IR 05000528/1987030
| ML17303A593 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1987 |
| From: | Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17303A592 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-87-30-MM, 50-529-87-30, 50-530-87-31, NUDOCS 8710050100 | |
| Download: ML17303A593 (14) | |
Text
e U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Licensee:
50-528/87-30 50"529/87"30 50-530/87"31 50-528 50-529 50-530 NPF"41 NPF-51 NPF-65 Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 e
Approved By:
S.
A. Richards, Chief Engineering Section
'7-i 7 -<7 Date Signed Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 & 3 Meeting Location:
ANPP Corporate Engineering Office, Phoenix, Arizona Meeting Conducted:
August 12, 1987 87i0050i00 8709i7 PDR ADQCN 05000528 G
DETAILS Meetin Partici ants See enclosure.
Mana ement Discussion A management meeting was held on August 12, 1987, at the Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP) Corporate Office in Phoenix, Arizona.
The meeting agenda is provided as an enclosure.
The discussion on each of the agenda topics are summarized below.
Performance Indicators Performance Indicators are generally improving.
The licensee needs to continue to give management attention to reducing the number of LERs and to the reduction of personnel and equipment failures.
ANPP management needs to guard against getting so involved in the startup of the 3rd unit and the reorganization that they neglect their plans for impt ovement in these areas.
Fuel Inte rit ANPP's review of Combustion Engineering (CE) manufacturing records indicates that there is a relatively high probability that there will be 40-50 failed fuel rods in Palo Verde Unit 2.
This will be less than the number of failed rods in the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 3.
However',
ANPP was cautioned that they should establish a
well thought out program for handling hot particles.
It was suggested that they could profit from the SONGS and Trojan experience.
ANPP management advised that they had already visited SONGS and Trojan to review their programs.
Condenser Water Hammer The circulating water system water hammer event on May 28, 1987, was discussed.
ANPP had a reasonably complete root cause analysis and had concluded that the event was caused by the failure of the quadrant gear bolts that had been overstressed by manual operation of the valve against the mechanical stops which had been improperly set.
Analysis of the broken bolts indicated that the bolts failed due to fatigue.
The licensee deduced that the bolts became loose from the overstressed condition and then failed due to fatigue.
All similar valves on Unit 1 were checked for wear and proper torque.
A chemical compound which aids in keeping bolts tight was used during the valve reassembly and hardened washers were added to distribute torque loading and assist in maintaining the torque.
The bolts in Units 2 and 3 were checked to verify tightness.
ANPP stated that the event had caused no damage to the tubes and tube sheet except one plug was forced inside a tube and a few other plugs were loosen.
All the displaced or loose plugs were replaced.
Also, ANPP stated that there were no other remotely operable valves in the plant that require consistent manual operatio Secondar Chemistr The recent operating history in regard to secondary plant chemistry was reviewed.
High antimony levels have been measured in Units 1 and
.
This activity has been transferred to the secondary side of Unit 1 due to recent steam generator tube leaks.
The source of the antimony, according to the licensee, is the reactor coolant pump (RCP) journal bearings.
The plant radwaste system is not currently designed to process waste water with high levels of antimony.
ANPP is investigating means to increase the processing capability and stated that they plan to cleanup the antimony in Unit 1 prior the upcoming outage.
Replacement RCP bearings for Units 1 and 2 are on order.
The RCP bearings have already been replaced with antimony free bearings in Unit 3.
ANPP had not determined when the antimony free bearings would be installed in Units 1 and 2.
They are evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of replacing the bearings during the next outage for each plant.
Mr. Martin asked why ANPP appeared to be reluctant to replace the RCP bearings during the next outage.
ANPP management advised that this would require operating the plant at mid-loop and their improvements to ensure safer mid-loop operation would not be completed in time for the replacement of the RCP bearings during the next Unit 1 outage.
Also, ANPP was asked whether the presence af antimony in the RCP bearings was a
design error.or due to proper engineering judgement.
ANPP management stated that the antimony was put in the bearings to provide longer bearing life.
ANPP was encouraged to consider their recent history with fuel failures and high levels of antimony, both of which cause high levels of primary system activity; steam generator leaks, that provide a path for the radioactivity to get into the secondary system; the lack of sufficient capability to process water with high levels of,radioactivity; and the plant license that allows no off-site release of radioactivity, i.e.,
a zero release plant.
These facts taken together indicate that a potential problem exists that should be aggressively addressed by ANPP before this potential problem becomes a real problem that will require shutdown of the plant.
ANPP management discussed possible options to pursue.
Unit 1 Low Pressure Safet In'ection LPSI Pum Seal Failure The history and chronology of the LPSI pump seal failures for the Unit 1
"A" and "B" train pumps were discussed.
The seals failed during the continued operation of the plant in Mode 4 (above 300'F) in early July 1987, while recovering from the water hammer event in the circulatory water system.
The apparent improper use of solvents on the seal
"0" rings and an accelerated wear rate of the carbon seal face from high temperature operation caused the failure of the "A" train pump seal.
The
"A" train pump seal failure caused the lower motor bearing oil to be displaced by the flow of water and ultimately caused the failure of the lower motor bearing.
The "B" train pump seal failure was caused by debris in the rotating part of the seal (resulting in misalignment of the seal faces)
and the accelerated wear rate due to high temperature operation.
The "B" train pump seal had failed previously in March of 1986, but a root cause analysis was not done for that failure and the cause of the failure was never determine The licensee has implemented the following corrective action to prevent reoccurrence of the seal failures:
~ ~
A.
Slingers have been installed on all Unit 1 and 2 LPSI and containment sp~-pumps.
B.
No solvents or petroleum based lubricants will be used on the seal o-rings.
,C.
Operating procedures have been revised to limit operation of the LPSI pumps above 210~F.
D.
The system engineer will monitor the seal life for each pump.
ANPP will be also evaluating the use of other o-ring 'materials that are more resistant to cleaning and lubricating chemicals and a completely new design for the seal.
Since the seals for both LPSI pumps for Unit 1 and the seal for a Unit 3 containment spray pump were found failed or degraded, ANPP was asked what program they had planned to inspect the remainder of the seals in the LPSI and containment spray pumps for all three units.
ANPP management stated that there were no definite plans, but that once the final corrective action was decided the modification would be installed in all the seals.
During the dis'cussion, ANPP identified several areas where the vendor technical manual information was incorrect or unclear.
The fai lure of the valve in the circulating water system that caused the water hammer resulted in part from the lack of vendor information for setting the mechanical stops.
As the vendor data was a
common contributor to both events, ANPP should ensure they have good interfaces with their vendors and that vendor data is of high quality.
8.
U date of Previous Issues
'P.'
The licensee addressed the following issues and provided an update on ANPP actions:
Conduct of Radiation Protection (RP) Surveillances System Engineer Involvement in Maintenance Modifications Operator Confidence in Control Room Indications Mr. Martin discussed the importance of how ANPP addressed these issues as this is the time when the basic personality of the organization is being formed.
Specifically, operators must have confidence in their indications.
It must become second nature for the operators to take the additional steps that may be necessary to ensure they understand how equipment is performing based on their indications.
ANPP management must provide the operators the necessary support by fixing promptly any unreliable indication Unit 3 "B" Diesel Generator - Current Status The licensee reviewed the problems with the Unit 3 "B" diesel generator.
The latest problem is the separation of the winding of one of the generator rotor poles found on July 15, 1987.
This is the second pole to fail in this manner.
The first failure was discovered in November, 1986.
The root cause analysis for the first failure disclosed that the resin had been contaminated with cleaning solvent on a brush used to apply the resins.
The generator rotor was repaired and the qualification testing completed by Westinghouse.
The preliminary root cause analysis indicates that not enough bonding resin was applied during manufacture.
An inspection plan for rotor pole.inspection is being developed with the assistance of the vendor.
Unit 3 Low Power Testin Pro ram The current forecast for the low power testing program for Unit 3 was reviewed.
It was noted that the problems with the "B" diesel generator had delayed the Unit 3 startup over two months.
Maintenance Backlo The maintenance backlog for Units 1, 2 and 3 for the past year, ending June, 1987, was reviewed.
The number of work orders issued equaled or exceeded the number closed in all but two of the twelve months reviewed.
The number of open work orders has averaged about 10,000 for the past seven month.
ANPP management stated that a program was being evaluated to effect a reduction in the backlog and ensure work orders important to safety were receiving the proper priority.
ANPP expected to have the program more in focus by the end of 1987.
Mr. Martin commented that this could be an indication of a serious problem and ANPP should have the issue in better focus and be prepared to discuss it in more detail for the NRC Commission meeting on the full power license of Unit 3 planned for October 1987.
A subset of the maintenance backlog is the work orders to repair or redesign control room annunciators that are inappropriately lighted (have invalid signals).
Currently the status was reported to be -- Unit 1, 59; Unit 2, 31; Unit 3, 35.
It is expected that the number for Unit 1 will be reduced to approximately 30 during the planned refueling outage.
ANPP management stated that the number will be reduced to approximately 15 as a continuing minimum, but did not have a well formulated plan that included a formal priority system to get to that targeted minimum number.
Mr. Martin also suggested that ANPP should be prepared to discuss their plans and progress in this area for the NRC Commission meeting.
Simulator Trainin for Licensed Reactor 0 erators The amount of simulator training for the licensed reactor operators was discussed.
ANPP described their current program, which includes 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for each operator this year, and their plans to have 40 to 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br /> on the simulator for each operator next year.
The current INPO suggested
good practice is to provide 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> of simulator training for each operator.. Hr. tIartin suggested that the training of operators is important to plant safety and should have management attention at a high level.
13.
ANPP Or anization The new ANPP organization was discu'ssed.
ANPP submitted the new organization to NRC for'approval on August 11, 1987.
NRC recognized the need for ANPP to implement the new organization as soon as possible and agreed to provide the necessary attention to ensure unnecessary delays are avoide ENCLOSURE AFFILIATION Hike Davis G.
W. Knighton Bill quinn Richard Bernier Ike Zerinque Joe Bynum J. Martin Robert J.
Pate Jay R. Ball J.
G.
Haynes E.
E.
Van Brunt J.
D. Driscoll F. J. Miraglia Ross A. Scarano Ken Rotta Duke Railsback Allan Mitchell Kristin L.
M Candless Lar ry Per ea Timothy Hall R.
H. Butler W.
E. Ide NRC/NRR/PDV NRC/NRR/PDV
'GR L'icensing/ANPP ANPP Lead Licensing Eng ANPP Tech Support ANPP Plant Mgr Region V Administrator Chief, Reactor Safety Br.,
Reg.
V NRC Acting Senior Resident Inspector VP Nuclear Production Exec.
V.
P. - ANPP Asst.
V.
P. Nuclear Prod.
NRC/NRR/ADP DRSS/RegV/NRC Az. Corp.
Comm
. Az. Corp.
Comm Az. Corp.
Comm Clark APS/PAD(Audit)
ANPP Lead Mech Engr ANPP Lead Mech Eng -
ANPP Director, Corp gA/gC
-2" NAME AFFILIATION T.
R. Bradish T.
D. Shriver A.
C.
Gehr Bill Simko John Vorees W.
F.
Fernow Dan Canady Brad Albert Kent Chavet John Mann Frank Turco Victor Dricks ANPP Compliance Supervisor ANPP Compliance Mgr Snell 8 Wilmer ANPP Ops Engr ANPP Manager, Nuc Safety ANPP Training Manager ANPP Communications Mgr ANPP Licensing Corporate Health Physics/Chemistry Corporate Health Physics/Chemistry Arizona Republic Phoenix Gazette
AGENDA NPP - NRC SAAGE%Ãl I4EETING AJGLST 12, 1987 ENCLOSURE I.
CPENING REI'%RES
- NPP
- NRC E. E. VN BRLNT NRC I I.
9/ERALL PLY PERFCRMNCE
- CCN LIANCE TREND DATA
- FLEL INTEGRITY J.
R.
HYNLM P.
F. ~EY I I I.
LFDATE CN RECENT EVENTS
- KNDENSER WAfER HAN4KR
- KKNDARYWATER CHEMISTRY KNTKL
- LNIT 1 LPSI RJtPS W. M. SINCO J.
R. NNN W. M. SING IV.
LPDATE CN PREV I CUS ISSUES
- SYSTEM ENGINEER INVOLVE%MT IN N,INTIPINCE ND KDIFICATIONS
.
- CPERATOR CNF I DENCE IN OwfRCL RCCM INDICATI CNS J.
R.
BYNLM 0. J.
ZERINCLE O. J.
ZERINCUE V.
PRINCIPLE FRCBL96 EN':TIERED CURING IJIIT 3 TESTING
- EKRGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 8 0. J.
ZERINGLE
'l.
LNIT 3 LOW FO"JER TESTING PR034M Vl I.
ADDITICNL ITEi%
J.
R. BNW
- NlNTENANCE BACKLOG
- NNLlCIATOR IN RQ/B4KNT PROGRAM
- SINJLATOR TIME J.
R.
BYNLM J.
R. BYE W. F.
FERiXQA Vl I I. NPP CRGNIZATICN E. E.
VAN ERLM/
J.
G.
HAYNES