IR 05000410/1981003
| ML17053C674 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1981 |
| From: | Feil R, Kister H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053C673 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-81-03, 50-410-81-3, NUDOCS 8106160586 | |
| Download: ML17053C674 (18) | |
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U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Repor t Ho.
50-410/81-03 Docket. Ho.
50-410 License Ho. CPPR-112 Priority Category Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard East Syracuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted:
ri" 21-23~ l981 Inspectors:
R.A. Feil, Reactor Inspector date signed date signed Approved by:
H.
. Keister, e
,
Reac r
rogects S
tion 1C, i
sion of sident and Project Inspection date signed date signed Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on A ril.21-23, 1981 Re ort No. 50-410/81-03
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inspector of unresolved items and facility status.
The inspection involved 20 inspector-hours on site by one NRC regional based inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration NMPC
"J.L. Dillon, Senior Site gA Representative
- G.J. Doyle, gA Engineer C.G.
Honors, Construction Engineer G.E. Sanford, Construction Manager Stone 8 Webster En ineerin Cor oration S&WEC
~S.W.
Crowe, Assistant Superintendent, FgC
.
~8.L. Holsinger, Field QC Engineer
"M.R. Oleson, Construction Engineer
"G.W. Page, Engineer, Site Engineering Office
"H.J. Pierre, Engineer, Resident Engineering Office.
~denotes those present at exit interview.
The inspector conferred with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspectio ~
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2.
~Fili T
The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work and plant status in several areas of the'facility during the course of the inspection-.
Presence of quality control inspectors, quality control records, conformance with procedural requirements and equipment preservation was observed.
The inspector conferred with craft personnel, supervision and quality inspection personnel as such personnel were available in the work areas.
Specifically, the inspector observed cadwelding in progress on the containment wall and welding of plates on the biological shield wall.
The inspector noted that preheat temperatures were within specification ranges, temp sticks were used as needed, and preheat temperatures were recorded for the biological shield wall repair work.
The inspector noted in one
.occasipn. that two hot boxes for the welding electrodes were propped open.
During a subsequent tour of the area, the inspector noted that one of the same hot boxes was again propped open.
The welders using these boxes closed the lids when the inspector's presence was known.
There is no requirement that hot boxes be used since the welding electrodes can be out of the ovens for up to four (4) hours, however, it is prudent practice to keep the hot boxes closed if they are to be used at the job site.
The inspector observed three Stone
& Webster (S&W) Field guality Control inspectors conducting a special inspection of the status of and bolting of structural steel for the reactor building at elevations 249'-0 and 247'-6.
The inspector noted the detail covered by the inspection.
The S&W inspectors appeared to conduct their inspection efforts with competence and efficiency.
They appeared to be proficient and knowledgeable in their functional inspection area t
)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Actions on Previous Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
Unresolved item (410/79-07-01):
Rigging and Handling pro-cedure does not address safety related equipment.
Construction Methods Procedure for Rigging and Equipment Maintenance CMP No.
10. 1-12.80 has been revised to include Special Handling Instructions which includes written instructions furnished by a manufacturer or seller of SAW gA Category 1 material/equipment.
Special handling instruction attributes considered are weight, size, configuration, susceptibility to shock damage, high nil ductibility transition temperature, materials, sellers instructions and vendor special handling instructions.
The inclusion of these attributes and special handling instructions in the procedure conform to the specific acceptance criteria required by ANSI N45.2.2 for the handling of applicable safety related equipment.
This specific unresolved item is closed.
However, the licensee submitted a report
,in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) citing inadequate procedures for implementing the requirements of ANSI N45.2.2.
Verification of the implementation of the ANSI standard and procedural requirements has not been completed by the licensee.
This verification remains an open item which has been designated 80-00-05.
(Closed)
Unresolved item (410/80-00-01):
Oeficencies in component seismic environmental qualification in GE supplied equipment.
During an audit of their nuclear steam supply system Vendor conducted the week of March 26, 1980, no evidence (lack of documentation)
was found to indicate that the three electrical instruments indicated below were adequately qualified:
Instrument MPL No.
ualification Lackin Conductivity Element E12-N001 Environmental and Seismic
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Level Transmitter E12-N008 Environmental and Seismic Rosemount Model 1151DP Differential Pressure Transmitter E12-N058 Environmental Test In-Complete The licensee reported that for the Rosemount Model 1151DP differential pressure transmitter, an additional search of the qualification records following the audit located the qualification documentation in another record file.
To prevent the recurrence of being unable to retrieve documentation in a timely manner, the nuclear steam supply system Ven-dor's guality Assurance Program is being modified to cross-reference qualification records and vendor-supplied documentation.
Regarding conductivity element E12-N001 and level transmitter E12-N008, it has been determined that no corrective action is required.
These instruments are considered to be passive and are not, required to function either during or after a design basis accident.
Since a
failure analysis shows that an electrical short circuit or open circuit in the instrument cannot damage the power source, no additional qualification is required.
The licensee stated that the electrical instruments have been shown to be adequately qualified to satisfy their intended design function.
Therefore, this condition could not have adversely affected the safety of operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2 at anytime throughout its ex-pected lifetime.
The inspector verified the adequacy of the report and the licensee's actions.
This item is considered closed.
(Open) Unresolved item (410/79-09-01):
Pipe support installation in-spection and corrective actio I
-V n
One audit finding (Report Cl) regarding the inspection of installed pipe supports recommended that the issuance of the subject Grinnell inspection procedure (FQC-4.2-14)
be expedited.
The follow-up audit (Report C3) found this issue to be as yet unresolved.
Six months after the issuance of the original audit finding, the inspector determined that the subject procedure had not been approved or issued.
Since the question of "prompt" and "timely" corrective action depends upon its relation to and effect upon the quality of the installed pipe hangers, the inspector examined the attributes listed in a draft of FQC-4 2-14 and interviewed personnel to determine if any adverse effect upon quality is created by the fact that no approved version of this procedure currently exists.
Several of the attributes refer to inspection in accordance with the "latest approved Engineering Detai 1 Drawing" and the inspector was informed that these are not available until after installation of the support and final approval of the actual installation details by engineering.
These supports are classified as "temporary" until such approval is provided.
While the inspector indicated some concern over this system of installation with subsequent approval and inspection, he recognizes that utilization of such a system with proper controls is not detrimental to quality.
The inspector verified that FQC-4.2-14-5, Field Quality Control Pro-cedure Inspection of Installed Pipe Supports has been written.
Additional procedural controls and examination of final approved Engineering Detail Drawings and examination of Temporary/Permanent hangers will be reviewed by the inspector upon resolution and com-pletion of the above items.
This item remains open.
(Open) Unresolved item (410/80-00-04):
Eight(8) rebar welded to plate imbedded in pedestal. per ASME vice AMS D12. 1.
Eight(8) sections of No.
14 rebar were welded to shear bars on the reactor pedestal plate in the field.
This type of weld is limited to these eight(8)
rebar.
This particular welding type was utilized due to congestion in the arear'owever, in the course of performing this work the following problems weve identified:
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1.
The welding procedure used was an ASME III procedure but was not qualified to the code applicable for the work performed, AWS D12. 1, 2.
The welder was qualified to ASME IX but not to the applicable code, AWS D12.1, 3.
The welds were not tested using sister splices as required by the specification.
As such, the structure did not conform to the Code, the specification, nor-the PSAR.
In addition, the eight(8) rebar to pedestal plate welds were not accessible.
The licensee evaluated the problem and determined the following:
1.
The welding procedure used for the welding of Ho.
14 rebar to plate PB-37 is qualified to ASME III and was used with a 300 F
preheat.,This procedure is adequate for the work performed and will provide acceptable results.
This has been verified by comparing the welding parameters specified in the procedure used with those specified in a procedure qualified to AWS D12. 1.
2.
The welding procedure used is comparable to an approved AWS D12. 1 procedure and the welder was qualified to the same procedure.
Also, a review of the welder's previous qualifications indicates that the rebar and plate that he actually welded are of essentially the same chemistry as the materials he was qualified to weld.
3.
Documentation indicates that a visual inspection was performed for these rebar welds indicating that surface cracks or discon-tinuities were not present.
4.
Initially, Plate PB-37 was designed to resist 405 pullout load k
due to various loading combinations.
The actual pullout load to
A Yg
be resisted by the plate is 336 for worst loading condition.
Eight No.
k 14 rebar welded to the plate can provide the maximum pullout capacity of 704
.
Therefore, the welds in question will never be stressed to full design load.
Design calculations of the plate indicated that maximum pullout load on any single No.
14 rebar will be 31.4 for the worst loading k
condition, which is far less than the allowable load of 88
.
k 5.
In order to further assure the adequacy of the welding procedure used, three sister splices and one dummy splice were prepared using the aforementioned ASME III procedure and tested for ten-sile stress.
All four developed over 87 ksi, which is more than the required 62.5 ksi.
The failure occurred in the bar in both coupons.
6.
Approval for a one-time deviation to AMS 012. 1 is being requested from the NRC-NRR.
The inspector reviewed the results of sister splices tested for ten-sile stress.
Two test plate/rebar coupons were prepared.
Each coupon consisted of two 014 rebar, Grade 5, welded to a 1~" thick plate.
The results of the test show that 1 coupon broke at 87, 100 psi and the second coupon broke at 87,500 psi.
This exceeds the required test strength of 62,500 psi.
The licensee is submitting a request to NRC-NRR for a one-time deviation from the AMS 012. 1 requirement as stated in the PSAR.
Pending approval by NRR of the PSAR change this item remains open.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Faci lit Status The licensee informed the inspector that the project is 37% complete.
Construction completion is 27%.
Manpower presently consists of 825
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craft and 425 non manual.
Major construction effort consists of cable tray installation; in the control, building, cad><elding on primary.
containment, placing concrete in secondary containment, turbine building and electric tunnels, installing floor drain piping; welding in suppression pool area and fit up and welding of cover plates in the biological shield wall.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Interview The. inspector met with the licensee's representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 23, 1981, The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding P
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