IR 05000456/1989032
| ML20011F475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1990 |
| From: | Beverly Clayton NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011F474 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-89-32, 50-457-89-30, NUDOCS 9003060090 | |
| Download: ML20011F475 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION'III e
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Reports No. 50-456/89032(DRP);50-457/89030(DRP)
J Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77-
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post Office Box 767
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Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At:
Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illinois Inspection Conducted: December 17, 1989 through January 31, 1990
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Inspectors:
T.'M. Tongue T. E.-Taylor
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D. Calhoun
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Approved By:
rent Clay on, Chief ez////,94
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Reactor Projects Section IA Dste
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. Inspection Summary
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Inspection from December 17, 1989 through January 31, 1990 (Reports No.
50-456/89032(DRP); 50-457/89030(DRP))
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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident i
. inspectors and one project inspector of licensee action on previously identified' items; licensee event report review; regional request; follow-up
on temporary instructions; cold weather preparations; enforcement discretion
- Braidwood Unit 2 refueling water storage tank vent temperature requirement;
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i operational safety verification; monthly maintenance observation; nonthly
. surveillance observation; new fuel receipt and storage; self-assessment -
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. quality-assurance activities; training effectiveness;~ report review; and events.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Although still acceptable, material condition and housekeeping are areas of concern. New
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efforts to-improve these areas are in the new discrepancy identification and
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computerized tracking system, the use of color coded Nuclear Work Requests-(NWRs) identification tagging system for backlog reduction, and formation of a -special task force for prompt correction of leaks. The effectiveness of these efforts will be monitored during future inspections.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
T. J. Maiman, Vice President, PWR Operations
- R. E. Querio, Station Manager-t
- D. E. O'Brien, Technical Superintendent
- K. L. Kofron, Production Superintendent
- S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator G. R. Masters, Assistant Superintendent - Operations
- G. E. Groth, Braidwood Project Manager, PWR Projects Department
- R. J. Legner, Services Director
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- M. E. Lohman, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance P. Smith, Operating Engineer - Unit 1 R. Yungk, Operating Engineer - Unit 2
- W. B. McCue, Operating Engineer - Unit 0
- R.' D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- D. J. Miller,. Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- D. E.-Cooper, Technical Staff Supervisor A. D' Antonio, Quality Control Supervisor
- A. Checca, Secur.ity Administrator
- R. L. Byers, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning and Startup
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- L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety Supervisor W. McGee, Training Supervisor
.P. Maher, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- J. Kuchenbecker, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- D. Elias, Projects Manager
- E. W. Carroll, Regulatory Assurance P. Holland, Regulatory Assurance J. Smith, Master, Electrical Maintenance
- T. W.- Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance
- V. Bean, Mechanical Maintenance Chief Steward i
- B. Gill, Stores Steward
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- R. Givens, Clerical Steward
- R. Mertogul, Operations Staff
- J. Matthews, Technical Staff
- D. Malone, Chief Steward, Clerical
- R. Vignocchi, Chief Steward, Physical
- T. C. Meyer, Housekeeping / Material Condition Coordinator
- A. R. Haeger, Operations Staff
- R. J. Cozzi, Offsite Review
- M. L. Alonso, Administrative Union Representative
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on February 1, 1990, and at other times throughout the inspection period.
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs, reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical, mechanical and instrument maintenance personnel, and contract security personnel.
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E.
E 2.-
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702]
a.
(Closed) Res >onse to Recomendations Augmented Inspection Team f
Report 50-453/89014(DRP); 50-457/89014(DRP).
The following is
the licensee's response to each of the recommendations:
i Recomendation A
In order to alleviate conditions that could result in inattentivenessoftheradiationprotectiontechnicians(RPTs)
at the 401' level, control station at the auxiliary building to
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turbine building access, the licensee has moved the monitoring c
station into the auxiliary building from the turbine building.
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In addition, they are evaluating: proposals to move the whole
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body contamination monitors into the auxiliary building. The RPTs have also been given instructions to request relief should conditions exist that could lead to inattentiveness.
s Recomendation B
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The licensee has developed and distributed a Vice President's Instruction, No.1-0-26 " Attentiveness on Duty, to all CECO employees, dated July 24, 1989, for gaining access to nuclear station property. This instruction referenced the existing
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" Conduct of Operations," Directive N00-0P-1, and expanded the requirements to all personnel.
It also addressed off duty periods and areas and was made part of the Fitness for Duty Program. This is being developed into a-station policy.
Recommendation C
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The licensee comitted to periodic refresher training covering attention to duty, methods to prevent sleeping on the job, and the Ceco policy on sleeping onsite. This will be part of the 1990 training program.
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Recomendation D
As in Recomendation B above, the Vice President's Instruction was made applicable to all persons reporting to and gaining access to a nuclear station's property.
In addition, the licensee comitted to have the Station Manager
discuss this through his addresses to station departments and it was a subject presented to all incumbent supervisors and mana0ement personnel.
J This matter is considered closed.
b.
Open Items (Closed) 456/86065-01:
Need for on auxiliary feedwater pump (AFW) performing periodic discharge test diesel starting batteries to
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evaluate their capacity. On November 3 and 14 1989 -the Unit 1 AFW >11esel starting batteries were tested with, satisfactory results.
- The l' nit 2 batteries will be tested during the refuel outage scheouled to start in March of 1990. The inspector's concern was that-the nickel. cadmium batteries were not scleduled for performance test 1o assure battery capacity and dependability. The AFW system is an ESF system, which must perform when called upon.
The tests perforaed satisfy the inspectors concern. This item is considered closed.
(Closec) 456/87014-01; 457/87014-01:
NRC inspector concern that safety elated commercial grade items are being reordered based solely on a part number. Through review of licensee procedures and discuss,ons with licensee personnel, the inspector has determined that conmercial grade items are not reordered based solely on a part number. The licensee is implementing a program based on NCIG-07,
" Guidelines for the Utilization of Connercial Grade Items in Nuclear Safety-Rtlated Applications," which uses critical characteristics (e.g.,partnumber, material, design,andpartapplication).to specify requirements for component order and reorder. The critical character <stics are incorporated into the receipt inspection process. During receipt inspection, the critical characteristics are verified for all items procured commercial grade for safety-related use. This item is considered closed.
(0 pen) 456/38029-01(DRP); 457/88029-01(DRP): The control room ventilation continues to have high differential pressures (DP)
as noted by difficulty in opening and closing doors. This has also caused 11gh air flow around the door creating a noise disturbance to operations personnel in the control room. The high-DP has created numerous door alarms to security personnel when the-
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In addition, during a recest NRC inspection, an NRC inspector escaped possible injury to her hand when the control room door dosed suddenly mie to the high DP.
This matter remains of concern to the NRC and it N.
noted that coriective action has not been timely. Discussions with the system engineers revealed that'the station has requested assistance from corporate engineering, Sargent & Lundy (Architectural Engineers), and is now in the process of seeking assistance'from a special ventilation engineering consultant. The concern has now gone beyond that expressed originally in that it has affected the activities of oparations personnel, security personnel and now poses a potentia 1 0SHA problem. This item will remain open.
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Unresolved Item (Closed) 456/8901E-01; 457/89015-01:
Deficient Logkeeping in the Control Room.
For the past several months the resident inspectors have been concerned with the quality of the control room logs. To improve control rocm logs the licensee has:
re-emphasized to shift
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logkeeping; made a stamp displaying unit status for use to ensure consistent logging of major running equipment, and an operator aid is also available to assist operators in developing acceptable logkeeping techniques. The licensee efforts to improve control room logs has improved the quality of control room logs..At the present time the inspectors have determined the logs to be adequate.
This issue is considered closed.
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d.
Violation
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(Closed) 457/89009-01: Failure to perform ~ proper technical review and subsequent 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation. Corrective action for this violation was to revise procedure BwAP 330-2, " Temporary Alterations." The procedure was revised to include an independent engineering review for proposed Temporary Alterations on systems or components involving Engineered Safety Features (ESF), Reactor l
Protection, and other systems that could impact ESF actuations.
L The cause of this violation was a fa11ure to perform an adequate technical review for an approved Temporary Alteration. The licensee's corrective action appears adequate to. help prevent a recurrence. This issue is considered closed.
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No violations or deviatic,ns were identified.
3.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective
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action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in-accordance with Technical Specifications _(TS):
a.
(Closed) 456/89002-LL and L1: Reactor Trip Safety Injection (SI)
ind Main Steam (MS) Isolation During Plant Heatup Due to Management l.
Deficiency. At 2:50 p.m., on April 16, 1989, a plant heatup was
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being monitored using a graph display on a control room monitor. ' At 4:01 p.m., the Nuclear Station Operator (NS0) attempted to repair a failed recorder. At 4:40 p.m., a MS low pressure reactor trip, SI,
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and MS isolation occurred due to reactor coolant system pressure
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being above 1930 (P-11) psig and MS pressure less than 640 psig.
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At 4:46 p.m., the SI signal was reset. At 4:40 p.m., SI flow was
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terminated. The cause of this event was a personnel error by shift management and the unit NSO. A formal policy on the use of the
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extra NSO during startup and heatup operations has been developed.
L The plant heatup procedure has been revised to add a hold point to verify that all steam generator pressures are greater than 640 psig
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before reactor coolant system pressure exceeds P-11.
l For this event a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued in NRC Inspection Report 50-456/89009(DRP);50-457/89009(DRP). Evaluation
L of the-licensee's corrective actions for this event will be tracked l
by the NOV closure.
This LER is considered closed.
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(Closed) 457/89005-LL: Failure to Consider ESF Dus Outage Effects a
on opposite Unit Due to Procedural Deficiency. At 4:38 p.m., on
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Octo>er 2,1989, a Unit I safety-related bus was removed from service. TheUnitIandUnit0TechnicalSpecification(TS) action statements were entered. The TS review did not consider the impact on Unit 2.
The bus was part of the AC power sources requirement for Unit 2.
The action statement provided for the bus to be inoperable
- for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This provision specified that operability of the remaining sources be verified by performing a surveillance, which consists of breaker alignment and bus voltage verification within one hour.and every eight hours thereafter. At 8:53 p.m., a supervisor discovered that the action statement had not been entered for Unit 2 when the Unit 1 bus was removed from. service. At 9:10 p.u., the requirements of the action statement were completed with i
acceptable-results. This exceeded the "within one hour" frequency by 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 32 minutes.
The cause of this event was a personnel error. The out-of-service procedure was structured in a unit
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specific format. This created a mind set that did not key the
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reviewer to consider the impact on the opposite unit. The o
out-of-service procedure will be revised to include a check-off block for TS applicability on the opposite unit. This event is not indicative of a progrannatic breakdown of the surveillance program.
The licensee's program for regularly scheduled surveillances is operating satisfactorily. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) 456/89012-LL: ContainmentVentilationIsolation(CVI)and
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- Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Fan Auto Start on Momentary Loss of
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Power to Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS) Due to Personnel Error.
At approximately 5:22 a.m., on October 16, 1989, a non-licensed
operator (EA) was removing a 120 volt AC circuit from service.
The switch was located in a distribution panel. While attaching-a card to switch 6, the EA' inadvertently bumped switch 4 to the off position. Switch 4 was the power supply for two ARMS One of the-ARMS monitored the.FHB and one monitored Unit I cont.anment. The
momentary loss of power to the FHB ARM caused a FHB charcoal booster l
fan to auto start and exhaust through the charcoal adsorbers. The
loss of power-to the containment ARM initiated a Train A containment i
ventilation isolation signal. The Train A isolation valves closed
and the mini flow purge supply and exhaust fans tripped. The EA immediately returned switch 4 to the on position. The root cause of this event was personnel error. A contributing cause to the event was the narrow switch spacing of the distribution panel.. The FHD fan was secured and the containment isolation signal was reset.
Corrective actions for the event included: discussions with operating personnel during training tailgate sessions; and toggle L
switch locking devices. The inspector has no further concerns.
l This LER is considered closed.
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(Closed) 456/89014-LL:
Inadvertent Safety Injection (SI) Signal l
with Heactor Defueled Due to Personal Error. On October 30, 1989,
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contractor personnel were installing card holders on lever-type switches in the main control room. At 11:05 a.m., a lever was removed from a switch and placed on the control panel near the
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pressurizer low pressure SI block / reset switch for Train B.
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11:07 a.m., the Train B prest,urizer low pressure SI logic circuit reset and Train B SI occurred.
The IB diesel generator started, the auxiliary building ventilation realigned, and a charging pump suction valve to-the RWST opened. All other SI components were
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removed from service and did not actuate. The SI initiated i
actuation signals for FHB ventilation, containment phase A isolation, containment ventilation, control room ventilation, and feedwater isolation.. The root cause of this event was personnel.
error.
It is believed that the contracted electrician inadvertently bumped the SI block / reset switch while reaching for the lever handle that was' laying on the control board by the block / reset switch.
The automatic functions were verified.upon receipt of the actuation.
The equipment was returned to its original status.
This event was discussed with contracted electricians. A method will be devised to
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block protective functions not required during cold shutdown and-l refueling modes.. The inspector has no further concerns with this event. This LER is-considered closed, l
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(Closed) 456/89016-LL: Residual Heat Removal Pump Suction Relief Valve Premature Actuation and Failure to Reseat Due to Deficient Work Practices and Personnel Error. This event was reviewed and evaluated by an Augmented Inspection Team.
The staff's concerns and
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findings are. documented in NRC Inspection Report 456/89030. This LER is considered closed.
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(Closed) 456/89017-LL: Control Room Ventilation Actuations Due to Failed Radiation Detector. On December 6 1989, the gas detector
. channel of process radiation monitor (PR),OPR 31J control room outside air intake A, experienced a spike that resulted in an alert alarm on the monitor. During the next several days several alert alarms were received. On December 10, 1989, a spike on the channel resulted in a hi ventilation (VC)gh radiation alarm, which caused a control room actuation for the OA train of VC. After-l-
maintenance troubleshooting it-was believed the spikes-were due L
to a faulty high voltage connector which was replaced. At 6:49 I
a.m., on December 21, 1989, a spike on the channel again resulted
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in the high radiation alarm, which caused a VC actuation for the 0A VC train. At 6:40 p.m., a spike on the' channel resulted in
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troubleshooting, it was discovered that the detector had failed. A l
new detector was installed and calibrated. The licensee is trending L
discrepancies with radiation monitoring components. Root cause of
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this event was the failed detector. The inspectors are continuing their monitoring of the licensee's trending of radiation monitoring equipment discrepancies. The inspectors have no further concerns with this event.
This LER is considered closed.
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(Closed) 456/89018-LL: ContainmentVentilationIsolation(CVI)
Signal Due to surveillance Procedure Deficiency. Surveillance IBwVS 3.3.1-2, " Monthly Digital Channel Operational Test of Area Radiation Monitors IRT-AR011 and 1RT-AR012," was in progress.
The procedure required a lead to be lifted, contacts verified open or closed o
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severaltimesusingaVolt-0hmMeter(V0M),andtheleadlanded.
At 1:18 p.m., on December 15, 1989, as the lead was being landed, the containment building fuel handling incident area radiation monitor 1RT-AR011 went into alert alarm and interlock actuation.
The interlock function of monitor 1RT-AR011 initiated a Train A
CVI signal.
No components were repositioned as the associated containment isolation valves were already closed.
The root cause of this event was a deficient procedure. The procedure failed to
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direct removal of the-V0M prior to landing the lead. This allowed a spike to occur as the lead was landed. The containment isolation signal was reset following verification that it was due to the performance of the surveillance.
IBwVX 3.3.1-2 was revised to include a ste) for removal of the V0M prior to landing the lead.
The other tec1nical staff radiation monitor surveillance procedures that have a potential for an Engineered Safety Feature actuation are being reviewed to ensure that 'the same deficiency does not exist.
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The. inspector has no further questions concerning this event. This L
LER is considered closed.
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In addition to the foregoing, the inspector reviewed the licensee's
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Deviation Reports (DVRs) generated during the inspection period. This
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was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, potential trends, etc. DVRs were also reviewed for proper initiation and disposition as required by the applicable procedures and the QA manual.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Regional Request (92701)
Per regional request, the resident inspectors performed NRC Inspection Procedure 71714, " Cold Weather Preparations," to evaluate the licensee's preparations for cold weather conditions. Refer to Paragraph 6. of this report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
P 5.
Follow-up on Temporary Instructions (TI) (255101, 255104, 92701)
a.
(Closed) TI 2515/101 - Loss of Decay Heat Removal: This subject was reviewed and found acceptable during a previous inspection period (reference inspection report 456/89022(DRP);457/89022(DRP)).
This additional information is provided for clarification on the licensee's response to Generic Letter (GL) 88-17, " Loss of Decay Heat Removal":
(1) Training The inspectors verified that the licensee had provided training to all operators on the Diablo Canyon event during the first cycle of Operator Requalification training.
In addition, Technical Specification, procedural, and administrative changes were covered during training.
The licensee plans to repeat the training on the Diablo Canyon event prior to each outage involving mid-loop operation.
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(2) Containment Closure
The licensee has revised the applicable procedures and initiated administrative controls to assure that containment closure is achieved prior to core uncovering as a result of a loss of residual heat removal (RHR) cooling.
(3) Temperature Indication The licensee has taken the appropriate administrative and procedural steps to ensure that two trains of core exit thermocouples will be available during mid-loop _ operation while the reactor vessel head is on the vessel.
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(4) Reactor. Coolant System (RCS) Water Level Indication
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The licensee through adequate procedural revisions has provided_
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additional assurance water level will be continuously monitored by the Tygon Tube Level Indication System when the RCS is in a reduced inventory condition.
(5) RCS Perturbations The licensee has implemented procedures and administrative.
controls to prevent operations or activities that could lead to RCS perturbations unless these activities have been reviewed and approved by the Operating Engineer. The licensee has taken additional measures to ensure that there is no effect on the stability of the RCS, by performing a final review of work-activity before it is initiated.
(6) RCS Inventory The licensee has implemented procedural requirements to ensure two independent means exist, a centrifugal charging pump and gravity feed from the refueling water storage tank,' for adding inventory to the RCS.
i-(7) Hot Leg Flow Paths The licensee has made procedural revisions to establish a hot l
leg vent path prior to entering a reduced inventory condition.
(8) Loop Stop Valves The licensee has implemented procedural requirements to ensure that if all hot legs are blocked simultaneously by closed stop
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valves, that a hot leg vent path will be available to prevent pressurization.
OperatingProcedures(ops),GeneralProcedures(gps), Abnormal Procedures (OAs), Emergency Procedures (EPs), and Administrative Procedures (APs) applicable to this topic were reviewed.
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k More recently, by letter dated January 22, 1990, the licensee I
described an RHR system iconic display for the control room monitors for. Byron and Braidwood. This display has been added to the Byron Unit 1 Process Computer and shows a mimic component / system with bar i
graphs-and valves of pertinent related parameters.
The licensee committed in that letter to hare the same software.
display installed on both units at Braidwooj by January 15, 1991.
l TI 2515/101 is considered closed,
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b.
_(Closed)TI 2515/104 - Fitness-For-Duty (FFD):
Inspection of Initial l
Training Program
As directed by TI 2515/104 an inspection'of the licensee's initial training for its FFD program was performed by the resident inspector. The licensee's initial training program was completed
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prior to the inspection. The resident inspector attended a licensee video training session given to contractors for general employee and escort FFD training.' These videos will be used for FFD training for new employees contractors and licensee personnel. The licensee also provided written material which outlined the information given during the initial FFD training sessions for licensee personnel in the area of general employee, escorts, and supervisory personnel.
Inspection requirements and inspection results of areas outlined in the TI are as follows:
(1) 5.01 Policy Awareness Training
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(a) Training Guidelines 1.
Licensee policy and procedures, including the methods
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that will be used to implement the policy.
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The personal and aublic health and safety hazards
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associated with asuse'of drugs and misuse of alcohol.
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The effect of prescription drugs, over-the-counter
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drugs and dietary conditions on job performance and chemical test results, and the role of the Medical Review Officer.
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Employee assistance programs provided by the
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licensee.
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What is expected of employees and what consecuences
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may result from lack of adherence to the policy.
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Inspection Results The inspector's review determined the licensee's training to be adequate for policy awareness '"ining.
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!(2) 5.02 FFD Training for Supervisors
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(a): Training Guideline
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Their role and responsibilities in implementing the
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The roles and responsibilities of others,-such as.the l
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personnel, medical, and employee assistance program j
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staffs.
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Techniques for recognizing drugs and indications of
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the use, sale, or possession of drugs.
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Behavioral observation techniques for detecting
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-degradation in performance, impairment, or changes in-employee behavior.
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Procedures for initiating appropriate corrective
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action, including referral to the Employee Assistance
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Program.
(b) Inspection Results The inspectors review of the licensee's initial training i
program for this area identified that Items (1) and (2) of
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the TI for Section 5.02 were adequately addressed; Item (3) addresses techniques for recognizing drugs and indications of-the use, sale, or possession of drugs - the licensee program training only addressed the recogni_ tion of various. drugs, physical characteristics, and behavioral characteristics of persons.using-drugs.
Indications of sale or possession were not casored.
Item (4) addressed behavioral observation techniques for detecti,
degradation in performance, impairment, or changes in
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em)loyee behavior. The training given addressed types of belavioral patterns to expect from use of various drugs,.
q observation techniques were not' discussed.
Item (5)
addresses procedures; however, at the time of the initial training the procedures were not available. Subsequent to
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the initial training the procedures have been approved and
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(3) 5.03 FFD Escort Training b
(a) Training Guidelines 1.
Techniques for recognizing drugs and indications of the use, sale, or possession of drugs.
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Techniques for recognizing aberrant behavior.
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The procedures for reporting problems to supervisory or security personnel.
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o (b) Inspection Results This area has three items which are the same as Items 3,
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4, and 5 of the previous Section 5.02. The comments for
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this area are the same as stated for Section 5.02.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Cold Weather preparations (71714)
DuringthemonthofDecember}censee'sprotectivemeasuresforextreme the resident inspectors performed an
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inspection to evaluate the 1
cold weather conditions. Through discussions with licensee personnel and review of their arnual surveillance, which verifies plant cold weather preparations, the inspectors identified that the licensee's cold weather preparations were adequate and in compliance with NRC Inspection procedure
71714. " Cold Weather Preparations." This issue is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
F 7.
Enforcement Discretion: Braidwood Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank
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IRWST) Vent Temperature Requirement (71707)
By telephone request on December 22, 1989, and follow up letter, l
dated December 23, 1989, the licensee requested that the NRC exercise discretionary enforcement from the requirements of Technical
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Specification (TS) 3/4-5.4 related to the RWST vent temperature, t
On December 22, 1989, at 7:00 p.m., the licensee noted that outside temperaturesandtheUnit2RWSTvgnttem>eraturesweredropping.
If the RWST vent had reached less than 35 F, Tec1nical Specification 3/4-5.4 would have required a reactor shutdown.
The licensee provided appropriate justification and review for issuance of the discretionary enforcement as stated in NRC Region III letter to the licensee, dated December 26, 1989.
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i The resident inspector was involved in the negotiations and monitored the licensee's capability of implementation of the conditions of the request.
It should be noted that the Unit 1 RWST had been previously modified to prevent such an occurrence.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
During the inspection period, the ins)ectors verified that the facility
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was being operated in conformance witi the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation. This
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u s done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of l-activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and l
discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety
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system status and limiting conditions for operation action requirements (LC0ARs), corrective action, and review of facility records.
On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified proper control room staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordination of plant
activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator i
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adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities; j
verified operation as required by Technical Specifications (TS);
including compliance with LC0ARs with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF)andESFelectricalalignmentandvalvepositions; nonitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for operator understanding, off normal condition examined nuclear instrunentation (NI)and corrective actions being taken; o
and other protection channels for
proper operability; reviewed radiation nonitors and stack monitors for l
abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available i
as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the
.l station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent,
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and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)foroperability, t
During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note
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of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities in
progress (maintenance / surveillance),observationofshiftturnovers.
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general safety items, etc.
The specific areas observed were:
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Engineered Safety features (ESF) Systems
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Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to verify:
valve position for proper flow path; proper alignnent of power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper removal of power from components if required by TS or TSAR; and the operability of suoport systems
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essential to system actuation or performance through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication,
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cooling water supply, etc.
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Radiation Protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health p.%ysics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, posting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for t
use, operability, and calibration.
- Security The inspectors, by sampling, verified that persons in the protected area (PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if required; vital areas were kept locked and alarmed, or guards posted if required; and personnel and packages entering the PA received proper search and/or monitoring.
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Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection, protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter and general protection.
Housekeeping and the material condition of the plant remains a concern. Although the overall plant is acceptable, several issues
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were raised by the ins)ectors. Some of these were identified during weekly plant tours wit) senior plant management officials. There is evidence of ongoing cleaning by the neat appearance of major j
walkways in the turbine and auxiliary buildings.
In addition, cleaning personnel were present performing their duties. Several l
out-of-the-way areas were noted as neglected and requiring cleanup,
such as steam tunnels, main steam isolation valve (MSIV) rooms, and
condensate pump rooms. This was pointed out to management personnel l
during the plant tours.
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i In addition, during this inspection period, a new method to identify i
housekeeping and material condition discrepancies was implemented by the licensee.
This consists of self dup 11cator brightly colored tags to identify the discrepancy with a computer generated tracking
list. This is considered a strength; the effectiveness of the system will be monitored during future inspections.
AnewNuclearWorkRequest(NWR)identificationtagwasplacedin service during the inspection period. The 11cer.see started using a
colored tag (blue) for all new NWRs since January 1,1990. This is
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an effort to differentiate between old and new work requests in
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order to reduce the backlog.
This is also considered a strength and it's effectiveness will be monitored during future inspections.
Several years ago, the licensee had established a program whereby
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flexible nylon nesh catch strainers are placed in floor drains
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throughout the plant.
The concept is excellent in that the fine mesh prevents debris from entering and clogging the floor drains.
l During plant tours, the inspectors noted nunerous floor drain strainers with debris present and some with a considerable amount that had apparently not been cleaned in some time. This was pointed out to the licensee and it was later noted that the strainers were being cleaned by cleaning personnel during routine housekeeping.
In addition, the licensee pointed out that there is a yearly program to check and clean these strainers. This will be monitored during future plant tours.
It was also noted by the inspectors that secondary systems on Unit 1
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had developed a considerable number of steam, water, and oil leaks since the refueling startup in December 1989. Through discussions with the licensee, the inspector found that this was a concern with the station as well. The licensee has established a task force of experienced people to pursue and correct leaks promptly which is a concerted effort between operations and maintenance desartments.
Within a month, there was a significant reduction in tie leaks preser.c.
This was especially noteworthy on the number of leaks
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repaired following the Unit I trip on January 12, 1990. This is also a strength and the inspectors will monitor the effectiveness on the operating unit and on Unit 2 during it's upcoming refueling i
outage.
The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, shiftly logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance items, various chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and postings required per 10 CFR 19.11.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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Station maintenance activities affecting the safety--related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they
were conducted in accordance with approved procecces, regulatory guides
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and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical i
Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting i
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to
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service; quality control records were maintained; activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were
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properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to
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determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system t
performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:
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Unit 0 OBVC Chiller oil change and attempt to change temperature switches.
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Unit 1 Bus 112 DC Ground troubleshooting and evaluation.
h DigitalElectro-HydraulicControl(DEHC)troubleshootingand evaluation following the unit trip of January 12, 1990.
18 Steam Generator Steam flow (IFT-523) instrument spiking, troubleshooting, and repair.
1RT-AR012 Fuel Handling Area Radiation Monitor communication problems,, investigation and repair.
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Unit 2 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump low suction trip and engineering evaluation.
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The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and approve 6 work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that operator training was i
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conducted in a reasonable period of time.
j ho violations or deviations were identified.
10. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical i
Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing-
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was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test
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instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation
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were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were
accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and
procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
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individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit I r
Bw0P 10-3, Rev 6, Incore Moveable Detectors, flux mapping
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procedures on December 1, 1989.
Bwls 3.1.1-302, Analog Operational Test and Channel Verification Calibration for Loops IT-0421 and IT-0422 (Delta T and Tave Protection Loop IB, Channel II, Cabinet 2 IPA 02J).
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Unit 2 2BwVS 3.1.2-3, Engineered Safeguards / Reactor Protection Sensor
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Time Response, Bw!S 3.1.1-339, Analog Operational Test and Channel p
Verification / Calibration for Loop (2P-457 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel III Cabinet 3 2PA03J).
Bwls 3.2.1-308, Analog Operational Test and Channel
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Verification / Calibration for Loop 2F-0541, 2F543, and 2P-0545 Steam Generator 20 Steam Flow / Feed Flow Mismatch Channel II Cabinet 2 (2PA02J).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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.g II. NewFuelReceiptandStorage(60501)
During the week of January 22, 1990, the licensee started receiving shipments of new fuel in preparation of the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage. The inspectors monitored portions of the activities and verified that appropriate requirements were met. This involved security controls, protection of the fuel from damage, cleanliness controls, appropriate p
documentation, that shipping containers were properly handled and labeled, that proper radiation protection controls were established and appropriate communications were used. The shipping containers were opened and the new fuel surveyed, inspected, and placed in the new fuel storage vault.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Self-Assessment-OualityAssurance(0A) Activities (40500)
Through discussions with the QA Superintendent during the inspection period, the inspectors were informed of numerous goals and initiations with the Station / Corporate QA organizations. Most of the information discussed was in draft and pre-decisional; however, it represented an aggressive program. The subjects discused were numerous and included; consolidation of duplicated audits, continuation of the extended surveillances, reduction of station reliance on QA to identify discrepancies, auditor field time vs. office time, training and certification of auditors, plus numerous other topics. The program is proactive and could result in a more effective QA organization when all of the goals are achieved.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Training Effectiveness (41400. 41701)
The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities and during the review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during the inspection period. Personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14. Report Review (71707)
I During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's Regulatory Assurance Department Trend / Concern Report, dated December 26, 1989, and the licensee's Monthly Plant Status Reports for November and j
December 1989.
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Institute on Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report.
The Station Manager provided a copy of the INP0 report on the most recent INPO evaluation of Braidwood. The evaluation was conducted in August 1989. The report provided a number of recommendations and strengths and was consistent with the previous verbal discussion provided by the Station Manager.
It was also consistent with NRC observations and findings. There were no unknown issues raised that require NRC follow-up.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Events (93702)
Reactor Trip On January 12, 1990, Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip from full power.
The trip occurred while licensee personnel were attempting to troubleshoot and isolate a DC electrical ground. The troubleshooting and isolation resulted in a runback of the turbine enerator which resulted in a reactor trip on low steam generstor water eyelfollowedbya turbine trip and generator trip. The resident inspectors were onsite at the time and responded to the control room to monitor reactions and stabilization to hot standby (Mode 3). The investigation revealed that the DC ground-test procedure was in error as the step that caused the trip should have been performed only at less than 30% power. This type of event had not occurred in the past. Upon identification of the cause, the licensee conducted some maintenance activities and restarted the unit on January 13, 1990. The licensee's final corrective actions will be reviewed ~when the LER is reviewed by the resident staff.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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16. ExitInterview(30703)
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I during the inspection aeriod and at the conclusion of the inspection on February 1,1990. T1e inspectors sunnarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature, b
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