ML022750053

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Brian Sheron Presentation to INPO on August 29, 2002 Re Davis-Besse RPV Head Corrosion Activities: Status & Future Plans on Vhp Nozzle & RPV Head Inspections
ML022750053
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 08/29/2002
From: Sheron B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
Download: ML022750053 (11)


Text

DAVIS-BESSE RPV HEAD CORROSION ACTIVITIES:

STATUS AND FUTURE PLANS ON VHP NOZZLE AND RPV HEAD INSPECTIONS Brian Sheron US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC/INPO Conference August 29, 2002 BACKGROUND ON VHP NOZZLE CRACKING

& RPV HEAD DEGRADATION HISTORY



First cracking of CRDM nozzles identified in France in 1991 - axial cracking



Industry analyses - axial cracking not a safety concern; circ. cracking unlikely



NRC issued Generic Letter 97-01



Spring 2001 Outages -- Circumferential flaws detected (boric acid deposits)



Oconee Units 2 & 3 - 2 nozzles 165 through-wall cracks



Chronology of circumferential cracks



Axial cracks in J-groove welds or HAZ allow leakage into annular region



Leakage to vessel head OD may be restricted by interference fit of nozzles



Circumferential cracks initiate on OD and grow in aggressive environment



NRC issued Bulletin 2001-01 (August 2001) - inspections for circumferential cracks



Spring 2002 Outages - vessel head degradation identified at Davis-Besse



NRC issued Bulletin 2002-01 (March 2002) - no head degradation at other plants



NRC issued Bulletin 2002-02 (August 9, 2002) - inspections to prevent leakage Typical Reactor Vessel Head - Oconee Unit 1 (Babcock & Wilcox)

Schematic View of B&W Design CRDM Nozzle Area FUTURE INSPECTIONS



Management by leakage detection not considered sufficient



Visual examination inspectability



Insufficient Davis-Besse root cause report



Technical specification limit of no pressure boundary leakage



Need further information to support visual examinations alone



On-going MRP activities



Support not sufficiently mature at this time



Lack of understanding about wastage (corrosion) rates



Lack of predictive models for crack growth in welds



Cracking is becoming more prevalent as plants age BULLETIN 2002-02 EXAMPLE INSPECTIONS



High Susceptibility Plants ( > 12 EDY) - ~ 33 plants



UT of nozzle base metal every RFO



Surface examination (eddy current or PT) every RFO



Bare metal visual every RFO



Moderate Susceptibility Plants ( > 8 EDY & <12 EDY) - ~ 15 plants



UT of nozzle base metal at RFO after next RFO and then every other RFO



Surface examination (eddy current or PT) at RFO after next RFO and then every other RFO



Bare metal visual at next RFO and then every other RFO



Low Susceptibility Plants ( < 8 EDY) - ~ 21 plants



UT of nozzle base metal within 5 years and then at least once every 5 years



Surface examination (eddy current or PT) within 5 years and then at least once every 5 years



Bare metal visual within 3 years and then at least once every 5 years PLANNED SUPPLEMENT TO BULLETIN 2002-01



Bulletin 2002-01 issued March 18, 2002



Within 60-days: Describe boric acid corrosion prevention program for ensuring integrity of reactor coolant pressure boundary



Licensee responses inadequate due to:



Lack of specificity regarding BAC prevention programs



Inspection techniques



Scope and frequency of inspections



Degree of insulation removal



Evaluation criteria



Corrective actions



Staff could not make a reasonable assurance finding that the boric programs have been implemented effectively.

OUTLOOK FOR ADDRESSING VHP NOZZLE AND RPV HEAD INSPECTIONS



Review Bulletin 2002-02 responses - status of inspection plans



Pursue regulatory actions for plants with inadequate inspections



Develop technical basis to support inspection programs



Pursue changes to ASME Section XI



Section XI Task Group on Alloy 600/182/82 Issues



Request for formation of task group on changes to inspection requirements



Insulation removal



Inaccessible components



Local corrosion areas



Revise 10 CFR 50.55a as appropriate INDUSTRY NEEDS TO TAKE MORE PROACTIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ISSUES



Industry needs to provide adequate technical justification to reduce necessary reliance on supplemental non-visual examinations



New heads with Inconel 690 tubes will have to follow the same inspection criteria as head with Inconel 600 until industry provides technical basis for changes NRC WEB-SITE INFORMATION Alloy 600 Cracking (including Circumferential Cracking of CRDM Nozzles) http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/alloy600.html RPV Head Degradation http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/vessel-head-degradation.html