IR 05000528/1987014
| ML17300A915 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1987 |
| From: | Ball J, Fiorelli G, Ivey K, Richards S, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17300A914 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-87-14, 50-529-87-15, 50-530-87-16, NUDOCS 8706230420 | |
| Download: ML17300A915 (20) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos:
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Licensee:
50-528/87-14, 50"529/87-15, 50-530/87-16 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-65 Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.
0.
Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034 Ins ection Conducted:
April 5, 1987, through May 9, 1987 Inspectors:
J. Ball, e ident Inspector Dat signed G. Fiore
, Resident Inspec or K. Ivey, ident Inspector Dat igned g7 Dat igned Approved By:
R.
Zimm an, Senior Resident Inspector S. Richards, Chief, Engineering Section Dat Signed 4-I -87 Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on A ril 5 1987 throu h Ma
1987 Re ort Nos.
50-528/87-14 50-529/87-15 and 50-530/87-16 Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the four resident inspectors.
Areas inspected included:
followup of previously identified items; review of plant activities; plant tours; engineered safety feature system walkdowns; surveillance testing; plant maintenance; local leak rate testing; inverter problem; temporary instructions; licensee event report followup; and periodic and special reports review.
During this inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered:
30703, 61720, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71709, 71710, 71881, 90712, 90713, 92703, 93702.
Results:
Of the ten areas inspected, no violations were identified.
70b230420 870602 PDR ADQCK 05000528 G
e, Persons Contacted:
DETAILS The below listed technical and supervisor personnel were among those contacted:
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro 'ect ANPP
R.
Adney
"J. Allen L. Brown R. Buckhalter J.
R.
Bynum B. Cederquist J.
Dennis W. Fernow D.
Gouge J.
G.
Haynes
"W.
E.
Ide W.
Jump J. Kirby A. McCabe D. Nelson
- R. Nelson G. Perkins J. Pollard F ~ Riedel
- T. Shriver L. Souza E.
E.
Van Brunt, R. Younger, 0. Zeringue, Operations Superintendent, Unit 2 Operations Manager Radiation Protection and Chemistry Manager Outage Management Superintendent, Unit 3 PVNGS Plant Manager Chemical Services Manager Operations Supervisor, Unit 1 Training Manager Operations Superintendent, Unit 3 Vice President, Nuclear Production Corporate equality Assurance Manager Startup Manager, Unit 3 Project Transition Manager Assistant Startup Manager, Unit 3 Operations Security Manager Maintenance Manager Radiological Services Manager Operations Supervisor, Unit 2 Operations Supervisor, Unit 3 Compliance Manager Assistant guality Assurance Manager Executive Vice President Operations Superintendent, Unit 1 Technical Support Manager The inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
"Attended the Exit Meeting on May 8, 1987.
2.
Previousl Identified Items Unit 2 a.
Closed Ins ector Fol 1 owu Item 529/86-32-01:
Investi ation Into Pressure Switches Out of Calibration.
This matter dealt with defective Ashcroft pressure switches monitoring main feedwater pump suction pressures which were out of calibration and which contributed to the tripping of the main "B" feedwater pump on November 19, 1987.
Investigation by the licensee confirmed the switch design to be undesirable in that the switch calibration could be easily changed either by the movement of the switch wires or when mounting the switch.
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Based on the instability of the settings, the main feedwater pump suction and discharge pressure switch calibration checks have been
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increased from an 18 month frequency to a monthly frequency at all three units, until the newly purchased switches which are of a sturdier design are received on site for installation.
Use of the sturdier switch in other locations where Ashcroft pressure switches are currently in use will be considered as part of the engineering resolution of this matter.
Continued followup of'he item will be done in conjunction with the routine inspection program.
This item is closed.
Closed Ins ector Followu Item 529/86-32-05
- Procedure 73AC-OZZ37 Root Cause S ecifies 0 erations En ineerin Identifies Si nificant Failures.
This matter deals with the process of performing root cause analyses associated with component failures.
The licensee had recognized a
problem in this area and issued Corrective Action Report (CAR)
CA 86-196 on December ll, 1986.
The report identified in part the need for organizing and developing procedures governing root cause analyses.
Several meetings were held among several ANPP organizational units in an effort to resolve the matter.
Ultimately a list of corrective actions, responsible organizations and task completion dates were developed.
The Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP) guality Assurance organization will monitor completion of the efforts which are in varying stages of completion.
Continued followup will be done in conjunction with the routine inspection program.
This item is closed.
Closed Ins ector Followu Item 529/86-33-08
Field Chan es That Mere Not Reviewed b
ualit Assurance A
Should be Reviewed b
A.
This item is associated with the responsibility of the guality Systems and Engineering (USE) organization to review and sign-off all quality related Field Change Requests (FCRs).
An ANPP finding revealed that this was not being done since the requirement was put into effect.
As a corrective action approximately 600 safety related FCRs which had not previously been reviewed were reviewed by USE.
None were found to have a negative impact on the safe operation of the plant.
This information is documented in a response to Corrective Action Report CA 86-0088.
This item is closed.
Closed Enforcement Item 529/86-33"12
- Failure to Secure Transient E ui ment.
The inspector conducted a tour of the Unit 2 facility and confirmed that the unsecured equipment listed in the violation had been removed or properly secured.
No new items were noted.
The inspector also observed evidence of actions taken by the licensee in connection with the control of transient equipment.
These actions included:
o Updating the site access training program to include transient load hazards in safety related areas.
o Revision of operating logs to include a check for proper transient storage once per shift.
o Issuance of a memo by the Plant Manager to all Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station personnel highlighting the control of transient loads.
o Project wide discussion of the control of transient loads through the "guality Talks" program.
In addition the inspector reviewed a report issued by the Independent Safety Engineering Group which included a discussion on the control of transient loads.
The report contained several recommendations involving programatic enhancements related to the control of transient equipment.
These recommendations are currently under review by plant management.
The actions taken by the licensee are considered consistent with those reported to the NRC.
This item is closed.
e.
Closed Enforcement Item 529/86"33-13
- Failure to Use Pro er Surveillance Procedure Revisions Mhen Performin Tests.
The inspector reviewed the programatic corrective action taken by the licensee.
This included the revision of administrative control procedure 73AC-9ZZ04, "Surveillance Testing" which incorporated a
check by the test procedure user verifying that the most current procedure revision is being used with a sign-off by the procedure user.
A review of approximately 20 surveillance test procedures currently in use at Units 1, 2, and 3 confirmed that the procedure revision was being implemented properly.
This item is closed.
3.
Review of Plant Activities a 0 Unit 1 The plant operated at 100K power throughout the reporting period with the exception of two days at 85K for surveillance testing on the Control Element Assemblies (CEA).
The next planned outage is to begin September 26, 1987, for refueling.
b.
Unit 2 Ouring the period, there was one inadvertent reactor trip which occurred on April 16.
The trip resulted from an erroneous penalty signal from the control element assembly calculators to the core protection calculators which occurred during an attempt to locate a
ground in the system power supply.
Otherwise the plant operated at lOOX power with the exception of several days at 90K due to a leak in one of the low pressure feedwater heaters.
C.
Unit 3
On April 9, the unit entered Mode 5 for the first time and remained in. Mode 5 throughout the rest of the inspection period.
During this period, the licensee plugged 60 tubes in each steam generator as a
preventative measure against tube degradation which was experienced in Units 1 and 2.
On April 22, while making preparations to plug tubes in the No.
1 steam generator, a number of small stones were found in the bottom hemispherical head of the hot leg side of the generator.
The licensee's investigation into the manner in which the stones were introduced into the generator determined that they were most likely carried into the generator unintentionally during the erection of a work platform.
Visual inspection of the cold leg side of the No.
1 steam generator, and the cold and hot leg sides of the No.
2 steam generator, and a boroscopic examination down the hot leg of No.
1 steam generator into the shutdown cooling suction line revealed no other foreign objects to be present.
Reassembly of the Train "B" Diesel Generator which was damaged during preoperational testing also continued during this period along with other work required to be performed prior to entry into Mode 4.
Initial criticality is currently scheduled to occur in July, 1987.
d.
Plant Tours The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by the inspector during the course of the inspection:
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0 Auxiliary Building Containment Building Control Complex Building Diesel Generator Building Radwaste Building Technical Support Center Turbine Building Yard Area and Perimeter The following areas were observed during the tours:
(1)
0 eratin Lo s and Records Records were reviewed against Technical Specification and administrative control procedure requirements.
(2)
Monitorin Instrumentation Process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
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conformance with 10 CFR 50.54. (k), Technical Specifications, and administrative procedures.
(4)
E ui ment Lineu s
Valve and electrical breakers were verified to be in the position or condition required by Technical Specifications and administrative procedures for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine control board indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineup (5)
E ui ment Ta in Selected equipment, for which tagging requests had been initiated, was observed to verify that tags were in place and the equipment in the condition specified.
(6)
General Plant E ui ment Conditions Plant equipment was observed for indications of system leakage, improper lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system from fulfillingtheir functional requirements.
(7)
Fire Protection Fire fighting equipment and controls were observed for conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative procedures.
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conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative control procedures.
(9)
~Securit Activities observed for conformance with regulatory requirements, implementation of the site security plan, and administrative procedures included manning of the security guard force, vehicle and personnel access control, protected and vital area integrity, intrusion detection system operation and alarm response.
(10) Plant Housekee in Plant conditions and material/equipment storage were observed to determine the general state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Housekeeping in the radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.
(11) Radiation Protection Controls Areas observed included control point operation, records of licensee's surveys within the radiological controlled areas posting of radiation and high radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits, personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, personnel frisking, and ALARA practices.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
4.
En ineered Safet Feature S stem Walk Down - Units 1 2 and
Selected engineered safety feature systems (and systems important to safety)
were walked down by the inspector to confirm that the systems were aligned in accordance with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of the systems, items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets, and cables were inspected to determine that they were operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspector also verified that the system valves wer e in the required position and locked as appropriate.
The local and remote position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.
a.
Unit 1
Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated date.
~Sstem Essential Spray Ponds, Trains "A" and "B" Date April 17 Essential Cooling Mater System, Trains "A" and "B" April 23 Emergency Diesel Generator, Train "B" April 28 Auxiliary Feedwater System, Train "B" May 6 Unit 2 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated dates.
~Sstem Safety Injection Tanks Essential Cooling Water System, Trains "A" and "B" Date April 3 April 14 Auxiliary Feedwater System, Train "B" April 21 Emergency Diesel Generator, Train "A" April 28 Iodine Removal System, Trains "A" and B"
May 7 Unit 3 Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on the indicated dates.
~Sstem Low Pressure Safety Injection Aligned for Shutdown Cooling, Train "B" Boron Injection Flow Paths 125V DC Electrical Distribution, Channels
"A" and "C" Date April 15 April 21 April 30 Emergency Diesel Generator, Train "A" May 6
e No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testin
- Units 1 2 and
Surveillance tests required to be performed by the Technical Specifications (TS) were reviewed on a sampling basis to verify that:
1) the surveillance tests were correctly included on the facility schedule; 2) a technically adequate procedure existed for performance of the surveillance tests; 3) the surveillance tests had been performed at the frequency specified in the TS; and 4) test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillances were witnessed by the inspector on the dates shown:
Unit 1 Procedure Descri tion Dates Performed
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36ST-1SE06 Log Power Functional Test, April 27 Channel
"A" Unit 2 Procedure 42ST-2RC02 Descri tion Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance Dates Performed April 14 42ST"2DG01 Diesel Generator Test, Train "A" April 14 42ST-2ZZ23 Control Element Assembly Position Data Log April 22 36ST"9S007 Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test May 4 Unit 3 Procedure Descri tion 43ST-3ZZ19 Routine Surveillance, Mode 5-6 Logs Dates Performed April 28 36ST-3SE06 Log Power Functional Test, April 29 Channel
"B" During the course of this Unit 3 inspection the inspector noted that the shiftly channel check performed by operations in accordance with surveillance test procedure 43ST-3ZZ19, of the noble gas radiation monitors RU-29 and RU-30 for the control room ventilation intake did not require a qualitative assessment of channel behavior by observation of the monitor indication nor when possible a comparison of the channel indication with other available indications.
On April 19, 1987, the licensee wrote a work request acknowledging that in Unit 3, RU-30
indicated higher than what was considered normal, based on the indication provided by the plant vent monitor and indications of similar monitors irl Units 1 and 2.
The licensee did not at this time declare the monitor inoperable even though it indicated erroneously.
Had the licensee declared the monitor inoperable, the licensee would have been required to enter into Technical Specification Action Statement 3.3.3.1, Action 26, which requires initiation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the essential filtration mode of operation within one hour, since RU-29, the redundant radiation monitor, was considered inoperable at this same time due to problems experienced with the unit's power supply.
Subsequently, on April 25, 1987, the licensee did declare RU-30 inoperable.and entered into the required Technical Specification Action Statement when RU-30 began to alarm at its alert setpoint level.
The delay in declaring RU-30 inoperable can be ';con4r'ibuted in part to unsatisfactory acceptance criteria contained in the.shiftly channel check surveillance procedure.
A similar condition was documented in inspection report 50-528/87-01 and a Notice of Violation issued due to the licensee's failure, to perform an adequate channel check of the log power instruments in Unit 1 while in Mode 3 due to unsatisfactory acceptance criteria having been included in the shiftly surveillance logs.
In response to the Notice of Violation (NOV), the licensee in a. letter dated April 4, 1987 committed to review surveillance tests required to be performed shiftly by operations personnel and to make necessary procedure changes to assure adequate channel checks were performed by May 15, 1987.
Since the licensee review was ongoing at the time of this inspection, additional enforcement action is not proposed.
The inspector will, followup the licensee corrective action to the previous violation 'during a subsequent inspection.
t No violations of NRC requirements or deviations, were identHied.
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I 6.
Plant Maintenance - Unit 1 2 and
a ~
During the inspection period, the inspector observed and reviewed documentation associated with maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with administrative and maintenance procedures, required QA/QC involvement, proper use of safety tags, proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers, personnel qualifications, and pr oper retesting.
The inspector verified reportability for these activities was correct.
b.
The inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Unit I
~c o
Various PMs on Diesel Generator Components o
Troubleshooting Failed PPS Power Supply Cooling Fan Dates Performed April 22 April 23
o Preventative Maintenance (PM)
on HPSI "B" Pump Power Supply Breaker Unit 2 Descri tion April 28 Dates Performed o
Troubleshooting Erratic Pressurizer Pressure Indication
"C" Channel April 22 Replacing Contro'I Room Light Bulbs Above the PPS Console Troubleshooting PP):.
Trouble/Ground!Annunciation Problem I
Installing a New Logic Card in Channel
"C" Inverter April 24 April 28 May 7 Unit 3 Descri tion Dates Performed o
Incore Instrumentation Nozzle Repair April 15 o
Steam Generator Tube Plugging April 30 o
Containment Spray Containmerjt May 7,
Isolation Valve Installation I
I No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
7.
Local Leak Rate Testin
- Unit 2 The inspector observed several local leak rate penetration tests as documented in NRC Inspection Report 529/87-11.
A review of the type "B" and "C" testing completed by the licensee during the recent extended maintenance outage confirmed all required testing was completed.
A comparison of "as found" and "as left" test results with Technical Specifications showed that the leakage requirements had been easily met.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
8.
"C" Channel Inverter - Unit 2 In recent months, the "C" channel inverter was rendered inoperable due to blown fuses.
In each of the four cases an appropriate transfer occurred so that the instrument loads were supplied by the regulator according to design and with no channel trips occurring.
The licensee's attempt to correct the problems were unsuccessful following the implementation of a modification which involved the replacement of a critical logic card recommended by the vendor.
The licensee is continuing to evaluate the
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problem with the assistance of the vendor.
No similar problems have occurred with the other three inverters.
The inspector will continue to.
follow this problem as part of the routine inspection program.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
9.
Licensee Event Re ort LER Followu
- Units 1 and
'a 0 The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by the inspector.
Based on the information provided in the report it was concluded that reporting requirements had been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions were appropriate.
The below LERs are considered closed.
Unit'
I LER Number I
LER 87-02 Descri tion Continuous Fire Watch Posted Late Oue to Personnel Error LER 87-05 LER 87"06 LER 87-08 Late Fire Watch Patrol Oue to Personnel Error LCO 3.0.3 Entries Due to Inoperable MSIVs Fire Patrol Performed Late Due to Log Omission Unit 2 n
LER NUMBER DESCRIPTION
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LER 86-23"05
'ER 86-23"Ol Reactor Trip Initiated by Loss of Power to Plant Protection System.
LER 87-01 Personnel Error Causes Control Room Ventilation Monitors to be Inoperable.
LER 87-02 Tech Spec Violation Oue to Personnel Error LER 87-05 Fire Patrol Performed Late Due to Malfunctioning Door LER 87-06 Entry into LCO 3.0.3 Oue to Inoperable MSIVs No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identifie.
Closed)
Tem orar Instruction - 2500/19 Ins ection of Licensee's Actions Taken to Im lement Unresolved Safet Issue A-26:
Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection for Pressurized Water Reactors - Units 1
and 3.
The inspector reviewed the installation, administrative controls, and training related to the mitigation of low temperature overpressure (LTOP)
transient conditions as outlined in the referenced Temporary Instruction.
a.
ossican The design review, confirming that the overpressure protection system is designed to prevent exceeding. Technical Specifications and
CFR 50 Appendix G limits for the reactor pressure vessel during plant cooldown or heatup, is documented in paragraphs 5.2.2 and 5.4.3 of Supplement 7 to the facility Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
The system is designed with a relief valve installed in each reactor coolant hot leg and the,.operation of the overpressure protection system is automatic after the isolation valves in the hot legs are open.
(No power operated relief valves are installed in the PVNGS CESSAR 80 reactor design.)
Both relief valves are required to be operable and aligned to provide overpressure protection for the reactor coolant system when the vessel head is installed and the temperature in one or more cold legs is less than or equal to 255 degrees F during cooldown, or 295 degree F during heatup.
The motor operated guard valves associated with the relief valves in each train are supplied by separate Class 1E power so that a single failure will not render both pressure relief paths inoperable.
The inspector reviewed the PVNGS CESSAR and noted that the piping and valves from the reactor coolant system (RCS),
up to and including the second hot leg isolation valve in the shutdown cooling lines are designed to ASME B&PVC Section III, Class I and that the shutdown cooling system is designed as a Seismic Category I system.-
b.
Surveillance The surveillance program included the following Technical Specification surveillances:
o Each relief valve setpoint is checked every 18 months.
The inspector noted that the latest valve setpoints at Units 1, 2, and 3 were checked within the required 18 month surveillance period.
o Each relief valve is verified to be aligned to provide overpressure protection for the reactor coolant system (RCS)
once every six hours during cooldown with RCS t'emperature less than or equal to 255 degrees F or during RCS heatup with temperature less than or equal to 295 degrees F.
The check is contained in procedure 42ST-2RC01,
"RCS and Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Rates".
o At least once per 18 months during shutdown, the automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling system connections from the RCS are checked for permissive and automatic closure as a function of RCS pressure.
The inspector noted that the automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling system RCS connection valves for Units. 1, 2, and 3 were tested within the required 18 month surveillance period as required by surveillance procedure 36ST-9SI03,
"Safety Injection/Shutdown Cooling System Instrument Surveillance Test".
Testing of the system-following maintenance is governed by the facility generic procedure
"Work Control", which requires as part of the maintenance activity, the identification of retests and the review of test results following the tests and prior to declaring the system operable.
C.
Administrative Procedures:
The LTOP system is designed such that either of the two shutdown cooling system (SCS) suction relief valves provides relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either; (1) the start of an idle reactor coolant pump (RCP) with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 100 degrees F above the RCS cold leg temperature or, (2) the inadvertent safety injection actuation with two HPSI pumps injecting into a water solid RCS with full charging capacity and with l,etdown isolated.
The plant operating procedures contain provisions which prohibit operating the first RCP when steam generator temperatures are greater than 20 degrees above RCS cold leg temperatures if the steam'enerator level is less than 33 percent.
With a level greater than 33 percent the first RCP is not to be started if the steam generator temperature is greater than any RCS cold leg temperature.
Water solid RCS operations are not performed at the PVNGS.
RCS venting is performed in Mode 5 with the overpressure protection system aligned to the RCS.
Alarms are provided which alert operations if the relief valve isolation valves are open and RCS pressure exceeds the maximum pressure for SCS operation, and if the SCS is not aligned to the RCS before cold leg temperature is reduced to below the maximum RCS cold leg temperature requiring LTOP.
Abnormal operating procedures have been written to address these alarm conditions.
d.
Trainin and E ui ment Modification The inspector confirmed that the plant training program includes topics 'related to the safety function, design, and operation of LTOP protection.
No modifications have been made to the system.
Based on the review of design, operating and test documents, as well as the observation of accessible equipment, it appears the system is installed in accordance. with the plant licens ~
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11.
Review of Periodic and S ecial Re orts - Units 1 and 2.
Periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test results and/or supporting information were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications; and the validity of the reported information.
within the scope of the above, the following reports were reviewed by the inspector.
Unit 1 o
Monthly Operating Report for February and March, 1987.
Unit 2 o
Monthly Operating Report for March, 1987.
No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.
The inspector met with licensee management representatives periodically during the inspection and held an exit on May 8, 1987.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector s findings, as noted in this report, were discussed and acknowledged by the licensee representative