Information Notice 1987-14, Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related Ventilation Equipment

Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related Ventilation Equipment

ML031180007
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	03/23/1987
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-87-014, NUDOCS 8703200082
Download: ML031180007 (4)

SSINS Ho.: 6835 IN 87-14 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 23. 1987 IE INFORmATION NOTICE 87-14: ACTUATION OF FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM CAUSING

INOPERABILITY OF SAFETY-RELATED VENTILATION

EQUIPMENT

Addressees

license (OL) or a

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

generic problem involving

This notice is to alert recipients to a potential that initiate fire

operator errors and single- and common-cause failures safety-related systems.

suppression systems and cause the inoperability of

for applicability to

We expect that recipients will review the information to preclude similar

their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, However, suggestions contained in

problems froma occurring at their facilities.NRC requirements; therefore, no

q this information notice do not constitute

specific action or written response is required.

i

Description of Circumstances

In June 1983 the NRC issued Information Notice (IN)83-41. The purpose of that

events during which fire

notice was to alert licensees to several reported

the inoperability ef safety-related

suppression systems actuation resulted in indicate that the concerns addressed by

systems. A continuing series of events

IN 83-41 are not resolved.

the deluge system temperature

On October 15, 19£6, at Duane Arnold, testinginofboth trains of the control room

sensors resulted in wetting of the charcoal isolation of the water

ventilation system. Although procedures called forfailed to requ1-e that the

i4 supply before testing the sensors, the procedures valve.

control valves be reset before reopening the supply

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 On August 27, 1986, the licensee for initiation

determined that automatic or manual system would of the standby gas treatment

result in the charcoal beds

(SBGT) system deluge fire suppression the Pilgrim SBGT system's redundant

of one train becoming water soaked. Sincenormally open dampers, a

trains are cross-connected via pneumatic action toopen/fail

close the cross connect

deluge system actuation without operatorof SBGT system operability.

dampers will result in a complete loss

Q8703200

%D.V Dtet-

IN 87-14 March 23, 1987 I observed water falling from a

On May 15, 1985, personnel at Hatch Unit conditioning (HYAC) vent onto an

control room heating ventilation and air the control room. The water was from

analog transmitter trip system panel in system which had been inadvertently

the control room RVAC filter train deluge activities (See Information

activated as a result of unrelated maintenance liftin9 of 3 safety relief valve four

Notice 85-85). The water resulted in the cycle, Initiating a severe tran- times. The valve stuck open on the fourthpressure coolant injection (HPCI) trip

sient. Moisture also energized the high vessel makeup during part of this

solenoid making the HPCI inoperable for

event.

the Cooper Nuclear Power Station

On April 4, 1984, construction workers at system. When the hydrant was

sheared a hydrant from the fire protection

a water hammer forced the SBGT system

isolated and the system repressurized,flooding the charcoal filters. Both

fire suppression deluge valves open, trains of SBGT were rendered inoperable.

in the firewater system (that was

On March 21, 1984, a pressure transient In the plant) momentarily opened the

caused by a false initiation elsewhere at WNP2. One valve did not reseat

deluge valves for both SBGT system trains one train occurred on April 4 and 27 properly. Similar events involving only

of the same year.

of a new control valve in the fire

On March 24, 1983, incorrect installation

train at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

suppression deluge system for one SBGT deluge system was not tested after

resulted in the loss of the train. The of the installation error. As

modification and the valve leaked as a result system design and operational config- discussed above, because the Pilgrim SBGT dampers, the continued opera- uration includes normally open cross connection

bility of the redundant SGTS train was threatened.

Discussion:

are of particular concern, not only

Events such as those described abovethat are required for accident mitigation, because of their impact on systems problem presented by dry charcoal

but also because of the special fire safety temperature) and because of water

that has been wetted (i.e., lower ignitionDesign Criterion 3 (Fire Protection)

damage to other safety systems. Generalin part: "Fire detection and fighting

of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 states shall be provided and designed

II systems of appropriate capacity and capability

on structures, systems and components

to minimize the adverse effects of fires shall be designed to ensure that

I important to safety. Fire fighting systems not significantly Impair the safety

their rupture or inadvertent operation doesand components.' Appendix R to 10 CFR

capability of these structures, systems be performed to assess the proba- Part 50 requires that a fire hazard analysis utilization facility. This analysis

bility and consequences of fires in each operation or leaks in moderate energy

should include the effects of inadvertent events reported in this notice

lines of the fire suppression system. Theproblem has not been fully resolved.

subsequent to IN 83-41 indicate that the

mar- -- _ --

IN 87-14 March 23, 1987 on the

To date, none of the repotted events have resulted in a serious impactcould lead

health and safety of the public. However, each instance cited above systems

to much more serious consequences given a valid demand for the safety

that were damaged by the event.

required, it is suggested that

Although no written response to this notice is this notice for applicability

holders of OLs or CPs review the information In occurred at BWes but our

at their facilities. The specific events citedSupplement 2 to Information

concern is not limited to BWRs. For example, dioxide fire suppression system

Notice 86-106 describes actuation of the carbon entering the control panels

at the Surry Power Station as a result of water

resulted in carbon dioxide

through the ends of several open conduits. This breath, dizziness, and nausea

entering the control room, causing shortness of

of some personnel.

above, NRC's evalua- Because of the recurring failures such as those discussedAEOD is currently evaluating

tion of this problem is continuing. Specifically, actuations of fire suppres- the safety significance of a number of inadvertent results of the evaluation, sion systems at operating plants. Depending on the actions may be requested.

further information will be published and/or specific

matter, please contact the Regional

If you have any questions regarding this or this office.

Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office,

0 a 4dordan, Director

Divis1o f Emergency Preparedness

and E ineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts: R. F. Scholl, NRR

(301) 492-8443 J. B. Henderson, IE

(301)492-9654 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

F

Attachment 1 IN 87-14 March 23, 1987 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

86-106 Sup. 2 Feedwater Line Break 3/18/87 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

87-13 Potential for High Radiation 2/24/87 All power reactor

Fields Following Loss of facilities holding

Water from Fuel Pool an OL or CP except

Fort St. Vrain.86-106 Sup. 1 Feedwater Line Break 2/13/87 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

87-12 Potential Problems With 2/13/87 All power reactor

Metal Clad Circuit Breakers, facilities holding

General Electric Type AKF-2-25 an OL or CP

87-11 Enclosure of Vital Equipment 2/13/87 All power reactor

Within Designated Vital facilities holding

Areas an OL or CP

87-10 Potential for Water Hammer 2/11/87 All BWR facilities

During Restart of Residual holding an OL or CP

Heat Removal Pumps

87-09 Emergency Diesel Generator 2/5/87 All power reactor

Room Cooling Design facilities holding

Deficiency an OL or CP

87-08 Degraded Motor Leads in 2/4/87 All power reactor

Limitorque CD Motor facilities holding

Operators an OL or CP

87-07 Quality Control of Onsite 2/3/87 All power reactor

Dewatering/Solidification facilities holding

Operations by Outside an OL or CP

Contractors

87-06 Loss of Suction to Low- 1/30/87 All power reactor

Pressure Service Water facilities holding

System Pumps Resulting From an OL or CP

Loss of Siphon

UL - Operating License

CP a Construction Permit

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