IR 05000410/1981006
| ML17053C818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1981 |
| From: | Feil R, Kister H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053C817 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-81-06, 50-410-81-6, NUDOCS 8109030095 | |
| Download: ML17053C818 (16) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Repor t No. 50-410/81-06 Docket No. 50-410 License No.
CPPR-112 Pri ority Category B
Licensee: 'ia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration 300 Erie Boulevard West S racuse New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Inspection At:
Syracuse, New York and Scriba, New York Inspection Conduct d:
Jul 14-16, 1981 C
Inspectors:
R.
. Feil, eactor Inspector Approved By:
H.B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1C, Division of Resident nd Project Inspection Ins ection Summar
date signed ate signed Ins ection on Jul 14-16 1981 Re ort No. 50-410/81-06 Areas Ins ected:
Routine announced inspection by one regional based inspector of licensee actions on bulletins and circulars.
The inspection involved 23 inspector hours at corporate headquarters and onsite by one regional based inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. Apri 1 77)
8109030095 810820'"
PDR ADOCK 05000410
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration NMPC J.L. Dillon, Senior Site QA Representative G.J.
Doyle, QA Engineer (site)
- L. Fenton, QA Engineer (corporate)
- P. Francisco, Nuclear Engineer S.F.
Manno, Project Manager R.L. Patch, QA Engineer ( site)
- N.L. Rademacher, Nuclear Design Coordinator, Unit 2 G.K. Rhode, Vice President, System Project Management
"S.W.
Wilczeic, Lead Nuclear Engineer Stone and Webster En ineerin Cor oration SWEC C.E.
Gay, Superintendent, FQC D. Gibson, Senior QC Engineer R.
Huggon, QC Engineer
- denotes those present at exit meeting.
The inspector conferred with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Bulletins and Circulars The inspector examined records and interviewed licensee and contractor personnel to verify action taken with respect to IE Bulletins and Circulars.
For each Bulletin and Circular shown below, the inspector verified that the identified problem was resolved as indicated.
a.
Item or Com onent Not Used in Safet Related S stem or in Facilit (Closed)Bulletin 79-09 Failure of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker in Safety Related Systems.
(Closed)Bulletin 79-11 Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems.
(Closed)Bulletin 80-02 Inadequate Quality Assurance for Nuclear Supplied Equipmen (Closed)Bulletin 80-19 Failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays in Reactor Protection Systems of Operating Power Plants Designed by Combustion Engineering.
(Closed) Circular 79-02 Failure of 120 Volt Vital AC Power Supplies'Closed)
Circular 79-13 Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors.
(Closed) Circular 79-18 Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety Relief Valves.
(Closed) Circular 79-19 Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pumps.
(Closed) Circular 79-20 Failure of GTE Sylvania Relay Type PM
.,Bulletin 7305, Catelog 5V12-11-AC with 120v AC Coil.
(Closed) Circular 79-22 Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves.
(Closed) Circular 79-23 Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate.
(Closed) Circular 79-25 Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference.
Item or Com onent Added to "Excluded Items List" (Closed)Bulletin 79-25 Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety Related Systems.
(Closed)Bulletin 80-09 Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies.
(Closed)Bulletin 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral Control Switches.
(Closed)Bulletin 80-23 Failures of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corporation.
(Closed) Circular 79-10 Pipefittings Manufactured from Unacceptable Material.
c.
Other Action Taken (Closed)Bulletin 78-12, 12A and 12B Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Vessel Welds.
Chicago Bridge and Iron, fabricator of the reactor vessel, submitted a generic report to NRC IE Hg as allowed by Bulletin
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78-12A.
GE and the licensee have reviewed and agree with the report.
NRC IE Hg has reviewed the report and has con-cluded that the material used in the reactor vessel meets the applicable acceptance criteria.
There is no archive material available for verification purposes.
(Closed)Bulletin 79-03 Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 30455 Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company.
The spools were radiographed by ITT-Grinnel.
The inspector reviewed a sample of the records of the radiography.
Minor discrepancies were found and were identified for correction during the review.
(Closed)Bulletin 79-07 Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping.
Stone and Webster Engineering Company reviewed and verified that the computer codes PSTRESS/Shock 3 and NUPIPE-SW calculate displacements and force responses of piping structures sub-jected to multi-directional seismic excitation using the provisions for Model Superposition/Response Spectrum Tech-niques as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.92, Revision 1,
February 1976.
General Electric supplied the analysis to the NRC in NEDO 24210.
(Closed)Bulletin 79-15 Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies.
Five deep draft vertical pumps will be used at NMP2.
They
=have not been received on site.
Manufacturers data was provided in the licensee's response to the bulletin.
As requested by the bulletin, drawings, sectional assemblies, parts lists, design specification, installation procedures, and quality assurance and reliability testing requirements will be available for inspection on site when the pumps are received on site.
Records of pump test results and maintenance will be maintained on site and made available for inspection as they are performed.
(Closed)Bulletin 79-23 Potential Failure of Emergency Diesel Generator Field Exciter Transformer.
The control power transformer for the Division I and II diesels at Unit 2 is a three phase transformer.
It is wye-wye connected to the generator with a floating neutral.
The Division III High Pressure Core Spray diesel has a single phase transformer which supplies power to a rotary exciter field.
This transformer is connected phase to phase to the generator.
Therefore, with these arrangements, there are no
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I common connections between the control power transformers and the generator neutral.
Full load carrying capacity tests in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1. 108, Revision
dated August 1977, Section C.2.a.3, will be conducted at Unit 2 during the preoperational tests of the emergency diesel generators.
This testing is scheduled to take place during the first half of 1983.
(Closed)Bulletin 80-03 Loss of Charcoal from Standard Type II, 2 inch Tray Absorber Cells.
The charcoal absorber cells have not been received on site.
They are manufacturerd by Mine Safety Appliances Company.
Their design will utilize spot welding every 3/4 inch to prevent loss of charcoal from the absorber cells.
(Closed)Bulletin 80-08 Examination of Containment Liner Welds.
The bulletin resulted from NDE performed on containment pen-etration welds at Nine Mile Point, Unit 2.
This was identified as an Infraction, 79-02-02.
The problem was resolved based upon the fact that the licensee re-examined by radiography all fluid head penetration weld'epairs were made of all welds which were found rejectable.
(Closed)Bulletin 81-03 Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components by Corbicula Sp. (Asiatic Clam) and Mytilus Sp.
(Mussel).
The licensee stated that the mussel (Mytilus sp.) is a
marine and estuarine species found in salt water environments only.
Recent lentic studies have not produced evidence for the presence of Corbicula sp. (Asiatic Clam) in Lake Ontario near the Unit 2 site.
(Closed) Circular 78-16 Limitorque Valve Actuators.
The information described in the circular will be addressed in an operating procedure.
(Closed) Circular 78-19 Manual Override (Bypass) of Safety System Actuation Signals.
The licensee stated that General Electric NSSS safety systems are designed in accordance with IEEE 279 and Regulatory Guide 1.47.
The design will be reviewed by the NRC during the FSAR revie l~
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(Closed) Circular 79-04 Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators.
Velan Engineering Corporation is supplying all motor-operated valves affected by this IE Circular.
To prevent the problem described, Velan is staking the locking nuts on all SMB motor operator units, and Limitorque Corporation, the supplier of the motor operating units, is staking all SB units.
(Closed) Circular 79-05 Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Con-ductors.
The data supporting environmental qualification of terminal blocks inside the primary containment for NMP2 design con-ditions is not yet available.
Stone
& Webster plans to use qualified in-line splices which would preclude moisture in-leakage at the terminations.
This item will be tracked on the licensing commitments list to ensure that the effect of moisture leakage in stranded wire conductors is given adequate consideration.
(Closed) Circular 79-17 Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches on General Electric Metal Clad Circuit Breakers.
The inspector reviewed records which revealed that General Electric personnel supervised the replacement of 134 SB-12 auxiliary switches on the normal distribution system 4. 16kv and 13.8kv switchgear and circuit breakers.
(Closed) Circular 79-21 Prevention of Unplanned Releases of Radioactivity.
The information described in the circular will be included in operations procedures and will also be included in facility training.
d.
Bulletins Needin Additional Information (Open)Bulletin 79-04 Incorrect Weights for Swing Checks Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation.
The bulletin requested the following information:
1.
List all Seismic Category I piping systems (or portions thereof)
Where 3, 4, or 6 inch diameter Velan swing check valves are installed or are scheduled to be installed.
2.
Verify for all those systems identified in item 1 above that correct check valve weights were used in the piping analysi s ~
Explain how and when the correct valve weights were determined.
3.
If incorrect valve weights were used, explain what actions have been taken or are planned to re-evaluate the piping systems affected.
Specify for all the affected systems identified in Item
whether modifications were or are required to the piping systems or their supports because of changes in valve weight.
Also, include the basis for this determination.
For those systems in which the actual valve weight is greater than the design weight provide a
summary of stresses and loads and their allowable limits for the piping and its supports.
Identify the analytical technique including identification of any computer codes used to determine the stresses indicated in Item 4.
6.
All holders of operating licenses for power reactor facilities are requested to complete Items 1 through 5 as promptly as possible, but no later than May 1, 1979.
Report in writing by May 1, 1979, to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office to describe your evaluation, any discrepancies in meeting Items 1 through 5, and, if necessary, your plans and schedule for resolution.
For planned action, a final report is to be submitted upon completion of your action.
The licensee's response was that ".
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.no 1500 psi 3, 4, or 6-inch diameter Velan swing check valves are being installed or planned to be installed in Seismic Category 1 piping systems at Nine Mile Point Unit 2."
The licensee acknowledged that the response was not complete and has committed to having a complete response by September 30, 1981.
The inspector expressed concern that activities relating to Bulletins/
Circulars/Information Notices. were not programatically defined.
The licensee stated that a program procedure has been drafted and is currently being upgraded.
A functional flow chart does presently exist.
The inspector stated that he did not see any evidence that bulletin/
circular activities which may be controlled and documented at the site were verified by the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation site gA staff.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that they would be considered in the upgrading of the program procedure.
No items of noncompliance were identifie +14
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Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee's representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 16, 1981.
The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding P e