ML20125B280
| ML20125B280 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1979 |
| From: | Leonard J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910290146 | |
| Download: ML20125B280 (1) | |
Text
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President & Chief Operatir.g Officer TO: Director of Regulatery oceration Cha t r-.an, S P C f
'USNRC Region f Manager of Nuclear Operations
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DATE/ TIME: 9/26/7? -
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Fit 0M Jnras A. FI tzPetrick Nuclear Power Plant P.0, Box 41
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SUBJECT:
PROFFT MEPORTAetE OCCURRENCE 00Cr.ET MD. 50-333 Lg.q:.q,,,,,,. -
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, 26, 1979.
Secte"ber
'REPear DATE:,
EVENT DATE:
SepteMer 26;-197?
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o EVENT DEscRIPTran:
The Piant Staf f was inf erred by the Architect-Engineer th9t additional High Pressure Coolant Infecticn Systen (llPCI) and Autmatic Depressurti.aticn System cabling affecting control of the HFCI fr. board s team sucply isolation valve did not have the seoaration criteria reuutred by the Derfulatory Comission, This datemination resulted from the fire hazards analysis Seing conducted by the Architect-Engineer, COMP 0fE.4TS II;VOLVED:
Valve 23 f10V 15 -HPCT Inboard Isolation Valve, steam supply.
GUSE AND UU'EDI AL ACTION:
1 Six (G) cables which could affect th'e centrol df the inboard isolation valve (cr the imCI steam weply !!ne (23 f10V 15) were 1ccated in a racewey containing A05 cah11ng, this valve is a normally open valve and is backed up by a nor-ally shut outboard valve (23 f10'/ 16) in the. high pressure coolant injection system steam supply ifne.
To pre-clurfe inedvertent shutting of the normally open inboard isolation velve, should a fire Occur which would af fect the cables identified by the Architect-Engineer, the breaker
<til be rec &ed out.
The <mtboard isoletion valve which is normally in the shut position fulfills the recuira ent of the Technical Specifications for the limiting conditions of
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- en ta i rr =nt i sol a t.f en.
In addition, the Architect-Endineer infor-ed the Plant that other (third party) cables c.mid af fect the creration of' this; valve haceuse of tcir pro *ity to both.HPCI and ADS cahics, it is our present intention, based on the aralysis of this indicated gebirm, to ec' rect this situation by installing a redundent ADS control system dring the forthco:' ring refueling outage sched!aled for the Spring of 1980.
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'CILITY'5TATUS:
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% THERFAL F0WER 52%
I Routine Startuo Shutdown Pontian SWhn Refuelino Steady State Power A
Other Load Change j
Not Applicable
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written follew-up re tort will be sent within two weeksd
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