IR 05000456/1989026
| ML19332C456 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1989 |
| From: | Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332C447 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-456-89-26, 50-457-89-26, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8911280148 | |
| Download: ML19332C456 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLSAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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-Reports No. 50-456/89026(DRP);50-457/89026(DRP)
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Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post Offire Box 767 i
Chicago, IL 60690 j
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Facility Name: - Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, Illitiois
' Inspection Conducted: September 17 through Octo'
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~ Inspectors:
T.-M. Tongue T. E. Taylor G..A. VanSickle E
R. G. Landsman
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l D. R. Calhoun'
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Approved B :
'J Y,HTnds, Chief NOV 161999
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eactor Projects Section IA Date (gl
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Inspection Summary Inspection from Seytember 17 through October. 31,1989-(Reports
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.No.-50-456/89026(D.lP); No. 50 457/89026(DRP))
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Areas Inspected:. Routine, unannounced safety. inspection by the resident-inspectors of TI 2500/027; licensee event report review regional request;'
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Unit I refuel outage; inspector inquiries (blue sheets); OSHA related;
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- operational safety verification;' events; monthly maintenance observation;
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monthly surveillance observation; training effectiveness; report review; me tings and other, activities; and TI 2515/093.
.Results: Of the: thirteen areas...spected, no violations were identified in twelve.
In the remaining area one violation was identified regaroing exceeding.a Technicel Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Action
~ Requirement (LC0AR).
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j8911280148 891117
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Commonwealth' Edison Company (Ceco)
T. J. Maiman, Vice President, PWR Operations
- R. E. Querio, Station Manager
- D. E. O'Brien, Technical Superintendent
- K. L. Kofron, Production Superintendent S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
- G. R. Masters, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
- G. E. Groth, Braidwood Project Manager, PWR Projects Department
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- R. J. Legner, Services Director
- M. E. Lohman, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance P. Smith,-Operating Engineer, Unit 1 R. Yungk, Operating Engineer, Unit 2
- W. B. McCuc, Operating Engineer,-Unit 0
- R. D. Kyrouac, Quality Assurance Supervisor
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- D. E. Cooper, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor.
R. C. Lemke, Technical Staff Supervisor A. D' Antonio,-Quality Control Supervisor
- A. Checca, Security Administrator
- R. L. Byers, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning and Startup
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- L. W. Raney, Nuclear Safety Supervisor
- D. F. Ambler, Health. Physics Supervisor
- M. A. Gorskey, Nuclear Safety W. McGee, Training Supervisor
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- D. Pierce, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
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- D. J. Miller, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- E. W. Carroll, Regulatory. Assurance
- P, Holland, Regulatory Assurance
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J. Smith, Master, Electrical Maintenance l
- M. R. Trusheim, Shift Control Room Engineer
- H. P. Pontious, Operations Staff l
- T. M. Bandura, Quality Assurance
- Denotes those attending the exit interviews conducted on October 27 and 31, 1989, and at other times throughout the inspection period.
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs,
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reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, and r
electrical, mechanical and inttrument maintenance personnel, and contract
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security personnel.
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2.
Temporary Instruction (TI)~ (2500/27)
(Closed) TI 2500/27:
Inspection kequirements for NRC Compliance Bulletin 87 027" Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications." This TI was issued as a followup on TI 2500/26 l
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in that certain plants had not fulfilled the renuirements of the sampling requested per NRC Bulletin 87-02.
Reference Braidwood Inspection Reports 456/89005(DRp);457/89005(DRP)and 456/87044(DRP);457/87045(DRP).
In the case of Braidwood, the bulletin requested analysis of a sample of 20 safety-related and 20 nonsafety-rrlated fasteners.. The inspector verified the sampling; however, there were only 18 safety-related and 11 nonsafety-related fastenens available in the station storeroom at the time of the inspection due to the station being in a semi-construction phase. All
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the fasteners were sampled and the test results showed no failures in any of the samples.
Through discussions with the licensee and a telephone conversation with-Mr. Greg Cwalfna of NRR on September 9,1989, the inspector determined
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that the Braidwood sample size would be acceptable provided that the licensee could show verification of vendor and receipt inspections for fasteners.- The inspector interviewed appropriate licensee personnel and reviewed a sample of receipt notices, QC checklists, QA statement sheets, certificates of conformance, shipment orders, visual' test reports on purchase orders, and storeroom check lists. The foregoing was found to be acceptable; therefore, this TI is considered complete and NRC Bulletin 87-02 is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Event Report (LER) Review (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensec personnel, and J
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective.
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action,was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been or would be accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS):
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Closed) No. 457/89004-LL: Reactor Trip as a Result of Lightning Tnduced Voltage Transient Affecting Rod Control System. On September 7, 1989, a severe thunderstorm was in tie Braidwood Station area. At 8:31 p.m., the Unit 2 containment was struck by lightning. At 8:32 p.m., all ten rod control system (RD) power cabinet overvoltage protection devices actuated. This caused the stationary gripper coils of the control rods to deenergize, and as a result, the rods dropped into the core. The rapid flux decrease was sensed by the nuclear instrumentation which generated a power range fluxrate high reactor trip.
rhe reactor trip breakers opened, the turbine tripped, and feedwater isolation occurred. The shrink affect on steam generator level instrumentation resulted in an auto start of the auxiliary feedwater pumps on low water level. A time delay has been added to the overvoltage protection devices as a corrective action. The licensee and NRC resident inspectors will continue to evaluate lightning strike events. This LER is considered closed.
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(Closed)No. 456/89007-LL:
ContainmentVentilationIsolation-(CVI)
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Actuation Signal Due to failed High Voltage Power Supply in
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Containment Building Fuel Handling Incident Radiation Monitor. At 2:53 a.m., on August 10, 1989, the containment building fuel handling incident area radiation monitor 1RT-AR011 went into alert alarm and-interlock actuation due to a loss of pulses. This initiated a Train
- A CVI signal. No components repositioned as a result of this signal.
The-associated containment isclation valves were already closed. At 3:51 a.m., the appropriate NRC notification via the ENS phone system was made. The root cause of this event was a failed high voltage power supply in IRT-AR011. The immediate corrective actions were to replace the high voltage power supply in IRT-AR011 and verify operability. '
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Power supplies for radiation detectors 1RE-AR011,1RE-AR012, 2RE-AR011,
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and 2RE-AR012 are checked during normally scheduled detector replacement.
There have been two previous occurrences of CVI signals due to a loss of pulses from a radiation monitor.
One event was due to construction activity = which damaged the detector, while the other event was due to a.very low background activity prior to Unit 2 inittel criticality.
-The rcsident inspectors hate no further concerns. This LER is
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c (Closed)No. 456/89008-LL: Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Suction P.' essure Switches Found Uut of Calibratica Due to Failure to
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Consider Head Correction. On August 29, 1989, Brafdwood Station was.
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informed that Byron Station was implementing a head correction to tha AFW pump suction pressure transmi!ters to the elevation of the process tap in response to a Sargent d Lundy Engineers (S&L)
recommendation. These transmitters provide input to the switches that switch the AFW pump water supply from the condensate storage
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tank (CST) to the essential. service water (SX) system and the switches -
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that provide low aump suction pressure trip and alarm. On August 30, 1989, this recali) ration was performed for both AFW pumps on Units 1 and'2 at Braidwood. On September 5,1989, an S&L evaluation determined that with the uncorrected setpoints the allowable-value specified in the Technical Specification had been exceeded. On September 13, 1989', S&L recommended new suction pressure switch setpoints to ensure auto switchover to SX when required. On Septemb w 14, 1989, the setpoint changes were made for t.oth Unit 2 AFW pumps. An administrative minimum' limit on the CST of 70% has been initiated. The cause of this evert was unclear design documents. A licensee review of other
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instrements with automatic ESF functions will be conducted. This t
issue is being tracked by Unresolved Item No. 456/89022-01(DRP).
This LER is considered closed.
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(Closed)No. 456/89009-LL:
Failure of Main Steamline Safety Valve IR5TV) to Reseat Due to a Valve Design Deficiency. At 12:14 a.m. on September 2, 1989, the Unit 1 turbine was taken off line as part of a scheduled piant shutdown. A " lift" test of MSSV, IMS017C, was in progress. At 1:00.a.m., a fourth lift was performed. The 1MS017C did not completely reseat. The IC main steamline was sampled to aid
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in determining the status of the integrity of IC steam generator l
(SG) tubes. At 1:41 a.m.,.1MS017C fully reseated at a main steamline header pressure of approximately 1030 psig. This was 28 psig below the miiimum reset pressure of 1058 psig.
Reactor coolant. system average temperature decreased to 5* below normal at 552*F. 5 table alant conditions were immediately established. The root cause of t11s event was a preservice error in the design of the valve. - This deficiency allowed the guide-to rotate, which occurred as a result of vibration or flow during normal system operation. The'
setting of the blowdown control upper adjusting ring was found approximately.392 inches lower than the recommended setting. The
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1MS017C was verified to be fully-closed at 1:41 a.m.
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recommended upgrade will be installed on IMS017C and two other safeties. -The-remaining MSSVs will be checked.
A Notice of Violation was issued relative-to this event for a late ENS notification (No.456/89022-02(DRP)). This !.ER is considered closed.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Deviation Reports (DVRs)
generated during the inspection period. This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel-performance, potential trends, etc. DVRc were also reviewed for proper initiation and disposition as required by the applicable procedures and the QA manual.
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No violations or deviations rere identified.
4.1 RegionalRequest(92701)
System Engineers
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On October 26, 1989,) Region III requested information on the licensee's.
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SystemEngineers(SE program for an NRC senior management study. The information requested pertained to areas of the SE program, such as duties, experience levels, organization, etc. The senior resident inspector provided the requested information to the Region on October 30, 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Unit 1 Refuel Outage (71707)
Throughout the inspection period, Unit I was in a refueling outage. The inspectors monitored activities in the plant, various tests and maintenance work, planning sessions, etc.; and verified that appropriate priorities-were established, procedures were followed, workers met ALARA requirements, and applicable requirements wero met.
During the inspection period, the licensee identified that sampling)of the Unit I reactor coolant system (RCS) per Technical Specification (TS 3/4 4.7 could not' be accomplished.
This occurred after the removal of all of the fuel and lowering of the level of water in the reactor vessel to
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below the RCS piping nozzle penetrations to accommodate maintenance work on
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the RCS loop isolation valves and steam generator tube eddy-current testing and annealing. The rcactor vessel head was set in place on the vessel.
TS 3/4 4.7 and Table 4-43 required RCS sampling on a 72-hour frequency in all' modes.
Upon discovery, the licensee promptly informed the NRC and initiated action for a TS relief or discretionary enforcement.
Subsequently, the inspector determined that the licensee would not perform any adentional. draining or additions until the vessel was refilled. A sample for analysis would then be obtained upon com.aencement of vessel refill activities. The inspector further verified that the results of the last sample obtained were within-the requirements of TS 4.4.7, Table 3.4-2.
Further discussions with the NRC Region III Director of.
the Division of Reactor Projects and NRC Headquarters, determined that the licensee met the intent of the TS and.no further action was required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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InspectorInquiries(BlueSheets)(71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors inquired into a number of matters in the-plant and the following is a suninary of the licensee responses:
The nspector noted towels over floor drain; in the Unit ? turbine buik ing in the vicinity of the steam jet air ejectors (SJEJ).
This was to suppress the ammonia odor coming from the SJEJ drain and was considered an annoyance to nearby workers. A modification is planned for the next outage to direct the SJEJ drains to the condenser rather than the floor drains.
Contairment Atmospheric flydrogen Sampling valve IPS 223B was bnd
'to be wired in reverse during LLRT test. The licensee rev%wed previous maintenance and surveillance activities. Th s - tesi was also addressed in LER 89010-LL.
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Operability of a non-accessible ventilation train was questioned whan ESF bus 142 t;cs deenergized ir. accordance with Technical Specification (TS) requirements. The licensee verifiea system configuration met TS requirements.
- A number of other minor issues, such as housekeeping or steam leaks were responded to acceptably.
No violations or deviatioir were identified.
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OSHA Related (9S001)
During a shift turnover observation, on October 17, 1989, the inspectors monitored a training'td sion on cautioning plant workers about the potential for falls and injuries. Specific events were discussed. One of the events discusstd was the injury of a shift engineer at the LaSalle County Station.
The responding personnel experienced some difficulty and
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delay in' removing the injured person from'the location.
Since this was another. licen:ee facility with similar practices, the inspector questioned what controls were in place to prevent a similar occurrence at Braidwood. The licensee responsed that at Braidwood, when an injury is identified, a shift engineer or shift foreman and a radiation technician with a first-afd kit responds to the scene. ~In addition, the licensee expressed confidence that sufficient stretchers and-
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first-aid kits were available at various locations in the plant to prevent the. delay that occurred in the incident described. This response
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Opera'tional Safety Verification (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the facility
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was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory
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requirements and that the licensee's management control-system was
effectively carrying out.its responsibilities for_ safe operation. This-
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was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and-discussions with licensee persc :nel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting condition:; for operation action requirements (LC0ARs'),: corrective action, and review of facility records.
On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verifieo' proper control room _
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staffing and access, operator behavior, and coordinatico of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; verified operator
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adherence with the latest revisions of procedures for ongoing activities;
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verified operatica as required by Technical Specifications (TS);
including compliance with LC0AR3, with emphasis on engineered safety features (ESF) and FSF electrical align.nent and valve positions; monitored instrumentation recorder traces and duplicate channels for abnormalities; verified status of various lit annunciators for operator understandin, off-normal condition examinednucearinstrumentation(Ni)andcorrectiveactionsbeingtaken; and other protection channels Tor proper operability; reviewed radiation monitors and stack monitors for abnormal conditions; verified that onsite and offsite power was available as required; observed the frequency of plant / control room visits by the station manager, superintendents, assistant operations superintendent, and other managers; and observed the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for operability.
Exceeding a Limiting Condition for Operation Requirement (LC0AR) for DC Bus Crosstie Breakers Closure During a routine tour of the control room on September 13, 1989, the resident inspectors observed that the DC bus crosstie breaker for bus 211 to bus 111 was closed.
The crnsstic breaker was closed on September 8, 1989, at 3:58 a.m.
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On September 14, 1989, the residents determined that the seven day LC0AR for DC bus crossties should have been entered as required by Technical c
Specificatien (TS) 3.8.2.1 action statement c.
On September 14, 1989, the resident inspectors informed the licensee ti,at the LC0AR should have been entered starting with the time and date of the breaker closure.
During a 1:00 p.m. weekly oriefing with plant management personnel the resident inspectors again stated TS 3.8.2.1 requirements. The licensee
acknowledged the TS requirement and stated'that they would comply and not exceed the seven day.LC0AR requirement.
On September 15, 1989, at approximately 6:30 a.m., the resident inspector discovered that the seven day LC0AR had expired at 3:58 a.m.; however; the DC crosstie was still closed. After being informed of the expired LC0AR by the residents, the licensee agreed that they had exceeded the LC0AR and subsequently opened the DC crossties at 9:10'a.m.. Tne licensee preliminary investigation into the event identified that confusion between managcment personnel and operating shift personnel.was the reason for exceeding the LC0AR. The operations personnel had rci entered the-LC0AR on the tracking:systcm nor officially entered the TS action statement when it expired.
This failure to comply with the TS action
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statement for DC crossties 13 considered a violation of TS 3.8.2.1 l
(No. 456/89026-01(DRP); No. 457/89026-01(DRP)).'
During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note
of general plant / equipment conditions, including control of activities-in
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progress (maintenance / surveillance),observationofshiftturnovers, j
general safety items, etc.
The specific areas observed were:
Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems
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n Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected to l
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valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses (if visible) for proper actuation on
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an initiating signal; proper reinoval of power from components if
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required by TS'or FSAR; and the operability of support syster,m essential to system actuation or performance:through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment. The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, proper lubrication, i
cooling water supply, etc.
l Ranietion Protection Controls The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, pesting, etc., and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for use, operability, and calibration.
i On October 18, 1989, the licensee informed the inspectors of an
administrative radiation overexposure to a contractor worker. The exposure was evaluated at about 140 mrem, which exceeded the procedural limit of 100 mrem per day. This was well within 10 CFR 20 criteria. The individuai was working in the Unit 1 containment on steam generater eddy-current testing and failed to properly monitor
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his personal digital dosimeter. Also, a contractor radiation
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technician failed to properly monitor or communicate with the t
worker.
Following the licensee's investigation, both. individuals were dismissed from work on the site. The licensee also connenced periodic checks and loggina of w rker exposures in such areat.
This was the first event of this type during this refueling outage.
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T6: Mspector reported this to a Region III radiation specialist
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r: r 11 further review the occurrence during a future inspection.
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Security'
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The inspectors, by sampling, verified N t persons in the'protecteu area (PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if required; vital-areas were kept locked and alarmed, or glearas posted if required;. and personnel and packages entering the PA received proper search and/or monitoring.
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. Housekeeping and Plant Cleanliness
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-The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant
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cleanliness for fire nrotection, protection of safety-related equipment Trom intrusion of foreign Tidtter and general protection.
The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, shiftly. logs and st..veillances, daily orders, wintenance items, various chemistry and radiological sampling and analysis, third party review results, overtime records, QA and/or QC audit results and postings
required per 10 CFR 19.11.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Events (93702)y Containment Spray (CS) Train B Chenical Additive Throttle Valve Found Mispositioned.
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0n October 20, 1.989, licensee personnel found the Unit 2 CS train B sodium hydroxide (Na0H) throttle valve fully opened versus the required 3/4 turn open. The mispasitioned valve was the eductor suction throttle valve, 2CS0218, that regulates the Na0H flow from'the NaOH storage tank to the eductor suction. The Ha0H would be mixed with water from the reactor water storage tank (RWST) at the suction of the CS pump during the injection phase following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and later with containment sump water during the recirculation phase.
The licensee reportad the mispositioned valve to the resident inspectors on October 21, 1989, and determined the event to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72, as a potentially unanalyzed condition.
The purpose of the Na0H addition system was to retain elemental iodine scrubbed from the containment atmosphere following e LOCA and niinimize chloride and caustic stress corrosion on components and equipment in the
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g containment. The questions raised were related to the safety significance of the elemental iodine concentration in containment and the impact of the corrosion on equipment and components during the exposure to a higher concentration of NaOH.
This mispositione) valve would have resulted in-
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the NaOH being added to the CS water more quickly and possibly creatirg a period of time where there would have been no %0H in the CS water until the recirculation phase hac' cammenced.-
In add nion, since the Na0H was L
being added more quickly, its concentration would have been higher,-
resulting in a period of time where equipment and components may have been subjected to accelerated corrosion.
The valve position is set to meet a minimum flow of 55 gallons per minute (gpm) per ECCS train and for assurance that the minimum flow is n.et, the flow is regulated to 63 + 6 -0 gpm. This is set forth in Technical
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Specification 3/4.6.2.2.
The senior resident-inspector requested assistance from NRR to assess
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the tafety significence. = Independently, the licensee is assessing
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the safety cignificance through their angineering departments.
The licensee determined that the valve was mispositioned on March 13, 19(1, when-it had been rcturned to-service following an Out of Sertice (00S).
The 00S called for the valve to be locked open upon return to service and did not specify that it should be throttled.
In addition, a subsequmt valve lineup was conducted and the applicable Braidwood administ.ive procedure called for throttle valves to be verified
" locked in place'and not full open" vice " throttled 3/4 turn open".as it should have been.
This event is another example of a mispositioned E%S valve. The licensee was summoned to an enforcement conference on July 11, 1989, for several previous events for mispositioned ECCS valves. Reference
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inspection reports No. 456/89017(DRP);457/89017(0RP)and456/89020(DRP);
457/89020(DRP), which resulted in a Notice of Vic,lation.
This event occurred prior to the enforcement conference and was of a different root cause. Additionally, the licensee was still implementing the corrective measures from previous events when this condition was identified. The corrective actions were a new column on the 00S form for_"As Found" and placing a placard on the throttle valve for special identification, as with ECCS pump miniflow valves.
In addition, upon discovery, the licensee conducted a walkdown of all accessible locked i
valves and no additional discrapancies were identified. Some corrcctive actions with respect to this event included instructing operating personnel tt, avoid using throttle valves as an 00S boundary, using M1 and El valve lineup links for valve positions on 00Ss, inste H of P& ids, and the possibility of clarifying the wording of applicable administrative procedures.
Since the affect on the safety significance is in question, this matm is considered Unresolved (No. 457/89026-02(DRP)).
One unresolved item was identified.
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- 10.. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703).
Station maintenance activities affecting the safety-related systems and
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components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides
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and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior to
- initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved
. procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional ~ testing and/or calibretions were performed prior to returning components or systems to-service; quality control recordt were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemerted; and fire prevention controls were implemented.- Work requests were reviewed to detennine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority-is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed and rt. '.ed:
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Unit 1 1A DG 5-year naintenance inspection.
18 DG 5-year maintenance inspection.
IPS 2298 repair / replacement.
18 RHR pump breaker repair.
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The inspectors monitored the licensee's work in progress and verified
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that it was being performed in accordance with proper procedures, and approved work packages, that 10 CFR 50.59 and other applicable drawing updates were made and/or planned, and that operator training was conducted in a reasonable period of time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical-Specifications during the inspection period and verified that testing was
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performed in accordance with adec;uate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation we e met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and thLt any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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.I The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 0 OPR33J celibration BwlS 3.1.1-201.
. Unit 1 N41 18-month calibration.
A meter and voltmeter calibration for instrument bus inverter 114.
Bwls 3.1.1-304.
IBwVS C.2.1.2.c,4-1.2
' Unit 2 Bwls 1.2.1-001 Analog Operational Test and Channel Verification /
Calibration for loops.
l 2F-0510, 2F-512, and 2P-0514 Steam Generator 2A Steam Flow /FES Flow Mismatch.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Training Effectiveness (41400, 41701)
The effectiveness'of training programs for.licersed and non-licensed
. personnel was reviewed by the inspectors curing the witnessing of the licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities and during the review of the licensea's response to events which occurred during the inspection period.
Persennel appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing-was observed which indicated any ineffectiveness of training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Report Review During.the inspection period, the ins)ector reviewed the licensee's Monthly Performance Report for Septem)er 1989. The inspector confirmed that the.information provided met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.8 and Regulatory Guide 1.16.
The inspector also reviewed the licensee's Monthly Plunt Status Reports for August and September 1989, and the Regulatory Assurance Department Trend / Concern Reports, dated September 14 and OctcLer 20, 1989.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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14. Meetings and Other Activities (30703)
Site Visits j
On October 23, 1989, Hsi Mei Kao, Specialist Environment Section, Radiation-Protection Division, Atomic Energy Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan,_ Republic of China, end Mr. Ed Pentecost, Director of NEPA Programs, Environmental Assessment and Information Sciences-Division, Argonne National Laboratory, were onsite for an information exchange.
They met with the Senior Resident Inspector (host), toured the plant and met with severai licensee staff members for specific information in areas of interest, such as thermal discharges, environmental radiation monitoring, and associated equipment.
The visitors ex)ressed gratitude for the opportunity.to visit and were impressed with t1e appearance of the plant.
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Management / Plant Sthtus Meeting
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A routine management meeting was held on site on October 19, 1989.
NRC representatives were Messrs. W. D. Shafer, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 1, J. M. Hinds, Jr., Chief, Division of Reactor-Projects, Section IA, and the resident inspectors.
The licensee representatives were the Station Manager, Superintendents, Nuclear Licensing Administrator, and other senior station staff members. - The meeting consisted of a presentation by licensee representatives on
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upcoming station personnel changes, overtime policy, planned actions for improving timcliness of Emergency Notification System (ENS) calls, mock SALP status, LER review, recent reactor trips, and the status of-the Unit I refuel outage. The NRC presentation was on recent and future personnel changes.
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The visit to the station also included a plant tour and monitoring a shift change tailgate session by the NK personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Temporary Instruction 2515/93 - Inspection for verification of Quality Assurance regarding Diesel Generator Fuel Oil - SIMS Item MPA-A-15 (2515/093)
The subject temporary instruction required the inspector to verify that the licensee had included emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil (F0) in its Quality Assurance (QA) program. The inspector reviewed Braidwood's Quality Assurance Manual, Quality Procedure 4-51, Attachment 1A, Section 3.10, " Diesel Fuel", where it states that the F0 for the EDG is considered safety-related and shall be procured commercial grade.
It further states that a certificate of corformance to ASTM is required.
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The inspector verified that th'e licensee has procedures in place for receipt inspection.
Braidwood Quality Procedure 7-54, " Receiving Inspection', and a sample of the associated quality receipt records for FC were reviewed and found to meet the QA program requirements.
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Braidwood station purchases commercial grade F0 from an approved vendor with a certificate ei conformance.
Upon arrival of the EDG F0 on site, prior to adding new F0 to the storage tanks, a sample in drawn, by members of the Chemistry department, from.the bottom of each comaartment of the tanker truck and com>ined to form a composite sample whic1 are later analysed on site for water and sediment.
If the composite sample passes this quality test, the F0 is added by mcmbers of the Fuel Handling department to a 125,000 gallon storage tank. A second sample is obtained from this. tank and sent to the System Materiel Analysis Department (SMAn) for analysis of ASTM D-975-/7 properties. This F0 is held in this tank until the SMAD results have been obtained and the new load of F0 has been certified. The F0 is_then transferred to a 50,000 gallon holding storage tank before beir.g distributed to the EDG's. A sample-of records from the Chemistry and Fuel Handling departments for F0 were.
reviewed and found to meet QA program requirements.
The. inspector compared the current F0 practices to site procedures and determined that station personnel are not follring procedure, BUCP 600-5, nn when~and who obtains the AE00 sample.
The procedures states that the AE0D sample shall be obtained by the Chemistry department prior to the addition of the F0 to the tanks and by the Fuel Handling department
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after~the addition to the tanks. The Chemistry departme.nt is also
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members of the not clearly identifying the initial samT e per procedure l
BWCP 103-11.. Because of constraints with-the waiting tanker trucks the
inspector has no concerns with the present practices. The only. concern
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is that the licensee revise all their F0 procedures to reflect actual j
practices. This will be an open item
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(456/89026-02(DRP);.457/89026-03(DRP))pendingrevisiontotheprocedures j
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One open item'was identified.
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16. Unresolved Item
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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
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order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or
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l deviations. An Unresolved item disclosed during the-inspection is discussed in Paragraph 9.
17. Open Item l
l Open items are matters which have been di: cussed with the licensee which j
will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involved some action
on the part of the NRC or the licensee or both. An open item disclosed
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l during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 15.
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18.. Exit Interview (30703)
l The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in i
L Paragraph I during the inspaction period and at the conclusion of the inspection on October 27 and 31, 1989. The inspectors summarized the l
scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of l
this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of ;.e information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
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