IR 05000528/1993054
| ML17310B040 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1994 |
| From: | Schaefer D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17310B039 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-93-54, 50-529-93-54, 50-530-93-54, NUDOCS 9402230063 | |
| Download: ML17310B040 (44) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/93-54, 50-529/93-54, and 50-530/93-54 Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529, and 50-530 License Nos.
. NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.O.
Box 53999, Station 9082 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999 Inspection Conducted:
December 15-17, 1993; 1994, a
J nuary ll, December 27, 1993 January 6,
1994 Date Signed
'u.
D. Schaefer, hysic Inspector:
Security Inspector Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2,
and
Inspection at:
Haricopa County, Arizona Approved by:
Ro ert J.
P te, C ief, Safeguards, Emergency Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch Ins ection Summar
/~r Pg D te igned Areas Ins ected:
This;special announced inspection by a region-based inspector examined the circumstances surrounding situations in which Palo Verde granted unescorted site access to individuals based upon false and/or incomplete informati on which may have been caused by programmatic deficiencies in a contractor's program for certification of unescorted access.
During this inspection, portions of Inspection Procedures 92700, 90713 and 81070 were used.
t Results:
The licensee's security program in the area of access authorization initially appeared inadequate to accomplish its security objective.
Following its discovery and reporting of unsatisfactory contractor performance, the licensee's immediate (temporary) corrective measures were judged to be adequate to again accomplish the security objectives.
The licensee was found
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to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined during this inspection, except as follows:
Access Control One apparent violation involves the licensee's fai lure to review and evaluate pertinent background investigation screening (access authorization)
information before granting individuals unescorted site access at Palo Verde.
See Inspection Report Details, paragraph 4.a.
9402230063 940121 PDR ADOCK 05000528 Q
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One apparent violation involves a licensee contractor's failure to annually audit private investigative agencies conducting background investigations.
See Inspection Report Details, paragraph REPORT DETAILS Ke Persons Contacted
'H. Bieling, Manager, Emergency Planning/Special Projects, APS P. Caudill, Director, Services Division, APS
"J. Draper, Site Representative, Southern California Edison Company E. Everling, Manager, Operations guality Assurance, BWNT T. Ford, Security Shift Supervisor, Security Department, APS
'"R. Fountain, Supervisor, equality Audits and Monitoring, APS
~B. Grabo, Supervisor, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, APS A. Hanse, Manager, Access Control, BWNT
- R. Henry, Site Representative, Salt River Project
- D. Hettick, Supervisor, Station Operating Experience Department, APS
"A. Hutti e, Supervisor, Security Training/Access Control, APS L. Levitt, Senior Security Analyst, Security Department, APS J.
Lough, Screening Analyst, Security Department, APS M. Mahoney, Screening Analyst, Security Department, APS
"J. Napier, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, APS
"R. Raisawen, Senior Engineer, Station Operating Experience Department, APS
- T. Ramey, Senior Analyst, Security Department, APS J.
Reynoso, Senior Engineer, Station Operating Experience Department, APS W. Speight, Principle Engineer, guality Assurance, BWNT T. Steckler, Screening Analyst, Security Department, APS L. Thompson, Attorney, Law Department, APS
"B. Whitney, Auditor, guality Audits and Monitoring, APS T. Wilson, Analyst, Access Control, BWNT The above individuals denoted with an asterisk were present during the exit meeting on December 17, 1993, as discussed in paragraph 5 of this inspection report.
The inspector also contacted other members of the licensee's security'taff during the course of this inspection.
Information Notices (MC-92700)
NRC Region V Inspection Report 50-528/92-01, 50-529/92-01, and 50-530/92-01, dated January 31, 1992, noted that the licensee had received and reviewed NRC Information Notice 91-59,
"Problems With Access Authorization Programs,"
dated September 23, 1991.
IN 91-59 alerted licensee's to continuing problems with access authorization programs, including the failure of licensee contractors or sub-contractors to comply with all requirements for background investigations, and falsification of records.
In January 1992, after reviewing this Notice, the'icensee determined that because of its centralized screening program at Palo Verde, contractors and sub-contractors were unable to falsify background investigation records or influence the results of their completed background investigations.
(Note:
In June 1992, the licensee decided to partially decentralize the screening program and to allow BWNT to complete background investigations for its own employees.)
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Licensee Event Re ort and Chronolo of Events (HC-90713)
Licensee Event Report (LER) 1-93-SOI, dated December 6,
1993, reported instances in which individuals had been granted unescorted site access based on false information and programmatic deficiencies in a contractor's program for certification of unescorted access.
The contractor involved, was BRW Nuclear Technologies (BWNT).
On October 28, November. 1, and 4, 1993, BWNT notified the licensee of the false and/or incomplete information.
Based on these reports, the licensee revoked the unescorted site access of the three affected individuals.
On November 4, 1993, following a meeting with BWNT at Palo Verde, the licensee notified NRC Headquarters pursuant to
CFR 73.71.
The LER also indicated that BWNT had not audited its investigative agencies (sub-contractors)
providing access authorization information, and did not have access to most of the sub-contractor's background investigation screening files.
On November 8, 1993, the licensee sent an audit team to the BWNT headquarters office in Lynchburg, Virginia to audit BWNT's access authorization program and files.
During this review, the licensee identified two other contract employees who had apparently falsified their access control records, and other discrepancies.
On November 16, 1993, licensee management reviewed the preliminary
, results of the audit and decided to suspend unescorted access for the
remaining individuals at Palo Verde who had been previously certified by BWNT, pending the licensee's independent review and approval.
Also, pending further review, the licensee discontinued its acceptance of Letters of Certification from BWNT based on BWNT investigations of its employees working at Palo Verde.
On November 19, 1993, the licensee issued a Vendor Corrective Action Report (CAR) to BWNT.
A copy of this vendor CAR is enclosed at Attachment A.
Also, on November 19, 1993, BWNT notified all users of the INDEX (Integrated Nuclear Data Exchange)
Network of the ongoing access authorization matter at Palo Verde, and suggested that all licensees might want to discuss with BWNT its Certification Letters for access authorization.
BWNT further noted that "These certifications may have been used as a basis for granting unescorted access via the INDEX program or through the 90-03 exchange program."
On December 22, 1993, the licensee determined that the work performed by the individuals improperly granted unescorted site access, met the appropriate standards fof that work.
The licensee's conclusions are documented in gA Monitoring Reports 93-0733 and 93-0752, dated December 16 and 22, 1993, respectively.
Access Control Personnel (MC-81070)
Two violations were identified.
CFR 73.56(a)(4)
provides in part that the licensee may accept an
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access authorization program used by its contractors for their employees ifit meets the requirements of section 73.56.
The licensee is responsible for granting, denying, or revoking unescorted access authorization to any contractor, vendor, or other affected organization employee.
CFR '73.56(b) {1) requires in part that the licensee establish and maintain an access authorizati on program granting individuals unescorted access to protected and vital areas of a nuclear power plant.
The program objective is to provide high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety, including the potential to commit radiological sabotage.
Paragraph 6.8. 1 of the Facility Technical Specifications states in part that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering security plan implementation.
On April 27, 1992, the licensee certified by letter to the NRC that "the access authorization program required by
CFR 73.56 has been incorporated into the PVNGS Security Plan and has been implemented.
All elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 have been implemented to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56."
a.
Back round Investi ations for Personnel Granted Unescorted Site Access at Palo Verde.
CFR 73.56(b)(2) requires in part that the 'licensee's unescorted access authorization program include a background investigation designed to identify past actions which are indicative of an individual.'s future reliability within a protected or vital area of a nuclear power reactor.
This investigation must include, in part,.development of information concerning an individual's employment and criminal history.
Further, the licensee is required to base its decision to grant, deny, revoke, or continue an unescorted access authorization, on review and evaluation of all ertinent information develo ed.
(emphasis added)
Section 3.8.2 of Palo Verde's Security Procedure 20AC-OSK07 requires in part that the Security Hanager or designee evaluate all information developed in the screening process with respect to an individual, and determine whether to grant or deny unescorted access to Palo Verde.
Section 3. 13.4 of Palo Verde's Security Procedure 20AC-OSK07 requires that if any derogatory information is developed concerning any individual for whom the contractor requests authorization for unescorted access at PVNGS, the contractor shall submit all information on that individual to the Security Access Control Supervisor for final determination as to whether unescorted access is to be authorize f
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Em lo ee R.
On October 14, 1993, BWNT requested interim site access and certified to the licensee that Employee R
had "successfully completed the psychological evaluation and the screening process comparable with PVNGS requirements which meets
CFR 73.56...."
On October 15, 1993, the licensee granted Employee R interim unescorted site access to Palo Verde.
On October 28, 1993, BWNT notified the licensee that it had derogatory employment information concerning Employee R (that it should have forwarded to APS on October 14, but did not).
On October 29, 1993, the licensee interviewed Employee R, confirmed that he had intentionally omitted listing previous employment in which he had been terminated for cause, and revoked his unescorted site access at Palo Verde.
Investigation by the licensee and by BWNT determined that on July 26, 1993, a
BWNT sub-contractor had completed a full 5-year background investigation, and Employee R was granted full unescorted access at Davis-Besse.
On March 2, 1993, an employment verification completed by a BWNT sub-contractor documented that while previously employed for a construction company in 1988 (later determined to be 3/6/89 5/23/89),
Employee R had failed to meet security standards and his employment was terminated.
A BWNT memorandum indicated that on September 29, 1993, BWNT'iscovered that Employee R's full 5-year background investigation file was discovered missing from BWNT files.
On October 15, 1993, the sub-contractor again forwarded to BWNT Employee R's full 5-year background investigation.
However, BWNT was later unsure when it received this investigation file and did not recognize that this file contained the above referenced March 2, 1993, employment verification which disclosed derogatory employment information.
(Note:
The licensee determined that there was no documented evidence that the sub-contractor had properly evaluated this derogatory information.)
On October 28, 1993, while auditing BlOT files, a Davis-Besse employee confirmed with Employee R's previous employer that Employee R had been terminated for cause because he had used a
company credit card to pay a personal
$ 150.00 bar bill.
Davis-Besse noti fied BWNT of this information, who in turn notified Palo Verde.
After reviewing appropriate documents, it appeared to the inspector that when BWNT requested interim unescorted site access at Palo Verde on October 14, 1993, BWNT possessed Employee R's prior derogatory employment history (identified on the employment verification form dated Narch 2, 1993);
however, BWNT failed to advise the licensee of this information until October 28, 1993.
The licensee stated to the inspector that Employee R would not have been granted
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unescorted site access at Palo Verde if this derogatory information had been known.
Because of BWNT's actions, the licensee was unaware of Employee R's previous derogatory employment information, and thus failed to base its decision to grant unescorted site access on evaluation of all pertinent access authorization investigation information.
Em lo ee H.
On October 18, 1993, BWNT requested interim site access at Palo Verde and certified to the licensee that Employee H had "successfully completed the psychological evaluation and the screening process comparable with PVNGS requirements which meets
CFR 73.56...."
On October 19, 1993, based upon this information from BWNT, the licensee granted Employee H interim unescorted site access to Palo Verde.
On November 1,
1993, BWNT notified the licensee of an omission concerning Employee H's criminal history.
On November 1, 1993, the licensee interviewed Employee H,
concluded that he had been intentionally deceptive on his criminal background questionnaire by omitting reference to criminal conviction and prison sentence, and suspended his unescorted site access.
Investigation by the licensee and by BWNT determined that Employee H completed his Employee Security guestionnaire for Palo Verde on September 30, 1993, listing two arrests as follows:
(1) Hay 7, 1988 Operating a vehicle after being declared a habitual offender
. paid a fine; and (2)
Hay 24, 1988 Assault, misdemeanor paid a fine.
In processing the background investigation, on October 5,
1993, BWNT tasked Sub-Contractor 1 to perform a local criminal record check and a motor vehicle record check.
On October 6, 1993, BWNT tasked Sub-Contractor 2 to perform an interim background investigation For access to Palo Verde.
On October 15, 1993, Sub-Contractor 1's local criminal search identified derogatory information which was not forwarded to BWNT unti 1 October 29, 1993.
This information involved a felony conviction and prison sentence that Employee H had not disclosed on his security questionnaire.
On October 18, 1993, BWNT received an interim report from Sub-Contractor 2,
and (as noted aboye)
submitted the interim temporary access certi fication letter to Palo Verde.
On November 1,
1993, BWNT notified Palo Verde of the results of the local criminal and the motor vehicle checks, indicating that the Hay 7, 1988, charge listed by Employee H as being disposed by a fine, was actually a felony conviction that resulted in a one year prison sentence.
(Note:
This information was also later confirmed to the licensee as a result of the FBI fingerprint check.)
The licensee stated to the inspector
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that Employee M would not have been granted unescorted site access at Palo Verde if this derogatory information had been known.
Because of the actions of BWNT's contractor, APS was unaware that Employee H had been previously 'convicted of a felony and sentenced to one year in a state prison, and thus failed to base its decision to grant unescorted site access on review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed.
~Em lo ee L.
On Harch 29, 1993, BNNT requested interim site access at Palo Verde and certified to the licensee that Employee L had "successfully completed the psychological evaluation and the screening process comparable with PVNGS requirements which meets
CFR 73.56..."
On April 14, 1993, based upon this information from BWNT, the licensee granted Employee L interim unescorted site access to Palo Verde.
On August 12, 1993, BWNT notified the licensee that a full 5 year background investigation had been completed.
On, November 23, 1993, as part of an ongoing investigation, the licensee reviewed BWNT's screening file for Employee L
and noted that on February 23, 1993, Employee L had disclosed on his security questionnaire that a
1982
"returned check" had been satisfactorily paid.
The licensee also noted that Employee L's background investigation screening file included four criminal charges (worthless checks)
that Employee L had not listed on his security questionnaire, and that apparently had not been properly evaluated by BWNT.
On November 30, 1993, the licensee interviewed Employee L
concerning his four arrests for worthless checks from 1979 to 1984.
Employee L could not explain why he had failed to include these 4 charges on his security questionnaire, nor why he failed to indicate on his questionnaire that the last of the 4 charges (in 1988)
was a conviction di spositioned by probation and suspended sentence.
Later, Palo Verde determined that Employee L's screening file at BWNT contained additional criminal convictions for worthless checks.
On December 24, 1993, upon being interviewed by Palo Verde, Employee L stated that he did not remember these convictions.
The licensee concluded that Employee L had been intentionally deceptive on his criminal background questionnaire by entering misleading information, and revoked his unescorted site access.
Additionally, the licensee determined that on Narch 29, 1993, when BWNT requested interim unescorted site access at Palo Verde, and again on August 12, 1993, when BiNT notified Palo Verde that the full 5-year investigation had been completed, that BWNT
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apparently possessed Employee L's prior derogatory criminal history, but failed to advise the licensee of this information.
Background investigation screening records indicated that as of September 5,
1991, BWNT possessed Employee L's derogatory criminal history.
The licensee stated to the inspector that Employee L would not have been granted unescorted site access at Palo Verde if this derogatory information had been known.
Due to the action's of BWNT, APS was unaware that Employee L
had been convicted on bad check charges, and thus failed to base its decision to grant unescorted site access on review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed.
Issues affecting the performance of BWNT and its sub-contractors will be the subject of separate NRC review.
Audits.
CFR 73.56(g)(2), effective July 1, 1991, requires in part that each licensee who accepts the access authorization background investigation screening program of a contractor audit this program every 12 months to ensure that the requirements of section 73.56 are met.
Additionally, each licensee retains responsibility for the effectiveness of any contractor and vendor program it accepts and the implementation of appropriate corrective action.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's report, dated June 17, 1993, of the audit of BWNT background investigation (BI) records conducted on Hay 17-20, 1993, and the subsequent review of this audit report by the Palo Verde gA Department, dated December 9,
1993.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's gA audit report of BWNT BI records conducted November 9-12, 1993, and the Executive Summary of this audit report.
The licensee's November 1993 audit of BWNT BI records identified BWNT's failure to fully implement the Access Control (Authorization) Program in accordance with Palo Verde and NRC requirements.
During this audit, the licensee identified deficiencies in most of the BWNT files reviewed resulting in the removal of the acceptance of the BWNT Access Control Program, and the decision by Palo Verde to conduct all BIs for BWNT employees.
The inspector concluded from the review of these documents that during the Hay 1993 audit, the licensee missed the opportunity to identify the inadequate BWNT Access Control Program and prevent the inappropriate granting of unescorted access to employees R, H, and L, noted above, as well
'as the fai lure of BWNT to conduct annual audi ts discussed below.
The licensee's December 9,
1993, review of the Nay 1993 audit reached similar conclusions.
Section 3. 13.5 of PaIo Verde's Security Procedure 20AC-OSK07 requires in part that APS contractors using private investigative agenci es to conduct background investigations conduct an annual
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audit of these agencies, and make the audit information available to the licensee.
In June 1992, licensee management arranged for BWNT to begin conducting its own background investigations.
It was agreed that BWNT would certify completion of the required background investigations, and that BWNT's employees would then be granted either interim (180-day)
access (based among other things upon a
one-year employment history investigation),
or full access (based on a 5-year investigation).
To document the completed investigations, BWNT issued Letters of Certification to the licensee.
On November 10, 1993, BWNT notified the licensee that it had been using the services of thirteen investigative agencies to provide
"completion services" for background investigations.
The licensee's November 1993 audit of BWNT identified that BWNT was unable, with two exceptions, to provide evidence of annual audits for any of its investigative agencies conducting background investigations.
BWNT's fai lure to conduct annual audits of its private investigative agencies and the failure of BWNT to make this audit information available to the licensee is an apparent violation.
Exit Neetin On December 17, 1993, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspector met with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 above to summarize the purpose and to discuss observations of the licensee's ongoing activities.
The preliminary results of this inspection were not available at that time.
The inspector made the following observations:
a 4 b.
c ~
That following the licensee's discovery and reporting of the initial concerns with BMNT background investigation screening records, APS appropriately dispatched a six-person audit team to the BWNT Corporate Office in Lynchburg, Virginia.
That based upon a review of the licensees's Vendor CAR, the quality of the BWNT background investigation screening records appeared to be inferior to the quality of background investigations completed at Palo Verde.
That the licensee's decision in 1990 to centralize its background investigati on screening program proved to be an effective solution to prevent the continued misuse of Good Guy letters by contract companies.
{Note:
In June 1992, the licensee decided to partially decentralize the screening program and to allow BWNT to complete background investigations for its own employees.)
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That BWNT personnel appeared to be aware of the requirement to audit BWNT sub-contractors, and were also apparently aware that they had been providing unaudited "off the shelf" background investigation screening information to other NRC licensee's.
(Note:
This matter may be the subject of separate review by NRC.)
Upon request, the licensee agreed to provide Region V a completed copy of its ongoing investigation.
On January 6,
1993, the inspector telephonica'lly summarized the preliminary results of this inspection with Hr. Paul Caudi ll, Director of Services, Palo Verde.
The inspector discussed the apparent violations discussed in paragraphs 4.a, and 4.b above.
Attachment A Licensee's Vendor Corrective Action Report, dated November 19, 1993
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V N 0 C
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EPOR VENDOR:
BWNT Resource Company VCAR NO: VC93-031 1.
INITIATION Initiated by:
REQUIRZtKNT:
Phel s
Date:
The Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR 73.56, 73.57, Regulatory Guide 5.66 and APS Contract No. PV90-21308 are the controlling documents which specify in part, the following requirements:
A)
Performance of external audits to evaluate the implementation, adequacy and effectiveness of vendors performing activities under the BWNT access control program.
B)
Performance of personnel background screening, i.e. background investigations for unescorted access screening.
DEFICIENCY:
Contrary to the requirements, the following deficiencies were identified:
A)
BWNT Access Control Procedure, BWNT-0503-20 does not require external vendor audits, nor is there any objective evidence that external audits are performed.
B)
The following deficiencies were identified in the personnel background investigation area.
Details of individual files and deficiencies are delineated in the-attached matrix which will be supplied to B&W.
1)
Employment/Unemployment Verifications In one instance, an employment reference indicated termination of employment with ineligibility for re-hire.
This information was not pursued by B&W Access Control.
The employee did not indicate he was terminated for cause on the Employee Secupity Questionnaire, but follow up by PVNGS with the former employer determined the employee had been terminated for poor gob performance and poor attitude.
This resulted in a one-hour reportable event to the NRC for falsification of the security questionnaire.
Attachment A
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In three instances, an employment/unemployment period which exceeded 30 days was not verified prior to granting access.
This resulted in three 73.71 reports due to granting unescorted access on an incomplete background investigation.
Followup was initiated by B6W Access Control, and the period for one file was properly verified, but this occurred after access had been granted.
In two instances, it was identified that a material false statement was made on employment verification forms. Both applicants involved were hired by SPEC to support an outage, but were not yet on payroll. The dates of employment supplied by SPEC were prospective start dates, rather than actual employment dates.
The employment verification form for both employees indicated a start date six days into the future from the actual date of verification.
Disciplinary history was not indicated on employment verification forms, and no space was provided for the information.
Unacceptable administrative practices included incomplete questionnaires:
questions were often left blank; the only indication that the question may have been asked is a disclaimer statement which states the individual will not release any further information. Questions referring to the individual's date of birth and/or social security number were left blank, raising a question as to how positive identification was made with the employer.
It was discussed with B6W that blank spaces raise the question of whether the information was sought. If the information will not be provided for certain spaces, the appropriate spaces should be marked, such as with an asterisk, to indicate the question was asked and then the disclaimer statement may be used to explain the spaces marked in that manner.
In one instance, employment was verified by a co-worker but was not entered on an employment verification form.
B&W was requested to follow up on the employment verification,
"Best effort attempts" were not evident for employment character references and suitable inquiry questions.
The B&W form was revised to include a statement which demonstrates best effort.
Best effort attempts were not evident for negative information developed.
In four instances, employers indicated the applicant was not eligible for re-hire, but no followup is indicated in the fil l l
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VENDOR CORRECTIVE AC ON REPOR VENDOR:
BWNT Resource Company VCAR NO: VC93-031 INITIATION (continued)
Best effort attempts were not evident for self-employment checks.
Business tax records were not in the files of three individuals, and one file had only one reference verified.
Best effort attempts to determine activities during unemployment were not evident in two files. More information regarding specific activities would support this effort.
Eight files indicated discrepancies in employment or unemployment periods which were not explained in the file or corrected on the ESQ.
In eight files, )ob sites were not listed for all periods of employment verification.
2.
Education Verification In six instances, official documentation was not present in the file to verify high school education.
One missing document was a
GED obtained while the applicant was in the military, which requires a request through the National Personnel Records Center.
In one instance, official documentation was not present in the file to verify higher education leading to a degree.
3.
Character References Personal reference forms request social security number, date of birth, and residences which cannot always be verified by the reference.
In discussion with B&W, the monitoring team suggested including physical features and age on the form so that positive identification can be documented.
Reference forms do not specify the last date of contact the reference had with the applicant.
For interim access, contact must have been made within the past 60 days.
Forms were revised to ask last date of contact.
Criminal history was not clearly asked on the forms, After discussion, the form was revised to inquire about criminal histor j
V.NDOR C RRECT VE CT 0 REPOR VENDOR:
BWNT Resource Company VCAR NO: VC93-031 INITIATION (continued)
In three instances, there was.no indication how the developed reference was generated.
In three instances, the specific question asking if the applicant is susceptible to coercion was not on the form. A response is pending from B&W on how this required element was included in those investigations.
Recently updated forms include this specific question.
In one instance, the developed reference was a relative of the individual.
B&W was advised another reference must be developed to complete the full background investigation.
In one instance, the personal reference form asks for the relationship to the applicant, but the question is unanswered.
In one instance, both listed and developed references were obtained through former ESQ's, instead of through the current investigation.
In one instance, the form does not indicate how the reference was contacted to provide the information.
4.
Ve'rification of Identity In six instances, it was not documented that the identity of the individual was verified for the investigative period.
5.
Credit History In one instance, no followup was indicated in the file for a lawsuit against the applicant.
In one instance, the applicant states he claimed bankruptcy, but no bankruptcy release was in the file.
6.
Criminal History Checks In one instance, documentation was missing from the individual's file to support that probation was completed and alcohol counseling was attended as claime f
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VENDOR CORR C
VE AC ON REPO VENDOR:
BWNT Resource Company VCAR NO: VC93-031 INITIATION (continued)
"Best effort attempts'ere not evident for two negative criminal checks.
Reports from the investigative agency indicated that a positive match had not been made for the negative information, so the agency reported the information could not be verified.
No followup actions were indicated by B&W Access Control personnel.
In another example, negative information was reported, and a followup interview with the applicant was conducted.
The negative information was subsequently adjudicated based on the analyst's determinations from the interview but the identified law enforcement agency was not contacted.
Unescorted access was requested and granted.
Based on the negative information contained in the file, a
.followup contact was made by the monitoring team with the law enforcement agency. It was determined that the applicant was the individual indicated on the criminal report by comparison of the date of birth and social security number.
A subsequent call was made to the law enforcement agency by the Manager, B&W Access Control, and additional confirmation was made.
Based on this information and on results of the interview of the individual by the Manager, Access Control, PVNGS Security was notified and a 73.71 report was initiated.
7.
Psychological Examination Evaluation forms from the psychologists/psychiatrists indicated the applicants were evaluated in accordance with ANSI/ANS-3.3-1982.
B&W provided a draft letter which indicated that a psychological evaluation is to be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 73.56, Reg.Guide 5.66 and 10 CFR, Part 26 requirements, This letter will be distributed to B&W's contractors.
8.
Suitable Inquiry After consideration by the APS legal staff of Part
requirements, PVNGS adopted five questions for suitable inquiry.
B&W forms do not reflect these five questions.
The monitoring team requested B&W Access Control to update the employment verification form to incorporate these question I
V NDOR CORREC IVE CTION REPOR VENDOR:
BWNT Resource Company VCAR NO: VC93-031 INITIATION (continued)
The Manager B&W Access Control agreed to review the five questions and consider revising, the forms.
Employment verifications performed by B&W Access Control of both B&W and B&W contract employees indicate that the investigator answers the suitable inquiry. This verification should indicate how the suitable inquiry was verified (through B&W files, personnel, etc.).
In one instance, the results of a suitable inquiry were not in place for a previously worked utility.
Four examples were identified in the files of blank spaces for suitable inquiry questions; the disclaimer statement was not checked in all cases.
The practice of leaving blank spaces was discussed, as previously indicated.
"Best effort attempts" are not always indicated on the forms, but the recently implemented revision of the B&W employment verification forms addresses this concern.
9.
Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) Reports DMV reports were located in files which do not indicate the date or the agency the report was obtained from. Discussion with B&W determined that the investigative agency may not have sent all pages of the report.
10.
Review of Background Screening Results A secondary review of all background investigations is required by PVNGS procedures 20AC-OSK07 and 20DP-OSKll. In many cases, this review was not evident and could have prevented some of the discrepancies noted by the monitoring team. In compliance with PVNGS procedures, as well as in good business practice, secondary review by another individual should also. be documented.
11.
Administrative Observations/Recommendations In at least one instance, a Letter of Certification was received on the same day the PVNGS Employee Security Questionnaire (ESQ)
was signed at PVNGS. This sequence
V OR CO C
VE ACT 0 REPOR VENDOR:
BWNT Resource Company 1.
INITIATION (continued)
VCAR NO: VC93-031 raises questions as to how the background investigation was performed in such a short period of time. The information cannot be verified until the ESQ is signed by the individual and turned over for investigation, since the information on the questionnaire can be altered.
In one instance, four pages were missing from the Update ESQ, which reflected employment, education and military information; the signature page was also missing.
The update was for a period of time just over 30 days, and the employee had been at Palo Verde the entire time. However, the entire form must be submitted, even if the information is not applicable.
Also, spaces on the form must be marked "N/A," rather than left blank if the information is not applicable.
Blank spaces were found in three instances.
The ESQ was not completed by the applicant in one instance, but he did sign where required.
The applicant should complete his/her own ESQ to prevent controversy over data entered if the data is incorrect.
A misunderstanding on the part of B&M access control personnel existed on the "last date of contact" for each applicant. It was clarified that the date to be used is the last date the applicant's present employment is verified through the employer.
An administrative correction was made to a file which had an unemployment worksheet with correction fluid, in response to a request by a previous PVNGS audit team.
A copy was made and noted as
"use as original" but the copy was not reviewed prior to destroying the original. It was discovered through this monitoring that there was information missing for periods of unemployment and an explanation was offered that the original contained information on the reverse side which was not copied.
The missing information was requested by the monitoring team and must be re-verified. It is recommended that when copies are made in the future, care be taken to ensure all information is duplicate )
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V DO CORREC CT ON REPOR VENDOR:
BWNT Resource Company VCAR NO: VC93-031 INITIATION (continued)
RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Review all applicable personnel files for impact to PVNGS for services provided by BWNT.
2.
Review and revise, as necessary, BWNT procedures to ensure that all regulatory and contractual requirements are established and controlled, including documented secondary review of background screening results.
BWNT is to determine root cause of deficiencies and the action(s)
taken to preclude recurrenc I
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V NDOR CORREC VE ACT ON EPORT VENDOR:.
BWNT Resource Company VCAR NO: VC93-031 2.
EVALUATION AND VALIDATION 10CFR21 REPORTABILITY REVIEW REQUIRED:
INITIALCONCURRENCE:
INITIALCORRECTIVE ACTION DUE DATE:
YES NO 0A o
/
VALIDATED Vendor Qua ity Supervisor DATE 3.
CORRECTIVE ACTION RESPONSE
- Please Attach Your Response to Address the Following:
Cause of Deficiency:
Action(s) to Correct Condition:
Action(s) to Prevent Recurrence:
Interim Corrective Action (if applicable):
Date for Completion of Corrective Action(s):
!
VENDOR CORRECTIVE ACTION REPOR Page ~0 of VENDOR'WNT Resource Company VCAR NO'C93 - 031 4.
RESPONSE EVALUATION Response Acceptable:
NO YES
0 Evaluator:
Name Date:
,
I
Page ~ of VENDOR CORREC VE ON RE OR VENDOR:
BWNT Resource Company 5.
VERIFICATION/CLOSEOUT:
Corrective Action Verified by:
VCAR NO: VC93-031 Date:
Verification Method:
Corrective Actions Complete and Adequate:
YES NO D
Closure Concurrence:
Vendor Quality Supervisor Date:
'1
E