Information Notice 1987-11, Enclosure of Vital Equipment Within Designated Vital Areas

Enclosure of Vital Equipment Within Designated Vital Areas

ML031210619
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	02/13/1987
Revision:	0
From:	Jordan E L NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-87-011, NUDOCS 8702110131
Download: ML031210619 (14)

SSINS No.: 6835IN 87-11UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555February 13, 1987IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 87-11: ENCLOSURE OF VITAL EQUIPMENT WITHINDESIGNATED VITAL AREAS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license orconstruction permit.

Purpose

This notice is provided to describe examples of significant degradationof facility security programs resulting from the failure to enclose vitalequipment within designated vital areas. It is expected that recipientswill review the information for applicability to their facilities andconsider actions as appropriate to ensure that similar degradations do notexist or occur at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in thisinformation notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specificaction or written response is required.Past Related Correspondence:IE Information Notice 85-79, "Inadequate Communications between Maintenance,Operations, and Security Personnel."IE Information Notice 86-27, "Access Control at Nuclear Facilities."

Description of Circumstances

Failure to provide adequate physical protection for vital equipment is oneof the most significant safeguards vulnerabilities that can occur at a nuclearpower facility. In recent months, plant walkdowns and inspections by NRC andlicensee personnel have identified instances in which vital equipment wasincompletely enclosed in a vital area designated in the physical securityplan, resulting in inadequate protection. The following examples werediscovered.1. High-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) pump rooms and 480-V shutdowntransformers were not enclosed within designated vital areas withpositive access controls established.2. 125-V dc power panels and steam supply piping designated as vital equip-ment was not enclosed within designated vital areas.870 IN 87-11February 13, 1987 . The vital area barrier surrounding the diesel generator room hadopenings in it that would have allowed someone to reach in andmanipulate valves on vital equipment.In the first two examples, positive access controls or compensatory measureshad not been established to restrict access to the vital equipment.Discussion:Failure to protect vital equipment by not ensuring that the equipment islocated within an appropriately established and controlled vital area posesa potentially significant threat to the security and safety of the facilitybecause of the opportunity for unauthorized and undetected access.A review of the circumstances of the examples noted above indicate that themost significant factors contributing to the degradations in protection ofvital equipment were:-Failure by the licensee to adequately review and verify the as-builtdrawings relative to the location and identity of designated vitalequipment.-Failure of the site security organization to verify the locationand protection afforded areas and equipment identified as vital inthe physical security plan.-Inadequate training of security and other licensee personnel inthe necessity for appropriate protection for designated vitalareas and equipment.-Failure to adequately coordinate and followup on maintenance andmodification activities that may result in exposing vital equipmentto an inadequately protected environmen .r'-' IN 87-11February 13, 987No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the RegionalAdministrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical contactlisted below.Edward L. Jordan, DirectorDivision of Emergency Preparednessand Engineering ResponseOffice of Inspection and Enforcement

Attachments:

1. IE Information2. IE Information3. List of Recent'R. P.(301)Rosano, IE492-4006Notice 85-79Notice 86-27ly Issued IE Information Notices*IE:PPMBDGable12/29/86*DD:DEPERSASchwartz2/9/87*D: DEPERELJordan2/9/87*IE:DI:ORPBRPRosano:jj1/8/87AIE:DI:ORPBLJCunningham1/14/87*IE:DI:ORPBPFMcKee1/14/87*IE: DI: DDRLSpessard1/15/87*IE:DI:DJGPartlow1/28/87*IE:DEPERRLBaer2/4/87 OFC :IE:PPMB 5R- F E :D:DEPERNAME :DGable :ELJDATE :12/ /86 /86 IN 87 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the RegionalAdministrator of the appropriate NRC 7egional ffice of the technical contactlisted below.Edward L. Jordan, DirectorDivision of Engineering andQuality AssuranceOffice of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact:

R. P. Rosano, (301)492-4006

Attachments:

IE Information Notice 85-79, "Inadequate Communicationsbetween Maintenance, Operations, and Security Personnel"IE Information Notice 86-27, "Access Control at NuclearFacilities"OFC :IE:DI:ORPB :IE:DI:ORPB :IE:DI:ORPB :IE:DI:DD :IE:DI:D :IE:DEPER______- -___ __ __ __ ___----__ __---------__---------___-___ __ __ __-__ __ __ __NAME :RPRosano:jj :LJCunningham :PFMcKee :RLSpessard :JGPartlow :REBaer______- ---------------_ ______________ --------------__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _DATE :12/ /86 :12/ /86 :12/ /86 :12/ /86 :12/ /86 :12/ /86OFC :IE:PPMB :DD:DEPER :D:DEPERNAME :DGable § :SASchwartz :ELJordan :DATE :12/1)/86 :12/ /86 :12/ /86 :

AttachmentIN 87-11v- SSINS No.: 6835 February 13IN 85-79 1987UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555September 30, 1985IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-79: INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MAINTENANCE,OPERATIONS, AND SECURITY PERSONNEL

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) orconstruction permit (CP), research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuelfabrication and processing facilities using or processing formula quantitiesof special nuclear material.

Purpose

This information notice is provided to alert addressees of the need to ensurethat actions of a temporary or permanent nature taken by operations, maintenance,or other personnel that may affect the integrity of the physical barriers usedto control access to protected, material access, and vital areas, or other por-tions of the overall security program, are coordinated with the organization -directly responsible for security before being implemented. It is expectedthat the recipients will review the information for applicability to theirfacilities and consider actions, if necessary, to preclude a similar problemoccurring at their facilities. Suggestions contained in this informationnotice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action orwritten response is required.

Description of Circumstances

During plant walkdowns and/or inspections, NRC and licensee personnel haveidentified instances where actions by plant organizational elements other thansecurity have resulted in the degradation of protected and vital area barriersand other security/safeguards measures without proper compensation. Someexamples are:o removal of portions of protected and vital area barriers, includingfences, hatches, or other portals that allow unauthorized access tothe protected area or vital areaso removal of equipment that had formed part of the barrier, such aspiping or valves that would allow passage of small objects into orout of a material access area or vital areao creation of holes in protected and vital area barriers to facilitateconstruction8509260122 IN 85-79September 30, 1985 o leaving vital area door alarms in access mode after work is completedo removal of essential telephone lines from an independent power sourceo building or placing equipment, structures, or vehicles within theisolation zone of the protected area or within exterior "clear" zonesof sensitive facilities, such as storage vaultsThe incidents that lead to the issuance of this information notice have resultedin the degradation of protected and vital area barriers and access controlsnecessary for protection of vital equipment and, in one case, the loss of themeans to communicate with local law enforcement officials or emergency responsepersonnel. In many cases, the loss of this protection has been accompanied bythe failure of the licensee to notify the NRC in accordance with the applicableprovisions of 10 CFR 73.71, depending on the degree to which the security systemhas been degraded.Discussion:A review of each incident has indicated that the modification or repairs thatdegraded the protected and vital area barriers and communications systems weremade without an adequate, or in some cases any, notification of the facility'ssecurity organization by the organization planning or performing the modifica-tions or repairs.The likelihood of degradation may be substantially lessened at sites where theorganization responsible for security is part of the planning or schedulingphase of any facility modifications or repairs. In such facilities, thebarriers and equipment necessary to provide security to the facility areidentified and the proper compensatory measures planned and scheduled to allowfor the efficient implementation of the planned modifications or repairs. Anintegrated planning system allows for all facility organizations to have inputto the planning and scheduling phase of maintenance and facility modifications,especially when the actions taken can negatively impact on the effectiveness ofother essential programs.The reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 may apply to security incidents ofthe type described above, depending on the degree to which the security systemhas been degrade ~'> IN 85-79September 30, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the RegionalAdministrator of the approprate NRC regional office or this office.dward ordan, DirectorDivisi f Emergency Preparednessand 6'gineering ResponseOffice of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact:

R. Rosano, IE(301) 492-4006

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices Attachment 1IN 85-79September 30, 1985LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to85-7885-7785-7685-7585-7484-70Sup. 185-7385-7285-7185-70Event NotificationPossible Loss Of EmergencyNotification System Due ToLoss Of AC PowerRecent Water Hammer EventsImproperly Installed Instru-mentation, Inadequate QualityControl And Inadequate Post-modification TestingStation Battery ProblemsReliance On Water LevelInstrumentation With ACommon Reference LegEmergency Diesel GeneratorControl Circuit Logic DesignErrorUncontrolled Leakage OfReactor Coolant OutsideContainmentContainment Integrated LeakRate TestsTeletherapy Unit FullCalibration And QualifiedExpert Requirements (10 CFR35.23 And 10 CFR 35.24)9/23/859/20/859/19/858/30/858/29/858/26/858/23/858/22/858/22/858/15/85All power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll materiallicenseesOL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit SSINS No.: 6835 IN 87-J11t1LfIN 86-27 February 13,UNITED STATES 198NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, DC 20555April 21, 1986IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-27: ACCESS CONTROL AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) orconstruction permit (CP), research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuelfabrication and processing facilities using or possessing formula quantitiesof special nuclear material.

Purpose

This information notice is provided to describe examples of significant physicalsecurity problems in the area of access control. It is expected that recipientswill review the information for applicability to their facilities and consideractions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at theirfacilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do notconstitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written responseis required at this time.

Description of Circumstances

In recent months, the number of incidents related to degraded access control atnuclear facilities appears to have increased considerably. Breakdowns in positiveaccess control, especially those that could have allowed access into vital areas(VAs) and material access areas (MAAs), are among the most significant safeguardsvulnerabilities that can occur at nuclear facilities.Examples of the most frequent access control problems are:° Weapons have been found on vehicles by security personnel during protectedarea exit searches instead of entry searches. Also, individuals already ,granted access have discovered that they mistakenly brought weapons on sitevia vehicle or package. In some cases, no entry search was conducted, whilein others, a search was conducted but the weapon was not detected. Secu-rity personnel have asked drivers of vehicles if they had any weapons ontheir persons, but failed to ask if there were any weapons in the vehicles.o Individuals have gained access to facilities by tailgating or by usingsomeone else's badge. Also, individuals not authorized access to VAs andMAAs have tailgated into those areas. In many cases, they were not chal-lenged by the person being tailgated or by personnel working in the area.Some violators displayed badges that clearly indicated they were notauthorized to be in the area, while others did not even display a badge.8604160379 IN 86-27April 21, 1986

• VA and MAA doors have been found unsecured because they would not closeproperly. Also, these doors have been found taped or propped open foroperational convenience. In other instances, the closure time for power-controlled VA and MAA doors has been excessive, inviting tailgating orunauthorized entries. Poor maintenance programs and inadequate compensa-tory measures have frequently compounded these problems.* Guards being used as compensatory measures for VA and MAA barriers and/orsecurity alarm systems, have been found asleep at their posts or have lefttheir posts before barriers and/or alarm systems have been returned to aneffective state of operation.o Responses to protected area and VA and MAM alarms have been very untimelyand, in some cases, no responses have been made.In several of these cases, NRC has taken escalated enforcement action forfailure to properly control access to the site protected area and VAs. Underthe NRC Enforcement Policy, failure to control access such that contraband isintroduced into the site protected area or individuals are allowed access toprotected areas or VAs without proper authorization may be categorized asSeverity Level III or higher violations. Depending on the particularcircumstances of such incidents, a substantial civil penalty may be imposed.Discussion:The above examples of frequent access control problems indicate that manylicensees may share some of the following program management problems:o Failure to properly train and motivate security personnel and other employeesin discharging their security-related responsibilities.o Failure to place appropriate priorities on maintenance of security equipment.a Poor security awareness or attitudes by employees.o Poor access control procedures, especially concerning searches, issuance ofbadges, and use of turnstiles.Human error, ineffective training, and poor attitudes towards the securityprogram appear to be the most significant factors in the problem areas identified.NRC inspectors are directing more inspection effort in'these areas, and violationswill be processed in accordance with NRC Enforcement Polic IN 86-27April 21, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions regarding thts matter, please contact the RegionalAdministrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this office.Efard ,iJordanDivisi of Emergency Preparednessand Engineering ResponseOffice of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact:

N. Ervin, IE(301) 492-7855

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices Attachment 1IN 86-27April 21, 1986LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to86-2686-2586-2486-2386-2286-2186-2086-19Potential Problems InGenerators Manufactured ByElectrical ProductsIncorporatedTraceability And MaterialControl Of Material AndEquipment, ParticularlyFasteners4/17/864/11/86Respirator Users Notice: 4/11/86Increased Inspection FrequencyFor Certain Self-ContainedBreathing Apparatus AirCylindersExcessive Skin Exposures DueTo Contamination With HotParticlesUnderresponse Of RaditionSurvey Instrument To HighRadiation FieldsRecognition Of AmericanSociety Of MechanicalEngineers AccreditationProgram For N Stamp HoldersLow-Level Radioactive WasteScaling Factors, 10 CFRPart 61Reactor Coolant Pump ShaftFailure At Crystal River4/9/863/31/863/31/863/28/863/21/86All power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP; researchand test reactorfacilities; fuelcycle licensees andPriority 1 materiallicenseesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP andresearch and testreactorsAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP and allrecipients of NUREG-0040 (white book)All power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPOL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit

-, 4 at , rAttachment 3IN 87-11February 13, 1987LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to87-1087-0987-0887-0787-0687-0587-0487-0387-0287-01Potential for Water HammerDuring Restart of ResidualHeat Removal PumpsEmergency Diesel GeneratorRoom Cooling DesignDeficiencyDegraded Motor Leads inLimitorque CD MotorOperatorsQuality Control of OnsiteDewatering/SolidificationOperations by OutsideContractorsLoss of Suction to Low-Pressure Service WaterSystem Pumps Resulting FromLoss of SiphonMiswiring in a WestinghouseRod Control SystemDiesel Generator FailsTest Because of DegradedFuelSegregation of HazardousInadequate Seismic Quali-fication of DiaphragmValves by MathematicalModeling and AnalysisRHR Valve MisalignmentCauses Degradation ofECCS in PWRs2/11/872/5/872/4/872/3/871/30/872/2/871/16/871/15/871/15/871/6/87All BWR facilitiesholding an OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll Westinghousepower reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll NRC licenseesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll PWR facilitiesholding an OL or CPOL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit