IR 05000483/1986015
| ML20206N547 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1986 |
| From: | Patterson J, Snell W, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206N540 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-86-15, NUDOCS 8608260313 | |
| Download: ML20206N547 (18) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-483/86015(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30 Licensee: Union Electric Company Post Office Box 149-Mail Code 400 St. Louis, M0 63166 Facility Name: Callaway Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At:
Callaway Plant, Steedman, M0 Inspection Conducted: July 29 through July 31, 1986 0b 9A Inspectors:
J. Patterson, Te nn Leader h fh'
Date M. Smith W
Nn
[-[h-b s
Date Approved By:
S el ef I^ /
d Emergency'Prep redness Section Date Inspection Suninary:
Inspection on July 29 through July 31, 1986 (Report No. 50-483/86015(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine; announced inspection of the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by six NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. No violations or deviations were identified as a result of the inspection.
8608260313 060818 PDR ADOCK 05000483 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed J. Patterson, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Health
Physics Access Control (HPAC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
B. Little, Control Room C. Brown, Control Room M. Good, TSC M. Smith, Operational Support Center (OSC)
T. Lynch, TSC and E0F N. Williamsen, EOF
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Union Electric Personnel I
D. Schnell, Vice President, Nuclear
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R. Shukai, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering S. Miltenberger, General Manager, Nuclear Operations
J. Price, Superintendent, Training i
M. Evans, Senior Training Supervisor i
J. Blosser, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance C. Naslund, Manager, Operations Support A. Neuhalfen, Manager, Quality Assurance J. Gearhart, Superintendent, Operations Support M. Stiller, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Emergency Preparedness A. White, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness S. Harvey, Administrator, Nuclear Affairs P. Sudnar, Administrator, Nuclear Affairs
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M. Cleary, Supervisor, Nuclear Information R. McAleenan, Manager, Nuclear Information T. Stotlar, Supervisory Engineer, Quality Assurance H. Bono, Engineer G. Poteat, Nuclear Scientist G. Nevels, Training Supervisor T. Rook, Training Instructor of Radiological Emergency Response Plan E. Thornton, Emergency Evaluator C. Hobbs, Co-Op Engineer W. Hinchie, Assistant Engineer, Emergency Preparedness R. Daming, Assistant Engineer S. Crawford, Nuclear Affairs Administrator M. Faulkner, Nuclear Affairs Administrator All of the above individuals attended the exit meeting on July 31, 1986.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Item a.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-483/85003-02:
Procedure EIP-ZZ-00201 has been revised in Attachment 4 " Notifications," to provide for notification of the NRC Operations Center immediately after State
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and local officials and the Recovery Manager. The Recovery Manager is part of the immediate response organization and must be contacted imediately after an emergency classification has been made. Other notifications previously included before the NRC Operations Office, the Public Information Officer, the American Nuclear Insurers and Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) have been relegated to later notifications in Attachment F.
Also, the licensee informed the inspector that Section 5.2.5 of this procedure will be revised to state that the NRC will be notified imediately after notifications to the State and local officials and the Recovery Manager, but no later than one hour after the emergency is declared.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-483/85011-01: During the June 1985 annual exercise several aspects of radiological control were not adequately demonstrated at the TSC, Maintenance OSC or the HPAC. Establishment i
of a health physics control point for radiological control at the
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l TSC, OSC and HPAC and proper frisking by those entering or leaving
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these points were demonstrated successfully during this exercise.
Also personnel in the Maintenance OSC were observed wearing their personal dosimetry correctly and protective clothing was put on and I
removed properly. This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Open Item No. 50-483/85011-02: During the June 1985 annual j
exercise OSC communications were observed as being inadequate.
Improvement in OSC comunications was observed during this exercise.
Telephones, Gaitronics and radio comunications functioned well with
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only a few exceptions. At locations in the plant where radio comunication was difficult, the repair team leader used Gaitronics or a regular telephone as a substitute. This item is closed.
3.
General
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An exercise of the licensee's Callaway Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the Callaway Plant on July 30, 1986, testing the respnnse of the licensee to a hypothetical accident scenario resulting in a major release. The attachment describes the scope and objectives and narrative sumary of the exercise. This was a full-scale exercise l
involving the emergency organizations of Union Electric Company, the
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State of Missouri and the Counties of Callaway, Montgomery, Osage and l
Gasconade.
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General Observations a.
Prncedures This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
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b.
Coordination The licensee's response was generally coordinated, orderly, and timely.
If the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the health and safety of the public.
c.
Observers Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with six NRC observers and a number of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observers.
FEMA observations on the responses of State and local authorities will be provided in a separate report.
d.
Critique A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on July 31, 1986, the day after the exercise. The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during the exit interview. A public critique was held later that day in Fulton, Missouri, to present the preliminary onsite and offsite findings of the NRC and FEMA exercise observers.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room The Control Room (CR) portion of the exercise was conducted from the Simulator, which added to the realism of the emergency. At shift turnover the Reactor Operator (RO) demonstrated knowledge of initial plant conditions and annunciator alarm status.
The CR crew appeared coordinated and operated with efficiency when required. The initial Emergency Coordinator, the Shift Supervisor (SS), demonstrated good command and control.
The Emergency Duty Officer (EDO) entered the CR at the Notification of Unusual Event (NUE).
He worked well with the SS and did not usurp the SS's authority. There was a smooth transition with the ED0 when he left at the Alert level to become the Emergency Coordinator (EC) at the TSC.
The Shift Technical Adviser (STA) worked well with the CR crew. He got directly involved with the plant's Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) and the Emergency Implementating Procedures (EIPs)
and provided technical assistance.
Communications within the CR and later with the TSC were generally good throughout the exercise. The CR communicator had trouble contacting Gasconade County at the NUE announcement, and therefore went through Callaway County to have them contact Gasconade County. Soon afterwards a backup telephone connection was made and used from then on in the exercise.
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More frequent plant status briefings should have been conducted in the CR.
Status boards were provided, but not maintained except for containment atmosphere activity which was trended. The CR log had a minimum number of entries and should have been better prepared.
There was a good discussion and awareness by the CR crew on core voiding potential. The CR/TSC Liaison was briefed by the SS and interfaced well with the CR crew at the Alert level.
When the announcement was made of an injured man in the Rad Waste building at the 2030 level, the CR response was good and a prompt call was made for the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT). As reactor operations varied the CR used good technical judgment in recommending containment purge after the manual reactor trip and safety injection was initiated.
Role playing, the ability to keep up the enthusiasm and realism of the event throughout the exercise, was often lacking as demonstrated several times throughout the exercise by the CR crew.
In slack periods the time could have been better utilized by discussing phases of the accident, updating status boards or logs, or analyzing some other facet of the emergency.
This is a difficult, somewhat subjective aspect to control.
However, greater effort should be made in the CR to continue the role playing aspects as much as possible.
Overall, the Control Room gave a good performance with some areas of improvement remaining as noted previously.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
Activation of the TSC was orderly and effectively completed approximately 20 minutes after the Alert was declared at 0830.
Area radiation monitors and habitability monitoring was in progress and functioning by 0849. A frisking station was later established at the TSC entrance and was used by anyone entering the TSC and monitored by a TSC HP person stationed in.that area. However, the frisker station was oriented such that some administrative personnel and office equipment were on the potentially contaminated side.
Assembly and accountability was initiated at 0909 based on present and projected plant conditions and prior to declaration of the Site Area Emergency which was declared at 0913.
The first personnel count at 0938 accounted for all but approximately 23 names. These names by badge number were on a Health Physics list which was inadvertently left in the HPAC by a Security Officer. This missing list was not discussed until 0944 when a HPAC person called in the names to complete the accountability. Assembly and accountability took 35 minutes.
This would have been more timely if there had been more efficient handling and better communication in expediting the delivery of this HP list to security.
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There was some confusion in the TSC as to whether two or three persons were trapped in the Containment Hatch, when in fact there were only two. At 1025 during a TSC Coordinators briefing, no one could tell the EC whether the reactor coolant pumps were running or not. Erroneous Containment pressure of 4 psi was listed on the
" flip chart" status board when it was actually 2.5 psi. Pressurizer pressure of 5100 psi was erroneously listed on the status board at 0945.
The Health Physics Coordinator (HPC) and the Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC) discussed the need to maintain auxiliary building exhaust flow to prevent an uncontrolled release. Also, they discussed using results from the containment process monitors for dose projections. These meaningful discussions were made just prior to transferring dose assessment to the EOF.
Initial dose assessments at the TSC were well done using computerized equipment and implementing procedure EIP-ZZ-01211 as needed. When the meteorology tower was lost, the TSC obtained vital information from the National Weather Service (NWS); however, the wind speed was given in knots, which was not consistent with the licensee's units.
It was converted to miles per hour with some effort.
Activities of the inplant emergency teams resulted in hypothetical overexposures for three individuals. Two individuals of one emergency team received five rem each while in the vicinity of the containment hatch. These increased levels were reported from Pocket Ion Chamber (PIC) readings as given by their Controller. This team had been briefed by the RAC before being dispatched and told to read their PIC's every 10-15 minutes. Although levels were low at the time the team arrived, by the time they read their PIC's 10-15 minutes later, radiation levels had increased resulting in the overexposures. After noticing the five rem readings as given by their Controller, both team members left the area. The other individual, an HP technician, received ten rem when he returned to the Nntainment Hatch area looking for the team that had just left.
He had his survey meter with him and returned to that area at the time fuel damage was occurring, which increased the radiation levels there. He also left immediately when informed of this reading.
These overexposures occurred somewhat spontaneously as the scenario developed. Those involved were responding to problems that developed and took appropriate action to minimize their exposure levels.
The TSC staff briefings on plant status and related discussion on ways to mitigate the emergency were very well done throughout the exercise. A very professional attitude prevailed in the TSC and interest was continually maintained at a high level throughout the exercise. One licensee participant playing the part of an NRC person took part in discussions and asked questions or gave his opinion on the exercise activities. This was well integrated into the scenario.
Log keeping in the TSC was excellent. There was a timely investigation of personnel overexposures (as described earlier) by compliance engineers.
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The TSC gave plant parameters and plant status to the EOF including radiation levels in the reactor building and auxiliary building.
Discussion by the EC and his key,ioport manager on rtcovery actions were well done and coordinated wita the EOF.
Decontamination of the access area to the auxiliary building and auxiliary building ventilation system repair was discussed during recovery.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
The Maintenance OSC was staffed and operational within 20 minutes after the Alert was declared.
Support team personnel logged in on the status board and were then directe.1 to waitirg areas to stand by for assigne.ents. The OSC Coordinator and support foremen demonstrated the ability to assign and control nine inplant teams with dispatch and efficiency.
Twc status boards were utilized in the Maintenance OSC and in general were well maintained. The large status board was the main means to keep track of team assignments and locations.
The second status board was maintained in the briefing area to assist the foremen in tracking team movements. Main developments and changes in plant conditions were announced as appropriate in the OSC. Teams were dispatched with adequate understanding of their mission and destination.
plant drawings and other references were used during team briefings before being dispatched.
From the inspector's observations in the OSC, all teams performed their assignments as designated with the exception of the diesel generator repair team.
The OSC Coordinator and his key support staff members did not fully understand the problem in restarting the diesel generator and bringing it up to operational capability.
Better instructions and use of drawings or other guidance should have been provided to better prepare this team for its mission.
Communications from the OSC to Emergency Repair Teams, CR, and TSC were good.
problems experienced in the 1985 emergency exercise appeared =to be solved.
Radio communications, telephones and
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Gaitronics functioned well with few exceptions. Gaitronics was used as a backup for radios for the repair teams. When one Gaitronics telephone was contaminated a plant telephone was used effectively i
for communications. Habitability of the OSC was monitored by a Health physics (HP) technician. Two frisker stations were attended
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to by HP technicians throughout the exercise, who monitored the frisking technique of all personnel as they frisked. The inspector
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i did not observe any individuals passing through these frisking stations who did not frisk themselves properly or avoid the frisking t
station entirely.
Radiological controls for emergency repair teams consisted of a review of known radiation levels in the area, routing to avoid any high radiation levels, and the issuance of thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLD's) and PIC's. Actual exposure levels obtained were
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record (d and monitored in the Health Physics Access Control (HPAC).
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Adequate Recovery planning by the OSC Coordinator and his key support staff included the time, personnel,
'd equipment required te clean up, repair and replace equipment as needed.
d.
Health Physics Access Control (HPAC)
The key emergency personnel in the HPAC, consisted of the Radiation Control Coordinator (RCC), the Communicator, the Status Board Keeper (SBK), and the individual assigned to input radiation exposure reading for emergency teams entering and leaving the Radiation Control Area (RCA). All performed their emergency function well and efficiently. The SBK and the Communicator especially did a very good job. The status board was kept current despite background noise and personnel in the work area.
Besides contacting other areas by telephone, the Communicator kept a clear and concise log which would help to reconstruct any phase of the emergency where the OSC was involved.
The inspector accompanied one emergency repair team which was sent to repair the Auxiliary Building Missile Door. The team demonstrated good knowledge as to how to proceed with the proper tools. They correctly answered questions from the Controller relating to their assignment.
They communicated back to the OSC and reported their position and that radiation levels were still background. Also one team member, on request from the Controller, properly donned and removed properly a Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus.
A frisker station was established and used by all persons entering the HPAC. A security officer present reminded those entering of this requirement. A new state-of-the-art portal radiation monitor was required for use by all teams or observers returning to the HPAC. A map on a' wall in the HPAC depicting various plant areas had radiation levels marked for each area as an additional guide for the RCC to consider for radiation exposure control.
e.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
The EOF was declared operational in a timely manner. Takeover of command and control by the Recovery Manager (RM) from the Interim Recovery Manager (IRM) included a good briefing of plant condiitons by the IRM.
The General Emergency was declared based on a loss of all three fission barriers, EAL Group 1, Condition F, followed by notifications to State, local agencies, and the NRC within the required times. The initial PAR was for evacuation in a five mile radius and ten miles downward in Sectors E, F, G, and H based on a release projected for eight hours. This PAR was appropriate based on current plant and offsite information. When recovery actions were planned following the four hour time advance, discussions included the need for a new PAR to permit people to return to their home. Recovery plans were well conducted with input from both the TSC and the E0F in several key areas.
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Good communications were demonstrated between the E0F and the TSC and within the EOF. Meaningful exchanges of infonnation with vendors and other supply-related firms were made by the Technical Engineering Assessment group in seeking advice and equipment relating to recovery activities. The Re.covery Manager often left the main EOF room to go to the Dose Assessment room or the room where the public information staff was located without notifying his staff. When questioned, he responded that his immediate subordinates knew where he was and he could return within less than five minutes. Press releases were discussed with the RM before being issued.
Plant status briefings and general exchanges of information between the RM and his support staff were well done.
The RM made good ust: of his support staff by asking them specific questions when warranted.
Trending of key reactor parameters was well done by the supporting EOF staff. The graphs developed were used periodically by the support managers and the RM. An overhead projector was used which helped make the chronology of key events more visually available to the EOF staff. However, log keeping as observed in the Dose Assessment Coordinator's log in the dose assessment room should have been more detailed and included more entries.
Intermediate recovery efforts for the short tenn (one week to a month) were not adequately addressed in the EOF recovery discussions. Short tenn efforts considered should have included defining the plume, action to get residents back to their homes, what areas or terrain to be decontaminated and what contamination levels would be considered acceptable within the EPZ. Public information staff could have been used to better convey information tc the public as well as those living in the EPZ. Recovery actions plant.ed as a result of the ingestion exposure pathway and icng term dose assassment were discussed the previous day as part of a mini-drill involving the licensee and the State of Missouri. Both the licensee and State representatives considered related recovery actions that were previously discussed in the mini-drill. The mini-drill should have been incorporated into the exercise and used appropriate sample data to maintah the scenario timeline, while having sarnples collected and analyzed in parallel with the exercise.
The person who surveyed the contaminated field team member should
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have worn protective clothing. Hands, face, head and arms were found to be contaminated. Nasal smears were not considered. The person surveying said he would have sent the team member to the whole body counter anyway.
The EOF dose assessment team worked closely with their State counterparts in making PARS and during recovery discussions.
The recovery' discussion held in the dose assessment room concerning intermediate (first week / month) dose assessment could have included legal aspects, details on interfacing with the licensee, public information personnel and the extent of offsite terrain
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decontamination efforts. The offsite field team dispatcher appeared to have good control of the teams and their locations which were posted on an EPZ map. Plant conditions and reminders to check dosimetry were forwarded to them on a fairly regular basis. The final downgrading of the emergency from a General Emergency to an Alert was based on an EAL regarding a very high coolant activity sample or 1% fuel failure in 30 minutes or 5% total fuel failure.
By then, containment had been secured by closing the containment hatch door, and radiation levels in the environment had decreased to an acceptable level. Justification for downgrading was warranted.
f.
Exercise Scenario and Control The exercise scenario, which at times was not overly challenging, did contain sufficient emergency conditions to test the knowledge and skills of the emergency response staff. There was a total of 11 mini scenario timelines which did not always blend into the main scenario timelines, but did increase involvement by several two-person emergency teams. One of these mini drills was an ingestion pathway drill which was conducted the day before the exercise date to accommodate the State of Missouri.
Anticipated player actions could have been included in the scenario package to assist the controllers in evaluating the players. The scenario had several realistic activities where actual plant problems had been encountered, e.g., the containment hatch. This made the emergency more meaningful. Overall, the scenario was satisfactory and developing events led to emergency responses by the licensee which met their ten objectives. Having a participant play the part of an NRC representative in the E0F and TSC was beneficial.
6.
Exit Interview The inspection team held an exit interview the day after the exercise on July 31, 1986 with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC team leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspectors also discussed the content of the report to determine if the licensee thought that any of the informatior was proprietary. The licensee responded that none of the information should be proprietary.
Attachment:
Callaway Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Sunknary
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CALLAWAY PLANT FIELD EXERCISE JULY 30, 1986 The overall objective of the Field Exercise is to demonstrate the level of emergency preparedness which exists for the Callaway Plant. The Field Exercise will demonstrate the following objectives:
The adequacy of the. Radiological Emergency Response Plan and appropriate Implementing Procedures for Callaway Plant, State of Missouri, and the Counties of Callaway, Osage, Montgomery and Gasconade.
That the response organizations understand the Emergency Action Levels and their appropriate responsibilities.
The adequacy of communication systems among emergency response organizations and personnel.
The availability of emergency supplies and equipment.
The capabilities of on-site and off-site radiological assessment and monitoring.
The ability to activate the Public Alert System in a timely manner.
The capabilities of off-site emergency medical support agencies.
ONSITE OBJECTIVES The following specific objectives will be demonstrated:
1)
Classification a) The ability of the Emergency Coordinator (s) and Recovery Manager (s), with the support of their staff, to classify and reclassify emergencies per EIP-ZZ-00101, Classification of Emergencies.
2)
Mobilization a) The ability to alert and mobilize the On Shift Emergency Organization per EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions.
b) The ability to alert and mobilize the On-Site Emergency
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Organization per EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions.
c) The ability to alert and mobilize the Interim EOF Emergency Organization per EIP-ZZ-00502, Callout of Interim EOF Emergency Organization.
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d) The ability to alert and mobilize the Corporate Emergency Organization per EIP-ZZ-C0020, Callout of the Corporate Emergency Organization.
3)
Emergency Response Facilities a) The ability to activate and operate the Technical Support Center per EIP-ZZ-00240, Technical Support Center Operation, b) The ability to activate and operate the Operational Support Center per EIP-ZZ-00241, Operational Support Center Operation.
c) The ability to activate and operate the Emergency Operations Facility per EIP-ZZ-C0010, Duties of the Corporate Emergency Organization.
d) The functional adequacy of the TSC, OSC, and EOF.
4)
Communications a) The ability of communicators to perform notifications per EIP-ZZ-00201, Notifications.
b) The adequacy, operability and effective use of the following communications equipment; Dedicated Phone Lines l
Emergency Notification System Notification and Coordination Line Gai-Tronics Normal Telephones Radio c) The ability to transfer communications from the Control Room to the Technical Support Center to the Emergency Operations Facility.
d) The adequacy of communications with Field Monitoring Teams.
5)
Direction and Control a) The ability of the Emergency Coordinator to implement appropriate actions per EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions.
b) The transfer of command from the On Shift Emergency Organization to the On-Site Emergency Organization to the Corporate Emergency Organization.
c) The ability of the Emergency Coordinator to maintain direction and control of the onsite emergency response, d) The ability of the Recovery Manager to maintain overall direction and control of Union Electric's emergency response.
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The ability to obtain additional support per EIP-ZZ-00203, Additional Support.
f) The ability to interface with simulated NRC personnel.
6)
Accident Assessment a) The ability of the Control Room personnel to effectively determine accident conditions, and to properly control the plant.
b) The use of the SPDS in determining plant conditions.
(SPDS displays live data. Plant parameters for the drill will be given in messages or from the simulator.)
c) The use of the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) to obtain plant status per EIP-ZZ-00215, Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS displays live data.
Drill conditions will be given in messages or from the simulator).
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d) The ability to form, brief and dispatch Emergency Repair Teams, per EIP-ZZ-00220, Emergency Team Formation.
e) The ability of the Engineering staff in the TSC and EOF to formulate corrective actions to mitigate the consequences of the accident.
f) The ability to perform core damage analysis per EDP-ZZ-00005, Mitigating Core Damage.
7)
Radiological Assessment and Controls a) The ability to establish contamination controls in Emergency Response Facilities per EIP-ZZ-00210, Radiological Controls During Emergencies; EIP-ZZ-00241, OSC Operations; EIP-ZZ-00240, TSC Operations; EIP-ZZ-C0010, EOF Operations.
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b) The ability to collect and analyze radiological samples l
(elevated and low activities), including radioiodine, within the plant and plant site.
c) The ability to perform dose rate surveys within the plant and plant site.
d) The ability to utilize the Post Accident Sampling System and analyze the results.
e) The ability to control the radiological exposure of emergency teams by b'riefing, debriefing, and providing proper Health Physics support.
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f) The mechanism for approving and documenting overexposure for emergency workers per EIP-ZZ-00210, Radiological Control During Emergencie3 g) The ability to collect and analyze plant effluent samples under accident conditions, h) The proper use of RWP's during an emergency.
1) The ability to supply adequate respiratory protection to emergency workers.
j) The ability to supply adequate dosimetry to emergency workers, k) The ability to determine and monitor the habitability of the Emergency Response Facilities.
1) The ability to evaluate the radiological conditions of assembly areas per EIP-ZZ-00210, Radiological Controls During
Emergencies.
m) The utilization of the alternate counting facility and lab in the E0F.
n) The ability to determine the need for, and properly document the administration of Potassium Iodide per EIP-ZZ-00216, Potassium Iodide Administration, o) The capabilities of the Field Monitoring Teams in locating the plume and obtaining required samples, surveys and analysis (including water, vegetation, milk, etc. as appropriate)
per EIP-ZZ-00223, Field Monitoring.
p) The adequacy of the decontamination facility at the EOF.
q) The ability to perform internal dosimetry.
8)
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations a) The ability to perform dose assessment in a timely manner with Radioactive Release Information System (RRIS) or per EIP-ZZ-01211, Initial and Intermediate Dose Assessment.
b) The ability of the TSC and EOF Dose Assessment personnel to effectively direct and coordinate Field Monitoring Teams per EIP-ZZ-00211, Field Monitoring Direction and Assessment.
c) The ability of the EOF personnel to coordinate field monitoring and dose assessment activities with the State.
d) The ability to formulate Ingestion and Plume Exposure Pathway protective action recommendations in a timely manner, per EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations.
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e) The ability to perform dose assessment based upon field data per EIP-ZZ-00211, Field Monitoring Direction and Assessment.
f) The ability to determine / calculate cumulative plume exposures per EIP-ZZ-002211, Long Term Dose Assessment.
g) The ability to determine the stability class utilizing data from the. National Weather Service, per EIP-ZZ-01213, Contingency Methed of Stability Class Determination, h) The ability to determine projected doses based upon isotopic analysis per EIP-ZZ-01211, Initial and Intermediate Dose Assessment.
9)
Protective Actions a) The ability to form and dispatch the Medical Emergency Response Team and to properly handle, transport and care for a contaminated injured person per EIP-ZZ-00224, Injury or Illness Procedure for the Callaway Plant.
b) The ability to obtain advice from Radiation Management Corpor-ation (RMC) for handling internally or externally contaminated individuals.
c) The ability to assemble personnel in designated Assembly Areas and perform accountability in a timely manner per EIP-ZZ-00230, Assembly and Evacuation.
d) The ability to maintain accountability.
10) Recovery and Reentry a) The ability to determine reentry requirements to evacuated portions of the plant per EIP-ZZ-00225, Reentry.
b) The ability to recommend the relaxation of protective action recommend 4tions in the EPZ to allow the public to return to their homes.
c) The ability to downgrade the emergency.
d) The ability to form an effective Recovery Organization per EIP-ZZ-00260, Recovery.
e) The ability to summarize the recovery activities needed to restore the plant to a safe condition, based upon current and projected conditions per EIP-ZZ-00260, Recovery.
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i FIELD EXERCISE NARRATIVE SUMMARY This scenario is based.upon a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
A large leak in the Reactor Coolant System is combined with extensive fuel damage and a breech of containment integrity through the personnel hatch.
The loss of all three fission product barriers results in a significant release of radioactive materials to the environment.
The initial conditions include a small unidentified leak in the RCS and work being performed on the fuel pool skimmer filter and an associated valve.
Equipment inoperable or tagged out for maintenance includes containment spray pump B, an Auxiliary Building exterior door, the Aux / Fuel Building normal exhaust filter absorber unit and the back-up meteorological tower near the EOF.
An unidentified reactor coolant leak has been detected and in progress
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for some time. This is the initiating event for the Unusual Event Classification.
A containment entry team is made up of a Health Physics technician and an Operating Supervisor.
The general area of the leak is identified but to find.the exact problem and to repair it would require entry beyond the biological shield and insulation to be removed.
While the team is in containment the leak increases.
In their haste to exit containment, the team becomes trapped within the containment hatch.
A team censisting of two maintenance mechanics and a Fadcaste Technician is replacing the fuel pool ski =ser filter and repacking an associated valve.
One of the cachanics slips and falls in a wet, contaminated area, breaking his leg.
The other team members provide assistance and call for the Medical Emergency Pesponse Team (MERT) to be dispatched to provide first aid and further assistance.
The injured man is transported to the Callaway C.amunity Hospital by ambulance for treatm.ent.
The leak rate increases to greater than 50 gallons per minute which is the initiating event for declaration of an Alert.
Conditions further degrade. The leak rate increases to greater than charging pump capacity.
The Control Room receives a RCP vibration alert alarm verified at 16 mils and trending upwards.
The reactor is tripped.
A Site Emergency is declared. The leak rate continues to increase.
In the effort to free the containment entry team f rom the personnel hatch, the inside door becomes j ammed partially open and the interlock system.is disabled allowing the outer door to open.
The two men have become internally contaminated due to inhalation of airborne
.
contamination.
4-1 Drill 86-3 6/06/86 E
-
.
During the transient extensive fuel danage is experienced.
Radiation levels within containcent and outside the containment hatch show a significant increase indicating extensive fuel damage.
Loss of the third fission product barrier causes a Ceneral Emergncy to be declared.
The Aux building ventilaticin is being previded by the emergency exhaust system, vnich must remain on to prevent an unmonitored, unfiltered release through the open door.
The release is filtered so it consists mainly of noble gases.
As time progresses the humid air causes the high efficiency particulate filter pre-heaters to fail.
Filtering capability is reduced and the release rate increases.
Repair tears are eventus11y able to access the containment hatch to cc.?plete the repairs to close the doors.
The release is t e rminated.
Plant conditions stabilize and the emergency is devngraded.
Reentry and Recovery is initiated.
The Field Exercise is completed.
.
4-2 Drill 86-3 6/03/86
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