IR 05000424/1989035
| ML20006D755 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1990 |
| From: | Aiello R, Brockman K, Rogge J, Starkey R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006D747 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-89-35, 50-425-89-40, NUDOCS 9002150024 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20006D755 (14) | |
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ppCfog'o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ATLANTA, oEORotA 30323,
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Report-Nos.:
50-424/89-35 and 50-425/89-40
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Licensee:
Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 1295
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Birmingham, AL 35201
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. Docket Nos.:
50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81-Facility Name:
Vogtle Units 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted:
December 2,1989 - January 5,1990 l
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Inspectors:.
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J.,FfRogge, Senior Resi5kir(t Inspector Date Signed g
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/-J/-90 R.f/Aiello Residerit Injpector Date Signed-
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. R. K tarkey,. Resident Jftspector -
Date Signed
. Approved By:
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J/ JNJ 90
K/ E. BrocJmin, yection Chief Date Signed
- 1 vision of Reactor Projects H
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l SUMMARY.
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This routine inspection entailed resident inspection-in the n
followi ng'
areasi. plant -operations, radiological-control s,
maintenance,- ' surveillance,- security, and quality programs and administrative controls affecting quality.
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-Results: One cited < violation was identified in the. area of quality controls
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for failure to follow procedure 85024-C for. establishing-quality control hold points (paragraph 2.b(7)). Three' non-cited violations were identified purs'uant to the discretionary provisions of the NRC '
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Enforcement Policy. 'Two are in the area of maintenance / surveillance
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for failure to follow procedures per TS 6.7.1 resulting in a. CVI (paragraphs 3.b(2)(a)) and (c)) and for failure to follow procedures per; TS 6.7.1 regarding procedure compliance with respect to valve
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reassembly. resulting in a turbine trip / reactor trip (paragraph
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i 3.b(2)(d))..The third non-cited violation is in the area or.
operations for. failure to follow procedures per TS 6.7.1 regarding
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valve operation resulting in a manual reactor ' trip. (paragraph
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3.b(2)(b)).
t 900215o024 900201
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gDR ADOCK 03000424
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REPORT DETAILS t~
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persons Contacted
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Licensee' Employees l
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- J. Aufdenkampe, Manager Technica! Support l
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- G..Bockhold, Jr., General Manager Nuclear Plant
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L C. Coursey Maintenance Superintendent
- G. Frederick, Safety Audit and Engineering Group Supervisor
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H. Handfinger,-Manager Maintenance
- W. Kitchens, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations
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- *R. Legrand, Manager Health Physics and Chee.lstry
- G. McCarley, Independent Safety Engineering Group Supervisor
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- A. Mosbaugh, Assistant General Manager Plant Support
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W. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor
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- R. Odom, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager i
- J. Swartzwelder, Manager Operations
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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, supervisors, engineers', operators, maintenance personnel, quality control inspectors,
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and office personnel.:
- Attended Exit Interview An alphabetical list of acronyms and initialisms is located in the last paragraph of the inspection report.
2.
0perational~ Safety Verification - (71707)(93702)
The facility began this inspection period with both units at 100% full
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power.
Unit 1:
The unit remained at full power-with the exception of minor power reductions-for maintenance through the end of this inspection period. On n
. December 11,:1939, during the performance of a surveillance on containment-radiation monitor 2kE-003, a CVI occurred.
-Unit 2:
D-On December. 2,1989, with the unit at 100% power, a turbine trip / reactor trip occurred due to a high level in the MSR. On December 3, 1989, the unit entered Mode ) (Startup) and went critical. On December 4, 1989, the unit enterea Mode'l (Power Operation) and synchronized to the grid.
The unit remained at full power with the exception of ii.inor power reductions i
for maintenance through the end of this inspection period.
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Control Room Activities I
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Control Room tours and observations were performed to verify that
facility operations were being. safely conducted within regulatory requirements.
These inspections consisted of one or more of the
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following attributes as cppropriate at the time of the inspection.
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- Proper Control Room staffing
- Control Room access and operator behavior
- Adherence to approved procedures for activities.in progress
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- Adherence to technical specification limiting conditions for i
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operation
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- Observance of-instruments and recorder traces of safety-related and L
important-to-safety systems for abnormalities
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>- Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct.
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- Control Board walkdowns
- Safety parameter display and the plant safety monitoring. system i
operability status
- Discussions and interviews with the On-Shift Operations Supervisor,
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Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operators, and the Shif t Technical
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Advisor (when stationed) to determine the plant status, plans, l
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- Review of the operator logs, unit logs, and shift turnover sheets
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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- M ility Activities.
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Facility tours and observations were performed to assess the j'
effectiveness of the administrative controls established by -direct E
. observation of. plant activities. interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status E
and LCOs, licensee' meetings, and facility records.
During these inspections, the following objectives were achieved:
(1) Safety System Status - Confirmation of system operability was obtained by verification that flowpath valve alignment, control and power supply alignments, component conditions, and support systems for the accessible portions of the ESF trains were
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proper - The inaccessible portions will be confirmed as availability permits.
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L (2) plant Housekeeping Conditions Storage of material.and
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L components and cleanliness conditions of. various areas throughout the facility were observed to determine whether safety and/or fire hazards existed.
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Fire protection activities, staf fing, and (3)
Fire Protection
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equipment were observed to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.
Radiation protection activities, (4)
Radiation Protection
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staffing, and equipment were observed to verify proper program implementation.
The inspection included review of the plant program ef fectiveness.
Radiation work permits and personnel compliance were reviewed during the daily plant tours.
Radiation Control Areas were observed to verify proper identification and implementation.
(5) Security - Security controls were observed to verify that security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty, and access to the Protected Area was controlled in accordance with the f acility security plan.
Personnel were observed to verify proper display of badges and that personnel requiring escort were properly escorted.
Personnel within Vital Areas were observed to ensure proper authorization for the area. Equipment operability or proper compensatory activities were verified on a periodic basis.
(6) Surveillance (61726)
Surveillance tests were observed to
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verify that approved procedures were being used, qualified personnel were conducting the tests, tests were adequate tu verify equipment operability, calibrated equipment was utilized, and TS requirements were followed.
The inspectors observed portions of the following surveillances and/or reviewed completed data against acceptance criteria:
Surveillance No.
Title 14235-2, Rev. 2 On-site Power Distribution
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Operability Verification 14514-C, Rev. 3 FHB Post Accident Exhaust System Operability Test Test 14607-2, Rev. 6 SSPS Slave Relay K618 SI Train "B" Test 14611-1(2), Rev. 0(0)
SSPS Slave Relay K602 SI Train "B" Test 14613-2, Rev. O SSPS Slave Relay K603 SI Train "B" Test
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Surveillance No.
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(continued)
14825-1(2), Rev. 12(3)
C5 And CVCS System Train "A" Valve Inservice Test j
14850-2, Rev. 3 Celd shutdown Valve Inservice Test
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(7) Maintenance Activities (02703)
The inspector observed
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maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment
clearances were in effect; work wqwsu und fire prevention i
work permits, as required, were innd and b&ing followed;
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quality control personnet wer9 w ail die for inspection activities as required; retesting &nd return of systems to
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service was prompt and correct; and i$ Paquitements were being
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followed.
The Maintenance Work Order backlog was reviewed, and
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maintenance was observed er.d/or vork packages were reviewed for the following maintenance activities:
MWO No.
Work Description
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18906257 Ir.vestt; ate /hvork PERM Monitor In-
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Order To Rewtore To Proper Operation
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18906131 Troubleshout And Clear Ground On-125 VOC feitchgear 1ADI i
28906273 Repair Extraction. Steam Flow Orifice To.
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6B Heater (leaking)
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18905182 NSCW Return Header Temperature
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Calibration Train "A"
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r 18905060 Install Jumpers Around Cell 37 In
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Battery 1AD1B -
Per-Temporary Modification 1-89-025
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On December 29, 1989, while observing the performance of MWO 18905060, Install : Jumpers Around Cell 37 In Battery 1ADIB Per Temporary:
Modification-1-89-025 the NRC inspector noted that there were
no quality control observations. being performed.
10 CFR
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Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, and the licensee's accepted QA
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program in FSAR Section 17.2.10 require that a program for
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inspection of activities affecting quality shall be established
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t activity to verify conformance with the documented instructions, procedures, and drawings for accomplishing the activity. ANSI i
N45~.2.4 (also designated as IEEE Standard 336-1971), committed c
to in FSAR Chapter 1.9.30, states that checks and inspections-
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shall be performed to verify the operational-readiness and
completeness of components and systems.
Plant procedure
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-85024-C, Electrical. Inspection, implements the-inspection
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activities by providing for the establishment and control of-j quality control hold points in work activities.
Procedure t
85024-C, step 4.5.3, requires hold points to verify that battery e
terminations are tightened or torqued to the values listed in procedure "27915-0, General Battery Maintenance, as directed by
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Operations Procedure 85010-C, step 4.4.6,_ Inspection Planning.
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The inspector's questioning of personnel on the job site revealed that the QC department did not apply their procedures i
due ' to the fact that the MWO was implemented by a temporary
modification. During the startup program, there was a practice i
of not using QC to witness temporary modification installations
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due to the number and short-term duration of temporary
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modifications.
The licensee confirmed that hold points were still not being established when temporary modifications were
involved even though the QC program had not allowed. this exception since startup. Failure to properly train-QC personnel I
of a significant change in program implementation is a weakness in the QC training-program.
This item is identified as:
f Violation 50-424/89-35-01 and 50-425/89-40-01, " Failure to Follow Procedure 85024-C For Establishing Quality Control Hold Points."
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One violation was identified in paragraph 2.b(7) above.
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3.
Review of Licensee Reports (90712)(90713)(92700)
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In-Office Review of Periodic and Special Reports This inspection consisted of reviewing the below listed reports to determine whether the information reported by the-licensee was
technically adequate and consistent with the inspector knowledge of
.the material contained within the report.
Selected materia 1'within.
t the report was questioned randomly to verify accuracy and to provide
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a reasonable assurance that other NRC personnel have an appropriate
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document for their activities.
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Monthly Operating Report - The report dated December.13,1989, was reviewed. The inspector had no comments.
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Deficiency Cards and Licensee Event Reports
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Deficiency Cards and Licensee Event Reports were reviewed for i
potential' generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether
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corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 were reviewed following occurrence to
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determine if the technical specifications and other regulatory requirements were satisfied. In-office review of LERs may result in further followup to verify that the stated corrective actions have
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described in the LER.
Each LER was reviewed for enforcement action
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. in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, and where the violation
was not cited the criteria specified in Sections V.A or V.G.1 of the
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NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
Review of DCs was performed
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to maintain a realtime status of deficiencies, determine regulatory
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compliance, follow the _ licensee corrective actions, and assist as a
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basis for closure of the LER when reviewed. Due to the numerous DCs
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processed, only those DCs.which result in enforcement. action or p
further inspector followup with the licensee at - the end of the.
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inspection are listed below.
The DCs and LERs denoted with an
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asterisk -indicate that. reactive inspection occurred - following the
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event and prior to receipt of the written report.
. (1) The following Deficiency Cards were reviewed:
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(a) DC 1-89-1617
" Incorrectly Sized Fuses Discovered During Licensee Fuse Inspection."
On December 16, 1989, while inspecting-fuses in IRX13122 as part of the licensee fuse inspection program, the licensee
discovered a 3 amp fuse which _ should have been a 5' amp fuse.. This DC was another example of incorrect _ fuse usage -
which was identified in LER 50-424/89-02.
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(b) DC 1-89-1624, " Liquid Waste Effluent Monitor Powered Down-
For Maintenance Without Proper Coordination With The
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Operations Or Chemistry Department."
On December 21, 1989, 1RE0018, Liquid Waste Effluent Monitor, was powered down to perform maintenance on the
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monitor.
Neither operations nor chemistry was notified of
the status ot' 1RE0018.
No actual release occurred during
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this time per'tod. The licensee is investigating the.cause and will determine corrective actions.
4 (2) The following LERs were reviewed and closed.
(a)
50-424/89-20, Rev. O, " Personnel Error Leads To Containment Ventilation Isolation."
On December 11,~1089, an Instrument and Controls technician was preparing to check the fuses in Containment Low Range
Area Radiation Monitor 1RE-0003. He removed power from the
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monitor prior to lif ting the leads to the Engineered Safety Features actuation aircuits. The loss of power caused the monitor to revert to' its failed, or safe, condition which sent a high alarm signal to ESF actuation circuits, initiating a Containm?nt Ventilation Isolation.
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L cause of this event was cognitive personnel error on the
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procedure.
The technician was disciplined and provisions i
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for blocking the ESF actuation signal during maintenance and testing are currently planned for installation in 1990.
The inspector has no further questions regarding this LER.~
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Technical Specification 6.7.1 requwes tnat procedures
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recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, be followed and this was not_ done.
However, the event described herein meets the criteria for non-citation, In order to track this violation, the following is
[c established. This is only one example of this violation.
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j NCV 50-424/89-35-02 and 50-425/89-40-02, " Failure To Follow g
Procedure Per TS 6.7.1 Resulting In Containment Ventilation Isolation - LER 89-20."
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(b) 50-425/89-29, Rev.
O, " Spurious Valve Operation Leads To
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'On November 5, 1989, plant personnel were adjusting the
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Steam Generator Blowdown condensate cooling water return flow to the heater drain tanks.
Additionally, plant equipment operators were returning the Train
"A" Heater-L Drain Tank High Level Dump Valve, 2LV-4333, to service following replacement of its packing and gaskets. Prior to unisolating 2LV-4333, PEOs noticed that it was indicating 30% open.
To check operability, they isolated the air supply line to the valve, whereupon it went-full open, as expected.
They attributed the 30% opening to a valid
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demand signal and then proceeded to re-open the air supply l
line and opened the manual isolation valves which had isolated 2LV-4333 during the maintenance work.
At this point, they noticed steam and water coming from the 2LV-4333 packing, Opening of the isolation valves was stopped while the-PEOs sought further direction before continuing the process. With 2LV-4333 30% open, the Heater Drain Tank began dumping to the main condenser.
This l-caused the heater drain pump to isolate on heater drain
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tank low level which resulted in a low suction pressure alarm for. both main feedwater pumps.
As the suction pressure dropped, the standby condensate pump received a signal to automatically start but failed to do so.-
The BOP operator attempted to manually start the standby condensate pump with no success. The BOP operator began a power reduction to avoid a main feedwater pump trip, which subsequently occurred due to the low suction pressure. The decrease in feedwater flow and the resultant decrease in steam generator water levels (to 19% narrow-range) led the Reactor Operator to manually trip the reactor.
Control rods inserted, the Main Feedwater System isolated and
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the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed.
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Control room operators responded to maintain SG water
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levels, and the unit transitioned to operation in j
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Mode 3 (Hot Standby). During the-inspector's review of the
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transient, he noted a lack of attention to det6il and control of the plant by. operations personnel-.
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instance, PE0's had established operability checks and made E
assumptions without control room approval.
The evolution
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L of returning equipment to service following maintenance is
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a critical' function requiring the full attention.of the i
control room.
The inspector has no further questions
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regarding this LER. However, the event' described herein represents-a violation of NRC requirements which meets the
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criteria for non-citation.
In order to track this item, a
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k NCV 50-425/89-40-03; " Failure To Follow Procedures Per
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TS 6.7.1 Regarding Valve Operation Resulting In A Manual p
Reactor Trip - LER 89-29."
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(c) 50-425/89-30, Rev. 0~ " Personnel Error Leads To Containment
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Isolation."
On November 26, 1989, an-Instrument and Controls technician was performing the 18-month Analog Channel Operational Test
on containment low range area radiation monitor 2RE-0003.
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The monitor's Remote / Bypass switch was in the " Bypass"
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position when the technician introduced a test-signal to simulate a
high radiation reading.
The monitor's i
processing unit took approximately four minutes to process'
the signal. However, the technician did not understand the
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delay and proceeded to check the gain and background signal
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to' ensure they were correct.
He moved the Remote / Bypass i
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switch to. the " Remote" position which allowed the test signal to initiate a Containment Ventilation Isolation.
The root cause of this event was cognitive personnel error on the part of the technician.
The procedure which was
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being employed to conduct the test.did not address movement-of the Remote / Bypass switch at the time when the technician
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moved it to the - Remote position. The technician has been
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counseled regarding the importance of compliance with
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procedures and to seek guidance when expected test results
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i are not achieved. - The event described in this LER is a h
second example of failing to follow procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.7.1, but represents a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria -for non-citation.
This is the second example of the non-cited violation described in paragraph 3.b(2)(a) above.
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(d) 50-425/89-31 Rev. O, " Heater Drain ~ Tank Valve Reassembly Error Leads To Turbine / Reactor Trip."
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On - December 2,1989, with the unit at 100% rated power, a turbine trip / reactor trip occurred due to a high level in
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-i Moisture Separator Reheater
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Plant personnel were
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I; releasing a clearance on Heater Drain Tank high level dump
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valve 2LV-4334.
The high level dump valve for Moisture
' Separator Reheater
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2LV-4525, was in the 50%
jacked-opened position due to 2LV-4334 being isolated.
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evident that 2LV-4334 was not' closed.
The HDT level-decreased and the normal level control valve, 2LV-4332, closed.
The isolation valve was reclosed and HDT level
rose; however, 2LV-4332 f ailed to reopen resulting in rising-feedwater heater levels and, due to the configuration of 2LV-4525 MSR D level rose as well.
The root cause for the event was cognitive personnel error E
involving. reassembly of 2LV-4334.
The valve was reassembled such that-its position indi' cation showed closed when it was actually full open.
For 2LV-4332, the level control sensing lines were discovered to be clogged which resulted in its malfunction.
Several abnormalities
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occurred following. the reactor trip, but had no impact on
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the ability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
These occurrences included the
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lifting and reclosing of steam generator atmospheric relief
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valve 2PV-3020 at a steam line pressure below. the lif t I
setpoint, an apparent waterhammer involving ofeedwater p
.. heater "4B", and the trip of breakers 2NBL1-04 and 2NBL1-13 during the residual -transfer of 4160 V switchgear 2NA01.
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The trip of breakers 2NBL1-04 and 2NBL1-13 resulted in normal lighting not being restored to portions of the Auxiliary Building and the Control Building.following completion of the residual transfer of 2NA01.
Operators responded to reset these breakers and restore lighting to-these areas. A walkdown of segondary piping and components h.
associated with feedwater heater "4B" was performed after the waterhammer occurred.
Two pressure indicators and.a pin for a pipe hanger were found damaged.
The inspector reviewed the post trip data and monitored corrective actions.
Long term corrective actions appear appropriate.
The inspector has no further questions.
The event described in this LER is a third example of failing to
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follow procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.7.1, but it represents a violation of NRC requirements j
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which meet the criteria for non-citation.
In order to-l q'
track this item, the following is established.
NCV ~ 50-425/89-40-04, " Failure To Follow Procedures Per
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TS 6.7.1 Regarding Procedure Compliance With Regards To Valve
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e LER 89-31."
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p Reassembly Resulting In A Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip
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Three non-cited violations were identified in paragraph 3.b above.
4.
Fitness For Duty Training - (255104)
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p The inspector witnessed one session of " Fitness for Duty Policy Awareness
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Training", on December. 7,1989, and one session of " Fitness for Duty i
Training for Supervisors", on December 13.
The inspector noted that-no
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. group training was conducted regarding. escort responsibilities even though each escort,is -individually briefed prior to entry into the protected
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area. The following areas were generally addressed:
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licensee policy procedures, including the methods that will be.
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used to implement the policy; q
the personal and public health and safety hazards associated
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with abuse of. drugs and misuse of alcohol;
U the effect of prescription. drugs, over-the-counter drugs, 'and-l
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dietary conditions on job performance and chemical test results, c
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-and the role of the Medical Review Officer; employee assistance programs provided by the licensee;
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what is expectad of employees and what consequences may result
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from lack of adherence to the policy;
their role and responsibilities in implementing the program;
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the roles and responsibilities of others, such as the personnel,
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medical, and employee assistance program staffs;
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techniques for recognizing aberrant behavior, drugs, and
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b indications of the use, sale, or possession of drugs;
-lt behavioral observation techniques for detecting degradation in
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-performance, impairment, or changes in employee behavior; and-j the procedures for initiating appropriate corrective action and
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reporting problems to supervisory or security personnel, including referral to the employee assistance program.
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l Georgia Power Company has certified in a letter dated December 28, 1989,
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that 'a Fitness For Duty program has been ' implemented which meets the
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requirements of 10 CFR Part 26.
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The broad training objectives of the fitness for duty rule as outlined in
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i, the guidance of TI 2515/104 for each type of training was addressed to the
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inspector's satisfaction.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
a 5.
Actions on Previous Inspection Findings - (92701)
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(Closed) IFI 50-424/88-31-02 " Review Engineering Design And Operators
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Actions For ALB 17Al - High Feedwater Nozzle Temperature."
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The inspector reviewed the Westinghouse response to the Licensee's
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request to remove' the feedwater line temperature sensors. 'These
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temperature sensors were originally installed to provide a margin against a bubble collapse waterhammer that potentially may occur in the feed,line.- The licensee demonstrated that these sensors are
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neither properly designed -nor needed due to other features.
The
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licensee has. implemented the guidelines outlined in the standard
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review plan that has been developed to reduce the probability of ~ a L
damaging steam condensation induced waterhammer.
T. hey are as follows:
Prevent or delay water draining from the feedring following a i
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drop in steam generator water level by means such as J-Tubes.
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Minimize the volume of feedwater piping external to-the steam I
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generator which could pocket steam using the shortest possible l
i" (less than seven feet) horizontal run of inlet piping to the steam generator feedring.
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.
Perform tests acceptable to NRC to verify that unacceptable
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feedwater-hammer will not occur using the plant operating
procedures for normal -and emergency restoration of steam generator water level following loss of normal feedwater and possible draining of the feedring.
Provide the procedures for
'these tests-for approval before conducting the tests.
Furthermore, the licensee has incorporated many of t,he Westinghouse operating procedures into operations procedure 13610, Precautions and Limitations, to mitigate the possibilities of such waterhammer occurring.
The actions required by this IFI are adequately complete, b.
(Closed) IFI 50-424/88-39-01, " Evaluate The Need To Upgrade The Fire Detection Operability Requirements."
u, The inspector reviewed procedure 92035-C, Rev. 5, Fire Protection
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Operability Requirement, Sections 1. 3.1 a nd 1. 3. 2, and procedure b
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L 92040-C, Rev. 2, Fire Protection LCO Program, Sections 4.2.6 and
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4.2.6-1.
LDCR 89-016 was approved on March 15, 1989, for FSAR Table
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L 9.5.1-10, Sections 1.3. A and 1.3.B revisions - These changes are a j
is result of the li:ensee's evaluation to upgrade the fire detection
{n operability requirement.
The inspector has no further questions.
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c.
(Closed) URI 50-424/88-32-01 " Damage To Cable During Installation Of
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Stainless Steel Tie Wraps,"
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This' item was officially closed in Report 50-425/88-67 on i
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p November 25, 1988.
The Unit 1 URI number was inadvertently omitted.
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This closeout action-is for administration purposes.
The inspector l
has no further comment.
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L 6.
Exit Interviews - (30703)
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o b
The inspection sco'e and findings were summarized on January 5, 1990, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspectors described
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v the areas inspected and discussed.in detail the inspection results.
No
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h dissenting comments were received from the licensee. 'The licensee did not
i identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by
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_the inspector during.this inspection.
Region based NRC exit interviews P
were attended during the inspection-period by a resident inspector. This
l inspection closed two. Inspector Followup Items (paragraphs 5.a and 5 b),
one Unresolved Item (paragraph 5.c), and four Licensee Event Reports i
(paragraph 3 b(2)).
The items identified during this inspection were:
l VIO 50-424/89-35-01 and-50-425/89-40-01, " Failure To Follow Procedure 85024-C For Establishing Quality Control-Hold Points" - paragraph p
2.b(7),
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NCV 50-424/89-35-02 and 50-425/89-40-02,
" Failure To Follow.
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Procedures Per TS 6.7.1 Resulting In ' A CVI" paragraphs 3.b(2)(a)
i and(c).
!
r NCV - 50-425/89-40-03, " Failure To Follow Procedures Per TS 6.7.1 Regarding Valve Operation Resulting In A Manual Reactor Trip" t
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paragraph 3.b(2)(b).
l NCV 50-425/89-40-04, " Failure To Follow Procedures Per TS 6.7.1 Regarding Procedure Compliance With Respect' To Valve Reassembly Resulting In a Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip" paragraph 3,b(2)(d).
7.
Acronyms And Initialisms ANSI American National Standard Institute i
B0P Balance of Plant CFR-Code of Federal Regulations
CS, Containment Spray System CVCS Chemical & Volume Control System
CVI-Containment Ventilation Isolation
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DC Deficiency Cards
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ESF'
Engineered Safety Features
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FHB
' Fuel Handling Building
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FSAR.
Final Safety Analysis Report
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t 1HDT Heater Orain Tank
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IEEE Institute of-Electrical and Electronic Engineers
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' Inspector Followup: Item
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N LCO Limiting Conditions for Operations-
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O LDCR License Document Change Request
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LER Licensee Event Reports MSR-Moisture Separator. Reheater.
- v-MWO-Maintenance Work Order
F-
-NCV Non-cited Violation f
NPF-Nuclear Power Facility
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NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission'
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-NSCW Nuclear Service Cooling Water $ystem
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s PE0 Plant Equipment _ Operator
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W PERMS Process Effluent Radiation Monitor System
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X QA Quality Assurance
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QC.
Quality Control
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Rev Revision j
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SI-Safety' Injection System
.
SSP 5:
Solid-State Protection System TI
. Teinporary Instruction
- TS Technical-Specification
,i URI-Unresolved Item
VDC Volts Direct Current-VIO.
Violation
NSCW Nuclear Service Cooling Water System-
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.PE0-Plant Equipment Operator-
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PERMS Process Effluent Radiation _ Monitor Syst'em
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QC Quality Control _
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Revision.
.i F-SG Steam Generator
SI Safety Injection System-
.d SSPS
. Solid State Protection: System
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- TI-Temporary Instruction TS
. Technical Specification
'URI Unresolved Item
VDC~
Volts Direct Current
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Violation
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