Div I, TRUE TUA I:30 minutes RPI 4B RRCS ARI FailurelDefeated Div II, TRUE TUA 1:30 minutes CONSOLE OPERATOR Defeat RPS interlocks by WHEN requested to defeat RPS per EOP-6 directing/installing RPS jumpers Attachment 14, immediately activate remote timer by depressing F9 key THEN WAIT until 0 Reset RPS by momentarily placing the 1:30 minute TUA timer times out and the following switches to RESET:
report the jumpers are installed (2CC*PNL603)
REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A RP02 RPS Failure to Scram Automatic, REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC C TRUE REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC B NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TUA 1:30 minutes REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC D
..................................................... 0 Ensure the eight white PILOT CONSOLE OPERATOR SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS WHEN RPS is reset, manually delete all lights are lit.
RD17 malfunctions to ensure rods fully insert 0 Ensure SCRAM DISH VOLUME when additional scram signal is inserted. VENT VLVS RDS*AOVI 24/132
.................................................... indicate open.
0 Ensure SCRAM DISH VOLUME DRAIN VLVS RDS*AOV123/130 indicate open.
NOTE: 0 Using one OR more of the After RPS is reset and while waiting for following, ensure the Scram
- indication that the SDV is drained, ATC RO Discharge Volume (SDV) is should proceed to section 3.5 to implement drained :
action to manually insert rods by driving in 0 Annunciator 603109, RPS A using RDS. It takes about 10 minutes for the DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL SDV annunciators to clear, indicating that the TRIP, clear SDV is drained 0 Annunciator 603409, RPS B DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL TRIP, clear Annunciator 603130, SDV LEVEL HIGH, clear NOTE: ATC RO At the examiners discretion, time compression may be used to shorten the time while waiting While waiting for SDV to drain for the SDV to drain. This is accomplished by performs section 3.5 directing the CONSOLE OPERATOR to NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS override OFF SDV annunciator 603109 or Verify the following pumps are 603409, to simulate SDV is drained. running (starts 2fldRDS pump using control switch):
RDS-PIA, CRD PUMP 1A RDS-PIB, CRD PUMP 1B Place controller 2RDS-FC107, CRD FLOW CONTROL, in MANUAL CAUTION To prevent pump motor damage or tripping the supply breaker, motor current shall not exceed 40 amps for RDS-PIA or RDS-PI B.
k * * * * * * * * * *
- X * * * * * * *
- 2 Depress the OPEN pushbutton on 2RDS-FC107 UNTIL the controller output meter shows 100% OR RDS pump motor current approaches 40 amps 7 Check that RDS System flow rises on C12-R606, CRD SYSTEM FLOW.
NOTE: In the following step it is 2xpected that RDS System Flow will Jrop.
3 Close 2RDS-PV101, DRIVE WTR NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS PRESS CONTROL MOV, to maximize Drive Water AP.
Ensure RDS Drive Water AP rises on C12-R602, DRIVE WTR DlFF PRESSURE Using an SHH 5366 key, bypass the RWM by taking the RWM Operator Console BYPASS/OPE RATE/TEST switch to the BYPASS position Using Figures 14-2 AND 14-3, track the status of the control rods, as the rods are inserted.
Starting with a control rod at OR near the center, select a control rod to be driven in on the Rod Select Matrix When the SDV alarms clear the ATC RO will ATC RO initiate another scram by tripping RPS using Return to Section 3.3 manual scram pushbuttons. All rods will fully WHEN the SDV is drained, insert. initiate a manual scram Arm and depress manual scram pushbutton (CT-4.0)
Check for control rod motion AND NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS control rod positions Confirm all rods fully inserted Report control rod status to SRO T ERMINAT ION C RITERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is restored and maintained in normal level band 160 to 200 inches and all control rods are fully inserted.
EVENT 11 SRO Admin JPM 5-1 SRO Classify the event as SAE 2.2.2 Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM for emergency classification.
NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE
-. A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 1 March 2005
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST I. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
- 2. Q uaIitat ive Attributes X I Realism/Credibility I x Event Sequencing I x Simulator Modeling Evaluating Crew Competencies I I I
- 3. Quantitative Attributes Total Malfunctions Malfunctions after EOP Entry Abnormal Events Major Transients EOPs Used EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time tb EOP Run Time Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
- 4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
NRC EXAM Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No.: NRC-02 Op-Test No.: NRC-01 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Simulator IC-20
- 1. Division I Low Pressure ECCS systems CSL and RHS are inoperable for maintenance.
- 2. 100% Power Rod Line >loo% (106%)
Turnover:
- 1. 'lace RDS-PI E 1 service Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description Swap Control Rod Drive Pumps to RDS-PI B in-service.
N (SRO) N2-OP-30 RR16A Recirc Pump (RCS) A outer seal degradation and leakage. The
@.25 1 min C, R, TS leakage requires removal from service and isolation of RCS Pump ramp (SRO) A to stop the leak. (TS 3.4.1)
RR16A Cram Rod insertion is required to reduce rod line below 100%.
@ .75 1 min R (ATC) With inoperable OPRMs additional actions are required to monitor ramp for power oscillations while in the Heightened Awareness Zone.
N2-SOP-29.I , Reactor Recirc Pump Seal Failure N2-SOP-29, Sudden Reduction In Core Flow Tech SPec 3.4.1 RD18 Control Rod Drive PumD RDS-PI B trim due to cloaaed suction RD063419 C, TS strainer with 2 HCU Acbumulator Troible Alarms. T h e crew will RD062227 (SRO) trip Reactor Water Cleanup pumps if warranted and restart an RDS pump after dispatching operators to changeover pump suction filters N2-SOP-30, Control Rod Drive Failures Tech -.---
. _SDec 3.1.5 ED02A Loss of line 5 and Division I and Ill Diesel Generators (DG) . . fails to DG04A TS (SRO) start on bus undervoltage. Division I DG manual start is CS03 performed to avoid the requirement to initiate a manual scram.
Crew will restore Service Water system to allow continued plant operation per SOP 3. SRO enters Tech Specs and with both High and Low Pressure Core Spray systems inoperable, enters LCO 3.0.3 which requires plant shutdown. High Pressure Core Spray is also unavailable as an injection source later in scenario.
N2-SOP-3, Loss of AC Power Tech Specs 3.5.1 LCO 3.0.3 3.7.1, 3.8.1, 3.8.8 PRA Tasks RR20 M (ALL) Reactor coolant leak. Rising Drywell Pressure will require a
@I .5% manual scram. RPV Water level lowers but can be restored and RR20@1Oo/o maintained above TAF by manually starting failed ECCS systems.
Containment Spray is required.
10 min ramp after scram N2-EOP-RPV, N2-EOP-PC Page 3 of 8 NUREG-I021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal Final Submittal Thursday, April 21,2005
NRC EXAM 9 1 I Perform RPV Blowdown to allow Low Pressure ECCS injection.
N2-E O P C 2 I
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor I Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No.: NRC-02 Op-Test No.: NRC-01 1 TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES ACTUAL ATTRIBUTES (PER SCENARIO; SEE SECTION D.5.d)
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 5 Events 2,3.4,5,7
\
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Events 7 3 '
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3 Event 2 SOP-29.1 and SOP-29, Event 3 SOP-30 Event 4 SOP-3
- 4. Major transients (1-2)
Event 5
- 5. EOPs enteredlrequiring substantive actions (1-2)
I 1 2
~ -~
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2 CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTIONS:
CT-1.0: Restart CRD pump within 20 minutes with inoperable control rod accumulators.
CT-2.0: Restore and maintain RPV water level above TAF with LP ECCS systems Event 8* Not counted in Total Malfunctions but counted as Malfunction After EOP entry per Appendix D C.2.c page 9. System out of service influences the mitigation strategy by reducing the number of available injection and containment spray systems to one. Crew must now prioritize use of remaining system to inject to restore water level before using RHR B for containment spray.
Page 4 of 8 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal Final Submittal Thursday, April 21,2005
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 42 RDS PUMP SWAP/RCS SEAL LEAK/LOSS OF LINE 5 WITH EDG FAILURES/RCS LEAK WITH DEGRADED ECCS REQUIRES RPV BLOWDOWN PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/1/05 VAL I DATED 6.Weaver, 6.Moore, P. Brennan DATE 3/7/05 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING - DATE qbI/d OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Securitv DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Initial Power Level: loo%, above the 100% Rod Line The scenario begins at 100% reactor power. The crew will swap Control Rod Drive Pumps to return RDS-P1B to service and remove RDS-P1A from service. After the normal evolution is complete, an outer seal leak develops on Recirc Pump (RCS) A. N2-SOP-29.1 is entered RCS pumps is removed from service and isolated. The crew will also enter N2-SOP-29 due to reduced core flow and insert Cram Rods to lower rod line below 100%. The crew will stabilize the plant in single loop and the SRO will implement the required single loop Tech Spec actions.
With the plant now stable, Control Rod Drive suction filter clogging results in the trip of the operating RDS pump and several accumulator trouble alarms. The crew will enter N2-SOP-30, trip Reactor Water Cleanup due to loss of pump seal cooling, swap RDS pump suction filters and restart an RDS pump.
A loss of one offsite 115 KV power Line 5 will occur. The Division I and Division Ill EDGs will fail to start. Manual operator action will be required to start the Division I EDG and preclude a manual scram. The Division Ill High Pressure Core Spray EDG cannot be started. The crew will implement the actions required by N2-SOP-3 to restore Service Water System flow to the Turbine and Reactor Building non safety related headers which have isolated due to the off site power loss.
__ A small reactor coolant leak develops inside the Drywell. This results in rising drywell temperatures and pressure. The crew will take manual action and scram the reactor. N2-EOP-RPV, PC are entered. The event is complicated by degraded ECCS response and loss of NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
electrical power. An RPV Blowdown is required to establish injection with the only remaining Low Pressure ECCS systems RHR B and C. Suppression Chamber Spray and Drywell Spray should be established to control primary containment pressure and temperature, as the LOCA becomes more severe. Drywell and Suppression Chamber Sprays will be complicated by loss of electrical power and degraded ECCS systems. The only remaining system that can be used for sprays, will also be required for RPV injection.
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C-2. SOP-29.1, 29,30 and 3 EAL Classification: ALERT 3.1.1 Primary containment pressure cannot be maintained <1.68 psig due to coolant leakage.
Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF. Drywell Spray is initiated.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
I. SIMULATOR SET UP
-- A. IC Number: IC-20 or equivalent.
- 6. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- b. RH14B ECCS Fails to Initiate (Divll), TRUE QUEUED
- c. CS03 HPCS Diesel Engine Failure, TRUE QUEUED
- d. E G I 56 No Transfer to Reserve SWG003, TRUE QUEUED
- e. RR16A RR Pump Upper Seal Failure (PIA), F3 Value 0.25; Ramp Time 1:00 minute
- f. RR16A RR Pump Upper Seal Failure (PIA), F4 Value 0.75; Ramp Time 1:00 minute
- g. RD18 CRD Suction Filter Clogged, TRUE F5
- h. RD063419 34-19 Rod Failure Accum Trouble, TRUE F5 TUA 2:OO minutes
- i. RD062227 22-27 Rod Failure Accum Trouble, TRUE F5 TUA 2:20 minutes
- j. ED02A Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 5, TRUE F6
- k. RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA F7 Value 1.5 I. RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA ET0 I Value 10; Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes
- 2. Remotes:
- a. RH33 2RHS*MOV24A 600V BKR STATUS, OPEN QUEUED
- b. CS17 2CSL*MOV104 600V BKR STATUS, OPEN QUEUED
- c. RH48 2RHS*MOV15B EOP Jumper, TRUE F8
- d. RH50 2RHS*MOV25B EOP Jumper, TRUE F8
- 3. Overrides:
- a. P601 LAMP RHS A /LPCS RTN TO SUPP POOL QUEUED MOV30A GREEN,OFF (PAGE 42)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. Division I Low Pressure ECCS
- a. CSL with Red Clearance applied to components
- i. CSL*Pl Pump in PTL ii. CSL*MOV104 Injection Valve Breaker open
- b. RHS Div I with Red Clearance applied to components
- i. RHS*PIA Pump Red Clearance PTL ii. RHS*MOV24A Injection Valve Breaker open iii. RHS*MOV30A closed using keylock switch
- c. RDS-PI B caution yellow tag applied to control switch D. Support Documentation None E. Miscellaneous
- 1. Red rod line sign posted
- 2. EVENT TRIGGERS
- a. ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown (Event Trigger 8) Initiates increase in RR20 magnitude to 10% with Ramp Time of 1O:OO minutes after Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN for reactor scram.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
- 11. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: I N 7D DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA)
Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 100% 0 Loadline = >loo%
Division I Low Pressure ECCS systems are INOPERABLE (pre-planned)
Corrective Maintenance on broken motor operator for RHS*MOV30A Return to Suppression Pool. Scheduled return to service is late on the next shift.
TS 3.5.1 Reauired Action C . l was entered 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> aao. Reauired Action C . l Action to restore one subsystem with 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time.
TS 3.6.1.6 Drywell Spray Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time TS 3.6.2.3 Suppression Pool Cooling Required Action A.l with 7 day Completion Time TS 3.6.2.4 Suppression Pool Spray Required Action A . l with 7 day Completion Time 0 Corrective Maintenance has been completed on RDS-PIB and it is to be placed in service for Post Maintenance Testing. When the pump is running contact the WEC to dispatch the assembled PMT crew to the pump to obtain all required data.
PART 111: RemarkslPlanned Evolutions:
Place RDS-PI B in service for Post Maintenance Testing.
PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO BOP RO NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What we did? Why? (Goals) I Other Options?
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
Ill. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1 .O Given the plant at power with RPV pressure >900 psig and two inoperable scram accumulators, the crew will restore charging water pressure >940 psig within 20 minutes of meeting conditions for entering TS 3.1.5 Condition B, by restarting an RDS pump and avoiding the requirement to immediately scram the reactor per N2-SOP-30 and Tech Spec 3.1.5.
CT Justification: Failure to restore Charging Header Pressure by restarting RDS pump results in direct adverse consequences and a challenge to plant safety by requiring a manual scram transient to be initiated. Per Tech Spec Basis 3.1.5With two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable and reactor steam dome pressure >900 psig, adequate pressure must be supplied to the charging water header. With inadequate charging water pressure, all of the accumulators could become inoperable, resulting in a potentially severe degradation of the scram performance.
Therefore, within 20 minutes from discovery of charging water header pressure < 940 psig concurrent with Condition B, adequate charging water header pressure must be restored. The allowed Completion Time of 20 minutes is considered a reasonable time to place a CRD pump into service to restore the charging header pressure, if required. This Completion Time also recognizes the ability of the reactor pressure alone to fully insert all control rods.
CT-2.0 Given degraded RPV injection sources, the crew will establish RPV injection using available Preferred Injection Systems listed i n Table E l of EOP-RPV to RESTORE AND MAINTAIN RPV water level above MSCRWL (-39 inches Fig Z) to preclude executing EOP-C3 or Flooding the Drywell by entering SAPS, per N2-EOP-RPV.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
CT Justification: Failure to restore and maintain RPV water level above -39 inches by implementing actions per EOP-RPV will result in adverse consequences to the plant by abandoning the EOP injection strategy and implementing Drywell Flooding (from EOP-RPV Step L-16) used in the SAPs. It is expected that proper implementation of EOP-RRV will result in performing an RPV Blowdown by opening 7 ADS valves to reduce RPV pressure and manual injecting RHS Pump B and RHS Pump C (either both or any one pump) which are capable of recovering level above -39 inches and ultimately above -14 inches (TAF). Water level is expected to drop below -39 inches for several minutes while executing the steps to blowdown and establish injection. There is no specific time constraints attached to this CT. As long as the crew recovers level without entering EOP-C3, Steam Cooling or the SAPs, this would demonstrate satisfactory completion of the CT.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I .o Given the plant with direction to swap Control Rod Drive pumps, the crew will start RDS-PI B and secure RDS-PI A per N2-OP-30 PO-2.0 Given the plant with an RCS pump seal leak, the crew will remove the pump from service per N2-SOP-29.1 and N2-SOP-29, then continue to operate the plant in single loop per with N2-OP-29.
PO-3.0 Given the plant operating at power and a Control Rod Drive pump trip with accumulator trouble alarms, the crew will restart an RDS pump within 20 minutes per N2-SOP-30 PO-4.0 Given the reactor plant operating at power when a loss of offsite line 5 with EDG failures occurs, the crew will take action to start the NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
failed EDG and stabilize service water in accordance with N2-SOP-
- 03. (Operator actions with PRA significance)
PO-5.0 Given a reactor plant operating at power with a LOCA in progress, the crew will manually scram the reactor plant prior to reaching 1.68 psig in the Containment.
PO-6.0 Given a loss of all high pressure injection the crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above TAF after performing an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-RPV and N2-EOP-C2. (Operator actions with PRA significance)
PO-7.0 Given a failure of Low Pressure ECCS pumps to start on high drywell pressure signal, the crew will manually start the Low Pressure ECCS pumps per EOP Bases and Operations Manual PO-8.0 Given the plant with a LOCA and conditions met for containment spray, the crew will initiate Containment Spray per N2-EOP-PC and EOP-6 Attachment 22.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Crew 0 Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 SRO RDS Pump Swap PO-1.o Directs RDS-PIB started and RDS-PIA placed in standby per N2-OP-30, F.2.0 0 After RDS-PI B is placed in service, contacts WEC to dispatch team to perform Post Maintenance Testing requirements.
BOP RO Dispatches A 0 to perform prestart Role Play lineup When dispatched as additional operators to support the pump swap with activities such as IF RDS is supplying WCS pump performing prestart verifications and seal cooling, THEN station monitoring, respond as required. There will be personnel at locations to no unusual conditions or readings to be simultaneously monitor WCS reported for this evolution. pump seal parameters during RDS pump changeover.
Start the standby CRD pump NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/ ---- _ - - -- .-
PLANT RESPONSE JP'tKA I OK AC I IONS 2RDS-PI B CRD PUMP 1B by placing its control switch to START, THEN release to Normal-Afte r-START.
Stop the CRD pump to be shutdown 2RDS-P1A, CRD PUMP 1A by taking its control switch to STOP AND releasing to Normal-After-STOP.
Directs local monitoring of operating WCS pump(s) seal cavity temperatures IF WCS pump seal cooling is being supplied from RDS, THEN directs verification of seal cooling flow between 1-4 gpm as indicated locally.
As required, directs adjusting RPV Level Inst rumentation BackfiII Reports RDS-PI B in service and RDS-PIA in standby.
NRC Scenario 2 -1 1- March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 RCS Pump A outer seal leakage PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR BOP RO When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate Identifies and reports annunciator malfunction by depressing F3 key: 602109 to SRO Implements ARP 602109 actions RRIGA, 0.25, Ramp Time 1:00 Min (F3) Monitor DW Equipment Drain Tank leak rate. Refer to ITS RRPIA upper seal cavity press lowers to 3.4.5 RCS Operational about 220 psis Leakage.
Annunciator 602109 Recirc Pump ?A Outer SL Monitor upper and lower seal Leak High alarms after about I minute. cavity pressures using P602 pressure indicators.
Monitor upper and lower seal cavity temperatures using P614 recorder points 8 and 9 and Process Computer points RCSTAl5 and RCSTAl7.
Enter N2-SOP-29.1 and performs concurrently with ARP actions.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SROlBOP RO Implements SOP-29.1 Actions while monitoring Seal Action leg conditions that may require pump trip Establish periodic monitoring of pump conditions.
If applicable, monitor DEWDFR leakage for indication of degradation (TS 3.4.5).
If conditions warrant, shutdown the affected pump per N2-OP-29, G.2.0.
Refer to N2-OP-29, H.4.0, if both seal injection and cooling water are lost.
BOP RO Implements SOP-29.1 Seal CONSOLE OPERATOR Actions After the crew enters N2-SOP-29.1 and is IF ANY of THESE OCCUR monitoring parameters activate malfunction by Upper seal cavity pressure depressing F4 key: < 100 psig Upper seal cavity pressure >
RRI 6A, 0.75, Ramp Time I:00 Min (F4) 920 psig Lower seal cavity pressure >
Upper Seal pressure drops below 100 psig 1200 psig which requires the RCS pump to be tripped Outer seal leakage > 1.2 gpm NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Annunciator 6021 15, Recirc Pmp 1A seal Seal staging flow > 1.8 gpm staging flow high/low DFR > 1 gpm rise RCS Pump A is manually tripped and isolated ..THEN CONTINUE AT A (when by closing RCS*MOVIOA and 18A with the seal pressure drops below following alarms 100 psig) 602207 RECIRC PMP ?A LOW SPEED AUTO Trip the affected pump TRANSFER NOTAVAILABLE AND enter N2-SOP-29.
603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL Recirculation pump should HIGH/L 0 W be tripped by opening 603218 OPRM TRIP ENABLED RECIRC PMP IA(1B)
Reactor Water Cleanup is manually realigned MOTOR BRKR 5A by for single loop by lowering system flow and placing control switch to closing WCS*MOVl05. When WCS flow is STOP or PTL.
lowered, the in-service filter demineralizer HOLD Pumps start with the following P602 Lower WCS flow to < 450 alarms gpm (by throttling MOV200) 602317 RWCU FILTER DEMlN I TROUBLE Close WCS*MOVI 05.
602318 RWCU FILTER DEMlN I TROUBLE Close RCS*MOVI OA Close RCS*MOVI 8A When time permits, perform N2-OP-29, H. (Single Loop Operations SRO/BOP RO/ATC RO Note Enter and implement the flowchart Crew initiates N2-SOP-29 flowchart decision actions per N2-SOP-29 when blocks by answering "YESINO" questions. directed from SOP-29.1 Is a Recirc pump in service?
YES NRC Scenario 2 -14 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 Is core flow to left of natural circ line? NO Core flow AND Power in Scram Region? NO Note Core flow AND Power in Exit With operation above the 100% rod line, the Region? NO crew will insert CRAM rods. It is expected that 0 Reduce rodline below 100% by the ATC RO will insert the first four cram rods inserting CRAM rods. (EVENT to position 00 using P603 CONTINUOUS 2 Reactivity Manipulation for INSERT pushbutton. (EVENT 2 Reactivity ATC RO)
Manipulation for ATC RO) 0 > 3 OPRMs operable? YES 0 Plant in Heightened Awareness Reactor Power will lower and Rod Line will be Zone? YES reduced below 100% rod line Recover per Attachment 2 SOP-29 Attachment 2 actions IF one Recirc. Pump tripped AND NOT in Natural Circulation, perform the following:
Verify Recirc Flow Controller in LOOP MANUAL for BOTH loops Close Flow Control valve for the tripped pump Reduce flow rate of operating loop to less than 41,800 gpm NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS as indicated by flow recorder at 2CEC*PNL602 0 Notify I&C to perform APRM Scram AND Rod Block AND rod block monitor setpoint change 0 Reduce thermal power to less than 70% of rated 0 IF pump speed does NOT indicate 0 rpm one minute AFTER pump trip, close 2RCS*MOV18A OR 2RCS*MOV1OA 0 IF NOT able to start the tripped pump, perform N2-OP-29, Subsection H.6.0, Single Recirculation Loop Operation AND exit this attachment.
EVENT 2 SRO ACTIONS SRO Direct trip of RCS Pump A and ensure actions of SOP-29, Attachment 2 and OP-29, G.2.0 are taken to place in shutdown condition.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS J Enters N2-SOP-29.
J Directs cram rods inserted.
J Refer to ITS 3.4.5 for RCS leakage requirements.
3 Refer to ITS 3.4.1 for single loop operation. Condition C LCO requirements are currently not met until actions are complete to adjust APLHGR, MCPR, RPS APRM Scram and Rod Block settings for single loop operation. The Completion Time is 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> o Notify I&C to reduce APRM scram and rod block monitor trip setpoints. May be done by contacting WEC SRO.
o Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and wok planning.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 PO-3.0 Operating Control Rod Drive Pump trip CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate ATC RO malfunction by depressing F5 key: Acknowledge and report Enter N2-SOP-30 RD18 CRD Suction Filter Clogged, TRUE Monitor for override conditions and RD063419 34-19 Rod Failure Accum performs actions if required Trouble, TRUE, TUA 2:OO minutes RD062227 22-27 Rod Failure Accum Trouble, TRUE, TUA 2:20 minutes (F5)
IF THESE OCCUR ....
RDS P I A trips RDS flow and charging pressure drop to 0 RPV pressure is >900 psig AND The following annunciators alarm: Two or more accumulators 603318 CRD Pmp Suction Fltr Diff Press for withdrawn control rods are inoperable AND High (first alarm)
Charging water header After the RDS pump trips then:
pressure <940 psig for 20 minutes 603308 CRD Pmp I A / I B Auto Trip THEN 603309 CRD Pmp ?A Suct Press Low SCRAM the reactor per N2-60331 I CRD Charging Wtr Press Low SOP-101c .
603315 CRD PMP 18 Suct Press Low 603446 CRD Pmp Disch Hdr Press Low NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS After 2:OO minutes, 603441 Rod Drive Dispatches operator to report Accumulator Trouble alarms accumulator pressure for 34-19 and Rod and Detector Display Amber Trouble light 22-27 is lit for the affected accumulators Implements pump recovery actions Accumulator 34-19 after 2:OO minute delay Accumulator 22-27 after 2:20 minute delay Note While executing actions to restart an RDS pump the crew will monitor the flowchart override conditions and initiate a manual scram, if required. It is NOT expected to meet any of the required manual scram conditions.
ROLE PLAY Report as operator dispatched that both accumulator 34-19 and 22-27 pressure read IsRDSpump 900 psig. operating? NO IF Annunciator 602324, RWCU Annunciator 602324, RWCU PUMP CLG WTR PUMP CLG WTR TEMP HIGH, TEMP HIGH, is expected to be received after is received. THEN ..... Remove several minutes with no operating RDS pump. WCS from service as follows:
Throttle WCS*MOV200 until in service filters on hold.
Trip WCS pumps.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE IF An RDS pump can NOT be RDS pump restoration is expected to be restored to service within 15 completed in less than 15 minutes. minutes OR indications of system breech exist.
THEN.. . .. .Isolate RDS backfill by closing 2RDS-V20 (preferred) OR 2RDS-V2058.
Shift 2RDS-FC107 (RDS flow CONSOLE OPERATOR controller) to Manual.
WHEN dispatched to swap RDS suction filter Close FCV to minimum DELETE malfunction RD18 WAIT 3 minutes position.
and report to control room that suction filters Determines trip is caused by are swapped. low suction pressure Dispatches operator to swap AFTER RDS pump is operating delete RDS suction filters per N2-OP-malfunction RD06 to clear accumulator 30, Section F . l .O.
trouble condition. Start a RDS pump (within 20 minutes of 2"d inoperable accumulator with Charging header pressure 940 psig.
(CT-1.O)
WHEN a RDS pump is running, Following RDS pump restart and flow control perform the following:
valve operation, system flow and pressure are Adjust RDS flow using restored to normal. Associated alarms will 2RDS-FC107 to clear. approximately 63 gpm.
Place 2RDS-FC107 in Auto.
IF WCS OR RPV backfill NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS was removed from service, THEN restore per SM/CRS.
Verify WCS/RCS seal flows and backfill flows per N2-OP-30, Sections F.2.5 through F.2.9 WHEN charging water header pressure has been restored above 940 psig, exit this procedure (N2-SOP-30).
Report RDS pump is restarted EVENT 3 SRO Actions -
SRO Directs entry into SOP-30 Declares two accumulators inoperable with their pressure below 940 psig and enters Tech Spec 3.1.5 Condition B and implements the REQUIRED ACTIONS B. Two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable with reactor steam dome pressure ~ 9 0 0 psig.
B. 1 Restore charging water header pressure to >940 psig. Completion NRC Scenario 2 -21 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT10NS Time is 20 minutes from discovery of Condition B concurrent with charging water header pressure <
940 psig AND B.2.1 Declare the associated control rod scram time "slow."
Completion Time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
OR B.2.2 Declare the associated control rod inoperable.
Completion Time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
EVENT 4 PO40 Loss of Line 5 with EDG Failures CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F6 key: BOP RO II Recognize and report Loss of Line EDOZA, Loss of Off-Site 115KV Line 5, 5 and Division I and Division Ill TRUE EDGs failed to start.
DG04A, DG 1 UV LOCA Start Failure is now II Enters and executes N2-SOP-3 in effect Determines that both Divisions Multiple 86 devices and annunciators actuate (I and II) have not lost power on P852. Div I and Div 111 EDG fail to start on Determines Division I EDG did undervoltage. 4 160 VAC Emergency not energize the bus Switchgear ENS*SWGIOI and 102 Starts Division I EDG from deenergize. HPCS is now unavailable due to P852 and reports EDG started NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS S WG 102 loss and is not recoverable. Verifies output breaker 101-1 SWP Non Essential MOVs close, isolating closes and observes SWP flow to CCS and CCP heat exchangers. ENS*SWG101 is energized The Div I EDG will start when manually started At P601, verifies Div II SWP fro P852. Non-Essential MOVs close After EDG energizes ENS*SWGI 01, verifies:
Div I SWP Non-Essential MOVs close One Div I SWP pump restarts WHEN SWP Pump restarts u Open ALL SWP Non-Essential MOVs Throttle SWP Pump Discharge MOV74s to maintain pump flow below 10,000 gpm o Start a 3rdDiv I1 SWP Pump and reopen MOV74s Verify proper operation of EDG Voltage 4160 VAC Frequency 60 Hz SWP flow > 780 gpm Restore pneumatics to Drywell At P851 open IAS*SOV166 At P601 open IAS*SOV164 Refer to Attachment 1 for subsequent actions and fault NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS identification Role Play: If dispatched to perform switchyard ATC RO to electrical power distribution panel Subsequent Actions (N2-SOP-3 wal kdowns, wait approximately 5 minutes then Attachment 1) report back that all indications are good and Reports GTS running on the only targets found were Div I under voltage Reactor Building trips. Restores drywell cooling by restarting unit coolers on P873.
0 Secures CWS blowdown if required.
Restores CMS.
Open 2CMS*SOV62B 0 Open 2CMS*SOV6OA 0 Open 2CMS*SOV62A 0 Open 2CMS*SOVGOB 0 Restart or verify in standby the Div I H2102 Monitor in CONSOLE OPERATOR accordance with N2-OP-82 WHEN requested to start CMSIO sample (May not be performed) pumps, manually activate remotes as 0 Notify Rad Protection to start requested 2CMS*RE1OA AND verify the RM03 for CMS*REI OA, ON monitor is on line and working properly 0 Notify Rad Protection to start 2CMS*REI OB AND verify the monitor is on line and working properly SRO NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Directs entry into N2-SOP-3 Directs subsequent and fault Line 5 loss with CSH EDG failing to starf identification actions results in loss of power to HPCS. HPCS is Declares HPCS inoperable AND now inoperable and with LPCS already with LPCS already inoperable inoperable for maintenance, Tech Spec 3.5.1 enter Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition H Condition H is entered. This is the most restrictive LCO.
Condition H not met for HPCS and Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS)
Systems inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTION H . l Enter LCO 3.0.3 COMPLETION TIME Immediately 0 Enters Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:
- a. MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;
- b. MODE 3 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and C. MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.
Enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 Condition B NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTO R ACT10NS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS for HPCS inoperable High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTIONS B.1 Verify by administrative means RClC System is OPERABLE when RClC is required to be OPERABLE.
Completion Time is Immediately AND B.2 Restore HPCS System to OPERABLE status.
Completion Time is 14 days TS 3.8.1 Condition D is most restrictive after Enters Tech. Spec. 3.8.1 and LCO 3.0.3 considerations, with 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Condition A completion time for line or EDG restoration. Condition A not met for Line 5 Then 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for the other component. REQUIRED ACTION A . l directs N2-OSP-LOG WOO1 performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
AND A.2 is not applicable under current conditions AND A.3 Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. Completion Time 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Condition B not met for Div Ill EDG Condition D not met Line 5 AND Div Ill EDG One required offsite circuit inoperable.
AND One required DG inoperable.
REQUIRED ACTION D.1 Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.
Completion Time 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> OR D.2 Restore required DG to OPERABLE status. Completion Time 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 0 Conducts crew briefing 0 Notifies Operations and Plant Management 0 Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and wok planning.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 5 RCS Coolant Leakage into the Drywell PO-5.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F7 key:
RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA Value 1.5 BOP RO RCS coolant leakage into DW is initiated. IF Reports alarm 851254 and CMS*RElOs have been returned to service implements actions following power loss, annunciator 851254 Determine the source(s) of the PROCESS AIRBORNE RAD MONITOR alarm by reviewing the status of A C TIVATED alarms. the DRMS monitors using the STATUS GRID function of the DRMS computer indicates CMS*REl Os DRMS console. Color-coded alarming . identification is used for status Drywell floor drain leak rate rising. of normal (green), alert alarm Drywell pressure begins to rise. (yellow), high radiation (red),
suspect data (white), and equipment failure (blue). For applicable alarm response refer DWP slowly rises and 603140 DRYWELL to Table 851254. For alert PRESSURE HIGH/LO W alarms at about 0.78 response refer to step e.
Psis If there has been an increase in A manual scram should be directed prior to the containment activity as automatic high drywell pressure RPS trip evidenced by an alert or High setpoint of 1.68 psis Rad alarm on the gaseous or particulate channel of NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPE RATOR ACT10NS CMS*RElOA or B:
Notify the SM.
0 Notify the Rad. Prot.
Department.
Attempt to identify the cause of the increase, notify Chemistry to sample contain ment.
Verify Reactor Coolant leakage is within Tech.
Spec. limits (see Tech.
Spec. 3.4.3.2). {ITS 3.4.5)
EVENT 5 and 6 SRO Actions SRO PO-5.0 and 6.0 Updates crew and identifies the threshold DWP value that the CONSOLE OPERATOR reactor will be scrammed at when WHEN Mode Switch is placed in Shutdown, reached.
verify change in status of malfunction RR20 When DWP threshold is reached, RR20 RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA Value directs manual scram I O ; Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes ET01 Receive and repeat back scram report ET01 Mode Switch in Shutdown.
Enters EOP-RPV on low RPV IF ET01 fails to trigger RR20 ......MANUALLY water level at 159 inches enter RR20, 1O%, Ramp Time 1O:OO minutes Directs initial level restored and maintained 160 inches to 200 inches with Feedwater, CRD, RClC (L-3)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 Directs RPV pressure band 800 to 1000 psig with EHC in automatic using BPV (P-5) 0 Enters EOP-PC on high Drywell pressure when DWP reaches 1.68 Psig 0 May direct Suppression Chamber and Drwyell spray initiation. If this is directed, the SRO will have to redirect RHS for injection, when level drops below TAF -14 inches.
0 When loss of high pressure feed systems occurs determines RPV water level cannot be maintained above -14 inches (TAF) 0 May direct SLS injected from Boron Tank 0 Transition to EOP-RPV at 0 Directs ADS inhibited (L-5)
Detail E l Preferred Injection Systems 0 Directs level restored and 0 Condensate/Feedwater (tripped) maintained above -14 inches (Fig 0 RClC (available) Z) with Preferred Injection Systems HPCS (power loss) from Detail E l (L-6) 0 LPCS (not available) 0 Are 2 or more Subsystems Detail F 0 LPCl (B and C only available) lineup? (L-7) YES; LPCl B and 0 RHS through Shutdown Cooling (RHS B LPCl c after depressurizing) 0 WAIT until level drops to -14 inches (Fig Z) (L-9)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Is any Subsystems Detail F lineup Detail F Injection Subsystems with a pump running? (L-IO) YES; 0 Condensate/Feedwater (NO) LPCl B and LPCl C HPCS(N0) Is any injection source lineup with 0 LPClA(N0) a pump running? (L-12) YES; LPCl LPCl B (YES) B and LPCl C LPCl C(YES)
LPCS(N0)
After applying Fuel Zone Correcfion using Fig BEFORE water level drops to -39 Z, TAF -14 inches is about -52 inches AND inches (Fig Z) . . ..... ENTER EOP-MSCRWL -39 inches is about -72 inches at C2 RPV Blowdown while 800 psig. continuing here (EOP-RPV step L-16)
Executes EOP-C2 as follows:
Determines reactor WILL stay shutdown without boron (Step 2)
Drywell Pressure? Above 1.68 psig (Step 9)
Prevent LPCS and LPCl injection not needed for core cooling.
(Step I O ) Current conditions require injection, so NO system injection is to be prevented.
Determines SPL is above 192 feet (Step 11)
Directs all 7 ADS valves open (Step 12)
When all 7 ADS valves are reported open, continues in C2 to WAIT blocks (Step 16 then 17)
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When RPV injection is established with RHS B Continues EOP-RPV actions at and C systems, RPV water level will turn and step L-16 and directs RPV water be restored above -39 inches. Afler level is level restored and mainatained restored, SRO should direct RHR system A above -39 inches (Fig Z) with lined up for Containment Spray Preferred Injection Systems from Detail E l RHS B and RHS C (LPCI) are to be injected (CT-2.0)
Determines RPV water level can be restored and maintained above
-14inches (Fig Z)per Step L-4 override and returns to EOP-RPV at 0 Directs RPV water level is restored and maintained 160 to 200 inches using RHS C and RHS B WHEN water level is restored above -14inches, directs RHS B lined up for Containment Spray SRO Actions directed from EOP-PC These actions are directed from EOP-PC Directs RHR Loop B placed in Suppression Chamber Spray but only if pump is not needed fore core cooling.
WAIT until Suppression Chamber Pressure is above 10 psig NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Verify DW parameters are inside Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (EOP-PC Fig K)
Directs tripping RCS Pumps (Should already be tripped)
Directs Drywell Unit Coolers tripped (Should already be tripped)
Directs RHS B lined up for Drywell Defeating Drywell Spray interlocks is Spray per EOP-6 Attachment 22 necessary due to Div I1 ECCS initiation logic 0 Defeating Drywell Spray failure (malfunction RHl4B).
interlocks is necessary EVENT 5 and 6 ATC RO/BOP RO as ATC RO v directed WHEN DWP reaches pre-PO-5.0 and PO-6.0 determined value and when directed by the SRO, places Mode Switch in Shutdown Provides scram report to SRO Performs Scram Actions per N2-SOP-101c 17 Verify automatic responses:
All rods full in Rx power lowering Turbine trippedlTSVs &
TCVs shut Generator tripped and house loads transferred SDV Vents &Drain valves closed NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACT1ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 RCS pumps downshift RPV pressure on TBVs OR SRVs FWLC controlling level >
159.3 inches IF all Feedwater pumps have tripped THEN place all FWS-LVlO and 55 controllers in manual and verify valves are full closed IF scram cannot be reset, if directed by SRO closes RDS-V28 Charging Header Is01 by dispatching operator.
-- Perform the following as time permits:
Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07 (2N HS-MCC008-2E).
0 If required, secure makeup to the Cooling Tower.
At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown HWC.
IF WCS is in one pump three filter lineup.. ...THEN throttle close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if required, throttle open 2WCS-MOVI I O ) to obtain approximately 225 gpm WCS NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
I NSTRUCTO R ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS flow.
Maintains RPV water level in directed band Reports NPS-SWG003 de-energized and resulting loss of Feedwater system BOP RO Actions performed as directed BOP RO When RPV level drops to I 0 8 When RPV water level drops to 108.8 inches inches report RClC start RClC starts and water Level 2 containment Inhibits ADS using 2 keylock isolation occurs. Standby Gas Treatment switches systems and Control Building Special Filter When DWP reaches 1.68 psig Trains start.
Inform SRO of EOP entry condition EVENT 7 Division II Low Pressure ECCS Verify Div II ECCS systems Systems fail to start PO-7.0 start Report failure to start Manually start RHS C Pump (CT-2.0)
Manually start RHS B Pump (CT-2.0)
Report pumps started Opens all 7 ADS valves by arming and depressing ADS MANUAL INITIATION pushbuttons on P601 Reports 7 ADS valves are open Injects with systems to restore After RPV Blowdown, RHS Injection MOVs NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS must be opened from P601 to establish and maintain RPV water level in injection. When level begins to rise and directed band (CT-2.0) transitions from Fuel Zone to Wide Range 0 RHS Via Shutdown Cooling instruments, action should be taken to LPCl B (RHS), opens MOV24B close RHS LPCl injection MOVs to prevent LPCl C (RHS), opens MOV24C overfilling the RPV (control level below 202 inches). This will also allow RHS B loop to be diverted to Containment Spray.
0 When directed initiates Drywell Contai nment Spray Spray using RHS B per EOP-6 PO-8.0 Attachment 22 step 3.2.2 (2CEC*PNLGOI ).
CONSOLE OPERATOR WHEN requested to defeat Drywell Spray IF Drywell spray valve interlocks valve interlocks per EOP-6 Attachment 22, WAIT 2 minutes then activate remote by are not met, defeat the depressing F8 key. Report the jumpers are RHS*MOVI5B/25B interlock by installed performing the following:
RH48 2RHS*MOV15B EOP Jumper, TRUE F8 NOTE: Dispatches another operator RH50 2RHS*MOV25B EOP Jumper, TRUE to install jumpers F8 0 At 2CEC*PNL704A, install EOP Jumper #33 from terminal strip T C I 10, TB2 terminal 7 to terminal strip T C I 12, TB2 terminal 19.
(Figure 22-2)
At 2CEC*PNL704A, install EOP Jumper #34 from NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS terminal strip T C I 08, TB1 terminal 2 to terminal strip TC108, T B I terminal 4.
(Figure 22-3)
NOTE: Verifying SWP*MOVSOB open may be delayed until after sprays are in service.
0 Verify open SWP*MOV90B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR INLET VLV 0 Verify closed AND IF possible overridden, RHS*MOV24B, LPCl B INJECTION VLV 0 Verify running RHS*Pl B, PMP 1B 0 IF Suppression Chamber Sprays are required concurrently with Drywell Sprays, perform the following:
Open RHS*MOV33B, OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY o Verify approximately 450 gpm on SUPPR SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*f1643) 0 Verify closed, RHS*FV38B, RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING 0 Verify open, RHS*MOV4B, NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS PMP I B MINIMUM FLOW VLV Open RHS*MOV25B, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY Open RHS*MOVI 5B, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY Verify closed, RHS*MOV4B, PMP 1B MINIMUM FLOW VLV Verify approximately 7450 gpm on DRYWELL SPRAY HEADER FLOW (2RHS*F/63B)
Verify open SWP*MOV90B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR INLET VLV Throttle open SWP*MOV33B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B SVCE WTR OUTLET VLV to establish Service Water flow to RHR Heat Exchanger 1B of approximately 7400 gpm (12-R602B)
WHEN possible, close RHS*MOV8B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B INLET BYPASS VLV CONSOLE OPERATOR When requested by BOP RO/ATC RO to place Request Rad Monitor radiation monitor SWP*RE23B in service (if SWP*RE23B placed in service.
not already in service), manually activate remotes, then report RE23B is in service:
RM02 SWP23B Rad Detector Online/Offline, ON RM03 SWP23B Process Monitor Sample Pump, ON NRC Scenario 2 -3E March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS T ERMI NATION C RITERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF. Drywell Spray is initiated.
EVENT 8 SRO Admin JPM 5-2 SRO Classify the event as ALERT 3.1 .I Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM for ernergency cIass ification.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. After the second caucus, convene the crew in the classroom for a facilitative critique on:
- 1. What the crew saw and how they responded to each event?
- 2. Why the crew responded the way they did or their goal?
- 3. What went well during the scenario (STRENGTHS)?
- 4. What the crew could have done better (AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT)?
B. Ensure the expectations in each performance objective are discussed.
C. PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS (Attachment 7), that were not met, should be addressed.
D. Review the Critical Tasks if applicable.
E. At the conclusion, review the strengths and areas for improvement for improvement. Review video tape if appropriate.
F. Significant comments from the post scenario discussion should be recorded to allow later retrieval and follow-up.
NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS
- A. Reference Events None B. Commitments
- 1. 10CFR55.45
- 2. 10CFR55.59 VII. LESSONS LEARNED None NRC Scenario 2 March 2005
NRC EXAM Appendix D Scenario 0utline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No.: NRC-03 Op-Test No.: NRC-01 Examiners: Operators:
Initial Conditions: Simulator IC-IO with additional rods withdrawn to raise power to about 4.5%. Reactor startup in progress per N2-OP-101A.
Turnover: Continue power ascension; N2-OP-IOI A; Section E.3.0, Step 3.3.
Continue the startup, transfer the reactor mode switch to run after APRM downscale condition is cleared (above 4%). EHC Pump B is out of service for motor repairs.
Event No. 1 Malf. No. Event Type*
Event Description I R (SRO)
I (SRO)
Withdraw control rods raise reactor power to above 5%. Several control rods must be withdrawn to raise power to clear the APRM downscale condition.
N2-OP-101A IRM A Failure - h o p Trip. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip. (TS determination for SRO).
TS (SRO) placed in service. With less than 4 operating pumps, an additional pumps must be started with 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> COMPLETION TIME.
N2-OP-11 Tech Spec 3.7.1 4 RD05 C (ATC) Control Rod 34-27 Drift Out. N2-SOP-8 will be executed to fully 34-27 C (SRO) insert and isolate the control rod. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod.
N2-SOP-8 Tech Spec 3.1.5 5 Transfer Reactor Mode Switch in RUN.
N2-OP-101A 6 FW30A Feedwater Pump A minimum flow valve fails open with RPV FW16A I (SRO) Narrow Range level input to FWLC failed as-is. RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective function then transfer to redundant Narrow Range transmitter before returning FWLC to automatic control.
N2-SOP-6 NP-nP-R -
(SRO) MCC 302 Feeder Breaker to ICS'MOV128 RClC Steam Line Containment Isolation Valve trips open. Prevents isolation valve from closing on subsequent steam leak.
Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 Page 5 of 8 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal Final Submittal Wednesday, April 20,2005
NRC EXAM 8 RC12 I M(ALL) RClC Steam Leak into Reactor Building with Failure to isolate.
25% 10 Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the RClC steam line will min be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-SC is required and the reactor will ramp be manually scrammed. EHC Pump trip results in loss of Bypass RC11 Valve capability, if used to anticipate RPV Blowdown.
TC15A N2-EOP-RPV T C I 5B N2-EOP-SC 9
radiation level. Requires action to close Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers and manually start Standby Gas Treatment systems to terminate a potential ground level release pathway.
N2-OP-52 10 When Reactor Building temperatures exceed 212°F an RPV Blowdown is required. ADS/SRV PSV 126 fails to open during RPV Blowdown due to Loss of N2supply. Requires operator action to open an additional SRV to obtain the number directed by EOP-c2 N2-EOP-C2
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Facility: Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No.: NRC-03 Op-Test No.: NRC-01 TARGET QUANTITATIVE ATTRIBUTES I ACTUALATTRIBUTES I
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 6 Events 2.3.6.7.9.10 I I
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Events 8.10
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Event 4 SOP-8 Event 6 SOP-6
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1 Event 8
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 3 Page 6 of 8 NUREG-1021, Revision 9 2005 U2 Test 2 (NRC) - Scenario Outline Final Submittal Final Submittal Wednesday, April 20,2005
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 37 TRANSFER MODE SWITCH TO RUNKONTROL ROD DRIFT/UNISOLABLE RClC STEAM LEAK WITH RPV BLOWDOWN PREPARER G. Bobka DATE 2/10/05 VALIDATED R. Lange, B. Moore, M. Smith DATE 2/16/05 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE vb\/a I f 0PERAT1ONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CON FIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Initial Power Level: 4.5% with Mode Switch in STARTUP The scenario begins at about 4.5% reactor power, during plant startup. The crew will continue the startup by withdrawing control rods to raise power above 5% with subsequent Mode Switch transfer to RUN. IRM A failure due to an inop trip occurs resulting in a trip if RPS trip system A. The crew will bypass the failed instrument and reset the resulting RPS channel trip.
Service Water Pump A trips occurs requiring a standby pump to be placed in service. With less than four operating Service Water pumps, Tech Spec entry is required. Control Rod 34-27 will drift out. N2-SOP-8 will be executed to fully insert and isolate the control rod. With power level below RWM setpoint the RWM must be bypassed to insert the drifting rod. The startup now continues and the crew completes steps until the Mode Switch is transferred to RUN. The scenario can continue regardless of whether the crew actually places the Mode Switch to RUN.
Feedwater Pump A minimum flow valve fails open with a concurrent failure of RPV Narrow Range level input to Feedwater Level Control System (FWLC). With the level transmitter failed as-is, an RPV water level transient results requiring crew to take manual control of level control valve to prevent an automatic protective trip function per N2-SOP-6. When level is stabilized the crew will then transfer to redundant Narrow Range transmitter per normal operating procedures and subsequently return FWLC to automatic control.
The major transient begins when a RClC Steam Leak into Reactor Building occurs. Automatic and manual attempts to isolate the RClC steam line will be unsuccessful. Entry in EOP-SC is required and the reactor will be manually scrammed. Reactor Building Ventilation System fails to isolate on high radiation level. This requires action to close Secondary Containment Isolation Dampers and manually start Standby Gas Treatment systems to terminate a potential ground level release pathway. When Reactor Building temperatures exceed 212°F in more than one area, an RPV Blowdown is required.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
EHC Pump A trips to disable the Bypass Valves as a means of rapidly reducing RPV pressure to mitigate the steam leak. ADS/SRV PSV 126 fails to open during RPV Blowdown due to Loss of N2 supply, requiring operator action to open an additional SRV to obtain the number directed by EOP-C2.
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, SC, C-2. N2-SOP-6 and N2-SOP-8 EAL Classification : SAE 3.4.1 Main Steam Line, RClC steam line or Reactor Water Cleanup isolation failure AND release pathway, outside normal process system flowpaths from unisolable system exists outside primary containment SAE 4.1 .IPrimary system is discharging into RB resulting in RB area temperatures >212"F in more than one area, N2-EOP-SC Termination Criteria:RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-10 or equivalent. (IC-48)
RWMStep29 Pull rods to raise power to about 4.5%. Initial IC power level is 2.5%. Start of RWM step 31 will result in the proper initial scenario power level.
Reset CSH HI WTR LEVEL SEAL IN Place EHC Pump B (TME-PIB) in P-T-L and hang red clearance tag on control switch.
B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. PC06, Secondary Containment Isolation Failure, TRUE QUEUED
- b. RCI 1, RClC Isolation Failure, TRUE QUEUED
- c. AD08C, ADS Valve N 2 Supply Severed (MSS*PSV126), TRUE QUEUED
- d. NMOSA, IRM Channel Failure INOP (A), TRUE F3
- e. CWOIA Service Water Pump Trip A, TRUE F4
- f. RD05 3427, Control Rod Failure Drift Out, TRUE F5
- g. FW30A, Reactor NR Level Transmitter Failure As Is (4A), TRUE F7
- h. FWIGA, FW Pump Recirc Valve Failure Open (FV2A), TRUE F7 TUA 3 seconds
- j. RC12, RClC Steam Leak in RB 215 Elevation 60% F10
- 2. Remotes:
- a. MS03 Cond Low Vac Bypass OFF QUEUED
- b. RD08 34-27 HCU Isolation, CLOSED F6
- 3. Overrides:
- a. MOV 121, Switch Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard), OPEN QUEUED
- b. MOV 128, Switch Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard), OPEN QUEUED
- c. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Inboard Isolation INOP Amber, ON F8
- d. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green, OFF F8 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
- e. MOV 128, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Red, OFF F8
- f. MOV 121, Light Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green, ON ET01
- g. MOV 121, Light Not Fully OPEN, Amber, ON ET01
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. AN601305, RClC System Inoperable, ON F8
- b. AN601319, RClC Valves Motor Overload, ON F8 C. Equipment Out of Service
- a. TMB-PIB EHC Pump B in P-T-L with red clearance on control switch D. Support Documentation
- a. N2-OP-IOIA, Plant Startup complete through E.3.3 E. Miscellaneous
- 1. EVENT TRIGGERS
- a. ET01 ANN 601 157 RB GEN TEMP HIGH IN ALARM (Event Trigger 68) When alarm actuates this results in indications of cause of the isolation failure.
- b. ET02 650 psig PAM A (Event Trigger 001). Trips EHC pump resulting in loss of Turbine Bypass Valves.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: IN ED DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA) Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL) cso Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SM, CRS, STA) 0 Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor Power = 4.5% approx RWM Step31 0 RPV Pressure 925 psig 0 Bypass Valve # I is full open and #2 is Dartiallv Bvpass partially oDen open 0 Feedwater Pump A in service with FWS-LV55A in AUTO (HICI 37)
EHC Pump B is out of service for motor repair. Red clearance issued.
Scheduled return to service date is Mav 20.
PART 111: RemarkdPlanned Evolutions:
Continue plant startup to place the reactor mode switch to RUN per N2-OP-IOIA.
Currently at step E.3.3 PART IV: To be reviewedlaccomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
0 Review new Clearances (SM) 0 Test Control Annunciators (CRE) 0 Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS) 0 TITLE NAME TITLE NAME 4
SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other 0ptions?
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.O Given a condition requiring automatic isolation of Secondary Containment and a failure of Ventilation isolation, the crew will manually isolate the reactor building by closing Secondary Containment isolation dampers and start GTS.
CT-2.0 Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment temperature approaching maximum safe values in one area, the crew will enter EOP-RPV and initiate a manual reactor scram before performing an RPV Blowdown.
CT-3.0 Given an unisolable RClC steam leak and secondary containment temperature above maximum safe values in more than one area, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per EOP-C2.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-I .o Given the plant during startup and an IRM INOP trip, the crew will bypass the failed IRM and reset RPS trip systems per N2-0P-92 and N2-OP-97.
PO-2.0 Given a Service Water Pump trip the crew will start a standby pump to restore the plant to 4 operating pumps per N2-OP-11.
PO-3.0 Given the reactor plant during startup and a control rod drifting out, the crew will fully insert and disarm the control rod per N2-SOP-8.
PO-4.0 Given a failed open Feedwater pump minimum flow valve with RPV level instrument failure resulting in lowering RPV water level, the crew will manually control level to avoid a reactor scram per N2-SOP-6 and N2-OP-3.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
PO-5.0 Given a RClC steam leak and temperatures approaching 212OF, the crew will manually scram per N2-EOP-SC and EOP-RPV.
PO-6.0 Given a RClC steam leak and temperatures in two areas exceeding 212"F, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-C2.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
\.-
3ew Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT I Continue Startup jR0 3 Directs plant startup continued 4TC RO The crew continues the startup per N2-OP- Continue to withdraw control rods 101A E.3.3 UNTIL APRM downscale lights have cleared.
Verify APRMs reading greater than 5% by placing IRM/APRM recorder select switch to APRM.
In EACH Reactor Protection Division leave one IRM/APRM recorder select switch placed in the APRM position.
EVENT 2 IRM A Failure h o p Trip PO-I .o CONSOLE OPERATOR SRO When power is above 5% or when directed by Acknowledges report of IRM A Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by INOP trip and RPS A half scram depressing F3 key: Directs IRM A bypassed Directs RPS trip system A reset NMOSA, IRM CHANNEL FAILURE-INOP (A) Notifies Operations and Plant TRUE, (F3) Management NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
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INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS IRM A channel fails upscale resulting in RPS Contacts WEC SRO for assistance trips system A trip. On left side of P603, the 4 and work planning white RPS scram lights are o f . For IRMA the Enters Tech Spec 3.3.1 .IRPS RED UPSC TR OR INOP light is on, indicating Function 1 IRMs. No action is the effected channel. Rod withdrawal block. required since only 1 IRM channel is inoperable. (NOTE Also see The following annunciators alarm: TRM 3.3.2 Control Rod Block 603102 RPS A NMS TRIP Instrumentation Function 2) 6031 10 RPS A AUTO TRIP Conducts post event brief 603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A UPSCALEANOPERABLE May place startup activities on hold 603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK to resolve IRM failure ATC RO Identifies and reports annunciators to SRO Implements ARP 603102 actions.
6031 10 actions are similar.
These are 603102 actions IF a SCRAM has occurred, THEN enter N2-SOP-101C, Reactor Scram. (Scram should NOT have occurred)
IF NO SCRAM has occurred, THEN perform the following:
Check the other IRM channels to verify that NO SCRAM should have occurred.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS IF a SCRAM should have occurred, THEN enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
(Scram should NOT have occurred)
IF NO SCRAM should have occurred, THEN perform the following:
Troubleshoot AND correct the cause of the alarm.
Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
IF desired, THEN bypass the applicable IRM per N2-OP-92.
WHEN the initiating signal is cleared OR bypassed, THEN reset the half SCRAM per N2-OP-97.
ATC RO These are 603201 actions At P603 determine by red UPSCLANOP light which IRM channel is tripped. (Determines IRM A is INOP)
Verify associated range switch setting is correct.
Consult with S.S.S. and bypass faulty channel.
NRC Scenario 3 -1 1- March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS ATC RO Bypass IRM A ATC RO These actions are taken to bypass IRM A, when directed k * * * * * * *
- X * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
- CAUTION Bypass joysticks can become electrically misaligned after numerous bending motions due to "Metal Creep". Any bypass function should be verified by channel BYPASS lights to ensure that only the intended channel is bypassed.
Verify NO other IRM in bypass for the instrument to be bypassed.
When IRM is bypassed the following Place the IRM BYPASS joystick to annunciators clear: the bypass position.
603102 RPS A NMS TRIP IF IRM A was bypassed, THEN 603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A UPSCALE/INOPERABLE verify the IRM A BYPASS light is lit 603442 CONTROL ROD OUT BLOCK on 2CEC*PNL603 OR H I 3-P606 ATC RO Reset of Tripped Protective System ATC RO Channel (RESET HALF SCRAM) These actions are taken to reset the RPS trip, when directed Determine which protective channel is tripped by verifying which SCRAM solenoid lights on 2CEC*PNL603 are de-energized.
At 2CEC*PNL603, reset SCRAM
... signals by momentarily placing the NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS applicable switches to RESET as follows:
When RPS A trip system is reset the following For RPS A:
PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID white REACTOR SCRAM RESET lights A, C, E AND G light and 6031 10 RPS A LOGIC A AUTO TRIP clears.. REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC C Verify PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID white lights A, C, E AND G are lit.
EVENT 3 Service Water Pump A Trip PO-2.0 CONSOLE OPERATOR When power directed by Lead Evaluator, SRO activate malfunction by depressing F4 key: Refers to Tech Spec 3.7.1 Service Water (SW) System CWOIA, Service Water Pump Trip (PIA), and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)
TRUE, F4)
LCO 3.7.1 Division 1 and 2 SW Service Water (SWP) Pump A trips. Flows rise subsystems and UHS shall be on the remaining operating S WP pumps. OPERABLE.
AND The following annunciators alarm: Four OPERABLE SW pumps 601 113 Service Water Pump l A / I C / l E PUMP shall be in operation.
AUTO TRIP/FAIL TO START APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 601 114 Service Water Pump I A / I C / I E Motor/ and 3 Feeder Electrical Fault. CONDITION E. One required SW pump not in operation.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION E . l Restore required SW pump to operation.
COMPLETION TIME 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief BOP RO C Recognizes and reports condition of the SWP*PIA tripped to the SRO.
Role Play 3 Performs actions required by N2-IF dispatched to perform prestart checks when ARP-01 ,601 113 (or 601 114 starting pump per N2-OP-11 E.2.0, WAIT actions are the same):
about 2 minutes and report ready to start the IF required, throttle standby pump. 2SW P*MOV74A(B ,C,D, E ,F) to maintain running SWP Pump flow 10,000 gpm. (Pumps B, C and D will require throttling)
Start additional Service Water Pumps, as required, at P601 as follows:
IF time permits per N2-OP-11 Section E.2.0, OR Place associated pump control switch to START Role Plav: As the AO, wait three minutes and Place the tripped Service Water report that Service Water Pump P I A , 86- Pump control switch in "PULL-1 lockout relay is tripped. TO-LOCK", at P601.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Notifies SRO to refer to Technical Specifications.
Dispatches A 0 to investigate the cause of P I A trip.
Reopen any MOV74s previously throttled EVENT 4 PO-3.0 Control Rod 34-27 Drift CONSOLE OPERATOR When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate malfunction by depressing F5 key:
SRO RD05 3427, Control Rod Failure Drift Out, Directs entry into N2-SOP-8 TRUE F5 Provides reactivity oversight Refer to TS 3.1.3, Control Rod Control Rod 34-27 slowly drifts outward and Operability.
power slowly rises. RWM Display indicates Refer to TS 3.1 5,Control Rod 34-27 is drifting out. Scram Accumulator Operability.
The following annunciators alarm Notifies Operations and Plant 603307 RWM ROD BLOCK Management 603443 CONTROL ROD DRIFT Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief May place startup continuation on hold to resolve current equipment deficiencies.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ATC RO Reports alarms and implements Annunciator 603443 actions Determine whether alarm is valid by checking the Full Core Display AND Four Rod Display.
IF alarm is valid, enter N2-SOP-08, Unplanned Power Changes, AND execute concurrently with this ARP.
Refer to N2-OP-95A, F.3.0, Rod Drift Indication, to reset Drift alarm.
Note Enters N2-SOP-8 Crew initiates N2-SOP-8 flowchart decision IF More than one control rod blocks by answering YES/NO questions. has scrammed OR drifted, THEN SCRAM the reactor per N2-SOP-101C. Scram not required, only 1 rod is drifting Power change due to Recirc FCV motion? NO Power on APRMs rising OR expected to rise? YES Reduce Reactor power to approximately 85% per N2-SOP-IOID. NA, Power is below 5%
Monitor Offgas AND Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS for evidence of Fuel Element FaiIure.
IF Cause due to Control Rod Drift ....THEN Continue at A (of SOP-8)
ATC RO These are A actions Identify which control rod is drifting and in what direction CR IN / OUT Using INSERT pushbutton, fully insert drifted control rod.
Bypass the RWM if necessary.
Uses keylock switch and Rod will insert to full in after bypassing RWM bypasses RWM.
and using INSERT pushbutton. Can control rod be fully inserted? YES After releasing the insert pushbutton, the rod Release the insert pushbutton.
will drift out again.
Did the control rod remain fully inserted? NO Depress and hold INSERT CONSOLE OPERATOR pushbutton to maintain control When dispatched to isolate HCU 34-27, rod fully inserted.
activate REMOTE by depressing F6 key : When control rod is fully inserted, close the following RD08 34-27, HCU Isolation for Inserted Rod valves at the HCU for the F6 drifting control rod.
Wait one minute, then report HCU 34-27 2RDS*V103 NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE isolated. 2RDS*V105 Release INSERT pushbutton Is the control rod drifting out?
................................................ NO CAUTION FOR CONSOLE OPERATOR IF Instructor Station locks up with REMOTE RD08 core grid displayed THEN select rod 31-18 on the map. This should release the grid and allow continued console operation.
After isolating the HCU, and the INSERT IF required, disarm the control pushbutton is released, 34-27 no longer drifts rod per N2-OP-30.
out. With rod fully inserted, A PRM power is Refer to TS 3.1.3, Control Rod lower. Annunciator 603215 APRM TRIP Operability.
SYSTEM DOWNSCALE may alarm WHEN directed by the SM, exit intermittently (at 4%). this procedure.
Refer to TS 3.1.5, Control Rod Scram Accumulator Operability.
Contact Maintenance for troubleshoothepair plan as required.
EVENT 6 Feedwater Pump A Minimum Flow Valve fails open with RPV Narrow Range A level transmitter failed as is. P O 4 0 CONSOLE OPERATOR ATC RO When directed by Lead Evaluator, activate Reports alarms malfunction by depressing F7 key: Monitors RPV water level and identifies difference between RX NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS FW16A, FW PUMP RECIRC VALVE LEVEL NARROW RANGE A
-_- FAILURE - OPEN (FVZA), TRUE F7 indicator and B and C indicators FW30A, REACTOR NR LEVEL Determines FW R-FV2A is ramped TRANSMITTER FAILURE - AS IS (C33- to 100% open N004A), TRUE F7 Enter SOP-6 due to lowering water level Places FWS-LIK1055A (LV55A) to manual RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A indicator is now failed at current value of about 183 Restores water level as directed.
inches. Feedwater Pump A minimum flow (178 to 187 inches) valve opens diverting feedflow from the RPV. Determines RX LEVEL NARROW RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE B and RX RANGE A indicator is LEVEL NARROW RANGE C indicators slowly malfunctioning. Recommends lower. With A failed, FWLC does not changeover to RX LEVEL compensate for the transient. NARROW RANGE B If directed, inserts control rods to lower power The following annunciator alarm: Per N2-0P-3 F.8.5, change 851456 CNST SYSTEM TROUBLE/ NO BACKUP PMP Narrow Range Level Instruments A VAILAB L E as follows:
851457 CNST BSTR PMP SYS TROUBLUNO BACKUP IF B Level Instrument is PMP AVAILABLE 851546 CNST PUMP DISCH HEADER FLOW LOW required, place LEVEL A/B CONTROL switch REACTOR WTRLEVEL C33A-SI in LEVEL B position NOTE:
\
May have to prompt SRO to use N2-OP-3 As directed, place FWLC in auto steps E.3.27 - E.3.30 to place FWLC in AUTO (N2-OP-3 E.3.27 - E.3.30)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT IONS with HlCl37 controlling FWS-LV55A. 0 Adjust adjust 2CNM-HICI 37, FEEDWATER LO FLOW CONTROLLER, tape setpoint to obtain equal signals as read in the input (vertical) AND output (horizontal) signal on 2 FW S-LV55A(B) control ler.
0 Verify 2CNM-HICI 37 indicator is in the green band.
Depress Auto (A) pushbutton on 2FWS-LV55A(B) controller.
Verify that Reactor water level is being maintained at the desired setpoint.
SRO 0 Directs entry into SOP-6 due to malfunctioning FWLC Determines RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A instrument is inoperable Refers toTech Spec 3.3.2.2 for Feedwater System and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation LCO 3.3.2.2 Three channels of feedwater system and main turbine high water level trip nstrumentation shall be OPERABLE.
APPL ICAB I LITY: THERMAL POWER 2 25% RTP.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACT10NS No action is required since power is below 25%.
NOTE: May direct control rods inserted to May have to prompt SRO to use N2-OP-3 lower power steps E.3.27 - E.3.30 to place FWLC in AUTO Directs FWLC system placed on with HlCl37 controlling FWS-LV55A. RX LEVEL NARROW RANGE A instrument and FWLC returned to automatic control per N2-OP-3 Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief EVENT 7 SRO Tech Spec 21CS*MOV128 Breaker Trip, Containment Isolation Valve Failed Open CONSOLE OPERATOR:
When directed by the Lead Evaluator, insert BOP RO the following overrides for ICS*MOVI28 Recognizes and reports RClC breaker trip, by depressing F8 key: Inboard Isolation Valve failure.
MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation These are 601305 actions (Inboard) Green OFF At 2CEC*PNLGOI, determine IF MOV*I 28, Steam Supply Line Isolation any INOP Status Lights are (Inboard) Red OFF energized.
IF any INOP Status Lights are NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
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INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS MOV*128, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation - energized, refer to their applicable INOP Amber ON Alarm Response Procedure.
AN601305, RClC System Inoperable ON Determines INOP status light lit for AN601319, RClC Valve Motor Overload TURB STM SPLY INBD ISOL VLV ON ICS*MOV128 All on F8 These are MOV128 lnop Status light MOV*128 Steam Supply Line Isolation actions (Inboard) - OPEN Queued Using the energized red OR green indicating lights, confirm power available to ICS*MOV128, TURBINE STM SUPPLY INBOARD ISOL VLV.
IF power is NOT available, dispatch an operator to 2EHS*MCC302.
Confirm 2EHS*MCC302 Bkr. 14A, 21CS*MOVI28 Power Supply, is ON.
SRO Acknowledges BOP RO report.
Refers to T.S. 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation fa ilure.
From Bases B.3.6.1.3 The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in Ref. 1. (TRM)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE IPERATOR ACTIONS 2ONDITION A One or more ienetration flow paths with one PClV noperable except due to leakage not Nithin limit.
3EQUIRED ACTION 4.1 Isolate the affected penetration
'low path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve,
- losed manual valve, blind flange, or
- heck valve with flow through the ialve secured.
COMPLETION TIME (for A . l ) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> except for main steam line.
(Determines penetration must be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.)
AND REQUIRED ACTION A.2 Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.
COMPLETION TIME (for A.2) Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment Refer to TRM If necessary TRM 3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Valves The Primary Containment Isolation
OPERATOR ACTIONS Valves and, if applicable, valve groups, isolation signals, and isolation times are listed in Table T3.6.1-2.
May enter Tech. Spec. 3.5.3 for RCIC inoperable.
Notifies Operations and Plant Management Contacts WEC SRO for assistance and work planning Conducts post event brief Role Play: When dispatched by the BOP RO, ask for panel and breaker numbers.
Wait two (2) minutes and report breaker in the tripped condition. No cause is apparent.
EVENT 8 and 9 Unisolable RClC Steam Reactor Building Ventilation Fails to isolate CONSOLE OPERATOR:
After Tech Specs are reviewed by the SRO for MOV*128 failure or when directed by Lead Evaluator, insert the following malfunction by BOP RO depressing F9 key: Check DRMS CRT Display to RC12, RClC Steam Leak in Reactor determine RB HVR*RE32A/B Building, 25% over 10 minute ramp F9 alarming.
These are 851254 Corrective The following annunciator alarms: Actions NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE 3PERATOR ACTIONS 851254 Process Airborne Rad Monitor 3n High Radiation Level Activated Verify Automatic Response has occurred, as applicable.
Gaseous Rad Level High initiates the following (CT-1.0, also redirected from EOP-SC):
RX Bldg Vent Emergency
- UC413A(B) starts. Suction Test Malfunction PC06 becomes active DMPR*AOD34A(B) will be open PC06, Secondary Containment Isolation after manual start.
Failure, TRUE Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Supp Air Is01 DMPR *AODIAIB.
Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Exh Air Is01 DMPR *AODSAIB.
Reactor Building Ventilation fails to isolate Shuts RX Bldg Ventilation Refuel Area Exh Air lsol DMPR
- AODl ONB.
Initiates Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train A or B Start Signal.
Identify Area affected, and verify level reading.
Refer to Emergency Plan Procedure EPIP-EPP-21.
Evacuates Reactor Building ,
when directed.
Refer to N2-EOP-SC (SRO).
Event 8 SRO enters and directs EOP-SC SRO actions. Enters and directs actions per EOP-SC when HVR Exhaust radiation is above an isolation NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS setpoint (HVR*RE32A/B exceed DRMS Red setpoint)
IF HVR Exhaust radiation exceeds an isolation setpoint THEN verify (Override SC-1) (CT-I.O)
HVR isolates HVR*UC413A or B starts GTSstarts HVR Unit Coolers start IF any area temperature is above the isolation setpoint THEN GO to Areas Temperature High is received and RClC 28 (Step SC-2)
Steam Line should isolate as temperature rises Isolate all discharges into affected above 135OF. WCS system isolates. WHEN areas except systems needed for 601 157, Reactor Building General Areas fire fighting or other EOP actions Temperature High is received, Event Trigger (Step SC-4)
ET01 activates:
Directs BOP RO to MOV121, Steam Supply Line Isolation manually isolate RClC (Outboard) - Green - ON Steam Line.
MOV*121, Not Fully Open - Amber - ON IF primary system is discharging ET01 into the Reactor Building (YES MOV*121 Steam Supply Line Isolation RCIC, Conditional Step SC-(Outboard) - OPEN Queued 4) ....THEN GO to 29 (Prevents valve from closing)
MOV*128 has no power and MOV*121 appears to be closing.
However, RClC steam line pressure stay up and temperatures in the area are still rising.
Thus, no isolation of the RClC Steam Line has occurred. Fire panel 8491 07 FIRE DETECTED PAIL103 SE QUAD 215 alarms as a result of NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE IPERATOR ACTIONS steam discharging into the area.
3 BEFORE any area temperature reaches Maximum Safe Value (Detail S; 212°F) (Step SC-7 and SC-8) ....ENTER RPV Control, while continuing in EOP-SC (CT-Event 8 SRO enters and directs EOP-RPV 2.0) actions. PO-5.0 rhese actions are directed by the SRO from EOP-RPV 3 ENTERSCRAMPROCEDURE N2-SOP-101C, while continuing in EOP-RPV (Step 3) 3 Executes LEVEL and PRESSURE legs concurrently EOP-RPV Detail E l Systems LEVEL ACTIONS DIRECTED BY o CondensatelFeedwater SRO CRD Restore and maintain RPV water RClC level between 159.3 inches and HPCS 202.3 inches using one or more 0 LPCS Preferred Injection Systems (Detail 0 LPCl E l ) Step L-3. SRO should direct RHS through Shutdown Cooling control between 159 to 200 inches.
IF level cannot be restored and EOP-RPV Detail E2 Systems maintained above 159.3 RHS Service Water Crosstie inches.. ..THEN maintain level Fire Systems above -14 inches (Fig Z)
ECCS Keep-Full OK to augment with Alternate SLS, test tank Injection systems if needed SLS, boron tank (Detail E2) (Use of these is Condensate Transfer NOT expected)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTR UCTO R ACT1ONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS PRESSURE ACTIONS DIRECTED BY SRO IF RPV Blowdown (EOP-C2) is anticipated.. ...THEN Rapidly depressurize the RPV using the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. OK to exceed 1OO°F/hr cooldown.
(Step P-I Override). (This is an expected action because EOP-C2 will be necessary due to rising Reactor Building temperatures).
Is any SRV Cycling? NO (Step P-2)
Stabilize RPV Pressure below 1052 psig using Main Turbine Bypass Valves. (Step P-4). SRO should direct control between 800 to 1OOOpsig with BPVs.
Use Alternate Pressure Control Systems, if needed.
Restore pneumatics to drywell, if necessary.
WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 128 psig (Step P-7) BEFORE proceeding to Step P-8. While in Step P-7 orsooner, the SRO will likely return to EOP-SC actions and may be waiting for 2 areas to reach 212°F NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO enters and directs EOP-SC actions. These actions are directed by SRO when returning to EOP-SC WAIT until 2 or more areas are above Maximum Safe Value for the same parameter (Step SC-9 and I O ) , THEN proceed to SC-10 to enter EOP-C2.
Event 8 BOP RO Actions BOP RO Recognize and reports increasing area temperatures and in the At back panel LDS Temperature Monitoring Reactor Building.
Panels P632 and P642 the first area in alarm Uses EOP-6 Attachment 28 to and to reach 212 OF monitor and report temperature E31-N619A and N620A conditions .
E31-N619B and N620B Confirms WCS and RHR isolation.
Reports failure of RClC to automatically isolate.
Attempts to manually isolate the RClC Steam Line by closing MOV*I 21 using keylock switch.
Monitors back panels for trending area temperatures and radiation levels.
Reports levels and trends to the SRO.
IF directed to rapidly depressurize the RPV using the Main Turbine Bypass Valves, opens all 5 BPVs using the BYPASS JACK INCREASE pushbutton. OK to I f "anticipating" RPV Blowdown, all 5 BPVs are exceed 100"Flhr cooldown. (Step NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS opened. RPV pressure lowers. RPV pressure P-1 Override). (This is an expected drops to about 650 psig, the following action because EOP-C2 will be malfunction activate from ET02: necessary due to rising Reactor TC15A, EHC Pump A Trip, TRUE Building temperatures).
TC15B, EHC Pump B Trip, TRUE 0 Reports trip of EHC pumps and loss of BPVs, if used for rapid EHC Pump A trips and as EHC pressure depressurization.
lowers, the BPVs will close to to loss of fluid pressure.
ATC RO Event 8 ATC RO Scram Actions These are N2-SOP-101 C Scram Actions IF Automatic Scram is anticipated AND time permits.. ... .THEN Reduce Recirc Flow to 55 mlbm/hr per N2-SOP-IO1D. (NA, at 4%
power)
IF Mode switch is NOT in REFUEL position .....THEN Place MODE Switch to SHUTDOWN position. (CT-2.O)
Provides Scram report to SRO IF RPS is NOT tripped ......THEN Arm AND depress BOTH Manual Scram pushbuttons on either side of 2CEC*PNL603. (NA, RPS trips)
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
3PE RAT0 R ACT1ONS 0 Verify automatic responses.
All rods full in Rx power lowering Turbine tripped/TSVs & TCVs shut Generator tripped and house loads transferred SDV V&D valves closed RCS pumps downshift RPV pressure on TBVs OR SRVs FWLC controlling level > 159.3" IF All feedwater pumps have tripped.. .THEN Place ALL 2FWS-LVIO and LV55 controllers to "manual" and verify the valves are full closed.
o IF the Reactor scram can be promptly reset (and remain reset) .... THEN Reset the scram.
0 IF the Reactor scram CANNOT be reset.. ..THEN Close 2RDS-V28 if directed by the SM/CRS.
0 Performs LEVEL control actions as directed by SRO from EOPs 0 Performs PRESSURE control actions as directed by SRO from EOPs WHILE continuing, perform the following as time permits:
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
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INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Fully insert IRMs AND SRMs.
Energize 2WCS-MOVI 07 (2NHS-MCC008-2E).
If required, secure makeup to the Cooling Tower.
At 2CEC-PNL842, shutdown HWC.
IF WCS is in one pump three filter lineup.. ..THEN Throttle close 2WCS*MOV200 (AND if required, throttle open 2WCS-MOVI 10) to obtain approximately 225 gpm WCS flow.
IF Feedwater Pumps trip on high level (above These actions are used to restart a 202.3 inches), an FWS Pump Restart can be tripped Fedwater pump, if directed performed per N2-SOP-101C, Level Control Is at least 1 condensate pump Actions Detail 1. Since RPV pressure will drop running? YES below 500 psig during the scenario (RPV Verify the following:
Blowdown), Condensate Booster Pump Out of service condensate, injection can be used instead of Feedpump booster and feedpumps in PTL.
restart. 2 condensate pumps running.
2 booster pumps running.
2FWR-FV2s closed.
The following controllers in manual with 0% output:
0 2FWS-HIC55s 0 2FWS-HICI 010s 0 2FWS-HIC1600 IF required, reset Level 8 pushbuttons.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 Start feedwater pump as follows:
Confirm suction pressure > 500 psi.
Verify aux oil pump running.
Place pump switch to red flag.
WHEN 2FWS-FV2A/B/C 15%
open, confirm pump start.
Confirm flow - 8000 gpm.
Inject with 2FWS-LV55A/B (open 2FWS-V103A/B if required)
OR verify open 2FWS- MOV47 A/B/C AND inject with 2FWS-LV1OA/B/C as required.
IF required, reset setpoint setdown per N2-OP-3, H . l .O.
For automatic control, refer to N2-OP-3, H.9.12 OR H.9.13.
Verify aux oil pump stops.
Event 10 Second Area Temperature reaches 21 2°F PO-6.0 Second area temperature reaches 2 12 F (E3 1-N601 E and N601F). RPV Blowdown is required.
Event 10 BOP RO actions BOP RO Report second area temperature reaching 212°F.
3 If required restore pneumatics to drywell NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
~
At P851 IAS*SOV166 and 184 At P601 IAS *SOV164 and 165 When directed, open seven (7)
ADS / SRVs by using keylock switch for EACH ADS valve at control room back panel P631 and P628. (CT-3.0)
Recognizes and reports failed ADS
Open additional non-ADS SRV from P601 control switch to achieve 7 open valves.
Event 70 SRO enters and directs EOP-C2 These actions are directed by the actions. SRO from EOP-C2 Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron? YES all rods are fully inserted (Step 2)
Drywell Pressure? Below 1.68 psig (Step 9, then bypass step IO)
Suppression Pool Level?
Above El 192 ft (Step 11)
EVENT 10 ADS Valve fails to open Open all 7 ADS Valves (Step 12)
(CT-3.0)
When ADS Valves are opened AD08C, ADS OK to exceed 100°F/hr Valve N2 supply severed becomes active. Restore pneumatics to drywell if necessary
-\ PSV 126 does not indicate open at P601, even Per Ops Manual, with no RHS NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS though back panel indication is that the valve pumps running, opening the 7 opened (ADS solenoid is energized). ADS valves is performed by placing individual keylock switch for EACH ADS valve to open at control room back panel P631 and P628.
Can all 7 ADS Valves be opened?
NO (Step 13)
Open other SRVs until a total of 7 are open (Step 14)
WAIT until shutdown cooling pressure interlock clears 128 psig (Step 16) BEFORE proceeding to Step 17.
T ERMINATION CRITERIA RPV Blowdown is complete and RPV level is maintained above TAF.
EVENT 11 SRO Admin JPM 5-3 SRO Classify the event as SAE 3.4.1 (SAE 4.4.1 with RB area temperatures
>212"F in more than one area)
Evaluator to perform SRO Admin JPM For emergency classification.
NRC Scenario 3 March 2005
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA. NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events None
- 6. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC Scenario 3 March 2005