IR 05000220/1981022
| ML17054A026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1982 |
| From: | Bailey R, Caphton D, Christopher R, Dunlap J, Martin T, Nicholas H, Shepherd R, Rich Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17054A020 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-81-22, NUDOCS 8308240568 | |
| Download: ML17054A026 (50) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-220/81-22 Docket No.
50-220 License No.
DPR-63 Priority Category C
Licensee:
Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration 300 Erie Boulevard West S racuse New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit
Investigation At:
Scriba New York investigation Conducted:
Au ust 18-25 and Se tember 1-3 1981 Investigators:
o~
y c
'
nspector D. L.
Cap
, Chief, PS, DETP I.
R.
Christo h r, nves ator M.
D nl ap, rity Inspector t
H.
H. Nicholas, Reactor Inspector R.
E.
She her
, Senior Investigator R.
H. Smith, Senior Inv igator d l'i7 em dat d /8'~
date dat 4 >7 a
e 4 >7 I~
da e
4-/7-f'M date//z E-date Approved by:
T. T. Martin, Director, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs date Investi ation Summar
Investi ation on Au ust 18-25 and Se tember 1-3 1981 Investi ation Re ort No. 50-220/81-22 Areas Investi ated:
Investigation of the inoperable condition of both emergency diesel generators (EDG's)
due to open filter drain petcocks and drained fuel oil supply lines.
The condition was discovered by licensee personnel on August 18, 1981.
8308240568 830504 PDR ADQCK 05000220 I,, 8,.
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I.
SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS II.
PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION III. BACKGROUND A.
Emergency Diesel Generators B.
Licensee Discovery of Condition and Response C.
Response to Incident D.
Safety Significance IV.
DETAILS A.
Scope of Investigation B.
Interviews C.
Emergency Diesel Generators 0.
Security E.
Review of Records V.
STATUS VI.
EXHIBITS
~ 1 IL
I.
SUMMARY On August 18, 1981, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (licensee)
personnel discovered that both emergency diesel generators (EDG's) were in an inoperable condition due to open fuel line petcocks and drained fuel lines.
Immediate action was taken to cor> ect the EOG fuel problem, thus restoring the EDG's to an operable condition.
The licensee promptly reported the incident to the NRC, the FBI, and the New York State Police.
The incident did not impact the health and safety of the public.
The EDG's are provided to supply the emergency electric power needs of reactor safety systems in the event of loss of offsite power.
There were no events requiring emergency power during the period of EDG inoperability (possibly beginning as early as August 6, 1981, but the exact period could not be determined).
Further, both sources of offsite electric power were continuously available during the period.
Had the offsite power been unavailable, reactor emergency condensers could have been activated to provide reactor core cooling during the restoration of the EDG's.
The NRC investigation was initiated on August 18, 1981 to determine the specific cause of the above incident and events concerning it.
The investigation included examination of equipment and facilities, review of licensee procedures and records, and interviews with personnel.
The FBI did not conduct an active investigation.
The New York State Police closed their investigation subsequent to concluding that no actual property damage resulted from the incident and that there was no clear evidence of intent to cause such damage.
The investigation determined that the earliest date the EOG inoperability could have occurred was August 6, 1981, the date the most recent routine EDG surveillance tests were performed on both EDG's.
On August 16, a plant operator observed that the sight glasses in the EDG fuel line were empty (evidence of an inoperable condition); however, the auxiliary operator did not realize the significance of an empty sight glass in the fuel line and did not report it.
No evidence of forcible entry into the EDG vital area, no damage to the EDG equipment, and no evidence of drained fuel oil was found by either the NRC or the licensee.
The investigation failed to identify the circumstances concerning the draining of the EDG fuel via the petcocks.
The investigation determined that there was no routine monitoring of the EOG fuel line sight glass, which could have revealed the inoperable condition of the EOG's, and that there was inadequate training of auxiliary operators concerning the significance of the EDG fuel line sight glasses.
Measures taken by the licensee, and subsequently verified by the NRC Resident Inspector, to provide continued safe operation of the reactor were confirmed in an NRC Immediate Action Letter (IAL 81-28) dated August 18, 1981.
These measures were not included in the scope of this investigatio II.
PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION The purpose of this investigation was to examine the events concerning the inoperable condition of both emergency diesel generators (EDG's) due to open filter drain petcocks and drained fuel oil supply lines.
The condition was discovered by licensee personnel on August 18, 1981.
The investigation attempted to determine the cause of the inopet able condition and the length of time that the condition had existe III.
BACKGROUND Emer enc Diesel Generators There are two emergency diesel generators (EDG No.
102 and No.
103) at Nine Mile Point Nuc(ear Station, Unit 1.
The EDG's are composed of a diesel engine connected to a 3200 KVA generator.
Together with the two 115 KV transmission lines which provide electric power from offsite, the
'two EDG's provide a source of emergency power to operate emergency reactor systems to accomplish and maintain a safe shutdown of the reactor under any circumstances.
One of these four sources of power can supply the emergency power needs of the reactor.
To ensure this emergency power source, Section 3.6.3 of the Technical Specifications (Exhibit 1) requires that one EDG be in an operable condition (ice.,
ready to automatically begin diesel operation and the supplying of power) under any reactor condition other than cold shutdown.
Under normal conditions, the EDG'
fuel oil supply lines are filled in order to provide a suction medium between the fuel pump and the fuel oil supply tank.
Once operation of the EDG is initiated, an engine-driven fuel pump supplies fuel to the diesel engine from an onsite fuel supply that is sufficient for four days continuous EDG operation.
A schematic of the fuel supply system is attached as Exhibit 2.
In an operable condition, there would be fuel in the fuel supply line to the diesel engine cylinders and in a portion of the return line such that the sight glass in the return line would be full of fuel.
When the return line sight glass is empty, the fuel supply line is no longer filled and the EDG is inoperable.
There would be fuel in the bypass line and the bypass line sight glass when the pressure drop across the engine-mounted fuel filter is large (indicating a clogged fuel filter).
Although normally empty, the bypass line sight glass could be full when filter replacement is needed.
A petcock drain valve is located on the bottom of the engine-mounted fuel filter to drain the fuel from the filter during filter replacement.
Pictures of the EDG, the fuel filter, and sight glasses are attached as Exhibits 3, 4, and 5.
Licensee Discover of Condition and Action The Technical Specifications require surveillance tests (operation for one hour minimum with electric load)
on the EDG's to periodically confirm the operability of the EDG's (see'xhibit 1 for requirements).
On August 18, 1981, during reactor power operations, a surveillance test was performed on EDG No.
103 in preparation for maintenance on EDG No.
102 that would place EDG No.
102 in an inoperable condition.
Beginning at 10:29 a.m.,
plant operators twice attempted to manually start EDG No.
103 but the EDG failed to operate on either occasion (see Senior Shift Supervisor (SSS)
Log, Exhibit 6).
Only after nuclear auxiliary operator s closed the open
~1 I I
petcock drain valve on the fuel filter and refilled the fuel supply line using the fuel priming pump was EDG No.
103 successfully started.
Examination of EDG No.
102 revealed that it was also in an inoperable condition due to an open petcock drain valve.
EDG No.
102 was returned to an operable condition by the same technique described above for EDG No.
103.
The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation immediately notified the NRC, the FBI, and the New York State Police (NYSP).
Further, the licensee initiated an investigation of the e'vents concerning the inoperable condition of both EDG's.
Res onse to Incident The contingency measures instituted by the licensee to provide continued safe operation of the reactor in response to the event were confirmed in an NRC Immediate Action Letter (IAL 81-28) dated August 18, 1981 from the Director, NRC Region I (see Exhibit 7).
The contingency measures involved confirmation of operability and proper valve line-up of reactor systems important to safety, an accelerated surveillance test program, and increased security measures.
Contingency measure implementation was reviewed by the NRC Resident Inspector and was not a part of this investigation.
The Director, NRC Region I, ordered an investigation of the occurrence on August 18, 1981.
The NRC investigation began at the reactor site on August 18, 1981, upon the arrival of the investigation team members.
The New York State Police (NYSP) commenced an investigation on August
to determine if the case involved criminal mischief under New York State law.
On August 25 NYSP Investigator i,
- -"
';;notified the NRC that the NYSP investigation was closed and, based on available evidence, the NYSP concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that the fuel filter drain petcocks on the licensee's emergency diesel generators were opened in an effort to disable the nuclear facility or to cause damage or monetary loss to the licensee.
The licensee, NRC Region I, and NRC Headquarters made contacts with the FBI regarding this incident.
The FBI declined to become actively involved pending further demonstration of need by the NRC investigation.
No FBI investigation resulted.
Safet Si nificance The EDG's are installed to provide emergency power.
During the period from August 6 to August 18, 1981, there were no occasions when the EDG's were needed to supply power in response to an emergency.
Further, electrical power from two offsite sources was continuously available during this period.
- Deleted name of an individual interviewed as part of the investigatio ~ ~
~
~
In the event of a reactor accident (e.g.,
loss of coolant) coincident with the loss of both offsite power sources, the EDG's would not have been available to automatically respond to the emergency power needs.
Personnel action would have been required to detect the EDG problem and correct it.
Upon discovery on August 18, 1981, the inoperable condition of the EOG's was corrected within eleven minutes.
This facility has two emergency condensers installed in the reactor coolant system to provide core cooling, and during an accident these condensers could have been activated if neede ~ 1
~ I j
IV.
DETAILS A.
~Sco e
The investigation included interviews with licensee and contractor per-sonnel who had access to the EDG's.
The investigation also included inspections of the EDG locations and a review of pertinent records and documents maintained at the Nine Mile Point facility and at the NRC Region I office.
B.
Interviews 1.
Joint Inter view of 4
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On August 19, 1981, the NRC Investigators met with~...
- *
to inform them of the nature and scope of the NRC investigaiion which commenced on August 18.
Specific actions being taken by the licensee in response to the Immediate Action Letter (IAL No. 81-28),
dated August 18, 1981, from NRC Region I Director to the licensee concerning the incident under investigation were-discussed.
~ ",,
'rovided information concerning the sequence of events related to the incident, the nature and scope of the licensee's investigation of the incident, and the specific actions taken and planned by the licensee in response to the IAL.
.
",
also informed the NRC Investigators of the scope and status of the investigation being conducted by the New York State Police.
2.
Interview of..:+
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b NRC Investi ators D.
L.
Ca hton and R.
E.
She herd on Au ust
1981
) said that he entered the No.
102 emergency diesel generator (EDG)
room at about 8:30 a.m.
on August 18, 1981 to assist
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.',
a licensee engineer, and,.
+
,.'
licensee chemical radiation technician, in tracing a leak in the No.
102 EDG coolant system.
~
+ ~opened the drain pipe on the service water side of the heat exchanger and found that the sodium chromate coolant was leaking into the service water side of the heat exchanger. ',
said that he did not look at the drain petcock or the fuel sight glasses on that occasion.
They reported their findings to(
Q Station Shift Supervisor (SSS),
who then declared No.
102 EDG to be inoperable and who told'
- " Chief Shift Operator, to mark it out of service.
At approximately 10:00 a.m., while -+'
was making his rounds of the plant, outside the EDG rooms,-,
.
paged him on the intercom and asked him to check out the No.
103 EDG and to get it ready to start.
'
, then went to the No.
103 EDG Room and checked the oil level dip stick, the air pressure on the gauge, and set the EDG speed group to 65.
He said that he visually examined the No.
103 EDG and walked all around it to see if there
- Deleted name of an individual interviewed as part of the investigatio P I
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was anything unhooked which should be hooked up, but he did not look at the fuel sight glasses or the drain petcock on the fuel oil filter.,'
~said that he returned to the Control Room after checking out the No.
103 EDG and that he and I
. "
3 went to the Screen House to obtain a vibration test reading on the diesel cooling water pumps.
They arrived at the Screen House at approximately 10:30 a.m.
and when they left there, he told'
'>to go to the Control Room to start the No.
103 EDG and that he (,
~
.) would be stationed at the No.
103 generator.
!'
.
/said that he arrived at the No.
103 EDG Room about ten minutes after leaving the Screen House and he then established page telephone contact with., *
Q in the Control Room.
He told;
~'that the No.
103 EDG was ready to start..
~
3 said that he then walked over to the east side of the Nc.
103 EDG and looked at the control panel for a couple of minutes and he heard the air motor start and come up to speed but it wound right down and the diesel did not start.
He paid that he knows by the sound of the generator when it is ug to speed and that when it started coasting down, he walked over to the page telephone and called
- . ~
He said that when'"
+
>answered the page phone,(
~
f-glanced over his shoulder and saw a fluid spurting out of the west side of the generator.
He said that he did not know at that time where the fluid was coming from but he did note that it was splattering on the. raised catwalk which is situated alongside the generator, approximately two feet above floor level.
He said that he walked over to the No.
103 EDG and saw that the fluid was spurting from the fuel oil filter drain petcock which he then closed.
He said that the fluid coming from the drain petcock was not a
"powerful stream" but rather a pulsating flow which splattered on the catwalk and covered an area of about two feet in diameter..
He did not notice if any of the liquid leaked onto floor space under the catwalk but he said that the whole room smelled of diesel fuel.
He said that he returned to the page phone and asked(
~
s.what the problem was and.i e ~ told him that he ( ~+
) received an annunciation that No.
103 EDG was off normal.
+
0 said that he told',,' a+that they had a problem and he asked)
e
)to mend
~down to the No.
103 EDG Room.
He said that,,
+
Q and
~ Nuclear Operator C, arrived at the scene and they all proceeded~to look everything over.
One of the alarm lights on the No.
103 EDG instrument panel was activated and it indicated a "600 RPM lockout." '.
~'
said that he and 1-'" * 'j cleared the alarm and that he ('.
+
,) and ';,
='iped up the fuel that had splattered on the catwalk.
He said that...
I then calledf.,= ~ 3 op'Ithe-page phone, and asked him to try another startup of the No.
103 EDG.
When the EDG again failed to start in the same manner as the first, said that he thought that the whole fuel system might be empty, whereupon he turned the toggle switch which starts the emergency d.c. (direct current) fuel oil pump from the normal position to the emergency position.
When he did so, he saw fuel entering the fuel return line sight glass.
While the fuel was being added to the No.
103 fuel oil system,I
'
-, said that he decided to check the drain petcock and fuel oil system on the No.
102 EDG in the adjoining
- Deletedpname of an individual interviewed as part of the investigatio ~ ~
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room.
He found the fuel oil filter drain petcock open on the No.
102 EDG also and he said that it took about 2 to 2~ turns to close it, whereas he did not recall how many turns it took for him to close the drain petcock on the No.
103 EOG.
',
~~ immediately returned to the No.
103 EDG Room and he told'
g that he found the petcock open on the No.
102 EDG.
The No.
103 EDG had been started and was running at this time.
Both il
'
I then went into the No.
102 EOG Room and saw that the fuel filter sight glasses on that unit were also empty, whereupon'
)activated the No.
102 emergency d.c.
pump and replenished the fuel oil in the fuel system as was done with the No.
103 EDG. j then made observations of the No.
103 EDG and noted that the lubricating oil pressure was dropping.
After a discussion of that problem, they returned to the Control Room andf
.e jinformed,"
e
~'iSupervisor of Nuclear Security, of the problem related to the opened drain petcocks on the No.
102 and No.
103 EOGs.
Interview of
.
~*
'-."-":"..-">'--'b NRC Investi ator R. Keith Christo her
'Has interviewed on August 22, 1981.
He stated he recalled being in the No.
102 EOG Room on one occasion making a routine walk-through when he observed the fuel sight glasses on the No.
102
'DG to be empty. '~
+
- 'aid he was not specifically checking the fuel sight glasses at the time and had no knowledge as to their use or in what condition they were supposed to be.
He said after observing the No.
102 EDG fuel sight glasses to be empty he became curious and examined the fuel sight glasses on No.
103 EDG. '
.lsaid he observed they were also empty and he therefore assumed that they were supposed to be empty and made no further mention of it until the incident came to light.
(
~'>stated he observed the fuel sight glasses to be empty on August 10, 1981.
However, when this could not be verified by the NRC investigator's review of access history records, he was reinterviewed on August 24, 1981 at which time,.'+
surmised that he observed the fuel sight glasses to be empty on August 16, 1981 because he recalled that coolant had already been added to the No.
102 and No.
103 EDGs when he observed the sight glasses to be empty.
(Note:
The coolant'
) referred to was added to the generators on August 13 and 14, 1981.
(
L.
/
)
.,)
+
.-..'i stated he was positive that both the fuel sight glasses on each of the EDGs were empty.
d j concluded he observed no signs of a diesel fuel spill at the time nor did he observe anything that would indicate that the EDGs had been tampered with.
Interviews with Other Licensee Personnel The NRC investigators interviewed 83 licensee personnel.
The individuals who were interviewed included 36 plant personnel and
Deleted name of an individual interviewed as part of the investigation.
,~.-~'Deleted in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(d}(1).
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gu'ardsr ("
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Two licensee operations personnel
}.;declined to be interviewed by the NRC due to personal reasons unrelated to the investigation; no further action was judged to be necessary.
None of the licensee personnel who were interviewed provided information significant to the incident under investigation (other than that noted in this report).
The individuals are listed in Exhibit 8.
Interviews of Contractor personnel The NRC investigators interviewed 16 electrical contractor personnel employed by the L. K. Comstock Company, 13 of whom are recorded on the licensee's
.=
.
. '*
) on various dates during the period August 6-18, 1981.
None of these individuals provided information significant to the incident under investigation.
The individuals are listed in Exhibit 8.
C.
Emer enc Diesel Generators The investigation had the following findings with respect to the physical condition and operation of the EDG':
Last known operable condition of EOG's prior to incident Surveillance testing records document that on August 6, EDG's No.
102 and No.
103 were successfully surveillance tested (i.e.,
one hour's operation with electric load)., None of the interviewed personnel could positively state that they observed the fuel return sight glass on either EDG to be full between August 6 and August 18.
2.
3.
Earliest known inoperable condition of EDG's prior to incident
.i~ an auxiliary operator stated that he observed the fuel return sight glasses on EDG's No.
102 and No.
103 to be empty on August 16 (see paragraph IV.B.3 for interview).
This is
'a positive indication that the EDG's were in an inoperable condition at the time.
No interviewed personnel could positively state that they observed the EDG fuel return sight glass to be full or empty between August 6 and August 16.
Maintenance, testing, or operation of EDG's between August 6 and August
Review of maintenance records, surveillance test records, operating logs and personnel interviews did not reveal any occasions during which work was done to either EDG's filter or fuel systems or any occasions during which either EDG was automatically or manually operated.
Visual observation of the EDG's did not reveal any evidence of tampering or damage.
- Deleted name of an individual interviewed as part of the investigation.
- Deleted in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(d}(1}.
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4.
Evidence of drained fuel oil Opening of the petcock drain valve on the fuel filter results in the draining of approximately one and a half liters of diesel fuel oil.
The NRC investigators did not find any evidence of drained fuel oil on the areas beneath the EDG's or in any containers in the EOG rooms or adjacent rooms.
Interviews did not reveal any observations of any drained fuel prior. to the incident (the open petcock on EDG No.
103 fuel filter did spurt fuel during the incident, see paragraph IV.B.2).
Interviews did not reveal any possible reasons for draining the fuel or identify legitimate usages for the fuel after it was drained.
S.
Routine documentation of training concerning EOG fuel sight glasses
An empty FOG fuel return sight glass indicates an empty fuel supply line and an inoperable EDG.
Therefore, the checking, documentation of checking and training concerning the EDG sight glass were reviewed.
Auxiliary operators routinely toured the EOG rooms once per shift.
However, there was no written procedure, guidance or checklist for this tour.
The only documentation of the tour was a log entry that the tour was completed.
Auxiliary operators performing the tours were trained by experienced operators or their supervisors.
However, there was no indication (i.e., training plans, procedures, or documentation)
that the training routinely included the significance of the EOG fuel sight glasses or their expected conditions (see interview in paragraph IV.B.3 for a specific example).
D.
Securit S stem This section contains Safeguards Information, and is not for public disclosure.
It is intentionally left blan I/
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Access Control This page contains Safeguards Information, and is not for public disclosure, it is intentionally left blank
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This section contains Safeguards Information, and is not for public disclosure.
It is intentionally left blank..
E.
Review of Records The following licensee records were reviewed during the course of this investigation.
Chemistry records Control room SSS logs Diesel maintenance records Surveillance test records EOG operation and maintenance manual EOG fuel oil system piping diagrams Station Technical Specifications Surveillance and test procedures NMPNS Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
Station fuel oil storage and transfer diagrams NMPNS organization charts NMP licensee personnel lists NMP contractor personnel lists Station plan and elevation drawings Security procedures f
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Control room computer readout
- Deleted in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(d)(1).
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V.
STATUS OF INVESTIGATION Attempts to develop additional pertinent information have been unproductive.
In the absence of logical investigative leads, this investigation is CLOSED, In the event that information subsequently comes to the attention of the NRC regarding this matter, the case w> 11 be reopened and the results of the additional investigative effort reported in Supplemental reports bearing the same case control numbe IV EXHIBITS Exhibit 1 -
NMPNS, Unit 1 Technical Specifications (Sections 3.6.3 and 4.6.3)
Exhibit 2 -
Schematic Diagram of EDG Fuel System Exhibit 3
Side View of EDG No.
103
,Exhibit 4 EDG Fuel Filter Exhibit 5 EDG Fuel Filter Sight Glasses Exhibit 6 -
Senior Shift Supervisor (SSS)
Log - August 18, 1981 Exhibit 7 Exhibit 8 NRC Immediate Action Letter (IAL-81-28), August 18, 1981 Floor Plan of EDG Rooms Exhibit 9 -
Individuals Interviewed Exhibit 10
- Deleted in accordance with 10 CRR 2.790(d)(1).
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LIHITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.6.3 EHERGENCY POWER SOURCES A~ii blitt Applies to the operational status of the emergency power sources.
Objective:
To assure the capability of the emer-gency power sources to provide the power required for emergency equipment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
S ecification:
4.6.3 EHERGENCY PO!<ER SOURCES A
1 icabil it:
Applies to the periodic testing requirements for the emergency power sources.
-
~
Ob ective:
To assure the operability of the emergency power, sources to provide emergency power required in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
S ecification:
a ~
For al 1 reactor operating conditions except cold shutdown, there shall normally be available two 115 kv ex-ternal lines, two diesel generator power systems and two battery sys-tems, except as further specified in
"b " "c " "d " "e," and "h" below, b.
One 115 kv external line may be de-energized provided two diesel-gen-erator power systems are operable.
If a 115 kv external line is de-energized, that line shall be re-turned to service within 7 days.
The emergency power systems surveil'lance will be performed as indicated below.
In addition, components on which maintenance has been performed will be tested.
I a.
Durin each ma'or refuelin outa e-test for automatic startup and pickup of load required for a loss-of-coolant accident.
b.
No~nthl
- manual start and operation at rated load shall be performed for a minimum time of one hour.
Determine the specific gravity of ach cell.
De-termine the battery voltage.
,qqgNiCPL SPECIFICA~~ONS n ig 1~v
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ll
LIHITIHG CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREI"1EHT c ~
d.
One diesel-generator power system may be inoperable provided two 115 kv external lines are energized. If a diesel-generator power system be-comes inoperable, it shall be re-turned to an operable condition with-in seven days.
In addition, if a diesel-generator power system becomes
'noperable coincident with a 115 kv line de-energized, that diesel-gen-
. erator power; system shall be re-
- turned to an operable condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
If a reserve, power transformer be-comes inoperable, it shall be re-turned to service within seven days.
c.
~Meekl
- determine the cell voltage and speci fi c gravity of the pi 1 ot cells of each battery.
d.
Surveillance for startu with an in-
~b1 di 1-p i t
startup the operable diesel-gene. ator shall.
be tested for automatic startup and pickup of the load required for a loss-of-coolant accident.
e.
Surveillance for o eration with an
~ino erable diesel-enerator the operable diesel-generator shall be manually started and operated at rated load for a minimum time of one hou't immediately and once per week there-after.
e, For all reactor operating conditions except startup and cold shutdown, the following limiting conditions shall be in effect:
(1) One operable diesel-generator power system and one energized 115 kv external line shall be available.
If this condition is not met, normal orderly.shutdown will be initiated within one hour and the reactor will be in the cold shutdown condition with-in ten hours,
~P
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREt1ENT (2) If no 115 kv external line is available, both diesel-generator power systems shall be operable with one diesel-generator run-ning. If no 115 kv external.
line is available after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, normal orderly shutdown will be initiated within one hour and the reactor will be in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours.
f.
For all reactor operating conditions except cold shutdown, there shall be a minimum of two day's fuel supply onsite for one diesel-generator or normal orderly shutdown will be ini-tiated within one hour and the re-actor will be in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours.
g.
When operating with only one diesel-
'enerator, all emergency equipment aligned to the operable diesel-gen-
..erator shall have no inoperable components.
h. If a battery system becomes inoper-able that system shall. be returned to service within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> l~
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BASES 'FOR 3.6.3 AND 4.6.3 EMERGENCY POWER SOURCES Other than the Station turbine generator, the Station is supplied by four independent sources of a-c power; two 115 kv transmission lines, and two diesel-generators.
Any one of the required power sources will pro-vide the power required for the worst loss-of-coolant accident.
The required loads of 2500 kva and 2750 kva for the loss-of-coolant are calculated in detail in the First Supplement to the FSAR.
This loading is greater than that required during a Station shutdown condition.
The monthly test run paralleled with the system is based on the manufacturer's recommendation for these units in this type of service.
The testing during operating cycle will simulate the accident conditions under which operation of the diesel-generators is required.
A detailed tabulation of the equipment comprising the maximum diesel-generator load is given in the answer to guestion V-10 of the First Supplement to the FSAR.
As mentioned above, a single diesel-generator is capable of providing the required power to equipment fol-lowing a major accident.--
Two fuel oil storage tanks are provided with piping interties to permit supplying either diesel-generator..
A two-day supply will provide adequate time to arrange for fuel makeup if needed.
The full capacity of both tanks will hold a four-day supply.
It has been demonstrated in Appendix E-I.3.21* that even with complete d-c loss the reactor can be safely isolated and the emergency cooling system will be operative with makeup water to the emergency cooling sys-tem shells maintained manually.
Having at least one d-c battery available will permit: automatic makeup to the shells rather than manual, closing of the d-c actuated isolation valve on all lines from the primary system and the suppression chamber, maintenance of electrical switching functions in the Station and pro-viding emergency lighting and con>unications power.
A battery system shall have a minimum of 106 volts at the battery terminals to be considered operable.
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