Information Notice 2012-22, Counterfeit, Fraudulent, Suspect Item Training Offerings
| ML12137A248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/25/2013 |
| From: | Laura Dudes, Kinneman J, Mark Lombard, Brian Mcdermott, Mary Muessle, Pasquale D NRC/FSME/DMSSA, NRC/NMSS/SFST, Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, NRC/NRO/DCIP/CEVB, Division of Policy and Rulemaking |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| D. Pasquale, NRO/DCIP/CEVB 415-2498 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML12319A044 | List: |
| References | |
| IN-12-022 | |
| Download: ML12137A248 (6) | |
ML12137A248 UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
OFFICE OF FEDERAL AND STATE MATERIALS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY
AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001
January 25, 2013
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2012-22:
COUNTERFEIT, FRAUDULENT, SUSPECT
ITEM (CFSI) TRAINING OFFERINGS
ADDRESSEES
All holders of and applicants for a specific source material license under Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 40, Domestic Licensing of Source Material.
All holders of an operating license, research and test reactor operating license, or construction
permit for a nuclear power reactor under 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production
and Utilization Facilities, including those who have permanently ceased operations and have
certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard
design certification, standard design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.
All holders of and applicants for a fuel cycle facility license or a special nuclear material license
authorizing the possession, use, or transport of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear
material under 10 CFR Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.
All holders of and applicants for a transportation package certificate of compliance or for a
specific approval for transport of radioactive material shipping containers under 10 CFR Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material.
All holders of and applicants for an independent spent fuel storage installation license or a
certificate of compliance under 10 CFR Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste and Reactor-Related Greater
Than Class C Waste.
All holders of and applicants for a gaseous diffusion plant certificate of compliance or an
approved compliance plan under 10 CFR Part 76, Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants.
All contractors and vendors that supply basic components to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) licensees.
PURPOSE
The NRC is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of a sampling of the
entities that offer training on how to detect potential counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items
(CFSI) that may enter the supply chain. This IN also is being issued to heighten each
addressees awareness of CFSI issues. The NRC expects that recipients will review the list of
available training resources listed in this IN as it may be useful for educating personnel involved
in NRC-regulated activities on current trends in CFSI, and techniques to prevent the use of
CFSI parts. The suggestions contained within this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no
specific action or written response is required.
Addressees
can review this information and
consider actions, as appropriate.
BACKGROUND
Over the past two decades, the NRC has issued several generic communications to inform
licensees of counterfeit or misrepresented vendor products, including Generic Letter (GL) 89-02, Actions to Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulently Marketed Products, dated
March 21, 1989 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML031140060). The GL emphasized the three characteristics of effective
procurement and dedication programs that NRC inspections have identified. These
characteristics are (1) the involvement of engineering staff in the procurement and product
acceptance process, (2) effective source inspection, receipt inspection, and testing programs, and (3) thorough, engineering-based programs for review, testing, and dedication of
commercial-grade products for suitability of use in safety-related applications. The NRC found
that programs that embodied the above three characteristics generally were effective in
providing enhanced capability to detect counterfeit or fraudulently marketed products and in
assuring the quality of procured products, both in safety-related and other plant systems. These
three characteristics are as relevant today as they were more than two decades ago.
In addition to GL 89-02, the NRC staff issued IN 89-70, dated October 11,1989, and a
supplement on April 26, 1990, both entitled, Possible Indications of Misrepresented Vendor
Products, to inform licensees of misrepresented vendor products and to provide information on
the detection of such products (ADAMS Accession No. ML031180470). The NRC staff also
issued IN 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants, dated April 7, 2008, to
inform addressees of the potential for counterfeit parts to enter their supply chains (ADAMS
Accession No. ML093620098).
The NRC recently stressed the importance of the nuclear industrys vendors and suppliers
establishing a positive nuclear safety culture by including them in the recent Safety Culture
Policy Statement, issued June 14, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111650336). On January
17, 2012, the NRC reinforced the importance of the Safety Culture Policy Statement through
Regulatory Issue Summary 2012-01, Availability of Safety Culture Policy Statement (ADAMS
Accession No. ML112940226). This policy statement identified, among other qualities, the need
for continuous learning, effective safety communications, and employees with a questioning
attitude as characteristics of a positive safety culture. A summary of the Safety Culture Policy
can be found in NUREG/BR-0500, Safety Culture Policy Statement (ADAMS Accession
No. ML11165A021).
DISCUSSION
Industrial counterfeiting has been on the rise. Recent examples that underscore this trend
include: the Construction Industry Institutes issuance of a 2010 study entitled, Product
Integrity Concerns in Low-Cost Sourcing Countries: Counterfeiting in the Construction Industry, in which the consensus of the 187 industry and government leaders from eight countries
interviewed, was that the magnitude of the problem has grown from big to very big. In
November of 2012, a nuclear utility located outside the United States, shut down two operating
nuclear power plants based on investigations at those plants that led to the identification of
numerous parts that may not have been properly qualified or certified for their intended use:
and in the same month, an individual pleaded guilty in U.S. Federal Court to making false
statements during an investigation led by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI), which found, among other things, that he had directed an employee to file off the serial number on a safety- related part taken off of a working display from a U.S. nuclear power plant and installed on a
refurbished display destined for application in another operating U.S. nuclear power plant
without informing either plants. As a result, industries affected have generated a significant
amount of training to raise personnel awareness, develop detection skills, protect intellectual
property, investigate fraud, and incorporate effective prevention techniques against industrial
counterfeiting. While much of this information is either free, or available at a nominal fee, other
training is fee-based. While the recent adverse trend in industry CFSI has not directly affected
NRC-regulated activities, the agency recognizes the potential implications industrial CFSI could
have, combined with anticipated increases in procurement activities associated with NRC-
licensed facilities. The NRC believes it is both prudent and warranted at this time to make
deliberate efforts toward understanding how the regulator and industry could address new CFSI
challenges.
The NRC is issuing this IN to create awareness of the evolving trends with CFSI in todays
global industrial supply chain. Many industries already are modifying their purchasing policies
and procedures in response to CFSI threats. While the NRC staff is not aware of similar CFSI
trends in NRC-regulated activities, it is necessary for the agency to heighten the industrys
awareness of CFSI issues and enhance the skill sets of individuals with the power to prevent
the entry of CFSI into the commercial nuclear supply chain. Proactive anti-CFSI policies should
stress the need to share CFSI information and to train the workforce in current identification, avoidance, management, and response techniques. Each organizations commitment to CFSI
training will vary based on many factors, including reliance on procurement strategies that carry
higher CFSI risks (e.g., unfamiliar supply sources, or suppliers known to exhibit questionable
business practices). As many published best practices recommend, every individual involved in
specifying, procuring, and installing components is responsible for combating CFSI. Providing
training and awareness programs to these individuals will help prevent the inadvertent
introduction of nonconforming parts into the supply chain. This message is particularly
important in keeping pace with the growing trends in business-to-business commerce. While
many organizations today have implemented some form of electronic commerce (e-commerce),
each organization must weigh the level of risk along with the legitimacy of a suppliers offer
when purchasing critical items. It is vitally important that all final procurement decisions, including those steps programmed into automated systems, consider best possible anti- counterfeiting purchasing practices before the final purchase.
Training, including hands-on instruction, should be considered for all employees supporting the
procurement process, including purchasing (materials and services), quality assurance, product
receiving, maintenance, and investigation personnel. Refresher training also may be regularly emphasized to update employees on new threats, identification techniques, and communication
strategies.
Table 1 of this IN (ADAMS Accession No. ML12318A216) presents a snapshot of CFSI training
courses offered from a variety of sources. The list is not intended to be a complete listing, nor is
it the staffs intent to maintain this list current. The listing is intended to inform industry of
existing CFSI training curriculum and to encourage industry representatives to expand the
body-of-knowledge to meet the changing roles and responsibilities anticipated in this dynamic
field. This list focuses on traditional supply chain procurement responsibilities from product
development through product receipt. It also includes some often overlooked support functions
including offerings focused on establishing and protecting ones intellectual property rights.
Furthermore, the list also recognizes the needs of fraud investigators and prosecutors and
provides offerings for them. Most of this training was developed with specific non-nuclear
industry perspectives in mind, but it may be adapted for the commercial nuclear industry
according to their representatives. Many of the organizations contacted were willing to tailor
sessions to a specific topic or audience. The NRC staff made no attempts to evaluate, rate, or
endorse one curriculum over another, but rather provides this list to those organizations and
individuals seeking this unique knowledge/skill set. The NRC cautions users of this list to
contact resource representatives directly and to perform due diligence to determine if the
offering adequately satisfies their specific needs.
CONTACT
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRC project manager.
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library.
/RA/
/RA/
Mary Muessle, Acting Director
Brian J. McDermott, Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Division of Materials Safety
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
and State Agreements
Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs
/RA/
/RA/
Laura A. Dudes, Director
John D. Kinneman, Director
Division of Construction Inspection
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
and Operational Programs
and Safeguards
Office of New Reactors
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
/RA/
Mark D. Lombard, Director
Division of Spent Fuel Storage
and Transportation
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Contacts: Daniel J. Pasquale, Senior (Sr.) Operations Engineer
NRO/DCIP/CEVB
301-415-2498
Daniel.Pasquale@nrc.gov
Scott Langan, Deputy Office Director
Maria E. Schwartz, Sr. Program Manager
OE/CRB
301-415-2373
301-415-1888
Scott.Langan@nrc.gov
Maria.Schwartz@nrc.gov
CONTACT
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRC project manager.
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library.
/RA/
/RA/
Mary Muessle, Acting Director
Brian J. McDermott, Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Division of Materials Safety
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
and State Agreements
Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs
/RA/
/RA/
Laura A. Dudes, Director
John D. Kinneman, Director
Division of Construction Inspection
Division of Fuel Cycle Safety
and Operational Programs
and Safeguards
Office of New Reactors
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
/RA/
Mark D. Lombard, Director
Division of Spent Fuel Storage
and Transportation
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Contacts: Daniel J. Pasquale, Senior (Sr.) Operations Engineer
NRO/DCIP/CEVB
301-415-2498
Daniel.Pasquale@nrc.gov
Scott Langan, Deputy Office Director
Maria E. Schwartz, Sr. Program Manager
OE/CRB
301-415-2373
301-415-1888
Scott.Langan@nrc.gov
Maria.Schwartz@nrc.gov
ADAMS ACCESSION No.: ML12137A248
- via e-mail
NRC-001 OFFICE
NRO/DCIP/
CAEB
Tech Editor*
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CAEB: BC
FSME/DWMEP/RDB:
BC*
OIP/ECIO: BC*
NRR/DPR/
PROB: BC*
OE/CRB/BC*
NRR/DPR/
PGCB:PM
NAME
DPasquale
TFrye
BWatson
JOwens
GBowman
DSolorio
TMensah
DATE
11/ 28 /12
10/23/12
12/03/12
12/19/12
12/06/12
1/08/13
01/09/13
12/06/12 OFFICE
NRR/DPR/
PGCB:LA*
NRR/DPR/
PGCB:BC
OI: DD*
FSME/
DMSSA:D*
NMSS/SFST:D*
NMSS/FCSS:D* NRO/DCIP:D
NRR/DPR:D
(Acting)
NAME
CHawes
DPelton
SLangan
BMcDermott
(PHenderson for)
MLombard
JKinneman
(MBailey for)
LDudes
MMuessle
DATE
12/07/12
12/10/12
01/09/13
01/09/13
12/27/12
12/12/12
01/14/13
01/25/13 OFFICAL RECORD DOCUMENT