ML040060764
| ML040060764 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/2004 |
| From: | Spitzberg D NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS/FCDB |
| To: | Ray H Southern California Edison Co |
| References | |
| -RFPFR IR-03-001, IR-03-010 | |
| Download: ML040060764 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000206/2003010
Text
January 6, 2004
Mr. Harold B. Ray, Executive Vice President
Southern California Edison Co.
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674-0128
SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-206/03-10; 50-361/03-10; 50-362/03-10;
72-41/03-01 FOR THE PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTING AND FIRST CANISTER
LOADING AT THE INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION
Dear Mr. Ray:
NRC inspections were conducted between June 26 and October 1, 2003, at your San Onofre
nuclear generating station to evaluate the dry cask storage activities for your Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). These inspections included observation of activities associated
with your pre-operational testing program and the loading of your first canister. The inspections
were conducted to confirm compliance of your program and activities with the requirements
specified in the license, technical specifications, Final Safety Analysis Report, the NRCs Safety
Evaluation Report and 10 CFR Part 72. The enclosed report presents the results of these
inspections. The inspections found that activities were being performed in accordance with
procedural and regulatory requirements. No violations of NRC regulations were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in
the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from
the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your
response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it
can be made available to the Public without redaction.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact the undersigned at
(817) 860-8191 or Mr. Vincent Everett, Senior Health Physicist, at (817) 860-8198.
Sincerely,
/RA/
D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief
Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch
Docket Nos.: 50-206; 50-361; 50-362; 72-41
License Nos.: DPR-13; NPF-10; NPF-15
Southern California Edison Company -2-
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report
50-206/03-10; 50-361/03-10; 50-362/03-10; 72-41/03-01
cc w/enclosure:
Dwight E. Nunn, Vice President
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674-0128
Michael R. Olson
San Onofre Liaison
San Diego Gas & Electric Company
P.O. Box 1831
San Diego, California 92112-4150
Mayor
City of San Clemente
100 Avenida Presidio
San Clemente, California 92672
Chairman, Board of Supervisors
County of San Diego
1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335
San Diego, California 92101
Ed Bailey, Radiation Program Director
Radiologic Health Branch
State Department of Health Services
P.O. Box 942732 (MS 178)
Sacramento, California 94327-7320
David Spath, Chief
Division of Drinking Water and
Environmental Management
P.O. Box 942732
Sacramento, California 94234-7320
James D. Boyd, Commissioner
California Energy Commission
1516 Ninth Street (MS 34)
Sacramento, California 95814
Southern California Edison Company -3-
Douglas K. Porter, Esq.
Southern California Edison Company
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, California 91770
Gary L. Nolff
Power Projects/Contracts Manager
Riverside Public Utilities
2911 Adams Street
Riverside, California 92504
Eileen M. Teichert, Esq.
Supervising Deputy City Attorney
City of Riverside
3900 Main Street
Riverside, California 92522
Dr. Raymond Waldo
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674-0128
A. Edward Scherer
Southern California Edison
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674-0128
Joseph J. Wambold, Vice President
Southern California Edison Company
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92764-0128
Southern California Edison Company -4-
bcc w/enclosure (via ADAMS e-mail distribution):
EECollins
DBSpitzberg
KMKennedy
SCOConnor
ERZiegler
CCOsterholtz
MASitek
RRTemps
ABBarto
JFMelfi
JDParrott
RJEvans
WCSifre
RVAzua
TWDexter
EMGarcia
FCDB
NBHolbrook
RIV Materials Docket Files - 5th Floor
ADAMS: :Yes 9No Initials: JVE
- Publicly Available 9Non-Publicly Available 9Sensitive :Non-Sensitive
DOCUMENT NAME: s:\dnms\fcdb\jve\So1-2003-010 jve.wpd final r:\_so1\So1-2003-10.wpd
RIV:DNMS:FCDB FCDB FCDB FCDB
JVEverett EMGarcia RJEvans TWDexter
/RA/ /RA JVEverett via E/ /RA JVEverett via E/ /RA JVEverett via E/
12/18/03 12/22/03 12/18/03 12/18/03
NMSS:DWM:HLWB NMSS:SFPO DRP:PBC DRP:PBC
JDParrott RRTemps JFMelfi MASitek
/RA JVEverett via E/ /RA JVEverett via E/ /RA JVEverett via E/ /RA JVEverett via E/
12/16/03 12/17/03 12/15/03 1/6/04
DRP:PBC DRS:EMB NMSS:SFPO C:FCDB
RVAzua WCSifre ABBarto DBSpitzberg
/RA JVEverett via E/ /RA JVEverett via E/ /RA JVEverett via E/ /RA/
12/29/03 12/18/03 12/30/03 1/6/04
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket Nos.: 50-206; 50-361; 50-362; 72-41
License Nos.: DPR-13; NPF-10; NPF-15
Report No: 50-206/03-10; 50-361/03-10; 50-362/03-10; 72-41/03-01
Licensee: Southern California Edison Co.
P.O. Box 128
San Clemente, California 92674
Facility: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Location: San Clemente, California
Dates: June 26 - 28, 2003 (Heavy loads demonstration)
August 4 - 8, 2003 (Pre-operational demonstration - Initial Inspection)
August 18 - 19, 2003 (Pre-operational demonstration - Final)
September 10 - 15, 2003 (First cask loading - Initial Inspection)
September 28 - October 1, 2003 (First cask loading - Final)
Inspectors: J. V. Everett, Team Leader, Region IV
R. R. Temps, Safety Inspector, NRC Spent Fuel Project Office
J. F. Melfi, Resident Inspector, Palo Verde Nuclear Station
R. J. Evans, P.E., C.H.P, Senior Health Physicist, Region IV
J. D. Parrott, Senior On-Site Representative, NRC Las Vegas Office
M. A. Sitek, Resident Inspector, San Onofre Nuclear Station
W. C. Sifre, Reactor Inspector, Region IV
A. B. Barto, Nuclear Engineer, NRC Spent Fuel Project Office
R. V. Azua, Project Engineer, Region IV
T. W. Dexter, Security Consultant
E. M. Garcia, Health Physicist, Region IV
Approved By: D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle/Decommissioning Branch
Attachment 1: Supplemental Information
Attachment 2: Inspector Notes
ADAMS Entry: IR05000206-03-010; 05000361-03-010; 05000362-03-010; 072000041-03-
01 on 08/4/2003 - 10/01/2003; Southern California Edison Co., San Onofre
Nuclear Generating Station; Units 1, 2, 3. ISFSI Report. No violations.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-206/03-10; 50-361/03-10; 50-362/03-10; 72-41/03-01
On October 3, 2003, Southern California Edison loaded the first canister of San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 1 spent fuel into their Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation (ISFSI). The ISFSI was located at the SONGS site adjacent to the Unit 1 reactor
facility. The Advanced NUHOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System was selected by Southern
California Edison to store the SONGS spent fuel under a general license. This cask system had
been approved for storage of irradiated nuclear fuel by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
under Certificate of Compliance No. 72-1029. Transnuclear, Inc., was the cask vendor for this
system.
Southern California Edison planned to move all Unit 1 spent fuel to the ISFSI by the spring
of 2005. This will involve moving 207 spent fuel assemblies from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool,
70 assemblies from the Unit 2 pool and 118 assemblies from the Unit 3 pool. Seventeen canisters
will be needed to hold the 395 Unit 1 spent fuel assemblies. The first five canisters to be loaded
into the ISFSI would remove all the Unit 1 spent fuel from the Unit 3 pool. The ISFSI pad currently
constructed at SONGS can accommodate 31 canisters. Each canister can hold 24 spent fuel
assemblies. The ISFSI pad will be expanded as additional space is needed and as dismantlement
activities at Unit 1 provide more space for ISFSI construction.
The inspections conducted by the NRC of Southern California Edisons dry cask storage project
provided a comprehensive evaluation of the licensees compliance with the requirements in the
NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No. 72-1029, Technical Specifications, Final Safety Analysis
Report, NRCs Safety Evaluation Report and 10 CFR Part 72. The inspection consisted of a team
of eleven NRC inspectors performing inspections of various phases of activities over a period from
June 26 through October 1, 2003. Sixteen technical areas were reviewed during the inspections
including such topical areas as fuel verification, security, radiological programs, quality assurance,
training, and heavy loads. During the inspections, the licensee conducted numerous
demonstrations for NRC observance related to the operations of equipment and the
implementation of procedures to verify that all required aspects of the use of the NUHOMS cask
system at the SONGS site had been adequately incorporated into site programs and procedures.
The licensee had integrated together many of the programs for the Part 50 reactor operations and
the Part 72 ISFSI operations to allow for an efficient use of site resources.
During the various pre-operational demonstrations and during the loading of the first canister, the
SONGS workers demonstrated a comprehensive knowledge of the technical requirements related
to the loading and operations of an ISFSI and for compliance with 10 CFR Part 72. Much of this
advanced knowledge of ISFSI operations was a result of experience gained by Southern
California Edison personnel who provided manpower support to the Rancho Seco
decommissioned reactor for their ISFSI project. Rancho Seco completed the loading of
21 canisters on August 2002. Southern California Edison personnel were a key part of that
successful program. The knowledge and experience gained by the Southern California Edison
personnel while at Rancho Seco was brought back and integrated into the SONGS program. This
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was obvious during discussions and interviews of the SONGS personnel which demonstrated
actual experience and knowledge of the issues that must be addressed in order to successfully
load spent fuel into the ISFSI.
During the loading of the first SONGS canister, the NRC provided 24-hour coverage of loading
operations for all critical tasks at the Unit 3 fuel handling building. This included fuel movement,
heavy lifts of the loaded canister, initial radiation surveys of the loaded cask, welding of the lids,
vacuum drying and helium backfill of the canister. Workers were knowledgeable of their assigned
tasks and had been well trained. Problems and issues were quickly identified and effectively
resolved. Shift supervision provided good oversight of work activities and workers always knew
who was in charge. Procedures were closely followed and a good questioning attitude was
demonstrated by all employees. There was good communications between the workers. Overall,
the licensees staff was well trained and highly motivated to perform work safely and in compliance
with the procedural requirements. The management team responsible for the ISFSI project had
worked hard to develop and implement a comprehensive program that would provide for the safe
operations of moving spent fuel at the SONGS site.
Details related to the 16 technical areas reviewed during this inspection are provided as
Attachment 2 to this inspection report. The following provides a summary of the findings of this
inspection.
Vacuum Drying, Helium Backfill and Helium Testing
! Vacuum drying time limits established in Technical Specification 3.1.1 had been
incorporated into the licensees procedures. Canisters with a heat load greater than
12 kW were required to be vacuum dried within a specific time frame. The licensees
procedure included provisions for establishing a helium environment in the canister or re-
flooding the canister, as required by the technical specification, if the time limit was not
met.
! The licensee had implemented a stepped vacuum drying process consistent with the
requirements in Technical Specification 3.1.1. This stepped process of lowering the
pressure in the canister to certain predetermined levels and holding at that level for a
period of time was intended to reduce the likelihood of ice blockage in the system lines.
The final vacuum drying pressure requirement for the canister was 3 torr. The licensees
procedures specified a value of 2.8 torr to account for instrument error and to provide an
extra margin for compliance.
! Helium backfill pressure requirements established in Technical Specification 3.1.2 had
been incorporated into the licensees procedures. Provisions for documenting the final
helium backfill pressure reading was provided in the procedure, including independent
verification and sign-off by quality control personnel.
! Helium leak rate testing of the inner lid weld and the vent/siphon port cover welds required
by Technical Specification 3.1.3 had been incorporated into the licensees procedures.
Procedural requirements included specifications for the helium to be $99 percent pure and
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the leak rate to be #10-7 standard cubic centimeters/second. Procedures also required
helium leak test personnel to be qualified to the standards in SNT-TC-1 Personnel
Qualification and Certification of Nondestructive Testing.
Emergency Planning
! Emergency planning provisions for the ISFSI had been incorporated into the site-wide
emergency plan. This included specific emergency action levels for fires, loss of canister
integrity and security events.
! The ISFSI design provided for accessability by emergency personnel and vehicles. The
licensee maintained their own site fire and medical response capability. Offsite fire,
security and medical support organizations were available to augment the site emergency
organization.
Fire Protection
! The ISFSI had been incorporated into the San Onofre Updated Fire Hazards Analysis.
Administrative controls were established to limit the quantity of combustible and flammable
liquids around the ISFSI and near the transport path during movement of the canister.
! Analysis had been completed to evaluate the effect on the ISFSI of site specific explosive
hazards and to confirm that the design of the ISFSI was adequate for the postulated
external pressure levels that could result from an explosion.
Fuel Verification
! The SONGS Unit 1 spent fuel was stored in four locations: 270 assemblies at the General
Electric spent fuel storage pool located in Morris, Illinois; 207 assemblies in the SONGS
Unit 1 spent fuel pool; 70 assemblies in the SONGS Unit 2 spent fuel pool; and 118
assemblies in the SONGS Unit 3 spent fuel pool. The first loading campaign will load the
Unit 1 spent fuel stored in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool. This will require five canisters.
! The requirements in Certificate of Compliance No. 1029 for the type of fuel that can be
stored in the Advanced NUHOMS 24PT1 canisters was evaluated against the SONGS
Unit 1 spent fuel planned for loading in the first five canisters. Criteria included type of
fuel, cladding, decay heat, burn-up, neutron/gamma source strength, cooling time and
enrichment. All spent fuel assemblies met the technical specification requirements.
! Twenty-seven Unit 1 fuel assemblies had been identified as damaged. Of these, four
were in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool and will be included in the first loading campaign of five
canisters. Damaged fuel assembles were required to be placed in special failed fuel cans
inside the canisters. Criteria used by the licensee for identifying which fuel assemblies
were damaged was consistent with NRC guidance.
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! The licensee had established provisions for independent verification of the correct loading
of the canister. This included videotaping the location of the spent fuel after loading in the
canister.
! Because the NUHOMS canisters were inserted into the concrete storage modules
horizontally, special center of gravity considerations for the canisters were necessary to
prevent rotation of the canister during insertion into the concrete storage module.
Technical specifications required the center of gravity of the loaded canister to be within
0.1" of the canisters radial center of gravity. Licensee calculations for the first five
canisters demonstrated compliance with this limit. The largest deviation from the radial
center of gravity was 0.0042".
Compliance with 10 CFR Part 72 General License Requirements
! The licensee evaluated the bounding environmental conditions specified in the NUHOMS
Final Safety Analysis Report and Certificate of Compliance No. 1029 technical
specifications against the conditions at the SONGS site. This included: tornados/high
winds, flood, seismic events, snow/ice loading, tsunami, lightning, burial under debris,
normal and abnormal temperatures, and fires/explosions. The site environmental
conditions at the SONGS ISFSI were bounded by the NUHOMS cask design parameters.
! Radiation levels at the ISFSI were calculated for workers during loading operations and
routine surveillance activities. Doses were calculated for the controlled area boundary.
Doses at the controlled area boundary were projected to be 1 mrem/year, well below the
10 CFR 72.104 limit of 25 mrem/year. Projected worker doses to conduct the daily visual
inspection were 172 millirem/year. Weekly radiation surveys of the ISFSI could add
49 millirem/year. A conservative estimate for loading a cask was determined to be
3117 millirem per canister loading.
! The licensee performed an evaluation of the site programs that could be impacted by the
addition of an ISFSI. The evaluation included the radiation protection program, emergency
planning program, quality assurance program, training program and the reactor technical
specifications and Part 50 license. Revisions to the programs to incorporate the ISFSI
were identified and implemented.
! The NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance and Final Safety Analysis Report had been
reviewed by the licensee to verify that the design basis for the NUHOMS cask system and
the conditions and requirements in the Certificate of Compliance and Final Safety Analysis
Report were met.
Heavy Loads
! The licensee had incorporated the special requirements related to the ISFSI project into
the site heavy loads programs and procedures. Crane operators interviewed during the
ISFSI inspections were knowledgeable of the special handling requirements related to the
heavy spent fuel casks.
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! Special lifting device height limits and temperature restrictions during movement of the
casks had been incorporated into the licensees procedures consistent with the
requirements in the Certificate of Compliance. This included the requirement to perform
an inspection of the cask for damage after any drop of 15" or higher.
! The maximum weight of the loaded transfer cask had been determined by the licensee to
verify the adequacy of the lift capability of the cranes planned for use in moving the spent
fuel. A loaded cask being removed from the spent fuel pool represented the maximum
weight to be lifted and exceeded the lifting capacity of the current Unit 1 crane. The
licensee had purchased new single failure proof cranes for installation and use during the
cask loading operations. The Unit 3 crane was rated at 125 tons. The Unit 1 crane would
be up-rated from 100 tons to 105 tons to account for the estimated 104.1 ton weight of the
loaded cask.
! A safe loads path had been identified and analyzed for moving the spent fuel from the
spent fuel pool to the ISFSI. Provisions were established in procedures and through the
use of limit switches to prevent the crane from moving the loaded cask outside the
boundaries of the safe load path while in the fuel building. Calculations were performed
for the roadway between the plant and the ISFSI to verify that the path was structurally
capable of handling the weight of the loaded transfer cask and trailer.
! The licensees heavy loads procedural requirements related to the transfer cask trunnions
and the slings used for lifting the canister lid were verified against industry standards and
manufacturer requirements for load tests, safety margins and inspection/maintenance.
! The adequacy of the transport trailer for the expected weight of a loaded canister and the
ability of the transport trailer to safely secure and move the cask to the ISFSI was verified.
Pad/Storage Modules
! Requirements in the Final Safety Analysis Report related to the placement of the storage
modules on the ISFSI pad and the module-to-module connections required for the high
seismic conditions at the SONGS site were being implemented.
! The concrete storage module thermal monitoring program had been incorporated into
procedures. This included the daily monitoring of the storage module temperature and the
daily verification that the air inlets and outlets were free from debris.
! The thickness requirements for the concrete storage module roof and shield walls to
ensure radiological levels would be below regulatory limits were verified by direct
observation of the storage modules under construction and a review of the design
drawings.
! The seismic design of the ISFSI pad to meet the potential earthquake intensity at the
SONGS site and to address liquefaction of the soil under the pad was inspected by the
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NRC on April 9, 2002, and documented in Inspection Report 50-206/02-07;72-41/02-01
issued May 21, 2002 (NRC Adams Document ML021410532).
Pre-Operational Testing
! The licensee successfully completed all the required pre-operational test requirements
specified by the Certificate of Compliance. This include the loading, welding, drying, and
backfilling of a canister and the unloading of a sealed canister. A weighted canister was
used to demonstrate heavy load activities, transport between the Unit 3 facility and the
ISFSI and insertion/removal of a canister into the concrete storage module.
Procedures and Technical Specification Requirements
! The licensee had developed the required operating procedures and programs required by
the Certificate of Compliance.
! The adequacy of the level of detail in the procedures was verified by reviewing
requirements in the Final Safety Analysis Report related to handling the cask at the spent
fuel pool. All requirements reviewed had been incorporated as operational steps in the
licensees procedures.
Quality Assurance
! The licensee had implemented their approved reactor facility Part 50 quality assurance
program for the activities associated with the ISFSI. Effective implementation of the
program was observed for all phases of ISFSI activities including procurement, control of
measuring equipment, corrective actions, design control, receipt inspections, storage and
audits.
! Southern California Edison was constructing their canisters onsite as a fabricator to
Transnuclear, Inc. An inspection conducted by the NRCs Spent Fuel Project Office on
March 3-6, 2003, and documented in Inspection Report 72-1029/2003201 issued March 6,
2003, found all work activities were being properly controlled under the Southern
California Edison quality assurance program (NRC Adams Document ML030940163).
! The licensees quality assurance organization had implemented a comprehensive quality
assurance audit and inspection program that was responsive to applying additional
oversight to selected work activities where problems were being identified. This was most
evident in the decision to place onsite quality assurance inspectors at one of the vendors
to ensure the quality of the concrete storage modules.
Radiation Protection
! Requirements for radiological and contamination surveys described in the Final Safety
Analysis Report had been incorporated into the licensees health physics program for the
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loading of the casks. This included special precautions related to potential high dose rate
work activities.
! Calculations performed by the licensee to evaluate the potential radiological doses during
normal operations at the ISFSI and during an accident demonstrated compliance with the
limits specified in 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 72.106.
! The licensee had identified the reactor Part 50 exclusion area as the controlled area for
the ISFSI. The distance from the ISFSI to the exclusion area boundary met the required
minimum distance for a controlled area around an ISFSI specified in 10 CFR 72.106.
Southern California Edison was authorized, through a signed easement, to remove
personnel from the exclusion area in the event of an emergency.
! The licensee had determined a dose conversion factor for neutron doses to workers to
account for the neutron spectrum expected with the loaded canisters.
! Environmental monitoring for the ISFSI had been incorporated into the existing reactor
environmental monitoring program. Additional thermoluminescent dosimeters had been
placed around the ISFSI to monitor the increase in radiation levels expected due to the
storage of the spent fuel. Dosimeters had been placed in service in 2001 and had been
used to collect background data that could be compared with the ongoing monitoring after
spent fuel was placed in the ISFSI to determine the level of increase in radiation levels.
Records
! A records system had been established by the licensee under their reactor Part 50 quality
assurance program. Records required for retention by 10 CFR 72.174, 10 CFR 72.212,
10 CFR 72.234 and the Final Safety Analysis Report had been identified in the licensees
program as required records for retention.
! An optical disk system was being used for permanent storage of the records. The quality
assurance plan required that ISFSI related records be retained for the duration of the
license or certificate of compliance.
! The required 90-day notification prior to loading the first cask had been made to the NRC
on May 5, 2003. The requirement to provide notice to the NRC within 30 days of use of a
cask had been incorporated into the appropriate procedure.
Safety Reviews
! Changes to the site related to the construction and operation of the ISFSI were being
evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 72.48 and 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. No issues
were identified during the review of selected safety screenings.
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Security
! Security for the ISFSI had been integrated into the overall site security program. The
security plan and procedures had been revised to incorporate specific provisions for
responding to a security threat at the ISFSI. Arrangements had been established to obtain
support from local law enforcement agencies during a security event.
! Security force personnel were trained on security requirements for the ISFSI including the
implementation of access controls, key controls and compensatory actions.
! Physical security systems had been installed and were operational. This included the
protected area fence, lighting systems, intrusion detection systems and backup power.
! Arrangements had been made for a moving protected area around the cask during
transport from Unit 3 to the ISFSI.
Training
! The licensee had implemented a training program for workers assigned to the ISFSI that
incorporated the topics listed in the technical specifications and provided for
documentation of completion of training and job task qualification.
! Specific training needs had been identified and incorporated into training for operations,
maintenance and health physics personnel as required by the Final Safety Analysis
Report.
! A computerized training records system had been established by the licensee to track
completion of training by individuals.
Welding/Nondestructive Testing
! Requirements for hydrogen monitoring during welding of the inner cask lid had been
incorporated into the procedures. The alarm set point had been established at 50 percent
of a lower explosive limit for hydrogen. During welding of the inner lid welds, hydrogen
levels were measured from 3 percent to 8.4 percent of the lower explosive limit.
! The licensee was performing the required dye penetrant examinations of welds on the
canister in accordance with the Final Safety Analysis Report. Dye penetrant examination
procedures had been developed for both normal temperatures and for the higher
temperatures that could be encountered with the hotter casks.
! Nondestructive examination requirements for welds were adequately specified in
procedures and on drawings.
! Nondestructive examination personnel were qualified to the requirements in SNT-TC-1A
for performing weld examinations of the type required on the canisters.
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Exit Meetings
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the various key stages of the inspection on August 8, August 19 and October 1,
2003. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The licensee did not identify as
proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors that had been incorporated
into the inspection effort.
ATTACHMENT 1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Agosti, Lead Auditor, Procurement Quality
A. Alexander, Security Lock and Key Specialist
J. Appel, Engineer, Design Engineering
R. Ashe-Everest, Project Manager, Spent Fuel Cask Transfer Operations
V. Barone, Cognizant Engineer, Dry Cask Storage
R. Beatty, Supervisor, Unit 1 Security
M. Bise, Program Analyst
J. Bock, Project Manager, Project Management and Engineering Support
R. Bordon, Surveillance Team Supervisor, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment
G. Broussard, Manager, Security Operations and Equipment Performance
R. Brown, ISFSI Support
R. Busnardo, Project Manager for Canister Fabrication, Nuclear Generation Maintenance
G. Cook, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
T. Cook, Shift Commander, Security
P. Coughlin, QA/QC Vendor Oversight, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment
J. Custer, Manager, ISFSI Operations
D. Czapski, Quality Control Inspector, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment
S. Davis, Nuclear Security Officer, Security
D. Faasamala, Security Lock and Key Specialist
G. Ferrigno, Health Physics Planner
B. Gossett, Engineer, Nuclear Fuel Services
R. Granaas, Engineer, Nuclear Fuel Services
K. Gribble, Maintenance Supervisor
P. Gyswyt, Design Engineering
N. Hansen, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Specialist
S. Hunn, Administrative Manager
N. Jervis, Supervisor, Security Operations
W. Kotteakos, Supervisor, Quality Control/Nondestructive Examinations
J. Larson, Supervisor, Procurement Quality
J. Linville, Acting Shift Commander, Security
M. Mason, Supervisor, Fabrication
M. McBrearty, Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
A. Meichler, Supervisor, Weld Engineering
D. Miller, Fuel Team Leader, Training
G. Moore, Manager, Decommissioning Oversight
J. Morales, Manager, Dry Cask Storage
M. Mullen, Nuclear Security Officer, Security
S. Ordorica, Nondestructive Examination Inspector
A. Ockert, Fire Protection Engineer
M. Orewyler, Maintenance Supervisor
R. Osborne, Manager, 72.48 Program
D. Pilmer, Manager, Dry Cask Fuel Storage Licensing
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D. Ripley, Manager, Maintenance Training
M. Russell, Technical Specialist
S. Salwach, Nuclear Engineer, Maintenance Engineering
D. Schell, Supervisor, Fabrication Welding
J. Scott, Emergency Planning Engineer
M. Speer, Maintenance Supervisor
D. Stoeckel, Technical Specialist, Maintenance Engineering
T. Swindle, Shift Commander, Security
R. Todd, Supervisor, Security Equipment Performance
J. Valsvig, Welding Technician
M. Watson, Shift Commander, Security
S. Wong, Nondestructive Examination Inspector
H. Wood, Surveillance Team Member, Nuclear Oversight and Assessment
T. Yee, Consulting Engineer, Design Engineering
G. Zwissler, Manager, Administration
Leak Test Specialists
D. Hecksel, Leak Testing Specialist
Transnuclear, Inc.
U. Farradj, Project Manager
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
60854 Pre-operational Testing of an ISFSI
60855 Operations of an ISFSI
60856 Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations
60857 Review of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations
81001 ISFSI Security
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened
None
Closed
None
Discussed
None
-3-
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable
ANSI American National Standards Institute, Inc
CFR code of federal regulations
DAC derived air concentration
DSC dry shielded canister
FSAR final safety analysis report
GWd/MTU gigawatt days/metric ton uranium
ISFSI independent spent fuel storage installation
kW kilowatt
MOX mixed-oxide fuel
NDE nondestructive examinations
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
psi pounds/in2
psig pounds/in2 (gauge)
QA quality assurance
SAR safety analysis report (same as final safety analysis report)
SNT-TC Society of Nondestructive Testing-Technical Council
SONGS San Onofre Generating Station
std-cc/sec standard cubic centimeters/second
Tech Specs technical specifications