IR 05000382/2006002

IR 05000382-06-002 on 01/01/2006 - 04/07/2006; Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3; Routine Intregrated Report

ML061250499
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	05/05/2006
From:	Graves D NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E
To:	Venable J Entergy Operations
References
IR-06-002
Download: ML061250499 (23)

Text

May 5, 2006

SUBJECT:

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2006002

Dear Mr. Venable:

On April 7, 2006, the NRC completed an inspection at your Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 11, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

David N. Graves, Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-382 License: NPF-38

Entergy Operations, Inc.

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Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 050000382/2006002 w/attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION IV==

Docket No.:

50-382 License No.:

NPF-38 Report No.:

05000382/2006002 Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location:

Hwy. 18 Killona, Louisiana Dates:

January 1 through April 7, 2006 Inspectors:

M. C. Hay, Senior Resident Inspector G. F. Larkin, Resident Inspector P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved By:

David N. Graves, Chief, Project Branch E ATTACHMENTS:

Supplemental Information

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR05000382/2006-002; 01/01/2006 - 04/07/2006; Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3; routine integrated report.

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and a regional senior emergency preparedness inspector. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status: The plant began the period on January 1, 2006, at 100 percent power and remained at 100 percent power until February 21, 2006, when power was reduced to 88 percent to support turbine valve testing activities. The plant was restored to 100 percent power the evening of February 21, 2006, and remained at that level for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Readiness For Seasonal Susceptibilities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors completed a review of the licensee's readiness of seasonal susceptibilities involving low seasonal temperatures and high winds. The inspectors:

(1) reviewed plant procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Technical Specifications to ensure that operator actions defined in adverse weather procedures maintained the readiness of essential systems;

(2) walked down portions of the three systems listed below to ensure that adverse weather protection features (heat tracing, space heaters and weatherized enclosures) were sufficient to support operability, including the ability to perform safe shutdown functions;

(3) evaluated operator staffing levels to ensure the licensee could maintain the readiness of essential systems required by plant procedures; and

(4) reviewed the corrective action program to determine if the licensee identified and corrected problems related to adverse weather conditions.

• February 10, 2006: emergency feedwater system, main steam system and the main feedwater system Documents reviewed by the inspectors included Operations Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather and Flooding, Revision 4-3, and design basis document W3-DBD-003, Emergency Feedwater System.

The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) walked down portions of the three below listed risk important systems and reviewed plant procedures and documents to verify that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned; and

(2) compared deficiencies identified during the walk down to the licensee's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and corrective action program to ensure problems were being identified and corrected.

• January 10, 2006, auxiliary component cooling water system, Train B

• January 31, 2006, auxiliary component cooling water system, Train A

• February 15, 2006, low pressure safety injection system, Train B Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed three samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown (71111.04s)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) reviewed plant procedures, drawings, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, and vendor manuals to determine the correct alignment of the 125 Volt DC system;

(2) reviewed outstanding design issues, operator work arounds, and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report documents to determine if open issues affected the functionality of the system; and

(3) verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment problems. Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed six fire protection inspection walkdowns of the below listed plant areas to assess the material condition of active and passive fire protection features and their operational lineup and readiness. The inspectors:

(1) verified that transient combustibles and hot work activities were controlled in accordance with plant procedures;

(2) observed the condition of fire detection devices to verify they remained functional;

(3) observed fire suppression systems to verify they remained functional and that access to manual actuators was unobstructed;

(4) verified that fire extinguishers and hose stations were provided at their designated locations and that they were in a satisfactory condition;

(5) verified that passive fire protection features (electrical raceway barriers, fire doors, fire dampers, steel fire proofing, penetration seals, and oil collection systems) were in a satisfactory material condition;

(6) verified that adequate compensatory measures were established for degraded or inoperable fire protection features and that the compensatory measures were commensurate with the significance of the deficiency; and

(7) reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to determine if the licensee identified and corrected fire protection problems.

• January 11, 2006, Fire Zone RAB 8B, 31, 32, 35, and the east side wet and dry cooling towers

• January 18, 2006, Fire Zone RAB 2 and 16

• February 7, 2006, Fire Zone RAB 2, 31, 37, and 39

• February 15, 2006, Fire Zone RAB 18, 19, 23, and cooling tower Trains A and B

• March 16, 2006, Fire Zone RAB 32, 36, 37, and 39

• March 27, 2006, Fire Zone RAB 2, 15, 21, and 23 Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed six samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

.1 Annual External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess seasonal susceptibilities involving external flooding;

(2) reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and corrective action program to determine if the licensee identified and corrected flooding problems;

(3) inspected underground bunkers/manholes to verify the adequacy of

(a) sump pumps,

(b) level alarm circuits, ©) cable splices subject to submergence, and

(d) drainage for bunkers/manholes;

(4) verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes; and

(5) walked down the one below listed area to verify the adequacy of:

(a) equipment seals located below the flood line,

(b) floor and wall penetration seals, ©) watertight door seals,

(d) common drain lines and sumps,

(e) sump pumps, level alarms, and control circuits, and

(f) temporary or removable flood barriers.

• February 27, 2006 through March 2, 2006 inspection of external flooding affecting the site ultimate heat sink consisting of the dry and wet cooling tower components Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

On January 23, 2006, the inspectors observed testing and training of senior reactor operators and reactor operators to identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the training, to assess operator performance, and to assess the evaluator's critique. The training scenario involved a steam generator tube rupture with a loss of off-site power, two dropped control element assemblies, failure of the reactor automatic trip system, and failure of a component cooling water pump to auto start.

The inspectors completed one sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two below listed maintenance rule scoped systems that have displayed performance problems to:

(1) verify the appropriate handling of structure, system, and component performance or condition problems;

(2) verify the appropriate handling of degraded structure, system, and component functional performance;

(3) evaluate the role of work practices and common cause problems; and

(4) evaluate the handling of structure, system, and component issues reviewed under the requirements of the maintenance rule, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, and the Technical Specifications.

• Essential Chill Water System

• Shutdown Cooling System Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment. The inspectors completed two samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

.1 Risk Assessment and Management of Risk

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the risk assessments associated with the four activities listed below to verify:

(1) performance of risk assessments when required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and licensee procedures prior to changes in plant configuration for maintenance activities and plant operations;

(2) the accuracy, adequacy, and completeness of the information considered in the risk assessment;

(3) that the licensee recognizes, and/or enters as applicable, the appropriate licensee-established risk category according to the risk assessment results and licensee procedures; and

(4) the licensee identified and corrected problems related to maintenance risk assessments.

• January 18, 2006, planned maintenance activities on emergency diesel generator, Train A

• February 2, 2006, planned maintenance activities on main steam Valve MS-319B resulting in the steam bypass control system being placed out of service

• February 24, 2006, planned maintenance activities involving control element assembly testing The inspectors completed three samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) verified that the licensee performed actions to minimize the probability of initiating events and maintained the functional capability of mitigating systems and barrier integrity systems;

(2) verified that emergent work-related activities such as troubleshooting, work planning/scheduling, establishing plant conditions, aligning equipment, tagging, temporary modifications, and equipment restoration did not place the plant in an unacceptable configuration; and

(3) reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to determine if the licensee identified and corrected risk assessment and emergent work control problems.

• January 21, 2006, emergent work activities on essential chiller, Train B

• March 30, 2006, emergent work activities on emergency diesel generator, Train B

• April 7, 2006, emergent maintenance activities involving repairs to motor control Center MCC 312A 5BR molded case circuit breaker Phase B load connection Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed three samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors:

(1) reviewed plant status documents such as operator shift logs, emergent work documentation, and standing orders to determine if an operability evaluation was warranted for degraded components;

(2) referred to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and design-basis documents to review the technical adequacy of licensee operability evaluations;

(3) evaluated compensatory measures associated with operability evaluations;

(4) determined degraded component impact on any Technical Specifications;

(5) used the Significance Determination Process to evaluate the risk significance of degraded or inoperable equipment; and

(6) verified that the licensee has identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated with degraded components.

• Operability evaluation addressing potential common mode degradation affecting several solenoid operated valves as described in Condition Report 2006-0058

• Operability evaluation addressing a degraded pulsation dampener supporting Charging Pump B as described in Condition Report 2006-0211

• Operability evaluation addressing extensive corrosion affecting the enclosure and internal supports of motor control Center MCC 315A as described in Condition Report 2006-0675

• Operability evaluation addressing the seismic qualifications of the containment sump weir level transmitter as described in Condition Report 2006-0703

• Operability evaluation addressing a degraded control air system affecting emergency diesel generator, Train B, as described in Condition Reports 2006-0877 and 2006-0894 The inspectors completed five samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the five below listed postmaintenance test activities of risk significant systems or components. For each item, the inspectors:

(1) reviewed the applicable licensing basis and/or design-basis documents to determine the safety functions;

(2) evaluated the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity; and

(3) reviewed the test procedure to ensure it adequately tested the safety function that may have been affected. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that acceptance criteria were met, plant impacts were evaluated, test equipment was calibrated, procedures were followed, jumpers were properly controlled, the test data results were complete and accurate, the test equipment was removed, the system was properly realigned, and deficiencies during testing were documented. The inspectors also reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to determine if the licensee identified and corrected problems related to postmaintenance testing.

• January 17, 2006, planned maintenance for Battery Charger 2A

• January 17, 2006, planned maintenance on Valve, SI-410A

• January 30, 2006, planned maintenance on Valve FP-601B

• February 09, 2006, emergent maintenance for Valve NG-911

• February 28, 2006, emergent maintenance for Valve, SI-6011 Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed five samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, procedure requirements, and Technical Specifications to ensure that the six below listed surveillance activities demonstrated that the structures, systems, and components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed test data to verify that the following significant surveillance test attributes were adequate:

(1) preconditioning;

(2) evaluation of testing impact on the plant;

(3) acceptance criteria;

(4) test equipment;

(5) procedures;

(6) jumper/lifted lead controls;

(7) test data;

(8) testing frequency and method demonstrated Technical Specification operability;

(9) test equipment removal;

(10) restoration of plant systems;

(11) fulfillment of ASME Code requirements;

(12) updating of performance indicator data;

(13) engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested structures, systems, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct;

(14) reference setting data; and

(15) annunciators and alarms setpoints. The inspectors also verified that the licensee identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.

• November 28, 2005, Surveillance Procedure 903-120, Containment and Miscellaneous Systems Quarterly IST Valve Tests, Revision 6. This surveillance verified the ability of containment isolation Valves BM-109, BM-110 GWM 104 and GWM-105 to adequately stroke closed.

• January 11, 2006, Surveillance Procedure OP-903-050, Component Cooling Water and Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump Operability Test, Revision 17-3. This inservice test verified operability of the component cooling water system Pump A.

• January 21, 2006, Surveillance Procedure OP-903-107, Plant Protection System Channel A & B & C & D Functional Test, Revision 15-4. This surveillance verified functionality of the plant protection system, Channel D.

• January 30, 2006, Surveillance Procedure OP-903-046, Emergency Feedwater Pump Operability Check, Revision 15. This inservice test verified operability of the emergency feedwater Pump B.

• April 2, 2006, Surveillance Procedure OP-903-024, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance, Revision 14. This surveillance determined the quantity of identified and unidentified leakage from the reactor coolant system during plant steady state operations.

• May 25, 2005, Surveillance Procedure STA-001-005, Leakage Testing of Air and Nitrogen Accumulators for Safety Related Valves, Revision 7. This surveillance verified the pressure boundary integrity of the Maintenance Hatch Seal System.

Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed six samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed in-office reviews of Revision 32 to the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan, and Revision 20-3 of Procedure EPP-001-001, Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions, both received February 6, 2006. These revisions:

• Added emergency action levels, revised the definitions of emergency classifications, and added definitions as described in NRC Bulletin 2005-002, Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events

• Described provisions for members of the public temporarily residing in the owner controlled area

• Described additional capabilities added to the Remote Shutdown Panel Room

• Corrected the described range of an instrument These revisions were compared to their previous revisions, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, to NRC Bulletin 2005-002, and to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 50.54(q) to determine if the licensee adequately implemented 10 CFR 50.54(q). These reviews were not documented in Safety Evaluation Reports and do not constitute approval of licensee changes, therefore these changes are subject to future inspection in their entirety. The inspector completed 2 samples during this inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the three performance indicators listed below for the period April 2004 through December 2005. The definitions and guidance of Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 2, were used to verify the licensees basis for reporting each data element in order to verify the accuracy of performance indicator data reported during the assessment period. The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports, monthly operating reports, and operating logs as part of the assessment. Licensee performance indicator data were also reviewed against the requirements of procedure EN-LI-114, Performance Indicator Process, Revision 0.

C Unplanned Scrams Per 7,000 Critical Hours C

Scrams With Loss Of Normal Heat Removal C

Unplanned Power Changes Per 7,000 Critical Hours

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This assessment was accomplished by reviewing condition reports and attending corrective action review and work control meetings. The inspectors:

(1) verified that equipment, human performance, and program issues were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and that the issues were entered into the corrective action program;

(2) verified that corrective actions were commensurate with the significance of the issue; and

(3) identified conditions that might warrant additional followup through other baseline inspection procedures.

.2 Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection

In addition to the routine review, the inspectors selected the below listed issue for a more in-depth review. The inspectors considered the following during the review of the licensee's actions:

(1) complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner;

(2) evaluation and disposition of operability/reportability issues;

(3) consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;

(4) classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem;

(5) identification of root and contributing causes of the problem;

(6) identification of corrective actions; and

(7) completion of corrective actions in a timely manner.

C On May 8, 2004, design changes in the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems were not incorporated into the control room dose analysis, Condition Report CR-2004-01403 Documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors completed one sample.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 On March 14, 2006, the inspector conducted a telephonic exit meeting to present the

emergency preparedness review inspection results to Mr. J. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Preparedness. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

.2 On April 11, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to

Mr. J. Venable, Vice President Operations, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Anders, Superintendent, Plant Security

C. Fugate, Assistant Manager, Operations (Shift)

T. Gaudet, Director, Planning and Scheduling

J. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

R. Murillo, Senior Staff Engineer, Licensing

R. Osborne, Manager, Programs and Components

G. Scott, Licensing Engineer

J. Venable, Vice President, Operations

K. Walsh, General Manager, Plant Operations

B. Williams, Director, Engineering