JAFP-92-0570, Special Rept:On 920703,CO-2 Fire Door Required to Close on CO-2 Sys Activation Did Not Fully Close When Released.Fire Door Repaired & Tested Satisfactorily

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Special Rept:On 920703,CO-2 Fire Door Required to Close on CO-2 Sys Activation Did Not Fully Close When Released.Fire Door Repaired & Tested Satisfactorily
ML20114A016
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/1992
From: Harry Salmon
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
JAFP-92-0570, JAFP-92-570, NUDOCS 9208070177
Download: ML20114A016 (3)


Text

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J2mes A. Fit 2 Patrick Nuclear Power Plant

, P O Don 41 4 Lycoming. New York 13091

  • 315 342-3840 -

A NewYorkPower nor,y e.Saimon,a,.

W Authority nesioomi uaoa9er s

July 31, 1992 JAFP-92-0570 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

DOCKET NO. 50-333 INOPERABLE CO2 FIRE SUPPRESSION-SYSTEM

Dear Sir:

The New York Power Authority (NYPA) submits the following special report to address the inoperability of the North and South Emergency Diesel Generator Switch Gear Rooms CO, Fire Suppression System for more than 14 days.

! The event requires that a 30-day special report be submitted in

accordance with Technical Specifications 3.12.C.2 and 6.9.B.2.

s Summary of Event l

[ The CO2 System supplying the North and South Emergency Diesel

' Generator Switchgear Rooms was isolated to perform a modification to relocate CO 2 control panel ( 76COaPNL-8 ) from the screenwell '

l -area to the Turbine Building to satisfy 10CFR50, Appendix R concerns. The 14-day limiting condition ~for operation (LCO) i started at 0510 on June 22, 1992 and ended on July 6, 1992 at 0510. The LCO was exited on July 7, 1992.

Description of the Event and Corrective Action On July 3, 1992, while performing a CO2 System initiation as post-work testing for the modification, the CO2 System activated properly. However, a CO2 actuated fire door that was required to q close on a CO2 System activation did not fully close when  !

. released.

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o TO: United States Regulatory Commission FROM: Harry P. Salmon, Jr. i

SUBJECT:

DOCKET NO.-50-333 Page 2 of 3 INOPERABLE CO2 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM Description of the Event and' Corrective Action (Continued)

The LCO could have been exited by closing and tagging the defective door since the CO2 System operated properly.

, on July 3, 1992, the Assistant operations Manager instructed the operating shifts, thru the night orders log, to close and tag the defective door and exit the LCO by July 5, 1992 if-repairs to the defective fire door were not complete. However, due to the i numerous other plant outage tasks and night order actions in

! progress between July 3 and July 6 the evolution was overlooked l by the operating shifts.

on the morning of July 6, 1992 the Assistant Operations Manager recognized the failure to close and tag the defective door in order to exit the LCO. He directed the day shift supervisor to take immediate action.

On July 7, 1992, it_was reported to the Assistant Operations

, Manager that the wrong door had been tagged shut. The error was

immediately corrected and the LCO exited.-

The defective fire door was subsequently repaired and tested satisfactorily on July 8, 1992. It should be noted that during

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this time frame of June 22 - July 8 a fire watch was posted to-monitor the affected area. Repairs to the door included replacing frayed cable and deburring the soor. The system was out of service for approximately 15 days.

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T0: United States Regulatory Commission FROM: Harry P. Salmon, Jr.

SUBJ ECT: DOCKET NO. 50-333 Page 3 of 3 INOPERABLE CO2 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM Corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence of this type cre:

1. Shift Supervisors will discuss all current LCOs at each preshift briefing with emphasis placed on expiration dates and required action items.
2. The format of the Operations Night Orders was changed to include a section exclusively for shift action items with a Shift supervisor sign off upon completion of each item.

This will keep each shift apraised of t..e status of each action item.

These actions have been implemented by the Operations Department.

y .- y l. L. v C v' . )__--

'IfARRY P' . S ALMON ,' _JR .

RESIDENT MANAGER HPS:RM:dmh CC: NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region I J. Gray, WPO A. Heath V. Childs JAF RMS WPO RMS RMS (Site)

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'Docement Control Desk July 31, 1992 Page 2 We apol' J1 2e for this discrepancy and expect that this letter has clarified 'our corrective action comniitment date. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

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Bob-Link Vice President Nuclear Power

- Copies to: NRC Regional Administrator, Region III

'NRC Resident Inspector 3 y- ~ m

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