Information Notice 1987-65, Plant Operation Beyond Analyzed Conditions

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Plant Operation Beyond Analyzed Conditions
ML031130392
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date: 12/23/1987
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-87-065, NUDOCS 8712170119
Download: ML031130392 (7)


IN 87-65

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON D.C.

20555

December 23, 1987

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 87-65: PLANT OPERATION BEYOND ANALYZED

CONDITIONS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems resulting from operating a plant beyond its analyzed basis.

The

safety concerns of the particular circumstances described in this information

notice are high temperature inside containment and insufficient post-LOCA

cooling of safety systems. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions contained in

this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

Arkansas 1 (ANO-1). During normal operation on August 7, 1987, it was found

that the containment temperatures were significantly higher than the tempera- tures assumed in the accident analyses in the final safety analysis report

(FSAR, including updates) and equipment qualification program. In the FSAR,

a design temperature of 110OF was assumed for safety analysis of containment

integrity and 1201F was assumed for equipment qualification during normal

service life. Measured temperatures ranged from 103OF to 1650F with one local

"hot spot" of 1831F about the "A" steam generator. The licensee had observed

such temperatures since plant startup in 1974.

Crystal River 3. During an inspection, it was found that the temperature of

the ultimate heat sink (UHS), the Gulf of Mexico, was above the value of 850F

assumed in the FSAR analysis for heat removal capability after a loss-of- coolant accident (LOCA).

The Technical Specifications (TS) permit a UHS

temperature of 1050F. The plant has been operating within the TS limit but

beyond the design-basis temperature of 850F assumed in the accident analysis.

8712170119 AZ

IN 87-65 December 23, 1987 Discussion:

l, Because'ANO-1 had been operating at elevated containment temperatures for

extended periods, the NRC staff had several concerns:

1. The plant had been operating beyond its analyzed basis with regard to

post-accident (LOCA) containment performance because the initial condi- tions assumed in the analysis were exceeded.

2. The higher temperature implies accelerated aging of equipment required for

post-accident safe shutdown in accordance with regulation 10 CFR 50.49 on

equipment qualification.

3. The higher temperature may cause deterioration of the concrete structure.

In response to the NRC staff concerns, the licen'see submitted an analysis of

the safety implications of the elevated containment temperatures and identified

both near term and long term actions to justify continued operation.

In general, the FSAR contains design bases, operational limits, and analyses of

structures, systems, and components for ensuring the safety of the facility.

It is a statement-by the applicant/licensee of how it intends to comply with

NRC requirements.

This statement is reviewed by the NRC to form the bases for

the operating license.

The analysis of containment performance following a

-

design-hasis accidet (for-example, a4LOCA) depands-on-certal-n-assumed-Thit-al---

conditions.

Exceeding these conditions may invalidate the analysis and thereby

raise concerns regarding the maintenance of containment integrity following an

accident.

In accordance with the "100C rule," which may be used to calculate qualified

life, an increase of 100C (180F) over the initially assumed temperature reduces

the qualified life by 50 percent.

Under these circumstances, equipment that is

relied on in the event of a design-basis accident may not reliably perform

its safety function when required.

In the case of Crystal River 3, the concern was consistency between the FSAR

and the TS.

Regulation 10 CFR 50.36 requires that the TS be derived from the

analyses in the safety analysis report.

Since the plant has been operating

beyond the assumed design-basis temperature for the UHS, the adequate transfer

of post-accident heat loads from safety-related structures, systems, and

components was in question.

Attachment

IN 67-65

December 23, 1987

face 1 of I

LIST OF RECENTLY

ISSUED

NRC

INFORWATION NOTICES 1387

I--_s

. ..

Notice No.

Sublect

87464

Conviction for Falsatication

of Security Training Redords

67-35, Supp. 1 Reactor Trip Breaker

Westinghouse Nodal OS-416,

- Failed to Open On Manual

Initiation From the Control

Room

87-63

Inadequate Net Positive

Suction Hoed in Low Pressure

Safety Systems

87-62

1echanical Failure of

Indicating-Type Fuses

Isuenev

Issued to

22/22/67

All nuclear power

reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP

and ll major fuel

facility licensews

12/26/87

All holders of OLs

or Cps for nuclear

,ower reactors.

11/9/87

All holders of OLe

or CPs for nuclear

por reactors.

12/6/67

All holders of OLt

or CP for nuclear

power reactors.

1l167

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

12/4/67

All holders of OLt

or CPs for PWRs.

l1/97

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

21117/87

All holders of OLS

or cps for nuclear

power reactors.

87-61

Failure of Westinghouse

W-2-Type Circuit Breaker

Coll Switches.

87-60

DCpressurization of Reactor

Coolant systems In

Pressuri od-Water Reactors

65-lo0.

Degradation of Reactor

Supp.

Cool2nt Syst Pressure

0oundary Iesulting from

6oric Acid Corrosion

87-59 Potential RHR

Punp Loss

OL : Operating License

CP

  • Construction Permit

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

IPOSTAGE 6 FEES PAOID

IN 87-65 December 23, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.

ar es E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

C. Li, NRR

(301) 492-9414

Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-8196

. Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

MI

o

1 '!! i

U1 tLS c..3 11I,;- . .

_ ~-::

i

.

.

.<._I:,\\_

,:

-

I

_n~.-

.:

IN 87-65 December 23, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

C. Li, NRR

(301) 492-9414

Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-8196 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC

The draft of this information notice was

memorandum from L. Shao dated 10/26/87.

Information Notices

I

transmitted to DOEA by DEST in a

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR

'PPMB:ARM

CVHodge

TechEd

11/27/87

12/11/87

  • SAD/DEST:NRR

AThadani

12/13/87

,C/OGCB: DOEA: NRR

CHBerlinger

12/16/87

IN 87-XX

December xx, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

C. Li, NRR

(301) 492-9414

Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-8196 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

The draft of this information notice was transmitted to

memorandum from L. Shao dated 10/26/87.

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

s

i0

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR

PPMB:ARM

SAD/DEST:NRR

C/OGCB:DOEi

CVHodge

TechEd6 AThadani

CHBerlingei

11/27/87

121/i /87 12/1 /87

12//a/87

DOEA by DEST in a

k:NRR

r

D/DOEA:NRR

CERossi

12/ /87

IN 87-XX

November xx, 1987 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

C. Li, NRR

(301) 492-9414

Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-8196 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

a

OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CVHodge

1 1/j1/87 PPMB:ARM

TechEd

11/ /87 C/OGCB: DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger

11/ /87 D/DOEA:NRR

CERossi

11/ /87