IR 05000483/1986003

Safety Insp Rept 50-483/86-03 on 860211-0414.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Tmi Action Plan Requirements,Surveillance,Maint,Operational Safety & Cycle 1 Refueling Outage

ML20203P005
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	04/29/1986
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203P003	List: IR 05000483/1986003 ML20203P001
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-***, TASK-TM 50-483-86-03, 50-483-86-3, NUDOCS 8605060264
Download: ML20203P005 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/86003(DRP)

Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400 St. Louis, MO 63166 Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Callaway Site, Steedman, M0 Inspection Conducted: February 11 through April 14, 1986 Inspectors: B. H. Little C. H. Brown B. Bartlett P. G. Brockman

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W.C.(Forneydhiedmb 9ttE Approved By: *

Reactor Projects Section IA Tdv/P4 Date'

Inspection Summary Inspection on February 11 through April 14, 1986 Report No. 50-483/86003(ORP))

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors and other inspectors of license conditions, TMI Action Plan require-ments, surveillance, maintenance, operational safety and Cycle 1 refueling outag Results: No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspectio PDR ADOCK 05000403 G PDR

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OETAILS Persons Contacted D. F. Schnell, Vice President, Nuclear

• S. E. Miltenberger, General Manager, Callaway Plant P. T. Appleby, Assistant Manager, Support Services

• L. Randolph, Manager, Callaway Plant

• A. P. Neuhalfen, Manager, Quality Assurance D. W. Capone, Manager, Nuclear Engineering A. C. Passwater, Superintendent, Licensing W. R. Campbell, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Engineering R. D. Affolter, Superintendent, Engineering

• D. C. Poole, Consultant W. H. Stahl, Supervisor, Engineering J. V. Laux, Supervisor, Quality Assurance

• J. D. Blosser, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance

• T. P. Sharkey, Supervisor, Compliance W. R. Robinson, Superintendent, Instrumentation and Controls J. R. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Technical Services C. D. Naslund, Manager, Operations Support

• Denotes those present at one or more exit interviews.

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In addition, a number of equipment operators, Reactor Operators, Senior Reactor Operators, and other members of the Quality Control (QC),

Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics and Engineering staffs were contacte . Inspection of License Conditions (94300)

The Callaway Plant Operating License No. NPF-30 contains license conditions applicable to the first refueling outag Inspection in this matter

, included the review of licensee and NRC correspondence relating to the license conditions and discussions with the NRC Licensing Project Manager (LPM) to ascertain acceptability of the licensee's submittals. On April 11, 1986, prior to plant startup, the LPM advised the inspector that the licensee had satisfied all license conditions related to startup restraint An inspection of license conditions that involved hardware changes, functional tests procedures or personnel training was performed to verify that the required activities had been accomplishe (Closed) Attachment 1, Item B: This attachment requires that the licensee install a permanent area monitor on the manipulator crane prior to entering Mode 6 (refueling mode).

The inspector reviewed Callaway Modification Package (CMP) No. 84-0068,

" Relocating Area Radiation Monitor SD-RE-41 to the Manipulator Crane". The CMP was approved prior to the work activity and contained the appropriate safety evaluations and reviews. On March 5, 1986, the inspector performed an in plant inspection and verified that the permanent area monitor was installed and operable prior to the plant entering Mode The license condition has been satisfie _ - - _- .- - - - - . .-- - _- __-

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(Closed) Item 2.C.(5)(b): Prior to restart following the first extended outage of known duration greater than two weeks occurring after February 15, 1985, or prior to restart following the first refueling outage which ever occurs first, Union Electric shall have completed the installa-tion of the five new isolation switches and modification to the four existing isolation switches identified in the August 23, 1984 SNUPPS lette The referenced letter (SLNRC 84-0109) identifies the necessary changes to ensure achievement and maintenance of hot standby conditions following a postulated control room fire. The letter identifies the new switches as GDHS11A, EGHS708, BNHS88128, EFHS26A and EFHS38A and the following switches to be modified as NG04DBF6, NG06EBF3, NG02BAF2 and SGK05 On April 7,1986, during an in plant inspection, the inspector verified that the five new isolation switches had been installed and that switch SGK05B had been modified. The other three modified switches were in circuits which were energized and not available for sisual inspection; however, through the review of Quality Assurance records, the inspector determined that the other three switches had been modifie The inspector reviewed plant procedure OTO-ZZ-00001, " Control Room Inaccessibility",

Revision 5, and verified that instructions for use of the new isolation switches had been provided for in the procedure. The license condition has been satisfied (Closed) Item 2.C.(7)(b), Emergency Response Capabilities (Generic Letter 82-33, Supplement I to NUREG-0737): Prior to restart following the first refueling outage, Union Electric shall have a fully functional Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility and a fully operable Emergency Response Facilities Information System (ERFIS). (This license condition includes the requirement for an operable Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)).

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licensee has provided a fully functional Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) which contain operable ERFIS and SPDS capabilities. Additionally, to verify that appropriate administrative controls / procedures have been implemented and that licensed operators and emergency response personnel have received training in the use of the emergency information system The inspection included; emergency response facilities and control room walkdowns, a review of administrative controls and procedures, interviews with personnel and the review of personnel training record In addition, the inspector attended an operator training class on SPDS operatio Facility Walkdown

The inspector determined that the ERFIS is installed and functional in the EOF and TSC. The SPDS is installed and functional in the control room and the TSC. Inspector observations of SPDS displays during plant startup indicated the displays were in agreement with control room instrumentation.

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Administrative Controls and Procedures: The following procedures have been implemented:

0TN-RR-00002 Safety Assessment System (SPDS)

APA-ZZ-385 Control of Computer Software and Operator Interface ITP-ZZ-003 Software Modification - Approval / Implementatio Personnel Interviews: During interviews, the inspector covered the problem areas identified in IE Information Notice No. 86-10, "SPDS Malfunctions -

Survey Results". The inspector determined that management support has been provided to the emergency assessment and information systems. The

, licensee has implemented administrative controls to assure display securit The licensee has integrated SPDS i ito the control room operations, and has provided licensed and non-licenset personnel training. System reliability was demonstrated during the systes's verification and validation progra Personnel interviewed expressed a high degree of acceptance of the system's

response and functions and demonstrated their ability to operate the syste Training

The inspector reviewed the training course outline (Technical Assessment) which included training in ERFIS and SPDS operation and reviewed personnel attendance and examination records. The inspector determined that the required training had been completed. The license condition has been satisfie !

(Closed) Item 2.C.(7)(C): Prior to restart, following the first refueling

.: outage, Union Electric shall have installed and operable the following

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, Source range instrumentation qualified to post-accident conditions 4 Reactor vessel water level 1,strumentation Subcooling monitors i Radiation monitors for releases from steam generator safety / relief valves or atmospheric dump valves, and Auxiliary feedwater pump turbine exhaust monito The instrumentation is identified as Post Accident-Monitoring (PAM),

instruments (Regulatory Guide 1.97) and as Instrumentation For Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling (TMI Action Plan 11.F.2.). Instruments which provide for the required monitoring are designated as follows: Source range instrumentation qualified to post-accident conditions, SE-NE-60 i SE-NE-61 E

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. Reactor vessel water level instrumentation, BB-LT-1311 BB-LT-1312 BB-LT-1321 BB-LT-1322 Subcooling monitors, RP081A RP081B Radiation monitors for releases from steam generator atmospheric relief valves, AB-RE-111 AB-RE-112 AB-RE-113 AB-RE-114 Auxiliary feedwater pump turbine exhaust monitor, FC-RE-385 Inspection in this matter included; interviews with personnel in operation, emergencv response, instrumentation and control, and training; and visual observa. ions of installed instrumentation. The inspector also performed a review of applicable quality assurance records consisting of the following:

Callaway Modification Packages (CMPs)

Work Requests (WRs)

Quality Control Inspection Records Surveillance Procedures Calibration and Functional Test Procedures Personnel Training Records Plant Emergency Operating Procedure The inspector determined that the required instrumentation has been installed and is operable, and that appropriate procedures and personnel training have been implemented. The license condition has been satisfie . Inspection of TMI Action Plan Requirements (92705)

This inspection concerned licensee actions relative to certain NRC requirements developed as a result of the Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 accident. These requirements were contained in NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," and were assigned item numbers for identificatio Completion of certain licensee actions required by the items reviewed during this inspection was previously verified by NRC inspection personne This inspection was conducted to establish a correlation between

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individual items (by number and title assigned in NUREG-0737) and the NRC Inspection Reports which document these verifications. This inspection was also conducted to supplement previous inspection activities as necessary to verify completion of required licensee actions for all items reviewed. The staff findings, as documented in the Callaway Safety Evaluation Report (SER) NUREG-0830 and four supplements, are included in some of the item I.C.7, NSSS Vendor Review of Procedures: In Callaway Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Supplement 3, Section 22, tne staff found that the involvement of Westinghouse representatives in the development of emergency response

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guidelines satisfied TMI Item I.C.7 requirement for vendor eview of emergency operating procedures. To obtain vendor review of low power test

, and power ascension procedures the licensee assigned Westinghouse represen-l tatives as Ad-Hoc members of the Onsite Review Committee (ORC). An inspection in this matter was performed to verify that the required vendor procedure review had been accomplishe This inspection included the review of the licensee's quality assurance records which document ORC Meeting Minute QA records for 15 ORC meetings, numbered 279 through 328, document the committees review of 156 engineering tests (low power tests and power ascension procedures). Also additional administrative, surveillance and emergency implementing procedures were reviewed during these meetings. Based on the review of the ORC Meeting Minutes, which provides the list of attendees and procedures reviewed, the inspector determined that the vendor's review of the required procedures was performe I.D.2, Plant-Safety-Parameter Display Console: TMI Action Plan requirement for the installation of a safety parameter display system (SPDS) was included in SER Section 22, in the staffs review of TMI Action Plan Item 111. A.1.2, " Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities." The SPDS requirements are included in Callaway Plant Operating License No. NPF-30, License Condition No. 2.C.(7)(b). Inspection of this item found that the license condition has been satisfied as documented in Paragraph 2 of this repor I.G.1, Training During Low-Power Testing: In the SER, it was stated that the licensee committed to revise the Callaway FSAR to describe a Natural Circulation Testing and Training program to meet the TMI Task Action Pla In SER Supplement No. 2, the staff determined that the FSAR revision was an acceptable resolution of Item I.G.I. The training during the Natural Circulation Testing was to have each licensed operator participate in initiation, maintenance and recovery from Natural Circulation mod In Inspection Reports No. 483/84-20 and 483/84-42, by direct observation and record review, the inspectors concluded that the training had been performed and the test data was entered in the simulator. The testing was performed and data collected by procedure ETT-ZZ-09240. All requirements have been met to satisfy this TMI ite II.B.1., Reactor Coolant System Vents: In Callaway SER, Section 22, the staff concluded that the reactor coolant system vent system design for Callaway, Unit I met the applicable requirements of TMI Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737. The staff specified that the procedures for operation of the vents be submitted by the licensee, reviewed and approved by the NRC

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prior to plant startup. This procedure requirement was satisfied by the licensee's commitment to implement an upgraded emergency operating procedure (E0P) program based on the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. In SER, Supplement 3, Section 22, the staff's review of Callaway's procedure generation package (PGP) found the licensee's program for new and upgraded emergency operating procedures acceptable.

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By visual observation, the inspector verified that the vent line and valves were installed in accordance with the Piping and Instrumentation Diagram P&ID M-22BB04-Q and Electrical Drawing No. E-03BB30-Q and verified the system was designed to safety grade and Class 1E standards. During a control room walkdown, the inspector verified that the installed valve

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indications and controls were powered from Class 1E supplies. The inspector reviewed plant procedure FR-1.3, " Response to Voids in the Reactor Vessel," and determined that the licensee has implemented appropriate procedures for the operation of the vent valves.

l ' Callaway Technical Specification 3/4.4.11, " Reactor Coolant System Vents",

provides system operability and surveillance testing requirement II.B.4, Training for Mitigating Core Damage: In Callaway SER, Section 22, i the staff concluded that the licensee's committed training program for mitigating core damage met staff requirements for training to control or mitigate an accident in which the core is severely damaged. Special training in this area is included in the licensee's training program (Control Board Certification and Mitigation of Core Damage Courses). The staff documented its acceptance of the licensee's training program in Callaway SER, Section 1 Region III inspections of cperational staff and staff training are documented in NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-483/83032(DRP) and 50-483/84020(DRP). The inspectors determined by the review of training records, personnel interviews and direct observations that training for mitigating core damage had been successfully completed by all licensed personnel and non-licensed shift technical advisors prior to fuel loa II.D.3, Valve Position Indication: The licensee was required to provide a reliable valve-position indication in the control room for the reactor coolant system safety and relief valve The staff's review found that safety-grade position indication was provided for each pressurizer safety valve and power operated relief valve that indicates when the valve is not fully shut. The valve discharge piping has thermocouples attached and temperature indicating in the control room as an alternate means to indicate valves are fully closed. The inspector's review determined these indicctors to be fully functiona II.E.1.1, Auxiliary Feedwater System Evaluation: The licensee was to perform an auxiliary feodwater system reliability analysis under various loss-of-main-feedwater-transients. The staff made various recommendations during their review to meet this requirement. The following reviews were made of the actions taken on the recommendations in Inspection Report No. 483/84-18(DPRP). The inspector reviewed the action taken on the

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isolation valve AP-V015 between condensate storage tank and auxiliary feedwater system pumps. The inspector noted in procedure 0DP-ZZ-0004,

" Locked Valve / Breaker Control," that valve AP-V015 was to be maintained in the locked open position. The inspector also noted that the valve was in the locked open positio In Inspection Report No. 483/83-32, the 48-hour endurance test of the auxiliary feedwater pumps was confirmed, with selected parts of the tests having been witnesse The staff concluded in the SER that the design of the auxiliary feedwater systems met the requirement of NUREG-073 ;

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II.E.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication: The licensee was notified that the auxiliary feedwater system's automatic initiation and flow indication should be upgraded to

" safety grade" equipment and circuits according to NUREG-0737. The staff found the design of the initiation and flow indication met the requirements of NUREG-0737. In Inspection Report No. 483/84-04(DE), safety grade associated equipment was noted to have been installed in the control room and the auxiliary shutdown panels. The Intergraded Design Inspection, Inspection Report No. 82-22, verified the auxiliary feedwater systems had been built as designe II.E.3.1, Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters: The requirement was for the licensee to provide the capability, controlled from the control room, to power the pressurizer heaters from 1E Class power buses as backu Sufficient heaters should be supplied to maintain natural circulation in the hot standby conditio The inspector's review of the as-built drawings and power supply schedules showed that the pressurizer backup heaters are supplied from the emergency buses, one group from each bus, and could maintain pressure in hot standb The staff determined that this design met NUREG-0737 requirement II.E.4.1, Dedicated Hydrogen Penetrations: The licensee was to provide containment penetrations that would only be used for the post-accident combustible gas control system. The recombiners and isolation system was l to be single-failure proof and components to satisfy the requirement were to be safety grade. Procedures for operating the system should be reviewed for use with post-accident conditions. The staff's review found that the SNUPPS hydrogen control system utilizes two redundant hydrogen recombiners permanently installed inside containment to control and reduce the hydrogen gas concentration within containment following a LOCA. Therefore, this item concerning dedicated containment penetrations for post-accident combustible gas control of the containment atmosphere was not applicable to Callawa )

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II.F.1.2.0, Containment-Pressure Monitor: The staff reviewed and reported in the SER that the.Callaway Plant design was in compliance with NUREG-0737 requirements for containment pressure monitoring indications and recordings in the control room. The inspector found the above monitoring and recording system installed and functiona II.F.1.2.E Containment Water-Level Monitor: The Callaway design included redundant Class IE containment water level monitoring which the staff concluded in the SER met the requirements of NUREG-0737. The inspector's review showed the monitoring system to be installed and functiona II.F.1.2.F Containment Hydrogen Monitor: The redundant Class IE containment hydrogen analyzers, each with two sample points in containment, was found to meet NUREG-0737 requirements by the staff during their revie The inspector's review indicated that the hydrogen monitor system was installed and functiona II.F.2. Instrumentation For Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC):

The ICC instrumentation requirements for the Callaway Plant SER Section 22, are identified as (1) reactor vessel level instrumentation (RVLIS) and (2) thermocouple / core cooling monitor system (subcooling monitors). The ICC instruments are included in the Callaway Plant Operating License NPF-30 as License Condition No. 2.C.(7)(c). Inspection in this matter found that the license condition has been satisfied as documented in Paragraph 2 of this repor II.G.1, Emergency Power For Pressurizer Equipment: The licensee was to

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provide emergency power to the pressurizer instrumentation, Power Operated

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Relief Valve (PORV), and the block valve. Power to the PORV and its associated block valve should be supplied from separate power source In SER Supplement No. 2, the staff determined that the SNUPPS design, PORV

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power supply from a DC power bus and the associated block valve on an AC power bus emanating from the same division was acceptable. The inspector reviewed the as-built drawings and found that DC pcwer is supplied to the PORV's and AC pcwer is supplied to the block valves from the safety buse II.K.1. IE Bulletins on Measures to Mitigate Small-Break LOCAs and Loss-of-Feedwater Accidents: The licensee was required to evaluate the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) valves for proper functioning and maintenance, the procedures for the removal from service and restoration to service of safety-related systems, and the use of a Icw-level bistable trip on the pressurize In SER Supplement 3, the staff transferred this item to the list of pre-fuel load requirements and closed out the item in the SER. As documented in Inspection Report No. 50-483/84027(DRS), the inspector had reviewed control procedures that, along with the system's procedures for operating, maintenance, and surveillance, adequately addressed the control of valve alignments for safety related systems. Verification of the

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operability of redundant safety related systems prior to removal of the primary system is addressed. The verification of the system operability before the system is returned to full service status is also addresse The requirements of the action item are considered to be met and the item is close II.K.1.19, Trip Per Low-Level Bistable: The FSAR Section 7.2 indicates that the reactor trip and safety injection are initiated on pressurizer low pressure. The pressurizer low-level trips are not utilized in the SNUPPS desig In the SER the staff concluded, that the design met the requirements in NUREG-073 II.K.1.20, Prompt Manual Reactor Trip: IE Bulletin applicable to B&W plants but was opened on Callaway TMI tracking form. This is considered l close '

l II.K.1.21, Auto Steam Generator Anticipatory Reactor Trip: IE Bulletin applicaole to B&W plants but was opened on Callaway TMI tracking for All line items for II.K.1 are considered close II.K.3.9, Proportional Integral Derivative Controller Modification: A change to the Integral Derivative controller as recommended by Westinghouse.

, In Inspection Report No. 50-483/84018(DRP), the inspector reported he had I

reviewed the modification. The jumper JK on the 7300 Series Controller Card for PC-455A was noted to hcse been removed. The removal of the jumper eliminates the derivative action; i.e., the output signal is no longer modified by the rate of change of pressure. This item is considered close II.K.3.25, Power on Pump Seals: The licensee was to determine the onsequences of a loss of cooling water to the reactor coolant pump seal tooler The staff closed this item in the SER as their review indicated tie necessary water systems would be powered from the emergency diesel generator buses. As documented in Inspection Report No. 50-483/84018(DRP),

thi inspector reviewed drawing E-01005(Q)-5 (List of Loads Supplied by the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)) which states that component cooling water, centrifugal charging, and essential service water pumps are supplied by l these buses. The Emergency Operating Procedures ECA-2.1 and ECA-2.2 (Loss of All AC Power Recovery), requires the establishment of Closed Cooling Water (CCW) flow to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Thermal Barriers and Seal Injection flow to the RCPs. This item is considered close III.A.1.2, Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities: TMI Action Plan requirement for the upgrading of emergency support facilitics was included in the staff's review of TMI Action Plan Item III.A.1.2, documented in SER No. 4, Section 22. These requirements are included in Callaway Plant Operating License NPF-30, License Condition No. 2.C.(7)(b). Inspection of this item found that the license condition has been satisfied as documented in Paragraph 2 of this repor .

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. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors reviewed / observed the Technical Specification reauired surveillance testing during power operations, prior to mode changes relative to the refueling outage, during the refueling outage and plant startu Items which were considered during the inspection included; that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumen-tation was calibrated, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators throughout the Sinspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected safety related systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor, auxiliary, and turbine buildings were conducte During these tours, observations were made relative to plant equipment conditions, fire hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures, radiological control and conditions, housekeeping, security, tagging of equipment, ongoing maintenance and surveillance, containment integrity, and availability of safety related equipmen No violations or deviations were identifie . Cycle 1 Refueling Outage (60705) (60710) (71711)

The Cycle 1 refueling outage commenced on February 28, 1986. Inspection in this area began prior to the outage which included attendance at the licensee's planning and scheduling meetings, review of pending work

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packages and procedures, pre-outage training and equipment checkout, personnel interviews, and observation of new fuel receipg handling, and '

storag Inspections also included the review, observation and witnessing of plant mode changes, refueling, startup, maintenance and testing activities. The resident inspectors provided extended site coverage to observe shift turnover activities and to attend daily planning meeting Inspections were also performed by NRC Region III Division of Reactor Safety Inspectors, and resident inspectors from the Byron and Wolf Creek Sites. Inspection findings are as follow Preparations For Refueling The licensee management and supervisory personnel were actively involved in the preplanning of outage activities. Detailed activity networks were provided and prerequisites for the outage activities were closely monitored. Licensee administrative controls included personnel responsibilities and authorities, communication and shift manning requirements, pretraining and equipment checkout requirements and radiation / radiological control and monitoring requirement The inspectors observed the receipt of four new fuel shipment Appropriate Health Physics survey and monitoring procedures were followed. The inspectors observed the off loading of 10 casks containing 20 new fuel assemblies and the handling and storage of 48 new fuel assemblies. The inspectors verified that the new fuel assemblies were inspected, handled and stored in accordance with licensee's procedures. During positioning of a strongback for new fuel removal, the strongback upending sling parted permitting the fixture containing the fuel assembly to drop approximately one inc In subsequent visual inspection by the licensee, Westinghouse Fuel Engineer and the NRC resident inspector it was determined that the fuel assembly had not been damage The inspectors interviewed licensee and contractor personnel and determined they were knowledgeable of their responsibilities, applicable administrative requirements and procedure Through in plant walkdowns the inspectors determined that plant system confiaurations were maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications for the applicable operating modes.

' Refueling Activities Inspections in this area focused on preparations for entering Mode 6, licensee adherence to " Refueling" Technical Specification, and the licensee's control of activities relating to defueling and refuelin The inspectors determined that applicable administrative controls were implemented including the maintenance of material and personnel control zones, manning of refueling crews, health physics monitoring

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and surveys, and containment integrity. The inspectors verified that control room communications and core monitoring was maintained.

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The inspectors performed sample inspections of fuel placement in the fuel building and reactor vessel, reviewed fuel logs and determined that correct fuel configuration was maintained. The inspectors verified that the required magnetic particle inspection had been performed on the main and auxiliary hooks of the polar crane and that the main book load cell was in current calibration. Following the completion of fuel loading the inspector viewed the licensee's video taping of the core configuration and verified that fuel location was in agreement with Cycle II Core Load Procedure ETP-ZZ-0003 Inspector observation during plant walkdowns, determined that the licensee provided close supervision of housekeeping practices and conditions. Minor deficiencies noted by the inspectors were brought to the licensee's attention and promptly corrected. Health physics personnel maintained appropriate health physics barrier tagging and posting conditions and provided extensive monitor and survey function Operating logs and equipment status boards were maintained and reflected actual plant conditions. Plant conditions were maintained in accordance with Technical Specificction The inspectors determined that the control room operators were cognizant of Technical Specification requirements and provided close supervision and control of plant conditions during the outag System lineups and prerequisites were satisfied for the various mode changes and mode changes were accomplished without incident, c. Plant Startup From Refueling Plant startup was in progress at the close of this inspection perio The inspectors performed plant walkdowns, reviewed startup procedures, observed licensee performance of surveillances and functional tests, reviewed system startup checklists and observed operators verifying system lineups. Plant walkdowns included the reactor, reactor auxiliary and turbine buildings, the emergency diesel and battery rooms. The inspectors verified Technical Specification requirements were met for pending Mode changes during plant heatu d. Outage Summaries Licensee management and supervision provided extensive overview of the outage activities. This was evident based on additional resources provided to operations and support groups, their presence within the plant and in their participation in the daily planning meetings throughout the outag Operations personnel provided effective control of system configurations during mode changes, refueling and maintenance activities such that flooding, spills or major incidents were avoide Planning and scheduling provided thorough task subnets with frequent updates, and the activities were well coordinated by the Outage Coordination Grou o-

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The health physics staff was increased during the outage. Their presence was observed in all areas of activities having potential for personnel exposure. Barriers, monitoring and surveys were effectively maintaine The Quality Assurance staff provided extensive activity surveillanc Housekeeping conditions were exceptionally well maintained throughout the outage perio No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents /

processes as proprietar