IR 05000528/1987015
| ML17300A893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1987 |
| From: | North H, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17300A892 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-87-15, 50-529-87-16, 50-530-87-17, IEIN-86-086, IEIN-86-090, IEIN-86-103, IEIN-86-107, IEIN-86-86, IEIN-86-90, IEIN-87-003, IEIN-87-3, NUDOCS 8706080118 | |
| Download: ML17300A893 (17) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/87-15, 50-529/87-16 and 50-530/87-17 Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529 and 50-530 License Nos.
NPF-41, NPF-51 and NPF-65 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.
0.
Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85836 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1, 2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site - Wintersburg and Phoenix, Arizona Inspection Conducted:
April 6-10 and 20-23, 1987 Inspected by:
H.
S. North, Senior Radiation Specialist Approved by: ~P G.
P.
uha, Chi et Facilit s Radiological Protection Section
~Summer:
I'7 Date Signed s
lV Da e Signed Ins ection Durin the Period of A ril 6-10 and 20-23 1987 Re ort Nos.
50-528/87-15 50-529/87-16 and 50-530 87-17 solid wastes, low level radioactive waste storage facilities, Unit 2 - liquids and liquid wastes, Unit 2 gaseous waste system, Unit 1 - Onsite followup of events at operating power reactors, tours, review of licensee reports, followup on Information Notices and exit interview.
Inspection procedures 30703, 83729, 84722, 65051, 84723, 84724, 93702, 90712 and 92701 were addressed.
Results:
In the ten areas addressed no violations or deviations were identified.
8>06080ii8 8705i4 PDR ADOCK 05000528 Q
DETAILS Persons Contacted
- M. E. Ide, Director, Corporate gA/gC
"R.
R. Baron, Commitment Supervisor, Compliance
"L. E.
Brown, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry
~J.
Mann, Supervisor, Corporate Health Physics and Chemistry
"G.
D. Perkins, Manager, Radiological Services
"T.
D. Shriver, Manager, Compliance Denotes individuals attending the April 23, 1987, exit interview.
In addition to the individuals identified above, the inspector met and held discussions with other members of the licensee's staff and contractor personnel.
Closed Enforcement Item 50-528/85-22-01)
The licensee had completed, approved and implemented procedure IN 202.08.00 Rev.
0, dated October 14, 1986, effective November 5, 1986, Task Force Utilization.
The procedure provides the purpose and scope for the establishment of Task Forces, defines responsibilities, and provides for the establishment, control, guidance, results or recommendation reporting, implementation of actions or recommendations, followup and Task Force disestablishment.
This matter is closed.
Closed Followu 50-528/85-03-01 Inspector identified item related to providing assurance that releases to the onsite evaporation pond did not exceed the limits of Technical Specification (T.S.)
3. 11. 1. 1 (LLD of 5E-7 pCi/ml for principal gamma emitters or lE-6jjCi/ml for I-131).
Discussions with the chemistry staff established that measurements of releases to the evaporation pond were performed at a 95K confidence level that the limits of the T.S.
were not exceeded.
The licensee stated that they had not observed a value of 5E-7pCi/ml for principal gamma emitters.
This matter is closed.
Closed Followu 50-529/85-43-01 During preoperational testing the licensee identified the failure of the containment power access purge system (8 inch) to provide the planned flow (2000-2200 cfm).
The licensee decided to use the system as is rather than modify the system to achieve the design flow.
The inspector stated (50-529/85-43-01) that the licensee should "carefully review the matter to evaluate the effect on occupational exposure and the ability to purge and enter containment quickly under degraded radiological conditions".
The licensee had compared the impact of the degraded purge (1100 cfm capability with the design capability based on a 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> per week purge and one entry per week.
The evaluation established, for cloud exposures only, that the difference in the time required to reach an exposure of 100 mrem was 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> for a 2000 cfm purge and 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> for an 1100 cfm
purge.
An ALARA cost benefit analysis based on Unit 3 est'ablished that modifications to achieve a flow of 2000 cfm were not justified.
A Design Change Package (DCP) 10M-CP-024 was initiated to optimize the flow at 1100 cfm.
Action to revise the FSAR was incorporated in the overall action.
This matter is closed.
Closed Followu 50-528/87-03-01 The licensee evaluates tritium releases from the onsite evaporation pond using sample data.
During the second half of 1986 the evaporation rate ranged from 12.56 inches in July to 1.83 inches in December.
Third quarter evaporation was 31. 15 inches and fourth quarter was 11.26 inches.
Based on the highest pond concentration observed (3407 pCi/1, July 1986),
historical X/g for the site boundary and evaporation rate (July 1986) the total dose would be 1.8 E-2 mrem per year.
The highest organ dose would have been during third quarter 1986 when a child thyroid dose of 2.8 E-2 mrem.was calculated.
This matter is closed.
Closed Followu
- Occu ational Ex osure Durin Extended Outa es-Units 1 and
83729 50-528 87-03-02 and 50-529 87-04-01
~Chan aa During the outages licensee radiation protection technicians functioned in lead capacities rather than using contract technicians in such positions as was done during the earlier Unit 1 reactor coolant pump rebuild outage.
Two leads were used per shift, one containment and one balance of plant.
Due to the sequence of events, Unit 1 was better prepared for the steam generator outage than Unit 2.
Radiation protection management reported that the traini ng and maintenance organizations provided excellent support during the combined outages.
The need for improved communications with platform and steam generator workers was identified.
The licensee found it necessary to use the equipment provided by the contractor providing eddy current testing service.
Due to the short response time the licensee was unable to obtain robotics equipment to support the steam generator work except for an older model probe walker.
The use of video equipment was significantly increased for steam generator work.
The licensee was planning improved communications in anticipation of future outages.
Plannin and Pre aration In preparation for the Unit 2 surveillance test outage, radiation protection had the opportunity to participate in the use of the planning tool SNOW (short notice outage).
The radiation protection staff participated selectively in the planning effort and did not become involved in all aspects of the planning effort.
Radiation protection management stated that experience during the outage showed that fuller participation was desirable and that participation would be revised in the future.
Corporate health physics personnel were observed to be on-site often and in frequent contact with the site staff at other times.
Cooperation between corporate and site radiation protection personnel was good.
It was noted that although good cooperation existed it was more the result of the individuals involved than a result of the organization
structure.
As presently organized the only official channel of communications between the site and corporate radiation protection organizations was through the Vice President - Nuclear Production.
Trainin and ualifications The training staff based contractor trainer augmentation on the expected Unit 2 outage.
The unexpected Unit 1 outage and increased scope of Unit 2 work significantly increased the demands placed on the training staff.
Extended work hours prevented training from becoming a critical path item.
The training staff was attempting to locate space for the steam generator mockup and other similar training aids.
The training staff was developing a
PASS mockup, applicable to all three units and was considering acquisition of a reactor coolant seal package mockup.
Internal Ex osure Control The licensee documents all airborne exposures.
Records of al.l personnel
, with airborne exposures in 1987 before April 8, 1987 were examined.
The highest exposures were 19.3 MPC hours.
Results of whole body counts for all individuals with airborne exposures greater than
NPC hours were examined.
No internal depositions were identified.
The licensee's use of engineering controls and respiratory protective devices have been effective in maintaining exposures within administrative and regulatory limits.
Maintainin Occu ational Ex osures ALARA The 1986 ALARA report was in preparation when the double outage occurred, which delayed the report.
The Units 1 and 2 outage ALARA reports were being prepared at the time of the inspection.
The initial goal for the Unit 2 outage was 28 person-rem.
The steam generator work added approximately 28 person-rem for a total of 56 person-rems.
No goals had been established for the Unit 1 outage, as the outage was unexpected.
Early estimates for.the steam generator work on both units were 210 person-rem, however based on mockup training and experience the estimates were later revised to 150 person-rem based on the first three tubes plugged.
The actual exposure was between 130-140 person-rem.
The ALARA.
group estimated that the use of video cameras on the platform and for tube plugging verification saved an estimated 10 person-rem.
Due to the location of the tubes requiring plugging, in the corners of the steam
generators, pipe supports were installed which were used to support 1000 lbs of lead shielding and three layers of Herculite in Unit 1.
The gamma dose rate in the corners without the shielding was 25 R/hr.
The protective clothing and Herculite reduced the beta to gamma ratio from 10/1 to 2/l.
The ALARA considerations of the planned Unit 1 PASS modifications were
'discussed.
The modifications will be very labor intensive and a
significant portion of the work will be performed in the PASS pit.
The Shut Down Cooling line is located near the PASS pit.
Based on an engineering analysis approximately 11,000 lbs. of lead shielding can be hung on the piping, scaffolding and structural members.
A dose commitment of 170 person-rem had been estimated for the work not including 20
person-rem to hang the lead.
Prior to the steam generator tube failure the Safety Injection - Shut Down Cooling (SI-SD) system dose rate was 15-20 mr/hr with 2 mr/hr in the PASS pit.
Following the tube failure the
.
SI-SD system dose rate was 500-1000 mr/hr.
Based on the ALARA evaluation of the PASS work the licensee was evaluating alternatives to the planned modifications.
The overall estimate for person-rem exposure for 1986 was 138.9 person-rem for Unit 1 and 8.6 person-rem for Unit 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Solid Wastes Unit 2 84722 Audits and A
raisals The review of the most recent audit (April 7-24, 1986, Audit No.86-014)
in this area was documented in Inspection Report 50-528/87-03.
guality Monitoring Report Numbe~ SM-87-0504, March 8-10, 1987 addressing detection and control of hot particles in laundry operations was examined.
No deficiencies were identified.
guality Monitoring Report SM-87-0388, applicable to this section, was discussed in report section 6.
~Chan ea Inspection Report No. 50-528/87-03 discussed changes relative to Unit 1 operations.
The licensee stated that the Plant Review Board had approved the use of Envirostone as a soliditication medium.
The volume reduction contracts discussed in the identified report were applicable to Unit 2.
The licensee had requested a special allocation of 27,000 ft3 of waste site disposal capacity over the next 4 years from the Secretary of DOE under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Polic Amendments Act of 1985.
The request was limited to the specified volume since that was the maximum.
value which could be justified over the average PWR.
Processin and Stora e
a The subject topic was examined with respect to Unit 1 (Inspection Report No. 50-528/87-03).
The information contained in that report was applicable to Unit 2.
The licensee stated that the ATI bitumen solidification system and the contractor supplied resin dewatering system had not been used at Unit 2.
The licensee had solidified two NUPAC spent resin containers.
The Semi-Annual Operating Reports for 1986 were reviewed.
No obvious mistakes, anomalous measurements, omissions or trends were noted.
Discussion with licensee personnel established that no 'problems had been experienced in the solidification of two containers of resin using the Envirostone process.
At the time of the inspection the Pacific Nuclear resin dewatering and drying system was being set up in the Unit 2 Radwaste Building truck bay.
The initial use of the system at Unit 2 was delayed due to an inoperable water valve in the plant system.
The installation was observed during a facility tour.
Space was limited for
the placement of equipment and reduced the ease of access however it appeared to be adequate for the planned activity.
Dis osal of Low-Level Waste The examination of licensee procedures required to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 61.55 and 61.56 and
CFR 20.311 was documented in Inspection Report No. 50-528/86-36.
The documentation supporting the shipment of two Envirostone solidified containers of resin, shipment no.
87-RW-002, was examined.
The examination established that the requirements for waste classification and characterization, manifest preparation, package marking, implementation of a quality assurance program and assurance of package delivery were satisfied.
In addition the file contained a memorandum, Sub ect:
Com liance with the EPA Under the "Resource Conservation and Recover Act" for Waste Shi ment 87-RW-002, addressing this topic.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Stora e Facilities 65051 Basis for Construction The licensee had completed an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 which appropriately addressed applicable concerns.
ualit Assurance The facility, a sheet steel building constructed on a concrete pad, will be built in conformance with local building codes.
The facility wi 11 be built by a contractor for the licensee.
The quality assurance applicable to the facility wi 11 be that normally associated with buildings of this type.
Procedures for Construction The inspector observed site preparation which included grading (leveling)
the site and the installation of underground utilities.
The facility plans call for a steel framed, sheet steel covered building, incorporating work (7000 ft~), office (2100 ft~), storage (8400 fthm)
areas and a loading dock constructed on a concrete pad.
The facility will be within the protected area when construction has been completed.
Services will include electrical, water and sanitary sewerage.
No drains other than sanitary sewage are to be provided.
A 27 ft~ sump will collect any drainage from the facility.
The facility will be fully protected with a sprinkler fire protection system, a part of the plant fire protection system.
Security will be provided by fence and guard force as a part of the facilities contained in the protected area.
Effluent air from the facility will be discharged through HEPA filters.
Provisions for effluent air sampling will be provided.
Review of Construction
The resident-inspection staff will provide onsite inspection of the facility during construction.
Or anization and Staffin The facility will incorporate the waste sorting activities presently conducted in the individual units.
The Radwaste Support Group and support personnel presently working in the units will work in the facility.
The licensee plans to amend the FSAR to address this facility.
This topic will be examined further during subsequent inspections.
a The licensee's progress in constructing and initiating operation of this facility will be examined further during subsequent inspections (50-530/87-17-01).
Li uids and Li uid Wastes - Unit 2 84723 Audits and A
raisals No audits in the area of liquid wastes had been conducted.
guality Monitoring Report SM-87-0388, applicable to this section, was discussed in report section 6.
guality Monitoring Report SM-87-0529, (March 12-13 and 18, 1987) addressed a Unit 2 concern related to the discharge of 90,000 gal. of condensate from the condenser hot well to the storm drain system rather than to the evaporation pond.
The licensee was continuing the evaluation to determine whether the discharge was contrary to the conditions of Appendix B of the Operating License.
This matter will be examined during a subsequent inspection (50-529/87-16-01).
~Chan ea The licensee stated that no changes had been made in the liquid radwaste system (LRS).
The licensee was providing training in preparation of evaluations performed in conformance with 10 CFR 50.59 changes, tests and experiments.
The currently used cover sheet for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations contains a certification that either the evaluation initiator or the initiator's supervisor has received the required training.
A new training program for radwaste personnel was being developed in preparation for INPO accreditation.
Effluents Semi-Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for 1986 were reviewed.
No obvious mistakes, anomalous measurements, omissions or trends were identified.
The licensee makes no liquid effluent releases off-site.
The licensee identified no problems in the operation of the liquid waste system.
Releases of tritium-containing water to the evaporation pond were discussed in report section 2 addressing gaseous effluents resulting from the evaporation of tritiated water from the pond.
Liquid effluents were within 10 CFR 50 Appendix I limits and were ALARA.
Instrumentation
This topic as addressed in inspection report 50-528/87-03 section 6 was applicable to Unit 2.
Reactor Coolant and Secondar Water Licensee records of chemical and radiochemical analysis were compared with the primary and secondary system chemistry limits contained in T.S.
3.4. 6, Table 3.4-2, 3.4. 7 and 3.4. 1.4 and surveillance requirements identified in T.S. Tables 4.4-3, 4.4-4 and 4.7-1.
No discrepancies were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Gaseous Waste S stem - Unit 2 84724 Audits and A
raisals No audits of the gaseous waste system operation had been conducted.
guality Monitoring Report Number SM-87-0388 (February 17-27, 1987)
applicable to all three units was reviewed.
The report addressed a
review of procedures 750P-1GROl 0 eration of the Gaseous Radwaste S stem, the Li uid Radwaste Eva orator applicable to all three units.
The result of the guality Monitoring activity was considered unsatisfactory in that deviation from the procedure specified sequence of operations was permitted by a statement in the Objective of the procedures.
Followup resulted in an evaluation of the possible impact of out-of-sequence operation.
It was determined that such operation could cause possible inadvertent release.
Procedure revisions were underway with a scheduled followup by guality Monitoring.
The corrective actions were being applied to all three units.
Chan<hes The changes detailed with respect to Unit 1 in Inspection Report No.
50-528/87-03, were applicable to Unit 2.
Effluents The Semi-Annual Operating Reports
-. Radioactive Effluents for 1986 were reviewed.
No obvious mistakes, anomalous measurements, omissions or trends were noted.
The comments and discussions relative to the generation of release permits and the licensee's calculation of doses and dose rates contained in the Unit 1 Inspection Report No. 50-528/87-03 were applicable to Unit 2.
Randomly selected release permits (15)
between July 14, 1986 (Permit No. 862061)
and March 13, 1987 (Permit No.
872050) were examined.
The completed permits were legible and complete.
In all cases final corrected reports had been prepared.
The permits examined included containment purges (8"), non standard containment purges (pressure relief) (8"), refueling containment'urges (42"), boric acid evaporator, fuel building, condenser vent and waste gas decay tank releases.
Dose and dose rate calculations were performed for Release Permit No. 872007, containment power access purge (8"), using ODCM Rev.
1.
No discrepancies were identifie The licensee reported that prior to the recent outage, waste gas decay tank back leakage to the surge tank of up to 5 psig/day had been noted.
Following repairs during the outage, back leakage was reduced to 1 psig/week.
The licensee specified that the leakage was not a contributor to the noble gas levels which had been observed in the auxiliary building.
The increased levels of noble gases released from Unit 2 vs. Unit 1, 3rd quarter 1987 4th quarter 1987 Unit 1 (Curies)
Unit 2 (Curies)
1.02E+02 5.68E+02 1.23E+02 1.39E+03 were attributed to the poorer Unit 2 fuel performance.
No unmonitored release paths were identified.
Effluents were within Appendix I (10 CFR 50) design objectives.
Instrumentation Records of performance of channel calibrations and functional tests required by Technical Specification (T. S. ) 4. 3. 3. 9 table 4. 3-8 were examined.
The tests were completed in a timely fashion.
The Gaseous Radwaste System Explosive Gas Monitoring System, hydrogen-oxygen analyzer was inoperable.
The licensee had satisfied the requirements of Action Statement 39 through the collection and analysis of grab samples.
Air Cleanin S stems The licensee's program and qualifications in this area were addressed in Inspection Report Nos.
50-528/87-03 and 50-530/87-04 pages 18 and 4 respectively.
The records of performance of tests of the Control Room Essential Filtration System (T. S.
4. 7. 7) and ESF Pump Room Air Exhaust Cleanup System (T. S.
4. 7. 8) and Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (T.S. 4.9. 12) were examined.
The tests had been successfully performed in a timely fashion, except that the Control Room system which was due for testing in early April 1987 had not been tested.
With respect to the surveillance tests applicable to the Control Room system the licensee had entered the 25K extension authorized by T. S. 3/4 Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements, item 4. 0. 2.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Followu of Events at 0 eratin Power Reactors 93702)
On April 22, 1987 a release of primary coolant to the chemistry laboratory and the roof of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building occurred.
At the time that the inspector discussed the matter with the licensee, the licensee was investigating the event and not all the facts were available.
Prior to 0845, April 22, 1987, reactor coolant was being recirculated preparatory to the collection of a sample.
At approximately 0845 an emergency plan drill was conducted which required individuals in
the protected area to report to their emergency stations for an accountability check.
The technician reportedly closed the sample bomb isolation valves changing the recirculation pathway to a bypass line.
The isolated sample bomb system incorporates a valved line for supplying argon.
At 1145 a chemistry technician reported shoe contamination of 50,000 dpm.
Subsequent investigation established that during the period 0845-1145, reactor coolant at full RCS pressure and approximately 100 F, had backed up into the argon line.
The laboratory argon supply system consisting of an argon bottle, pressure regulator (0-100 psig) supplies, two taps in the counting room,.PASS, the main hot lab bench, the RCS sampling system and one other outlet not identified.
The argon line also incorporates a
relief valve (relief setting unknown) which discharges to the auxiliary building roof.
The primary coolant had leaked onto the main hot lab bench and into the atomic absorption spectrometer and had also discharged through the relief valve to the auxiliary building roof.
Contamination on the bench was 1.5E6 dpm/smear and 1.25E6 dpm/probe area on the roof.
Approximately 50 ft~ of roof area was contaminated and about a 400 ft~ area was barricaded.
A roof air sample about 1245 showed 6.98K MPC for iodine and a chemistry laboratory air sample showed no peaks.
Decontamination activities were initiated promptly and by 1435 strippable paint was being applied to the roof.
A total of eight chemistry technicians were sent for whole body counts.
Preliminary results showed a possible trace of iodine in one individual with negative results in the other seven.
Decontamination personnel working in the chemistry laboratory were wearing protective clothing and respirators.
The licensee'repared a release permit no.
8701089, which estimated that 18 gals.
of primary coolant had been released.
It assumed that all of the liquid had been, discharged through the auxiliary building roof vent and was released to the air.
The flow rate of the release was estimated at 0.08 cfm for 0.50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.
The activity of the release was based on analyses of RCS gas, hot leg RCS liquid and hot leg RCS crud samples for a worst case evaluation.
The calculated doses and dose rates were 9.4 E-5 mrem gamma, 6.01 E-5 mrem beta, whole body 1. 56 EO mrem/yr, skin 2. 54EO mrem/yr and organ 2. 10E2 mrem/yr.
The worst case site boundary dose was to an infant thyroid, 2.49 E-1 mrem.
The licensee concluded that the event was not reportable.
The reporting requirement of 10 CFR 20.403 related to the loss of use of facilities and damage to property were called to the licensee's attention.
The licensee's evaluation of the event will be examined during a
subsequent inspection (50-528/87-15-01).
No violations or deviations were identifie t
g the inspection the auxiliary and radwaste buildings of Units 1 and 2 were toured.
Surveys, using an ion chamber survey instrument NRC-009154 due for calibration June 24, 1987, were performed to verify postings and evaluate accessible areas.
The housekeeping appeared to be good with essentially a complete recovery from the earlier outages.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Review of Licensee Re orts (90712)
Licensee Event Reports (LER) and Special Reports (SR) were reviewed for content, timeliness, adequacy, cause and corrective actions.
The following reports were examined, for Unit 1 LERs86-058 and 87-001 and SR's87-010, 87-011,87-013 and 87-014 and for Unit 2, SR's86-039, 87-002,87-004 and 87-005.
No onsite followup was required.
On-site followup of several LER's and SR's was attempted.
At the time of the inspection the licensee was engaged in a rereview of all 1986 reports and action on the reports selected for review was not complete.
The licensee's procedures for documentation of action on LER's and SR's was reviewed.
Action on the selected reports will be completed during a
subsequent inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Followu on IE Information Notices 92701 The inspector verified that an established and operating system provides for receipt verification, review, appropriate distribution and documentation of comments.
Receipt of Notices 86-86, 86-90,86-103, 86-107 and 87-03 was verified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
ll.
Exit Interview 30703 The results of the inspection were discussed with the individuals identified in report section 1.
The scope and findings were identified.
The licensee was informed that no violations or deviations had been identifie (