IR 05000382/2003005
| ML031980155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/2003 |
| From: | William Jones NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E |
| To: | Venable J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-03-005 | |
| Download: ML031980155 (23) | |
Text
uly 16, 2003
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-382/2003-05
Dear Mr. Venable:
On June 21, 2003, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on June 30, 2003, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection no findings of significance were identified.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, NRC has issued five Orders and several threat advisories to licensees of commercial power reactors to strengthen licensee capabilities, improve security force readiness, and enhance controls over access authorization. In addition to applicable baseline inspections, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/148, Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Interim Compensatory Measures, and its subsequent revision, to audit and inspect licensee implementation of the interim compensatory measures required by order. Phase 1 of TI 2515/148 was completed at all commercial nuclear power plants during Calendar Year 2002, and the remaining inspection activities at Waterford 3 were completed in June 2003. The NRC will continue to monitor overall safeguards and security controls at Waterford 3.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure(s), and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
William B. Jones, Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-382 License: NPF-38
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 50-382/2003-05 w/attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION IV==
Docket: 50-382 License: NPF-38 Report : 50-382/2003-05 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location: Hwy. 18 Killona, Louisiana Dates: March 23 through June 21, 2003 Inspectors: M. C. Hay, Senior Resident Inspector G. F. Larkin, Resident Inspector G. A. Pick, Senior Physical Security Inspector R. E. Lantz, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector H. F. Bundy, Senior Operations Engineer Approved By: W. B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000382/2003-005; 3/23/2003 - 6/21/2003; Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a senior emergency preparedness inspector, a senior operations inspector, and a senior physical security inspector.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status: The plant began the period at full Rated Thermal Power and operated at full power for the entire report period, except for a planned reduction to approximately 90 percent power on June 7, 2003, for turbine valve testing. The unit returned to 100 percent power on June 8,
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Since thunderstorms with the potential for localized flooding were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for April 18, 2003, the inspectors completed inspection and area walkdowns to verify that Entergy Operations had made appropriate seasonal preparations to protect the following areas inside and outside the plant:
- Electrical distribution switchyard, including main, auxiliary, and startup transformers
- Wet and dry cooling tower (ultimate heat sink)
- Main turbine generator These areas were selected because their functions could be affected by adverse weather. The inspectors also reviewed Operating Procedure OP-901-521, Severe Weather and Flooding, Revision 3, and the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignments
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdowns The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during this inspection period.
On April 4, 2003, the inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the mechanical and electrical components of a critical portion of auxiliary component cooling water system Train A. This walkdown was completed during scheduled maintenance that rendered Train B inoperable. System configuration was assessed using Operating Procedure OP-002-001, "Auxiliary Component Cooling Water," Revision 9, as well as applicable sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
On April 14, 2003, the inspectors completed a partial equipment alignment inspection of the 125V dc electrical distribution system Train A. System configuration was assessed using Operating Procedure OP-006-003, "125 Volt D.C. Electrical Distribution,"
Revision 9, as well as applicable chapters of the Final Safety Analysis Report. A walkdown of accessible portions of the system was performed to assess material condition, such as system leaks and housekeeping issues, that could adversely affect system operability.
On April 24, 2003, the inspectors completed a partial equipment alignment inspection of containment cooling system Train A. A review of select maintenance work orders and corrective action documents was performed to assess the material condition and performance of containment cooling system Train A. System configuration was assessed using Operating Procedure OP-008-003, "Containment Cooling System,"
Revision 6, as well as applicable chapters of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete equipment alignment inspection of the essential service chilled water system. A review of selected maintenance work orders and corrective action documents was performed to assess the material condition and performance of the essential service chilled water system. The system configuration was assessed using Operating Procedure OP-002-004, "Chilled Water System," Revision 12. A walkdown of accessible portions of the system was performed to assess material condition, such as system leaks and housekeeping issues, that could adversely affect system operability. The inspectors noted scaffolding erected in the vicinity of the essential chillers and reviewed Procedure PMC-002-006, Erecting Scaffold, along with Scaffold Request Number 12-29729. The inspection also consisted of verifying that the system was installed, maintained, and tested as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed six routine fire protection inspections and observed one unannounced fire drill.
Routine Fire Protection Inspections The inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the six areas described below to assess Entergy Operations control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed Procedure UNT-005-013, Fire Protection Program, Revision 8, and applicable sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
- Fire Zone RAB 33, 35, 36, and 39 on March 20, 2003
- Fire Zone CTB and CTA on April 9, 2003
- Fire Zone RAB 8A, 8B, 11, 12, and 13 on April 11, 2003
- Fire Zone RAB 32 on April 15, 2003
- Fire Zone RAB 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 23 on June 3, 2003
- Fire Zone RAB 2, 15A, and 16A on June 12, 2003 Routine Fire Drill Inspection The inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill performed on April 17, 2003. The simulated fire was located in Main Transformer A. The inspectors assessed the fire brigades performance in the following areas:
- Appropriate clothing donned in a timely manner
- Self-contained breathing apparatus properly worn and used
- Effective command and control provided by the fire brigade leader The inspectors also reviewed Entergy Operations fire drill critique to verify that areas for improvement were properly identified and all the scenario objectives were met.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a semiannual inspection of internal flood protection features.
Charging pump Room A, safeguard pump Room B, and component cooling pump Room AB were selected based on the severity of postulated room flood rates from inadvertent fire protection system sprinkler actuation, high and medium energy line break flooding calculations, and risk significance of losing the safety-related equipment in the affected areas. The inspection included a review of the Final Safety Analysis Report, selected design calculations, and a walkdown of flood protection features in the selected areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
On June 12, 2003, the inspectors completed a review of heat exchanger performance documentation for the essential Chiller A/B condenser and evaporator. The inspection focused on identifying potential heat exchanger deficiencies which could mask a degraded condition from being captured. The inspection included a review of Work Order 2475 that performed cooler tube cleaning and eddy current testing on April 30, 2003. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed applicable sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report and Engineering Calculation EC-M91-064, "Performance of Essential Water Chillers with Plugged Tubes," Revision 0.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On May 6, 2003, the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training. The simulator training evaluated the operators ability to recognize, diagnose, and respond to a plant transient involving a dropped control element assembly, a turbine and reactor trip, and a main steam line break in containment. The inspectors observed and evaluated the following areas:
- Understanding and interpreting annunciator and alarm signals
- Diagnosing events and conditions based on signals or readings
- Understanding plant systems
- Use and adherence of Technical Specifications
- Crew communications
- The crew's and evaluator's critiques
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed Entergy Operations implementation of the Maintenance Rule for the three systems listed below. The inspectors considered the characterization, safety significance, performance criteria, and the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions. The inspectors assessed Entergy Operations implementation of the Maintenance Rule to the requirements outlined in 10 CFR 50.65 and Regulatory Guide 1.160, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2.
- 125 Volt DC System
- Essential chillwater system Train A
- Essential chillwater system Train B
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the four risk assessments listed below for planned or emergent maintenance activities to determine if Entergy Operations met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for assessing and managing any increase in risk from these activities.
- From April 12-17, 2003, emergency diesel Generator A was declared inoperable for planned maintenance activities.
- On April 18, 2003, essential Chiller A was declared inoperable and required emergent repairs.
- On April 23, 2003, core protection Calculator D was declared inoperable and required emergent repairs.
- On May 4, 2003, essential Chiller A/B was declared inoperable and required emergent repairs.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations Entergy Operations had generated that warranted selection on the basis of risk insights. The selected samples are addressed in the condition reports listed below. The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures, if needed, and compliance with the Technical Specifications. The inspectors review included a verification that operability determinations were made as specified by Procedures W4.101, Operability Confirmation Process, Revision 3, and LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 2. The technical adequacy of the evaluations was reviewed and compared to the Technical Specifications, Final Safety Analysis Report, and associated design basis calculations.
- Operability evaluation addressing back leakage from the auxiliary component cooling water jockey Pump A discharge check valve (Condition Report 2003-00940)
- Operability evaluation addressing reduced flow through containment fan cooling system Train A (Condition Report 2003-00827)
- Operability evaluation addressing elevated noise and temperature condition associated with switchgear ventilation system Valve SVS-201B (Condition Report 2003-00828)
- Evaluation addressing operability of emergency diesel generating system Train A following repetitive thermal overload trips of Air Compressor A1 (Condition Report 2003-00964)
- Operability evaluation addressing constant rising of containment pressure due to unidentified gas leakage into containment (Condition Report 2003-00906)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a permanent plant modification of the low-pressure safety injection system to ensure that the modification did not adversely affect system operability or design requirements specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications. The modification was installed to automatically vent gas from the low-pressure safety injection system at Valve SI-1402A that has been creating undesirable voids. The inspectors reviewed the following documentation during this inspection activity:
- Engineering Request W3-2002-0352-002, SI-1402A Automatic Vent Assembly, Revision 0
- Waterford 3 Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 6.3, Emergency Core Cooling System
- Drawing G1114, Shutdown Cooling Flowpath Through LPSI, Revision 3
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the six postmaintenance tests listed below to verify system operability and functional capabilities. The inspectors considered whether testing met design and licensing bases, Technical Specifications, and Entergy Operations procedural requirements.
- Essential Chiller A following forced outage to correct a loose electrical connection on April 19, 2003
- Component cooling water Valve CC-835B following replacement of its air regulator on April 4, 2003
- Reinstallation of reactor trip circuit Breaker 4 after failure of a replacement reactor trip circuit breaker to satisfactorily trip on March 28, 2003
- Essential Chiller A/B following a planned maintenance outage on May 3, 2003
- Component cooling water Valve CC-835A following air regulator adjustments on October 23, 2002
- Shield building ventilation Train B emergency filtration heater following heater element replacement after a failed surveillance test on May 22, 2003
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed or reviewed six surveillance tests listed below to ensure the systems were capable of performing their safety function and to assess their operational readiness. Specifically, the inspectors considered whether the following surveillance tests met Technical Specifications, the Final Safety Analysis Report, and Entergy Operations procedural requirements:
- Surveillance Procedure ME-003-230, Battery Service Test, Revision 13, performed on March 26, 2002. This surveillance tested the capacity of the 125V dc battery system Train A to adequately supply and maintain all actual or simulated emergency loads for its design duty cycle.
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-037, Containment Cooing Fan Operability Verification, Revision 4, performed on October 11, 2002, and April 2, 2003.
This procedure verifies the operability of each train of containment fan coolers.
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-046, Emergency Feedwater Pump Oberability Check, Revision 15, performed on April 3, 2003. This surveillance tested the functional capability of the turbine-driven emergency feedwater system Pump AB.
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification, Revision 13, performed on April 14, 2003. This surveillance tested the functional capability of motor-driven low-pressure safety injection system Pump A.
- Procedure NOECP-253, ASME Section XI Pressure Testing, Revision 4, performed on April 15, 2002. This visual Level 2 test examined the reactor vessel pressure retaining boundary for system leakage. This surveillance was performed following reactor vessel refueling at normal operating pressures.
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-007, Turbine Inlet Valve Cycling Test, Revision 9, performed on June 7, 2003. This surveillance tested the functional capability of the turbine generator overspeed protection system.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two temporary plant modifications during the inspection period associated with the emergency diesel generating system. These modifications were reviewed based on risk insights associated with this safety system.
The inspectors reviewed a temporary plant modification of emergency diesel Generator B to ensure that the modification did not adversely affect system operability or design specifications. The modification consisted of installing a new type of electrical cabinet air filter as a corrective action to prevent oil intrusion from adversely affecting the diesel generator electrical components. The source of the oil was a leak through the diesel end-housing shaft felt seal (see NRC Inspection Report 50-382/02-05 for details).
The inspectors reviewed the following documentation during this inspection activity:
- ER-W3-2003-0105-000
- CR-W3-02-2043
- Cooper-Bessemer Vendor Technical Manual 457001225 The inspectors also reviewed a temporary plant modification of the 4160 Volt distribution system that aligned temporary emergency diesel generators to support the safety-related electrical switchgear during planned maintenance outages on the permanently installed diesel generators. A review of Technical Specifications, the Final Safety Anlaysis Report, and the documentation listed below was performed to verify that the modification did not adversely affect system operability or design specifications.
- Administrative Procedure ME-001-012, Temporary Power From Temporary Diesel For 3A2 and 3B2 Buses, Revision 0
- Operations Procedure OP-TEM-008, Emergency Diesel Generator A(B) Backup Temporary Diesel Generator(s), Revision 0
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP1 Exercise Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the 2003 biennial emergency plan exercise to determine if the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the emergency plan. The scenario simulated a train derailment in the owner-controlled area, a tornado which damaged plant equipment, a complete loss of offsite and emergency onsite electrical power, a large reactor coolant system leak, subsequent loss of containment integrity, and a release of radioactive materials to the environment.
The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk-significant activities of classification, notification, protective action recommendations, and offsite dose consequences in the simulator and in the following dedicated emergency response facilities:
- Operations Support Center
- Emergency Operations Facility The inspectors also assessed personnel recognition of abnormal plant conditions, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, protection of emergency workers, emergency repair capabilities, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan.
The inspectors attended the May 21, 2003, postexercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the initial Entergys self-assessment of exercise performance. The inspectors also attended the May 23, 2003, presentation of the exercise evaluation results to plant management.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an onsite review of the Waterford Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Revision 29, against its previous revision and 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the revision decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan. This change implemented changes previously approved by the NRC in a Safety Evaluation Report dated December 23, 2002 (ADAMS accession Number ML023570329). In addition to several administrative changes, the Safety Evaluation Report approved increases in the required response time goals with a commensurate increase in the minimum onshift staffing for the emergency response facilities. Revision 29 also changed the reporting authority for the Security Superintendent from the Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator to the Operational Support Center Supervisor.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario and observed activities in the simulated control room, the emergency operations facility, the technical support center, and the operations support center. The drill scenario simulated equipment failures, a site evacuation, a failure of the reactor to automatically trip, and the release of radioactive material offsite.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the drill critiques and the resolution of identified performance problems. The drill was conducted on April 24, 2003.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
SAFEGUARDS
Cornerstone: Physical Protection (PP)
3PP4 Security Plan Changes (71130.04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted an in-office review of Security Training and Qualification Plan, Revision 6, Change 5, dated October 18, 2000, to determine whether the change decreased the effectiveness of the Plan and to determine if requirements of 10 CFR 50.54
- (p) were met. This change implemented National Rifle Association courses of fire and targets to accommodate the revised weapons being used when the protective strategy changed in March 2000.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Initiating Events and Barrier Integrity Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed data for the mitigating systems cornerstone performance indicators from the first quarter of 2002 through the first quarter of 2003. This data was reviewed to verify accuracy of the Entergy Operations reported data, using the requirements of NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2. The following performance indicators were reviewed:
- Safety System Unavailability (SSU)-High Pressure Injection System
- Safety System Unavailability (SSU)-Heat Removal System
- Safety System Unavailability (SSU)-Residual Heat Removal System
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled Entergy Operations submittals for the performance indicators listed below for the period from July 1, 2002, through March 31, 2003. Performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.
- Drill and Exercise Performance
- Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation
- Alert and Notification System The inspectors reviewed a sampling of drill and exercise scenarios, licensed operator simulator training sessions, notification forms, and attendance and critique records associated with training sessions, drills, and exercises conducted during the verification period. The inspectors reviewed selected emergency responder qualification, training, and drill participation records. The inspectors reviewed siren test and maintenance records and procedures. The inspectors also interviewed Entergy Operations personnel responsible for collecting and evaluating the performance indicator data.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
1. Essential Chillers
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Entergy Operations corrective actions associated with multiple failures of essential chillers that occurred between April 18, and May 4, 2003. The inspectors reviewed Condition Reports CR-WF3-2003-01026, -01141, and -01177 to verify the full extent of the issues were identified, appropriate evaluations were performed, and corrective actions were specified and prioritized. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the corrective and preventive maintenance history on the associated essential chillers to ensure that maintenance activities were accomplished in accordance with vendor recommendations, design specifications, and corrective action documentation. The inspectors also verified that previous corrective actions addressing chiller performance deficiencies did not contribute to the recent chiller failures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a summary of corrective action documents assigned to the emergency planning department from January 2002 through May 2003. The inspectors reviewed the reports against the requirements of Entergy Operations corrective action program as delineated in LI-102, Corrective Action Process, Revision 2. The inspectors also reviewed site drill and exercise reports from July 2002 through March 2003 to identify areas where significant drill performance weaknesses were previously identified. The results of this review were used to identify previous drill performance deficiencies that were required to be corrected by 10 CFR 50.54(b)(14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F.2.g.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cross-References to Problem Identification and Resolution Findings Documented Elsewhere None.
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-382/2002-002-00: Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers
Rendered Inoperable During Response Time Testing On February 4, 2002, Entergy Operations identified that an inadequate procedure was used to perform response time testing on reactor trip circuit breakers. This procedure required the installation of jumpers that bypassed the undervoltage trip actuation function for all eight reactor trip circuit breakers simultaneously. This action caused all four reactor trip circuit breaker channels to be inoperable beyond the allowed outage time of Technical Specification 3.0.3. The reactor trip circuit breakers could have still performed their function via the shunt trip device if required by a valid actuation signal. This finding constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Entergy Operations documented this problem in their corrective action process as Condition Report CR-WF3-2002-00200. No new findings were identified in the inspectors review.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
The security inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Scott Anders, Security Superintendent, during a telephonic exit on April 3, 2003.
The emergency preparedness inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. J. R. Douet and other members of Entergy Operations staff on May 23, 2003.
The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Joseph Venable, Vice President Operations, and other members of Entergy Operations staff at the conclusion of the inspection on June 30, 2003.
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations
None ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- S. Anders, Superintendent, Plant Security
- J. R. Douet, General Manager, Plant Operations
- C. Fugate, Assistant Manager, Operations
- T. Gaudet, Director, Planning and Scheduling
- B. Houston, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
- C. Lambert, Director, Engineering
- J. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Planning
- R. Osborne, Manager, System Engineering
- R. Perry, Emergency Planner
- K. Peters, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance/Emergency Preparedness
- O. Pipkins, Senior Engineer, Licensing
- J. A. Ridgel, Manager, Maintenance
- G. Sen, Manager, Licensing
- G. Scott, Engineer, Licensing
- T. E. Tankersley, Manager, Training
- J. Venable, Vice President, Operations
- K. T. Walsh, Manager, Operations
ITEMS CLOSED
Closed
50-382/2002-002 LER Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers Rendered Inoperable During
Response Time Testing (Section 4OA3)