IR 05000424/2001007

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IR 05000424/2001-007 & IR 05000425/2001-007, Vogtle, Resident Inspection on 12/30/2001 - 03/30/2002. No Violations Noted
ML021190598
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  
Issue date: 04/29/2002
From: Cahill S
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To: Beasley J
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-01-007
Download: ML021190598 (19)
v • d • e


Text

April 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-424/01-07 AND 50-425/01-07

Dear Mr. Beasley:

On March 30, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 5, 2002, with Mr. J. Gasser and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosure:

Integrated Inspection Report 50-424/01-07 and 50-425/01-07 w/Attachment

REGION II==

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81 Report No:

50-424/01-07 and 50-425/01-07 Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2 Location:

7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates:

December 30, 2001 through March 30, 2002 Inspectors:

J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector T. Morrissey, Resident Inspector B. Bearden, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R07 and 1R12.2)

J. Blake, Senior Project Manager (Section 1R08)

Approved by: Stephen J. Cahill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000424-01-07, IR 05000425-01-07, on 12/30/01-03/30/2002; Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, resident inspector report.

The inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and two regional reactor inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html.

A.

Inspector Identified Findings None B.

Licensee Identified Violations None

Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at essentially 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) until March 5 when the unit was shutdown for a planned refueling outage. The unit remained in a refueling outage at the end of the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at essentially 100% RTP throughout the inspection period.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R04 Equipment Alignment a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted partial walkdowns of the following systems when the redundant equipment was inoperable. The inspectors compared actual system configuration to licensee procedure 13145-2, Diesel Generators, and procedure 13011-1, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, to verify the systems were correctly aligned.

  • 2B EDG and associated electrical distribution system
  • 1A RHR system b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of six plant areas to verify the licensee was controlling combustible materials and ignition sources as required by licensee procedures 92015-C, Use, Control, and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials, and 92020-C, Control of Ignition Sources. The inspectors also assessed the condition of fire detection, suppression, and protection systems and reviewed the licensees fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) log and Condition Report (CR) database to verify that the corrective actions for degraded equipment were identified and appropriately prioritized.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensees fire protection program to verify the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Program, and Appendix 9A, Fire Hazards Analysis were met. Plant areas toured were the following:

  • 2A EDG room and associated fuel pump building
  • 2B EDG room and associated fuel pump building
  • 1A RHR pump room
  • 1B RHR pump room
  • 1A and 1B High Head Safety Injection pump rooms b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed implementation of licensee programs, tests, and inspection activities to provide assurance of the integrity and operability of the Component Cooling Water System (CCW), EDG jacket cooling water heat exchangers and the Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (NSCW). The inspection included a review of documents and discussions with system engineers. The inspectors reviewed documentation to confirm that the licensee had continued to meet their commitments for Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee corrective actions identified in CRs associated with the above systems.

The inspectors also reviewed documentation to confirm that ongoing frequent heat exchanger inspection/maintenance activities, test methodology, system performance monitoring, operational guidance, and system chemical treatments were consistent with accepted industry practices. Licensee procedures and documents reviewed are included in the attachment of this report.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI) Activities a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated ISI activities during the Unit 1 refueling outage to determine the effectiveness of the licensees American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

Section XI ISI program. This outage was in the second period of the second ten-year interval. The inspectors reviewed procedures, documents, and selected ISI records and observed the ISI work activities listed below to verify compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS) and Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1989 Edition, with no Addenda. The inspectors also reviewed the qualification records for equipment, materials, and personnel involved with these ISI activities.

  • Steam Generator (SG) Degradation Assessment for Vogtle Unit 1, 1R10 RefuelingOutage March 2002,
  • Evaluation of SG eddy current data for 1R10 Refueling Outage

11204-008-34, 11204-008-35, and 11204-011-10,

  • Magnetic Particle Examinations, in accordance with procedure MT-V-505 for Weld Nos. 11301-016-3, 11301-013-3, and 11301-013-1,
  • Ultrasonic Examinations, in accordance with procedure UT-V-481 for stainless steel Weld Nos. 11204-008-34, 11204-008-35, 11204-011-10, and 11206-003-3,
  • Ultrasonic Examinations, in accordance with procedure UT-V-480 for carbon steel Weld Nos. 11301-016-3, 11301-013-3, and 11301-013-1,
  • Engineering Analyses and Flow-Accelerated Corrosion inspection data for components 11305056-16-P029, 11305056-16-E029MFW20, 11305057-16-P009 and 11305057-16-E010MFW24, b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification a.

Inspection Scope On January 28, the inspectors observed licensed operator performance during licensee Dynamic Simulator Scenario #32 which included a loss of one train of 4160 Volt AC Class 1E electrical system and a steam generator tube rupture. The inspectors assessed operator performance for the following: 1) use of licensee procedures 10000-C, Conduct of Operations, 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems, 19000-C, E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, 19030-C, E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions, 2)

proper control board manipulations including high-risk operator actions, 3) quality of crew communications and supervisory command and control, and 4) effectiveness of the post evaluation critique. The inspectors also verified that the simulator control boards closely matched the plant control boards.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule (MR) Implementation

.1 Review of Maintenance Effectiveness a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the equipment problems listed below and associated CRs to verify the licensees maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. This included review of failure characterization, establishment of performance criteria or (a) (1) performance goals, and corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed the CR database to verify that equipment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program, and appropriately resolved.

  • Inadvertent de-energization of 480Volt switchgear 2NB10 (CR 2001002205)
  • Failure of battery charger 1CD1CA due to shorted out equalizing light (CR 2001002985)
  • Auxiliary Building drain valve failure to properly isolate (CR 2001002953)
  • Unit 2 NSCW Pump 4 Motor Cooler Flow found outside acceptance criteria (CR 2001003040)
  • Failure of EDG 2B building HVAC fan to start (CR 2002000215)

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Review of Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees November, 2001 MR assessment which covered the period from May 1, 2000, until September 30, 2001, to verify that the assessment was issued in accordance with the time requirements of the MR and included evaluation of balancing reliability and unavailability, MR (a)(1) and (a)(2) activities, and use of industry operating experience. The inspectors also reviewed selected MR activities during the assessment period for the following systems to verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.65. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed licensee actions associated with corrective actions for systems 1204 and SRMC which had been reclassified as MR (a)(2).

  • Safety Injection (System 1204)
  • Process Protection and Control (System 1604)
  • Containment Isolation (System 2415)
  • Safety Related Pump Motor Coolers (System SRMC)

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed risk assessments and risk management controls implemented for the following maintenance activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling, and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors conducted a review of emergent work activities to verify plant risk was properly reassessed. The inspectors also reviewed the CR database to verify that equipment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the

corrective action program, and appropriately resolved. The maintenance work orders (MOWs) reviewed were the following:

  • Replacement of Unit 2 Generex power supply monitor board (MWO 20103806)
  • 2A EDG system End-of-Cycle Outage (MWO 20102647)
  • 2B EDG system End-of-Cycle Outage (MWO 20102648)
  • 1A RHR system outage (MWOs 10100451, 10103054 and 10101390)
  • 1B RHR system outage (MWOs 10100452, 10102980, 10101640, 10102671, and 10101391)

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations to verify that they met the requirements of licensee procedure 00150-C, Condition Reporting and Tracking System. This included the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation. Operability evaluations reviewed included:

  • Pump Inservice Test (IST) vibration data taken without proper filtering (CR 2001002974)
  • Unexpected automatic restart of Unit 2 NSCW Pump No. 1 following manual stop demand (CR 2001003019)
  • Conduit plug missing from actuator for valve 2HV3009 (CR 2002000282)

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed abnormal plant configurations and conditions to verify if the conditions could increase the likelihood of an initiating event or affect multiple mitigating systems. The inspectors also reviewed the cumulative effects of potential workarounds to verify the operators ability to perform a correct and timely response to plant transients.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors either observed the testing or reviewed the test results for maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements of licensee procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests. The inspectors also reviewed the test procedures to verify the acceptance criteria was sufficient to meet the operability requirements in Technical Specifications. The maintenance activities included the following:

  • 2A EDG system outage (MWOs 20102647, 20002403, 20101196)
  • 2B NSCW Fan No. 1 Agastat relay replacement (MWO 20200004)
  • Battery 1CD1B cell replacement (MWO 10003090)
  • 2B EDG system outage (MWO 20102648)
  • 1A RHR system outage (MWOs 10100451, 10103054 and 10101390)
  • 1B RHR system outage (MWOs 10100452, 10102980, 10101640, 10102671, and 10101391)

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the following activities during the scheduled Unit 1 refueling outage that began March 5. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Review of Outage Planning: The inspectors reviewed the licensees outage schedule and the 1R10 Pre-Outage Schedule Risk Assessment, dated January 11, 2002, to verify that the licensee had considered risk, industry experience, previous site specific problems, and had developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions and incorporated defense-in-depth.

Shutdown Activities: The inspectors observed reactor coolant system cooldown to verify that cooldown rate limits specified in TS and licensee procedure 12006-C, Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown, were met.

Licensee Control of Outage Activities: The inspectors reviewed Clearance 10215988, Isolation of Dilution Flow Path, to verify that the system was appropriately configured to support the clearance. The inspectors reviewed the status and configuration of electrical systems to verify that the configurations met TS, licensee procedure requirements, and outage risk planning assumptions. The inspectors observed decay heat removal parameters to verify proper system operation. The inspectors observed spent fuel pool operations to verify that outage work was not impacting the ability of the system to perform its function. The inspectors reviewed containment penetration

controls to verify that containment closure was being maintained as appropriate when required. The inspectors reviewed reactor coolant system inventory controls to verify that required and alternate means of inventory additions were maintained and that precautions for inventory losses were properly implemented.

Refueling Activities: The inspectors observed core unload activities to verify that fuel handling operations were performed in accordance with TS and licensee procedures 12007-C, Refueling Operations (Entry into Mode 6), 93300-C, Conduct of Refueling Operations, and 93360-C, Limitations and Precautions for Handling New and Partially Spent Fuel Assemblies.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures and either observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately demonstrated that the equipment was operable. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems. Surveillance tests witnessed or reviewed included the following:

  • Procedures 14804-1, Safety Injection Pump Inservice and Response Time Tests (2A Safety Injection Pump) and 14710-1, Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer Switch and Control Circuit 18 Month Surveillance Test (2A Safety Injection Pump)
  • Procedure 14666-2, Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test (Section 5.1)
  • Procedure 14667-2, Train B Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test (Section 5.1)
  • Procedure 14609-1, SSPS Slave Relay K601 Train B Test Safety Injection

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness 1EP6 Drill Evaluation a.

Inspection Scope

On February 13, the inspectors observed an emergency response facility activation drill involving a steam generator tube rupture scenario. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator control room and Technical Support Center to verify that classification, notification, and operator actions were in accordance with licensee procedures 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions, 91002-C, Emergency Notifications, and 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. In addition, the inspectors attended the licensee critique following the drill to verify that weaknesses were identified for resolution.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA5 Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (Temporary Instruction 2515/145)

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees activities in response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, in accordance with NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/145, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (NRC Bulletin 2001-01), dated September 9, 2001.

b.

Findings The licensees response, dated August 29, 2001, to the bulletin indicated that Vogtle fell into the NRC category of plants with a low susceptibility to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking using a time-at-temperature analysis. Based on this low susceptibility, the licensee did not plan on conducting vessel head inspections during the Unit 1 refueling outage. However, following the March 7, 2002 identification of a significant loss of metal surrounding a vessel head penetration nozzle at another power plant, the licensee decided to conduct an examination of the reactor vessel head.

The licensees examination involved a remote visual inspection and video taping of the top of the reactor head surface in the area of the 78 control rod drive mechanisms and head vent penetrations under the head insulation. The inspectors verified the adequacy of Westinghouse Field Service procedure MRS-SSP-1312, Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Remote Visual Inspections for A. W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1, used to conduct the examination and verified the ASME visual test (VT)-2 Level III qualifications of the individuals conducting the examinations. The inspectors observed a representative sample of these video examinations and made the following observations regarding the examination process and results:

  • The visual clarity and color of the video inspection process allowed for effective visual examination of the vessel head surface and 100% circumferential coverage of each

head penetration and its associated annulus region. No leakage was identified from any of the vessel head penetrations.

  • There were no significant examples of insulation, leakage sources, debris, dirt, or other physical impediments that prevented a complete visual examination.
  • The vessel head was generally free of debris, dirt, or large boron deposits.

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to J. Gasser, Nuclear Plant General Manager, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 5, 2002. No proprietary information was identified.

.2 Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) - Annual Assessment Meeting On March 19, 2002, the NRC Division of Reactor Projects Branch Chief and the Senior Resident Inspector assigned to the VEGP met with SNC to discuss the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the NRCs annual assessment of VEGP safety performance for the period of April 1, 2001 - December 31, 2001. This meeting was open to the public. The major topics addressed were: the NRCs assessment program, the results of the VEGP assessment, and the NRCs Agency Action Matrix. Attendees included VEGP members of both site management and staff.

Information used for the discussions of the ROP is available from the NRCs document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML020600179. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed Item Number Item Type Title 2515/145 (Docket 50-424)

TI Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (NRC Bulletin 2001-01) (Section 4OA5)

Attachment Supplementary Information LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee W. Bargeron, Manager Operations W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support G. Frederick, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager J. Gasser, Nuclear Plant General Manager K. Holmes, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness P. Rushton, Plant Support Assistant General Manager NRC S. Cahill, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2 INSPECTION DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 1R05 REA 99-VAA650, Door Database Procedure 92000-C, Fire Protection Program Procedure 92855-1, Zone 155 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse Train B Fire Fighting Preplan Procedure 92856-1, Zone 156 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse Train A Fire Fighting Preplan Procedure 92857A-1, Zone 157A Auxiliary Feedwater Pumphouse Train C Fire Fighting Preplan Procedure 92861-2, Zone 161 Diesel Generator Building Fire Fighting Preplan Procedure 92862-2, Zone 162 Diesel Generator Building Fire Fighting Preplan Procedure 92866-2, Zone 166 Diesel Generator Tanks and Pump House Fire Fighting Preplan Procedure 92709-2, Zone 9 Auxiliary Building RHR Pump Room Train B Procedure 92710-2, Zone 10 Auxiliary Building RHR Pump A Fire Fighting Preplan Procedure 92719-1, Zone 19 Auxiliary Building CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pump Rooms Fire Fighting Preplan Procedure 92720-1, Zone 20 Auxiliary Building CVCS Centrifugal Charging Pump Room Train A Fire Fighting Preplan Section 1R07 Procedures:

Procedure 83306-C, CCW Heat Exchanger Fouling Factor Testing Procedure 83308-C, Testing of Safety Related NSCW System Coolers Procedure 83310-C, Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Testing Procedure 85360-C, Circulating Water, NSCW, and River Water Makeup Chemistry Control Condition Reports (CRs):

Attachment CR 1999000854, Operator identified NSCW pump 4 motor cooler flow below acceptable range CR 2000001323, Containment spray motor cooler flow not in expected range due to debris in cooler CR 2000001755, Intermittent noise in NSCW piping downstream of 1B CCP, 1B CSP, and 1B RHR pumps CR 2000002368, 1B CCW heat exchanger fouling factor testing not performed during steady state conditions CR 2001000945, Debris found in tubes during inspection of 2B CCW heat exchanger CR 2001000967, Debris in 2B CCW heat exchanger CR 2001002642, Misalignment of Unit 2 SI Pump B lube oil cooler end cover CR 2001003040, Unit 2 NSCW Pump 4 Motor Cooler Flow found outside acceptance criteria CR 2002000093, Conductivity/nitrite anomaly in certain closed cooling water systems Work Orders (MWOs):

MWO 10000981-00, Measurement of NSCW flow on various equipment MWO 19203226-00, Visually inspect EDG Train A jacket water heat exchangers MWO 19203227-00, Visually inspect EDG Train B jacket water heat exchangers Other Documents:

Vogtle response to Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment, dated January 25, 1990 Maintenance Rule NSCW System monthly performance monitoring and evaluation reports, January 2000 to January 2002 Section 1R12 Vogtle Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual System 1204 Monthly Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports, September 1999 to September 2001 System 1604 Monthly Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports, October 1998 to January 2002 System 2415 Monthly Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports, December 1998 to January 2002 System PROT Monthly Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports, July 1998 to January 2002 System SRMC Monthly Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports, January 1998 to March 2001 Section 1R19

Procedure 14980-2, Diesel Generator Operability Test Diesel Generator Surveillance Manual - GEN-95, Chapter 11 Drawing No. 2X3D-BD-K03E Procedure 25093-C, Battery Cell and Hardware Replacement Procedure 28705-C, 4.16KV/13.8 KV Circuit Breaker Inspection and Testing

Attachment Procedure 14805-1, Residual Heat Removal Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Tests Section 1R20 1R10 Revision 0 Schedule, dated February 22, 2002 Procedure 29542-C, Shutdown Risk Management Procedure 29540-C, Risk Assessment Monitoring Procedure 12005-C, Reactor Shutdown to Hot Standby (Mode 2 to Mode 3)

Procedure 12007-C, Refueling Operations (Entry into Mode 6)

Procedure 18019-C, Loss of Residual Heat Removal Procedure 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Procedure 18030-C, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling Procedure 13005-1, Reactor Coolant System and Refueling Cavity Draining Procedure 11899-1, RCS Draindown Configuration Checklist Procedure 23985-1, RCS Temporary Water Level System Procedure 14406-1, Boron Injection Flow Path Verification - Shutdown Procedure 93641-C, Development and Implementation of the Fuel Shuffle Sequence Plan Procedure 93663-C, Verification of Core Loading Pattern Procedure 14210-1, Containment Building Penetrations Verification - Refueling Procedure 00254-C, Foreign Material Exclusion and Plant Housekeeping Programs

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