IR 05000456/1989031
| ML19354D842 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/1990 |
| From: | Choules N, Jablonski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19354D841 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-89-31, 50-457-89-29, NUDOCS 9001220253 | |
| Download: ML19354D842 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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REGION III
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Report Hos.: 50-456/89031(DRS); 50-457/89029(DRS)
Docket Nos.: 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No.: NPF-72; NPF-77 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company.
Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690
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Facility Nane: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station - Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braceville, IL t
Inspection Conducted: Dececher 6-8 and 18-22,1989 f
Inspector:
6Une r i IO N i
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N.(C.Choules
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Approved By:
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F.diJ$lonski, Chief LTiE
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Maintenance and Outages Section
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. Inspection Summary
Inspection on December 6-8 and 18-22, 1989 (Reports No. 50-456/89031(DRS);
i No. 50-457/69029(DR5))
l Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of Balance of Plant (BOP) activities in
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l the areas of modification::, operations, root cause analysis and maintenance.
i There were six Licensee Event Reports (LERs) that involved BOP systems that L
affected safety-related systems / components; there were three automatic reactor
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trips caused by B0P systems / components. The inspection was accomplished using selected portions of inspection procedure 71500.
Results:
In general, the licensee handles B0P activities the same way as safety-related activities. Based on the number of BOP related LERs and B0P caused reactor trips, and current material condition, it appears that more management emphasis should be placed on maintaining and correcting BOP system L
and component problems. No violations or deviations were identified.
i 9001220253 900110 PDR ADOCi; 05000456 Q
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I DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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l Comonwealth Edison Company (CECO)
- R. Querio, Station Manager
- E. Carrol, Regulatory Assurance, NRC Coordinator
- S. Hedden, Maintenance Staff Supervisor
- R. Legner, Services Director
- M. Lohmann, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
- G. Masters, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
- D. Miller, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- D. Pierce, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- H. Pontious, Operations Staff
- L. Raney, Nuclear Safety Supervisor U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (U. S. NRC)
T. Tongue, Senior Resident Inspector
- T. Taylor, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present 6t the Exit meeting on Dccember 22, 1989.
Other licensee personnel were contacted as a matter of routine during the inspection.
2.
Inspection Results The purpose of this it;spection was to examine Balance of Plant (BOP)
activities in the areas of modifications, o)erations, root cause analysis, and maintenance. Unit 1 was in an outage t1e first week and in startup
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l the second week of the inspection. Unit 2 was at 100% power during the
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inspection. Results of the inspection follow, a.
Modifications The inspector reviewed Unit 1 and 2 nonsafety-related B0P modifications selected from a list of completed and ongoing modifications including:
l N20-0-87-021 Install valve in Fire Protection system M20-0-87-053 Relocate sample and return line in Process Radiation Monitor System L
l M20-1-87-070 Install check valve and drain line in Reactor Building Sump system l
M20-1-87-093 Add drain lines to Turbine Lube Oil system l
M20-1-88-082 Remove check valves from Heater Drain system
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M20-0-89-003 Remove / add jumpers to GGP reverse power relay scheme M20-2-88-021 Retag instruments and lines associated with Component Cooling system
M20-2-88-022 Provide annunciator for 345 kV line 2004
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M20-2-88-030 Add hydrogen flow meter to stator water tank
vent line
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The inspector verified that the modifications were made in accordance with the same procedures used for safety-related systems. Attributes
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included changing procedures and drawings affected by a modification, post modification testing, identification of spare parts needed, design in accordance with appropriate codes and standards, safety evaluations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, training of personnel or the modification, and review and approval consistent with the original design basis.
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One abnormal situation was observed with Modification M20-1-87-093, which added drain valves to the Unit 1 turbine lube oil system. The
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vche check list for Unit 1 had bsen changert to correspolid to the modification, which tne inspector verified. The /.rchitect-Ergineer i
also includeo isnit 2 cr: wings in the completed package which indicated that valves had been added during the Unit 1 modification; however, the Unit 2 valves apparently had been added during construction but the drawings were not changed until the Unit 1 modification was
complete. The licensee was in the process of determining if this was a generic problem and was al w iniing action to add the Unit 2 valves to the appropriate check list and change the Unit 2 drawing to indicate the rearon for the addition of the valve was "as-built" rather than the Unit 1 modification.
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Operations - Units 1 and 2_
During the review of BOP modifications, the inspector verified that affected drawings and operating procedures, which were located in the control room had been changed. The licensee used checklists for lineups of nonsafety-related B0P systems. The inspector verified that several valves in the feedwater system were positioned as indicated on the current checklists.
On December 3, 1989, the inspector observed Unit 2 B0P equipment located within the turbine building. The plant was operating at 100% power. On the 426 foot level, the inspector noted drip pans, tents, and Tygon tubing that directed water from about 12 steam or water leaks from valve packing or bonnets to drains. The leaks were not radioactive.
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'4 1.arge amounts of water were leaking from the area of high pressure feedwater heater, 278, and heater drain pump 24HD043C had a minor leak. The leaking equipment was tagged, wnich indicated that work requests had been initiated.
On December 21, 1989, the inspector observed Units 1 and 2 equipment in the turbine building.
Unit 1 had just returned to power following a refucling outage and was operating at about 50% power. Unit 1 had only one significant leak that was on feedwater isolation valve 1FWOO60. Contractor personnel evaluated the leak and planned to repair the valve with cn approved caulking compound.
Unit 2 was still at 100%. Heater drain pump 24HD043B had developed a significant gasket leak at a bolted flange. Based on the previous and current observations the inspector was concerned with the high number of leaks on Unit 2, which the licensee indicated was caused by varying power levels during the operating cycle scheduled to end in March 1990. The licensee indicated that a more aggressive approach to repairing leaks on DOP equipment was being initiated.
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The erosion / corrosion program for B0P equi ment was implemented during the Unit 1 outage when ultrasonic tiickness measurements were performed on 53 components of the secondary system. No problems were identified. The licensee plans to perform the same measuremer.ts on Unit 2 components during the upcoming outage.
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Root Cause Analysis The inspector reviewed equipment failures identified on deviation
reports (DYRs) and program analysis data sheets (PADS) to cetermine if the root cause was determined, and the adequacy and timelincss of the ccrrective action taken by the licensec.
The inspector reviewed six B0P equipment failures Mentified cn DVRs including:
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20-1-88-273 Motor driven main feedwater pump fails to operate
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20-2-88-106 Turbine / reactor trip due to feedwater bypass valve inadvertantly going 15% open 20-2-88-141 Unreliable feedwater isolation valve 20-2-88-149 Valve 2FWOO90 failed at 30% open 20-2-88-177 Turbine tripped from high conductivity due to ruptured condenser tube 20-2-88-180 Manual reactor trip due to plugged condensate system pump suction strainer
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The root cause appeared to have been adequately determined for each DVR. The inspector was concerned about the timeliness of corrective action for DVR 20-1-88-273, a motor driven feedwater pump problem regarding the inability to start the motor pump at full power, and DVR 20-2-88-177 regarding the main condenser, took about a year to complete. The cause of the a) parent untimeliness was the feedwater pump required an outage and t1e main condenser was not accessible during most of the year.
The licensee had recently implemented the PADS program in June 1989.
The inspector noted that 23 of 39 PADS initiated were for B0P equipment. The inspector reviewed four PADS that had been closed, inciuding:
P-89-005 Condensate pump lube oil pressure gauge P-89-0012 Main steam valve body to bonnet leaks P-89-0022 Lake screen house sump
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P-89-0030 Feedwater pumps The rent eacsa for aach PADS uppeared to have been adequately deterained; however. ',h4 incpector had the following cocerns.
There was no requirement to document the cffectiventss of the
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corrective action on the PADS. The corrective action specified in P-89-005 was to replace the gauges with glycerine filled ('-
gruges. Effectiveness of the success or failure of the corrective action taken was r.ot apparent.
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for outstanding items identified in a PACS. PADS iten P-89-0012, l
indicated that a procedure incorporating the corrective action l
1 earned was to be prepared for repair of these type valves.
However, there was no indication that the action was being
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tracked.
The licensee agreed to consider the inspector's concerns, d.
Maintenance The inspector reviewed six work requests for BOP equipment including:
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A30029 Repair steam leak coming from 1C Heater l
Drain punp A33046 Replace right interceptor valve "0"-ring actuators A33049 Replace "0"-rings on ORC block valve of the Electro Hydraulic Control system
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A33051 Replace "O*-rings on solenoid valve
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20-1/0PC of the Electro Hydraulic Control System A33053 Replace "0"-rings on solenoid valve i
20-2/0PC of the Electro Hydraulic control system A33494 Replace solenoid "0"-ring on 2FWOO9C The work requests (WR) had detailed instructions, post maintenance j
testing requirements, and some QC involvement.
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The inspector reviewed the main turbine vendor manual to determine if the preventive maintenance (PM) recommendations specified in
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the manual were included in the licensee's PM program. The recomendations were not included in the formal PM program; however, the outage related items were completed on Unit 1 by the vendor i
during the outage. Most of the other non-outage related vendor recommeried PM items had been completed in accordance with the WRs i
generated by the system engineer.
Interviews with technical and maintenance personnel indicated that a formal review of the BOP
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vendor mbr.uals for l'M items had not been completed but was in j
progress.
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Licensee Eve t Reports
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Prior to this inspection, a review was made of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) that involved BOP systems and components that affected safety-relatec systems / components including three automatic trips of the reactor. Unit i had two LERs and Unit ? had four LERs as follows:
UNI.T 1 B8-025 Instrument air pressure decreased due to inadequate installation of a coupling, causing feedwater regulator valve to shut resulting in steam generator level dccrease and a manual reactor trip.89-004 Defective turbine trip test switch caused the turbine governor valve to close, resulting in steam generator level shrink and a reactor trip.
UNIT 2 88-014 Erratic operation of a main feedwater regulation valve caused by a low spring preload, resulting in increased feedwater flow and high steam generator level which resulted in a reactor trip.
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!88-016 Failure of a heater drain valve to open as a result of the feedback cam falling off, caused a
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W decrease in feedwater flow, low low steam generator level and a reactor trip.
,88-020 A failed open heater drain valve resulted in plugging of condensate pump suction strainers causing a low feedwater flow and manual tripping of the reactor.
I 88-029 Condensate pump suction strainer became plugged due to deteriorated material from a demineralizer service coat, resulting in reduced feedwater flow which caused low steam generator level and manual tripping the reactor.
Based on the number of B0P related LERs and BOP caused reactor trips, and current material condition, it appears that more management emphasis should be placed on maintaining and correcting BOP system and component problems.
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Exit _ Meeting The inspector met with licensee repretentatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
on December 22, 1989, at the Braidwood Station and summarized the purpose, scope, ar.d findings of the inspection.
The inspector discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee J
did not identify any such dccutents or procesres as prcpriety y.
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